G.R. No.

L-5279 31 October 1955

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, ETC.

vs.
SECRETARY OF EDUCATION and the BOARD OF TEXTBOOKS.

- Samantha Jo C. Muñoz
Facts:
Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities assailed the constitutionality
of Act No. 2706, known as the “Act making the Inspection and Recognition of private
schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction.”

As contended by PACU, the Act is unconstitutional because of the following

reasons: 1) The act deprives the owner of the school and colleges as well as teachers
and parents of liberty and property without due process of law; 2) it will also deprive
the parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency; and
3) its provisions conferred on the Secretary of Education unlimited powers and
discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute towards unlawful delegation of
legislative powers.

Additionally, the association contended that the Constitution guaranteed every

citizen the right to own and operate a school and any law requiring previous
governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise the said right.
On the contrary, the Department of Education maintained that 1) the matters does not
contain justiciable controversy and thus does not need court decision or intervention;
2) petitioners are in estoppels to challenge the validity of the said act; and 3) the Act
is constitutionally valid.

Section 1 of Act No. 2706 provides that “It shall be the duty of the Secretary of
Public Instruction to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all private schools and
colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish adequate instruction to the
public, in accordance with the class and grade of instruction given in them, and for this
purpose said Secretary or his duly-authorized representative shall have authority to
advise, inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine the
efficiency of instruction given in the same.”

Issue:
Whether or not Act No. 2706 is unconstitutional.

Ruling:

No, Act No. 2706 is constitutional.

The organic law provides that the state has the power to regulate private
schools for the development of morals, civic efficiency, and scientific aptitude of
students. The court found no justiciable controversy. The power of the courts to
declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interest of litigant require the use
of judicial authority for their protection against actual interference. As such, judicial
power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies. Thus, the court does
not sit to adjudicate a mere academic question, such as that provided by the petitioner.
On this phase of the litigation, the court conclude that there has been no undue
delegation of legislative power even if the petitioners appended a list of circulars and
memoranda issued by the Department of Education.
 G.R. No. 118577, 7 March 1995

Mariano, Jr. vs. COMELEC

- Samantha Jo C. Muñoz
Facts:

Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as

taxpayers, assail Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 (“An Act Converting the
Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati”).
Another petition which contends the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed
by John H. Osmena as a senator, taxpayer and concerned citizen.

Issues:

1. Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the
proposed city of Makati violating sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code on specifying metes and bounds with technical
descriptions
2. Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with Section 8,
Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution stressing that the
new city’s acquisition of a new corporate existence will allow the
incumbent mayor to extend his term to more than two executive terms
as allowed by the Constitution
3. Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati is
unconstitutional as the reapportionment cannot be made by a special
law

Ruling:

1. No.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that:

Sec. 2. The City of Makati. — The Municipality of Makati shall be

converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati,
hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of
the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has
jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of
Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the
municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay
and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.

Emphasis has been provided in the provision under dispute. Said delineation
did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a
municipality. It must be noted that the requirement of metes and bounds was meant
merely as a tool in the establishment of LGUs. It is not an end in itself.

Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute
between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court
litigation. Out of becoming a sense of respect to co-equal department of government,
legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide.
 2. NO

Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that:

Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. — The represent elective officials
of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati
and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election
is held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume
their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The
appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues
exercising their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed
by the city government of the City of Makati.

Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution provide the

following:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay

officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected

for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law,
at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.

No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than

three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service
for the full term for which he was elected.

This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained as the premise on the

issue is on the occurrence of many contingent events. Considering that these events
may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to
ripen to an actual case or controversy. Moreover, only Mariano among the petitioners
is a resident of Taguig and are not the proper parties to raise this abstract issue.

3. The addition is constitutional.

Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such

as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall
be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus
worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership
by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was
done by Congress in enacting RA 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati’s
legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through
a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each
local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new
city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an
indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new
city or province a particle of their sovereignty.

Petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is
not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the
population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said section provides that a city with a
population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Even granting
that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its legislative
district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of
250,000.
 G.R. No. 171396, 3 May 2006

Randolf S. David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

- Samantha Jo C. Muñoz
Facts:

On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the
EDSA People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No.
5, declaring a state of national emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the

Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article
7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: “The President. . . whenever
it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or
suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do
hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and
order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience
to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the
Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents
stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy
among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army, and some
members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.
They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reins
of government as a clear and present danger.

Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006
on their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which
was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on
February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises – in the absence of any official of the
Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building – were several materials for
publication. The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as
basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search and seizure was
Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in
the exercise of her constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the Philippines
to prevent or suppress lawless violence.

Issues:

1. Whether the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to

PP 1017, valid?
2. Whether the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribune’s offices
conducted pursuant to PP 1017 valid?
Ruling:

The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.

1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP

1017, were NOT valid.

Searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a

validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure provides [for the following circumstances of valid
warrantless arrests]:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it;

Neither of the provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests justifies
petitioner David’s warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to
sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their
observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective “Oust Gloria
Now” and their erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the rally.
Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground
of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject
t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting
to sedition.

2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribune’s offices
conducted pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT valid.

The search and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises is illegal. Rule 126 of The
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search
and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause
in connection with one specific offence to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise
be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family
or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age
and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must
direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the
place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be
served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG
operatives.
 G.R. No. 191988, 31 August 2010

PORMENTO V ESTRADA

- Samantha Jo C. Muñoz
Facts:

Estrada was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 1998
elections. He sought the presidency again in the May 2010 elections. Pormento
opposed Estrada’s candidacy and filed a petition for disqualification. COMELEC
(Division) denied his petition as well as his subsequent Motion for Reconsideration (En
Banc). Pormento then filed the present petition for certiorari before the Court. In the
meantime, Estrada was able to participate as a candidate for President in the May 10,
2010 elections where he garnered the second highest number of votes.

Issue:

Is Estrada disqualified to run for presidency in the May 2010 elections in view of
the prohibition in the Constitution which states that: "[t]he President shall not be eligible
for any re-election?

Ruling:

Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran. Since the
issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase any re-election will be premised on a
persons second (whether immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or
controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists. There is
in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may
conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the
parties herein. As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of
judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this
case.

As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court
is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare
principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the
case before it. In other words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable.

An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy

because the issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in
dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention
unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for
the court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent
events.

Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a

President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no
longer true today. Following the results of that elections, private respondent was not
elected President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his re-election will
simply be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.
 G.R. No. 107921, 1 July 1993

Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority

- Samantha Jo C. Muñoz
Facts:

Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare as unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44

of Republic Act No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing
Act of 1992. He predicates his locust standi on his being a consultant of the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) pursuant to a Contract of
Consultancy on Operation for Removal of Obstructions and Encroachments on
Properties of Public Domain (executed immediately after his retirement on 2 January
1992 from the Philippine National Police) and his being a taxpayer. As to the first, he
alleges that said Sections 28 and 44 "contain the seeds of a ripening controversy that
serve as drawback" to his "tasks and duties regarding demolition of illegal structures";
because of the said sections, he "is unable to continue the demolition of illegal
structures which he assiduously and faithfully carried out in the past." 1 As a taxpayer,
he alleges that "he has a direct interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly
and lawfully disbursed." 2

On 14 May 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment to the petition. He
maintains that, the instant petition is devoid of merit for non-compliance with the
essential requisites for the exercise of judicial review in cases involving the
constitutionality of a law. He contends that there is no actual case or controversy with
litigants asserting adverse legal rights or interests, that the petitioner merely asks for
an advisory opinion, that the petitioner is not the proper party to question the Act as
he does not state that he has property "being squatted upon" and that there is no
showing that the question of constitutionality is the very lis mota presented. He argues
that Sections 28 and 44 of the Act are not constitutionality infirm.

Issue:

Whether or not Petitioner has legal standing

Held:

It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act

of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that, question is properly
raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the
case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be very lis mota presented. 8 To reiterate,
the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a
law are: (a) the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal
rights susceptible of judicial determination, (b) the constitutional question must be
raised by a proper property, (c) the constitutional question must be raised at the
opportunity, and (d) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to
the decision of the case. 9 A proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of
sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of.

It is easily discernible in the instant case that the first two (2) fundamental requisites
are absent. There is no actual controversy. Moreover, petitioner does not claim that,
in either or both of the capacities in which he is filing the petition, he has been actually
prevented from performing his duties as a consultant and exercising his rights as a
property owner because of the assertion by other parties of any benefit under the
challenged sections of the said Act. Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo.
Judicial power is the "right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse
litigants."
Wherefore, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED with costs against
the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 GR. NO 96541, 24 August 1993

DEAN JOSE JOYA, et al. vs. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD

GOVERNMENT (PCGG)

- Samantha Jo C. Muñoz
Facts:

On August 15,1990, Chairman Caparas of the PCGG, signed the Consignment

Agreement with the authority given by the President Aquino on August 14,1990,
through former Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., allowing Christie's of New
York to auction off (82) Old Masters Paintings seized from Malacañang and the
Metropolitan Museum of Manila and the (71) cartons of antique silverware in the
custody of the Central Bank of the Philippines, and such other property as may
subsequently be identified by PCGG and accepted by CHRISTIE'S to be subject to
the provisions of the agreement which were alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth
of the late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies for and in behalf of the Republic
of the Philippines scheduled January 11,1991.

On October 26,1990, Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo of COA submitted to

President Aquino the audit result on the Consignment Agreement that: (a) the authority
of former PCGG Chairman Caparas to enter into the Consignment Agreement was of
doubtful legality; (b) the contract was highly disadvantageous to the government; (c)
PCGG had a poor track record in asset disposal by auction in the U.S.; and, (d) the
assets subject of auction were historical relics and had cultural significance, hence,
their disposal was prohibited by law. Then the new PCGG Chairman David M. Castro,
defended the contract made and refuting the allegations of Chairman Domingo on
November 15, 1990. On that same date, Director of National Museum, Gabriel S.
Casal, issued a certification that the items subject of the Consignment Agreement did
not fall within the classification of protected cultural properties and did not specifically
qualify as part of the Filipino cultural heritage. Hence the petition was filed on January
7, 1991

Petitioners raise the following issues:

1. Whether petitioners have legal standing to file the instant petition;
2. Whether the Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware are embraced in
the phrase "cultural treasure of the nation" which is under the protection of
the state pursuant to the 1987 Constitution and/or "cultural properties"
contemplated under R.A. 4846, otherwise known as "The Cultural
Properties Preservation and Protection Act;"
3. Whether the paintings and silverware are properties of public dominion on
which can be disposed of through the joint concurrence of the President and
Congress;
4. Whether respondent, PCGG has the jurisdiction and authority to enter into
an agreement with Christie's of New York for the sale of the artworks;
5. Whether, PCGG has complied with the due process clause and other
statutory requirements for the exportation and sale of the subject items; and,
6. Whether the petition has become moot and academic, and if so, whether
the above issues warrant resolution from this Court.
 Issue:

Whether the petition complies with the legal requisites of judicial inquiry, whether
petitioners has the legal standing & the actual controversy of the petition.

Ruling:

In relation to the issue of the legal standing and the actual controversy,
with the allegation of the petitioners, “that the paintings were donated by private
persons from different parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila
Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-stock corporations established to promote
non-Philippine arts. The foundation's chairman was former First Lady Imelda R.
Marcos, while its president was Bienvenido R. Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership
of the paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members
thereof. Similarly, the pieces of antique silverware were given to the Marcos couple as
gifts from friends and dignitaries from foreign countries on their silver wedding and
anniversary, an occasion personal to them. The confiscation of the properties by the
Aquino administration however should not be understood to mean that the ownership
of the paintings has automatically passed on the government without complying with
constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just compensation. The
court held that one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction
of the court as party-plaintiff in an action on the premised of Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the
Rules of Court which provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in
the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest in the subject
of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. And
since the purpose of the petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials
from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date — 11 January 1991
— which is long past, the issues raised in the petition have become moot and
academic.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for prohibition and mandamus
was DISMISSED.
 G.R. No. L-72119, 29 May 1987

Legaspi vs. CSC

- Samantha Jo C. Muñoz
Facts:

The respondent CSC had denied petitioner Valentin Legaspi’s request for
information on the civil service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas
who were employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City.
Sibonghanoy and Agas had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligible
who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.

Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas
is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the
extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent CSC to disclose said
information.

The respondent CSC takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring the
suit. It is asserted that the petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspi’s actual interest
in the civil service eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit

Ruling:

The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It
has been held in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, that when the question
is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of
a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest, and the person at
whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal
or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as
such interested in the execution of the laws.

It becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of

a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the
petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the
right.

The petitioner, being a citizen who as such, is clothed with personality to seek
redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right.
 G.R. No. L-52245 22 January 1980

PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR.,

vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
- Samantha Jo C. Muñoz

Facts:
Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg
52 as discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and due process guarantees of
the Constitution. Sec. 4 provides that any retired elective provicial or municipal official
who has received payments of retirement benefits and shall have been 65 years of
age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall
not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired.
According to Dumlao, the provision amounts to class legislation. Petitioners Igot and
Salapantan Jr. also assail the validity of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52, which
states that any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including
those amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or other similar crimes, shall
not be qualified for any of the offices covered by the act, or to participate in any partisan
activity therein: provided that a judgment of conviction of those crimes shall be
conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of such
crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be
prima facie evidence of such fact.

Issue:
Whether or not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate the Constitution and
thus, should be declared null and void

Ruling:
In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Blg 52 remains
constitutional and valid. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is
subject to rational classification. One class can be treated differently from another
class. In this case, employees 65 years of age are classified differently from younger
employees. The purpose of the provision is to satisfy the “need for new blood” in the
workplace. In regards to the second paragraph of Sec. 4, it should be declared null
and void for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed
to an accused. “Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution).
An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The
challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a
candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges
have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one
is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made
between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have
been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A
person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed
against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of
a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of
suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised
Penal Code).”
 And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and
therefore, may be rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present danger" that because of
the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of
disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against
him.

Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before
the Courts rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly
possible conflict of findings between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment
of a person charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative
determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial
determination.

Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that
objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second
paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself.

Wherefore, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 is hereby

declared valid and that portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the
constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.
 G.R. No. 113375, 5 May 1994
Kilosbayan v. Guingona
- Samantha Jo C. Muñoz
Facts:
This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction which seeks to prohibit and
restrain the implementation of the Contract of Lease executed by the PCSO and the
Philippine Gaming Management Corporation in connection with the on-line lottery
system, also known as lotto.
Petitioners strongly opposed the setting up of the on-line lottery system on the
basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. It submitted that said contract of
lease violated Section 1 of R. A. No. 1169, as amended by B. P. Blg. 42.
Respondents contended, among others, that, the contract does not violate the
Foreign Investment Act of 1991; that the issues of wisdom, morality and propriety of
acts of the executive department are beyond the ambit of judicial reviews; and that
the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit.

Issues:
1. Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the instant petition.
2. Whether or not the contract of lease is legal and valid.

Ruling:
As to the preliminary issue, the Court resolved to set aside the procedural
technicality in view of the importance of the issues raised. The Court adopted the
liberal policy on locus standi to allow the ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress,
and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations to initiate and
prosecute actions to question the validity or constitutionality of laws, acts, decisions,
or rulings of various government agencies or instrumentalities.
As to the substantive issue, the Court agrees with the petitioners whether the
contract in question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent
contractor should not be decided on the basis of the title or designation of the
contract but by the intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions
of the contract itself. Animus homini est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the
soul of the instrument.
Therefore the instant petition is granted and the challenged Contract of Lease
is hereby declared contrary to law and invalid.