Co vs. New Prosperity Plastic PDF

8/7/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 727
G.R. No. 183994. June 30, 2014.*

WILLIAM CO a.k.a. XU QUING HE, petitioner, vs. NEW
PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, represented by
ELIZABETH UY,1 respondent.
Constitutional Law; Right to Speedy Trial; While the Supreme

Court (SC) recognizes the accused’s right to speedy trial and
adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, we cannot
deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute
criminals.—This Court has emphasized that “‘speedy trial’ is a
relative term and necessarily a flexible concept.” In determining
whether the accused’s right to speedy trial was violated, the delay
should be considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings.
The factors to balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay;
(b) reason therefor; (c) assertion
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* THIRD DIVISION.
504
of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such
delay. Surely, mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved
would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be regarded
in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum,
and that particular regard must be given to the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case. “While the Court recognizes
the accused’s right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of
speedy administration of justice, we cannot deprive the State of a
reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified
postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length
of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial.”
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Provisional Dismissal;
Essential Requisites of a Provisional Dismissal.—Co is burdened
to establish the essential requisites of the first paragraph of
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules, which are conditions sine qua
non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph
thereof, to wit: (1) the prosecution with the express conformity of
the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio)
dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused
http://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000015dbbe0523e24a23d99003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/16
move for a provisional dismissal of the case; (2) the offended party
is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; (3)
the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the
case provisionally; and (4) the public prosecutor is served with a
copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case.
Same; Same; Same; When the Rules states that the
provisional dismissal shall become permanent one year after the
issuance of the order temporarily dismissing the case, it should not
be literally interpreted as such.—There is evident want of
jurisprudential support on Co’s supposition that the dismissal of
the cases became permanent one year after the issuance of the
June 9, 2003 Order and not after notice to the offended party.
When the Rules states that the provisional dismissal shall become
permanent one year after the issuance of the order temporarily
dismissing the case, it should not be literally interpreted as such.
Of course, there is a vital need to satisfy the basic requirements of
due process; thus, said in one case: Although the second
paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall
become permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the
case having been revived, the provision should be construed to
mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent
505
one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public

prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the
criminal case having been revived. The public prosecutor cannot
be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a
copy of the order of dismissal.
Same; Evidence; Judicial Notice; Judicial notice must be
taken of the fact that most, if not all, of our trial court judges have
to deal with clogged dockets in addition to their administrative
duties and functions.—The contention that both the filing of the
motion to revive the case and the court order reviving it must be
made prior to the expiration of the one-year period is
unsustainable. Such interpretation is not found in the Rules.
Moreover, to permit otherwise would definitely put the offended
party at the mercy of the trial court, which may wittingly or
unwittingly not comply. Judicial notice must be taken of the fact
that most, if not all, of our trial court judges have to deal with
clogged dockets in addition to their administrative duties and
functions. Hence, they could not be expected to act at all times on
all pending decisions, incidents, and related matters within the
prescribed period of time. It is likewise possible that some of
them, motivated by ill will or malice, may simply exercise their
whims and caprices in not issuing the order of revival on time.
Civil Law; Periods; A year is equivalent to 365 days regardless

of whether it is a regular year or a leap year. Equally so, under the
Administrative Code of 1987, a year is composed of 12 calendar
months. The number of days is irrelevant.—Granting for the sake
of argument that this Court should take into account 2004 as a
leap year and that the one-year period to revive the case should
be reckoned from the date of receipt of the order of provisional
dismissal by Uy, We still hold that the motion to revive the
criminal cases against Co was timely filed. A year is equivalent to
365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year.
Equally so, under the Administrative Code of 1987, a year is
composed of 12 calendar months. The number of days is
irrelevant.
Attorneys; Code of Professional Responsibility; The Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) enjoins lawyers to observe the
rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of
justice (Rule 10.03, Canon 10) as well as not to unduly delay a
case or misuse court processes (Rule 12.04, Canon 12).—We find it
hard to disregard the thought that the instant petition was filed
as a dilatory tactic to
506
prosecute Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634.

As correctly pointed out by Uy since the time when the “Motion
for Permanent Dismissal” was filed, the issues raised herein were
already resolved with finality by this Court in G.R. No. 171096.
Verily, Co, acting through the guidance and advice of his counsel,
Atty. Oscar C. Maglaque, adopted a worthless and vexatious legal
maneuver for no purpose other than to delay the trial court
proceedings. It appears that Atty. Maglaque’s conduct
contravened the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins
lawyers to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them
to defeat the ends of justice (Rule 10.03, Canon 10) as well as not
to unduly delay a case or misuse court processes (Rule 12.04,
Canon 12). The Lawyer’s Oath also upholds in particular: x x x I
will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false
or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay
no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients x x x.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Oscar C. Maglaque for petitioner.
Teresita Dizon Capulong for respondent.
PERALTA,** J.:
PERALTA,** J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure
(Rules) are the April 30, 20082 and August 1, 20083
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. S.P.
No. 102975, which
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1 Surnamed Yu in some parts of the records.
**
Designated as Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 1707 dated
June 17, 2014.
2 Rollo, p. 36.
3 Penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., with
Associate Justices Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Vicente S.E. Veloso,
concurring; id., at pp. 38-40, 307-309.
507
dismissed the petition and denied the motion for

reconsideration, respectively. In effect, the CA affirmed the
January 28, 2008 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Branch 121 of Caloocan City, which annulled and set
aside the Orders dated September 4, 20065 and November
16, 20066 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch
50 of Caloocan City, permanently dismissing Criminal Case
Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634.
The facts are simple and undisputed:
Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products,
represented by Elizabeth Uy (Uy), is the private
complainant in Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77
and 209634 for Violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang
22 filed against petitioner William Co (Co), which were
raffled to the MeTC Branch 49 of Caloocan City. In the
absence of Uy and the private counsel, the cases were
provisionally dismissed on June 9, 2003 in open court
pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure (Rules).7 Uy received a copy of the
June 9, 2003 Order on July 2, 2003, while her counsel-of-
record received a copy a day after.8 On July 2, 2004, Uy,
through counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the Criminal
Cases.9
_______________
4 Rollo, pp. 243-246.
5 Id., at pp. 172-174.
6 Id., at p. 206.
7 Id., at p. 44. Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the Rules states:
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal.—A case shall not be provisionally

dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice
to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become
permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having
been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of
more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become
permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived.
8 Rollo, p. 57.
9 Id., at pp. 50, 58.
508
Hon. Belen B. Ortiz, then Presiding Judge of the MeTC

Branch 49, granted the motion on October 14, 2004 and
denied Co’s motion for reconsideration.10 When Co moved
for recusation, Judge Ortiz inhibited herself from handling
the criminal cases per Order dated January 10, 2005.11 The
cases were, thereafter, raffled to the MeTC Branch 50 of
Caloocan City. On March 17, 2005, Co filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO)/writ of preliminary
injunction (WPI) before the RTC of Caloocan City
challenging the revival of the criminal cases.12 It was,
however, dismissed for lack of merit on May 23, 2005.13
Co’s motion for reconsideration was, subsequently, denied
on December 16, 2005.14 Co then filed a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court,
which was docketed as G.R. No. 171096.15 We dismissed
the petition per Resolution dated February 13, 2006.16
There being no motion for reconsideration filed, the
dismissal became final and executory on March 20, 2006.17
Before the MeTC Branch 50 where Criminal Case Nos.
206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 were re-raffled after the
inhibition of Judge Ortiz, Co filed a “Motion for Permanent
Dismissal” on July 13, 2006.18 Uy opposed the motion,
contending that the motion raised the same issues already
resolved with finality by this Court in G.R. No. 171096.19 In
spite of this, Judge Esteban V. Gonzaga issued an Order
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 56-58, 69-71.
11 Id., at p. 244.
12 Id., at pp. 72-87.
13 Id., at pp. 116-117, 292-293.
14 Id., at pp. 128, 294.
15 Id., at pp. 129-144.

16 Id., at pp. 147-148, 295-296.
17 Id., at pp. 297-298.
18 Id., at pp. 149-165.
19 Id., at pp. 166-171.
509
dated September 4, 2006 granting Co’s motion.20 When

the court subsequently denied Uy’s motion for
reconsideration on November 16, 2006,21 Uy filed a petition
for certiorari before the RTC of Caloocan City. On January
28, 2008, Hon. Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of the RTC
Branch 121 acted favorably on the petition, annulling and
setting aside the Orders dated September 4, 2006 and
November 16, 2006 and directing the MeTC Branch 50 to
proceed with the trial of the criminal cases.22 Co then filed
a petition for certiorari before the CA, which, as aforesaid,
dismissed the petition and denied his motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this present petition with prayer
for TRO/WPI.
According to Co, the following issues need to be resolved
in this petition:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL

CASES AGAINST PETITIONER ON THE GROUND OF
DENIAL OF HIS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL CONSTITUTES
FINAL DISMISSAL OF THESE CASES;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE METC ACTED WITH
JURISDICTION IN REVIVING THE CRIMINAL CASES
AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH WERE DISMISSED ON
THE GROUND OF DENIAL OF HIS RIGHT TO SPEEDY
TRIAL; and
3. ASSUMING POR GRATIA ARGUMENTI THE CASES WERE
ONLY PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED:
a. WHETHER THE ONE-YEAR TIME BAR OF THEIR
REVIVAL IS COMPUTED FROM ISSUANCE OF THE
ORDER OF PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL;
_______________
20 Id., at pp. 172-174, 299-301.
21Id., at p. 206.
22 Id., at pp. 243-246, 302-305.
510
b. WHETHER THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF DAYS IN A YEAR

IS THE BASIS FOR COMPUTING THE ONE-YEAR TIME
BAR;
c. WHETHER THE PROVISIONALLY DISMISSED CASES
AGAINST PETITIONER ARE REVIVED IPSO FACTO BY
THE FILING OF MOTION TO REVIVE THESE CASES.23
Co argues that the June 9, 2003 Order provisionally

dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and
209634 should be considered as a final dismissal on the
ground that his right to speedy trial was denied. He
reasons out that from his arraignment on March 4, 2002
until the initial trial on June 9, 2003, there was already a
“vexatious, capricious and oppressive” delay, which is in
violation of Section 6 of Republic Act 8493 (Speedy Trial
Act of 1998)24 and Section 2, Paragraph 2, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure25 mandating that the
entire trial period
_______________
[23] Id., at pp. 12-13.
[24] Section 6. Time Limit for Trial.—In criminal cases involving
persons charged of a crime, except those subject to the Rules on Summary
Procedure, or where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed six (6)
months imprisonment, or a fine of One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or
both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, the justice or judge shall,
after consultation with the public prosecutor and the counsel for the
accused, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other short-term
trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure speedy trial. In
no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred eighty (180) days
from the first day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 3, Rule 22 of the Rules
of Court.
[25] SEC. 2. Continuous trial until terminated; postponements.—Trial
once commenced shall continue from day to day as far as practicable until
terminated. It may be postponed for a reasonable period of time for good
cause.
The court shall, after consultation with the prosecutor and defense
counsel, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other
511
should not exceed 180 days from the first day of trial. As
the dismissal is deemed final, Co contends that the MeTC
lost its jurisdiction over the cases and cannot reacquire
jurisdiction over the same based on a mere motion because
its revival would already put him in double jeopardy.
Assuming that the criminal cases were only
provisionally dismissed, Co further posits that such
dismissal became permanent one year after the issuance of
the June 9, 2003 Order, not after notice to the offended

party. He also insists that both the filing of the motion to
revive and the trial court’s issuance of the order granting
the revival must be within the one-year period. Lastly,
even assuming that the one-year period to revive the
criminal cases started on July 2, 2003 when Uy received
the June 9, 2003 Order, Co asserts that the motion was
filed one day late since year 2004 was a leap year.
The petition is unmeritorious.
At the outset, it must be noted that the issues raised in
this petition were also the meat of the controversy in Co’s
previous petition in G.R. No. 171096, which We dismissed
per Resolution dated February 13, 2006. Such dismissal
became final and executory on March 20, 2006. While the
first petition was dismissed mainly due to procedural
infirmities, this Court nonetheless stated therein that “[i]n
any event, the petition lacks sufficient showing that
respondent court had committed any reversible error in the
questioned judgment to warrant the exercise by this Court of
its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case.” Hence,
upon the finality of Our February 13, 2006 Resolution in
G.R. No. 171096, the same already consti-
_______________
short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure
speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred
eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise
authorized by the Supreme Court.
The time limitations provided under this section and the preceding
section shall not apply where special laws or circulars of the Supreme
Court provide for a shorter period of trial.
512
tutes as res judicata between the parties. On this ground

alone, this petition should have been dismissed outright.
Even if We are to squarely resolve the issues repeatedly
raised in the present petition, Co’s arguments are
nonetheless untenable on the grounds as follows:
First, Co’s charge that his right to a speedy trial was
violated is baseless. Obviously, he failed to show any
evidence that the alleged “vexatious, capricious and
oppressive” delay in the trial was attended with malice or
that the same was made without good cause or justifiable
motive on the part of the prosecution. This Court has
emphasized that “‘speedy trial’ is a relative term and
necessarily a flexible concept.”26 In determining whether
the accused’s right to speedy trial was violated, the delay
should be considered in view of the entirety of the

proceedings.27 The factors to balance are the following: (a)
duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of
the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by
such delay.28 Surely, mere mathematical reckoning of the
time involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday
life must be regarded in judicial proceedings which, after
all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that particular regard
must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to
each case.29 “While the Court recognizes the accused’s right
to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy
administration of justice, we cannot deprive the State of a
reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals.
Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an
unreasonable length of
_______________
26 Jacob v. Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, G.R. No. 162206,
November 17, 2010, 635 SCRA 94, 106.
27 Id.; People v. Rama, 403 Phil. 155, 168; 350 SCRA 266, 277 (2001).
28 Tan v. People of the Philippines, 604 Phil. 68, 81; 586 SCRA 139, 154
(2009).
29 Id.; supra note 26 at pp. 106-107.
513
time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy

trial.”30
Second, Co is burdened to establish the essential
requisites of the first paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of
the Rules, which are conditions sine qua non to the
application of the time-bar in the second paragraph thereof,
to wit: (1) the prosecution with the express conformity of
the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin
perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and
the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; (2)
the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional
dismissal of the case; (3) the court issues an order granting
the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and (4)
the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of
provisional dismissal of the case.31 In this case, it is
apparent from the records that there is no notice of any
motion for the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos.
206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 or of the hearing thereon
which was served on the private complainant at least three
days before said hearing as mandated by Section 4, Rule 15
of the Rules.32 The fact is that it was only in open court
that Co moved for provisional dismissal “considering that,
as per records, complainant had not shown any interest to

pursue her complaint.”33 The importance of a prior notice to
_______________
30 Supra note 27.
31 People v. Lacson, 448 Phil. 317, 370-371; 400 SCRA 267, 292-293
(2003), as cited in Los Baños v. Pedro, 604 Phil. 215, 229; 586 SCRA 303,
310-311 (2009).
32 Sec. 4. Hearing of motion.—Except for motions which the court
may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every
written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing
thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the
other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the
court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.
33 See Order dated June 9, 2003 (Rollo, p. 44).
514
the offended party of a motion for provisional dismissal is

aptly explained in People v. Lacson:34
x x x It must be borne in mind that in crimes involving private

interests, the new rule requires that the offended party or parties
or the heirs of the victims must be given adequate a priori notice
of any motion for the provisional dismissal of the criminal case.
Such notice may be served on the offended party or the heirs of
the victim through the private prosecutor, if there is one, or
through the public prosecutor who in turn must relay the notice to
the offended party or the heirs of the victim to enable them to
confer with him before the hearing or appear in court during the
hearing. The proof of such service must be shown during the
hearing on the motion, otherwise, the requirement of the new rule
will become illusory. Such notice will enable the offended party or
the heirs of the victim the opportunity to seasonably and
effectively comment on or object to the motion on valid grounds,
including: (a) the collusion between the prosecution and the
accused for the provisional dismissal of a criminal case thereby
depriving the State of its right to due process; (b) attempts to
make witnesses unavailable; or (c) the provisional dismissal of the
case with the consequent release of the accused from detention
would enable him to threaten and kill the offended party or the
other prosecution witnesses or flee from Philippine jurisdiction,
provide opportunity for the destruction or loss of the prosecution’s
physical and other evidence and prejudice the rights of the
offended party to recover on the civil liability of the accused by his
concealment or furtive disposition of his property or the
consequent lifting of the writ of preliminary attachment against

his property.35
Third, there is evident want of jurisprudential support

on Co’s supposition that the dismissal of the cases became
permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003
Order
_______________
34 448 Phil. 317; 400 SCRA 267 (2003).
35 Supra note 31 at pp. 378-379; pp. 299-300.
515
and not after notice to the offended party. When the Rules
states that the provisional dismissal shall become
permanent one year after the issuance of the order
temporarily dismissing the case, it should not be literally
interpreted as such. Of course, there is a vital need to
satisfy the basic requirements of due process; thus, said in
one case:
Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the
order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after the
issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the
provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal
shall become permanent one year after service of the order of
dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the
prosecution without the criminal case having been revived. The
public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline
unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal.36
We hasten to add though that if the offended party is

represented by a private counsel the better rule is that the
reckoning period should commence to run from the time
such private counsel was actually notified of the order of
provisional dismissal. When a party is represented by a
counsel, notices of all kinds emanating from the court
should be sent to the latter at his/her given address.37
Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules analogously provides that if
any party has appeared by counsel, service upon the former
shall be made upon the latter.38
_______________
36 Id., at p. 371; p. 311.
37 See Sy v. Fairland Knitcraft Co., Inc., G.R. No. 182915 and G.R. No.
189658, December 12, 2011, 662 SCRA 67, 100 and Bello v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 559 Phil. 20, 27; 532 SCRA 234, 241 (2007),
citing Ginete v. Sunrise Manning Agency, 411 Phil. 953, 957-958; 359
SCRA 404, 408 (2001).
38 Id.
516
Fourth, the contention that both the filing of the motion

to revive the case and the court order reviving it must be
made prior to the expiration of the one-year period is
unsustainable. Such interpretation is not found in the
Rules. Moreover, to permit otherwise would definitely put
the offended party at the mercy of the trial court, which
may wittingly or unwittingly not comply. Judicial notice
must be taken of the fact that most, if not all, of our trial
court judges have to deal with clogged dockets in addition
to their administrative duties and functions. Hence, they
could not be expected to act at all times on all pending
decisions, incidents, and related matters within the
prescribed period of time. It is likewise possible that some
of them, motivated by ill will or malice, may simply
exercise their whims and caprices in not issuing the order
of revival on time.
Fifth, the fact that year 2004 was a leap year is
inconsequential to determine the timeliness of Uy’s motion
to revive the criminal cases. What is material instead is
Co’s categorical admission that Uy is represented by a
private counsel who only received a copy of the June 9,
2003 Order on July 3, 2003. Therefore, the motion was not
belatedly filed on July 2, 2004. Since the period for filing a
motion to revive is reckoned from the private counsel’s
receipt of the order of provisional dismissal, it necessarily
follows that the reckoning period for the permanent
dismissal is likewise the private counsel’s date of receipt of
the order of provisional dismissal.
And sixth, granting for the sake of argument that this
Court should take into account 2004 as a leap year and
that the one-year period to revive the case should be
reckoned from the date of receipt of the order of provisional
dismissal by Uy, We still hold that the motion to revive the
criminal cases against Co was timely filed. A year is
equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular
year or a leap year.39
_______________
39 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group,
Inc., 558 Phil. 182, 189; 531 SCRA 436, 442 (2007).
517
Equally so, under the Administrative Code of 1987, a

year is composed of 12 calendar months. The number of
days is irrelevant. This was our ruling in Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc.,40
which was subsequently reiterated in Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc.,41
thus:
x x x [In] 1987, EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was

enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides:
Sec. 31. Legal Periods.—“Year” shall be understood
to be twelve calendar months; “month” of thirty days,
unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it
shall be computed according to the number of days the
specific month contains; “day,” to a day of twenty-four hours
and; “night” from sunrise to sunset. (emphasis supplied)
A calendar month is “a month designated in the calendar
without regard to the number of days it may contain.” It is the
“period of time running from the beginning of a certain numbered
day up to, but not including, the corresponding numbered day of
the next month, and if there is not a sufficient number of days in
the next month, then up to and including the last day of that
month.” To illustrate, one calendar month from December 31,
2007 will be from January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2008; one
calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1,
2008 until February 29, 2008.42
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the

Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the one-year
period reckoned from the time Uy received the order of
dismissal on July 2, 2003 consisted of 24 calendar months,
computed as follows:
_______________
40 558 Phil. 182; 531 SCRA 436 (2007).
41 G.R. No. 184823, October 6, 2010, 632 SCRA 422.
42 Supra note 40.
518
1st calendar month July 3, 2003 to August 2, 2003

2nd calendar month August 3, 2003 to September 2, 2003
3rd calendar month September 3, 2003 to October 2, 2013
4th calendar month October 3, 2003 to November 2, 2003
5th calendar month November 3, 2003 to December 2, 2003
6th calendar month December 3, 2003 to January 2, 2004
7th calendar month January 3, 2004 to February 2, 2004
8th calendar month February 3, 2004 to March 2, 2004
9th calendar month March 3, 2004 to April 2, 2004
10th calendar month April 3, 2004 to May 2, 2004
11th calendar month May 3, 2004 to June 2, 2004

12th calendar month June 3, 2004 to July 2, 2004
In the end, We find it hard to disregard the thought that

the instant petition was filed as a dilatory tactic to
prosecute Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and
209634. As correctly pointed out by Uy since the time when
the “Motion for Permanent Dismissal” was filed, the issues
raised herein were already resolved with finality by this
Court in G.R. No. 171096. Verily, Co, acting through the
guidance and advice of his counsel, Atty. Oscar C.
Maglaque, adopted a worthless and vexatious legal
maneuver for no purpose other than to delay the trial court
proceedings. It appears that Atty. Maglaque’s conduct
contravened the Code of Professional Responsibility which
enjoins lawyers to observe the rules of procedure and not to
misuse them to defeat the ends of justice (Rule 10.03,
Canon 10) as well as not to unduly delay a case or misuse
court processes (Rule 12.04, Canon 12). The Lawyer’s Oath
also upholds in particular:
x x x I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any

groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the
same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my
clients x x x.
519
This Court has repeatedly impressed upon counsels that

the need for the prompt termination of litigation is
essential to an effective and efficient administration of
justice. In Spouses Aguilar v. Manila Banking
Corporation,43 We said:
The Court reminds petitioners’ counsel of the duty of lawyers

who, as officers of the court, must see to it that the orderly
administration of justice must not be unduly impeded. It is the
duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman on the
intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of
his case. If he finds that his client’s cause is defenseless, then it is
his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit,
rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist
the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client’s
propensity to litigate. A lawyer’s oath to uphold the cause of
justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is
indisputable.44
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is

DENIED. The April 30, 2008 and August 1, 2008
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, respectively, in C.A.-
G.R. S.P. No. 102975, which affirmed the January 28, 2008
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121 of
Caloocan City, annulling and setting aside the Orders
dated September 4, 2006 and November 16, 2006 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 50 of Caloocan City that
permanently dismissed Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59,
206661-77 and 209634, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs of
suit to be paid by the petitioner.
The Commission on Bar Discipline-Integrated Bar of the
Philippines is DIRECTED to investigate Atty. Oscar C.
Maglaque for his acts that appear to have violated the
Lawyer’s Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
the Rule on Forum Shopping.
_______________
43 533 Phil. 645; 502 SCRA 354 (2006).
44 Id., at p. 669; p. 381.
520
SO ORDERED.
Villarama, Jr.,*** Mendoza, Reyes**** and Leonen, JJ.,

concur.
Petition denied, resolutions affirmed.
Notes.—The right to a speedy trial is available only to

an accused and is a peculiarly criminal law concept, while
the broader right to a speedy disposition of cases may be
tapped in any proceedings conducted by state agencies.
(Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.
[COCOFED] vs. Republic, 663 SCRA 514 [2012])
In determining the right of the accused to speedy trial,
courts should do more than a mathematical computation of
the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of
the case. (Villareal vs. People, 664 SCRA 519 [2012])
——o0o——
_______________
***Designated acting member per Special Order No. 1691 dated May
22, 2014.
****Designated acting member in lieu of Associate Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr., per Special Order No. 1704 dated June 17, 2014.

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8/7/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 727

G.R. No. 183994. June 30, 2014.*

Constitutional Law; Right to Speedy Trial; While the Supreme

one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public

Civil Law; Periods; A year is equivalent to 365 days regardless

prosecute Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions of the

dismissed the petition and denied the motion for

Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal.—A case shall not be provisionally

Hon. Belen B. Ortiz, then Presiding Judge of the MeTC

15 Id., at pp. 129-144.

dated September 4, 2006 granting Co’s motion.20 When

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL

b. WHETHER THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF DAYS IN A YEAR

Co argues that the June 9, 2003 Order provisionally

the June 9, 2003 Order, not after notice to the offended

tutes as res judicata between the parties. On this ground

should be considered in view of the entirety of the

time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy

as per records, complainant had not shown any interest to

the offended party of a motion for provisional dismissal is

x x x It must be borne in mind that in crimes involving private

consequent lifting of the writ of preliminary attachment against

Third, there is evident want of jurisprudential support

We hasten to add though that if the offended party is

Fourth, the contention that both the filing of the motion

Equally so, under the Administrative Code of 1987, a

x x x [In] 1987, EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was

Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the

1st calendar month July 3, 2003 to August 2, 2003

11th calendar month May 3, 2004 to June 2, 2004

In the end, We find it hard to disregard the thought that

x x x I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any

This Court has repeatedly impressed upon counsels that

The Court reminds petitioners’ counsel of the duty of lawyers

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is

Villarama, Jr.,*** Mendoza, Reyes**** and Leonen, JJ.,

Petition denied, resolutions affirmed.

Notes.—The right to a speedy trial is available only to

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Villarama, Jr.,* Mendoza, Reyes** and Leonen, JJ.,