G.R. No.

97336 February 19, 1993

Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.

Opinion By: DAVIDE, JR., J.:

NATURE:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set
aside the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals.

FACTS:
o The private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a
complaint for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get
married.
o The respondent, Marilou T. Gonzales, alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years
old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her
community.
o That she is an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette, Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City and a
high school graduate.
o The petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig,
Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern
Colleges in Dagupan City.
o The parties happened to know each other when the manager of the Mabuhay Luncheonette,
Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff.
o The petitioner courted and proposed to marry her and in which she accepted his love on the
condition that they would get married.
o They both agreed to get married after the end of the school semester.
o Petitioner visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure
their approval to the marriage.
o The petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments. She was a virgin before she
began living with him.
o It was a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change;
he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries.
o Petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and is
already married to someone living in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties
at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.
o Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the
amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00,
attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and
equitable.
o Petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint and
denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and
Affirmative Defenses.
o He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private
respondent.
o He neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment;
he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that
she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport.

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ISSUE 1:
o The issues presented are whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to
marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
o Insisting, in the petitioner’s Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that
as a result thereof, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and
P25,000.00 as moral damages.

ISSUE 2:
o Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition where he raises therein the
single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar.
o Petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love
to the private respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable
in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of promise is not actionable.

ISSUE 3:
o Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed
the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256.
o He contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal
basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and
costs.

RATIONALE:
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and
private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable
virtue who readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false
pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she
allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and
her parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some preparations for the
wedding by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f)
petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and
who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and
traditions.

o The trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would
not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to
public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.

o Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines

To compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower court
ordered him to do in its decision in this case. Designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict
in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.

o Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the
parties before the lower court.

o Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., the Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]);
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna
v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave ab

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 use of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953);
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30,
1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellate and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil.
401 [1958]); (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v.
Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,);
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of
fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and is contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA
242 [1970]).

o The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.

o Code Commission Art. 23

Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

o Article 2176 of the Civil Code

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

*. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept
while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept.
* . Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence,
but international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and
deceit.

o Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code

The criminal could not be held liable for criminal seduction Code because the private respondent was
above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.

o There are prior plethora of cases in which the Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied
in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction:

Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals - Court denied recovery of damages to the woman because
complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she
"wanted to bind" him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.

Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals - The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere
sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit,
enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman
has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
Buenaventura case (supra) - To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient
promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she
consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43
Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of
some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect,

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and which result in her person to ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her
seducer (27 Phil. 123)
American Jurisprudence - it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire of
curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the
commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend
to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of
adventuresses would be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662).

xxx xxx xxx Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out
that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a
woman of adult age, maintain intimate sexual relations with appellant,
with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the
idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion;
for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively
because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she
would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year,
without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and
would have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did
not intend to fulfill his defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise.
Hence, we conclude that no case is made under article 21 of the Civil
Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was
committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint.