Marine Pilot Fatigue Management

Proposal for the Management of

Work-Related Fatigue in Marine Port Pilots.

Submission to House of representatives Standing Committee

on Communications, Transport and the Arts.

Captain Rob Lovell. BA, MNI.

4 Pullen Ct
Kirwan, Qld 4817
Email: hazewind@bigpond.com

submission21.doc Lovell 05/07/1999

1. INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................................1

2. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF A PILOTAGE SERVICE? ............................................................................2

3. SAFETY LEGISLATION................................................................................................................................2
3.1. AVIATION LEGISLATION..............................................................................................................................2
3.2. ROAD TRANSPORT LEGISLATION (QLD) ......................................................................................................3
3.3. MARINE LEGISLATION ................................................................................................................................3
3.4. STCW 95 ...............................................................................................................................................3
4. HUMAN FACTORS STUDIES OF MARINE PILOTAGE..............................................................................4
4.1. PAST STUDIES..........................................................................................................................................4
4.2. STRESS/FATIGUE......................................................................................................................................4
4.3. HEARTBEAT INDICATORS OF TASK STRESS LEVELS .....................................................................................4
4.4. ADRENALINE LEVELS.................................................................................................................................5
4.5. COMPARISON BETWEEN MARINE PILOTAGE AND AVIATION PILOTAGE ...........................................................5
4.6. SICK LEAVE ..............................................................................................................................................6
5. CURRENT STUDIES INTO FATIGUE ..........................................................................................................6
5.1. OFFSHORE INDUSTRY IN AUSTRALIA AND OVERSEAS ...................................................................................6
5.2. COMPARISONS BETWEEN ALCOHOL INTOXICATION AND FATIGUE ..................................................................6
5.3. RISK-CONTROL MODEL FOR FATIGUE .........................................................................................................7
5.4. RELIABILITY OF RESEARCH RESULTS .........................................................................................................7
6. RESPONSIBILITY.........................................................................................................................................7
6.1. WORKPLACE HEALTH & SAFETY REQUIREMENTS ........................................................................................7
6.2. DUTY OF CARE .........................................................................................................................................7
7. DESIGNING A MARINE FMP - .....................................................................................................................8
7.1. INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS ...........................................................................................................................8
7.2. OTHER ISSUES .........................................................................................................................................9
7.2.1. Management of Pilot Resource .....................................................................................................9
7.2.2. Drugs Alcohol ................................................................................................................................9
7.2.3. Pilot Error versus Pilot Overload .................................................................................................10
7.2.4. Fatigue Related Marine Incidents in Marine Parks .....................................................................10
8. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................................................10

9. RECOMMENDATIONS ...............................................................................................................................11

10. PROPOSED MARINE PILOT’S FMP .....................................................................................................12

submission21.doc Lovell 05/07/1999

 1

1. Introduction
The life of Shipmaster has been described as hours of boredom punctuated by moments of terror.
To most foreign going shipmasters the arrival at port limits heralds a stressful time. They usually
possess limited shiphandling experience, tend to define a close quarters situation as one where
their ship will pass within two nautical miles of another, and regard a safe course as one where
their track is at least three miles from the salient points of land.

Their ship will be entering an area of high traffic density and navigating in narrow channels where
the banks might be less than 30 metres away, or passing other ships within 60 metres while
encountering unfamiliar cross currents, tides and shoals. The master will be attempting to
communicate in a foreign language with port officials. He will be assigned tugs, the performance
and capabilities of which he might have little knowledge. These tugs will be assisting to berth his
ship at a berth, in a port he might never before have seen. The knowledge that by far the majority
of all marine incidents occur within harbour limits or the approaches to a port will be carrion
comfort.

These are the moments of terror.

The Marine Port Pilot earns his living working solely within these moments of terror. With a
specialised knowledge of local conditions and a high level of shiphandling experience, the pilot
provides a unique competence to head the Bridge Navigation Team while conducting the
navigation of the ship through the jurisdiction of the pilotage area.

Operating at very high levels of concentration combined with a heavy workload can result in high
levels of fatigue. Fatigue was identified as a contributing factor in the world’s worst maritime
environmental disaster - the Exxon Valdez. Fatigue was also identified as a major factor leading
to the grounding of the Peacock on Pipers Reef in the Great Barrier Reef. The International
Maritime Organisation has recommended minimum rest periods for watchkeepersi, whether they
are operating within the confines of a port or not.

Recognising fatigue as a safety issue, other transport authorities have introduced mandatory
fatigue management plans (FMP)ii. Queensland Transport has identified fatigue as a significant
contributing factor to motor vehicle accidents on the open roads. “...operators are required to
schedule practices which do not expect an employee to drive unreasonable distances... without
adequate rest periods.”iii

The Commonwealth of Australia’s Civil Aviation Authority through Civil Aviation Orders specifically
prohibit either operators requiring them to fly, or their pilots and flight crew members flying, if they
are suffering from fatigue, or are likely to become fatigued, if this would impair their judgement.iv

Several questions arise.

1. If it is unsafe to drive a truck when fatigued, and it is unsafe to fly an aeroplane when one is
fatigued, and it is unsafe to be in charge of a navigational watch in open sea when one is
fatigued, is it safe for a marine pilot to have the conduct of the navigation of a ship while
fatigued?
2. Is it reasonable for a master to expect that the pilot assigned to his/her ship is adequately
rested prior to commencing pilotage duties.
3. Is there evidence that allows comparison between the stress levels of an airline pilot and a
marine pilot, and hence comparable rest period indicators?
4. Does a pilot, who pilots a ship without having had adequate rest, cause the ship to be operated
unsafely?
5. What about the service provider? Does the port authority, pilot company, or transport
department, if the transport department is the service provider, have a responsibility to ensure
they have sufficient adequately rested pilots to meet traffic demands?
6. Is there a duty of care required of the regulatory authority responsible for setting standards?

The draft AAPMA paper on pilotage standards requires that pilots should be adequately rested at
the commencement of their roster period.v What is an adequate rest period prior to commencing

submission21.doc Lovell 17 June 1999 4:49 PM

 2

pilotage duties? It is important to differentiate between work related fatigue and general fatigue
brought about by lifestyle. The employer cannot control the latter but has a significant
responsibility to intervene in the control of the former.

This paper will address these issues, attempt to provide some answers to these questions and
make some recommendations based on existing research into these issues.

2. What is the purpose of a Pilotage Service?

The goal of any pilotage service should be that ships move through the port as quickly as is safely
possible. It is about the protection of the environment, safety of life, and protection of the port
infrastructure. It is about risk management.

A pilotage service is essentially a safety service of which efficiency is a major part. An

experienced pilot will bring an arriving ship safely to its berth in a far shorter time than an
inexperienced master with little knowledge of the port and its procedures could possibly do. With
running costs of modern ships within port limits in the order of $3000 to $4000 per hour, a saving
of just one hour in turnaround time more than pays the pilots’ wages. This is just one example of
how a safety service can provide substantial financial benefits.

3. Safety Legislation
Legislation addressing the question of fatigue for road and aviation transport industries has been
enacted. Their requirements are summarised as follows:

3.1. Aviation Legislationvi

In addition to being quite specific about acceptable hours, it is a requirement that “a flight crew
member shall not fly, and an operator shall not require that person to fly if either the flight crew
member is suffering from, or, considering the circumstances of the particular flight to be
undertaken, is likely to suffer from, fatigue or illness which may affect judgement or performance to
vii
the extent that safety may be impaired.”

The limitations on hours are reduced where pilots are not flying solo.

There are some similarities between marine pilotage and aviation pilotage. Both transport modes
operate in a fluid medium, both are similarly affected by cross winds/currents. That is where the
similarities end. The aircraft has the benefit of 3 dimensions to avoid dangers, there is only one
way traffic, they always “stem” the tide, no other “ships” are moving when they land or take off,
they do not lose steerage when they brake, they can always stop within half the distance of the
runway, when things go wrong, they can get out of trouble by going full ahead and holding their
course, and they do not use smaller aircraft to push them sideways on to solid objects before they
come to rest on the apron.

It is useful to examine the limitations where there are not more than two pilots, since this closely
resembles the Master/Marine pilot situation.

• A rest period at home, preceding pilotage, of at least 9 hours where the 9 hours includes the
period from 2200-0600 (normal sleeping hours) or at least 10 consecutive hours.
• Pilots should not be rostered for tours of duty exceeding 11 hours, but if already flying, this
may be extended to 12 hours.

If flight time is extended beyond the 11 hours, then the minimum rest period must be extended by
1 hour for each 15 minutes the tour of duty is extended beyond 11 hours.
Where a tour of duty exceeds 12 hours, the pilot must be given a clear 24 hours break.

A tour of duty means the period between the time a pilot commences any duties related to his/her
employment until the time he/she is relieved of all such duties. It includes standby time at airports.
In other words, any pilotage duties not separated by an uninterrupted rest period at home of at
least 9 hours.

Comment:

submission21.doc Lovell 17 June 1999 4:49 PM

 3

A fatigue management plan for marine pilots could safely adopt these guidelines if it could
be demonstrated that workload and corresponding fatigue levels experienced by marine
pilots were similar to those experienced by aviation pilots.

3.2. Road Transport Legislation (Qld)

In 1994 Queensland Transport introduced its much heralded Fatigue Management legislation and
FMP Accreditation systemviii for truck drivers. This requires operators to educate their heavy
vehicle drivers about health and fatigue. It also requires logs of driving hours to be maintained.
Vehicles are to have a sleeping bunk so that drivers may pull over and have a rest when they are
tired.

Driving Hours are limited as follows:

5 hours without a rest

12 hours in any 24
72 hours in any week.

Rest periods must include:

30 minutes after 5 hours.

6 hours unbroken rest in any 24 hours.
Not less than 9 hours rest in any 24 hours.
24 hours unbroken rest in any week.

Driving includes any duties related to the operation of the vehicle.

Comment:
Marine pilots do not have the opportunity to “park” their ships on the side of the channel
for a 30 minute “siesta” after completing 5 hours pilotage duties.

3.3. Marine Legislation

The Queensland Government Marine Safety Act (1994) provides for severe penalties if “a person
involved with a ship’s operation (including the owner, master, pilot and crew members) ...cause a
ship to be operated unsafely.” Maximum penalty- 500 penalty points (about $35 000) or
imprisonment for 1 year. This increases to 5000 penalty points (about $350 000) or imprisonment
for 2 years if a person is killed or injured as a consequence of operating the ship unsafely.ix

Other States have similar legislation.

Comment:
If it is possible for a fatigued pilot to be prosecuted in the event of a Marine Incident, a
fatigue management plan is needed urgently. If a Marine Pilot cannot be held responsible
for his/her actions when piloting while fatigued, then claiming fatigue is an excellent
defence.

3.4. STCW 95
Under the section on Fitness for Duty, dealing with Bridge Watchkeeping, there is a requirement to
organise watchkeeping duties so that the efficiency of the watch is not impaired by fatigue. The
master has the authority to take such measures as are necessary to avoid fatigue.x The master
however, has no control over the fatigue levels of the pilot assigned to his/her ship.

Minimum rest periods are as follows:

A minimum of 10 hours rest in any 24 hour period.
Rest may be divided up into two periods, one of which must be at least 6 hours in length.
The reduction of 10 consecutive hours to 6 consecutive hours may only occur two days running.

submission21.doc Lovell 17 June 1999 4:49 PM

 4

Comment:
The STCW requirements apply to watchkeepers. The demands on a Marine Pilot and the
level of alertness required to perform the job safely are far higher than one would expect for
a normal lookout on board a ship. Nevertheless, they provide a good starting point from
which to develop Fatigue Management Guidelines for Marine Pilots.

4. Human Factors Studies Of Marine Pilotage

4.1. Past Studies.

Fortunately, several studies have been made into the human factors of Marine Pilotagexv. One
study found the mortality rate among Trinity House Pilots was about 3 times higher than the
general populationxvi. Other studies conducted in Englandxvii and in Germany reported similar
results.xviii
Two Dutch studies looked at rest/work ratios for Dutch pilotsxix and their workloads in order pilots
to determine admissible occupational stress. They found that the workload of Dutch Pilots was
such that it not only jeopardised safety but severely impacted negatively on pilots’ health and
longevity.xx A rest/work ratio of 4:3 for day work, with a greater ratio for night work was required. If
a pilot worked a 12 hour day shift, then a minimum rest period of 16 hours was indicated.xxi

A similar study was made in Australia by Dr Yossi Berger. His findings enjoyed significant
correlation with the other studies.xxii

All studies noted considerable stress experienced by Marine Pilots in carrying out their functions
Recent studies have found clear links between stress levels, long term elevated adrenaline levels,
and cardiac induced morbidity. Swedish studiesxxiii, have been able to correlate stress levels
and/or pilot morbidity with workload.

Comment:
There are sufficient studies into the human factors associated with work-related fatigue in
Marine Port Pilotage. Another study is not needed. What is needed is legislation enacting
recommendations based on the best research.

4.2. Stress/Fatigue
Is there a link between fatigue levels and stress? By stress we mean the physical and mental
demands brought about by the nature of the work. The IMO/ILO working group examining the
subject prior to making recommendations for inclusion in the STCW 95 annex seemed to think so.
The group concluded: ”Fatigue can be induced by prolonged periods of mental and physical
activity, inadequate rest, ... physiological stress or other psychological factors.”xxiv
Boyle (1993) notes that research has shown that fatigue causes individuals to focus attention on
what are perceived to be the most important tasks, and in so doing, ignore peripheral warnings.

Comment:
This can be disastrous for a pilot who needs to be continually assessing a multitude of
indicators, ie. Draft vs depth, proximity of shallows or rocks, ship speed and deceleration,
helmsman’s capabilities, steering behaviour of the ship, other ships, transits, beacons, ETA
at tugs, distance to breakwater, wind, tide, current, swinging room, clearance fore and aft,
bridge position with relationship to wharf, rotational speed of ship, transverse and fore/aft
movement of ship, helm orders, engine orders, compliance with same, communication with
linesmen, wharf, port control, linesboat, tugs,... etc, etc.

Stress levels can be accurately monitored. The simplest indicator is the elevated heart beat.

4.3. Heartbeat Indicators of Task Stress Levels

Shipley (1978) did considerable monitoring of stress levels using heart rate as an indicator. The
conclusions were that the more difficult the job, the higher the stress levels. The most stressful
situation was the swinging of large ships in confined space, or berthing ships into confined berth

submission21.doc Lovell 17 June 1999 4:49 PM

 5

pockets. Where all other factors were equal, the larger ships were consistently more stressful to
pilot.xxv

“The high heart-rates that do occur under mental load may be tiring, the overnight acts are
undoubtedly so. It is most important, therefore, that adequate rest and recuperation takes
xxvi
place before the next assignment.”

The maximum heartbeat is in the order of 220 minus age. A 50 year old’s maximum heartbeat
would therefore be in the order of 170 beats per minute. While boarding, near maximum pulse
rates of up to 150 were recorded. While swinging large ships, pulse rates of up to 160 were
recorded.xxvii The results indicated that from time to time pilots were working at the limits of their
physical ability.

Berger (1984) conducted far more detailed pathological studies of Australian Pilots (Port Philip
Sea Pilots). His tests included, not only ECG monitoring at various stages of pilotage, but also
took urine samples to monitor residual adrenaline levels. He found abnormal hormone excretions,
a high incidence of irregular sleep patterns, and found nearly identical Cardiac Risk and morbidity
results.xxviii

4.4. Adrenaline Levels

Berger found, by analysing Pilot’s urine, extremely high levels of adrenaline excretion. For pilots
who had been piloting around midnight, these levels were up to 7 times higher than a normal
person sleeping. For pilots who then go home and “rest”, sleep would be very difficult.xxix Normal
levels of adrenaline only occurring up to two days later. Persistent high levels of adrenaline have
been associated with arterial plaque deposits and cholesterol production. xxx

Waiting for a ship movement also produced high levels of adrenaline. “It is clear that the pilot’s
anticipatory stage - with its high level of uncertainty and unpredictability and no effective
control are costly ... In fact, in the waiting period, [the pilot] is already ‘working’.
It is also evident two days following such work ([between] ... 2300 and ... 0600) are
xxxi
necessary to re-establish a normal pattern.”

4.5. Comparison between Marine Pilotage and Aviation Pilotage

Results of the monitoring of Airline Pilot’s heart rates and those of Air traffic controllers (ATCs) was
available to obtain a comparative analysis. Marine pilots stress levels, based on operating pulse
rates, were shown to be significantly higher than those of ATCs. The tasks of Airline pilots were
considered to be more comparable to those of Marine Pilot, with the exception that airline pilots sit
and marine pilots stand while working.

“The heart rates observed are related to the complexity and the difficulty of the task and
there is evidence that some tasks may be sufficiently demanding to produce very high heart
rates, levels which may indicate the pilot has reached his/her limit in terms of task
difficulty. The act average values of heart rate and peak heart rate show marine pilotage to
be more demanding than Industrial Management and Air Traffic Control.”

“The limited evidence available also indicates that [marine] pilotage makes greater
xxxii
demands on the marine pilot than long-haul flying does on the airline pilot”.

Why is Marine Pilotage so demanding? Consider the following:

• The marine pilot is trying to manoeuvre the largest movable man-made objects on earth.
• They drive them down relatively narrower channels than the driver of a road transport truck is
required to do.
• It is not uncommon to have an 80 000 tonne displacement vessel powered by as little as 8 000
horse power. This equates to one horse power per 10 000 kilograms. It’s a bit like having to
drive a Mack truck and semi trailer powered by a lawn mower engine and then park it in a
parking place with a metre clearance each end.
• Now to make it interesting, let’s simulate leeway drift by making the truck slide sideways at one
kilometre per hour, and the current by making the parking place move along the road. We’ll
give you two smaller ride on lawnmowers to help push the truck sideways into the kerb, but like
the truck, they to are slipping and sliding.

submission21.doc Lovell 17 June 1999 4:49 PM

 6

• Sounds too easy, doesn’t it? Let’s add one more dimension, we won’t give you any brakes,
we’ll make you slow the truck down by causing the wheels to spin backwards, and when you do
so, you have to let go of the steering wheel, because large ships do not steer when going
astern.
• Finally, if you mess it up, we’ll throw you in court and make you justify why you should have a
job.

4.6. Sick Leave

Shipley(1978) found that although all research from the 1950’s on has indicated that pilots operate
in very high stress environments, their claims on sick leave was less than 40% of the general
population. Only 35% of those occasioning work-related injuries took time off. Given their
generous sick leave entitlements, the reason for the low absence rates resides in their high work
commitment.xxxiii Berger(1984) found Australian Pilots were no less dedicated than their European
colleagues:

“There is no doubt that pilots will put up with a great deal of discomfort and some injury to
continue work; an attitude typical of high professionalism and a strong commitment to
xxxiv
work.”

Is there a link between pilots’ refusal to take sick leave and their high cardiac morbidity rates?

5. Current Studies into Fatigue

There are a host of research centres worldwide,xxxv with NASA so concerned with Aviation safety
that they now have a Fatigue Counter Measures Program. Their studies mirror the findings of
other centres regarding the problems with disrupted sleep patterns.

5.1. Offshore Industry in Australia and Overseas

QUT was commissioned by AMSAxxxvii to conduct a review of Health, Stress and Fatigue in the
xxxvi

Shipping & Offshore Industries of Australia, abbreviated to “FASTOH”. The study provided no new
physiological data, although it was originally intended to include non-invasive medical screening
tests. The research consisted of questionnaires completed by members of the Blue Water and
Offshore Industries. The study included responses from Reef Pilots but excluded Port Pilotage.
As such, the study throws no new light on the issue of fatigue in Marine Port Pilotage.

A similar study is being conducted by the Batelle Seattle Research Institute in Washington but with
a greater emphasis on the link between fatigue and Marine Incidents.xxxviii

5.2. Comparisons between Alcohol Intoxication and Fatigue

The Centre for Sleep Research in South Australia conducted a study which equated Performance
xxxix
Impairment associated with Sustained Wakefulness and Alcohol Intoxication. This study
compared the performance of subjects in a randomly generated tracking task at various stages of
alcohol intoxication and compared their performance when suffering from sleep deprivation. They
found that for each hour of wakefulness the reduction in performance was consistent with a
0.004% rise in Blood Alcohol Content. In simple terms, a person completing a shift after 12 hours
of wakefulness had the performance coordination of a person with a blood alcohol content of
0.048%.

The study found no appreciable performance deterioration until the BAC exceeded about 0.04%.
Similarly, fatigue limited performance remained acceptable up to about 10 hours of work. After 12
hours, performance deteriorated quite rapidly. The study also showed that an acceptable level of
performance did not occur immediately after waking but about 45 minutes later.

Comment:
What is an appropriate level of alcohol intoxication under which a Marine Pilot could safely
operate? Answer that question, and you are able to determine appropriate levels of fatigue.

submission21.doc Lovell 17 June 1999 4:49 PM

 7

5.3. Risk-control Model for Fatigue

The Centre for Sleep Research in South Australia conducted a further study which found that “the
hours worked between midnight and 0700 were more likely to produce higher... fatigue.” They
designed a risk-control modelxl that can be used to assess rosters for their impact on fatigue. A
fatigue score of 80 (which equated to the performance associated with a blood alcohol content of
0.05) was considered the maximum under which train drivers and electricity workers should
normally be allowed to operate with increases to a score of 100 in emergencies. The model has
significant advantages in that it allows actual hours worked to be used, rather than rostered hours.
With modern electronic data retrieval systems, it would be relatively simple to monitor pilots hours
and rest requirements.

This model is currently being used by the Adelaide Port Authority to assess its pilot rosters.

5.4. Reliability of Research Results

Research into pilotage human factors over a period of about 30 years provided a high level of
correlation. Can Shipley’s findings be reliably extrapolated a further 20 years? Can Berger’s be
extrapolated a further 10? Has the nature of pilotage changed that much? Given the current
uncertainties regarding career futures and persisting high workloads their findings must be
considered conservative. With the rapidly declining standards of training of seafarers and the
aging world merchant fleet, pilots must be demonstrating higher levels of skill, managing greater
workloads and dealing with higher levels of stress than ever before.

The research in all cases was disinterested, that is the researchers had no preconceived notions
of the possible outcomes. The researchers were all specialists in their fields. Their results bear
such close correlation that their findings must be accepted.

6. Responsibility
While the issues covered thus far may be true and relevant, whose responsibility is it that
something is done? Workplace Health and Safety legislation provides a very clear line of
responsibility.

6.1. Workplace Health & Safety Requirements

Under the Workplace Health and Safety Act, the persons in control of a workplace are obligated to
minimise the risk of injury to people coming into the workplacexli. This obligation extends to
ensuring work practices of people other than employees of the persons in charge of the workplace
are carried out in a manner that minimises risk to others.xlii

The area within port limits is a workplace. Who is the person in charge of the workplace? In the
case of the Port Authority, it is the CEO and Directors. The Harbour Master by definition has a
statutory obligation to control the safety of navigation within his jurisdiction but this does not
include monitoring the hours worked by pilots, unless the Harbour Master’s Office provides a
pilotage service.

It is not possible to contract out of this obligation. While Pilotage Service Provider Companies will
be bound by the provisions as a principal contractorxliii and they will be able to contract out of
direct liability by having individual contracts for their pilots, Port Authorities however, are not able
to contract out of their obligation to ensure their contractors comply.

6.2. Duty of Care

We frequently hear of the term “Duty of Care”. What is an adequate level of care when it comes to
allowing a pilot suffering from fatigue to have the conduct of the navigation of a ship?

What if the ship is a product tanker for example, carrying up to 45 million litres of premium motor
spirit, some of which contains lead, along a narrow navigational channel leading through a marine
park? At risk are the lives of some 20 to 30 crewmen, hundreds of millions of dollars of ship,
product, port infrastructure, marine life, fisheries and tourism revenue. Should the people involved

submission21.doc Lovell 17 June 1999 4:49 PM

 8

in the navigation of the ship be allowed to do so if they are suffering from fatigue to the extent that
it impaired their judgement?

The test for the required standard of care is how a reasonable person in the particular situation
would have reacted. If a reasonable person would have thought that the acts in question would
lead to a forseeable risk of injury, the standard of care has been breached.xliv

• Is it reasonable to expect that the controller of the workplace is aware that a risk to people’s
health and safety exists as a consequence of allowing pilots to perform pilotage acts while
suffering from fatigue?
• Is it reasonable to assume that regulatory authority responsible for setting standards should be
aware that a risk to people’s health and safety exists as a consequence of allowing pilots to
perform pilotage acts while suffering from fatigue?
• Is it reasonable to require that the pilots conducting the navigation of ships within the
jurisdiction of a Port Authority are adequately rested and are not suffering from fatigue or illness
to the extent that it impairs their judgement?

In terms of occupational workplace safety legislation, the obligation is only discharged if due
diligence is exercised and reasonable precautions are taken.xlv

The only reason that navigating under the influence of alcohol is illegal is because alcohol impairs
one’s judgement. Would it be fair to assume that a pilot who had only had had a few hours sleep
in the previous 24 hours might be suffering from fatigue to such an extent that it impaired the
judgement? The Civil Aviation Authority seems to think it to be the case for Aviation Pilots, Road
Transport Authorities seem to think it is the case for heavy vehicle drivers, IMO seems to think it is
the case for Marine Watchkeepers. Are Marine Pilots significantly different?

Comment:
The only conceivable circumstance where the use of a fatigued pilot might be acceptable, is
when it is judged that the risk to the ship or its crew, occasioned by leaving it alongside or
at sea, would be greater than causing it to be piloted by a pilot suffering from fatigue.

7. Designing a Marine FMP -

7.1. Initial considerations

Comment:
Offering a pilot more money as an incentive to pilot when fatigued does not buy a safer,
more efficient pilotage service.

“Normal psychological and physiological tendencies exist which should be factored into the design,
planning, management and conduct of pilot operations. These include … the time of day,
circadian phase, time on task, fatigue, age, and the use or abuse of of substances that are
considered a normal part of society.”xlvi

Based on existing research, the following should be taken into consideration when designing a
Marine Pilot Fatigue Management Program:

1. Marine Piloting is more demanding than long-haul airline piloting.

2. Rest/work ratios of at least 4:3 should be endorsed.
3. Work between the hours of midnight and 0700 is more tiring than any other period
4. For the same hours worked, more frequent rest days with shorter roster periods is safer than
longer off periods after a longer roster period.xlvii
5. Time on task (working) commences from when a pilot is called to service and ends when
he/she is relieved of all pilot-related dutiesxlviii
6. There is a difference between the rostered period of duty and the actual hours worked.
However, the roster must indicate an adequate rest period based on the assumption that the
pilot could be called on to perform pilotage duties for the entire roster period.
7. In designing rosters the following should be considered: xlix
• Forward rotating rosters provide an easy way of changing the shift worked, but it is the actual
hours rest that determines the levels of accumulated fatigue.

submission21.doc Lovell 17 June 1999 4:49 PM

 9

• Long periods of shiftwork should be avoided.

• Longer shifts (9-12 hours) should be avoided.
• Adequate recovery time must be provided.
• Every shift system should include some free weekends off with at least two successive days
off.
• The number of consecutive working days should be limited.

7.2. Other Issues

Pilot fatigue is not merely a consequence of too little sleep. While adequate rest is important,
many other issues impact on it.

1. The efficient use of pilot resources. At present there are no penalties for ships failing to keep
ETAs or ETDs. Some Agents do not bother to keep pilots informed and frequently give ETAs
or ETDs they know the ship cannot make, in order to have a pilot standing by. Trying to
schedule shipping in these circumstances is very difficult. Pilots are called out early and then
waste time standing around waiting for ships to finish.
2. A relaxing room where pilots can lie down and rest between shipping movements at night
would greatly contribute towards reducing accumulated fatigue. However, when introducing a
system of “scheduled napping”, the need to be awake not less than 45 minutes before
performing a pilotage movement must be borne in mind.
3. Pilot physical fitness can impact on fatigue.
4. Travel to outports. Extensive travel to and from outports can be very tiring, travel at night
especially so. No consideration has been given to the effect this might have on a pilot’s
judgement.
5. The provision of adequate rest periods does not guarantee a home environment where the pilot
may obtain adequate rest. The management of the rest period however, is the pilot’s
responsibility and not the controller of the workplace’s.
7.2.1. Management of Pilot Resource
Both Shipley and Berger commented on the problem of uncertainty, incorrect ETAs or ETDs, and
the abuse of pilot resources that this causes.

“Attention should be given to demands required from Agents in relation to ETAs and ETDs.
These discussions should seriously consider substantial, well-reasoned penalty costs for
the misuse or abuse of a pilot’s time. The degree of uncertainty and unpredictability across
every aspect of a pilot’s life is entirely unacceptable at any price”l

“A better system of forecasting of shipping movements would help ... Compulsory ETAs
and ETDs with penalties for infringements within reasonable tolerance margins, may be a
li
practicable answer to this problem.”

Waking up a pilot to tell him/her to go back to sleep because of a change in ETA/ETD severely
diminishes the rest of the pilot and directly compromises the safety of the pilotage act about to be
performed. If there is insufficient shipping to justify continuous shifts and pilots’ rosters are
nominal and not absolute, then appropriate notification times for pilot bookings are essential and
adherence should be enforced.
7.2.2. Drugs Alcohol
Dawson (1997)liv found an increase in performance associated with low levels of alcohol
intoxication. The study however, did not aggregate the two. It is difficult to accept the notion that
a moderate level of alcohol intoxication at the commencement of a period of duty would enhance
the performance of a marine pilot towards the end of the duty period. While there are laws
prescribing acceptable levels of alcohol intoxication for Masters, no legislation currently applies to
the Marine Pilot.

Pilots suffering from illness or taking drugs that cause drowsiness should not perform pilotage acts
until fit to do so. It goes without saying that drug abuse should not be tolerated.

Finally, alcohol is known to disrupt sleep dramatically and therefore contributes to the poor
quantity and quality of sleep obtained on trip nights. Alternative approaches to the use of alcohol

submission21.doc Lovell 17 June 1999 4:49 PM

 10

to unwind after duty and promote sleep should be identified and offered (eg., relaxation
techniques)lvi.
7.2.3. Pilot Error versus Pilot Overload
de Vries-Griever (1982a) studied the cumulative effect of pilot overload over the years of disrupted
sleep patterns and high demand work periods and found: “In particular for older pilots, the
lvii
work load could become irresponsibly high, jeopardising the safety of shipping traffic”.

While the pilot workload is high, the indirect workload, brought about by irregular hours, long
travel, often at night, compounds the problem. Shipley concluded that it was possible that “Pilot
Error” as an explanation for Marine Incidents, could in reality be a consequence of “Pilot
lviii
Overload.”

7.2.4. Fatigue Related Marine Incidents in Marine Parks

The FASTOH study found that Reef Pilots had on average about 3.5 hours of sleep per day while
conducting pilotage. It is not surprising therefore that the grounding of the mv Peacock on Piper’s
Reef on the Great Barrier Reef occurred after the pilot fell asleeplix. The cost of the resulting
pollution prevention operation cost Australian taxpayers more than A$2M.

The inquiry into the grounding of the product tanker mv Conus in Townsville on 12 January 1995
did not find fatigue as a contributing factor despite the fact that the pilot had been on duty
conducting marine pilotage from 1900 on the previous night to 0300 on the morning of the
incident, and had driven a motor vehicle 500km alone in order to perform the pilotage act in Abbot
Point, the bulk loading facility operated by Mount Isa Mines. The pilot had had no more than about
5 hours effective sleep in the 48 hours before the incident!

Comment:
Until a pilot fell asleep, resulting in a grounding, it had not been a common practice during
Marine Incident Inquiries involving pilots, to examine the pilots’ rest/work periods in the
fortnight preceding the incident in order to determine if current work practices are allowing
pilots sufficient rest. This should be the second question, after the breathalyser.

8. Conclusion
We return to the questions I asked earlier:

1. Is it safe for a marine pilot to have the conduct of the navigation of a ship, while fatigued? The
answer is no.
2. Does a pilot, who pilots a ship without having had adequate rest, cause the ship to be operated
unsafely? The answer is yes.
3. Is there evidence that allows comparison between the stress levels of an airline pilot and a
marine pilot, and hence comparable rest period indicators? Yes.
4. Is it reasonable for a master to expect that the pilot assigned to his/her ship is adequately
rested prior to commencing pilotage duties? Again, yes.
5. Does the port authority, pilot company, or transport department, if the transport department is
the service provider, have a responsibility to ensure they have sufficient adequately rested
pilots to meet traffic demands? Yes.
6. Is there a duty of care required of the regulatory authority responsible for setting standards?
Legally no, but now that they know the issues, yes.

“[The] research results clearly present a case that pilots’ work-load, defined narrowly or broadly, is
a source of distress, fatigue and serious social disruption; it is frequently physically dangerous. It
is also clear that this work creates unique problems that monetary compensation will not
alleviate.”lx

Patricia Shipley’s concluding words eloquently sum it up:

“If we value our pilots, then we should promote healthier systems of work. If pilots value their
profession, they will try to promote their own physical and mental fitness.”lxi

submission21.doc Lovell 17 June 1999 4:49 PM

 11

9. Recommendations
Pilot Service Delivery organisations should consider the following:

1. Adopt a fatigue management plan. I would recommend that the attached FMP be adopted as a
minimum standard and included in the AAPMA Pilotage Standards.
2. Proposed rosters should be submitted to the Centre for Sleep Research for assessment of their
fatigue implications.
3. Alcohol Consumption should cease not less than eight hours prior to the commencement of a
pilotage act and the pilot should have a 0.000 BAC reading. This should also be included as
navigational safety standard.
4. Tighten up the booking process. Changes to ETAs or ETDs without adequate advance
warning should attract real penalties, as should delays and cancellations at short notice.
5. The use of relaxing rooms where pilots can lie down and rest between ships should be
provided at all pilot stations.
6. Pilots travelling to and from outports should not be coerced into undertaking solo road journeys
in excess of one hour’s travelling between the hours of 2200 and 0600 prior to or after
performing a pilotage act. In fact, it should be actively discouraged.

Not addressed in this paper is the stress on a Pilotage Exempt master. While fatigue
management has been addressed for sea-going staff, there should be some requirement for an
exempt master to take a pilot if his/her workload has been such that he/she could be sufficiently
fatigued to impair judgement. This area should also be given attention.

submission21.doc Lovell 17 June 1999 4:49 PM

 12

10. Proposed Marine Pilot’s FMP

HOURS OF DUTY LIMITATIONS - MARINE PILOTS

SUBSECTIONS
1 - Application and responsibility 3 - General Conditions
2 - Definitions 4 - Exemptions

1. Application and responsibility

1.1. - This Fatigue Management Plan applies to all Marine Pilots who hold Marine Pilotage Licences.
1.2. - Notwithstanding anything contained in this Fatigue Management Plan, a Marine Pilot shall not perform a
Marine Pilotage Act, and an employer shall not require a Marine Pilot to perform a Marine Pilotage act, if either
the Marine Pilot is suffering from, or, considering the circumstances, of the pilotage act about to be
undertaken, is likely to suffer from fatigue or illness which may affect judgement or performance to the extent
that safety may be impaired.
1.3. - A marine pilot’s fatigue scores using the risk-control modelling method should not exceed a fatigue
score of 80 under normal operations, but in any case should never exceed a score of 100.

2. Definitions

In this part, unless the contrary intention appears:

‘Marine Pilotage Act’ means the movement of a ship, which is required under the act to take a pilot, within a
compulsory pilotage area.
‘Marine Pilot’ means any Master Mariner who is licensed under the act to perform pilotage duties within a
compulsory pilotage area.
‘Marine Pilotage Duties” means any duties related to the navigating of ships within a compulsory pilotage
area, or any other duties pertaining to the Marine Pilot’s employment.
‘Rest Period’ means any uninterrupted period of not less than four consecutive hours where the Marine Pilot
is not engaged in Marine Pilotage duties.
‘Roster Period’ means any period of consecutive days during which a Marine Pilot may be required to
perform Marine Pilotage Duties.
‘Risk-Control Modeling Method’ means the mathematical model for determining workload induced fatigue
levels as developed by the Centre for Sleep Research in South Australia.
‘Standby time’ means any period a pilot is on roster but is not actually involved in Marine Pilotage Duties.

HOURS OF DUTY LIMITATIONS - MARINE PILOTS

3.General Conditions

3.1.- A period of Marine Pilotage duties shall be preceded by a rest period, at home or the pilot’s place of
residence, of at least:
(a) nine consecutive hours embracing the hours between 2200 and 0600 local time; or
(b) twelve consecutive hours.
3.2. - A period of Marine Pilotage Duties shall not exceed 12 hours in any 24 consecutive hours.
3.3.- A Marine Pilot shall not be assigned to a ship where it is anticipated that the movement will be of a
duration such that the pilot will be required to perform marine pilotage duties for a period of duty of more than
12 hours.
3.4. - Where a Pilotage act has commenced in accordance with 3.3 above and the movement is delayed for
reasons beyond the pilot’s control the period of pilotage duty may be extended beyond 12 hours.

submission21.doc Lovell 17 June 1999 4:49 PM

 13

3.5. - Where extensions have been made in accordance with 3.4 above, the pilot shall receive a rest period of
twelve hours plus four hours for each hour or part thereof that the pilot’s period of duty exceeds 12 hours.
3.6. - Where extensions have been made in accordance with 3.4 above, the period of Marine Pilotage Duties
shall not exceed 16 hours.
3.7. - Where a pilot is required to perform a Marine Pilotage Act or acts, a minimum of 4 hours Marine Pilotage
duties is recorded irrespective of the actual hours worked.
3.8.- A Marine pilot shall not be required to perform Marine Pilotage duties in excess of 7 consecutive days
without an uninterrupted rest period of not less than 24 hours.
3.9. - A Marine pilot shall not be required to perform Marine Pilotage duties in excess of 120 hours in any 3
week period.
3.10. - Where a pilot is on Standby, a minimum of 4 hours Marine Pilotage duties is recorded irrespective of
the actual hours worked.
3.11.- A Marine Pilot Roster Period shall be preceded by a Rest Period of not less than 2 days for each 7 days
worked in the preceding roster period.
3.12.- A Marine Pilot shall not be rostered on duty for more than 15 consecutive days.
3.13.- A Marine Pilot shall not perform pilotage acts on more than 200 days per annum.
3.14. - All Marine Pilots to whom this Fatigue Management Plan applies shall keep a log of the hours worked
and shall inform their employers of their rest requirements.

4. - Exemptions
4.1. - The limitations on hours may be exceeded in cases of emergency and in all circumstances where the
safety of life is concerned.

i
STCW.6/Circ.1 Annex, Page 133. Chapter VIII -Standards Regarding Watchkeeping. Section A-VIII/1.
Fitness for duty.
ii
Queensland Transport - Fatigue Management For Heavy Vehicles, February 1994
iii
MEDIA RELEASE, November 6, 1995. WORLD-FIRST QUEENSLAND PROJECT TAKES TIREDNESS
OUT OF TRUCKING. Page 2.
iv
Civil Aviation Orders Part 48. Section 48. April 1991. s1.4
v
Australian Marine Pilotage Standards Part 3 - Conduct, s17.8, February 1997
vi
Civil Aviation Orders Part 48. Section 48. April 1991.
vii
Civil Aviation Orders Part 48. Section 48. April 1991. s1.4
viii
Queensland Transport - Fatigue Management For Heavy Vehicles, February 1994
ix
Queensland Government Transport Operations (Marine Safety) Act 1994. s43.(1)
x
Boyle, Captain P. Bridge Watchkeeping. The Nautical Institute Council. Nautical Briefing, Supplement to
Seaways; April 1993

xv
Shipley, Patricia. A Human Factors Study of Marine Pilotage. Birbeck College, 1978.
xvi
Slack J, (1967) and Slack, J. & Noble, N. (1977). Lipid and Lipoprotein concentration in 1604 men and
women working populations in North West London. British medical Journal 2, p345-412; in Shipley
(1978) p2.
xvii
Harrington, J.M. (1969 & 1972). Mortality of English Channel Pilots, 1956-1968. Dissertation, MSc
Occupational Medicine, in Shipley (1978), p4.
xviii
Zorn, E.M., Harrington J.M. and Goethe H., (1977), Ischaemic Heart Disease and Work Stress in West
German Sea Pilots.. Journal of Occupational Medicine, in Shipley (1978), p4-5.
xix
Bink B., (1976). Workload of Pilots. Report of Netherlands Institute for Preventative Medicine, in Shipley
(1978) p54 and Berger (1984) p11.

submission21.doc Lovell 17 June 1999 4:49 PM

 1

xx
de Vries-Griever (1982a and 1982b) Papers presented to International Research Workshop on
Psychological Approaches to Night and Shift Work, Edinburgh 1982, and Congress of European
Maritime Pilots Association, Rotterdam 1982, in Berger, (1984), p12,13 & 39
xxi
Bink B., (1976). Workload of Pilots. Report of Netherlands Institute for Preventative Medicine in Berger
(1984), p12.
xxii
Berger, Dr Yossi. Port Philip Sea Pilots: an Occupation at Risk. La Trobe University. Melbourne 1984
xxiii
Kilboom A., (1969) Marine Pilots and Piloting. Arbeitsmedisinska Institutet, Stockholm and Dalhamn T.,
(1953) The incidence of peptic ulcers and chronic gastritis among Swedish Sea Pilots. British Journal
Industrial Medicine in Shipley (1978) p4,5.
xxiv
Boyle, Captain P. Bridge Watchkeeping. The Nautical Institute Council. Nautical Briefing, Supplement
to Seaways; April 1993
xxv
Shipley (1978), p78.
xxvi
Shipley (1978), p12.
xxvii
Shipley (1978), p93.
xxviii
Berger (1984), p36.
xxix
Berger (1984), p26.
xxx
Berger (1984), p20.
xxxi
Berger (1984), p28.
xxxii
Shipley (1978), p83.
xxxiii
Shipley (1978), p45.
xxxiv
Berger (1984), p43.
xxxv
Internet Website http://bisleep.medsch.ucla.edu/map/world.map.html (1997)
xxxvi
QUT - Queensland University of Technology
xxxvii
AMSA - Australian Maritime Safety Authority
xxxviii
Raby M., (1997). Fatigue at Sea. In Seaways, The International Journal of the Nautical Institute,
September 1997, p10-12.
xxxix
Dawson, D & Reid, K. (1997). Equating Performance Impairment associated with Sustained
Wakefulness and Alcohol Intoxication. Centre for Sleep Research. Queen Elizabeth Hospital. Woodville.
South Australia.
xl
Dawson, D. (1997). Cabin Safety and Hours of Work: Developing a general risk-control model. Centre
for Sleep Research. Queen Elizabeth Hospital. Woodville. South Australia.
xli
Queensland Government Workplace health and Safety Act (1995) s.30.(1) (a)
xlii
Queensland Government Workplace health and Safety Act (1995) s.30.(1) (b)
xliii
Queensland Government Workplace health and Safety Act (1995) s.31.(1)
xliv
Clayton Utz,. Solicitors and Attorneys (1993). Queensland Transport Legal Manual, p402.
xlv
Queensland Government Workplace health and Safety Act (1995) s.27.(3)
xlvi
Cantwell, V (1998) Human Factors in Marine Pilot Operations: Managing Fatigue, Alertness and
Endurance in the MarinePilot Operations. 14th Conference of the International Maritime Pilots’
Association, Shanghai 1998. Witherby & Co., London.
xlvii
Dawson, D. (1997). Cabin Safety and Hours of Work: Developing a general risk-control model. Centre
for Sleep Research. Queen Elizabeth Hospital. Woodville. South Australia.
xlviii
Cantwell, V (1998) Human Factors in Marine Pilot Operations: Managing Fatigue, Alertness and
Endurance in the MarinePilot Operations. 14th Conference of the International Maritime Pilots’
Association, Shanghai 1998. Witherby & Co., London.
xlix
Knauth, P. (1993) Ergonomics. The Design of Shift Systems, in Health, Stress and Fatigue in Offshore
Maritime Workrs. (1997), Queensland University of Technology.

submission21.doc Lovell 17 June 1999 4:49 PM

 2

l
Berger (1984), p32.
li
Shipley (1978), p23.

liv
Dawson, D & Reid, K. (1997). p6,

lvi
Fatigue Countermeasures @ http://olias.arc.nasa.gov/projects/fcp/FCP-history-shaul.html . Mark Rosekind
1997
lvii
Berger (1984), p13., de Vries-Griever, A. 1982a. Paper presented to the International Research
Workshop on Psychological Approaches to Night and Shift Work, Edinburgh, July 1982.
lviii
Shipley (1978), p12
lix
Australian Government - Marine Incident Investigation Unit @ Website:
http://www.dotrs.gov.au/miiu/incident/peacock.htm
lx
Berger (1984), p15.
lxi
Shipley (1978), p27.

submission21.doc Lovell 17 June 1999 4:49 PM