Cases and Materials International Law
Cases and Materials International Law
Cases and Materials International Law
International Law
Bishkek 2012
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Student Contributors
American University of Central Asia: Altynai Abdyldaeva, Myrzagul Aida-
ralieva, Zulaika Anvarbekova, Chynara Baichaeva, Shirin Gurdova, Aigerim
Kebekchieva, Medina Kuldaeva, Ermek Mamaev, Nazik Muradova, Altynai
Ryspaeva, Nurjan Subanbekova, Sultan Tolomushev, Asel Tursunbekova. Kyrgyz
State Academy of Law: Jyldyz Turcalieva.
Copy Editors
Steven Lustig, Associate Professor, Acting Chair of Business Administration
Department, American University of Central Asia, Aiaz Baetov, Kyrgyz National
University, for the Russian Edition, and Gulnaz Naamatova, Director Legal Clinic,
American University of Central Asia, for additional edits and translation.
Project Liaisons
Fulbright Association of the Kyrgyz Republic: Dr. Baktybek Keldibekov,
Deputy Director, Kyrgyz-Chinese Institute, Kyrgyz National University, President
of the Fulbright Association, Ruslan Myrzalimov, Director International Depart-
ment, Kyrgyz National University and Former Association President Baktibek
Ismailov, Ministry of Education, Kyrgyz Republic.
The Editors thank the authors, scholars and publishers who agreed to
contribute their work in gratis to this book which will be provided at no cost
to university faculty and students of Kyrgyzstan in support of their legal educa-
tion, including David Weissbrodt and Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Ashfaq Khalfan and
Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Dinah Shelton, Richard Lillich, Hurst Hannum,
and James Anaya, Vyacheslav V. Gavrilov, Andrew Clapham, Sir Franklin Berman,
Noemi Gal-Or, Alison MacDonald, Louis-Philippe Rouillard, Oxford University
Press, Aspen Publishers, The American Bar Association, New Zealand Armed
Forces Law Review, Santa Clara University Law Review, and the United Nations.
We also thank for circulation, insights or peer review Chynara Musabekova, Bek-
bosun Borubashov, Leonard Hammer, Diane Amann, and Naomi Roht-Arriaza,
and the Max Planck Institute for its in-depth resources on the International
Court of Justice. The Editors also thank Adviser Kanatbek Abdukadyrov, Dean
International Law Faculty, Kyrgyz State Academy of Law, and the American
University of Central Asia Tian Shan Policy Center, Rodger L. Dillon, Director,
and AUCA International and Business Law Department, for additional support.
Special thanks to the United States Embassy in the Kyrgyz Republic for
support of the Project and the publication of the book in Russian and English
languages, and enormous thanks to the Project’s key advisers from the U.S.
Embassy Ms. Guljan Tolbaeva, Cultural Affairs Assistant, and the Public Affairs
Officer, Kimberly McDonald.
Ta b l e o f C o n t e n t s
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS............................................................................................................2
PART I.............................................................................................................................................................. 30
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................................. 30
CHAPTER 2
SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW............................................................... 33
Overview............................................................................................................................................. 69
Brownlie, “Subjects of International Law”...................................................... 69
Blakesley, “States and Statehood: The Aura of Sovereignty”.............. 79
States...................................................................................................................................................... 80
Definition of a State
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States........... 80
Membership in the United Nations
The United Nations Charter, Article 3................................................................ 80
Defined Territory and Population
Western Sahara, I.C.J. Advisory Opinion, 1975............................................. 81
Principle That All States Are Equal......................................................................... 84
Declaration on Principles of International Law Operation
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.............................. 84
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons in Armed
Conflict, I.C.J. Advisory Opinion, 1996............................................................... 86
Question of Statehood: International Legal Personality...................... 88
Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria,
(Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), 2002......... 88
Creation of New States............................................................................................................ 89
Declaration of Independence of a People—Recognition of a New
State................................................................................................................................................ 89
Declaration of Independence by Kosovo, I.C.J. Advisory Opinion,
2010............................................................................................................................................... 89
Introduction................................................................................................................................. 263
What are Human Rights? .......................................................................................... 263
Overview of Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR)................................................................................................................................ 263
Development of International Human Rights Law.............................. 265
The International Bill of Human Rights
Fact Sheet No.2 (Rev.1)................................................................................................ 266
Treaty Bodies................................................................................................................................ 269
Sources of International
Humanitarian Law................................................................................................................... 386
The First Geneva Convention................................................................................ 386
List of Customary Rules of International
Humanitarian Law........................................................................................................... 388
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
I.C.J. Advisory Opinion, 1996.................................................................................. 398
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia......................................................................... 402
Jus Ad Bellum and Jus In Bello....................................................................................... 404
Fundamental Distinction Between Jus Ad Bellum
(On The Legality Of The Use Of Force) And Jus In Bello
(On The Humanitarian Rules To Be Respected In Warfare)........... 404
International Law Commission,
Articles on State Responsibility............................................................................. 407
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Tablada................ 410
Combatants and Prisoners of War............................................................................... 412
The First Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
(Protocol I)............................................................................................................................ 412
The Third Geneva Convention, 1949.............................................................. 413
Convention on the Safety of UN Personnel................................................ 415
Most of the cases referred to in the book are selected portions of the In-
ternational Court of Justice decisions. Only the title of the case and year of
judgement are listed in the headings. The footnote to each case lists the ICJ
Report citation (the official volumes of decisions for the Court).
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration
of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, I.C.J. Advisory Opinion, 2010.
The U.N. General Assembly requested an advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice on the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Kosovo. The
territory of Kosovo is the subject of a dispute between Serbia and the Republic
of Kosovo established by the declaration. This was the first case regarding a
unilateral declaration of independence to be brought before the Court.
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom v. Iran), 1952. The
case involved a dispute between the United Kingdom (UK) and Iran. The UK
alleged that the Iranian Oil Nationalization act of 1951 violated a convention
agreed upon by the Anglo-Persian Oil Co. (now British Petroleum (BP)) and the
Imperial Government of Persia (now Iran) in 1933 which granted the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Co. a 60-year license to mine oil in 100,000 square miles (260,000
km2) of Iran’s territory in return for a percentage royalty. On 26 May 1951,
the UK brought a case against Iran before the International Court of Justice,
demanding that the 1933 agreement be upheld and that Iran pay damages and
compensation for disrupting the UK-incorporated company’s profits.
Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment for the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montene-
gro), 1996. On March 20, 1993, the Government of. Bosnia filed an Application
before the International Court of Justice alleging violations of the 1948 Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide
Convention) by the Government of the Yugoslavia. Bosnia asked the Court to
order Yugoslavia to cease the acts constituting such violations and declare that
Yugoslavia had incurred international responsibility for which it must make
appropriate reparation. Yugoslavia sought to dismiss the case. It argued that the
Application was not admissible because of the lack of an international dispute
and the lack of authority of the President of Bosnia at the time the Application
was filed. Yugoslavia also alleged that the Court lacked jurisdiction.
Arbitral Award (Guinea Bissau v. Senegal), 1989. On August 23, 1989,
Guinea-Bissau instituted proceedings against Senegal in the International
concerning the legality under international law of the use or the threatened
use of nuclear weapons.
The S.S. “Lotus” Case (France v. Turkey), 1927. After a collision on
2 August 1926 between the S.S. Lotus, a French steamship and the S.S. Boz-
Kourt, a Turkish steamer, in a region just north of Mytilene, the government
of Turkey brought criminal proceedings against a French officer, Monsieur
Demons, of the S.S. Lotus for the drowning of eight Turkish nationals aboard
the Boz-Kourt. On 7 September 1927, the case was presented to the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice to decide whether Turkey had authority to
try Monsieur Demons.
Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), 2009.
On 16 September 2004, Romania brought a case against Ukraine before the
International Court of Justice relating to a dispute concerning the establish-
ment of a single maritime boundary between the two states in the Black Sea,
thereby delimiting the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones
(EEZ) appertaining to them. Romania requested the Court to draw the boundary
in accordance with international law and, specifically, the criteria of Article 4
of the Additional Agreement between Romania and Ukraine of October 1997.
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar
and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), 2001. On 8 July 1991, Qatar instituted pro-
ceedings before the International Court of Justice against the State of Bahrain in
respect of certain disputes between the two States relating to sovereignty over
the Hawar islands, sovereign rights over the shoals of Dibal and Qit’at Jaradah,
and the delimitation of the maritime areas of the two States.
Mathieu-Mohin and Klerfeyt v. Belgium, Decision of the European
Court of Human Rights, 1987. The applicants to the European Court of
Human Rights, Ms. Lucienne Mathieu-Mohin and Mr. George Klerfeyt, lived in
the communes of the Al-Vilvord administrative district, which was part of the
bilingual Brussels region and the electoral district of Brussels. On direct elec-
tions in the late 1970’s they were elected to the House of Representatives (Ms.
Mathieu-Mohin) and Senate (Mr. Klerfeyt). During that period of time, Belgium
was divided on a linguistic basis into several regions, which was governed by
regional councils, and included members of both houses of parliament, elected
in their respective districts (in the bilingual region of Brussels two councils
were created). In the administrative county where the applicants were elected,
most of the population was Flemish, and it was governed by Flemish Council.
However, the applicants could not join it since they took a parliamentary oath
in French, thus belonging only to Francophone faction. The Court considered
violations of the European Convention on Human Rights in this context.
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) with murder (crimes against humanity, Article
5), and alternatively, murder (violations of the laws or customs of war, Article 3).
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, 2005. Tadic was a Bosnian Serb war criminal,
former SDS leader in Kozarac and a former member of the paramilitary forces
supporting the attack on the district of Prijedor. He was convicted of crimes
against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and violations
of the customs of war by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) for his actions in the Prijedor region, including the Omar-
ska, Trnopolje and Keraterm detention camps. He was sentenced to 25 years
of imprisonment.
Prosecutor v. Juvenal Kajelijeli. The case involved charges against
Kajelijeli based on his responsibility for attacks against Tutsis of the Mukingo,
Nkuli, and Kigombe communes during April 1994. The Trial Chamber found
Kajelijeli guilty of genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide,
and extermination as a crime against humanity. It found him not guilty of
conspiracy to commit genocide and crimes against humanity (rape and “other
inhumane acts”), and dismissed the charges of complicity in genocide and
crimes against humanity (murder and persecution). He was sentenced to two
terms of life imprisonment and one term of 15 years to be served concurrently.
Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, 2004. Radislav Krstić was the Deputy
Commander and Chief-of -Staff of the Drina Corps within the Bosnian Serb
Army (“VRS”). In 1998, Krstić was indicted by the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in connection with the attacks led
by the Serb forces on the Muslim enclave of Srebrenica and its surroundings
from July 1995 onwards. On 2 August 2001, the Trial Chamber found Radislav
Krstić guilty of murder, persecutions and genocide. This was the first time that
the ICTY irrevocably established that genocide was committed in Srebrenica
Krstić became the first man convicted of genocide by the Tribunal and was
sentenced to 46 years in prison.
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Uruguay v. Argentina), 2010. On
20 April 2010 the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) in The Hague delivered
its judgment in the case of Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uru-
guay). The dispute concerned the construction of a pulp mill by Uruguay on the
River Uruguay. Argentina had argued the Uruguayan pulp mills were pumping
dangerous waste into the mutual river on the border between the two countries.
Raihon Hudoyberganova v. Uzbekistan, Human Rights Commit-
tee,2004. The Committee held in favor of the author of the communication
is Raihon Hudoyberganova, an Uzbek national born in 1978. She claimed that
her right to freedom of of thought, conscience, and religion under the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was violated when her university
excluded her because she refused to remove the headscarf that she wore in
accordance with her religious beliefs.
Rainbow Warrior Case (New Zealand v. France), 1990. The case in-
volved a dispute between New Zealand and France that arose in the aftermath
of the sinking of the British-registered Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior. It
was arbitrated by UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar in 1986, who
considered international law related to State responsibility.
The Government of the Republic of South Africa. v. Grootboom
and others, Constitutional Court of South Africa, 2000. The residents of
Wallacedene lived in severe poverty, without any basic services such as water,
sewage or refuse removal. The area was partly waterlogged and dangerously
close to a main thoroughfare. Many Wallacedene residents had long since placed
their names on a waiting list for low-income housing. As time wore on, a group
of about 900 people, including Irene Grootboom, began to move from Walla-
cedene onto adjacent, vacant, privately-owned land that had been ear-marked
for low-cost housing. The private landowner obtained an eviction order and the
sheriff was ordered to dismantle and remove any structures remaining on the
land. The evicted community, with nowhere to go, moved onto the Wallacedene
sports field and tried to erect temporary structures. With legal assistance, the
community formally notified the municipality of the situation and demanded
that the municipality meet its constitutional obligation to provide temporary
accommodation. The case was eventually brought before the highest constitu-
tional court in South Africa.
Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v. Ma-
laysia), 2001. The case concerned disputed sovereignty over two small islands
in the Celebes Sea off the coast of Borneo. It was initiated by a special agreement
between Indonesia and Malaysia of 30 September 1998. On 23 October 2001,
the I.C.J. denied (14 to 1) the application of the Philippines to intervene on failure
of the applicant to demonstrate an interest of a legal nature specific to the case.
Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, U.S. Supreme Court, 1946.
From 29 October to 7 December 1945, an American military tribunal in Manila
tried General Yamashita for war crimes relating to the Manila Massacre and
many atrocities in the Philippines and Singapore against civilians and prison-
ers of war, such as the Sook Ching massacre, and sentenced him to death. This
case considered command responsibility for war crimes and is known as the
Yamashita Standard.
Yekaterina Pavlovna Lantsova v. Russia, Human Rights Committee,
2002. The author of the communication brought to the Human Rights Com-
PA R T I
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1
Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, “The Future of International Law is
Domestic (or, The European Way of Law),” 47 Harvard Int’l L. J. 327, (No. 2, Summer
2006).
CHAPTER 2
SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW
Treaty Law
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions (Qatar v.
Bahrain), 19942
***
22. The Parties agree that the exchanges of letters of December 1987
constitute an international agreement with binding force in their mutual
relations. Bahrain however maintains that the Minutes of 25 December 1990
were no more than a simple record of negotiations, similar in nature to the
Minutes of the Tripartite Committee; that accordingly they did not rank as
2
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar
v. Bahrain), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1994, p. 112.
an international agreement and could not; therefore, serve as a basis for the
jurisdiction of the Court.
23. The Court would observe, in the first place, that international agree-
ments may take a number of forms and be given a diversity of names. Article
2, paragraph (1) (a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23
May 1969 provides that for the purposes of that Convention,
“ ‘treaty’ means an international agreement concluded between States in
written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular
designation.”
Furthermore, as the Court said, in a case concerning a joint
communiqué, “it knows of no rule of international law which
might preclude a joint communiqu é from constituting an
international agreement to submit a dispute to arbitration or
judicial settlement” (Aegean Sea Continental Shelf; Judgment. I.C.J.
Reports 1978, p. 39, para. 96).
In order to ascertain whether an agreement of that kind has been con-
cluded, “the Court must have regard above al1 to its actual terms and to the
particular circumstances in which it was drawn up.” (ibid.)
***
[p.95] The Application referred to the Declarations by which the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom and the Government of Iran accepted the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2,
of the Court’s Statute….
[p. 102] On April 29th, 1933, an agreement was concluded between the
Imperial Government of Persia (now the Imperial Government of Iran, which
name the Court will use hereinafter) and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Lim-
ited (later the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Limited), a Company incorporated
in the United Kingdom. This agreement was ratified by the Iranian Majlis on
May 28th, 1933, and came into force on the following day after having received
the Imperial assent.
On March 15th and 20th, 1951, the Iranian Majlis and Senate, respectively,
3
Anglo Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom v. Iran), Preliminary Objection, Judg-
ment, I.C.J. Reports, 1952, p. 93.
the representatives of the Iranian Government and the Company has a single
purpose: the purpose of regulating the relations between that Government and
the Company in regard to the concession. It does not regulate in any way the
relations between the two Governments.
This juridical situation is not altered by the fact that the concessionary con-
tract was negotiated and entered into through the good offices of the Council
of the League of Nations, acting through its Rapporteur. The United Kingdom,
in submitting its dispute with the Iranian Government to the League Council,
was only exercising its right of diplomatic protection in favour of one of its
nationals. It was seeking redress for what it believed to be a wrong which Iran
had committed against a juristic person of British nationality. The final report
by the Rapporteur to the Council on the successful conclusion of a new con-
cessionary contract between the Iranian Government and the Company gave
satisfaction to the United Kingdom Government. The efforts of the United King-
dom Government to give diplomatic protection to a British national had thus
borne fruit, and the matter came to an end with its removal from the agenda.
Throughout the proceedings before the Council, Iran did not make any en-
gagements to the United Kingdom other than to negotiate with the Company,
and that engagement was fully executed. Iran did not give any promise or make
any pledge of any kind to the United Kingdom in regard to the new concession.
The fact that the concessionary contract was reported to the Council and placed
in its records does not convert its terms into the terms of a treaty by which
the Iranian Government is bound vis-à-vis the United Kingdom Government.
***
70. The Court must now proceed to the last stage in the argument put
forward on behalf of Denmark and the Netherlands. This is to the effect that
even if there was at the date of the Geneva Convention no rule of customary
international law in favour of the equidistance principle, and no such rule was
crystallized in Article 6 of the Convention, nevertheless such a rule has come
into being since the Convention, partly because of its own impact, partly on the
4
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal
Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports, 1969, p. 3.
basis of subsequent State practice, - and that this rule, being now a rule of cus-
tomary international law binding on all States, including therefore the Federal
Republic, should be declared applicable to the delimitation of the boundaries
between the Parties’ respective continental shelf areas in the North Sea.
71. In so far as this contention is based on the view that Article 6 of the
Convention has had the influence, and has produced the effect, described, it
clearly involves treating that Article as a norm-creating provision which has
constituted the foundation of, or has generated a rule which, while only con-
ventional or contractual in its origin, has since passed into the general corpus
of international law, and is now accepted as such by the opinio juris, so as to
have become binding even for countries which have never, and do not, become
parties to the Convention. There is no doubt that this process is a perfectly
possible one and does from time to time occur: it constitutes indeed one of the
recognized methods by which new rules of customary international law may
be formed. At the same time this result is not lightly to be regarded as having
been attained.
72. It would in the first place be necessary that the provision concerned
should, at al1 events potentially, be of a fundamentally norm-creating char-
acter such as could be regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of law.
Considered in abstracto the equidistance principle might be said to fulfill this
requirement. Yet in the particular form in which it is embodied in Article 6 of
the Geneva Convention, and having regard to the relationship of that Article
to other provisions of the Convention, this must be open to some doubt. In
the first place, Article 6is so framed as to put second the obligation to make
use of the equidistance method, causing it to come after a primary obligation
to effect delimitation by agreement. Such a primary obligation constitutes an
unusual preface to what is claimed to be a potential general rule of law. With-
out attempting to enter into, still less pronounce upon any question of ,jus
cogens, it is well understood that, in practice, rules of international law can,
by agreement, be derogated from in particular cases, or as between particular
parties,-but this is not normally the subject of any express provision, as it is in
Article 6 of the Geneva Convention. Secondly the part played by the notion
of special circumstances relative to the principle of equidistance as embodied
in Article 6, and the very considerable, still unresolved controversies as to the
exact meaning and scope of this notion, must raise further doubts as to the
potentially norm-creating character of the rule. Finally, the faculty of making
reservations to Article 6, while it might not of itself prevent the equidistance
principle being eventually received as general law, does add considerably to
the difficulty of regarding this result as having been brought about (or being
potentially possible) on the basis of the Convention :for so long as this faculty
continues to exist, and is not the subject of any revision brought about in con-
sequence of a request made under Article 13 of the Convention-of which there
is at present no official indication-it is the Convention itself which would, for
the reasons already indicated, seem to deny to the provisions of Article 6 the
same norm-creating character as, for instance, Articles 1 and 2 possess.
73. With respect to the other elements usually regarded as necessary be-
fore a conventional rule can be considered to have become a general rule of
international law, it might be that, even without the passage of any consider-
able period of time, a very widespread and representative participation in the
convention might suffice of itself, provided it include that of States whose
interests were specially affected. In the present case however, the Court notes
that, even if allowance is made for the existence of a number of States to whom
participation in the Geneva Convention is not open, or which, by reason for
instance of being land-locked States, would have no interest in becoming par-
ties to it, the number of ratifications and accessions so far secured is, though
respectable, hardly sufficient. That non-ratification may sometimes be due to
factors other than active disapproval of the convention concerned can hardly
constitute basis on which positive acceptance of its principles can be implied:
the reasons are speculative, but the facts remain.
74. As regards the time element, the Court notes that it is over ten years
since the Convention was signed, but that it is even now less than five since
it came into force in June 1964, and that when the present proceedings were
brought it was less than three years, while less than one had elapsed at the
time when the respective negotiations between the Federal Republic and the
other two Parties for a complete delimitation broke down on the question of
the application of the equidistance principle. Although the passage of only a
short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a
new rule of customary international law on the basis of what bras originally a
purely conventional rule, an indispensable requirement would be that within
the period in question, short though it might be, State practice, including that
of States whose interests are specially affected, should have been both exten-
sive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked;- and should
moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that
a rule of law or legal obligation is involved.
75. The Court must now consider whether State practice in the matter
of continental shelf delimitation has, subsequent to the Geneva Convention,
been of such a kind as to satisfy this requirement. Leaving aside cases which,
for various reasons, the Court does not consider to be reliable guides as prec-
edents, such as delimitations effected between the present Parties themselves,
or not relating to international boundaries, some fifteen cases have been cited
in the course of the present proceedings, occurring mostly since the signature
of the 1958 Geneva Convention, in which continental shelf boundaries have
been delimited according to the equidistance principle-in the majority of the
cases by agreement, in a few others unilaterally-or else the delimitation was
foreshadowed but has not yet been carried out. Amongst these fifteen are the
four North Sea delimitations United Kingdom/Norway-Denmark-Netherlands,
and Norway/Denmark already mentioned in paragraph 4 of this Judgment.
But even if these various cases constituted more than a very small proportion
of those potentially calling for delimitation in the world as a whole, the Court
would not think it necessary to enumerate or evaluate them separately, since
there are, a priori, several grounds which deprive them of weight as precedents
in the present context.
76. To begin with, over half the States concerned, whether acting unilater-
ally or conjointly, were or shortly became parties to the Geneva Convention,
and were therefore presumably, so far as they were concerned, acting actually
or potentially in the application of the Convention. From their action no in-
ference could legitimately be drawn as to the existence of a rule of customary
international law in favour of the equidistance principle. As regards those States,
on the other hand, which were not, and have not become parties to the Con-
vention, the basis of their action can only be problematical and must remain
entirely speculative. Clearly, they were not applying the Convention. But from
that no inference could justifiably be drawn that they believed themselves to be
applying a mandatory rule of customary international law. There is not a shred
of evidence that they did and, as has been seen (paragraphs 22 and 23), there
is no lack of other reasons for using the equidistance method, so that acting,
or agreeing to act in a certain way, does not of itself demonstrate anything of
a juridical nature.
77. The essential point in this connection-and it seems necessary to stress
it-is that even if these instances of action by non-parties to the Convention
were much more numerous than they in fact are, they would not, even in the
aggregate, suffice in themselves to constitute the opinion juries;-for, in order
to achieve this result, two conditions must be fulfilled. Not only must the acts
concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be car-
ried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered
obligatory by the existence of a rule of Law requiring it. The need for such a
belief, i.e. the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion
of the opinio juris sive necessitatis. The States concerned must therefore feel
that they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation. The frequency,
or even habitual character of the acts is not in itself enough. There are many
international acts, e.g., in the field of ceremonial and protocol, which are per-
formed almost invariably, but which are motivated only by considerations of
courtesy, convenience or tradition, and not by any sense of legal duty.
78. In this respect the Court follows the view adopted by the Permanent
Court of International Justice in the Lotus case, as stated in the following pas-
sage, the principle of which is, by analogy, applicable almost word for word,
mutatis mutandis, to the present case (P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 10, 1927, at p. 28):
“Even if the rarity of the judicial decisions to be found . . . were
sufficient to prove . . . the circumstance alleged . . ., it would merely
show that States had often, in practice, abstained from instituting
criminal proceedings, and not that they recognized themselves
as being obliged to do so; for only if such abstention were based
on their being conscious of having a duty to abstain would it be
possible to speak of an international custom. The alleged fact does
not allow one to infer that States have been conscious of having
such a duty on the other hand, . . .there are other circumstances
calculated to show that the contrary is true.”
Applying this dictum to the present case, the position is simply that in
certain cases-not a great number-the States concerned agreed to draw or did
draw the boundaries concerned according to the principle of equidistance.
There is no evidence that they so acted because they felt legally compelled to
draw them in this way by reason of a rule of customary law obliging them to
do so-especially considering that they might have been motivated by other
obvious factors.
***
[p. 39] For the purpose of determining whether Portugal has established the
right of passage claimed by it, the Court must have regard to what happened
during the British and post-British periods. During these periods, there had
developed between the Portuguese and the territorial sovereign with regard to
passage to the enclaves a practice upon which Portugal relies for the purpose
of establishing the right of passage claimed by it….
5
Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), Merits,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1960, p. 6.
[p. 40] The Court, therefore, concludes that, with regard to private per-
sons, civil officials and goods in general there existed during the British and
post-British periods a constant and uniform practice allowing free passage
between Daman and the enclaves. This practice having continued over a period
extending beyond a century and a quarter unaffected by the change of regime
in respect of the intervening territory which occurred when India became in-
dependent, the Court is, in view of all the circumstances of the case, satisfied
that that practice was accepted as law by the Parties and has given rise to a
right and a correlative obligation.
The Court therefore holds that Portugal had in 1954 a right of passage
over intervening Indian territory between coastal Daman and the enclaves and
between the enclaves, in respect of private persons, civil officials and goods in
general, to the extent necessary, as claimed by Portugal, for the exercise of its
sovereignty over the enclaves, and subject to the regulation and control of India.
As regards armed forces, armed police and arms and ammunition, the posi-
tion is different.
It appears that during the British period up to 1878 passage of armed forces
and armed police between British and Portuguese possessions was regulated on
a basis of reciprocity. No distinction appears to have been made in this respect
with regard to passage between Daman and the enclaves. There is nothing to
show that passage of armed forces and armed police between Daman and
the enclaves or between the enclaves was permitted or exercised as of right….
[p. 42] It would thus appear that, during the British and post-British periods,
Portuguese armed forces and armed police did not pass between Daman and
the enclaves as of right and that, after 1878, such passage could only take place
with previous authorization by the British and later by India, accorded either
under a reciprocal arrangement already agreed to, or in individual cases. Having
regard to the special circumstances of the case, this necessity for authorization
before passage could take place constitutes, in the view of the Court, a negation
of passage as of right. The practice predicates that the territorial sovereign had
the discretionary power to withdraw or to refuse permission. It is argued that
permission was always granted, but this does not, in the opinion of the Court,
affect the legal position. There is nothing in the record to show that grant of
permission was incumbent on the British or on India as an obligation….
[p.43] There was thus established a clear distinction between the practice
permitting free passage of private persons, civil officials and goods in general,
and the practice requiring previous authorization, as in the case of armed forces,
armed police, and arms and ammunition.
The Court is, therefore, of the view that no right of passage in favour of
Portugal involving a correlative obligation on India has been established in
respect of armed forces, armed police, and arms and ammunition. The course
of dealings established between the Portuguese and the British authorities with
respect to the passage of these categories excludes the existence of any such
right. The practice that was established shows that, with regard to these catego-
ries, it was well understood that passage could take place only by permission of
the British authorities. This situation continued during the post-British period.
Portugal also invokes general international custom, as well as the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations, in support of its claim of a right
of passage as formulated by it. Having arrived at the conclusion that the course
of dealings between the British and Indian authorities on the one hand and the
Portuguese on the other established a practice, well understood between the
Parties, by virtue of which Portugal had acquired a right of passage in respect of
private persons, civil officials and goods in general, the Court does not consider
it necessary to examine whether general international custom or the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations may lead to the same result.
As regards armed forces, armed police and arms and ammunition, the find-
ing of the Court that the practice established between the Parties required for
passage in respect of these categories the permission of the British or Indian
authorities, renders it unnecessary for the Court to determine whether or not,
in the absence of the practice that actually prevailed, general international
custom or the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations could
have been relied upon by Portugal in support of its claim to a right of passage
in respect of these categories.
***
21. The use of the word “permitted” in the question put by the General
Assembly was criticized before the Court by certain States on the ground that
this implied that the threat or the use of nuclear weapons would only be per-
missible if authorization could be found in a treaty provision or in customary
international law. Such a starting point, those States submitted, was incompat-
ible with the very basis of international law, which rests upon the principles
of sovereignty and consent; accordingly, and contrary to what was implied by
6
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opin-
ion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 66.
use of the word “permitted,” States are free to threaten or use nuclear weap-
ons unless it can be shown that they are bound not to do so by reference to a
prohibition in either treaty law or customary international law. Support for this
contention was found in dicta of the Permanent Court of International Justice
in the “Lotus” case that “restrictions upon the independence of States cannot
. . . be presumed” and that international law leaves to States “a wide measure
of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules” (P.C.I.J.,
Series A, No. 10, pp. 18 and 19). Reliance was also placed on the dictum of the
present Court in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) that:
“in international law there are no rules, other than such rules
as may be accepted by the State concerned, by treaty or otherwise,
whereby the level of armaments of a sovereign State can be limited”
(I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 135, para. 269).
For other States, the invocation of these dicta in the “Lotus” case was inap-
posite; their status in contemporary international law and applicability in the
very different circumstances of the present case were challenged.
It was also contended that the above-mentioned dictum of the present
Court was directed to the possession of armaments and was irrelevant to the
threat or use of nuclear weapons. Finally, it was suggested that, were the Court
to answer the question put by the Assembly, the word “permitted” should be
replaced by “prohibited.”
22. The Court notes that the nuclear-weapon States appearing before it
either accepted, or did not dispute, that their independence to act was indeed
restricted by the principles and rules of international law, more particularly
humanitarian law (see below, paragraph 86), as did the other States which took
part in the proceedings. Hence, the argument concerning the legal conclusions
to be drawn from the use of the word “permitted,” and the questions of burden
of proof to which it was said to give rise, are without particular significance for
the disposition of the issues before the Court….
52. The Court notes by way of introduction that international customary
and treaty law does not contain any specific prescription authorizing the threat
or use of nuclear weapons or any other weapon in general or in certain cir-
cumstances, in particular those of the exercise of legitimate self-defense. Nor,
however, is there any principle or rule of international law which would make
the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons or of any other weapons
dependent on a specific authorization. State practice shows that the illegality
of the use of certain weapons as such does not result from an absence of au-
thorization but, on the contrary, is formulated in terms of prohibition….
60. Those States that believe that recourse to nuclear weapons is illegal stress
that the conventions that include various rules providing for the limitation or
elimination of nuclear weapons in certain areas (such as the Antarctic Treaty of
1959 which prohibits the deployment of nuclear weapons in the Antarctic, or
the Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967 which creates a nuclear-weapon-free zone in
Latin America) or the conventions that apply certain measures of control and
limitation to the existence of nuclear weapons (such as the 1963 Partial Test-
Ban Treaty or the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons)al 1 set
limits to the use of nuclear weapons. In their view, these treaties bear witness,
in their own way, to the emergence of a rule of complete legal prohibition of
al1 uses of nuclear weapons.
61. Those States who defend the position that recourse to nuclear weapons
is legal in certain circumstances see a logical contradiction in reaching such a
conclusion. According to them, those Treaties, such as the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as Security Council resolutions 255
(1968) and 984 (1995) which take note of the security assurances given by
the nuclear-weapon States to the non nuclear-weapon States in relation to any
nuclear aggression against the latter, cannot be understood as prohibiting the
use of nuclear weapons, and such a claim is contrary to the very text of those
instruments. For those who support the legality in certain circumstances of
recourse to nuclear weapons, there is no absolute prohibition against the use
of such weapons. The very logic and construction of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, they assert, confirm this. This Treaty, whereby,
they contend, the possession of nuclear weapons by the five nuclear-weapon
States has been accepted, cannot be seen as a treaty banning their use by those
States; to accept the fact that those States possess nuclear weapons is tanta-
mount to recognizing that such weapons may be used in certain circumstances.
Nor, they contend, could the security assurances given by the nuclear-weapon
States in 1968, and more recently in connection with the Review and Extension
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons in 1995, have been conceived without its being supposed that there
were circumstances in which nuclear weapons could be used in a lawful man-
ner. For those who defend the legality of the use, in certain circumstances, of
nuclear weapons, the acceptance of those instruments by the different non-
nuclear-weapon States confirms and reinforces the evident logic upon which
those instruments are based.
62. The Court notes that the treaties dealing exclusively with acquisition,
manufacture, possession, deployment and testing of nuclear weapons, without
specifically addressing their threat or use, certainly point to an increasing con-
cern in the international community with these weapons; the Court concludes
from this that these treaties could therefore be seen as foreshadowing a future
general prohibition of the use of such weapons, but they do not constitute such
a prohibition by themselves. As to the treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga and
their Protocols, and also the declarations made in connection with the indefi-
nite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it
emerges from these instruments that :
(a) a number of States have undertaken not to use nuclear
weapons in specific zones (Latin America; the South Pacific)
or against certain other States (non-nuclear-weapon States
which are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons) ;
(b) nevertheless, even within this framework, the nuclear-weapon
States have reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in certain
circumstances; and
(c) these reservations met with no objection from the parties
to the Tlatelolco or Rarotonga Treaties or from the Security
Council.
63. These two treaties, the security assurances given in 1995 by the nuclear-
weapon States and the fact that the Security Council took note of them with
satisfaction, testify to a growing awareness of the need to liberate the com-
munity of States and the international public from the dangers resulting from
the existence of nuclear weapons. The Court more over notes the signing, even
more recently, on 15 December 1995, at Bangkok, of a Treaty on the Southeast
Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, and on 11 April 1996, at Cairo, of a treaty on
the creation of a nuclear weapons-free zone in Africa. It does not, however, view
these elements as amounting to a comprehensive and universal conventional
prohibition on the use, or the threat of use, of those weapons as such.
64. The Court will now turn to an examination of customary international
law to determine whether a prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons
as such flows from that source of law. As the Court has stated, the substance of
that law must be “looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris
of States” (Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jarnahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I. C. J.
Reports 1985, p. 29, para. 27).
65. States which hold the view that the use of nuclear weapons is illegal have
endeavored to demonstrate the existence of a customary rule prohibiting this
use. They refer to a consistent practice of non-utilization of nuclear weapons
by States since 1945 and they would see in that practice the expression of an
opinio juris on the part of those who possess such weapons.
66. Some other States, which assert the legality of the threat and use of
nuclear weapons in certain circumstances, invoked the doctrine and prac-
tice of deterrence in support of their argument. They recall that they have
always, in concert with certain other States, reserved the right to use those
weapons in the exercise of the right to self-defence against an armed attack
threatening their vital security interests. In their view, if nuclear weapons
have not been used since 1945, it is not on account of an existing or nascent
custom but merely because circumstances that might justify their use have
fortunately not arisen.
67. The Court does not intend to pronounce here upon the practice known
as the “policy of deterrence.” It notes that it is a fact that a number of States
adhered to that practice during the greater part of the Cold War and continue
to adhere to it. Furthermore, the members of the international community are
profoundly divided on the matter of whether non-recourse to nuclear weap-
ons over the past 50 years constitutes the expression of an opinio juris. Under
these circumstances the Court does not consider itself able to find that there
is such an opinio juris.
68. According to certain States, the important series of General Assembly
resolutions, beginning with resolution 1653 (XVI) of 24 November1961, that
deal with nuclear weapons and that affirm, with consistent regularity, the il-
legality of nuclear weapons, signify the existence of a rule of international
customary law which prohibits recourse to those weapons. According to other
States, however, the resolutions in question have no binding character on their
own account and are not declaratory of any customary rule of prohibition of
nuclear weapons; some of these States have also pointed out that this series
of resolutions not only did not meet with the approval of al1 of the nuclear-
weapon States but of many other States as well.
69. States which consider that the use of nuclear weapons is illegal indi-
cated that those resolutions did not claim to create any new rules, but were
confined to a confirmation of customary law relating to the prohibition of
means or methods of warfare which, by their use, overstepped the bounds of
what is permissible in the conduct of hostilities. In their view, the resolutions
in question did no more than apply to nuclear weapons the existing rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict; they were no more than the
“envelope” or instrumentum containing certain pre-existing customary rules
of international law. For those States it is accordingly of little importance that
the instrumentum should have occasioned negative votes, which cannot have
the effect of obliterating those customary rules which have been confirmed
by treaty law.
70. The Court notes that General Assembly resolutions, even if they are not
binding, may sometimes have normative value. They can, in certain circum-
stances, provide evidence important for establishing the existence of a rule or
the emergence of an opinio juris. To establish whether this is true of a given
General Assembly resolution, it is necessary to look at its content and the con-
ditions of its adoption; it is also necessary to see whether an opinio juris exists
as to its normative character. Or a series of resolutions may show the gradual
evolution of the opinio juris required for the establishment of a new rule.
71. Examined in their totality, the General Assembly resolutions put before
the Court declare that the use of nuclear weapons would be “a direct viola-
tion of the Charter of the United Nations”; and in certain formulations that
such use “should be prohibited.” The focus of these resolutions has sometimes
shifted to diverse related matters; however, several of the resolutions under
consideration in the present case have been adopted with substantial numbers
of negative votes and abstentions; thus, although those resolutions are a clear
sign of deep concern regarding the problem of nuclear weapons, they still fa11
short of establishing the existence of an opinio juris on the illegality of the use
of such weapons.
72. The Court further notes that the first of the resolutions of the General
Assembly expressly proclaiming the illegality of the use of nuclear weapons,
resolution 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961 (mentioned in subsequent resolu-
tions), after referring to certain international declarations and binding agree-
ments, from the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868 to the Geneva Protocol
of 1925, proceeded to qualify the legal nature of nuclear weapons, determine
their effects, and apply general rules of customary international law to nuclear
weapons in particular. That application by the General Assembly of general
rules of customary law to the particular case of nuclear weapons indicates that,
in its view, there was no specific rule of customary law which prohibited the
use of nuclear weapons; if such a rule had existed, the General Assembly could
simply have referred to it and would not have needed to undertake such an
exercise of legal qualification.
73. Having said this, the Court points out that the adoption each year by
the General Assembly, by a large majority, of resolutions recalling the content
of resolution 1653 (XVI), and requesting the member States to conclude a con-
vention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance, reveals
the desire of a very large section of the international community to take, by a
specific and express prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, a significant step
forward along the road to complete nuclear disarmament. The emergence, as
lex lata, of a customary rule specifically prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons
***
8. Between 13 July 1995 and approximately 22 July 1995, thousands of
Bosnian Muslim men were summarily executed by members of the Bosnian
Serb army and Bosnian Serb police….
12. On or about 16 July 1995, Drazen Erdemovic did shoot and kill and did
participate with other members of his unit and soldiers from another brigade
in the shooting and killing of unarmed Bosnian Muslim men at the Pilica col-
lective farm. These summary executions resulted in the deaths of hundreds of
Bosnian Muslim male civilians.... Drazen Erdemovic claims that he received
the order from Brano Gojkovic, commander of the operations at the Branjevo
farm at Pilica, to prepare himself along with seven members of his unit for a
mission the purpose of which they had absolutely no knowledge. He claimed it
was only when they arrived on-site that the members of the unit were informed
that they were to massacre hundreds of Muslims…. He declared that had he
not carried out the order, he is sure he would have been killed or that his wife
or child would have been directly threatened….
16. The Appeals Chamber has raised… preliminary questions to the parties
in a Scheduling Order dated 5 May 1997:
(1) In law, may duress afford a complete defence to a charge of crimes
against humanity and/or war crimes such that, if the defence is proved at trial,
the accused is entitled to an acquittal?...
19. For the reasons set out in the Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald
and Judge Vohrah and in the Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Li, the
majority of the Appeals Chamber finds that duress does not afford a complete
defence to a soldier charged with a crime against humanity and/or a war crime
involving the killing of innocent human beings….
32. As to the first preliminary question addressed to the parties in this
appeal, “[i]n law, may duress afford a complete defence to a charge of crimes
against humanity and/or war crimes such that, if the defence is proved at trial,
7
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Vio-
lations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former
Yugoslavia since 1991 former Yugoslavia, October 7, 1997, (citations omitted).
the accused in entitled to an acquittal?,” three factors bear upon this general
statement of the issue. Firstly, the particular war crime or crime against human-
ity committed by the Appellant involved the killing of innocent human beings.
Secondly, as will be shown in the ensuing discussion, there is a clear dichotomy
in the practice of the main legal systems of the world between those systems
which would allow duress to operate as a complete defence to crimes involving
the taking of innocent life, and those systems which would not. Thirdly, the Ap-
pellant in this case was a soldier of the Bosnian Serb army conducting combat
operations in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzogovina at the material time. As
such, the issue may be stated more specifically as follows: In law, may duress
afford a complete defence to a soldier charged with crimes against humanity
or war crimes where the soldier has killed innocent persons?...
56. It is appropriate now to inquire whether the “general principles of law
recognised by civilised nations,” established as a source of international law in
Article 38(1)(c) of the I.C.J. Statute, may shed some light upon this intricate
issue of duress. Paragraph 58 of the Report of the Secretary-General of the
United Nations presented on 3 May 1993 expressly directs the International
Tribunal to this source of law:
The International Tribunal itself will have to decide on various
personal defences which may relieve a person of individual
criminal responsibility, such as minimum age or mental incapacity,
drawing upon general principles of law recognised by all nations.
Further, Article 14 of the International Law Commission s Draft Code of
Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind provides:
The competent court shall determine the admissibility of
defences in accordance with the general principles of law, in the
light of the character of each crime.
57. A number of considerations bear upon our analysis of the application
of “general principles of law recognised by civilised nations” as a source of
international law. First, although general principles of law are to be derived
from existing legal systems, in particular, national systems of law, it is gener-
ally accepted that the distillation of a “general principle of law recognised by
civilised nations” does not require the comprehensive survey of all legal systems
of the world as this would involve a practical impossibility and has never been
the practice of the International Court of Justice or other international tribu-
nals which have had recourse to Article 38(1)(c) of the I.C.J. Statute. Second,
it is the view of eminent jurists, including Baron Descamps, the President of
the Advisory Committee of Jurists on Article 38(1)(c), that one purpose of
this article is to avoid a situation of non-liquet, that is, where an international
Germany
Section 35(1) of the German Penal Code of 1975 (amended as at 15 May
1987) provides:
If someone commits a wrongful act in order to avoid an
imminent, otherwise unavoidable danger to life, limb, or liberty,
whether to himself or to a dependant or someone closely
connected with him, the actor commits the act without culpability.
This is not the case if under the circumstances it can be fairly
expected of the actor that he suffer the risk; this might be fairly
expected of him if he caused the danger, or if he stands in a special
legal relationship to the danger. In the latter case, his punishment
may be mitigated in conformity with section 49(1).
(b) Common law systems: England, United States and Australia, Canada,
South Africa, India, Malaysia, Nigeria, Japan, China, Morocco, Somalia, Ethiopia.
(For instance,)...
England
60. In England, duress is a complete defence to all crimes except murder,
attempted murder and, it would appear, treason. Although there is no direct
authority on whether duress is available in respect of attempted murder, the
prevailing view is that there is no reason in logic, morality or law in granting
the defence to a charge of attempted murder whilst withholding it in respect
of a charge of murder.
United States and Australia
The English position that duress operates as a complete defence in respect
of crimes generally is followed in the United States and Australia with variations
in the federal state jurisdictions as to the precise definition of the defence and
the range of offences for which the defence is not available.…
63. In numerous national jurisdictions, certain offences are excepted from
the application of the defence of duress. Traditional common law rejects the de-
fence of duress in respect of murder and treason. Legislatures in many common
law jurisdictions, however, often prescribe a longer list of excepted offences.
64. Despite these offences being excluded from the operation of duress as
a defence, the practice of courts in these jurisdictions is nevertheless to miti-
gate the punishment of persons committing excepted offences unless there
is a mandatory penalty of death or life imprisonment prescribed for the of-
fence. In the United Kingdom, section 3(3)(a) of the Criminal Justice Act 1991
provides that a court “shall take into account all such information about the
circumstances of the offence (including any aggravating or mitigating factors)
as is available to it.”
Mitigating factors may relate to the seriousness of the offence, and in par-
ticular, may reflect the culpability of the offender. It is clearly established in
principle and practice that where an offender is close to having a defence to
criminal liability, this will tend to reduce the seriousness of the offence.
In R. v. Beaumont, the Court of Appeal reduced the offender s sentence
because he had been entrapped into committing the offence even though
entrapment is no defence in English law.
Similarly, in Australian sentencing jurisprudence and practice, the culpabil-
ity of the offender is taken into account in sentencing. Section 9(2)(d) of the
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) requires a court to take into account
“the extent to which the offender is to blame for the offence.” Section 5(2)
(d) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) refers to “the offender s culpability and
degree of responsibility for the offence.” In R. v. Okutgen, the Victorian Court
of Criminal Appeal held that provocation is a factor mitigating crimes of vio-
lence. In R. v. Evans, credence was given to the principle that a sentence should
reflect the degree of participation of an offender in an offence. The degree of
participation is taken to reflect the degree of the offender s culpability….
65. Courts in civil law jurisdictions may also mitigate an offender s punish-
ment on the ground of duress where the defence fails. In some systems, the
power to mitigate punishment on the ground of duress is expressly stated in
the provisions addressing duress. In other jurisdictions in which the criminal
law is embodied in a penal code, the power to mitigate may be found in general
provisions regarding mitigation of sentence.
66. Having regard to the above survey relating to the treatment of duress
in the various legal systems, it is, in our view, a general principle of law recog-
nized by civilized nations that an accused person is less blameworthy and less
deserving of the full punishment when he performs a certain prohibited act
under duress. We would use the term “duress” in this context to mean “immi-
nent threats to the life of an accused if he refuses to commit a crime” and do
not refer to the legal terms of art which have the equivalent meaning of the
English word “duress” in the languages of most civil law systems. This alleviation
of blameworthiness is manifest in the different rules with differing content in
the principal legal systems of the world as the above survey reveals. On the one
hand, a large number of jurisdictions recognize duress as a complete defence
absolving the accused from all criminal responsibility. On the other hand, in
other jurisdictions, duress does not afford a complete defense to offences
generally but serves merely as a factor which would mitigate the punishment
to be imposed on a convicted person. Mitigation is also relevant in two other
respects. Firstly, punishment may be mitigated in respect of offences which
have been specifically excepted from the operation of the defence of duress
by the legislatures of some jurisdictions. Secondly, courts have the power to
mitigate sentences where the strict elements of a defence of duress are not
made out on the facts.
It is only when national legislatures have prescribed a mandatory life sen-
tence or death penalty for particular offences that no consideration is given
in national legal systems to the general principle that a person who commits
a crime under duress is less blameworthy and less deserving of the full punish-
ment in respect of that particular offence.
67. The rules of the various legal systems of the world are, however, largely
inconsistent regarding the specific question whether duress affords a complete
defence to a combatant charged with a war crime or a crime against humanity
involving the killing of innocent persons. As the general provisions of the nu-
merous penal codes set out above show, the civil law systems in general would
theoretically allow duress as a complete defence to all crimes including murder
and unlawful killing. On the other hand, there are laws of other legal systems
which categorically reject duress as a defence to murder. Firstly, specific laws
relating to war crimes in Norway and Poland do not allow duress to operate as
a complete defence but permit it to be taken into account only in mitigation
of punishment. Secondly, the Ethiopian Penal Code of 1957 provides in Article
67 that only “absolute physical coercion” may constitute a complete defence
to crimes in general. Where the coercion is “moral,” which we would interpret
as referring to duress by threats, the accused is only entitled to a reduction of
penalty. This reduction of penalty may extend, where appropriate, even to a
complete discharge of the offender from punishment. Thirdly, the common
law systems throughout the world, with the exception of a small minority of
jurisdictions of the United States which have adopted without reservation Sec-
tion 2.09 of the United States Model Penal Code, reject duress as a defence to
the killing of innocent persons.
(a) The case-law of certain civil law jurisdictions
68. We would add that although the penal codes of most civil law juris-
dictions do not expressly except the operation of the defence of duress in
respect of offences involving the killing of innocent persons, the penal codes
of Italy, Norway, Sweden, Nicaragua, Japan, and the former Yugoslavia require
proportionality between the harm caused by the accused s act and the harm
with which the accused was threatened. The effect of this requirement is that
it leaves for determination in the case law of these civil law jurisdictions the
question whether killing an innocent person is ever proportional to a threat
to the life of an accused. The determination of that question is not essential
to the disposal of this case and it suffices to say that courts in certain civil law
jurisdiction may well consistently reject duress as a defence to the killing of
innocent persons on the ground that the proportionality requirement in the
provisions governing duress is not met. For example, the case law of Norway
does not allow duress as a defence to murder. During the last months of World
War Two, three Norwegian policemen were forced to participate in the execu-
tion of a compatriot who was sentenced to death by a Nazi special court. After
the war, they were prosecuted under the Norwegian General Civil Penal Code
for treason (paragraph 86) and murder (paragraph 233) and pleaded duress
(paragraph 47) as a defence. It was urged upon the court that if they had re-
fused to follow the order, they would have been shot along with the person
who had been sentenced. Whilst accepting the version of the facts given by the
accused, the court nevertheless declined to call their act “lawful” and stated:
And when this is so, the Penal Code will not allow punishment
to be dispensed with merely because the accused acted under
duress, even where it was of such a serious nature as in the case at
bar, since according to the decision of the court of assize it must be
deemed clear that the force did not preclude intentional conduct
on the part of the accused.
In other words, the Norwegian court found that the proportionality re-
quired by paragraph 47 between the harm caused by the accused’s act and the
harm with which the accused were threatened, was not satisfied. Accordingly,
despite the general applicability to all crimes of paragraph 47 as set out in the
Code, it would appear that a Norwegian court when interpreting this general
provision will deny the defence to an accused person charged with murder
because paragraph 47 requires that the circumstances afford justification to
the accused in “regarding [the] danger as particularly significant in relation to
the damage that might be caused by his act.”
69. In addition, the provisions governing duress in the penal codes of Ger-
many and the former Yugoslavia suggest the possibility that soldiers in an armed
conflict may, in contrast to ordinary persons, be denied a complete defence
because of the special nature of their occupation. Section 35 (1) of the German
Penal Code provides that duress is no defence “if under the circumstances it
can be fairly expected of the actor that he suffer the risk; this might be fairly
expected of him if he stands in a special legal relationship to the danger. In the
latter case, his punishment may be mitigated in conformity with section 49(1).”
Article 10(4) of the Penal Code of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
provides that “[t]here is no extreme necessity where the perpetrator was under
an obligation to expose himself to the danger.”
(b) The principle behind the rejection of duress as a defence to murder in
the common law
70. Murder is invariably included in any list of offences excepted by legisla-
tion in common law systems from the operation of duress as a defence. The
English common law rule is that duress is no defence to murder, either for a
principal offender or a secondary party to the crime. The House of Lords in
R.v Howe and Others overruled the earlier decision of a differently constituted
House of Lords in Lynch v. DPP for Northern Ireland in which it was held that
duress could afford a defence to murder for a principal in the second degree.
Thus, R v. Howe restored the position of the English common law to the tra-
ditional position that duress is not available as a defence to murder generally.
There are two aspects to this position. The first is a firm rejection of the view
in English law that duress, generally, affects the voluntariness of the actus reus
or the mens rea. In R .v Howe, Lord Hailsham stated at page 777:
the second unacceptable view is that, possibly owing to a
misunderstanding which has been read into some judgements,
duress as a defence affects only the existence or absence of mens
rea. The true view is stated in Lynchs case [1975] 1 AC 653 at 703
by Lord Kilbrandon (of the minority) and by Lord Edmund-Davies
(of the majority) in their analysis. Lord Kilbrandon said:
“. . . the decision of the threatened man whose constancy is
overborne so that he yields to the threat, is a calculated decision to
do what he knows to be wrong, and therefore that of a man with,
perhaps to some exceptionally limited extent, a “guilty mind.” . . “
The speech of Lord Wilberforce in Lynch v. DPP for Northern Ireland points
out that
“an analogous result is achieved in a civil law context: duress
does not destroy the will, for example, to enter into a contract, but
prevents the law from accepting what has happened as a contract
valid in law.”
It is of interest to note that this view of duress is shared by the Italian Court
of Cassation in the Bernardi and Randazzo case where it stated that
[duress] leaves intact all the elements of criminal imputability.
The person at issue acts with a diminished freedom of determination,
***
[p. 23] …it is certain that the courts of many countries, even of countries
which have given their criminal legislation a strictly territorial character, in-
terpret criminal law in the sense that offences, the authors of which at the
moment of commission are in the territory of another State, are nevertheless
to be regarded as having been committed in the national territory, if one of
the constituent elements of the offence, and more especially its effects, have
taken place there. French courts have, in regard to a variety of situations, given
decisions sanctioning this way of interpreting the territorial principle. Again,
the Court does not know of any cases in which governments have protested
against the fact that the criminal law of some country contained a rule to
this effect or that the courts of a country construed their criminal law in this
sense. Consequently, once it is admitted that the effects of the offence were
produced on the Turkish vessel, it becomes impossible to hold that there is a
rule of international law which prohibits Turkey from prosecuting Lieutenant
Demons because of the fact that the author of the offence was on board the
French ship….
[p. 26] In the first place, as regards teachings of publicists, and apart from
the question as to what their value may be from the point of view of estab-
lishing the existence of a rule of customary law, it is no doubt true that al1 or
nearly al1 writers teach that ships on the high seas are subject exclusively to
the jurisdiction of the State whose flag they fly. But the important point is the
significance attached by them to this principle; now it does not appear that in
8
The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (France v. Turkey), Permanent Court of International
Justice (P.C.I.J.), Series A No. 70, 7 September 1927.
general, writers bestow upon this principle a scope differing from or wider than
that explained above and which is equivalent to saying that the jurisdiction of
a State over vessels on the high seas is the same in extent as its jurisdiction in
its own territory. On the other hand, there is no lack of writers who, upon a
close study of the special question whether a State can prosecute for offences
committed on board a foreign ship on the high seas, definitely come to the
conclusion that such offences must be regarded as if they had been commit-
ted in the territory of the State whose flag the ship flies, and that consequently
the general rules of each legal system in regard to offences committed abroad
are applicable….
On the other hand, there is no lack of cases in which a State has claimed
a right to prosecute for an offence, committed on board a foreign ship, which
it regarded as punishable under its legislation. Thus Great Britain refused the
request of the United States for the extradition of John Anderson, a British
seaman who had committed homicide on board an American vessel, stating
that she did not dispute the jurisdiction of the United States but that she was
entitled to exercise hers concurrently. This case, to which others might be added,
is relevant in spite of Anderson’s British nationality, in order to show that the
principle of the exclusive jurisdiction of the country whose flag the vessel flies
is not universally accepted.
The cases in which the exclusive jurisdiction of the State whose flag was
flown has been recognized would seem rather to have been cases in which the
foreign State was interested only by reason of the nationality of the victim, and
in which, according to the legislation of that State itself or the practice of its
courts, that ground was not regarded as sufficient to authorize prosecution for
an offence committed abroad by a foreigner.
***
188. The Court thus finds that both Parties take the view that the principles
as to the use of force incorporated in the United Nations Charter correspond,
in essentials, to those found in customary international law. The Parties thus
both take the view that the fundamental principle in this area is expressed in
the terms employed in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter.
They therefore accept a treaty-law obligation to refrain in their international
9
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14.
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or po-
litical independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the purposes of the United Nations. The Court has however to be satisfied that
there exists in customary international law an opinio juris as to the binding
character of such abstention. This opinio juris may, though with al1 due cau-
tion, be deduced from, inter alia, the attitude of the Parties and the attitude of
States towards certain General Assembly resolutions, and particularly resolution
2625 (XXV) entitled “Declaration on Principles of International Law concern-
ing Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations.” The effect of consent to the text of such resolu-
tions cannot be understood as merely that of a “reiteration or elucidation” of
the treaty commitment undertaken in the Charter. On the contrary, it may be
understood as an acceptance of the validity of the rule or set of rules declared
by the resolution by themselves. The principle of non-use of force, for example,
may thus be regarded as a principle of customary international law, not as such
conditioned by provisions relating to collective security, or to the facilities or
armed contingents to be provided under Article 43 of the Charter. It would
therefore seem apparent that the attitude referred to expresses an opinio juris
respecting such rule (or set of rules), to be thenceforth treated separately from
the provisions, especially those of an institutional kind, to which it is subject
on the treaty-law plane of the Charter.
***
190. A further confirmation of the validity as customary international law
of the principle of the prohibition of the use of force expressed in Article 2,
paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations may be found in the fact
that it is frequently referred to in statements by State representatives as being
not only a principle of customary international law but also a fundamental or
cardinal principle of such law. The International Law Commission, in the course
of its work on the codification of the law of treaties, expressed the view that
‘the law of the Charter concerning the prohibition of the use of force in itself
constitutes a conspicuous example of a rule in international law having the
character of jus cogens’ (paragraph (1) of the commentary of the Commission
10
Ibid.
to Article 50 of its draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, ILC Yearbook, 1966-II,
p. 247). Nicaragua in its Memorial on the Merits submitted in the present case
states that the principle prohibiting the use of force embodied in Article 2,
paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations ‘has come to be recognized
as jus cogens’. The United States, in its Counter-Memorial on the questions of
jurisdiction and admissibility, found it material to quote the views of scholars
that this principle is a ‘universal norm’, a ‘universal international law’, a ‘univer-
sally recognized principle of international law’, and a ‘principle of jus cogens’.
11
Santa Clara Journal of International Law 72, at 74-85 (2005). [Citations omitted]
[Reprinted with permission of the Journal]
A treaty is void, if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremp-
tory norm of general international law. For the purpose of the present conven-
tion, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of states as a whole, as a norm
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character. That
means a treaty is no longer an international legal document, if, at the time of
its conclusion, it conflicts with the norms of jus cogens, which are peremptory
in nature. This article sets up the four criteria for a norm to be determined as
jus cogens, specifically: (1) status as a norm of general international law; (2)
acceptance by the international community of states as a whole; (3) immunity
from derogation; and (4) modifiable only by a new norm having the same
status. On the other hand, Finnish scholar Lauri Hannikainen demonstrated
that if a norm of general international law protects an overriding interest or
value of the international community, and if any derogation would seriously
jeopardize that interest or value, then the peremptory character of the norm
may be presumed if the application of the criteria of peremptory norms pro-
duces no noteworthy negative evidence. Recognition of the rules of jus cogens
was again confirmed in 1986 at the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
between States and International Organizations or Between International Or-
ganizations. The importance of the rules of jus cogens was confirmed by the
trend to apply it beyond the law of the treaties, in particular, in the law of state
responsibility. Specifically, the International Law Commission (ILC) proposed
the notion of international crimes resulting from the breach by a state of an
international obligation “essential for the protection of fundamental interests
of the international community,” which is, in fact, closely linked to the doctrine
of international jus cogens. In the Nicaragua Case, the International Court of
Justice clearly affirmed jus cogens as an accepted doctrine in international law.
The I.C.J. relied on the prohibition on the use of force as being “a conspicu-
ous example of a rule of international law having the character of jus cogens.”
Status of the Norm in International Law
A peremptory norm may, it would appear, be derived from a custom or a
treaty, but not, it is submitted, from any other source. This statement is, however,
self-contradictory. Indeed, there are serious problems associated with the asser-
tions that a norm of jus cogens could be the result of the natural law, or, one
or any of the traditional primary sources of international law, namely, treaties,
customs or general principles of laws. According to Professor Michael Byers
of the Duke University Law School, treaties can, at best, only be contributing
factors in the development of jus cogens rules for two reasons. First, a treaty
cannot bind its parties’ abilities to modify the treaty terms nor to relieve the
party’s obligations under it, such as through a subsequent treaty to which all
the same parties have consented. Second, all generally accepted jus cogens rules
apply universally yet none of the treaties, which have codified these rules, have
been universally ratified. No treaty, not even the Charter of the Charter of the
United Nations, can establish a rule of general international law. Treaties can
only create obligations between their parties.
As for the assertion that jus cogens rules to be considered as customary
international law, more ambiguity exists. Customs are binding only in the case
of an established opinio juris wherein a state believes to be bound by a said
practice due to its creation from customary rule.
However, persistent objection of any customary principle creates an ex-
ception to have the binding nature of such rules. There are also other ways to
supersede customary rules, such as through the development of rules of spe-
cial customary international law and the conclusion of treaties. On the other
hand, in case of the rules of jus cogens, these rules are binding regardless of the
consent of the parties concerned and regardless of the states’ own individual
opinion to be bound since these rules are too fundamental for states to escape
responsibility. Modification of the rules of jus cogens is only possible when a
new peremptory norm of equal weight emerges.
As for the binding character of jus cogens, acceptance by the large major-
ity of states of such norm would amount to universal legal obligation for the
international community as a whole. These are superior rules and bear the
common values for the international community as a whole. Michael Byers,
however, tends to show that jus cogens rules are derived from the “process of
customary international law,” which is itself a part of international constitu-
tional order. He argues that opinio juris (or something resembling opinio juris)
appears to be at the root of the non-detractable character of jus cogens rules,
because states simply do not believe that it is possible to contract out of jus
cogens rules or to persistently object to them. States regard these rules as be-
ing so important to the international society of states and to how that society
defines itself, such that they cannot conceive of an exception. Article 53 of the
Vienna Convention, however, contains no reference to any element of practice.
One could then hardly conceive jus cogens as a strengthened form of custom.
David Kennedy termed jus cogens as super-customary norm.
In fact, two views predominate regarding the foundation of the concept
of jus cogens, the first, as directly originating from international law, or the
second, as being based on the one of the existing sources of international law.
However, some argue and accept that a jus cogens recognizes a wholly new
source of law capable of generally binding rules.
This idea was developed during the Vienna Conference on the Law of the
Treaties at which jus cogens was interpreted to indicate that a majority could
bring into existence peremptory norms which could bind the international com-
munity of states as a whole, regardless of the individual consent of the states.
Thus, the result is a new source of law founded on the basis that a community
as a whole may create rules that will bind all its members, notwithstanding their
possible individual dissent. Others argue that the existing sources have been
modified to allow majority rulemaking in the context of higher law. However,
the negotiating history of the Vienna Convention does not support the view
that the notion of jus cogens emerges as a new source of general international
law. Rather, there was a clear tendency to view jus cogens as the product of the
existing sources. For example, France argued that if the draft article on jus cogens
was interpreted to mean that a majority could bring into existence peremptory
norms that would be valid erga omnes, then the result created an international
source of law. France objected to such a possibility on the ground that such a
new source of law would be subject to no “control and lacking all responsibility.”
Moreover, complexity remains in the interpretation of Article 53, regarding the
phrase: “acceptance and recognized by the international community of States
as a whole.” M.K. Yasseen, the former Chairman of the Drafting Committee of
the Vienna conference on the Law of Treaties, states that [T]here is no question
of requiring a rule to be accepted and recognized as peremptory by all States. It
would be enough if a very large majority did so; that would mean that, if one state
in isolation refused to accept the peremptory character of a rule, or if that state
was supported by a very small number of states, the acceptance and recognition of
the peremptory character of the rule by the international community as a whole
would not be affected. Yasseen further stated that no individual state should have
the right of veto. Additionally, in the ILC commentary to the Article 19 of the
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, it explained the meaning of “as a whole”
within the context of requiring international recognition of international crimes:
[T]his certainly does not mean the requirement of unanimous recognition by
all the members of the community, which would give each state an inconceivable
right of veto. What it is intended to ensure is that a given international wrongful
act shall be recognized as an “international crime,” not only by some particular
group of states, even if it constitutes a majority, but by all the essential compo-
nents of the international community. This means that “a very large majority”
will not necessarily be able to impose its will on “a very small minority” if that
“small minority” represents a significant element of the international community.
The same view was expressed at the Vienna Conference by the representative
of the United States, namely, that the recognition of the peremptory character
of a norm “would require, at a minimum, absence of dissent by any important
of jus cogens. They claimed that the principles of common heritage of mankind, as
proclaimed by the 1970 United Nations General Assembly resolution on the seabed,
were principles of jus cogens. This argument was clearly rejected by the minority
of western states. Nonetheless, the majority, led by the Group of 77, continued to
rely on the notion of jus cogens in order to impose specific normative solutions
regarding the seabed. The Group of 77 asserted that since the common heritage
of mankind is a customary rule which has the force of peremptory norm, then it
would follow that the unilateral legislation and limited agreements were illegal
and were, therefore, violations of this principle. Another example could be found
concerning the legal nature of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural
resources proclaimed in a number of the U.N. General Assembly resolutions. This
issue was raised at the Vienna Conference on Succession of States in Respect of
State Property, Archives and Debts. The Draft Convention on Succession of States
contained a rule requiring that agreements concluded between a predecessor
state and a newly independent state concerning succession to state property of
the predecessor state not “infringe the principle of the permanent sovereignty of
every people over its wealth and natural resources.” In its commentary to a draft
article containing this rule, the ILC noted that some of the members of the Commis-
sion expressed the view that agreements violating the principle of the permanent
sovereignty should be void ab initio. Relying on this commentary, the developing
states claimed that the principle of permanent sovereignty over wealth and natural
resources was a principle of jus cogens. The conference was also used to impart the
jus cogens character to other broad principles, including the right of the peoples
to development, to information about their history, and to their cultural heritage.
The idea of invoking some of the General Assembly Resolutions in terms of the
norm of jus cogens, with a plea that resolutions achieve support from the large
majority of states, was criticized by the Western states that resolutions adopted at
the General Assembly are only recommendatory. These do not have any binding
force. Therefore, while a very large majority of states support lawmaking under the
concept of jus cogens at the session in General Assembly, it could hardly be pos-
sible, unless the other significant elements of international community, namely the
western states, agreed to do so. Nonetheless, three categories of jus cogens found
genuine support, as suggested by the German scholar Ulrich Scheuner:
(1) the rules protecting the foundations of international order, (i.e., the
prohibition of genocide or of the use of force in international relations except
in self-defence),
(2) the rule concerning peaceful cooperation in the protection of common
interests (i.e., freedom of the seas) and the rules protecting the most funda-
mental and basic human rights, and
(3) rules for the protection of the civilians in time of war.
CHAPTER 3
SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Overview
Brownlie, “Subjects of International Law”12
1. INTRODUCTION.
A subject of the law is an entity capable of possessing international rights
and duties and having the capacity to maintain its rights by bringing interna-
tional claims.13 This definition, though conventional, is unfortunately circular
since the indicia referred to depend on the existence of a legal person. All that
can be said is that an entity of a type recognized by customary law as capable
of possessing rights and duties and of bringing international claims, and having
these capacities conferred upon it, is a legal person. If the first condition is not
satisfied, the entity concerned may still have legal personality of a very restricted
kind, dependent on the agreement or acquiescence of recognized legal persons
and opposable on the international plane only to those agreeing or acquiescent.
The principal formal contexts in which the question of personality has arisen
have been: capacity to make claims in respect of breaches of international law,
capacity to make treaties and agreements valid on the international plane, and
the enjoyment of privileges and immunities from national jurisdictions. States
have these capacities and immunities, and indeed the incidents of statehood as
developed under the customary law have provided the indicia for, and instru-
ments of personality in, other entities. Apart from states, organizations may have
these capacities and immunities if certain conditions are satisfied. The first of
the capacities set out above, for organizations of a certain type, was established
by the Advisory Opinion in the Reparation for Injuries case. The first Waldock
Report prepared for the International Law Commission on the law of treaties
recognized the capacity of international organizations to become parties to
international agreements, and this recognition reflected the existing practice
12
Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 7th ed. (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2008), 57-67. [Excerpt reprinted with kind permission of Oxford University
Press. Some citations omitted.]
13
Reparation for Injuries case, I.C.J. Reports (1949), 179.
between organisations and also between states and organizations. Finally, while
an organization probably cannot claim privileges and immunities like those
of a sovereign state as of right, it can claim to be a suitable candidate for the
conferment of like privileges and immunities.
It is states and organizations (if appropriate conditions exist) which rep-
resent the normal types of legal person on the international plane. However,
as will become apparent in due course, the realities of international relations
are not reducible to a simple formula and the picture is somewhat complex.
The ‘normal types’ have congeners which create problems, and various enti-
ties, including non-self-governing peoples and the individual, have a certain
personality. Moreover, abstraction of types of acceptable persons at law falls
short of the truth, since recognition and acquiescence may sustain an entity
which is anomalous, and yet has a web of legal relations on the international
plane. But in spite of the complexities, it is as well to remember the primacy
of states as subjects of the law. As Professor Friedmann observes:14
“The basic reason for this position is, of course, that ‘the world
is to-day organized on the basis of the co-existence of States, and
that fundamental changes will take place only through State action,
whether affirmative or negative. The States are the repositories of
legitimated authority over peoples and territories. It is only in terms
of State powers, prerogatives, jurisdictional limits and law-making
capabilities that territorial limits and jurisdiction, responsibility
for official actions, and a host of other questions of co-existence
between nations can be determined…This basic primacy of the State
as a subject of international relations and law would be substantially
affected, and eventually superseded, only if national entities, as
political and legal systems, were absorbed in a world state.”
2. ESTABLISHED LEGAL PERSONS
(a) States
This category, the most important, has its own problems. The existence
of ‘dependent’ states with certain qualified and delegated legal capacities
complicates the picture, but, providing the conditions for statehood exist, the
‘dependent’ state retains its personality. The position of members of federal
unions is interesting. In the constitutions of Switzerland and the German Federal
Republic component states are permitted to exercise certain of the capacities
of independent states, including the power to make treaties. In the normal case,
such capacities are probably exercised as agents for the union, even if the acts
14
The Changing Structure of International Law (1964), 213.
concerned are done in the name of the component state. However, where the
union originated as a union of independent states, the internal relations retain
an international element, and the union may act as agent for the states.15 The
United States constitution enables the states of the Union to enter into agree-
ments with other states of the Union or with foreign states with the consent of
Congress. In Canada the federal government has the exclusive power to make
treaties with foreign states.
(b) Political entities legally proximate to states
Political settlements both in multilateral and bilateral treaties have from time
to time produced political entities, such as the former Free City of Danzig, which,
possessing a certain autonomy, fixed territory and population, and some legal
capacities on the international plane, are rather like states. Politically such enti-
ties are not sovereign states in the normal sense, yet legally the distinction is not
very significant. The treaty origin of the entity and the existence of some form of
protection by an international organization—the League of Nations in the case of
Danzig—matter little if, in the result, the entity has autonomy and a nucleus of the
more significant legal capacities, for example the power to make treaties, to main-
tain order and exercise jurisdiction within the territory, and to have an independent
nationality law. The jurisprudence of the Permanent Court recognized that Danzig
had international personality, except in so far as treaty obligations created special
relations in regard to the League and to Poland.16 The special relations of Danzig
were based upon Articles 100-8 of the Versailles Treaty. The League of Nations had
a supervisory function and Poland was placed in control of the foreign relations
of Danzig. The result was very much a protectorate, the legal status and constitu-
tion of which were externally supervised. To describe legal entities like Danzig as
‘internationalized territories’ is not very helpful since the phrase covers a number
of distinct entities and situations and begs the question of legal personality. The
Italian Peace Treaty of 1947 provided for the creation of a Free Territory of Trieste
with features broadly similar to those of the Free City of Danzig, but placed under
the direct control of the United Nations Security Council.17
15
This appears to be the position in Switzerland.
16
See “Free City of Danzig and the ILO” (1930), PCIJ, Ser. B, no. 18; and Polish Nation-
als in Danzig (1932), Ser. A/B, no. 44, pp. 23-4. Germany occupied the Free City in
1939 and since 1945 the area has been part of Poland.
17
The Permanent Statute of Trieste was not implemented: the administration of the
territory was divided by agreement in 1954; the partition was made definitive by the
Treaty of Osimo, in force 3 Apr. 1977, Rivista did.i. 60,674. See Verzijl, International
Law in Historical Perspective, 504-5; and, on the issue of sovereignty, infra, pp. 68-9.
On the position of the Holy See and Taiwan see infra, pp. 67,68.
(c) Condominia
A condominium, as a joint exercise of state power within a particular terri-
tory by means of an autonomous local administration, may bear a resemblance
to entities of the type considered latterly. However, the local administration
can only act as an agency of the states participating in the condominium, and
normally even its capacity as agent is limited.18
(d) Internationalized territories
The label ‘internationalized territory’ has been applied by writers to a variety of
legal regimes. It may be applied very loosely to cases like Danzig and Trieste where
a special status was created by multilateral treaty and protected by an international
organization. In these instances the special status was attached to entities with
sufficient independence and legal capacity to admit of legal personality. However,
a special status of this kind may attach without the creation of a legal person. An
area within a sovereign state may be given certain rights of autonomy under treaty
without this leading to any degree of separate personality on the international
plane: this was the case with the Memel Territory, which enjoyed a special status in
the period 1924 to 1939, yet remained a part of Lithuania. Another type of regime,
more truly international, involves exclusive administration of a territory by an
international organization or an organ thereof: this was the regime proposed for
the city of Jerusalem by the Trusteeship Council in 1950 but never implemented.
In such a case no new legal person is established except in so far as an agency of
an international organization may have a certain autonomy.
(e) UN administration of territories immediately prior to independence
In relation to territories marked out by the United Nations as under a regime
of illegal occupation and qualified for an expeditious transition to indepen-
dence, an interim transitional regime may be installed under UN supervision.
Thus the final phase of the attainment of Namibian independence involved the
Security Council, the General Assembly, and the UN Transition Assistance Group,
established by Security Council resolution 435 (1978) of 29 September 1978.
In 1999 the long drawn out crisis concerning the illegal Indonesian occupa-
tion of East Timor was the subject of decisive action by the Security Council in
Resolution 1272 (1999) of 25 October 1999. This established the United Na-
tions Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) with a mandate to
prepare East Timor for independence. UNTAET had full legislative and executive
powers and assumed its role independently of any competing authority. After
elections, East Timor became independent in 2002.
18
See 9 ICLQ (1960), 258. On the New Hebrides see O’Connell, 43 BY (1968-9), 71-145.
19
See Fitzmaurice, Yrbk. ILC (1956), ii. 118 п.; and Morin, 3 Canad. Yrbk.(1965), 127-
86. See further the draft articles on the law of treaties, ILC (1966), Art. 5 (2). On the
role of the chartered companies such as the English East India Company and the
Dutch East India Company, see Schwarzenberger, International Law, i. (3rd ed.), 80-1;
McNair, Opinions, i. 41, 55; and the Palmas award, RIAA, ii at p. 858.
20
Supra, p. 59; infra, pp. 113-14.
21
See Baxter, The Law of International Waterways (1964), 107.
22
Ibid. 103-6,126-9.
national liberation movements. Most, but by no means all, of the peoples rep-
resented by such movements have acquired statehood. In 1974 the General
Assembly accorded recognition to the Angolan, Mozambican, Palestinian, and
Rhodesian movements. These liberation movements were recognized as such
by regional organizations. The political and legal roots of the concept of na-
tional liberation movements are to be found in the Declaration of Principles
of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Resolution 2625
(XV), adopted without vote, 24 October 1970), and the principle of self-
determination, of which the beneficiary is a ‘people’.
National liberation movements may, and usually do, have other roles, as de
facto governments and belligerent communities.
The political entities recognized as liberation movements have a number
of legal rights and duties, the more significant of which are as follows:
(a) In practice liberation movements are accorded the capacity
to conclude binding international agreements with other
international legal persons.
(b) The rights and obligations set by the generally recognized
principles of humanitarian law. The provisions of the Geneva
Protocol I of 1977 apply to conflicts involving national
liberation movements if certain conditions are fulfilled: see
Articles 1(4) and 96(3) of the Protocol.
(c) The legal capacity of national liberation movements is reflected
in the right to participate in the proceedings of the United
Nations as observers, this right being conferred expressly
in various General Assembly resolutions. Thus the Palestine
Liberation Organisation (PLO) was granted observer status
in Resolution 3237 (XXIX), adopted on 22 November 1974.
In conclusion, it is necessary to recall the impact of the designation of
a non-self- governing people engaged in a process of national liberation
upon the colonial (or dominant) power. The colonial authorities do not, for
example, have the legal capacity to make agreements affecting the boundar-
ies or status of the territory to which the liberation process is applicable. 23
23
See the Award in the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Guinea-Bissau
and Senegal (1989): RIAA, Vol. XX, 138-9, paras. 49-52.
has certain peculiarities. It has no population, apart from the resident function-
aries, and its sole purpose is to support the Holy See as a religious entity. Some
jurists regard the Vatican City as a state, although its special functions make
this doubtful. However, it is widely recognized as a legal person with treaty-
making capacity. Its personality seems to rest partly on its approximation to a
state in function, in spite of peculiarities, including the patrimonial sovereignty
of the Holy See, and partly on acquiescence and recognition by existing legal
persons. More difficult to solve is the question of the personality of the Holy See
as a religious organ apart from its territorial base in the Vatican City. It would
seem that the personality of political and religious institutions of this type can
only be relative to those states prepared to enter into relationships with such
institutions on the international plane. Even in the sphere of recognition and
bilateral relations, the legal capacities of institutions like the Sovereign Order
of Jerusalem and Malta must be limited simply because they lack the territorial
and demographic characteristics of states. In the law of war the status of the
Order mentioned is merely that of a ‘relief society’ within the meaning of the
Prisoner of War Convention, 1949, Article 125.
Two other political animals require classification. ‘Exile governments’ may
be accorded considerable powers within the territory of most states and be ac-
tive in various political spheres. Apart from voluntary concessions by states and
the use of ‘exile governments’ as agencies for illegal activities against lawfully
established governments and states, the legal status of an ‘exile government’ is
consequential on the legal condition of the community it claims to represent,
which may be a state, belligerent community, or non-self-governing people.
Prima facie its legal status will be established the more readily when its exclu-
sion from the community of which it is an agency results from acts contrary
to the jus cogens, for example, an unlawful resort to force. Lastly, the case of
territory the title to which is undetermined, and which is inhabited and has
an independent administration, creates problems. On the analogy of belliger-
ent communities and special regimes not dependent on the existence of the
sovereignty of a particular state (for example, internationalized territories and
trust territories), communities existing on territory with such a status may be
treated as having a modified personality, approximating to that of a state. On
one view of the facts, this is the situation of Taiwan (Formosa). Since 1972 the
United Kingdom has recognized the Government of the People’s Republic of
China as the sole Government of China and acknowledges the position of the
Chinese Government that Taiwan is a province of China. The question will arise
whether Taiwan is a ‘country’ within particular legal contexts.24
24
See Rogers v. Cheng Fu Sheng, ILR 31, 349; Reel v. Holder [1981] 1 WLR 1226; ILR 74,
(g) Individuals
There is no general rule that the individual cannot be a ‘subject of inter-
national law’, and in particular contexts he appears as a legal person on the
international plane. At the same time to classify the individual as a ‘subject’ of
the law is unhelpful, since this may seem to imply the existence of capacities
which do not exist and does not avoid the task of distinguishing between the
individual and other types of subject.
4. CONTROVERSIAL CANDIDATURES
Reference to states and similar political entities, to organizations, to non-
self-governing peoples, and to individuals, does not exhaust the tally of agen-
cies active on the international scene. Thus corporations of municipal law,
whether private or public corporations, engage in economic activity in one or
more states other than the state under the law of which they were “incorpo-
rated” or in which they have their economic seat. The resources available to
the individual corporation maybe greater than those of the smaller states, and
they may have powerful diplomatic backing from governments. Such corpo-
rations can and do make agreements, including concession agreements, with
foreign governments, and in this connection in particular, jurists have argued
that the relations of states and foreign corporations as such should be treated
on the international plane and not as an aspect of the normal rules governing
the position of aliens and their assets on the territory of a state. In principle,
corporations of municipal law do not have international legal personality.
Thus a concession or contract between a state and a foreign corporation is
not governed by the law of treaties. However, in the present connection it
must be pointed out that it will not always be easy to distinguish corporations
which are so closely controlled by governments as to be state agencies, with
or without some degree of autonomy, and private corporations not sharing
the international law capacity of a state. It will be clear that the conferment of
separate personality by a particular national law is not necessarily conclusive of
autonomy vis-a-vis the state for purposes of international law. Thus ownership
of shares may give a state a controlling interest in a private law corporation’.
Important functions are performed today by bodies which have been
grouped under the labels ‘intergovernmental corporations of private law’ and
‘etablissements publics internationaux’. The point is that states may by treaty
create legal persons the status of which is regulated by the national law of one
or more of the parties. However, the treaty may contain obligations to create
a privileged status within the national law or laws to which the corporation is
105, CA.
subjected. The parties by their agreement may accord certain immunities to the
institution created and confer on it various powers. Where the independence
from the national laws of the parties is marked, then the body concerned may
simply be a joint agency of the states involved, with delegated powers effective
on the international plane and with a privileged position vis-a-vis local law in
respect of its activities. Where there is, in addition to independence from na-
tional law, a considerable quantum of delegated powers and the existence of
organs with autonomy indecision and rule-making, then the body concerned
has the characteristics of an international organization. It is when the institution
created by treaty has a viability and special function which render the descrip-
tion ‘joint agency’ inappropriate, and yet has powers and privileges primarily
within the national legal systems and jurisdictions of the various parties, that
it calls for use of a special category. An example of intergovernmental enter-
prise of this kind is Eurofima, a company set up by a treaty involving fourteen
states in 1955, with the object of improving the resources of railway rolling
stock. The treaty established Eurofima as a corporation under Swiss law with
modifications in that law provided for in the treaty. The parties agreed that
they would recognize this (Swiss) private law status, as modified by the treaty,
within their own legal systems. The corporation is international in function
and the fourteen participating railway administrations provide the capital.
The corporation is also given privileges on the international plane, including
exemption from taxation in Switzerland, the state of domicile. However, use-
ful as the category ‘etablissements publics internationaux’ may be, it is not an
instrument of exact analysis, and does not represent a distinct species of legal
person on the international plane. This type of arrangement is the product of
a careful interlocking of the national and international legal orders on a treaty
basis, and the nature of the product will vary considerably from case to case.
5. SOME CONSEQUENCES
The content of the previous sections must serve as a warning against facile
generalizations on the subject of legal personality. In view of the complex nature
of international relations and the absence of a centralized law of corporations,
it would be strange if the legal situation had an extreme simplicity. The number
of entities with personally for particular purposes is considerable. Moreover,
the tally of autonomous bodies increases if agencies of states and organiza-
tions, with a quantum of delegated powers, are taken into account. The listing
of candidates for personality, the characters the reader will encounter, has a
certain value, and yet such a procedure has some pitfalls. In the first place, a
great deal depends on the relation of the particular entity to the various aspects
of the substantive law. Thus the individual is in certain contexts regarded as a
legal person, and yet it is obvious that he cannot make treaties. The context of
problems remains paramount. Further, subject to the operations of the jus co-
gens, comprising certain fundamental principles, the institutions of recognition
have been active in sustaining anomalous relations. And finally, the intrusion
of agency and representation has created problems, both of application and
of principle. Thus it is not always easy to distinguish a dependent state with
its own personality from a subordinate entity with no independence, a joint
agency of states from an organization, or a private or public corporation under
some degree of state control from the state itself.
25
Christopher L. Blakesley, Edwin B. Firmage, Richard F. Scott, and Sharon A. Williams,
The International Legal System: Cases and Materials, 5th ed. (2001), Ch. 2.
States
Definition of a State
26
Signed at Montevideo, 26 December 1933, entered into force, 26 December 1934,
Article 8 reaffirmed by Protocol, 23 December 1936.
Article 4
1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states
which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judg-
ment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.
2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations
will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommenda-
tion of the Security Council.
***
75. Having established that it is seised of a request for advisory opinion
which it is competent to entertain and that it should comply with that request,
the Court will now examine the two questions which have been referred to it
by General Assembly resolution 3292 (XXIX). These questions are so formu-
lated that an answer to the second is called for only if the answer to the first
is in the negative:
“1. Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of
colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)?
If the answer to the first question is in the negative,
II. What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Mo-
rocco and the Mauritanian entity?”…
79. Turning to Question 1, the Court observes that the request specifically
locates the question in the context of “the time of colonization by Spain,”
and it therefore seems clear that the words “Was Western Sahara . . . a territory
belonging to no one (terra nullius)?” have to be interpreted by reference to
the law in force at that period. The expression “terra nullius” was a legal term
of art employed in connection with “occupation” as one of the accepted legal
methods of acquiring sovereignty over territory. “Occupation” being legally an
original means of peaceably acquiring sovereignty over territory otherwise than
by cession or succession, it was a cardinal condition of a valid “occupation”
that the territory should be terra nullius - a territory belonging to no-one - at
the time of the act alleged to constitute the “occupation” (cf. Legal Status of
Eastern Greenland, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 53, pp. 44 f. and63 f.). In the view of
27
Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 12.
the Court, therefore, a determination that Western Sahara was a “terra nullius”
at the time of colonization by Spain would be possible only if it were established
that at that time the territory belonged to no-one in the sense that it was then
open to acquisition through the legal process of “occupation.”
80. Whatever differences of opinion there may have been among jurists,
the State practice of the relevant period indicates that territories inhabited by
tribes or peoples having a social and political organization were not regarded
as terrae nullius. It shows that in the case of such territories the acquisition of
sovereignty was not generally considered as effected unilaterally through “oc-
cupation” of terra nullius by original title but through agreements concluded
with local rulers. On occasion, it is true, the word “occupation” was used in a
non-technical sense denoting simply acquisition of sovereignty; but that did
not signify that the acquisition of sovereignty through such agreements with
authorities of the country was regarded as an “occupation” of a “terra nullius”
in the proper sense of these terms. On the contrary, such agreements with
local rulers, whether or not considered as an actual “cession” of the territory,
were regarded as derivative roots of title, and not original titles obtained by
occupation of terrae nullius.
81. In the present instance, the information furnished to the Court shows
that at the time of colonization Western Sahara was inhabited by peoples which,
if nomadic, were socially and politically organized in tribes and under chiefs
competent to represent them. It also shows that, in colonizing Western Sahara,’
Spain did not proceed on the basis that it was establishing its sovereignty over
terrae nullius. In its Royal Order of 26 December 1884, far from treating the case
as one of occupation of terra nullius, Spain proclaimed that the King was taking
the Rio de Oro under his protection on the basis of agreements which had been
entered into with the chiefs of the local tribes: the Order referred expressly to
“the documents which the independent tribes of this part of the coast” had
“signed with the representative of the Sociedad Espafiola de Africanistas,” and
announced that the King had confirmed “the deeds of adherence” to Spain.
Likewise, in negotiating with France concerning the limits of Spanish territory
to the north of the Rio de Oro, that is, in the Sakiet El Hamra area, Spain did
not rely upon any claim to the acquisition of sovereignty over a terra nullius.
82. Before the Court, differing views were expressed concerning the nature
and legal value of agreements between a State and local chiefs. But the Court is
not asked by Question 1 to pronounce upon the legal character or the legality
of the titles which led to Spain becoming the administering Power of Western
Sahara. It is asked only to state whether Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet
El Hamra) at the time of colonization by Spain was “a territory belonging to no
one (terra nullius).” As to this question, the Court is satisfied that, for the reasons
which it has given, its answer must be in the negative. Accordingly, the Court
does not find it necessary first to pronounce upon the correctness or otherwise
of Morocco’s view that the territory was not terra nullius at that time because
the local tribes, so it maintains, were then subject to the sovereignty of the
Sultan of Morocco; nor upon Mauritania’s corresponding proposition that the
territory was not terra nullius because the local tribes, in its view, then formed
part of the “Bilad Shinguitti” or Mauritanian entity. Any conclusions that the
Court may reach with respect to either of these points of view cannot change
the negative character of the answer which, for other reasons already set out,
it has found that it must give to Question 1….
87. Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) is a territory having
very special characteristics which, at the time of colonization by Spain, largely
determined the way of life and social and political organization of the peoples
inhabiting it. In consequence, the legal régime of Western Sahara, including its
legal relations with neighbouring territories, cannot properly be appreciated
without reference to these special characteristics. The territory forms part of
the great Sahara desert which extends from the Atlantic Coast of Africa to Egypt
and the Sudan. At the time of its colonization by Spain, the area of this desert
with which the Court is concerned was being exploited, because of its low and
spasmodic rainfall, almost exclusively by nomads, pasturing their animals or
growing crops as and where conditions were favourable. It may be said that
the territory, at the time of its colonization, had a sparse population that, for
the most part, consisted of nomadic tribes the members of which traversed
the desert on more or less regular routes dictated by the seasons and the wells
or water-holes available to them. In general, the Court was informed, the right
of pasture was enjoyed in common by these tribes; some areas suitable for
cultivation, on the other hand, were subject to a greater degree to separate
rights. Perennial water-holes were in principle considered the property of the
tribe which put them into commission, though their use also was open to
all, subject to certain customs as to priorities and the amount of water taken.
Similarly, many tribes were said to have their recognized burial grounds, which
constituted a rallying point for themselves and for allied tribes. Another feature
of life in the region, according to the information before the Court, was that
inter-tribal conflict was not infrequent.
88. These various points of attraction of a tribe to particular localities were
reflected in its nomadic routes. But what is important for present purposes is the
fact that the scarcity of the resources and the spasmodic character of the rainfall
compelled al1 those nomadic tribes to traverse very wide areas of the desert. In
consequence, the nomadic routes of none of them were confined to Western
28
U.N. General Assembly, Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations, 24 October 1970, General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV),
of 24 October 1970,GAOR (25th Sess., 1883 Plen Mtg), UN Doc A/Res/2625.
***
Dissenting opinions of Judge Shahabuddeen and Judge Weeramantry.
[p. 417 D.O. Shahabuddeen] There would be difficulty also in following
how it is that what is inalienable for some States is alienable for others. It is an
attribute of sovereignty that a State may by agreement restrain the exercise of
its competence; yet how far it may do so without losing its status as a State is
another question.30 Since the right of self-defence is “inherent” in a State, it is
not possible to conceive of statehood which lacks that characteristic. See the
illustration in General Assembly resolution 49/10 of 3 November 1994,
“[r]eaffirming ... that as the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is, a sover-
eign, independent State and a Member of the United Nations, it is entitled to
all rights provided for in the Charter of the United Nations, including the right
to self-defence under Article 51 thereof.”
Arrangements for the exercise of the right of self-defence are a different matter.
But, so far as the right itself is concerned, if the right includes a right to use nuclear
29
Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opin-
ion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 66, pp. 226-27.
30
See argument of M. Yasseen in I.C.J. Pleadings, Interpretation of the Agreement of 25
March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, pp. 298-299.
weapons, the latter is not a small part of the former. It was no doubt for this reason
that, in the parallel case brought by the World Health Organization, it was argued
that to “deny the victim of aggression the right to use the only weapons which
might save it would be to make a mockery of the inherent right of self-defence.”31
The argument is understandable, granted the premise that the right to use nuclear
weapons is part of the inherent right of self-defence. The question is whether the
premise is correct. For, if it is correct, then, by the same token, there is difficulty in
seeing how the NNWS which were parties to the NPT could have wished to part
with so crucially important a part of their inherent right of self-defence….
[p. 526-527 D.O. Weeramantry] As with all sections of the international
legal system, the concept of equality is built into the texture of the laws of war.
Another anomaly is that if, under customary international law, the use of the
weapon is legal, this is inconsistent with the denial, to 180 of the 185 Members
of the United Nations, of even the right to possession of this weapon. Customary
international law cannot operate so unequally, especially if, as is contended by
the nuclear powers, the use of the weapon is essential to their self-defence. Self-
defence is one of the most treasured rights of States and is recognized by Article 51
of the United Nations Charter as the inherent right of every Member State of the
United Nations. It is a wholly unacceptable proposition that this right is granted
in different degrees to different Members of the United Nations family of nations.
De facto inequalities always exist and will continue to exist so long as the
world community is made up of sovereign States, which are necessarily unequal
in size, strength, wealth and influence. But a great conceptual leap is involved
in translating de facto inequality into inequality de jure. It is precisely such a
leap that is made by those arguing, for example, that when the Protocols to
the Geneva Conventions did not pronounce on the prohibition of the use of
nuclear weapons, there was an implicit recognition of the legality of their use
by the nuclear powers. Such silence meant an agreement not to deal with the
question, not a consent to legality of use. The “understandings” stipulated by the
United States and the United Kingdom that the rules established or newly intro-
duced by the 1977 Additional Protocol to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions
would not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons do not undermine
the basic principles which antedated these formal agreements and received
expression in them. They rest upon no conceptual or juristic reason that can
make inroads upon those principles. It is conceptually impossible to treat the
silence of these treaty provisions as overruling or overriding these principles.
31
Statement of the Government of the United Kingdom (para. 24), in the case concern-
ing Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (Request for
Advisory Opinion).
***
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ajibola
[p. 568-569 D.O. Ajibola] The Court agrees with Cameroon in that it does
not accept the submission of Nigeria that the City States of Old Calabar have
international legal personality. As far as Cameroon is concerned, this is a myth
or a kind of mirage. It argues that the City States of Old Calabar cannot claim
any international legal entity separate from the State of Nigeria. During the oral
proceedings counsel for Nigeria argued about the City States of Old Calabar thus:
“These City States were the holders of an original historic title over the cities
and their dependencies, and the Bakassi Peninsula was for long a dependency
of Old Calabar.” (Ibid.,Vol. I, p. 67 para. 5.2.).
Although Cameroon accepts that “[w]ithout doubt, Efik trading took place
over a vast area of what is now south-eastern Nigeria and western Cameroon”
(Reply of Cameroon, Vol. I, p. 247, para. 5.24), yet it asserts that there were other
ethnic groups in that area of the Bakassi Peninsula, which at that time showed
a “complex pattern of human settlement” (ibid.,Vol. I, p. 247, para. 5.24).
In deciding whether the City States of Old Calabar is an international legal
entity, one should look to the nature of the Treaty entered into between Great
Britain and the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar in 1884. In the first place, this
is not the first treaty of this kind signed by the Kings and Chiefs. As I have al-
ready mentioned, Great Britain signed altogether 17 treaties of this kind with
the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar. Secondly, Great Britain referred to it not as
a mere agreement, a declaration or exchange of Notes, but as a treaty ¾ Treaty
with the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar, September 10, 1884” (Counter-
Memorial of Nigeria, Vol. IV, Ann. NC-M 23, p. 109). How then could Great
Britain sign a document, and call it a treaty if it were not so? It would have
been described as an “ordinance” had it been a document involving a colony
of Great Britain. There is therefore no doubt that the City States of Old Calabar
have international legal personality.
32
Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria:
Equatorial Guinea intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 303.
***
IV. THE QUESTION WHETHER THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
78. The Court now turns to the substance of the request submitted by
the General Assembly. The Court recalls that it has been asked by the Gen-
eral Assembly to assess the accordance of the declaration of independence
of 17 February 2008 with “international law” (resolution 63/3 of the General
Assembly, 8 October 2008). The Court will first turn its attention to certain
questions concerning the lawfulness of declarations of independence under
general international law, against the background of which the question posed
falls to be considered, and Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) is to be
understood and applied. Once this general framework has been determined,
the Court will turn to the legal relevance of Security Council resolution 1244
(1999), and determine whether the resolution creates special rules, and ensu-
ing obligations, under international law applicable to the issues raised by the
present request and having a bearing on the lawfulness of the declaration of
independence of 17 February 2008.
A. General international law
79. During the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there
were numerous instances of declarations of independence, often strenuously
opposed by the State from which independence was being declared. Sometimes
a declaration resulted in the creation of a new State, at others it did not. In no
case, however, does the practice of States as a whole suggest that the act of
promulgating the declaration was regarded as contrary to international law. On
the contrary, State practice during this period points clearly to the conclusion
that international law contained no prohibition of declarations of indepen-
dence. During the second half of the twentieth century, the international law
of self-determination developed in such a way as to create a right to indepen-
33
Accordance with International Law of The Unilateral Declaration Of Independence
in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 22 July 2010, pp. 29-32.
Council resolutions 216 (1965) and 217 (1965), concerning Southern Rhode-
sia; Security Council resolution 541 (1983), concerning northern Cyprus; and
Security Council resolution 787 (1992), concerning the Republika Srpska. The
Court notes, however, that in all of those instances the Security Council was
making a determination as regards the concrete situation existing at the time
that those declarations of independence were made; the illegality attached to
the declarations of independence thus stemmed not from the unilateral char-
acter of these declarations as such, but from the fact that they were, or would
have been, connected with the unlawful use of force or other egregious viola-
tions of norms of general international law, in particular those of a peremptory
character (jus cogens). In the context of Kosovo, the Security Council has never
taken this position. The exceptional character of the resolutions enumerated
above appears to the Court to confirm that no general prohibition against
unilateral declarations of independence may be inferred from the practice of
the Security Council.
82. A number of participants in the present proceedings have claimed,
although in almost every instance only as a secondary argument, that the
population of Kosovo has the right to create an independent State either as
a manifestation of a right to self-determination or pursuant to what they de-
scribed as a right of “remedial secession” in the face of the situation in Kosovo.
The Court has already noted (see paragraph 79 above) that one of the major
developments of international law during the second half of the twentieth
century has been the evolution of the right of self-determination. Whether,
outside the context of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to
alien subjugation, domination and exploitation, the international law of self-
determination confers upon part of the population of an existing State a right
to separate from that State is, however, a subject on which radically different
views were expressed by those taking part in the proceedings and expressing
a position on the question. Similar differences existed regarding whether in-
ternational law provides for a right of “remedial secession” and, if so, in what
circumstances. There was also a sharp difference of views as to whether the
circumstances which some participants maintained would give rise to a right
of “remedial secession” were actually present in Kosovo.
83. The Court considers that it is not necessary to resolve these questions
in the present case. The General Assembly has requested the Court’s opinion
only on whether or not the declaration of independence is in accordance with
international law. Debates regarding the extent of the right of self-determination
and the existence of any right of “remedial secession,” however, concern the
right to separate from a State. As the Court has already noted (see paragraphs
49 to 56 above), and as almost all participants agreed, that issue is beyond the
scope of the question posed by the General Assembly. To answer that question,
the Court need only determine whether the declaration of independence vio-
lated either general international law or the lex specialis created by Security
Council resolution 1244 (1999).
84. For the reasons already given, the Court considers that general interna-
tional law contains no applicable prohibition of declarations of independence.
Accordingly, it concludes that the declaration of independence of 17 February
2008 did not violate general international law. Having arrived at that conclu-
sion, the Court now turns to the legal relevance of Security Council resolution
1244, adopted on 10 June 1999.
34
31 I.L.M. 1485 (1992) Extraordinary IPC Ministerial Meeting/ Brussels, 16 December
1991.
1486 they accept the provisions laid down in the draft Convention - es-
pecially those in Chapter II on human rights and rights of national or ethnic
groups - under consideration by the Conference on Yugoslavia; they continue
to support the efforts of the Secretary General and the Security Council of the
United Nations, and the continuation of the Conference on Yugoslavia. The ap-
plications of those Republics which reply positively will be submitted through
the Chair of the Conference to the Arbitration Commission for advice before
the implementation date. In the meantime, the Community and its member
States request the UN Secretary General and the UN Security Council to con-
tinue their efforts to establish an effective cease-fire and promote a peaceful
and negotiated outcome to the conflict. They continue to attach the greatest
importance to the early deployment of a UN peacekeeping force referred to
in UN Security Council Resolution 724. The Community and its member States
also require a Yugoslav Republic to commit itself, prior to recognition, to adopt
constitutional and political guarantees ensuring that it has no territorial claims
towards a neighbouring Community State and that it will conduct no hostile
propaganda activities versus a neighbouring Community State, including the
use of a denomination which implies territorial claims.
35
31 I.L.M. 1486 ( 1992).
with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE; - respect for
the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful means and
by common agreement; - acceptance of all relevant commitments with regard
to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation as well as to security and regional
stability; - commitment to settle by agreement, including where appropriate by
recourse to arbitration, all questions concerning state succession and regional
disputes. The Community and its Member States will not recognise entities which
are the result of aggression. They would take account of the effects of recognition
on neighbouring states. The commitments to these principles opens the way to
recognition by the Community and its Member States and to the establishment
of diplomatic relations. It could be laid down in agreements.
Brussels, The Hague, 16 December 1991.
Succession of States
***
123. The Court does not find it necessary for the purposes of the present
case to enter into a discussion of whether or not Article 34 of the 1978 Conven-
tion reflects the state of customary international law. More relevant to its present
analysis is the particular nature and character of the 1977 Treaty. An examination
of this Treaty confirms that, aside from its undoubted nature as a joint investment,
its major elements were the proposed construction and joint operation of a large,
integrated and indivisible complex of structures and installations on specific parts
of the respective territories of Hungary and Czechoslovakia along the Danube.
The Treaty also established the navigational regime for an important sector of
an international waterway, in particular the relocation of the main international
shipping lane to the bypass canal. In so doing, it inescapably created a situation
in which the interests of other users of the Danube were affected. Furthermore,
the interests of third States were expressly acknowledged in Article 18, whereby
the parties undertook to ensure “uninterrupted and safe navigation on the inter-
national fairway” in accordance with their obligations under the Convention of
18 August 1948 concerning the Regime of Navigation on the Danube.
In its Commentary on the Draft Articles on Succession of States in respect
of Treaties, adopted at its twenty-sixth session, the International Law Commis-
36
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997,
p. 7.
***
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kreca
[p. 681 D.O. Kreca] In the light of the contents of the Dayton Agreements
and in particular in the light of the current state of affairs, Bosnia and Herze-
govina may be qualified in terms of international law as a State in statu nascendi.
37
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 595, Dissenting
Opinion Of Judge Korea p. 681, para. 23.
At the time of the entry into force of the Dayton Agreements, the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a State within the administrative borders of the
former Yugoslav federal unit of the same name, possessed literally no relevant
attribute of a State in terms of international law….
[p. 684 D.O. Kreca] At present, an absence of the crucial State elements in
terms of international law makes Bosnia and Herzegovina within its administra-
tive borders a State sui generis: a combination of a contractual relationship of
two entities with a strongly installed element of an international protectorate.
This status is expressed at two levels, that is
(a) the factual level, as reflected in the position of IFOR. These forces are,
by definition, a “multinational military Implementation Force”38 deployed to
Bosnia and Herzegovina to “help ensure compliance with the provisions of this
Agreement”39). IFOR is not only one armed force which shall “have complete
and unimpeded freedom of movement by ground, air, and water throughout
Bosnia and Herzegovina”40 but is even authorized to “take such actions as
required, including the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance with this
Annex, and to ensure its own protection”41;
(b) the legal level, since particularly relevant provisions of Article VI of the
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Constitutional Court), which is an
inherently adjudicative body which has “exclusive jurisdiction to decide any
dispute that arises under this Constitution between the Entities or between
Bosnia and Herzegovina and an Entity or Entities , or between institutions of
Bosnia and Herzegovina”42
38
Article 1 of the Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement, doc.
A/50/790/S/1995/999, p. 7.
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid., p. 19.
41
Ibid., p. 8.
42
Ibid., p. 71.
Intergovernmental Organizations as
Subjects of International Law (IGOs)
United Nations and International Bodies
43
Summary of the Advisory Opinion, published by the Court, See, http://www.I.C.J.-cij.
org/docket/files/4/1837.pdf).
the State of which the victim is a national could not complain of a breach of an
obligation towards itself. Here the obligation is assumed in favour of the Orga-
nization. However, the Court admits that the analogy of the traditional rule of
diplomatic protection of nationals abroad does not in itself justify an affirmative
reply. In fact, there exists no link of nationality between the Organization and its
agents. This is a new situation and it must be analyzed. Do the provisions of the
Charter relating to the functions of the Organization imply that the latter is em-
powered to assure its agents limited protection? These powers, which are essential
to the performance of the functions of the Organization, must be regarded as a
necessary implication arising from the Charter. In discharging its functions, the
Organization may find it necessary to entrust its agents with important missions
to be performed in disturbed arts of the world. These agents must be ensured
of effective protection. It is only in this way that the agent will be able to carry
out his duties satisfactorily. The Court therefore reaches the conclusion that the
Organization has the capacity to exercise functional protection in respect of its
agents. The situation is comparatively simple: in the case of Member States, for
these have assumed various obligations towards the Organization.
But what is the situation when a claim is brought against a State which is
not a Member of the Organization? The Court is of opinion that the Members
of the United Nations created an entity possessing objective international per-
sonality and not merely personality recognized by them alone. As in the case of
Question I (a),the Court therefore answers Question I (6) in the affirmative….
***
19. In order to delineate the field of activity or the area of competence of
an international organization one must refer to the relevant rules of the organi-
zation and, in the first place, to its constitution. From a formal standpoint, the
constituent instruments of international organizations are multilateral treaties,
to which the well-established rules of treaty interpretation apply. As the Court
has said with respect to the Charter:
“On the previous occasions when the Court has had to interpret the Char-
ter of the United Nations, it has followed the principles and rules applicable
44
Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, On the matter
of the World Health Organization, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 66, pp.
74-75, 82-83, and dissenting opinion of Judge Koroma p. 198.
been adopted intra vires are two separate issues. The mere fact that a majority
of States, in voting on a resolution, have complied with all the relevant rules of
form cannot in itself suffice to remedy any fundamental defects, such as acting
ultra vires, with which the resolution might be afflicted.
As the Court has stated, “each organ must, in the first place at least, deter-
mine its own jurisdiction” (Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17,
paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 168). It
was therefore certainly a matter for the World Health Assembly to decide on
its competence - and, thereby, that of the WHO - to submit a request to the
Court for an advisory opinion on the question under consideration, having
regard to the terms of the Constitution of the Organization and those of the
Agreement of 10 July 1948 bringing it into relationship with the United Nations.
But likewise it is incumbent on the Court to satisfy itself that the conditions
governing its own competence to give the opinion requested are met; through
the reference made, respectively, by Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter to
the “scope of [the] activities” of the Organization and by Article X, paragraph
2, of the Agreement of 10 July 1948 to its “competence,” the Court also finds
itself obliged in the present case, to interpret the Constitution of the WHO.
The exercise of the functions entrusted to the Court under Article 65, para-
graph l, of its Statute requires it to furnish such an interpretation, independently
of any operation of the specific recourse mechanism which Article 75 of the
WHO Constitution reserves for cases in which a question or dispute arises be-
tween States concerning the interpretation or application of that instrument;
and in doing so the Court arrives at different conclusions from those reached
by the World Health Assembly when it adopted resolution WHA46.40.
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma
[p. 203 D.O. Koroma] Although the resolution containing the request is not
itself a treaty, however, like the Court in its majority opinion, its interpretation
can be guided by the relevant provisions of the 1969 Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties so as to establish that the question formulated in the reso-
lution falls within the competence or scope of activities of the Organization,
as defined in its Constitution.
[p. 219 D.O. Koroma] On the question whether an international organiza-
tion is entitled to determine its own competence or jurisdiction, the Court had
this to say in its Advisory Opinion in the Certain Expenses case:
“In the legal systems of States, there is often some procedure for determin-
ing the validity of even a legislative or governmental act, but no analogous
procedure is to be found in the structure of the United Nations. Proposals made
during the drafting of the Charter to place the ultimate authority to interpret
the Charter in the International Court of Justice were not accepted; the opinion
which the Court is in course of rendering is an advisory opinion. As anticipated
in 1945 therefore, each organ must, in the first place at least, determine its own
jurisdiction.” (Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2,
of the Charter), I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 168; (second emphasis added.)
In that same Opinion, the Court stated that
“when the Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it
was appropriate for the fulfillment of one of the stated purposes of the United
Nations, the presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the Organiza-
tion” (ibid.).
What this shows, in my view, is that prior to the present case and in accordance
with its jurisprudence; the Court has held that international organizations are com-
petent to determine their competence or jurisdiction. On this occasion, the Court
decided to depart from this its jurisprudence, but with hardly any explanation or
reason but not only did the Court choose not to follow its jurisprudence on this
occasion in the past, while not denying itself the right to examine the competence
of the body making the request, it rejected certain objections to its jurisdiction
based on the claims that such bodies were not competent to make the request
(Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase,
I.C.J. Reports 1950, pp. 72 et seq., and Reservations to the Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, I.C.J. Reports 1951, pp. 19-20).
***
Separate Opinion of Judge Lauterpacht
[pp. 439-441 S.O. Lauterpacht] On the face of it, Security Council resolution
713 (1991)46 is a valid prohibition of the supply of arms and military equipment
45
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia/Herzegovina v Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Provisional
Measures, Order, I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 325.
46
“... that all States shall, for the purpose of establishing peace and stability in Yugo-
to those involved in the Yugoslav conflict and is binding on all Members of the
United Nations. Although the resolution is open to the comments expressed
above in paragraphs 91-96, it cannot be said with certainty that in themselves
these comments affect the continuing validity of the resolution. The fact that
some of the members of the Security Council indicated that they would not
have supported the resolution in the absence of the consent of Yugoslavia, in
relation to whose territory the embargo was adopted, could only be relevant
in the absence of a determination by the Security Council that the situation fell
within Chapter VII of the Charter. Once the Security Council indicated that it
was acting “under Chapter VII,” it was no longer constrained by the necessity
of obtaining the consent of any State to the measures that it considered the
circumstances to require.
This is not to say that the Security Council can act free of all legal controls
but only that the Court’s power of judicial review is limited. That the Court has
some power of this kind can hardly be doubted, though there can be no less
doubt that it does not embrace any right of the Court to substitute its discretion
for that of the Security Council in determining the existence of a threat to the
peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression, or the political steps to be
taken following such a determination. But the Court, as the principal judicial
organ of the United Nations, is entitled, indeed bound, to ensure the rule of
law within the United Nations system and, in cases properly brought before
it, to insist on adherence by all United Nations organs to the rules governing
their operation. The Court has already, in the Lockerbie case, given an exten-
sive interpretation of the powers of the Security Council when acting under
Chapter VII, in holding that a decision of the Council is, by virtue of Articles
25 and 103 of the Charter, able to prevail over the obligations of the parties
under any other international agreement (see Questions of Interpretation and
Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident
at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures,
Order of 14 April 1992, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 15 para. 39).
The present case, however, cannot fall within the scope of the doctrine
just enunciated. This is because the prohibition of genocide, unlike the mat-
ters covered by the Montreal Convention in the Lockerbie case to which the
terms of Article 103 could be directly applied, has generally been accepted as
having the status not of an ordinary rule of international law but of jus cogens.
Indeed, the prohibition of genocide has long been regarded as one of the few
undoubted examples of jus cogens. Even in 1951, in its Advisory Opinion on
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, the Court affirmed that genocide was “contrary to moral
law and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations” (a view repeated by the
Court in paragraph 51 of today’s Order) and that “the principles underlying the
Convention are provisions which are recognized by civilized nations as binding
on States even without any conventional obligation” (I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 22).
An express reference to the special quality of the prohibition of genocide
may also be seen in the work of the International Law Commission in the
preparation of Article 50 of the draft articles on the Law of Treaties (Yearbook
of the International Law Commission, 1966, Vol. II, pp. 248-249) which even-
tually materialized in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties and in the same Commission’s commentary on Article 19 (international
crimes and delicts) of the draft articles on State Responsibility (Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, 1976, Vol. II, Pt. 2, p. 103). The concept of jus
cogens operates as a concept superior to both customary international law and
treaty. The relief which Article 103 of the Charter may give the Security Council
in case of conflict between one of its decisions and an operative treaty obliga-
tion cannot - as a matter of simple hierarchy of norms - extend to a conflict
between a Security Council resolution and jus cogens. Indeed, one only has to
state the opposite proposition thus - that a Security Council resolution may
even require participation in genocide - for its unacceptability to be apparent.
Nor should one overlook the significance of the provision in Article 24 (2)
of the Charter that, in discharging its duties to maintain international peace
and security, the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations. Amongst the Purposes set out in Article 1(3)
of the Charter is that of achieving international co-operation “in promoting
and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.”
Now, it is not to be contemplated that the Security Council would ever
deliberately adopt a resolution clearly and deliberately flouting a rule of jus
cogens or requiring a violation of human rights. But the possibility that a Secu-
rity Council resolution might inadvertently or in an unforeseen manner lead to
such a situation cannot be excluded. And that, it appears, is what has happened
here. On this basis, the inability of Bosnia-Herzegovina sufficiently strongly to
fight back against the Serbs and effectively to prevent the implementation of
the Serbian policy of ethnic cleansing is at least in part directly attributable
to the fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina’s access to weapons and equipment has
been severely limited by the embargo. Viewed in this light, the Security Council
resolution can be seen as having in effect called on Members of the United Na-
tions, albeit unknowingly and assuredly unwillingly, to become in some degree
supporters of the genocidal activity of the Serbs and in this manner and to that
extent to act contrary to a rule of jus cogens.
What legal consequences may flow from this analysis? One possibility is
that, in strict logic, when the operation of paragraph 6 of Security Council
resolution 713 (1991) began to make Members of the United Nations acces-
sories to genocide, it ceased to be valid and binding in its operation against
Bosnia-Herzegovina; and that Members of the United Nations then became free
to disregard it. Even so, it would be difficult to say that they then became posi-
tively obliged to provide the Applicant with weapons and military equipment.
There is, however, another possibility that is, perhaps, more in accord with
the realities of the situation. It must be recognized that the chain of hypotheses
in the analysis just made involves some debatable links - elements of fact, such
as that the arms embargo has led to the imbalance in the possession of arms
by the two sides and that that imbalance has contributed in greater or lesser
degree to genocidal activity such as ethnic cleansing; and elements of law, such
as that genocide is jus cogens and that a resolution which becomes violative of
jus cogens must then become void and legally ineffective. It is not necessary for
the Court to take a position in this regard at this time. Instead, it would seem
sufficient that the relevance here of jus cogens should be drawn to the atten-
tion of the Security Council, as it will be by the required communication to it
of the Court’s Order, so that the Security Council may give due weight to it in
future reconsideration of the embargo.
***
30. Australia objects that the United Nations resolutions regarding East
Timor do not say what Portugal claims they say; that the last resolution of the
Security Council on East Timor goes back to 1976 and the last resolution of
the General Assembly to 1982, and that Portugal takes no account of the pas-
sage of time and the developments that have taken place since then; and that
the Security Council resolutions are not resolutions which are binding under
Chapter VII of the Charter or otherwise and, moreover, that they are not framed
in mandatory terms.
47
East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 90, 103-104, and
Weeramantry dissenting opinion pp. 190-91.
31. The Court notes that the argument of Portugal under consideration
rests on the premise that the United Nations resolution, and in particular those
of the Security Council, can be read as imposing an obligation on States not to
recognize any authority on the part of Indonesia over the territory and, where
the latter is concerned, to deal only with Portugal. The Court is not persuaded,
however, that the relevant resolutions went so far.
For the two Parties, the Territory of East Timor remains a non-self-governing
territory and its people has the right to self-determination. Moreover, the
General Assembly, which reserves to itself the right to determine the territories
which have to be regarded as non-self-governing for the purposes of the ap-
plication of Chapter XI of the Charter, has treated East Timor as such a territory.
The competent subsidiary organs of the General Assembly have continued to
treat East Timor as such to this day. Furthermore, the Security Council, in its
resolutions 384 (1975) and 389 (1976) has expressly called for respect for “the
territorial integrity of East Timor as well as the inalienable right of its people to
self-determination in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).”
Nor is it at issue between the Parties that the General Assembly has expressly
referred to Portugal as the “administering Power” of East Timor in a number
of the resolutions it adopted on the subject of East Timor between 1975 and
1982, and that the Security Council has done so in its resolution 384 (1975).
The Parties do not agree, however, on the legal implications that flow from the
reference to Portugal as the administering Power in those texts.
32. The Court finds that it cannot be inferred from the sole fact that the
above-mentioned resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council
refer to Portugal as the administering Power of East Timor that they intended
to establish an obligation on third States to treat exclusively with Portugal as
regards the continental shelf of East Timor.
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry
[p. 190-191 D.O. Weeramantry] The proposition that lapse of time wears
down the binding force of resolutions needs to be viewed with great caution.
In cases where resolutions in fact impose obligations at international law, this
Court would then, in effect, be nullifying obligations which the appropriate
organ of the United Nations, properly seised of that matter, has chosen to
impose. More especially is caution required from the Court in regard to resolu-
tions dealing with obligations erga omnes and rights such as self-determination
which are fundamental to the international legal system. The Court would, in
the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary, show due respect for the
valid resolutions duly passed by its sister organs.
***
50. In the process of determining whether a particular expert on mission is
entitled, in the prevailing circumstances, to the immunity provided for in Section
22 (b), the Secretary-General of the United Nations has a pivotal role to play.
The Secretary-General, as the chief administrative officer of the Organization,
has the authority and the responsibility to exercise the necessary protection
where required. This authority has been recognized by the Court when it stated:
“Upon examination of the character of the functions entrusted to the Or-
ganization and of the nature of the missions of its agents, it becomes clear that
the capacity of the Organization to exercise a measure of functional protection
of its agents arises by necessary intendment out of the Charter.” (Reparation
for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion,
I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 184.)
51. Article VI, Section 23,of the General Convention provides that “[p]
rivileges and immunities are granted to experts in the interests of the United
Nations and not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves.” In exer-
cising protection of United Nations experts, the Secretary-General is therefore
protecting the mission with which the expert is entrusted. In that respect, the
Secretary-General has the primary responsibility and authority to protect the
interests of the Organization and its agents, including experts on mission. As
the Court held:
“In Order that the agent may perform his duties satisfactorily, he must feel
that this protection is assured to him by the Organization, and that he may
48
Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 62.
count on it. To ensure the independence of the agent, and, consequently, the
independent action of the Organization itself, it is essential that in performing
his duties he need not have to rely on any other protection than that of the
Organization ...” (Ibid., p. 183.)
52. The determination whether an agent of the Organization has acted
in the course of the Performance of his mission depends upon the facts of a
particular case. In the present case, the Secretary-General, or the Legal Counsel
of the United Nations on his behalf, has on numerous occasions informed the
Government of Malaysia of his finding that Mr. Cumaraswamy had spoken
the words quoted in the article in International Commercial Litigation in his
capacity as Special Rapporteur of the Commission and that he consequently
was entitled to immunity from “every kind” of legal process.
53. As is clear from the written and oral pleadings of the United Nations,
the Secretary-General was reinforced in this view by the fact that it has become
standard practice of Special Rapporteurs of the Commission to have contact
with the media. This practice was confirmed by the High Commissioner for
Human Rights who, in a letter dated 2 October 1998, included in the dossier,
wrote that: “it is more common than not for Special Rapporteurs to speak to
the press about matters pertaining to their investigations, thereby keeping the
general public informed of their work.”
54. As noted above… Mr. Cumaraswamy was explicitly referred to several times
in the article “Malaysian Justice on Trial” in International Commercial Litigation
in his capacity as United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Independence of
Judges and Lawyers. In his reports to the Commission … Mr. Cumaraswamy had
set out his methods of work, expressed concern about the independence of the
Malaysian judiciary, and referred to the civil lawsuits initiated against him. His
third report noted that the Legal Counsel of the United Nations had informed
the Government of Malaysia that he had spoken in the performance of his mis-
sion and was therefore entitled to immunity from legal process.
55. As noted in Paragraph 18 above, in its various resolutions the Commis-
sion took note of the Special Rapporteur’s reports and of his methods of work.
In 1997, it extended his mandate for another three years (see paragraphs 18
and 45 above). The Commission presumably would not have so acted if it had
been of the opinion that Mr. Cumaraswamy had gone beyond his mandate and
had given the interview to International Commercial Litigation outside the
course of his functions. Thus the Secretary-General was able to find Support
for his findings in the Commission’s Position.
56. The Court is not called upon in the present case to pass upon the aptness
of the terms used by the Special Rapporteur or his assessment of the situation.
In any event, in view of all the circumstances of this case, elements of which
are set out in paragraphs 1 to 15of the note by the Secretary-General, the Court
is of the opinion that the Secretary-General correctly found that Mr. Cumaras-
wamy, in speaking the words quoted in the article in International Commercial
Litigation, was acting in the course of the Performance of his mission as Special
Rapporteur of the Commission. Consequently, Article VI, Section 22 (b), of the
General Convention is applicable to him in the present case and affords Mr.
Cumaraswamy immunity from legal process of every kind….
60. As the Court has observed, the Secretary-General, as the chief adminis-
trative officer of the Organization, has the primary responsibility to safeguard
the interests of the Organization; to that end, it is up to him to assess whether its
agents acted within the scope of their functions and, where he so concludes, to
protect these agents, including experts on mission, by asserting their immunity.
This means that the Secretary-General has the authority and responsibility to
inform the government of a member State of his finding and, where appropri-
ate, to request it to act accordingly and, in particular, to request it to bring his
finding to the knowledge of the local Courts if acts of an agent have given or
may give rise to Court proceedings.
61. When national Courts are seised of a case in which the immunity of
a United Nations agent is in issue, they should immediately be notified of any
finding by the Secretary-General concerning that immunity. That finding, and
its documentary expression, creates a presumption which can only be set aside
for the most compelling reasons and is thus to be given the greatest weight
by national Courts.
The governmental authorities of a party to the General Convention are
therefore under an obligation to convey such Information to the national
Courts concerned, since a proper application of the Convention by them is
dependent on such information.
Failure to comply with this Obligation, among others, could give rise to
the Institution of proceedings under Article VIII, Section 30, of the General
Convention….
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry
[pp. 96-97 S.O. Weeramantry] Since it is essential to United Nations staff that
they receive sufficient protection to be able to discharge their missions with
independence, and since the duty of protecting its staff in the exercise of such
duties lies so heavily on the United Nations, great importance must attach to
the views of its chief functionary, the Secretary-General, regarding the question
whether immunity does or does not attach in a given case.
49
1974 UN General Assembly recognized and accorded recognition to the Angolan,
Mozambican, Palestinian, and Rhodesian movements. Add UN GA 3237 (XXIX)
(November 22, 1974 PLO observer status to UN).
Also at the same session, the General Assembly… demanded that Israel, the
occupying Power, comply with its legal obligations under international law, as
mentioned in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice and
as demanded in resolutions ES-10/13 of 21 October 2003 and ES-10/15 of
20 July 2004 and, inter alia, that it immediately cease its construction of the
wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem; reiterated
its demand for the complete cessation of all Israeli settlement activities in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied
Syrian Golan, and called for the full implementation of the relevant Security
Council resolutions; reaffirmed its commitment to the two-State solution of
Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security within recognized
borders, based on the pre-1967 borders; urged Member States to expedite the
provision of economic, humanitarian and technical assistance to the Palestin-
ian people and the Palestinian Authority; and requested the Secretary- General
to continue his efforts with the parties concerned, and in consultation with
the Security Council, towards the attainment of a peaceful settlement of the
question of Palestine and the promotion of peace in the region and to submit
to the Assembly at its sixty-second session a report on those efforts and on
developments on the matter (resolution 61/25).
50
Professor of Public International Law, Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies, Geneva, Director of the Geneva Academy of International
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights. Email: andrew.clapham@graduateinstitute.
ch. [Reprinted with permission of the author].
51
(7th ed., 2008), at 65.
52
Shaw’s discussion in the 6th edition of his International Law (2008), at 258, asserts
that ‘modern prac-tice does demonstrate that individuals have become increasingly
recognised as participants and sub-jects of international law’, but the subsequent paras
are confined to recalling those treaties which allow individuals to appeal directly to an
international body, and he recalls at 259 that it is now established that international
law proscribes certain heinous conduct so that it ‘imports direct individual criminal
responsibility’.
53
‘Soliloquy’, in Cassese, supra note 5, at pp. lxii-lxiii, quoting the ‘Report Presented to
the Preliminary Peace Conference by the Commission on the Responsibility of the
Authors of War and on the Enforcement of penalties’, in Violations of the Laws and
Customs of War, Report of Majority and Dissenting Reports of Americans and Japanese
members of the Commission of Responsibilities, Conference of Paris 1919 (1919), at
13.
54
Ibid., at p. lxii with a reference to Trial of the Major War Criminals before the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal- Nuremberg 14 November 1945-1 October 1946(Nuremberg
International Military Tribunal, 1947), at 219 (emphasis added).
55
See ICTY, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the defence motion for Interlocutory Ap-
peal on Jurisdiction, Prosecutor v. Tadic, (IT-94-1-AR72), 2 Oct. 1995, especially at
paras 128-13 7.
56
International Law (2nd ed., 2005), at 145.
57
Ibid.
Protocol allowing the individual victim to seise the Court directly. The same is
now possible with regard to the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights.
Can we reason therefore that the individual has not only criminal law ob-
ligations but also rights under international law? At this point we should recall
the doctrinal debate which has raged over whether it made sense for individuals
to be considered ‘subjects’ of international law. Gaja has recently addressed the
issue in the context of the question whether non-governmental organizations
should be included in the scope of the ILC’s work on the responsibility of in-
ternational organizations. Here the doctrine concerning the current category
of subjects seems to exclude non-governmental organizations, but Gaja, having
recalled the International Court of Justice’s conclusions regarding the UN and
its specialized agencies, exposes the indeterminate nature of the concept (or
conception) of subjects of international law. Gaja recalls the implications of
the same Court’s LaGrand dictum:
The Court’s assertion of the legal personality of international organizations
needs to be viewed in the context of its more recent approach to the question
of legal personality in international law. The Court stated in the LaGrand case
that individuals are also subjects of international law.58 This approach may lead
the Court to assert the legal personality even of non-governmental organiza-
tions. It would be difficult to understand why individuals may acquire rights
and obligations under international law while the same could not occur with
any international organization, provided that it is an entity which is distinct
from its members…59
To be clear I am suggesting that individuals may have a role to play with
regard to respect for international law which goes beyond their international
criminal law obligations. This could involve obligations which have not been
criminalized, or simply mean that an act could give rise to simultaneous criminal
and civil violations of international law.
58
Footnote 47 in the original reads: ‘I.C.J. Reports 2001, para. 77. The Court referred
to the Vienna Con-vention on Consular Relations of 24 April 1963 and concluded
that “article 36, paragraph 1, creates individual rights.”
59
First report on responsibility of international organizations, UN Doc.A/CN.4/532, 26
Mar. 2003, at para.17. See also the Report of the ILC Working Group, ‘The Responsi-
bility of International Organiza-tions: Scope and Orientation of the Study’, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/L.622, 6 June 2002, at para.11: ‘[t]he topic would be considerably widened if
the study were to comprise also organizations that States establish under municipal
laws, for example under the law of a particular State, and non-governmental orga-
nizations. Thus, it may seem preferable to leave questions of responsibility relating
to this type of organization aside, at least provisionally.’
***
75. Germany further contends that “the breach of Article 36 by the United
States did not only infringe upon the rights of Germany as a State party to the
[Vienna] Convention but also entailed a violation of the individual rights of the
LaGrand brothers.” Invoking its right of diplomatic protection, Germany also
seeks relief against the United States on this ground.
Germany maintains that the right to be informed of the rights under Article
36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention, is an individual right of every
national of a State party to the Convention who enters the territory of another
State party. It submits that this view is supported by the ordinary meaning of
the terms of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), of the Vienna Convention, since the
last sentence of that provision speaks of the “rights” under this subparagraph
of “the person concerned,” i.e., of the foreign national arrested or detained.
Germany adds that the provision in Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), according to
which it is for the arrested person to decide whether consular notification is to
60
‘So far this principle has operated in the field of criminal responsibility, but it is not
excluded that developments may occur in the field of individual civil responsibility.
As a saving clause Article 58 is not intended to exclude that possibility; hence the
use of the general term “individual responsibility”’: Draft Articles on Responsibility
of States for Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two, at 142 (footnote omitted).
61
LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States), I.C.J. Reports 2001, p.466 and Oda dissent.
be provided, has the effect of conferring an individual right upon the foreign
national concerned. In its view, the context of Article 36 supports this conclu-
sion since it relates to both the concerns of the sending and receiving States
and to those of individuals. According to Germany, the travaux preparatoires of
the Vienna Convention lend further support to this interpretation. In addition,
Germany submits that the “United Nations Declaration on the human rights of
individuals who are not nationals of the country in which they live,” adopted
by General Assembly resolution 40/144 on 13 December 1985, confirms the
view that the right of access to the consulate of the home State, as well as the
information on this right, constitute individual rights of foreign nationals and
are to be regarded as human rights of aliens.
76. The United States questions what this additional claim of diplomatic
protection contributes to the case and argues that there are no parallels between
the present case and cases of diplomatic protection involving the espousal by a
State of economic claims of its nationals. The United States maintains that the
right of a State to provide consular assistance to nationals detained in another
country, and the right of a State to espouse the claims of its nationals through
diplomatic protection, are legally different concepts.
The United States contends, furthermore, that rights of consular notifica-
tion and access under the Vienna Convention are rights of States, and not of
individuals, even though these rights may benefit individuals by permitting
States to offer them consular assistance. It maintains that the treatment due
to individuals under the Convention is inextricably linked to and derived from
the right of the State, acting through its consular officer, to communicate with
its nationals, and does not constitute a fundamental right or a human right.
The United States argues that the fact that Article 36 by its terms recognizes
the rights of individuals does not determine the nature of those rights or the
remedies required under the Vienna Convention for breaches of that Article. It
points out that Article 36 begins with the words “[w]ith a view to facilitating the
exercise of consular functions relating to nationals of the sending State,” and
that this wording gives no support to the notion that the rights and obligations
enumerated in paragraph 1 of that Article are intended to ensure that nationals
of the sending State have any particular rights or treatment in the context of
a criminal prosecution. The travaux preparatoires of the Vienna Convention
according to the United States, do not reflect a consensus that Article 36 was
addressing immutable individual rights, as opposed to individual rights deriva-
tive of the rights of States.
77. The Court notes that Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), spells out the obli-
gations the receiving State has towards the detained person and the sending
State. It provides that, at the request of the detained person, the receiving State
must inform the consular post of the sending State of the individual’s detention
“without delay.” It provides further that any communication by the detained
person addressed to the consular post of the sending State must be forwarded
to it by authorities of the receiving State “without delay.” Significantly, this
subparagraph ends with the following language:
“The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of
his rights under this subparagraph” (emphasis added). Moreover, under Article
36, paragraph 1 (c), the sending State’s right to provide consular assistance to
the detained person may not be exercised “if he expressly opposes such action.”
The clarity of these provisions, viewed in their context, admits of no doubt. It
follows, as has been held on a number of occasions, that the Court must apply
these as they stand (see Acquisition of Polish Nationality, Advisory Opinion,
1923, P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 7, p. 20; Competence of the General Assembly for
the Admission of a State to the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports
1950, p. 8; Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1991, pp.
69-70, para. 48; Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1994, p. 25,para. 51). Based on the text of these provisions, the
Court concludes that Article 36, paragraph 1, creates individual rights, which,
by virtue of Article I of the Optional Protocol, may be invoked in this Court
by the national State of the detained person. These rights were violated in the
present case.
78. At the hearings, Germany further contended that the right of the in-
dividual to be informed without delay under Article 36, paragraph 1, of the
Vienna Convention was not only an individual right, but has today assumed
the character of a human right. In consequence, Germany added, “the charac-
ter of the right under Article 36 as a human right renders the effectiveness of
this provision even more imperative.” The Court having found that the United
States violated the rights accorded by Article 36, paragraph 1, to the LaGrand
brothers, it does not appear necessary to it to consider the additional argument
developed by Germany in this regard.
Separate Opinion of Judge Shi
[p. S.O. Shi] …The result of the debate was the adoption of the twenty States’
amendment with the insertion of the words “if he so requests” at the beginning
of the subparagraph. The last sentence of Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), i.e., the
provision that the competent authorities of the receiving State “shall inform
the person concerned without delay of his rights” (United Nations Conference
on Consular Relations, 1963, Vol. 1, pp. 336-343) was inserted belatedly as a
compromise between the aforesaid two opposing views. Thus, it is not possible
to conclude from the negotiating history that Article 36, paragraph 1 (b), was
intended by the negotiators to create individual rights. Moreover, if one keeps
in mind that the general tone and thrust of the debate of the entire Confer-
ence concentrated on the consular functions and their practicability, the better
view would be that no creation of any individual rights independent of rights
of States was envisaged by the Conference.
Separate Opinion of Judge Oda
[pp. 536 D.O. Oda] …I see no convincing argument to support the determi-
nation of the Court that “Article 36, paragraph 1, creates individual rights for
the detained person in addition to the rights accorded the sending State, and ...
consequently the reference to ‘rights’ in paragraph 2 must be read as applying
not only to the rights of the sending State, but also to the rights of the detained
individual” (Judgment, para. 89).
I shall take the liberty of expressing my puzzlement at the reason for and
relevance of the Court’s reference in the Judgment to Article 36, paragraph 1
(c), of the Convention in connection with the rights of a detained person. I
believe that this provision was included in the Convention simply to provide
for the situation in which an arrested foreign national waives consular notifica-
tion in order to prevent his criminal conduct or even his presence in a foreign
country from becoming known in his home country; that provision may not
have any further significance.
[p. 537 D.O. Oda]…I am not convinced of the correctness of the Court’s
holding that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations grants to foreign
individuals any rights beyond those which might necessarily be implied by the
obligations imposed on States under that Convention. In addition, I cannot but
think that the Court holds the view that the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations grants more extensive protection and greater or broader individual
rights to foreign nationals (in this case, German nationals in the United States)
than would be enjoyed by nationals in their home countries (in this case,
Americans in the United States).
If the Vienna Convention on Consular Rights is to be interpreted as granting
rights to individuals, those rights are strictly limited to those corresponding to
the obligations borne by the States under the Convention and do not include
substantive rights of the individual, such as the rights to life, property, etc. I find
the Judgment devoid of any convincing explanation of this point.
62
Excerpt from Alice de Jong, “Transnational Corporations and International Law:
Bringing TNCs out of the Accountability Vacuum,” p.68 available at: www.emeraldin-
sight.com/1742-2043.htm.
63
International Court of Justice; Practice Directions, http://www.I.C.J.-cij.org/docu-
ments/index.php?p1=4&p2=4&p3=0.
and published in the Court’s Yearbook, with a note of any temporal reservations
relating to their applicability.
***
Practice Direction XII
1. Where an international non governmental organization submits a written
statement and/or document in an advisory opinion case on its own initiative,
such statement and/or document is not to be considered as part of the case file.
2. Such statements and/or documents shall be treated as publications readily
available and may accordingly be referred to by States and intergovernmental
organizations presenting written and oral statements in the case in the same
manner as publications in the public domain.
3. Written statements and/or documents submitted by international non
governmental organizations will be placed in a designated location in the Peace
Palace. All States as well as intergovernmental organizations presenting written
or oral statements under Article 66 of the Statute will be informed as to the
location where statements and/or documents submitted by international non
governmental organizations may be consulted.
64
Emanuele Rebasti and Luisa Vierucci, at http://www.esil-sedi.eu/fichiers/en/Vieruc-
ciRebasti_971.pdf.
65
The notion of NGO is not univocal in the international practice or in academic debate.
In the present study the term is used to identify organizations established by private
initiative, formally free from any governmental influence and without profit-making
aim. The notion is considered equivalent to the one of “Civil Society Organization”
or more generally to “civil society.” The latter term is thus meant to have a narrower
meaning than the one retained by some IGOs (e.g. UN) where it includes also the
private sector.
66
See Seary, “The Early History – From the Congress of Vienna to the San Francisco
Conference” in Willets ed., The Conscience of the World – The Influence of Non-
Governmental Organisations in the UN System, 1996.
(ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR)). The proliferation of judicial bodies coupled
with enhanced public participation of NGOs at the international level calls for
a re-assessment of the interrelationship between these two entities mostly with
a view to verifying the state of the art from an international law angle. This
means investigating whether NGOs are satisfied with the access to justice they
are currently experiencing as well as speculating on the opportunity eventu-
ally to suggest changes de lege ferendain order to making their participation
to international justice more fruitful.
CHAPTER 4
TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY
67
Excerpt from Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law, pp. 132-34, 136-37, 5th
ed. [Reprinted with permission Oxford University Press, 2005].
hand, there is an equally general principle that a state is entirely free to project
its jurisdiction over any matter taking place outside its territory, so long as this
is not prohibited by a contrary rule of international law in a specific case. Can
both these statements of principle be correct, for they appear to be mutually
exclusive? The answer lies in the fact that the concept of state jurisdiction over
persons, property and territory encompasses two distinct ideas.
6.1.1 The jurisdiction to prescribe
The power of a state to bring any (matter within the cognisance of its
national law is called its prescriptive jurisdiction. The second principle of the
Lotus Case refers to this. It is the power of a state, to assert the applicability of
its national law to any person, property, territory or event, wherever they may
be situated or wherever they may occur. As we have seen from the dicta in
the Lotus Case, in the exercise of its prescriptive jurisdiction a state is virtually
unlimited by international law, save only that it may have accepted specific
international obligations limiting its competence. Two good examples of the
prescriptive jurisdiction of the UK are the Broadcasting Act 1990 which makes
it an offence under UK law to broadcast from the high seas in a manner which
interferes with domestic broadcasting services, and the case of Joyce v DPP
[1946J AC 347, which illustrates that the offence of treason may be committed
by any person owing allegiance to the Crown who has done a treasonable act,
wherever that act took place. In essence, the jurisdiction to prescribe comprises
a generally unfettered power to claim jurisdiction over any matter. However,
the practical effect of this jurisdiction is curtailed by the first of the principles
outlined in the Lotus Case—the jurisdiction to enforce.
6.1.2 The jurisdiction to enforce
Whereas a state may have a general power under international law to
prescribe jurisdiction, the enforcement of that jurisdiction can generally take
place only within its own territory. Specifically, a state cannot, as the above
quotation from the Lotus Case makes’ clear, enforce its prescriptive jurisdiction
in the territory of another state. Consequently, the actual exercise of jurisdic-
tion—the operation of a police force, national courts etc.—is limited to the
territory of the state asserting jurisdiction unless there is an agreement that
the enforcement jurisdiction can take place elsewhere. So when a person over
whom the state has prescribed jurisdiction enters the territory, the state may
proceed to exercise its powers, as in Joyce v DPP. It cannot, in the absence of
special permission, seek to enforce its prescriptive jurisdiction outside of its
territory. A rare example of such a special permission is the UK/Netherlands
Agreement 1999, permitting the trial of the Lockerbie subjects by a Scottish
court, according to Scots law, in Dutch territory.
In fact, then, the two principles identified in the Lotus Case are not contra-
dictory. They are concerned with two different species of jurisdiction. Under
international law, a state may assert, by its national law, a jurisdiction that is
virtually unlimited. However, any enforcement of that jurisdiction is confined
to its own territory and must not, without special agreement, be exercised in
any form in the territory of another state. As we shall see, the territorial exclu-
siveness of the jurisdiction to enforce is one of the most important principles
of international law.
6.1.3 The absolute nature of territorial jurisdiction
Third, and as a corollary to the first of the Lotus principles, it is a funda-
mental rule of international law that the jurisdiction of a state within its own
territory is complete and absolute. The state has power and authority over
all persons, property and events occurring within its territory. This is a basic
attribute of sovereignty and flows from the very existence of the state as an
international legal person. Furthermore, no other power, including, the United
Nations (Charter Art. 2(7)), may exercise an enforcement jurisdiction in state
territory and matters arising within domestic jurisdiction cannot form the sub-
ject matter of international claims, save in exceptional cases (such as human
rights). It is for this reason, for example, that police officers from other states
have no authority within the UK and may operate there only with the consent
of the relevant UK authorities.
However, it is clear that the absolute and complete nature of territorial
jurisdiction can be modified either by general principles of international law
or by specific obligations freely undertaken by the territorial sovereign. For
example, a state is obliged under international law to refrain from exercising
its territorial jurisdiction over diplomats… and public vessels of other states (e.g.
Schooner Exchange v McFaddon (1812) 7 Cranch 116). These have immunity
from jurisdiction. Similarly, a state may agree by treaty that another state can
exercise some form of enforcement jurisdiction within its territory (e.g. the
UK/Netherlands Agreement 1999) or the grant of jurisdiction may be an aspect
of the grant of sovereignty, as with the.UK sovereign military bases in Cyprus
and the US military base in Cuba.
To sum up, then, the basic principles of jurisdiction are, first, that a state
has authority under international law to apply its national laws to matters
arising within and outside its territory, irrespective of the nationality of the
object of that jurisdiction: this’s its prescriptive jurisdiction. Second, this pre-
scriptive jurisdiction is curtailed in practice by the fact that the enforcement of
jurisdiction may take place only in a state’s own territory unless some special
permission has been granted to exercise enforcement jurisdiction in an area
under the sovereignty of another state. Third, a state has absolute and exclusive
power of enforcement within its own territory over all matters arising therein,
unless that: power is curtailed by some rule of international law, either general
or specific. No other state or international legal person may trespass into the
‘domestic jurisdiction’ of the territorial sovereign.
6.2.1 Territorial jurisdiction
This principle is inherent in what has been discussed above. It is, simply, that
a state has jurisdiction over all matters arising in its territory. This is so whether
the individuals concerned are nationals, friendly aliens or enemy aliens, and,
for example, was the primary ground for Scotland’s assertion of jurisdiction in
the Lockerbie case. There is no doubt that this rule accords with international
practice and the greater part of the criminal and civil jurisdiction exercised by
states is based on this principle. Some doubts remain as to when an act can
be said to have ‘taken place’ on the territory of a state, but these have been
substantially reduced by the development of the ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’
approaches to territorial jurisdiction.
(a) Objective territoriality. A state will have jurisdiction over offences which
are completed in its territory, even though some element constituting the of-
fence (or civil wrong) took place abroad. In the Lotus Case, for example, a
collision between The Lotus, a French ship, and a Turkish vessel resulted, in the
death of eight persons on the Turkish vessel. France objected to the exercise
of jurisdiction by Turkey over the French Officer of the Watch. However, after
noting that the Turkish vessel was to be assimilated to Turkish territory, the
PCIJ decided that Turkey was entitled to exercise jurisdiction by virtue of the
fact that a constituent element in the offence of manslaughter—death—had
occurred on Turkish territory.
(b) Subjective territoriality. This is simply the converse of the principle just
discussed. Thus, a state has jurisdiction over all offences and matters commenc-
ing in its territory, even if some element—or the completion of the offence—
takes place in another state.
In the United Kingdom, the territoriality of jurisdiction is regarded as of
fundamental importance, as made clear in Compania Naviera Vascortgado v
Steamship ‘Cristitta’ [1938] AC 485, when the court emphasised the absolute-
ness of the court’s reach within the territory. So, by way of corollary, in R v
Governor of Belmarsh Prison, ex parte Martin (1995] 2 All ER 548, the Court of
Appeal refused in the absence of clear words to construe an Act of Parliament
as operating extraterritorialty, that is in respect of acts occurring outside the
territory, as this was contrary to the normal UK presumption about the reach
of its jurisdiction. More importantly, the UK once took the general view that
as a matter of common law a crime did not ‘occur’ within state territory (so
did not trigger an exercise of jurisdiction) unless the last event constituting the
crime took place within the UK: there was a self-imposed presumption against
subjective territoriality, even though international law permitted just such an
approach. When transnational crime was little known this was not a serious
limitation. However, in the ‘global village’, the fact that an individual might
escape UK jurisdiction because an offence was completed abroad, even if all
preliminary steps in the commission of the ‘crime’ were undertaken within the
territory, became more difficult to justify. Consequently, the Law Commission
reviewed the matter and its modified proposals resulted in the enactment of
the Criminal Justice Act 1993, ss. 1-3. This preserves the principle of territoriality
in criminal matters - in the sense that there is no general modification of the
principle that jurisdiction does not exist for acts occurring outside the terri-
tory—but authorises courts in England and Wales to exercise jurisdiction over
certain crimes. Where a constituent element of the crime occurred within UK
territory, whether or not the final element was completed therein. It is a move
to subjective territoriality. This is perfectly in conformity with international
law and is a pattern already followed in other states. It must also be appreci-
ated that the UK may still exercise an extraterritorial jurisdiction where such is
specifically provided for by Act of Parliament (e.g. Civil Aviation (Amendment)
Act 1996) or where justified by the other international principles of jurisdic-
tion considered below.
6.2.2 Nationality jurisdiction
It is clear that international law permits (but does not require) a state to
exercise jurisdiction over its nationals, wherever they may be when the offence
or civil wrong is committed. A national is entitled to the diplomatic protection
of his or her state at all times and, as a corollary, he or she is subject to its civil
and criminal jurisdiction. Necessarily, the jurisdiction will not be exercised
until the national physically comes within the territory of his or her home
state and it may be that the state takes no action, because the matter has been
dealt with by the state in whose territory the events did occur. However, there
is a recognised legal right to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of nationality,
and this is now exercised by the UK in respect of offences of a serious nature
(e.g. murder, some sexual offences). Thus, in the Trial of Earl Russel [1901] AC
446, the defendant, a UK national, was convicted of bigamy even though the
second act of marriage took place outside the United Kingdom. This case is
also an early (and then rare) example of the subjective territorial principle in
operation in the United Kingdom.
***
By a special agreement signed at Geneva on October 12, 1926, between the
Governments of the French and Turkish Republics… [the parties] have submit-
ted to the Permanent Court of International Justice the question of jurisdiction
which has arisen between them following upon the collision which occurred
on August and, 1926, between the steamships Boz-Kourt and Lotus.
According to the special agreement, the Court has to decide the following
questions:
“(1) Has Turkey, contrary to Article 15 of the Convention of Lausanne of July
24th, 1923, respecting conditions of residence and business and jurisdiction, acted
in conflict with the principles of international law--and if so, what principles--by
instituting, following the collision which occurred on August 2nd, 1926, on the
high seas between the French steamer Lotus and the Turkish steamer Boz-Kourt
and upon the arriva1 of the French steamer at Constantinople-as well as against
the captain of the Turkish steamship-joint criminal proceedings in pursuance of
Turkish law against M. Demons, officer of the watch on board the Lotus at the
time of the collision, in consequence of the loss of the Boz-Kourt having involved
the death of eight Turkish sailors and passengers?”
***
On August 2nd, 1926, just before midnight, a collision occurred between
the French mail steamer Lotus, proceeding to Constantinople, and the Turk-
ish collier Boz-Kourt, between five and six nautical miles to the north of Cape
Sigri (Mitylene). The Boz-Kourt, which was cut in two, sank, and eight Turkish
nationals who were on board perished. After having done everything possible
to succor the shipwrecked persons, of whom ten were able to be saved, the
Lotus continued on its course to Constantinople, where it arrived on Au-
gust 3rd.
At the time of the collision, the officer of the watch on board the Lotus was
Monsieur Demons, a French citizen, lieutenant in the merchant service and first
officer of the ship, whilst the movements of the Boz-Kourt were directed by its
captain, Hassan Bey, who was one of those saved from the wreck….
On August 5th, Lieutenant Demons was requested by the Turkish authori-
ties to go ashore to give evidence. The examination,… led to the placing under
68
The Case of the S.S. “Lotus” (France v Turkey), Permanent Court of International
Justice (PCIJ), Series A No. 70, 7 September 1927.
arrest of Lieutenant Demons without previous notice being given to the French
Consul-General -and Hassan Bey, amongst others. This arrest, which has been
characterized by the Turkish Agent as arrest pending trial (arrestation preven-
tive), was effected in order to ensure that the criminal prosecution instituted
against the two officers, on a charge of manslaughter, by the Public Prosecutor
of Stamboul, on the complaint of the families of the victims of the collision,
should follow its normal course.
The case was first heard by the Criminal Court of Stamboul on August 28th.
On that occasion, Lieutenant Demons submitted that the Turkish Courts had
no jurisdiction; the Court, however, overruled his objection.…
On September 15th, the Criminal Court delivered its judgment, the terms
of which have not been communicated to the Court by the Parties. It is, how-
ever, common ground, that it sentenced Lieutenant Demons to eighty days’
imprisonment and a fine of twenty-two pounds, Hassan Bey being sentenced
to a slightly more severe penalty….
The action of the Turkish judicial authorities with regard to Lieutenant
Demons at once gave rise to many diplomatic representations and other steps
on the part of the French Government or its representatives in Turkey, either
protesting against the arrest of Lieutenant Demons or demanding his release,
or with a view to obtaining the transfer of the case from the Turkish Courts to
the French Courts.
As a result of these representations, the Government of the Turkish Repub-
lic declared on September 2nd, 1926, that “it would have no objection to the
reference of the conflict of jurisdiction to the Court at The Hague.”
THE LAW
1.-The collision which occurred on August 2nd, 1926, between the S.S. Lotus,
flying the French flag, and the S.S. Boz-Kourt flying the Turkish flag, took place
on the high seas : the territorial jurisdiction of any State other than France and
Turkey therefore does not enter into account.
2.-The violation, if any, of the principles of international law would have
consisted in the taking of criminal proceedings against Lieutenant Demons. It
is not therefore a question relating to any particular step in these proceedings-
such as his being put to trial, his arrest, his detention pending trial or the
judgment given by the Criminal Court of Stamboul-but of the very fact of the
Turkish Courts exercising criminal jurisdiction. That is why the arguments put
forward by the Parties in both phases of the proceedings relate exclusively to
the question whether Turkey has or has not, according to the principles of
international law, jurisdiction to prosecute in this case. …
3.-The prosecution was instituted because the loss of the Boz-Kourt involved
the death of eight Turkish sailors and passengers. It is…a case of prosecution for
involuntary manslaughter....[T]here is no doubt that their death may be regarded
as the direct outcome of the collision, and the French Government has not
contended that this relation of cause and effect cannot exist….
II
…[T]he Court must now ascertain which were the principles of international
law that the prosecution of Lieutenant Demons could conceivably be said to
contravene.
It is Article 15 of the Convention of Lausanne of July 24th, 1923, respecting
conditions of residence and business and jurisdiction, which refers the contract-
ing Parties to the principles of international law as regards the delimitation of
their respective jurisdiction. This clause is as follows: “Subject to the provi-
sions of Article 16, all questions of jurisdiction shall, as between Turkey and
the other contracting Powers, be decided in accordance with the principles
of international law.”
… Now the Court considers that the words “principles of international law,”
as ordinarily used, can only mean international law as it is applied between all
nations belonging to the community of States….
III
International law governs relations between independent States. The
rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as
expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing prin-
ciples of law and established in order to regulate the relations between these
co-existing independent communities or with a view to the achievement of
common aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore
be presumed.
Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon
a State is that-failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary-it may
not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this sense
jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its
territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom
or from a convention.
It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a State from
exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case which relates
to acts which have taken place abroad, and in which it cannot rely on some
permissive rule of international law. Such a view would only be tenable if inter-
tween two vessels flying different flags, on one of which was one of the persons
alleged to be guilty of the offence, whilst the victims were on board the other.
This being so, the Court does not think it necessary to consider the conten-
tion that a State cannot punish offences committed abroad by a foreigner simply
by reason of the nationality of the victim. For this contention only relates to
the case where the nationality of the victim is the only criterion on which the
criminal jurisdiction of the State is based. Even if that argument were correct
generally speaking-and in regard to this the Court reserves its opinion-it could
only be used in the present case if international law forbade Turkey to take
into consideration the fact that the offence produced its effects on the Turk-
ish vessel and consequently in a place assimilated to Turkish territory in which
the application of Turkish criminal law cannot be challenged, even in regard
to offences committed there by foreigners. But no such rule of international
law exists. No argument has come to the knowledge of the Court from which
it could be deduced that States recognize themselves to be under an obligation
towards each other only to have regard to the place where the author of the
offence happens to be at the time of the offence.
On the contrary, it is certain that the courts of many countries, even of
countries which have given their criminal legislation a strictly territorial char-
acter, interpret criminal law in the sense that offences, the authors of which at
the moment of collision are in the territory of another State, are nevertheless
to be regarded as having been committed in the national territory, if one of
the constituent elements of the offence, and more especially its effects, have
taken place there. French courts have, in regard to a variety of situations, given
decisions sanctioning this way of interpreting the territorial principle. Again,
the Court does not know of any cases in which governments have protested
against the fact that the criminal law of some country contained a rule to this
effect or that the courts of a country construed their criminal law in this sense.
Consequently, once it is admitted that the effects of the offence were produced
on the Turkish vessel, it becomes impossible to hold that there is a rule of in-
ternational law which prohibits
Turkey from prosecuting Lieutenant Demons because of the fact that the
author of the offence was on board the French ship. Since, as has already been
observed, the special agreement does not deal with the provision of Turkish
law under which the prosecution was instituted, but only with the question
whether the prosecution should be regarded as contrary to the principles of
international law, there is no reason preventing the Court from confining itself
to observing that, in this case, a prosecution may also be justified from the point
of view of the so-called territorial principle….
The offence for which Lieutenant Demons appears to have been prosecuted
was an act-of negligence or imprudence-having its origin on board the Lotus,
whilst its effects made themselves felt on board the Boz-Kourt. These two ele-
ments are, legally, entirely inseparable, so much so that their separation renders
the offence non-existent. Neither the exclusive jurisdiction of either State, nor
the limitations of the jurisdiction of each to the occurrences which took place
on the respective ships would appear calculated to satisfy the requirements of
justice and effectively to protect the interests of the two States. It is only natural
that each should be able to exercise jurisdiction and to do so in respect of the
incident as a whole. It is therefore a case of concurrent jurisdiction.
For these reasons…the COURT [finds]…Turkey…has not acted in conflict with
the principles of international law…
***
212. The Court should now mention the principle of respect for State sover-
eignty, which in international law is of course closely linked with the principles
of the prohibition of the use of force and of non-intervention. The basic legal
concept of State sovereignty in customary international law, expressed in, inter
alia, Article 2, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter, extends to the internal
waters and territorial sea of every State and to the air space above its territory.
As to superjacent air space, the 1944 Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation
(Art. 1) reproduces the established principle of the complete and exclusive
sovereignty of a State over the air space above its territory. That convention, in
conjunction with the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea, further
specifies that the sovereignty of the coastal State extends to the territorial sea
and to the air space above it, as does the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea adopted on 10 December 1982. The Court has no doubt that
these prescriptions of treaty law merely respond to firmly established and
longstanding tenets of customary international law.
213. The duty of every State to respect the territorial sovereignty of others
is to be considered for the appraisal to be made of the facts relating to the
mining which occurred along Nicaragua’s coasts. The legal rules in the light of
which these acts of mining should be judged depend upon where they took
place. The laying of mines within the ports of another State is governed by
69
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14.
the law relating to internal waters, which are subject to the sovereignty of the
coastal State. The position is similar as regards mines placed in the territorial
sea. It is therefore the sovereignty of the coastal State which is affected in such
cases. It is also by virtue of its sovereignty that the coastal State may regulate
access to its ports….
251. The effects of the principle of respect for territorial sovereignty inevi-
tably overlap with those of the principles of the prohibition of the use of force
and of non-intervention. Thus the assistance to the contras, as well as the direct
attacks on Nicaraguan ports, oil installations, etc., referred to in paragraphs 81
to 86 above, not only amount to an unlawful use of force, but also constitute
infringements of the territorial sovereignty of Nicaragua, and incursions into its
territorial and internal waters. Similarly, the mining operations in the Nicaraguan
ports not only constitute breaches of the principle of the non-use of force, but
also affect Nicaragua’s sovereignty over certain maritime expanses. The Court
has in fact found that these operations were carried on in Nicaragua’s territo-
rial or internal waters or both (paragraph 80), and accordingly they constitute
a violation of Nicaragua’s sovereignty. The principle of respect for territorial
sovereignty is also directly infringed by the unauthorized overflight of a State’s
territory by aircraft belonging to or under the control of the government of
another State. The Court has found above that such overflights were in fact
made (paragraph 91 above).
These violations cannot be justified either by collective self-defence, for
which, as the Court has recognized, the necessary circumstances are lacking,
nor by any right of the United States to take counter-measures involving the
use of force in the event of intervention by Nicaragua in El Salvador, since no
such right exists under the applicable international law. They cannot be justified
by the activities in El Salvador attributed to the Government of Nicaragua. The
latter activities, assuming that they did in fact occur, do not bring into effect any
right belonging to the United States which would justify the actions in ques-
tion. Accordingly, such actions constitute violations of Nicaragua’s sovereignty
under customary international law….
258. …A State’s domestic policy falls within its exclusive jurisdiction, pro-
vided of course that it does not violate any obligation of international law. Every
State possesses a fundamental right to choose and implement its own political,
economic and social systems. Consequently, there would normally be no need
to make any enquiries, in a matter outside the Court’s jurisdiction, to ascertain
in what sense and along what lines Nicaragua has actually exercised its right.
259. However, the assertion of a commitment raises the question of the
possibility of a State binding itself by agreement in relation to a question of
domestic policy, such as that relating to the holding of free elections on its
territory. The Court cannot discover, within the range of subjects open to in-
ternational agreement, any obstacle or provision to hinder a State from making
a commitment of this kind. A State, which is free to decide upon the principle
and methods of popular consultation within its domestic order, is sovereign
for the purpose of accepting a limitation of its sovereignty in this field. This
is a conceivable situation for a State which is bound by institutional links to a
confederation of States, or indeed to an international organization. Both Ni-
caragua and the United States are members of the Organization of American
States. The Charter of that Organization however goes no further in the direc-
tion of an agreed limitation on sovereignty of this kind than the provision in
Article 3 (d) that:
“The solidarity of the American States and the high aims which are sought
through it require the political organization of those States on the basis of the
effective exercise of representative democracy”; on the other hand, it provides
for the right of every State “to organize itself as it sees fit” (Art. 12), and to
“develop its cultural, political and economic life freely and naturally” (Art. 16).
263. The finding of the United States Congress also expressed the view that
the Nicaraguan Government had taken “significant steps towards establishing
a totalitarian Communist dictatorship.” However the regime in Nicaragua be
defined, adherence by a State to any particular doctrine does not constitute a
violation of customary international law; to hold otherwise would make non-
sense of the fundamental principle of State sovereignty, on which the whole
of international law rests, and the freedom of choice of the political, social,
economic and cultural system of a State. Consequently, Nicaragua’s domestic
policy options, even assuming that they correspond to the description given
of them by the Congress finding, cannot justify on the legal plane the various
actions of the Respondent complained of. The Court cannot contemplate the
creation of a new rule opening up a right of intervention by one State against
another on the ground that the latter has opted for some particular ideology
or political system….
269. …in international law there are no rules, other than such rules as may
be accepted by the State concerned, by treaty or otherwise, whereby the level
of armaments of a sovereign State can be limited, and this principle is valid for
all States without exception.
Territorial Sovereignty
and Self-Determination
East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), 199570
***
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Skubiszewski
[pp. 270-271 D.O. Skubiszewski] Here the distinction between sovereignty
and its exercise is a useful one. As already recalled, the Friendly Relations Dec-
laration provides that “[t]he territory of a colony or other non-self-governing
territory has, under the Charter, a status separate and distinct from the [met-
ropolitan] territory of the State administering it.” The reason for that separ-
ateness and distinctness is self-determination. But the provision quoted does
not aim at depriving the State of its title to sovereignty which it held prior to
the Charter and the Declaration. The State has remained sovereign. The said
provision imposes restrictions on the exercise of the State’s sovereignty. These
restrictions are far-reaching. Portugal rightly referred to its “prerogatives [of]
sovereignty” (para. 75 above), though on occasions it has avoided the word
“sovereignty” in describing its position with regard to East Timor. Instead it has
used the terms “jurisdiction” (CR 95/4, p. 10, para. 2, Co-Agent, counsel and
advocate of Portugal, J. M. S. Correia), and “authority” (CR 95/12, p. 44, para.
3, idem). Nonetheless Portugal explains that the “Administering Powers are
independent States which keep their attributes as such when they act on the
international scene in relation to the non-self-governing territories for whose
administration they are responsible.” (Ibid.).
It is submitted that these “attributes” are nothing more than sovereignty,
the exercise of which has been restricted in favour of the self-determination
of the people concerned. Portugal stresses that the people of the Territory is
“the holder of the sovereignty inherent in the capacity to decide for itself its
future international legal status” (CR 95/4, p. l3, para. 6, idem) and that “the
international law of decolonization has transferred the sovereignty relating
to such territories to their own peoples” (CR 95/12, p. 44, para. 3, idem). Un-
der international law these contentions must be understood as referring to
self-determination: it is the people which decide on its implementation; but
“people” as the holder of “sovereignty” is a concept which, at least in part, lies
beyond the realm of law.
70
East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 90..
71
Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v. Malaysia), Applica-
tion, for Permission to Intervene, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 575.
72
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962,
GAOR (Supp., No. 17 at 15), U.N. Doc. A/5217.
its natural resources should be respected, Considering that any measure in this
respect must be based on the recognition of the inalienable right of all States
freely to dispose of their natural wealth and resources in accordance with their
national interests, and on respect for the economic independence of States,
Considering that nothing in paragraph 4 below in any way prejudices
the position of any Member State on any aspect of the question of the rights
and obligations of successor States and Governments in respect of property
acquired before the accession to complete sovereignty of countries formerly
under colonial rule,
Noting that the subject of succession of States and Governments is being
examined as a matter of priority by the International Law Commission,
Considering that it is desirable to promote international co-operation for
the economic development of developing countries, and that economic and
financial agreements between the developed and the developing countries
must be based on the principles of equality and of the right of peoples and
nations to self-determination,
Considering that the provision of economic and technical assistance, loans
and increased foreign investment must not be subject to conditions which
conflict with the interests of the recipient State, Considering the benefits to
be derived from exchanges of technical and scientific information likely to
promote the development and use of such resources and wealth, and the im-
portant part which the United Nations and other international organizations
are called upon to play in that connection,
Attaching particular importance to the question of promoting the eco-
nomic development of developing countries and securing their economic
independence,
Noting that the creation and strengthening of the inalienable sovereignty
of States over their natural wealth and resources reinforces their economic
independence,
Desiring that there should be further consideration by the United Nations
of the subject of permanent sovereignty over natural resources in the spirit of
international co-operation in the field of economic development, particularly
that of the developing countries,
I
Declares that:
1. The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their
natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of their national
development and of the well-being of the people of the State concerned.
2. The exploration, development and disposition of such resources, as well
as the import of the foreign capital required for these purposes, should be in
conformity with the rules and conditions which the peoples and nations freely
consider to be necessary or desirable with regard to the authorization, restric-
tion or prohibition of such activities.
3. In cases where authorization is granted, the capital imported and the
earnings on that capital shall be governed by the terms thereof, by the national
legislation in force, and by international law. The profits derived must be shared
in the proportions freely agreed upon, in each case, between the investors and
the recipient State, due care being taken to ensure that there is no impairment,
for any reason, of that State’s sovereignty over its natural wealth and resources.
4. Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds
or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest which are recognized
as overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign.
In such cases the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance
with the rules in force in the State taking such measures in the exercise of its
sovereignty and in accordance with international law. In any case where the
question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, the national jurisdiction
of the State taking such measures shall be exhausted. However, upon agree-
ment by sovereign States and other parties concerned, settlement of the dispute
should be made through arbitration or international adjudication.
5. The free and beneficial exercise of the sovereignty of peoples and nations
over their natural resources must be furthered by the mutual respect of States
based on their sovereign equality.
6. International co-operation for the economic development of develop-
ing countries, whether in the form of public or private capital investments,
exchange of goods and services, technical assistance, or exchange of scientific
information, shall be such as to further their independent national develop-
ment and shall be based upon respect for their sovereignty over their natural
wealth and resources.
7. Violation of the rights of peoples and nations to sovereignty over their
natural wealth and resources is contrary to the spirit and principles of the
73
Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1974, p. 3.
74
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, Summary of the Judgement, I.C.J. Summaries, available at:
http://www.I.C.J.-cij.org/docket/files/55/5979.pdf.
gave rise, while proceedings before the Court were continuing and Iceland was
refusing to recognize the Court’s decisions, to a series of incidents and negotia-
tions which resulted [in] an interim agreement between the United Kingdom
and Iceland…”pending a settlement of the substantive dispute….
[Opinion of the Court]75
11. In the course of the written proceedings, the following submissions
were presented on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom:
“The United Kingdom asks the Court to adjudge and declare:
(a) That there is no foundation in international law for the claim by Iceland
to be entitled to extend its fisheries jurisdiction by establishing a zone of ex-
clusive fisheries jurisdiction extending to 50 nautical miles from the baselines
hereinbefore referred to; and that its claim is therefore invalid; and
(b) that questions concerning the conservation of fish stocks in the waters
around Iceland are not susceptible in international law to regulation by the
unilateral extension by Iceland of its exclusive fisheries jurisdiction to 50 nauti-
cal miles from the aforesaid baselines but are matters that may be regulated, as
between Iceland and the United Kingdom, by arrangements agreed between
those two countries,...”
…49. The Applicant has challenged the Regulations promulgated by the
Government of Iceland on 14 July 1972, and since the Court has to pronounce
on this challenge, the ascertainment of the law applicable becomes necessary.
As the Court stated in the Fisheries case: “The delimitation of sea areas has
always an international aspect; it cannot be dependent merely upon the will
of the coastal State as expressed in its municipal law. Although it is true that
the act of delimitation is necessarily a unilateral act, because only the coastal
State is competent to undertake it, the validity of the delimitation with regard
to other States depends upon international law.” (I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 132.)
The Court will therefore proceed to the determination of the existing rules of
international law relevant to the settlement of the present dispute.
50. The Geneva Convention on the High Seas of 1958, which was adopted
“as generally declaratory of established principles of international law,” defines
in Article 1 the term “high seas” as “all parts of the sea that are not included in
the territorial sea or in the interna1 waters of a State.” Article 2 then declares
that “The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to
subject any part of them to its sovereignty” and goes on to provide that the
75
Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1974, p. 3.
freedom of the high seas comprises, inter dia, both for coastal and non-coastal
States, freedom of navigation and freedom of fishing. The freedoms of the
high seas are however made subject to the consideration that they “shall be
exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the interests of other States
in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas.”
51. The breadth of the territorial sea was not defined by the 1958 Conven-
tion on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. It is true that Article 24 of
this Convention limits the contiguous zone to 12 miles “from the baseline from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.” At the 1958 Conference,
the main differences on the breadth of the territorial sea were limited at the time
to disagreements as to what limit, not exceeding 12 miles, was the appropriate
one. The question of the breadth of the territorial sea and that of the extent of
the coastal State’s fishery jurisdiction were left unsettled at the 1958 Confer-
ence. These questions were referred to the Second Conference on the Law of
the Sea, held in 1960. Furthermore, the question of the extent of the fisheries
jurisdiction of the coastal State, which had constituted a serious obstacle to the
reaching of an agreement at the 1958 Conference, became gradually separated
from the notion of the territorial sea. This was a development which reflected
the increasing importance of fishery resources for all States.
52. The 1960 Conference failed by one vote to adopt a text governing the
two questions of the breadth of the territorial sea and the extent of fishery rights.
However, after that Conference the law evolved through the practice of States on
the basis of the debates and near-agreements at the Conference. Two concepts
have crystallized as customary law in recent years arising out of the general con-
sensus revealed at that Conference. The first is the concept of the fishery zone,
the area in which a State may claim exclusive fishery jurisdiction independently
of its territorial sea; the extension of that fishery zone up to a 12-mile limit from
the baselines appears now to be generally accepted. The second is the concept of
preferential rights of fishing in adjacent waters in favour of the coastal State in a
situation of special dependence on its coastal fisheries, this preference operating
in regard to other States concerned in the exploitation of the same fisheries, and
to be implemented in the way indicated in paragraph 57 below.
53. In recent years the question of extending the coastal State’s fisheries
jurisdiction has come increasingly to the forefront. The Court is aware that a
number of States has asserted an extension of fishery limits. The Court is also
aware of present endeavours, pursued under the auspices of the United Nations,
to achieve in a third Conference on the Law of the Sea the further codifica-
tion and progressive development of this branch of the law, as it is of various
proposals and preparatory documents produced in this framework, which
62. The concept of preferential rights is not compatible with the exclusion
of all fishing activities of other States. A coastal State entitled to preferential
rights is not free, unilaterally and according to its own uncontrolled discretion,
to determine the extent of those rights. The characterization of the coastal
State’s rights as preferential implies a certain priority, but cannot imply the
extinction of the concurrent rights of other States, and particularly of a State
which, like the Applicant, has for many years been engaged in fishing in the
waters in question, such fishing activity being important to the economy of
the country concerned… Accordingly, the fact that Iceland is entitled to claim
preferential rights does not suffice to justify its claim unilaterally to exclude
the Applicant’s fishing vessels from all fishing activity in the waters beyond the
limits agreed to in the 1961 Exchange of Notes….
67. The provisions of the Icelandic Regulations of 14 July 1972 and the
manner of their implementation disregard the fishing rights of the Applicant.
Iceland’s unilateral action thus constitutes an infringement of the principle
enshrined in Article 2 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas which
requires that all States, including coastal States, in exercising their freedom of
fishing, pay reasonable regard to the interests of other States….
71. …. Due recognition must be given to the rights of both Parties, namely
the rights of the United Kingdom to fish in the waters in dispute, and the pref-
erential rights of Iceland. Neither right is an absolute one: the preferential rights
of a coastal State are limited according to the extent of its special dependence
on the fisheries and by its obligation to take account of the rights of other States
and the needs of conservation; the established rights of other fishing States
are in turn limited by reason of the coastal State’s special dependence on the
fisheries and its own obligation to take account of the rights of other States,
including the coastal State, and of the needs of conservation.
***
196. Bahrain claims that Qit’at Jaradah comes under Bahraini sovereignty,
since it has displayed its authority over it in various ways, and that this was
recognized by the British Government in 1947. In this respect it has referred to
a number of activities, including the erection of a beacon, the ordering of the
drilling of an artesian well, the granting of an oil concession, and the licensing
76
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar
v. Bahrain), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 40.
of fish traps. Qatar contends that Qit’at Jaradah, being a low-tide elevation, can-
not be appropriated, and that, since it is situated in the part of the territorial
sea which belong to Qatar, Qatar has sovereign rights over it.
197. The Court first notes that Qit’at Jaradah is a very small island situated
within the 12-mile limit of both States. According to the report of the expert
commissioned by Bahrain, at high tide its length and breadth are about 12 by 4
metres, whereas at low tide they are 600 and 75 metres. At high tide, its altitude
is approximately 0.4 metres.
Certain types of activities invoked by Bahrain such as the drilling of artesian
wells would, taken by themselves, be considered controversial as acts performed
à titre de souverain. The construction of navigational aids, on the other hand,
can be legally relevant in the case of very small islands. In the present case, tak-
ing into account the size of Qit’at Jaradah, the activities carried out by Bahrain
on that island must be considered sufficient to support Bahrain’s claim that it
has sovereignty over it.
198. In this context the Court recalls that the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice observed in the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland case that
“It is impossible to read the records of the decisions in cases as to territo-
rial sovereignty without observing that in many cases the tribunal has been
satisfied with very little in the way of the actual exercise of sovereign rights,
provided that the other State could not make out a superior claim.” (P.C.I.J.,
Series A/B, No. 53, p. 46.).
77
Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Summary of the Judge-
ment, I.C.J. Summaries, available at: http://www.I.C.J.-cij.org/docket/files/132/14989.
pdf Full case, see Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judg-
ment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 61.
The Court, in considering the issue in dispute, would recall two principles
underpinning its jurisprudence on this issue: first, that the “land dominates the
sea” in such a way that coastal projections in the seaward direction generate
maritime claims (North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/
Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1969, p. 51, para. 96); second, that the coast, in order to be considered as rel-
evant for the purpose of the delimitation, must generate projections which
overlap with projections from the coast of the other party. Consequently “the
submarine extension of any part of the coast of one Party which, because of
its geographic situation, cannot overlap with the extension of the coast of the
other, is to be excluded from further consideration by the Court” (Continental
Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 61,
para. 75).
The Court therefore cannot accept Ukraine’s contention that the coasts of
Karkinits’ka Gulf form part of the relevant coast. The coasts of this gulf face
each other and their submarine extension cannot overlap with the extensions
of Romania’s coast. The coasts of Karkinits’ka Gulf do not project in the area to
be delimited. Therefore, these coasts are excluded from further consideration
by the Court….
6. Relevant maritime area78
The Court observes that the legal concept of the “relevant area” has to be
taken into account as part of the methodology of maritime delimitation.
In the first place, depending on the configuration of the relevant coasts in
the general geographical context and the methods for the construction of their
seaward projections, the relevant area may include certain maritime spaces and
exclude others which are not germane to the case in hand.
Secondly, the relevant area is pertinent to checking disproportionality. This
will be done as the final phase of the methodology. The purpose of delimita-
tion is not to apportion equal shares of the area, nor indeed proportional
shares. The test of disproportionality is not in itself a method of delimitation.
It is rather a means of checking whether the delimitation line arrived at by
other means needs adjustment because of a significant disproportionality in
the ratios between the maritime areas which would fall to one party or other
by virtue of the delimitation line arrived at by other means, and the lengths of
their respective coasts.
The Court further observes that for the purposes of this final exercise in
78
Id. Opinion of I.C.J. decision at paras. 106-114.
the delimitation process the calculation of the relevant area does not purport
to be precise and is approximate. The object of delimitation is to achieve a
delimitation that is equitable, not an equal apportionment of maritime areas
(North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal
Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 22, para.
18; Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen
(Denmark v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J Reports 1993, p. 67, para. 64).
The Court notes that the delimitation will occur within the enclosed Black
Sea, with Romania being both adjacent to, and opposite Ukraine, and with
Bulgaria and Turkey lying to the south. It will stay north of any area where third
party interests could become involved….
7. Delimitation methodology79
When called upon to delimit the continental shelf or exclusive economic
zones, or to draw a single delimitation line, the Court proceeds in defined stages.
These separate stages, broadly explained in the case concerning Conti-
nental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta) (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985,
p. 46, para. 60), have in recent decades been specified with precision. First,
the Court will establish a provisional delimitation line, using methods that are
geometrically objective and also appropriate for the geography of the area in
which the delimitation is to take place. So far as delimitation between adjacent
coasts is concerned, an equidistance line will be drawn unless there are com-
pelling reasons that make this unfeasible in the particular case (see Territorial
and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea
(Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment of 8 October 2007, para. 281). So far as
opposite coasts are concerned, the provisional delimitation line will consist
of a median line between the two coasts. No legal consequences flow from
the use of the terms “median line” and “equidistance line” since the method
of delimitation is the same for both.
Equidistance and median lines are to be constructed from the most ap-
propriate points on the coasts of the two States concerned, with particular
attention being paid to those protuberant coastal points situated nearest to the
area to the delimited. The Court considers elsewhere the extent to which the
Court may, when constructing a single-purpose delimitation line, deviate from
the base points selected by the parties for their territorial seas. When construc-
tion of a provisional equidistance line between adjacent States is called for,
the Court will have in mind considerations relating to both parties’ coastlines
when choosing its own base points for this purpose. The line thus adopted is
79
Id. at paras. 115-122.
heavily dependent on the physical geography and the most seaward points of
the two coasts.
In keeping with its settled jurisprudence on maritime delimitation, the first
stage of the Court’s approach is to establish the provisional equidistance line.
At this initial stage of the construction of the provisional equidistance line the
Court is not yet concerned with any relevant circumstances that may obtain and
the line is plotted on strictly geometrical criteria on the basis of objective data.
In the present case the Court thus begins by drawing a provisional equi-
distance line between the adjacent coasts of Romania and Ukraine, which will
then continue as a median line between their opposite coasts.
The course of the final line should result in an equitable solution (Articles
74 and 83 of UNCLOS). Therefore, the Court will at the next, second stage
consider whether there are factors calling for the adjustment or shifting of
the provisional equidistance line in order to achieve an equitable result (Land
and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria:
Equatorial Guinea intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 441, para. 288).
The Court has also made clear that when the line to be drawn covers several
zones of coincident jurisdictions, “the so-called equitable principles/relevant
circumstances method may usefully be applied, as in these maritime zones this
method is also suited to achieving an equitable result” (Territorial and Maritime
Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua v.
Honduras), Judgment of 8 October 2007, para. 271).
This is the second part of the delimitation exercise to which the Court will
turn, having first established the provisional equidistance line.
Finally, and at a third stage, the Court will verify that the line (a provisional
equidistance line which may or may not have been adjusted by taking into
account the relevant circumstances) does not, as it stands, lead to an inequi-
table result by reason of any marked disproportion between the ratio of the
respective coastal lengths and the ratio between the relevant maritime area of
each State by reference to the delimitation line. A final check for an equitable
outcome entails a confirmation that no great disproportionality of maritime
areas is evident by comparison to the ratio of coastal lengths.
This is not to suggest that these respective areas should be proportionate to
coastal lengths - as the Court has said “the sharing out of the area is therefore
the consequence of the delimitation, not vice versa” (Maritime Delimitation in
the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1993, p. 67, para. 64).…
80
Id. at paras. 210-216.
81
Id. at paras. 217-218.
CHAPTER 5
STATE RESPONSIBILITY
Chapter I
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
82
U.N. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001. Full articles and comments available at: http://
untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/9_6.htm.
***
56. The principal facts material for the Court’s decision on the merits of
the present case have been set out earlier in this Judgment. Those facts have
to be looked at by the Court from two points of view. First, it must determine
83
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1980, p. 3.
how far, legally, the acts in question may be regarded as imputable to the Ira-
nian State. Secondly, it must consider their compatibility or incompatibility
with the obligations of Iran under treaties in force or under any other rules of
international law that may be applicable. The events which are the subject of
the United States’ claims fall into two phases which it will be convenient to
examine separately.
***
78. Moreover, in practice, the operation of Variant C led Czechoslovakia to
appropriate, essentially for its use and benefit, between 80 and 90 per cent of
the waters of the Danube before returning them to the main bed of the river,
despite the fact that the Danube is not only a shared international watercourse
but also an international boundary river.
Czechoslovakia submitted that Variant C was essentially no more than
what Hungary had already agreed to and that the only modifications made
were those which had become necessary by virtue of Hungary’s decision not
to implement its treaty obligations. It is true that Hungary, in concluding the
1977 Treaty, had agreed to the damming of the Danube and the diversion of its
waters into the bypass canal. But it was only in the context of a joint operation
and a sharing of its benefits that Hungary had given its consent. The suspen-
sion and withdrawal of that consent constituted a violation of Hungary’s legal
obligations, demonstrating, as it did, the refusal by Hungary of joint operation;
but that cannot mean that Hungary forfeited its basic right to an equitable and
reasonable sharing of the resources of an international watercourse. The Court
accordingly concludes that Czechoslovakia, in putting Variant C into operation,
was not applying the 1977 Treaty but, on the contrary, violated certain of its
express provisions, and, in so doing, committed an internationally wrongful act.
***
56. The reason is that the general principles of International Law concern-
ing State responsibility are equally applicable in the case of breach of treaty
obligation, since in the international law field there is no distinction between
84
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 7.
85
Arbitration Tribunal 1990, vol. XX (Sales No.E/F.93.V.3), p. 215 (1990).(p. 251, para.
75).
***
[p. 87] The Court concludes that the Government of Malaysia had an ob-
ligation, under Article 105 of the Charter and under the General Convention,
to inform its Courts of the position taken by the Secretary-General. According
to a well-established rule of international law, the conduct of any organ of a
State must be regarded as an act of that State. This rule, which is of a customary
character, is reflected in Article 6 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility
adopted provisionally by the International Law Commission on first reading,
which provides:
86
Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 62.
***
109. What the Court has to determine at this point is whether or not the
relationship of the contras to the United States Government was so much one
of dependence on the one side and control on the other that it would be right
to equate the contras, for legal purposes, with an organ of the United States
Government, or as acting on behalf of that Government. Here it is relevant to
note that in May 1983 the assessment of the Intelligence Committee, in the
Report referred to in paragraph 95 above, was that the contras “constitute[d]
an independent force” and that the “only element of control that could be
exercised by the United States” was “cessation of aid.” Paradoxically this assess-
ment serves to underline, a contrario, the potential for control inherent in the
degree of the contras’ dependence on aid. Yet despite the heavy subsidies and
other support provided to them by the United States, there is no clear evidence
of the United States having actually exercised such a degree of control in all
fields as to justify treating the contras as acting on its behalf….
111. In the view of the Court it is established that the contra force has,
at least at one period, been so dependent on the United States that it could
not conduct its crucial or most significant military and paramilitary activities
without the multi-faceted support of the United States. This finding is funda-
mental in the present case. Nevertheless, adequate direct proof that all or the
great majority of contra activities during that period received this support has
not been, and indeed probably could not be, advanced in every respect. It will
suffice the Court to stress that a degree of control by the United States Govern-
ment, as described above, is inherent in the position in which the contra force
finds itself in relation to that Government….
115. The Court has taken the view (paragraph 110 above) that United
States participation, even if preponderant or decisive, in the financing, organizing,
training, supplying and equipping of the contras, the selection of its military or
paramilitary targets, and the planning of the whole of its operation, is still insuf-
ficient in itself, on the basis of the evidence in the possession of the Court, for the
purpose of attributing to the United States the acts committed by the contras in
87
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14.
the course of their military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. All the forms of
United States participation mentioned above, and even the general control by the
respondent State over a force with a high degree of dependency on it, would not
in themselves mean, without further evidence, that the United States directed or
enforced the perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights and humanitarian
law alleged by the applicant State. Such acts could well be committed by members
of the contras without the control of the United States. For this conduct to give rise
to legal responsibility of the United States, it would in principle have to be proved
that that State had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in
the course of which the alleged violations were committed.
116. The Court does not consider that the assistance given by the United
States to the contras warrants the conclusion that these forces are subject to the
United States to such an extent that any acts they have committed are imput-
able to that State. It takes the view that the contras remain responsible for their
acts, and that the United States is not responsible for the acts of the contras,
but for its own conduct vis-à-vis Nicaragua, including conduct related to the
acts of the contras. What the Court has to investigate is not the complaints
relating to alleged violations of humanitarian law by the contras, regarded by
Nicaragua as imputable to the United States, but rather unlawful acts for which
the United States may be responsible directly in connection with the activities
of the contras. The lawfulness or otherwise of such acts of the United States
is a question different from the violations of humanitarian law of which the
contras may or may not have been guilty. It is for this reason that the Court does
not have to determine whether the violations of humanitarian law attributed
to the contras were in fact committed by them. At the same time, the ques-
tion whether the United States Government was, or must have been, aware at
the relevant time that allegations of breaches of humanitarian law were being
made against the contras is relevant to an assessment of the lawfulness of the
action of the United States. In this respect the material facts are primarily those
connected with the issue in 1983 of a manual of psychological operations….
155. Secondly, even supposing it well established that military aid is reach-
ing the armed opposition in El Salvador from the territory of Nicaragua, it still
remains to be proved that this aid is imputable to the authorities of the latter
country. Indeed, the applicant State has in no way sought to conceal the pos-
sibility of weapons en route to the armed opposition in El Salvador crossing
its territory but it denies that this is the result of any deliberate official policy
on its part. As the Court observed in 1949:
“it cannot be concluded from the mere fact of the control exercised by a
State over its territory and waters that that State necessarily knew, or ought to
have known, of any unlawful act perpetrated therein, nor yet that it necessarily
knew, or should have known, the authors. This fact, by itself and apart from
other circumstances, neither involves prima facie responsibility nor shifts the
burden of proof.” (Corfu Channel, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 18.)….
157. ... if the flow of arms is in fact reaching El Salvador without either Hon-
duras or El Salvador or the United States succeeding in preventing it, it would
clearly be unreasonable to demand of the Government of Nicaragua a higher
degree of diligence than is achieved by even the combined efforts of the other
three States. In particular, when Nicaragua is blamed for allowing consignments
of arms to cross its territory, this is tantamount, where El Salvador is concerned,
to an admission of its inability to stem the flow. This is revealing as to the
predicament of any government, including that of Nicaragua, faced with this
arms traffic: its determination to put a stop to it would be likely to fail. More
especially, to the extent that some of this aid is said to be successfully routed
through Honduras, this accusation against Nicaragua would also signify that
Honduras, which is not suspected of seeking to assist the armed opposition in
El Salvador, is providing involuntary proof that it is by no means certain that
Nicaragua can combat this clandestine traffic any better than Honduras. As the
means at the disposal of the governments in the region are roughly comparable,
the geographical obstacles, and the intrinsic character of any clandestine arms
traffic, simply show that this traffic may be carried on successfully without
any complicity from governmental authorities, and even when they seek to
put a stop to it. Finally, if it is true that the exceptionally extensive resources
deployed by the United States have been powerless to prevent this traffic from
keeping the Salvadorian armed opposition supplied, this suggests even more
clearly how powerless Nicaragua must be with the much smaller resources
at its disposal for subduing this traffic if it takes place on its territory and the
authorities endeavour to put a stop to it.
158. Confining itself to the regional States concerned, the Court accord-
ingly considers that it is scarcely possible for Nicaragua’s responsibility for an
arms traffic taking place on its territory to be automatically assumed while the
opposite assumption is adopted with regard to its neighbours in respect of
similar traffic. Having regard to the circumstances characterizing this part of
Central America, the Court considers it more realistic, and consistent with the
probabilities, to recognize that an activity of that nature, if on a limited scale,
may very well be pursued unbeknown to the territorial government.
Separate Opinion of Judge Ago
[pp. 188-189 S.O. Ago] On the other hand, the negative answer returned by
the Court to the Applicant’s suggestion that the misdeeds committed by some
88
I refer to Articles 11 (Conduct of persons not acting on behalf of the State) and 8
(Attribution to the State of the conduct of persons acting in fact on behalf of the
State), read together.
89
12th Raymond & Beverly Sackler Distinguished Lecture Series. Human Rights and
State Responsibility. James Crawford. [Reprinted with permission of the author]
90
I.C.J. Reports 1998 p 248.
91
I.C.J. Reports 2001 p 466.
92
I.C.J. Reports 2004 p 12.
93
I.C.J. Reports 1999 p 62, 87 (para 62).
94
Inter-Am Ct. H.R. Ser C No 4 (1989), 95 ILR 259, 296 (para 170).
95
League of Nations, OJ, 5th Year, No. 4 (April 1924), p 524.
96
Yeager v. Islamic Republic of Iran (1987) 17 Iran-U.S.C.T.R. 92, 101-2.
Having established that the position is not absolute, that the conduct of
private parties is not to be attributed to the State, it falls to be considered under
what circumstances such conduct will implicate State responsibility.
(ii) Non-State actors as agents of the State
A non-State actor might be engaged by the State to “exercise elements of
the governmental authority.” Where this is the case, conduct of the non-State
actor may be attributed to the State. According to ARSIWA Article 5,
“The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the
State under article 4 but which is empowered by the law of that
State to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be
considered an act of the State under international law, provided the
person or entity is acting in that capacity in the particular instance.”
There are various situations in which non-State actors are agents of a State.
For example, in recent years, in some countries, public organs have contracted
with private security firms to take over the management of prisons. This is an
example of a private party acting as agent of the State—a situation in which
its acts will be attributed to the State for international law purposes. Prison
management, it would seem almost as a matter of course, is one area that gives
rise to challenges under human rights law.97 Alfred Aman expresses concern that
private prison companies might (1) influence public authorities to increase the
number of sentences and thus the number of “clients.” Aman admits that “[t]
here is no evidence that private providers attempt to either influence sentencing
or statute drafting in order to increase the number of prisoners”—but identi-
fies this as a risk nonetheless. In his view the removal of public monitoring
organs from private prisons presents the risk that the prison managers will be
unaccountable for violations of human rights.98
(iii) Non-State actors under the direction or control of a State
Situations also may be presented, in which the State, though it has not
formally engaged a private party as its agent, nonetheless directs or controls
its activity. Under Article 8 of the ILC Articles:
97
Some 140,000 prison beds in the U.S, UK and Australia are managed by private firms,
and problems of international human rights law have been identified in this: Colin
Fenwick, “Private Use of Prisoner’s Labor: Paradoxes of International Human Rights
Law,” (2005) 27 Human Rights Quarterly 249.
98
Alfred C. Aman, Jr., “Privatization, Prisons, Democracy, and Human Rights: The Need
to Extend the Province of Administrative Law,” (2005) 12 Indiana J Global Legal
Studies 511, 543-5.
99
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. USA), Merits,
I.C.J. Rep 1986 p 14, 62, 64-5 (para 109, 115).
100
Case IT-94-1, Prosecutor v Tadić (1999) 38 ILM 1518, 1541 (para 117) (emphasis
original).
***
76. Under the title “Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness” the Inter-
national Law Commission proposed in Articles 29 to 35 a set of rules which
include three provisions, on force majeure and fortuitous event (Article 31),
distress (Article 32), and state of necessity (Article 33), which may be relevant
to the decision on this case.
77. …[T]here are several reasons for excluding the applicability of the excuse
of force majeure in this case. As pointed out in the report of the International
Law Commission, Article 31 refers to “a situation facing the subject taking
the action, which leads it, as it were, despite itself, to act in a manner not in
conformity with the requirements of an international obligation incumbent
on it” (Yrbk. I.J.C., 1979, vol. II, para. 2, p. 122, emphasis in the original). Force
majeure is “generally invoked to justify involuntary, or at least unintentional
conduct,” it refers “to an irresistible force or an unforeseen external event
against which it has no remedy and which makes it ‘materially impossible’ for
it to act in conformity with the obligation,” since “no person is required to do
the impossible” (Ibid., p. 123, para. 4).…
…New Zealand is right in asserting that the excuse of force majeure is not
of relevance in this case because the test of its applicability is of absolute and
material impossibility, and because a circumstance rendering performance
more difficult or burdensome does not constitute a case of force majeure.
Consequently, this excuse is of no relevance in the present case.
78. Article 32 of the Articles drafted by the International Law Commis-
sion deals with another circumstance which may preclude wrongfulness in
international law, namely, that of the “distress” of the author of the conduct
which constitutes the act of State whose wrongfulness is in question….The com-
mentary of the International Law Commission explains that “‘distress’ means
a situation of extreme peril in which the organ of the State which adopts that
conduct has, at that particular moment, no means of saving himself or persons
entrusted to his care other than to act in a manner not in conformity with
the requirements of the obligation in question”…. The question therefore is to
determine whether the circumstances of distress in a case of extreme urgency
101
26 ILM 1346, Special Arbitration Tribunal (1987).
88. …Both parties recognized that the return of Major Mafart to Hao de-
pended mainly on his state of health. Thus, the French Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in its note of 30 December 1987 to the New Zealand Embassy referring
to France’s respect for the 1986 Agreement had said that Major Mafart will re-
turn to Hao when his state of health allowed. Consequently, there was no valid
ground for Major Mafart continuing to remain in metropolitan France and the
conclusion is unavoidable that this omission constitutes a material breach by
the French Government of the First Agreement.
The Case of Captain Prieur
89. As to the situation of Captain Prieur, the French authorities advised the
New Zealand Government, on 3 May 1988, that she was pregnant, adding that
a medical report indicated that “this pregnancy should be treated with special
care . . . “ The advice added that “the medical facilities on Hao are not equipped
to carry out the necessary medical examinations and to give Mrs. Prieur the
care required by her condition.”…
93. The facts above, which are not disputed, show that New Zealand would
not oppose Captain Prieur’s departure, if that became necessary because of
special care which might be required by her pregnancy….
94. On the other hand, it appears that during the day of 5 May the French
Government suddenly decided to present the New Zealand Government with
the fait accompli of Captain Prieur’s hasty return for a new reason, the health
of Mrs. Prieur’s father, who was seriously ill, hospitalized for cancer.
96. …during the day of 5 May 1988, France did not seek New Zealand’s
approval in good faith for Captain Prieur’s sudden departure; and accordingly,
that the return of Captain Prieur, who left Hao on Thursday, 5 May at 11.30 p.m.
(French time) and arrived in Paris on Friday, 6 May, thus constituted a violation
of the obligations under the 1986 Agreement.
97. Moreover, France continued to fall short of its obligations by keeping
Captain Prieur in Paris after the unfortunate death of her father on 16 May 1988.…
99. In summary, the circumstances of distress, of extreme urgency and the
humanitarian considerations invoked by France may have been circumstances
excluding responsibility for the unilateral removal of Major Mafart without
obtaining New Zealand’s consent, but clearly these circumstances entirely fail
to justify France’s responsibility for the removal of Captain Prieur and from the
breach of its obligations resulting from the failure to return the two officers
to Hao (in the case of Major Mafart once the reasons for their removal had
disappeared). There was here a clear breach of its obligations and a breach of
a material character.
***
49. The Court will now consider the question of whether there was, in 1989,
a state of necessity which would have permitted Hungary, without incurring
international responsibility, to suspend and abandon works that it was com-
mitted to perform in accordance with the 1977 Treaty and related instruments.
50. In the present case, the Parties are in agreement in considering that the
existence of a state of necessity must be evaluated in the light of the criteria laid
down by the International Law Commission in Article 33 of the Draft Articles
on the International Responsibility of States that it adopted on first reading.
That provision is worded as follows:
“Article 33. State of necessity
1. A state of necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for
precluding the wrongfulness of an act of that State not in conformity with an
international obligation of the State unless:
(a) the act was the only means of safeguarding an essential interest
of the State against a grave and imminent peril; and
(b) the act did not seriously impair an essential interest of the State
towards which the obligation existed.
2. In any case, a state of necessity may not be invoked by a State
as a ground for precluding wrongfulness:
(a) if the international obligation with which the act of the State is
not in conformity arises out of a peremptory norm of general
international law; or
(b) if the international obligation with which the act of the State
is not in conformity is laid down by a treaty which, explicitly
or implicitly, excludes the possibility of invoking the state of
necessity with respect to that obligation; or
(c) if the State in question has contributed to the occurrence
of the state of necessity.”(Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, 1980, Vol. ll, Part 2, p. 34.)
In its Commentary, the Commission defined the “state of necessity” as being
102
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997,
p. 7.
its commentary, the “extremely grave and imminent” peril must “have been
a threat to the. interest at the actual time” (Yearbook of the International
Law Commission, 1980, Vol. II, Part 2, p. 49, para. 33). That does not exclude,
in the view of the Court, that a “peril” appearing in the long term - might
be held to be “imminent” as soon as it is established, at the relevant point
in time, that the realization of that peril, however far off it might be, is not
thereby any less certain and inevitable.
The Hungarian argument on the state of necessity could not convince the
Court unless it was at least proven that a real, “grave” and “imminent” “peril”
existed in 1989 and that the measures taken by Hungary were the only pos-
sible response to it….
57. The Court concludes from the foregoing that, with respect to both Nagy-
maros and Gabčíkovo, the perils invoked by Hungary, without prejudging their
possible gravity, were not sufficiently established in 1989, nor were they “im-
minent”; and that Hungary had available to it at that time means of responding
to these perceived perils other than the suspension and abandonment of works
with which it had been entrusted. What is more, negotiations were under way
which might have led to a review of the Project and the extension of some of
its time-limits, without there being need to abandon it. The Court infers from
this that the respect by Hungary, in 1989, of its obligations under the terms of
the 1977 Treaty would not have resulted in a situation “characterized so aptly
by the maxim summum jus summa injuria” (Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, 1980, Vol. II, Part 2, p. 49, para. 31).
Moreover, the Court notes that Hungary decided to conclude the 1977
Treaty, a Treaty which - whatever the political circumstances prevailing at the
time of its conclusion - was treated by Hungary as valid and in force until the
date declared for its termination in May 1992. As can be seen from the material
before the Court, a great many studies of a scientific and technical nature had
been conducted at an earlier time, both by Hungary and by Czechoslovakia.
Hungary was, then, presumably aware of the situation as then known, when it
assumed its obligations under the Treaty. Hungary contended before the Court
that those studies had been inadequate and that the state of knowledge at that
time was not such as to make possible a complete evaluation of the ecological
implications of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project. It is nonetheless the case
that although the principal object of the 1977 Treaty was the construction of a
System of Locks for the production of electricity, improvement of navigation on
the Danube and protection against flooding, the need to ensure the protection
of the environment had not escaped the parties, as can be seen from Articles
l5, l9 and 20 of the Treaty.
What is more, the Court cannot fail to note the positions taken by Hungary
after the entry into force of the 1977 Treaty. In 1983, Hungary asked that the works
under the Treaty should go forward more slowly, for reasons that were essentially
economic but also, subsidiarily, related to ecological concerns. In 1989, when, ac-
cording to Hungary itself, the state of scientific knowledge had undergone a sig-
nificant development, it asked for the works to be speeded up, and then decided,
three months later, to suspend them and subsequently to abandon them. The Court
is not however unaware that profound changes were taking place in Hungary in
1989, and that, during that transitory phase, it might have been more than usually
difficult to co-ordinate the different points of view prevailing from time to time.
The Court infers from all these elements that, in the present case, even if it
had been established that there was, in 1989, a state of necessity linked to the
performance of the 1977 Treaty, Hungary would not have been permitted to
rely upon that state of necessity in order to justify its failure to comply with its
treaty obligations, as it had helped, by act or omission to bring it about.
80. Slovakia also maintained that it was acting under a duty to mitigate
damages when it carried out Variant C. It stated that “It is a general principle
of international law that a party injured by the non-performance of another
contract party must seek to mitigate the damage he has sustained.”
It would follow from such a principle that an injured State which has failed
to take the necessary measures to limit the damage sustained would not be en-
titled to claim compensation for that damage which could haye been avoided.
While this principle might thus provide a basis for the calculation of damages,
it could not, on the other hand, justify an otherwise wrongful act...
83. In order to be justifiable, a countermeasure must meet certain conditions
(see Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States of America) Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 127, para.
249. See also Arbitral Award of 9 December 1978 in the case concerning the
Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946 between the United States of America
and France, United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards (RIAA),
Vol. XVIH, pp. 443 et seq.; also Articles 47 to 50 of the Draft Articles on State
Responsibility adopted by the International Law Commission on first reading,
“Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its forty-eighth
session, 6 May-26 July 1996,” Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-
first Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/51/10), pp. 144-145.).
In the first place it must be taken in response to a previous international
wrongful act of another State and must be directed against that State. Although
not primarily presented as a countermeasure, it is clear that Variant C was a
response to Hungary’s suspension and abandonment of works and that it was
directed against that State; and it is equally clear, in the Court’s view, that Hun-
gary’s actions were internationally wrongful.
84. Secondly, the injured State must have called upon the State committing
the wrongful act to discontinue its wrongful conduct or to make reparation
for it. It is clear from the facts of the case, as recalled above by the Court (see
paragraphs 61 et seq.), that Czechoslovakia requested Hungary to resume the
performance of its treaty obligations on many occasions.
85. In the view of the Court, an important consideration is that the effects
of a countermeasure must be commensurate with the injury suffered, taking
account of the rights in question.
In 1929, the Permanent Court of International Justice, with regard to navi-
gation on the River Oder, stated as follows:
“[the] community of interest in a navigable river becomes the basis of a
common legal right, the essential features of which are the perfect equality of
all riparian States in the user of the whole course of the river and the exclu-
sion of any preferential privilege of any one riparian State in relation to the
others”(Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River
Oder, Judgment No. 16, 1929, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 23, p. 27).
Modern development of international law has strengthened this principle
for non-navigational uses of international watercourses as well, as evidenced
by the adoption of the Convention of 21 May 1997 on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses by the United Nations General
Assembly.
The Court considers that Czechoslovakia, by unilaterally assuming control
of a shared resource, and thereby depriving Hungary of its right to an equitable
and reasonable share of the natural resources of the Danube - with the con-
tinuing effects of the diversion of these waters on the ecology of the riparian
area of the Szigetköz - failed to respect the proportionality which is required by
international law.
86. Moreover, as the Court has already pointed out (see paragraph 78),
the fact that Hungary had agreed in the context of the original Project to the
diversion of the Danube (and, in the Joint Contractual Plan, to a provisional
measure of withdrawal of water from the Danube) cannot be understood as
having authorized Czechoslovakia to proceed with a unilateral diversion of
this magnitude without Hungary’s consent.
87. The Court thus considers that the diversion of the Danube carried out
by Czechoslovakia was not a lawful countermeasure because it was not pro-
portionate. It is therefore not required to pass upon one other condition for
the lawfulness of a countermeasure, namely that its purpose must be to induce
the wrongdoing State to comply with its obligations under international law,
and that the measure must therefore be reversible.
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Herczegh
[pp. 182-183 –D.O. Herczegh] State of necessity is a very narrow concept
in general international law. In the course of the International Law Commis-
sion’s work on the codification of State responsibility, the great majority of its
members were of the view “that any possibility of the notion of state of neces-
sity being applied where it is really dangerous must certainly be prevented, but
that this should not be so in cases where it is and will continue to be [a] useful
...” “The imperative need for compliance with the law must not be allowed to
result in situations so aptly characterized by the maxim summum jus summa
injuria” (Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1980, Vol. 11, Part 2,
p. 49, para. 31). Thus the International Law Commission, expressing an almost
general approach and conviction, stressed that the situation had to involve an
“essential” interest of the State in question. That “essential” character naturally
depends upon the circumstances in which a State finds itself, which cannot be
defined beforehand, in the abstract. The peril threatening the essential interest
must be extremely grave and imminent, and it must have been avertable only
by means conflicting with an international obligation. In a state of necessity,
there is a “grave danger to the existence of the State itself, to its political or
economic survival, the maintenance of conditions in which its essential ser-
vices can function, the keeping of its internal Peace, the survival of part of its
population, the ecological preservation of all or some of its territory ...” (ibid.,
p. 35, para. 3).
Invoking a state of necessity is not a way to terminate treaty obligations
lawfully, that is, to terminate an international treaty. However, the party in ques-
tion will be released from the consequences of the violation of international
law, since it acted in a state of necessity. The state of necessity is a circumstance
which exonerates from responsibility: in other words, it exonerates the author
of the unlawful act from that international responsibility. Hence the problem
has not been resolved - and cannot be resolved - by the law of treaties, but
pertains to the provisions of the international law of State responsibility.
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fleischhauer
[pp. 212-213 D.O. Fleischhauer] The principle that no State may profit from
its own violation of a legal obligation does not condone excessive retaliation.
The principle, as stated by the Permanent Court and applied to the present
case, means that one Party, Hungary, would not be entitled to avail itself of the
fact that the other Party, Czechoslovakia, has not fulfilled an obligation if the
first Party, Hungary, has by an illegal act prevented the other, Czechoslovakia,
from fulfilling the obligation in question. This, however, is not the case here.
The obligation not fulfilled by Czechoslovakia is the duty to respect Hungary’s
entitlement to an equitable and reasonable share in the waters of the Danube.
Hungary has not made it impossible for Czechoslovakia to respect that right;
as I have pointed out above, the unilateral realization of Variant C by Czecho-
slovakia was neither automatic nor the only possible reaction to Hungary’s
breaches of the Treaty. A broader interpretation of the principle in question
which would disregard the requirement of proportionality, would mean that
the right to countermeasures would go further, in respect to disproportionate
intersecting violations of a treaty, as it goes under general international law. It is
therefore wrong to apply the principle quite schematically to cases where there
are intersecting (“reciprocal”) violations of a treaty as the Court does where
it states “that although it has found that both Hungary and Czechoslovakia
failed to comply with their obligations under the 1977 Treaty, this reciprocal
wrongful conduct did not bring the Treaty to an end nor justify its termina-
tion” (para. 114).
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Vereshchetin
[p. 222 D.O. Vereshchetin] The basic conditions for the lawfulness of a coun-
termeasure are (1) the presence of a prior illicit act, committed by the State at
which the countermeasure is targeted; (2) the necessity of the countermeasure;
and (3) its proportionality in the circumstances of the case. Certain kinds of
acts are entirely prohibited as countermeasures, but they are not relevant to
the present case (these acts being the threat or use of force, extreme economic
or political coercion, infringement of the inviolability of diplomatic agents,
derogations from basic human rights or norms of jus cogens).
[p. 230-231 D.O. Vereshchetin] Article 30 of the International Law Com-
mission’s Draft on State Responsibility, which codifies general international
law, provides:
“The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an obligation
of that State toward another State is precluded if the act constitutes a measure
legitimate under international law against that other State, in consequence of
an internationally wrongful act of that other State.”
All the conditions required by Article 30 of the International Law Commis-
sion’s Draft on State Responsibility are met in the present case. Variant C was
conceived as a provisional and reversible solution (see para. 10 above), which
may be explained as an attempt to induce Hungary to comply with its 1977
Treaty obligations and it cannot be considered a disproportionate reaction.
Therefore, even assuming that the construction and the putting into operation
of Variant C could be characterized as an internationally wrongful act commit-
ted by Czechoslovakia, its wrongfulness would be precluded because is was a
legitimate countermeasure.
The Judgment takes a different view and “considers that Czechoslovakia,
by unilaterally assuming control of a shared resource, and thereby depriving
Hungary of its right to an equitable and reasonable share of the natural re-
sources of the Danube - with the continuing effects of the diversion of these
waters on the ecology of the riparian area of the Szigetköz - failed to respect the
proportionality which is required by international law” (see para. 85).
However, “the withdrawal of water from the Danube” is regulated by Article
14 of the 1977 Treaty. Not only Article 14 but also all the Treaty provisions
that may support the conduct of Czechoslovakia, continued by Slovakia, have
to be applied to determine whether or not it was lawful, since the Judgment
acknowledges that the 1977 Treaty and related instruments are in force be-
tween the parties.
In my opinion, it is not necessary to choose between the aforementioned
grounds to justify the action undertaken by Czechoslovakia, continued by
Slovakia, because the juridical consequences are the same, i.e., the building
and putting into operation of Variant C was not an internationally wrongful
act committed by Czechoslovakia; and Slovakia, as its sole successor State,
has not committed any internationally wrongful act in operating Variant
C to date.
***
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Skubiszewski
[pp. 239-240 D.O.Skubiszewski] A State that concluded a treaty with an-
other State providing for the execution of a project like Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros
cannot, when that project is near completion, simply say that all should be
cancelled and the only remaining problem is compensation. This is a situation
103
Ibid.
where, especially under equitable principles, the solution must go beyond mere
pecuniary compensation. The Court has found that the refusal by Hungary to
implement the Treaty was unlawful. By breaching the Treaty, Hungary could
not deprive Czechoslovakia and subsequently Slovakia of all the benefits of the
Treaty and reduce their rights to that of compensation. The advanced stage of
the work on the Project made some performance imperative in order to avoid
harm: Czechoslovakia and Slovakia had the right to expect that certain parts
of the Project would become operational.
Thus, pecuniary compensation could not, in the present case, wipe out
even some, not to speak of all, of the consequences of the abandonment of
the Project by Hungary. How could an indemnity compensate for the absence
of flood protection, improvement of navigation and production of electricity?
The attainment of these objectives of the 1977 Treaty was legitimate not only
under the Treaty but also under general law and equity. The benefits could in no
way be replaced and compensated by the payment of a sum of money. Certain
works had to be established and it was vital that they be made operational. For
the question here is not one of damages for loss sustained, but the creation of
a new system of use and utilization of the water.
***
75. The Court has already concluded (see paragraphs 70 and 71) that the
issue and circulation of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 by the Belgian
authorities failed to respect the immunity of the incumbent Minister for For-
eign Affairs of the Congo and, more particularly, infringed the immunity from
criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability then enjoyed by Mr. Yerodia under
international law. Those acts engaged Belgium’s international responsibility.
The Court considers that the findings so reached by it constitute a form of sat-
isfaction which will make good the moral injury complained of by the Congo.
76. However, as the Permanent Court of International Justice stated in its
Judgment of 13 September 1928 in the case concerning the Factory at Chorzów:
“[t]he essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act - a
principle which seems to be established by international practice and in par-
ticular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals - is that reparation must, as far as
possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the
104
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 3.
situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been
committed” (P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17, p. 47).
In the present case, “the situation which would, in all probability, have
existed if [the illegal act] had not been committed” cannot be re-established
merely by a finding by the Court that the arrest warrant was unlawful under
international law. The warrant is still extant, and remains unlawful, notwith-
standing the fact that Mr. Yerodia has ceased to be Minister for Foreign Affairs.
The Court accordingly considers that Belgium must, by means of its own choos-
ing, cancel the warrant in question and so inform the authorities to whom it
was circulated.
77. The Court sees no need for any further remedy: in particular, the Court
cannot, in a judgment ruling on a dispute between the Congo and Belgium,
indicate what that judgment’s implications might be for third States, and the
Court cannot therefore accept the Congo’s submissions on this point.
Dissenting Opinion Judge Oda
[p. 53 D.O. Oda] I find little sense in the Court’s finding in paragraph (3) of
the operative part of the Judgment, which in the Court’s logic appears to be
the consequence of the finding set out in paragraph (2) (Judgment, para. 78).
Given that the Court concludes that the violation of international law occurred
in 2000 and the Court would appear to believe that there is nothing in 2002
to prevent Belgium from issuing a new arrest warrant against Mr. Yerodia, this
time as a former Foreign Minister and not the incumbent Foreign Minister,
there is no practical significance in ordering Belgium to cancel the arrest war-
rant of April 2000. If the Court believes that this is an issue of the sovereign
dignity of the Congo and that that dignity was violated in 2000, thereby caus-
ing injury at that time to the Congo, the harm done cannot be remedied by
the cancellation of the arrest warrant; the only remedy would be an apology
by Belgium. But I do not believe that Belgium caused any injury to the Congo
because no action was ever taken against Mr. Yerodia pursuant to the warrant.
Furthermore, Belgium was under no obligation to provide the Congo with
any assurances that the incumbent Foreign Minister’s immunity from criminal
jurisdiction would be respected under the 1993 Law, as amended in 1999, but
that is not the issue here.
***
[p. 89-90 J.S.O. Higgins, Kooijmans, Buergenthal] In paragraph (3) of the
dispositif, the Court “[f]inds that the Kingdom of Belgium must, by means of its
own choosing, cancel the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 and so inform the au-
thorities to whom that warrant was circulated.” In making this finding, the Court
***
[pp. 83 D.O. Van den Wyngaert] I still need to give reasons for my vote
against paragraph 78 (3) of the dispositif, calling for the cancellation and the
“de-circulation” of the disputed arrest warrant. Even assuming, arguendo, that
the arrest warrant was illegal in the year 2000, it was no longer illegal at the
moment when the Court gave Judgment in this case. Belgium’s alleged breach
of an international obligation did not have a continuing character: it may
have lasted as long as Mr. Yerodia was in office, but it did not continue in time
thereafter. For that reason, I believe the International Court of Justice cannot
ask Belgium to cancel and “decirculate” an act that is not illegal today.105
***
318. Cameroon, however, is not only asking the Court for an end to Nige-
ria’s administrative and military presence in Cameroonian territory but also for
guarantees of non-repetition in the future. Such submissions are undoubtedly
admissible (La Grand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment of 27
June 2001, paras. 117 et seq.). However, the Judgment delivered today specifies
in definitive and mandatory terms the land and maritime boundary between
the two States. With all uncertainty dispelled in this regard, the Court cannot
envisage a situation where either Party, after withdrawing its military and po-
lice forces and administration from the other’s territory, would fail to respect
the territorial sovereignty of that Party. Hence Cameroon’s submissions on this
point cannot be upheld.
319. In the circumstances of the case, the Court considers moreover that, by
the very fact of the present Judgment and of the evacuation of the Cameroonian
territory occupied by Nigeria, the injury suffered by Cameroon by reason of the
occupation of its territory will in all events have been sufficiently addressed. The
Court will not therefore seek to ascertain whether and to what extent Nigeria’s
responsibility to Cameroon has been engaged as a result of that occupation.
105
See Art. 14 of the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, United Nations doc.
A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1, concerning the extension in time of the breach of an interna-
tional obligation, which states the following:
The breach of an international obligation by an act of a State not having a
“1.
continuing character occurs at the moment when the act is performed, even
if its effects continue.
2.
The breach of an international obligation by an act of a State having a continu-
ing character extends over the entire period during which the act continues
and remains not in conformity with the international obligation ...”
106
Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria:
Equatorial Guinea intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 303.
CHAPTER 6
DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMPLIANCE
107
Excerpt from Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law, pp. 132-34, 136-37, 5th
ed. (2005)[Reprinted with permission of Oxford University Press].
use force in its relations with its own citizens in its own territory, subject only to
limitations imposed by human rights law or other specific obligations, such as
the requirements of a mandatory resolution of the Security Council. Conversely,
it is also clear that a dispute may be ‘international’ even though the parties (or
some of them) are not states. Recent examples are the dispute between the
Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats and the disputes between rival groups in
Sudan. Consequently, the obligation to settle disputes peacefully encompasses
all disputes occurring on the international plane, including those considered
in the previous chapter arising between a state and a foreign company over an
internationalized contract (e.g. Texaco v Libya (1977) 53ILR 389).
It is vital that the obligation to settle disputes peacefully should be supported
by practical means. In fact, international law knows many methods of dispute
settlement and it is important to remember that the International Court of
Justice plays only a small part in this process. There are many other tribunals—
international, regional and bilateral—which resolve disputes ‘judicially’, as well
as several ways in which disputes can be resolved ‘diplomatically’. While there
are no set criteria by which to identify a ‘judicial’ means of settlement, generally
this is taken to mean the settlement of a dispute according to international law,
usually by an impartial third party, the outcome of which is legally binding on
the disputants. The growing list of cases settled by the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) is a good example. However, even in modes of
dispute settlement which are essentially ‘diplomatic’, international law is not
irrelevant. In direct negotiations, for example, each side will have a battery of
legal principles with which to support its economic and political arguments.
Consequently, it should not be thought that any of the various methods of
dispute settlement are exclusively ‘judicial’ or ‘diplomatic’. International law
will play a part in each, varying from being the sole criterion before the I.C.J. to
one of several in ‘negotiations’ and ‘mediation’. Similarly, there is no exclusive
method by which any particular dispute, or any aspect of it, need be resolved,
as seen by the many methods specified in the Law of the Sea Convention of
1982. In practice, the means of dispute settlement are cumulative and they do
not operate in isolation.
10.1 Negotiation
As in national law, the most common method of settlement is direct nego-
tiations between the parties. This ‘method’ accounts for the great majority of
settlements between states and appears to be the one most preferred. There is
no set procedure for negotiations and these may be at arm’s length or face to
face. Necessarily any negotiated settlement will be legally binding only if this
is the wish of the parties, and then it may be encapsulated in a treaty. Other-
solution of the problem of the former South-West Africa (now Namibia) and
has buttressed the Secretary-General in his efforts to bring peace to Iran and
Iraq. Yet it has had little success with the dispute between India and Pakistan
over Kashmir and the prospects for a solution to the Cypriot problem—once
very rosy—now look less promising. Much depends, as always, on the will of
the parties to a dispute, rather than on the will of the Assembly. Indeed, the
political nature of the Assembly means that questions of international law
are not always at the front of its concern and it would seem more suited to
the solution of political and economic disputes, especially those in which the
Assembly itself has an interest. Thus, the Assembly will be vital in matters con-
cerning statehood and membership, as it was with China in 1974 the states
of the former Yugoslavia in 1992 and in East Timor in 2002. These are issues
having considerable legal significance in respect of which the Assembly has
particular expertise.
10.4.2 The Security Council
Under Chapter VI of the Charter (Pacific Settlement of Disputes), the Security
Council has various powers and responsibilities in respect of the settlement of dis-
putes. First, if all other means have failed, the parties to a dispute which is likely to
endanger international peace and security are under an obligation to refer it to the
Security Council. Second, any member or non-member of the Organisation may,
without the parties’ consent, refer any dispute to the Council to see if it is likely
to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. In both cases,
the Council may recommend appropriate procedures or methods of settlement,
as well as the actual terms of a compromise. In practice, the procedural aspects of
these provisions are quite readily invoked, especially the reference power enjoyed
by uninvolved states. Generally, the Council is reluctant to make a concrete rec-
ommendation without the participation of all interested parties, as was the case
with the India/Pakistan conflict in 1971. It is also clear that the Security Council
cannot actually impose a settlement on the parties, save only that its residual
power to deal with threats to the peace and acts of aggression remains intact (e.g.
the Congo/Uganda/Rwanda Resolution, 16 June 2000, SC Res. .1304 (2000)) and
this could conceivably lead to the Council imposing a settlement if the precon-
ditions of Art. 39 were established (breach of the peace, threat to the peace, act
of aggression). Again, however, the Security Council is primarily concerned with
political, not legal matters, and its task is to keep the peace rather than to judge
the rights and wrongs of a dispute. According to Art. 36(3) of the Charter, the
Council must bear in mind that ‘legal disputes should as a general rule be referred
by the parties to the International Court of Justice’, although it has no power to
force states to submit to this jurisdiction. In this respect, note must be taken of
three I.C.J. decisions which bear on the relationship between the Council and the
Court. In the Lockerbie Case one of the grounds upon which the I.C.J. decided
not to grant ‘interim measures of protection’ to the plaintiff state (on which see
below) was that the Security Council had taken concrete measures in respect of
the dispute after determining that the matter fell, within Art. 39: This illustrates not
only that most disputes have both a legal and a political dimension, but also that
the Security Council can assume paramount responsibility for dispute settlement
in such cases as it deems appropriate. Conversely, in the Case Concerning Armed
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v Uganda) (Provisional Measures),
1 July 2000, the I.C.J. did grant interim measures of protection to Congo, which
in terms were very similar to those ‘demanded’ in SC Resolution 1304 of 16 June
2000. Apparently, in contrast to Security Council action in the Lockerbie Case, in
the Congo situation the Council had not reached a decision determinative of the
rights which Congo now claimed deserved protection. No doubt this is a logically
defensible distinction, but it requires a fine judgment by the. Court. Thirdly, in the
Advisory Opinion concerning the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 2004 I.C.J. Rep, the Court again touched
on the relationship of the UN with the Court (including, but not specifically, the
Security Council). Admittedly, this was an Advisory Opinion rather than a judg-
ment in a contentious case, but the Court seems clear that the mere fact that other
UN bodies are considering a dispute is no bar to the Court considering the legal
aspects of the same dispute.
10.4.3 Other agencies
A number of specialized agencies operating under the general aegis of the
United Nations may also assist in the resolution of disputes between states.
These agencies deal with a variety of matters of a specific nature and they
provide a forum for discussion and an impetus to settlement in much the same
way as the General Assembly. Included in this category are the International
Labour Organisation, the International Monetary Fund, the International Civil
Aviation Authority and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
10.5 Conciliation
Conciliation can be regarded either as a ‘non-judicial’ or a ‘semi-judicial’
procedure for the settlement of disputes. Once again the process of concili-
ation may deal with a variety of questions, including matters of international
law. Bearing this in mind, conciliation denotes the reference of a dispute to a
third party, often a commission or committee, whose task is to produce a report
recommending proposals for settlement. Conciliation commissions are differ-
ent from commissions of inquiry because the latter do not produce concrete
proposals. In this regard, conciliation is similar to arbitration. However, here
also there is one vital difference. Generally, the reports of- conciliation commis-
sions are not legally binding on the parties, although the simple fact that the
matter has been referred to a third party combined with the force of a formal
recommendation means that the great majority of proposed settlements are not
ignored. The report and the proposed solution of the conciliation commission
may, of course, form the basis for future negotiations. Conciliation is, then, the
middle ground between inquiry and arbitration. A settlement is proposed by a
neutral third party, but it is not binding. Conciliation commissions were estab-
lished by the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of
Disputes and by the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes 1928. A
more recent example is provided by the Jan Meyen Conciliation Commission
(Iceland v Norway) (1981) 20 ILM 797 on maritime delimitation. Conciliation
commissions may be used as one of the dispute settlement procedures estab-
lished by the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.
10.6 Settlement by regional machinery
There is a great variety of regional organisations that are instrumental in the
peaceful settlement of disputes. These range from political bodies such as the
Organisation of American States and the Organisation of African Unity (see e.g. its
role in the Congo/Uganda dispute), to economic forums such as the Caribbean
Community and Common Market, (Carricom) and the World Trade Organisa-
tion (formerly GATT), to more judicial bodies such as the European Court of
Human Rights, the Central American Court of Justice and Inter-American Court
of Human Rights. In this context, note must also be taken of the political-legal
Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (formerly the CSCE). This Organisation has increased in importance
following the massive political changes in Eastern Europe in the late twentieth
century. Obviously, these forums are eminently suitable for the resolution of local
disputes, and their precise terms of reference will vary accordingly.
10.7 Arbitration
The International Law Commission has defined arbitration as ‘a procedure
for the settlement of disputes between states by a binding award on the basis
of law and as a result of an undertaking voluntarily accepted’. It is the most
commonly used ‘judicial’ means for the settlement of disputes much more so
than reference to the International Court of Justice Arbitration awards have
contributed significantly to the development of many areas of international law,
and this has not diminished even now that we have more established standing
courts. The decisions of the US-Mexican Claims Commission 1926, for example,
did much to clarify the law of state responsibility, and the arbitral award in the
Island of Palmas Case (1928) 2 RIAA 829, is the locus classicus on acquisition of
territory. The US-Iran Claims Tribunal resolved many of the disputes that arose
out of the rupture of relations between these two states in 1979 and has made
significant pronouncements on the law relating to expropriation of foreign-
owned property (e.g. the Amoco Finance Case 15 Iran-US CTR 189 (1987)).
Like all methods of pacific settlement in international law, arbitration is
voluntary. States must consent beforehand to the exercise of jurisdiction by the
arbitrators. This may be done on an ad hoc basis, as-with the Guinea/Guinea-
Bissau Maritime Delimitation Case 77 ILR 636 and the. Canada/France Maritime
Delimitation (1992) 31 ILM 114S, or consent may be given in advance to a
specific procedure, as with the Permanent Court of Arbitration, although the
submission of actual disputes may depend on further consent. This last body,
established by the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions on Pacific Settlement,
provides an institutionalized procedure for the settlement of disputes by arbi-
tration and recent moves have been made to revive its role in dispute settle-
ment. A recent example is the Eritrea/ Yemen Arbitration Concerning Maritime
Delimitation, 1999, it must also be remembered that arbitration proceedings
are not limited to the determination of disputes between states. An important
function of arbitration, and one which the I.C.J. cannot undertake, is to settle
disputes between states and other bodies having international personality. Typi-
cally, such arbitrations involve states and multinational corporations, although
exceptionally individuals may be given the right to claim directly against a state.
One of the most important examples of an arbitration procedure for non-
states and states is the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes, established by International Convention in 1964, which provides a
forum for the settlement of disputes between states and corporations arising
out of capital investment in the former’s territory. Two examples of arbitrations
heard under this framework are AAPL v Sri Lanka and Southern Pacific v Egypt,
both important in the law of state responsibility. In addition, there is now a set
of Model Rules for International Commercial Arbitration (28 ILM 231) again
reflecting the practical importance of arbitration in the-world of commerce.
Moving away from the machinery of arbitration, what are its legal charac-
teristics? In general parlance, ‘arbitration’ can denote any settlement achieved
by reference to a third party. However, as the Permanent Court of Justice indi-
cated in its Advisory Opinion on the Interpretation of the Treaty of Lausanne
Case. (1925) PCIJ Ser. В-No. 12, arbitration in international law has a more
specific meaning. First, arbitration is a procedure for the settlement of a legal
dispute. Arbitration is concerned with the rights and duties of the parties under
international law and a settlement is achieved by the application of this law
to the facts of the case. This is not to say that political or economic factors are
irrelevant, but rather that they, of themselves, cannot affect the outcome. Like
the I.C.J., arbitration is concerned primarily with questions of international law.
All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action
it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving
assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive
or enforcement action.
The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the
United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be neces-
sary for the maintenance of international peace and security.
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement
under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application
of enforcement measures under Chapter VII….
CHAPTER VI: PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
Article 33
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a
solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful
means of their own choice.
The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties
to settle their dispute by such means.
Article 34
The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which
might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to deter-
mine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security.
Article 35
Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation
of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council
or of the General Assembly.
A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the
attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to
which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the
obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.
The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its
attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.
Article 36
The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to
in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures
or methods of adjustment.
The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for
the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.
In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should
also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be re-
ferred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with
the provisions of the Statute of the Court.
Article 37
Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to
settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security
Council.
If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall
decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms
of settlement as it may consider appropriate.
Article 38
Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council
may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the
parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.
108
General Assembly resolution 37/10 of 15 November 1982, GAOR (68th Plen. Sess.)
U.N. Doc. A/Res/37/10 (1982).
Recognizing the important role of the United Nations and the need to
enhance its effectiveness in the peaceful settlement of international disputes
and the maintenance of international peace and security, in accordance with
the principles of justice and international law, in conformity with the Charter
of the United Nations,
Reaffirming the principle of the Charter of the United Nations that all
States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,
Reiterating that no State or group of States has the right to intervene, di-
rectly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs
of any other State,
Reaffirming the Declaration on Principles of International Law concern-
ing Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations,
Bearing in mind the importance of maintaining and strengthening inter-
national peace and security and the development of friendly relations among
States, irrespective of their political, economic and social systems or levels of
economic development,
Reaffirming the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples
as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and referred to in the Dec-
laration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Na-
tions and in other relevant resolutions of the General Assembly,
Stressing the need for all States to desist from any forcible action which
deprives peoples, particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or
other forms of alien domination, of their inalienable right to self-determination,
freedom and independence, as referred to in the Declaration on Principles of
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
Mindful of existing international instruments as well as respective principles
and rules concerning the peaceful settlement of international disputes, includ-
ing the exhaustion of local remedies whenever applicable,
Determined to promote international co-operation in the political field and
to encourage the progressive development of international law and its codifica-
tion, particularly in relation to the peaceful settlement of international disputes,
solution and shall consult forthwith on mutually agreed means to settle the
dispute peacefully. Should the parties fail to settle by any of the above means
a dispute the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security, they shall refer it to the Security Council in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to
the functions and powers of the Council set forth in the relevant provisions
of Chapter VI of the Charter.
8. States parties to an international dispute, as well as other States, shall
refrain from any action whatsoever which may aggravate the situation so as to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security and make more
difficult or impede the peaceful settlement of the dispute, and shall act in this
respect in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
9. States should consider concluding agreements for the peaceful settlement
of disputes among them. They should also include in bilateral agreements and
multilateral conventions to be concluded, as appropriate, effective provisions
for the peaceful settlement of disputes arising from the interpretation or ap-
plication thereof.
10. States should, without prejudice to the right of free choice of means,
bear in mind that direct negotiations are a flexible and effective means of
peaceful settlement of their disputes. When they choose to resort to direct
negotiations, States should negotiate meaningfully, in order to arrive at an
early settlement acceptable to the parties. States should be equally prepared
to seek the settlement of their disputes by the other means mentioned in the
present Declaration.
11. States shall in accordance with international law implement in good
faith all the provisions of agreements concluded by them for the settlement
of their disputes.
12. In order to facilitate the exercise by the peoples concerned of the right
to self-determination as referred to in the Declaration on Principles of Inter-
national Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the parties to a dispute
may have the possibility, if they agree to do so and as appropriate, to have re-
course to the relevant procedures mentioned in the present Declaration, for
the peaceful settlement of the dispute.
13. Neither the existence of a dispute nor the failure of a procedure of
peaceful settlement of disputes shall permit the use of force or threat of force
by any of the States parties to the dispute.
II
1. Member States should make full use of the provisions of the Charter of
the United Nations, including the procedures and means provided for therein,
particularly Chapter VI, concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes.
2. Member States shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by
them in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. They should,
in accordance with the Charter, as appropriate, duly take into account the
recommendations of the Security Council relating to the peaceful settlement
of disputes. They should also, in accordance with the Charter, as appropri-
ate, duly take into account the recommendations adopted by the General
Assembly, subject to Articles 11 and 12 of the Charter, in the field of peaceful
settlement of disputes.
3. Member States reaffirm the important role conferred on the General As-
sembly by the Charter of the United Nations in the field of peaceful settlement
of disputes and stress the need for it to discharge effectively its responsibilities.
Accordingly, they should:
(a) Bear in mind that the General Assembly may discuss any
situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair
the general welfare or friendly relations among nations and,
subject to Article 12 of the Charter, recommend measures for
its peaceful adjustment;
(b) Consider making use, when they deem it appropriate, of the
possibility of bringing to the attention of the General Assembly
any dispute or any situation which might lead to international
friction or give rise to a dispute;
(c) Consider utilizing, for the peaceful settlement of their disputes,
the subsidiary organs established by the General Assembly in
the performance of its functions under the Charter;
(d) Consider, when they are parties to a dispute brought to the
attention of the General Assembly, making use of consultations
within the framework of the Assembly, with a view to
facilitating an early settlement of their dispute.
4. Member States should strengthen the primary role of the Security Council
so that it may fully and effectively discharge its responsibilities, in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, in the area of the settlement of disputes
or of any situation the continuance of which is likely to endanger the mainte-
nance of international peace and security. To this end they should:
Nations, particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms
of alien domination; nor the right of these peoples to struggle to that end and
to seek and receive support, in accordance with the principles of the Charter
and in conformity with the above-mentioned Declaration;
Stresses the need, in accordance with the Charter, to continue efforts to
strengthen the process of the peaceful settlement of disputes through progres-
sive development and codification of international law, as appropriate, and
through enhancing the effectiveness of the United Nations in this field.
109
Vyacheslav V. Gavrilov, Notion and Interaction of International and National Legal
Systems, Vladivostok (2005), p. 216. [citations omitted] [Reprinted with permission
of the author].
One of the first states to embrace the doctrine of incorporation at the leg-
islative level was the United States of America. In Section 2, Art. VI of the Con-
stitution of the United States of 1787, the so-called supreme clause (supremacy
clause) was introduced as follows: “This Constitution and the laws of the United
States, which are issued for its execution, as well as the treaties which have been
or will be signed by the United States’ authorities are the highest laws of the
country and the judges of each state are obliged to execute them even if the
Constitution or the laws in individual states contain contradicting provisions.”
It is easy to notice that, in accordance with this rule, the basic principle of the
theory of incorporation - “international law is part of the country’s law” - was
extended to the international treaty rules.
In addition to the United States, countries to have proclaimed international
law as part of the national law included Germany and Greece. Article 25 of the
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, provides that “the
universally recognized norms of international law are an integral part of the law
the Federation. They have the advantage over the laws and directly create rights
and duties for the inhabitants of the federal territory.” And, according to Clause
1, Article 28 of the Constitution of Greece of 1975, “accepted norms of interna-
tional law, as well as international agreements from the time of their ratification
by the law and entry into force are an integral part of the domestic Greek law
and take precedence over any provision of law that is contradictory to them.”
Other countries have declared the international legal norms as part of their
domestic legislation. Thus, in accordance with Part 1 of Art. 96 of the Con-
stitution of the Kingdom of Spain in 1978, “international treaties concluded
in accordance with the law of and officially published in Spain are part of its
internal legislation.” Similar provisions can be found in the constitutions of
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine and some other states.
It is easy to see that in the basis of the theory of incorporation there lies a
monistic approach to the problem of the relation of international and national
legal standards, but its essence amounts to declaring international law entirely
and without change in its nature an integral part of domestic law. This is done
on the basis of rules worked out by the jurisprudential practice of the respective
state, or by direct reference to its constitutional norm. The essence of the theory
of incorporation, therefore, can be summarized in the following main points:
1. International law and domestic law represent two systems of law that
are consistent with each other. Therefore, the first may be an integral part of
the second.
2. By virtue of specifying the constitutional norm or practice worked out by
national courts, international treaties and (or) norms of general international
law become part of the national law (legislation) of the country in their entirety,
without the need to issue any additional domestic legislation.
We should not forget these regulatory structures differ substantially from
each other not only in terms of content and sources of legal norms, but also in
the ways they are created and implemented. These legal systems are of different
nature, scope of application, purpose, whereby they are cannot objectively be
or become part of each other.
Quite revealing in this sense is a statement by German jurist D. Rauschning,
who, commenting on the provisions of Art. 25 of the Constitution of Germany,
emphasized that the phrase contained therein, stating that “general norms of
international law are an integral part of the law of the Federation,” can be mis-
leading. “This provision does not mean that international law norms become
national law norms of Germany. They remain to be the norms of international
law. The meaning of this article of the Constitution is in that it requires appli-
cation of such rules within the framework of the legal system of the Federal
Republic of Germany.” Similarly, Professors T. Burgental and G. Maier note:
“When we in the U.S. say, for example, that international law is “the law of the
nation,” we really mean that it represents a part of our legal system.”
As pointed out by R. A. Müllerson, regardless of the dualistic or monistic ap-
proach to the correlation of international law and national law, “the national
law of any state and international law are different systems of law and interna-
tional treaties, regardless of the method of their conclusion or implementation,
are the norms of international law that can operate within the state only with
permission of the national law of the country. The only specificity is that, within
the framework of the incorporation theory, such permission takes the form of
announcing international law not as part of the legal system but rather as part
of domestic law or legislation of the respective state.
The theory of incorporation, following the transformation theory, thus
gives the wrong impression about the actual status of international law norms
within the framework of national legal systems.
Firstly, within the framework of the theory of incorporation, no distinction
is made between international legal norms designed to regulate relations arising
within the state and relations that occur beyond its borders.
Secondly, the theory of incorporation (and, incidentally, that of transforma-
tion, too) does not consider the obvious fact that, even if international legal
norms are aimed at achieving a certain degree of normalization of relations that
involve national law subjects, they are not always suitable for direct regulation of
these relations. This raises the problem of self-executing and nonself-executing
international treaties and provisions therein which has not been given a satisfac-
tory resolution in any of the states that have declared international law as part
of their domestic law. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that some of
these countries declared as part of their rights only conventional international
legal norms, which, according to Professor J. Bederman, indicates the existence
not only of those countries adhering to the concept of “contractual monism”
but also the states that recognize only the “monism of common law norms.”
And, this fact is not always taken into consideration within the framework of
the theory of incorporation.
Thirdly, when declaring international legal norms as part of a country’s law,
there appear a number of problems of a “technical” nature which have not
received a uniform and comprehensive solution in the doctrine, the law and
the enforcement practice of respective states. These problems, in particular,
raise issues about the legal validity of international treaties conflicting with
the provisions of national legal acts adopted later on, as well as about the
relationship between the norms of international treaties concluded on behalf
of the state by its various organs and the national legal norms of various levels.
Most of these problems and inaccuracies are rather successfully overcome
within the framework of the theory of implementation which has been widely
used in the legal doctrine in recent years.
The theory of implementation, just like the theory of transformation, is
based on the assumption of independence of the systems of international law
and domestic law. In other words, in accordance with the theory of implementa-
tion, the outcome of the harmonization is not that of transformation of inter-
national legal norms into national legal norms, not that of their declaration as
part of domestic law, but granting the ability of the former to act in their own
right in the legal system of the state through approval and support of the latter.
Similar ideas were expressed back in the 60’s of the last century, when the
German Society of International Law put forward a theory of international legal
norms’ implementation. In their view, the state can and should be limited, in
this case, only to the act of effecting execution of the international legal norm.
This act “does not transform one norm to another, it only serves the condition
of domestic operation of the international legal norm, extrapolates its nor-
mativity to the domestic sphere. At this, the nature of the norm itself remains
unchanged, it continues to be a norm of international law.”
The theory of “implementation” advanced here, in its broader sense, implies
“implementation of international legal and domestic norms in compliance
with domestic international law, as well as establishment of conditions for such
implementation at international and domestic levels.”
The Court
The International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) is the principal judicial organ of
the United Nations (UN). It was established in June 1945 by the Charter of the
United Nations and began work in April 1946.
The seat of the Court is at the Peace Palace in The Hague (Netherlands). Of
the six principal organs of the United Nations, it is the only one not located in
New York (United States of America).
The Court’s role is to settle, in accordance with international law, legal dis-
putes submitted to it by States and to give advisory opinions on legal questions
referred to it by authorized United Nations organs and specialized agencies.
The Court is composed of 15 judges, who are elected for terms of office of
nine years by the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council.
It is assisted by a Registry, its administrative organ. Its official languages are
English and French.
Origins and History
The creation of the Court represented the culmination of a long develop-
ment of methods for the pacific settlement of international disputes, the origins
of which can be traced back to classical times.
Article 33 of the United Nations Charter lists the following methods for the
pacific settlement of disputes between States: negotiation, enquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, and resort to regional agencies or ar-
rangements; good offices should also be added to this list. Among these methods,
certain involve appealing to third parties. For example, mediation places the par-
ties to a dispute in a position in which they can themselves resolve their dispute
thanks to the intervention of a third party. Arbitration goes further, in the sense
that the dispute is submitted to the decision or award of an impartial third party, so
that a binding settlement can be achieved. The same is true of judicial settlement
(the method applied by the International Court of Justice), except that a court is
subject to stricter rules than an arbitral tribunal, particularly in procedural matters.
Mediation and arbitration preceded judicial settlement in history. The former
was known in ancient India and in the Islamic world, whilst numerous examples
110
See, http://www.I.C.J.-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1.
of the latter are to be found in ancient Greece, in China, among the Arabian tribes,
in maritime customary law in medieval Europe and in Papal practice.
The origins111
The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)
Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations gave the Council of the
League responsibility for formulating plans for the establishment of a Permanent
Court of International Justice (PCIJ), such a court to be competent not only to
hear and determine any dispute of an international character submitted to it by
the parties to the dispute, but also to give an advisory opinion upon any dispute
or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly. It remained for
the League Council to take the necessary action to give effect to Article 14. In
December 1920, after an exhaustive study by a subcommittee, the Committee
submitted a revised draft to the Assembly, which unanimously adopted it. This
was the Statute of the PCIJ.
The PCIJ was thus a working reality. The great advance it represented in
the history of international legal proceedings can be appreciated by consider-
ing the following:
• unlike arbitral tribunals, the PCIJ was a permanently constituted
body governed by its own Statute and Rules of Procedure, fixed
beforehand and binding on parties having recourse to the Court;
• it had a permanent Registry which, inter alia, served as a channel
of communication with governments and international bodies;
• its proceedings were largely public and provision was made
for the publication in due course of the pleadings, of verbatim
records of the sittings and of all documentary evidence
submitted to it;
Although the Permanent Court of International Justice was brought into
being through, and by, the League of Nations, it was nevertheless not a part of
the League. There was a close association between the two bodies, which found
expression inter alia in the fact that the League Council and Assembly periodi-
cally elected the Members of the Court and that both Council and Assembly
were entitled to seek advisory opinions from the Court, but the latter never
formed an integral part of the League, just as the Statute never formed part of
the Covenant. In particular, a Member State of the League of Nations was not
by this fact alone automatically a party to the Court’s Statute.
111
I.C.J. website: http://www.I.C.J.-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=1.
Between 1922 and 1940 the PCIJ dealt with 29 contentious cases between
States and delivered 27 advisory opinions.
has in fact happened as the membership of the United Nations grew from 51
in 1945 to 192 in 2006.
The San Francisco Conference nevertheless showed some concern that all
continuity with the past should not be broken, particularly as the Statute of
the PCIJ had itself been drawn up on the basis of past experience, and it was
felt better not to change something that had seemed to work well. The Charter
therefore plainly stated that the Statute of the International Court of Justice
was based upon that of the PCIJ. At the same time, the necessary steps were
taken for a transfer of the jurisdiction of the PCIJ so far as was possible to the
International Court of Justice. In any event, the decision to create a new court
necessarily involved the dissolution of its predecessor. The PCIJ met for the last
time in October 1945 when it was decided to take all appropriate measures to
ensure the transfer of its archives and effects to the new International Court
of Justice, which, like its predecessor, was to have its seat in the Peace Palace.
…In April 1946, the PCIJ was formally dissolved, and the International Court
of Justice, meeting for the first time, elected as its President Judge José Gus-
tavo Guerrero (El Salvador), the last President of the PCIJ. …The first case was
submitted in May 1947. It concerned incidents in the Corfu Channel and was
brought by the United Kingdom against Albania.
112
http://www.I.C.J.-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0#CHAPTER_II.
***
[pp. 142-143] The Court considers appropriate the request of Nicaragua
for the nature and amount of the reparation due to it to be determined in a
subsequent phase of the proceedings. While a certain amount of evidence
has been provided, for example, in the testimony of the Nicaraguan Minister
of Finance, of pecuniary loss sustained, this was based upon contentions as
to the responsibility of the United States which were more far-reaching than
the conclusions at which the Court has been able to arrive. The opportunity
should be afforded Nicaragua to demonstrate and prove exactly what injury
was suffered as a result of each action of the United States which the Court has
found contrary to international law. Nor should it be overlooked that, while
the United States has chosen not to appear or participate in the present phase
of the proceedings, Article 53 of the Statute does not debar it from appearing
to present its arguments on the question of reparation if it so wishes. On the
contrary, the principle of the equality of the Parties requires that it be given that
opportunity. It goes without saying, however, that in the phase of the proceed-
ings devoted to reparation, neither Party may call in question such findings in
the present Judgment as have become res judicata.
There remains the request of Nicaragua (paragraph 15 above) for an award,
at the present stage of the proceedings, of $370,200,000 as the “minimum (and
in that sense provisional) valuation of direct damages.” There is no provision
in the Statute of the Court either specifically empowering the Court to make
an interim award of this kind, or indeed debarring it from doing so. In view of
the final and binding character of the Court’s judgments under Articles 59 and
60 of the Statute, it would however only be appropriate to make an award of
this kind, assuming that the Court possesses the power to do so, in exceptional
circumstances, and where the entitlement of the State making the claim was
already established with certainty and precision. Furthermore, in a case in which
the respondent State is not appearing, so that its views on the matter are not
known to the Court, the Court should refrain from any unnecessary act which
might prove an obstacle to a negotiated settlement. It bears repeating that
“the judicial settlement of international disputes, with a view
to which the Court has been established, is simply an alternative
113
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States
of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14 (p. 142-143 of decision).
Boundary Disputes
Malcolm Shaw, Boundary Treaties114
Boundary treaties, whereby either additional territory is acquired or lost or
uncertain boundaries are clarified by agreement between the states concerned,
constitute a root of the title in themselves. They constitute a special kind of
treaty in that they establish an objective territorial regime valid erga omnes.
Such a regime will not only create rights binding also upon third states, but
will exist outside of the particular boundary treaty and thus will continue even
if the treaty in question itself ceases to apply.…
Accordingly, many boundary disputes in fact revolve around the question
of treaty interpretation. It is accepted that a treaty should be interpreted in the
light of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
1969, ‘in good faith, in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to
its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose’....
More generally, the difficulty in seeking to interpret both general concepts
and geographical locations used in early treaties in the light of modern sci-
entific knowledge has posed difficulties. In the Botswana/Namibia case, the
Court, faced with the problem of identifying the ‘main channel’ of the River
Chobe in the light of an 1890 treaty, emphasized that ‘ the present – day state
of scientific knowledge’ could be used in order to illustrate terms if that treaty.
In the Eritrea/Ethiopia case, the Boundary Commission referred to the prin-
ciple of contemporaneity, by which it meant that treaty should be interpreted
by reference to the circumstances prevailing when the treaty was concluded.
In particular, the determination of geographical name (whether of a place or
of a river) depended upon the contemporary understanding of the location
to which that name related at the time of the treaty. However, in seeking to
114
Quote from Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, p. 417, 5th ed. (Cambridge University
Press, 2003).
understand what that was reference to subsequent practice and to the objects
of the treaty was often required. In interpreting a boundary treaty, in particular
in seeking resolve ambiguities, the subsequent practice of the parties will be
relevant. Even where such subsequent practice cannot in the circumstance
constitute an authoritative interpretation of the treaty, it may be deemed to
‘be useful’ in the process of specifying the frontier in question. However, where
the boundary line as specified in the pertinent instrument is clear, it cannot
be changed by a court in the process of interpreting delimitation provisions.
***
[pp. 563-564] The Parties have argued at length over how the present
dispute is to be classified in terms of a distinction sometimes made by legal
writers between “frontier disputes” or “delimitation disputes,” and “disputes
as to attribution of territory.” According to this distinction, the former refer
to delimitation operations affecting what has been described as “a portion of
land which is not geographically autonomous” whereas the object of the latter
is the attribution of sovereignty over the whole of a geographical entity. Both
Parties seem ultimately to have accepted that the present dispute belongs rather
to the category of delimitation disputes, even though they fail to agree on the
conclusions to be drawn from this. In fact, however, in the great majority of
cases, including this one, the distinction outlined above is not so much a dif-
ference in kind but rather a difference of degree as to the way the operation
in question is carried out. The effect of any delimitation, no matter how small
the disputed area crossed by the line, is an apportionment of the areas of land
lying on either side of the line. In the present case, it may be noted that the
Special Agreement, in Article I, refers not merely to a line to be drawn, but to a
disputed “area,” which it defines as consisting of a “band” of territory encom-
passing the “region” of the Béli. Moreover, the effect of any judicial decision
rendered either in a dispute as to attribution of territory or in a delimitation
dispute, is necessarily to establish a frontier….
[p. 566] The territorial boundaries which have to be respected may also
derive from international frontiers which previously divided a colony of one
State from a colony of another, or indeed a colonial territory from the terri-
tory of an independent State, or one which was under protectorate, but had
retained its international personality. There is no doubt that the obligation to
respect pre-existing international frontiers in the event of a State succession
115
Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 554
derives from a general rule of international law, whether or not the rule is ex-
pressed in the formula uti possidetis. Hence the numerous solemn affirmations
of the intangibility of the frontiers existing at the time of the independence
of African States, whether made by senior African statesmen or by organs of
the Organization of African Unity itself are evidently declaratory rather than
constitutive: they recognize and confirm an existing principle; and do not seek
to consecrate a new principle or the extension to Africa of a rule previously
applied only in another continent….
[p. 582] At the present stage of its reasoning the Chamber can confine
itself to the statement of a principle. Whether in frontier delimitations or in
international territorial conflicts, maps merely constitute information which
varies in accuracy from case to case; of themselves, and by virtue solely of their
existence, they cannot constitute a territorial title, that is, a document endowed
by international law with intrinsic legal force for the purpose of establishing
territorial rights. Of course, in some cases maps may acquire such legal force, but
where this is so the legal force does not arise solely from their intrinsic merits:
it is because such maps fall into the category of physical expressions of the will
of the State or States concerned. This is the case, for example, when maps are
annexed to an official text of which they form an integral part. Except in this
clearly defined case, maps are only extrinsic evidence of varying reliability or
unreliability which may be used, along with other evidence of a circumstantial
kind, to establish or reconstitute the real facts….
[pp. 632-633] It should again be pointed out that the Chamber’s task in
this case is to indicate the line of the frontier inherited by both States from
the colonizers on their accession to independence. For the reasons explained
above, this task amounts to ascertaining and defining the lines which formed
the administrative boundaries of the colony of Upper Volta on 31 December
1932. Admittedly, the Parties could have modified the frontier existing on
the critical date by a subsequent agreement. If the competent authorities had
endorsed the agreement of 15 January 1965, it would have been unnecessary
for the purpose of the present case to ascertain whether that agreement was
of a declaratory or modifying character in relation to the 1932 boundaries.
But this did not happen, and the Chamber has received no mandate from the
Parties to substitute its own free choice of an appropriate frontier for theirs.
The Chamber must not lose sight either of the Court’s function, which is to
decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to
it, nor of the fact that the Chamber was requested by the Parties in their Special
Agreement not to give indications to guide them in determining their common
frontier, but to draw a line, and a precise line.
As it has explained, the Chamber can resort to that equity infra legem, which
both Parties have recognized as being applicable in this case (see paragraph
27 above). In this respect the guiding concept is simply that “Equity as a legal
concept is a direct emanation of the idea of justice” (Continental Shelf (Tuni-
sia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), I.C.J. Reports 1982, p. 60, para. 71). The Chamber
would however stress more generally that to resort to the concept of equity in
order to modify an established frontier would be quite unjustified. Especially in
the African context, the obvious deficiencies of many frontiers inherited from
colonization, from the ethnic, geographical or administrative standpoint, can-
not support an assertion that the modification of these frontiers is necessary or
justifiable on the ground of considerations of equity. These frontiers, however
unsatisfactory they may be, possess the authority of the uti possidetis and are
thus fully in conformity with contemporary international law. Apart from the
case of a decision ex aequo et bono reached with the assent of the Parties, “it is
not a matter of finding simply an equitable solution, but an equitable solution
derived from the applicable law” (Fisheries Jurisdiction, I.C.J. Reports 1974,
p. 33, para. 78). It is with a view to achieving a solution of this kind that the
Chamber has to take account, not of the agreement of 15 January 1965, but of
the circumstances in which that agreement was concluded.
***
111. Bahrain maintains that the British decision of 1939 must be considered
primarily as an arbitral award, which is res judicata. It claims that the Court
does not have jurisdiction to review the award of another tribunal, basing its
proposition on
“a virtual jurisprudence constante, not to review, invalidate or even confirm
awards taken by other international tribunals, unless there is specific, express,
additional consent to reopen the award.”
Thus Bahrain refers to the decision of 15 June 1939 by the Permanent Court
of International Justice in the case of the Société Commerciale de Belgique
(P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 78, p. 160); and to those rendered by the present Court on
116
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar
v. Bahrain), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 40 at pg. 76-77, and 83-85.
18 November 1960 in the case concerning the Arbitral Award made by the King
of Spain on 23 December 1906 (Honduras v. Nicaragua) (I.C.J. Reports 1960,
p. 192), as well as on 12 November 1991 in the case concerning the Arbitral
Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal), (I.C.J. Reports 1991, p. 53).
112. Qatar denies the relevance of the judgments cited by Bahrain. It con-
tends that
“[N]one of them are in the slightest degree relevant to the issue which the
Court has to determine in the present case, namely, whether the procedures
followed by the British Government in 1938 and 1939 amounted to a process
of arbitration which could result in an arbitral award binding upon the parties.”
Qatar also advances in support of its position the 19 October 1981 arbi-
tral award rendered by the Court of Arbitration in the Dubai/Sharjah Border
case; in that award, which in Qatar’s view was rendered under circumstances
comparable to those of the present case, the Court of Arbitration concluded
that boundary delimitation decisions taken by the British Government were
not arbitral awards but rather administrative decisions of a binding character
(International Law Reports, Vol. 91, p. 579; see also pp. 577, 583 and 585).
113. The Court will first consider the question whether the 1939 British
decision must be deemed to constitute an arbitral award. The Court observes in
this respect that the word arbitration, for purposes of public international law,
usually refers to “the settlement of differences between States by judges of their
own choice, and on the basis of respect for law.” This wording was adopted in
Article 15 of the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes, dated 29 July 1899. It was repeated in Article 37 of the Hague Con-
vention dated 18 October 1907, having the same object. It was adopted by the
Permanent Court of International Justice in its Advisory Opinion of 21 Novem-
ber 1925, interpreting Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne (P.C.I.J.,
Series B, No. 12, p. 26). It was reaffirmed in the work of the International Law
Commission, which reserved the case where the parties might have decided that
the requested decision should be taken exæquo et bono (Report by Mr. Georges
Scelle, Special Rapporteur of the Commission, Document A/CN.4/113, of 6 March
1958, Yearbook of the International Law Commission,1958, Vol. II, p. 2). Finally,
more recently, it was adopted by the Court of Arbitration called upon to settle
the border dispute between Dubai and Sharjah in a dispute bearing some simi-
larities to the present case (Dubai/Sharjah Border Arbitration, arbitral award of
19 October 1981, International Law Reports, Vol. 91, pp. 574 and 575).
114. The Court observes that in the present case no agreement existed
between the Parties to submit their case to an arbitral tribunal made up of
judges chosen by them, who would rule either on the basis of the law or ex
æquoet bono. The Parties had only agreed that the issue would be decided by
“His Majesty’s Government,” but left it to the latter to determine how that de-
cision would be arrived at, and by which officials. It follows that the decision
whereby, in 1939, the British Government held that the Hawar Islands belonged
to Bahrain, did not constitute an international arbitral award….
139. The Court will begin by recalling that the 1939 decision is not an
arbitral award (see paragraphs 113-114 above). This does not, however, mean
that it was devoid of all legal effect. Quite to the contrary, the pleadings, and in
particular the Exchange of Letters referred to above (see paragraphs 118 and
119 above), show that Bahrain and Qatar consented to the British Government
settling their dispute over the Hawar Islands. The 1939 decision must therefore
be regarded as a decision that was binding from the outset on both States and
continued to be binding on those same States after 1971, when they ceased to
be British protected States (see paragraph 65 above).
140. The validity of that decision was certainly not subject to the procedural
principles governing the validity of arbitral awards. However as the British Po-
litical Agent undertook on 20 May 1938, and as was repeated in the letter of
the Ruler of Qatar of 27 May 1938 (see paragraphs 119 and 120 above), this
decision was to be rendered “in the light of truth and justice.”
141. In this connection, the Court observes in the first place that the Ruler
of Qatar in that last letter entrusted the question of the Hawar Islands to the
British Government for decision, notwithstanding that seven days before the
British Political Agent had informed him that “by their formal occupation of the
Islands for some time past the Bahrain Government possess a prima facie claim
to them” and that it was therefore for the Ruler of Qatar to submit a “formal
claim ... supported by a full and complete statement of the evidence” on which
he relied (see paragraph 119 above). This procedure was followed and the
competent British officials found that “[t]he Shaikh of Qatar ha[d] produced no
evidence whatsoever” to counter the effectivités claimed by Bahrain, in particular
its occupation of the islands since 1937 (see paragraph 128 above). Under these
circumstances, while it is true that the competent British officials proceeded on
the premise that Bahrain possessed prima facie title to the islands and that the
burden of proving the opposite lay on the Ruler of Qatar, Qatar cannot maintain
that it was contrary to justice to proceed on the basis of this premise when Qatar
had been informed before agreeing to the procedure that this would occur and
had consented to the proceedings being conducted on that basis.
142. The proceedings leading to the 1939 British decision summarized above
(see paragraphs 118 to 133 above) further show that Qatar and Bahrain both had
the opportunity to present their arguments in relation to the Hawar Islands and
the evidence supporting them. Qatar presented its claim in its letters of 10 and
27 May 1938. Bahrain’s opposing claims were presented on 22 December 1938,
with an annex containing the declarations of several witnesses. Qatar commented
on this statement of Bahrain in its letter of 30 March 1939, to which testimonial
evidence to support its arguments was also annexed. Thus the two Rulers were
able to present their arguments and each of them was afforded an amount of
time which the Court considers was sufficient for this purpose; Qatar’s contention
that it was subjected to unequal treatment therefore cannot be upheld.
143. Finally, the Court notes that, while the reasoning supporting the 1939
decision was not communicated to the Rulers of Bahrain and Qatar, this lack
of reasons has no influence on the validity of the decision taken, because no
obligation to state reasons had been imposed on the British Government when
it was entrusted with the settlement of the matter.
144. Moreover, in the present case the reaction of the Ruler of Qatar was to
inform the British Political Resident that he was “deeply astonished” by the decision,
but he did not claim that it was invalid for lack of reasons. Qatar stated that it had
provided enough evidence to support its position, and limited itself to requesting
the British Government to re-examine its decision. Therefore, Qatar’s contention
that the 1939 British decision is invalid for lack of reasons cannot be upheld.
145. Finally, the fact that the Sheikh of Qatar had protested on several oc-
casions against the content of the British decision of 1939 after he had been
informed of it is not such as to render the decision inopposable to him, contrary
to what Qatar maintains.
146. The Court accordingly concludes that the decision taken by the British
Government on 11 July 1939 is binding on the Parties.
***
42. Guinea-Bissau argues, secondly, that any arbitral award must, in accor-
dance with general international law, be a reasoned one. Moreover, according to
Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Arbitration Agreement, the Parties had specifically
agreed that “the Award shall state in full the reasons on which it is based.” Yet,
117
Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1991, p. 53, p 69, and p. 72, majority opinion, and p. 92 Judge Lachs dissent.
according to Guinea-Bissau, the Tribunal in this case did not give any reasoning
in support of its refusal to reply to the second question put by the Parties or, at
the very least, gave “wholly insufficient” reasoning, which did not even make
it possible to “determine the line of argument followed” and did not “reply on
any point to the questions raised and discussed during the arbitral proceedings.”
On this ground also, it is claimed that the Award is null and void.
43. In paragraph 87 of the Award, referred to above, the Tribunal “bearing
in mind the ... conclusions” that it had reached, together with “the wording of
Article 2 of the Arbitration Agreement,” took the view that it was not called
upon to reply to the second question put to it. This reasoning is brief, and could
doubtless have been developed further. But the references in paragraph 87 to
the Tribunal’s conclusions and to the wording of Article 2 of the Arbitration
Agreement make it possible to determine, without difficulty, the reasons why
the Tribunal decided not to answer the second question. By referring to the
wording of Article 2 of the Arbitration Agreement, the Tribunal was taking note
that, according to that Article, it was asked, first, whether the 1960 Agreement
had “the force of law in the relations” between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, and
then, “in the event of a negative answer to the first question, what is the course
of the line delimiting the maritime territories” of the two countries. By referring
to the conclusions that it had already reached, the Tribunal was noting that it
had, in paragraphs 80 et seq. of the Award, found that the 1960 Agreement, in
respect of which it had already determined the scope of its substantive validity,
was “valid and can be opposed to Senegal and to Guinea-Bissau.” Having given
an affirmative answer to the first question, and basing itself on the actual text
of the Arbitration Agreement, the Tribunal found as a consequence that it did
not have to reply to the second question. That statement of reasoning, while
succinct, is clear and precise. The second contention of Guinea-Bissau must
also be dismissed….
47. By its argument set out above, Guinea-Bissau is in fact criticizing the in-
terpretation in the Award of the provisions of the Arbitration Agreement which
determine the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, and proposing another interpretation.
However, the Court does not have to enquire whether or not the Arbitration
Agreement could, with regard to the Tribunal’s competence, be interpreted in
a number of ways, and if so to consider which would have been preferable.
By proceeding in that way the Court would be treating the request as an ap-
peal and not as a recours en nullité. The Court could not act in that way in
the present case. It has simply to ascertain whether by rendering the disputed
Award the Tribunal acted in manifest breach of the competence conferred on
it by the Arbitration Agreement, either by deciding in excess of, or by failing
to exercise, its jurisdiction.
Obligations of Negotiation
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons in Armed
Conflict, I.C.J. Advisory Opinion, 1996118
***
98. Given the eminently difficult issues that arise in applying the law on
the use of force and above al1 the law applicable in armed conflict to nuclear
weapons, the Court considers that it now needs to examine one further aspect
of the question before it, seen in a broader context. In the long run, international
law, and with it the stability of the international order which it is intended to
govern, are bound to suffer from the continuing difference of views with regard
to the legal status of weapons as deadly as nuclear weapons. It is consequently
important to put an end to this state of affairs: the long-promised complete
nuclear disarmament appears to be the most appropriate means of achieving
that result.
99. In these circumstances, the Court appreciates the full importance of
the recognition by Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons of an obligation to negotiate in good faith a nuclear disarmament. This
provision is worded as follows: “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes
to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessa-
tion of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and
on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control.”
The legal import of that obligation goes beyond that of a mere obligation
of conduct ; the obligation involved here is an obligation to achieve a precise
result- nuclear disarmament in al1 its aspects - by adopting a particular course
of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good faith.
100. This twofold obligation to pursue and to conclude negotiations for-
mally concerns the 182 States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, or, in other words, the vast majority of the international
community. Virtually the whole of this community appears moreover to have
been involved when resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly con-
cerning nuclear disarmament have repeatedly been unanimously adopted.
Indeed, any realistic search for general and complete disarmament, especially
nuclear disarmament, necessitates the CO-operation of al1 States.
118
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opin-
ion, I. C. J. Reports 1996, at pp. 363-65, paragraphs 98-103.
101. Even the very first General Assembly resolution, unanimously adopted
on 24 January 1946 at the London session, set up a commission whose terms
of reference included making specific proposals for, among other things, “the
elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of al1 other
major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.” In a large number of subse-
quent resolutions, the General Assembly has reaffirmed the need for nuclear
disarmament. Thus, in resolution 808 A (IX) of 4 November 1954, which was
likewise unanimously adopted, it concluded “that a further effort should be
made to reach agreement on comprehensive and CO-ordinated proposals to
be embodied in a draft international disarmament convention providing for: . . .
(b) The total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons
and weapons of mass destruction of every type, together with the conversion
of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes.”
The same conviction has been expressed outside the United Nations con-
text in various instruments.
102. The obligation expressed in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons includes its fulfilment in accordance with
the basic principle of good faith. This basic principle is set forth in Article 2,
paragraph 2, of the Charter. It was reflected in the Declaration on Friendly
Relations between States (resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970) and in
the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference of 1 August 1975. It is also embodied
in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969,
according to which “[elvery treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and
must be performed by them in good faith.”
Nor has the Court omitted to draw attention to it, as follows:
“One of the basic principles governing the creation and perform of legal
obligations, whatever their source, is the principle of good faith. Trust and con-
fidence are inherent in international CO-operation, in particular in an age when
this CO-operation in many fields is becoming increasingly essential.” (Nuclear
Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I. C.J. Reports 1974, p. 268, para. 46.)
103. In its resolution 984 (1995) dated 11 April 1995, the Security Coun-
cil took care to reaffirm “the need for al1 States Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to comply fully with al1 their obliga-
tions” and urged “al1 States, as provided for in Article VI of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to pursue negotiations in good faith on
effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general
and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control
which remains a universal goal.”
119
See, Court of Justice of the European Union, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/
Jo2_6999.
120
See, EUROPA, European Commission website: http://europa.eu/geninfo/legal_no-
tices_en.htm.
121
Costa v Enel, European Court of Justice, 20 February 1964, Judgment, Issues of fact
and of law.
PA R T I I
CHAPTER 1
USE OF FORCE
122
Sir. Franklin Berman, The Singapore Yearbook of International Law, 2004. 10 SYBIL
9–17 (2006). [Reprinted with the permission of the author and the Singapore Year
Book of International Law].
123
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Ter-
ritory, (Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004), [2004] I.C.J. Rep. 136 at para. 103.
This dictum seemed on the face of it to limit the legal recognition of the
right of self-defence to certain kinds of security threat only—a view that looks
no less strange now than it did then. And in its most recent judgment, on
certain aspects of that especially tragic conflict in the Congo124, it is more by
its silences than by clear words that the International Court corrects the un-
fortunate aspects of its earlier decision in the Nicaragua case125. It ought now
to be regarded as not open to doubt—for reasons both of legal principle and
practical effectiveness—that the right of self-defence includes a right to respond
in all cases of the unlawful threat or use of force, without abstract distinctions
as to the source of the threat (or attack)126. This is of course without prejudice
to the question what form of response would be permissible in the particular
circumstances of individual cases.
Perhaps this is therefore a good moment to stand back and reconsider what
it is we want the legal controls on the use of force to do, as part of an interna-
tional system equipped to deal with present-day problems under present-day
conditions. That is certainly the approach taken by the UN Secretary-General’s
High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change127, and by the Secretary-
General himself in his report “In Larger Freedom”128. What they say deserves
great respect, and I will touch on it later.
III. National Interests and Common Interests
To my mind, the correct way to look at the problem is to map out the entire
area against an analytical distinction of a fundamental kind: the distinction
between the use of force in the protection of purely national interests, and
the use of force in the common interest. The idea is not a new one. It reflects
what is already in the UN Charter: in the Preamble to the Charter, it is stated
that one of the fundamental aims behind the founding of the Organization was
124
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda) (2002-2005), online: http://www.I.C.J.-cij.
org/I.C.J.www/idocket/ico/icoframe.htm.
125
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US), Merits,
1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 [other citations omitted].
126
See, in general, Chatham House, Principles of International Law on the Use of Force
by States in Self-Defence, ILP WP 05/01 (2005), online: Chatham House http://www.
chathamhouse.org.uk/pdf/research/il/ILPForce.doc.
127
Report of the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, UN Doc. No. A/59/565 (2
December 2004), online: http://www.un.org/secureworld/.
128
Report of the Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security
and Human Rights for All, UN Doc. No. A/59/2005 (21 March 2005), online: http://
www.un.org/largerfreedom.
“to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that
armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest,” and in its coupling
with the later reservation in Article 51 that nothing in the Charter “shall impair
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence.”
What matters however is not whether the point is new, but the enduring
framework it offers for analysing the question before us, a framework consist-
ing of: a set of principles to be accepted and of methods to be used, to ensure
that force is either used in legitimate self-defence, or in the common interest,
and not for any other purpose.
Why do I lay such stress on this basic proposition? Because the difference
between using force in self-interest, and using force in the common interest is
a fundamental one, from the conceptual point of view: it conditions the objec-
tives for which force may legitimately be used, and the methods to be followed;
and it controls, in an important way, what force may be used….
IV. Self-Defence
Distortions aside, the law of self-defence is by now well understood. It
is controlled by the twin parameters of necessity and proportionality, which
between them contain the capacity to adapt themselves to regulate both the
circumstances in which and the degree to which force can legitimately be
used129. All that is needed, in addition, is to recognise that what necessity and
proportionality measure themselves against is the threat faced by the defend-
ing State. Self-defence is designed to be the last-resort response available to a
State to dispose of a threat against itself, and it arises inherently out of the legal
nature of the State as the basic unit of international law. So self-defence is not,
and never has been, a legal justification for punishment, or for retaliation, or
for menacing deterrence; its deterrent effect lies rather in the political realm,
in the combination of the practical and rhetorical willingness to stand up for
one’s rights, within the limits allowed by law130.
And by the same token what the law allows by way of self-defence is what is
necessary and sufficient to put paid to the unlawful threat. Some have stumbled
over what they see as the paradox in the claim that self-defence following an
actual use of force may justify more force than in the original attack. But there
is no paradox, once the purpose of having a law of self-defence is taken into
129
Deriving from the Webster/Ashburton correspondence over the Caroline Incident
in 1841[other citations omitted].
130
The long-established posture of NATO; see the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion,
infra note 9 at para. 48, for the International Court’s recognition that “deterrence”
is not of itself unlawful.
account. The calculus, of course, works both ways: self-defence may in some
cases find its limits in a response less severe than the original attack.
Nothing in what I have said so far should contain the least cause for surprise.
It is inherent in what lawyers are prone to use as their tablet of stone, Article
2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which proscribes the “threat” of force on
exactly the same footing as the “use” of force. And as the International Court
wisely pointed out in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, if an actual use of force would be illegal, then the threat to use
it would be equally illegal131. To which I would add “and vice versa,” from which
it simply has to follow, in my view, that the law of self-defence allows a forcible
response to an unlawful threat—so long as the response meets the requirements
both of necessity and proportionality. If the International Court said anything
different in its Judgment in the US/Nicaragua case, then it was wrong….
V. Use of Force in the Common Interest
Which brings me to the second part: the use of force in the common inter-
est. I have put the matter in those terms, rather than using the labels “humani-
tarian intervention,” “war against terrorism,” or “weapons of mass destruction,”
in order to bring out the common thread between those three very different
cases, namely that what is being thought to be achieved by the employment
of force is the vindication of a common international interest.
The threat, in other words, is not to the particular interests of a given State
or group of States, but to the well-being of international society at large. Note
that the conditioning factor is once again a “threat.” Nor should that surprise us
if we return to the United Nations Charter and remind ourselves that the first,
and also the most wide-ranging, of the trilogy of malfunctions with which the
Security Council is empowered to deal is “threats to the peace.” While “breaches
of the peace” and “acts of aggression” are relatively confined in their opera-
tion, it is in ‘threats to the peace’ that the greatest inbuilt flexibility resides, and
especially so when the issue is prevention not cure.
The important point is, however, that all of these threats imperil common
interests, not those of individual States as such. As the Secretary-General again
pointedly puts it: “As to genocide, ethnic cleansing and other such crimes against
humanity are they not also threats to international peace and security, against
which humanity should be able to look to the Security Council for protection?”
Yes indeed, is my answer—with the sole exception that the Secretary-General uses
‘threats to international peace and security’ where I have used “common interests.”
131
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996),
[1996] I.C.J. Rep. 226 at para. 47.
***
37. The Court will now address the question of the legality or illegality of
recourse to nuclear weapons in the light of the provisions of the Charter relat-
ing to the threat or use of force.
38. The Charter contains several provisions relating to the threat and use
of force. In Article 2, paragraph 4, the threat or use of force against the ter-
ritorial integrity or political independence of another State or in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations is prohibited.
That paragraph provides:
“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”
This prohibition of the use of force is to be considered in the light of other
relevant provisions of the Charter. In Article 51, the Charter recognizes the in-
herent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs.
A further lawful use of force is envisaged in Article 42, whereby the Security
Council may take military enforcement measures in conformity with Chapter
VII of the Charter.
39. These provisions do not refer to specific weapons. They apply to any
use of force, regardless of the weapons employed. The Charter neither expressly
prohibits, nor permits, the use of any specific weapon, including nuclear weap-
ons. A weapon that is already unlawful per se, whether by treaty or custom,
does not become lawful by reason of its being used for a legitimate purpose
under the Charter….
46. Certain States asserted that the use of nuclear weapons in the conduct
of reprisals would be lawful. The Court does not have to examine, in this con-
text, the question of armed reprisals in time of peace, which are considered
to be unlawful. Nor does it have to pronounce on the question of belligerent
reprisals save to observe that in any case any right of recourse to such reprisals
would, like self-defense, be governed inter alia he principle of proportionality.
132
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports
1996, p. 226.
47. In order to lessen or eliminate the risk of unlawful attack, States some-
times signal that they possess certain weapons to use in self-defense against
any State violating their territorial integrity or political independence. Whether
a signalled intention to use force if certain events occur is or is not a “threat”
within Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter depends upon various factors. If
the envisaged use of force is itself unlawful, the stated readiness to use it would
be a threat prohibited under Article 2, paragraph 4. Thus it would be illegal for
a State to threaten force to secure territory from another State, or to cause it to
follow or not follow certain political or economic paths. The notions of “threat”
and “use” of force under Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter stand together
in the sense that if the use of force itself in a given case is illegal - for whatever
reason - the threat to use such force will likewise be illegal. In short, if it is to
be lawful, the declared readiness of a State to use force must be a use of force
that is in conformity with the Charter. For the rest, no State - whether or not
it defended the policy of deterrence - suggested to the Court that it would be
lawful to threaten to use force if the use of force contemplated would be illegal.
48. Some States put forward the argument that possession of nuclear weap-
ons is itself an unlawful threat to use force. Possession of nuclear weapons may
indeed justify an inference of preparedness to use them. In order to be effective,
the policy of deterrence, by which those States possessing or under the umbrella
of nuclear weapons seek to discourage military aggression by demonstrating that
it will serve no purpose, necessitates that the intention to use nuclear weapons
be credible. Whether this is a “threat” contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, depends
upon whether the particular use of force envisaged would be directed against
the territorial integrity or political independence of a State, or against the Pur-
poses of the United Nations or whether, in the event that it were intended as
a means of defense, it would necessarily violate the principles of necessity and
proportionality. In any of these circumstances the use of force, and the threat to
use it, would be unlawful under the law of the Charter.
curity Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility
of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such ac-
tion as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace
and security.
***
190. A further confirmation of the validity as customary international law
of the principle of the prohibition of the use of force expressed in Article 2,
paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations may be found in the fact
that it is frequently referred to in statements by State representatives as being
not only a principle of customary international law but also a fundamental or
cardinal principle of such law. The International Law Commission, in the course
of its work on the codification of the law of treaties, expressed the view that
‘the law of the Charter concerning the prohibition of the use of force in itself
constitutes a conspicuous example of a rule in international law having the
character of jus cogens’ (paragraph (1) of the commentary of the Commission
to Article 50 of its draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, ILC Yearbook, 1966-II,
p. 247). Nicaragua in its Memorial on the Merits submitted in the present case
states that the principle prohibiting the use of force embodied in Article 2,
paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations ‘has come to be recognized
as jus cogens’. The United States, in its Counter-Memorial on the questions of
jurisdiction and admissibility, found it material to quote the views of scholars
that this principle is a ‘universal norm’, a ‘universal international law’, a ‘univer-
sally recognized principle of international law’, and a ‘principle of jus cogens’….
195. In the case of individual self-defence, the exercise of this right is subject
to the State concerned having been the victim of an armed attack. Reliance
on collective self-defence of course does not remove the need for this. There
appears now to be general agreement on the nature of the acts which can be
treated as constituting armed attacks. In particular, it may be considered to be
agreed that an armed attack must be understood as including not merely action
by regular armed forces across an international border, but also ‘the sending
by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries,
which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to
amount to’ (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, ‘or
133
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States of America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14.
least 1980’. In that Declaration, El Salvador affirmed that initially it had ‘not
wanted to present any accusation or allegation [against Nicaragua] to any of
the jurisdictions to which we have a right to apply’, since it sought ‘a solution
of understanding and mutual respect’ (para. III).
234. As to Honduras and Costa Rica, they also were prompted by the insti-
tution of proceedings in this case to address communications to the Court; in
neither of these is there mention of armed attack or collective self-defence. As
has already been noted (paragraph 231 above), Honduras in the Security Coun-
cil in 1984 asserted that Nicaragua had engaged in aggression against it, but did
not mention that a request had consequently been made to the United States
for assistance by way of collective self-defence. On the contrary, the representa-
tive of Honduras emphasized that the matter before the Security Council ‘is a
Central American problem, without exception, and it must be solved region-
ally’ (S/PV.2529, p. 38), i.e., through the Contadora process. The representative
of Costa Rica also made no reference to collective self-defence. Nor, it may be
noted, did the representative of the United States assert during that debate that
it had acted in response to requests for assistance in that context.
235. There is also an aspect of the conduct of the United States which the
Court is entitled to take into account as indicative of the view of that State on the
question of the existence of an armed attack. At no time, up to the present, has
the United States Government addressed to the Security Council, in connection
with the matters the subject of the present case, the report which is required by
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter in respect of measures which a State
believes itself bound to take when it exercises the right of individual or collective
self-defence. The Court, whose decision has to be made on the basis of custom-
ary international law, has already observed that in the context of that law, the
reporting obligation enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations
does not exist. It does not therefore treat the absence of a report on the part of
the United States as the breach of an undertaking forming part of the customary
international law applicable to the present dispute. But the Court is justified in
observing that this conduct of the United States hardly conforms with the latter’s
avowed conviction that it was acting in the context of collective self-defence
as consecrated by Article 51 of the Charter. This fact is all the more noteworthy
because, in the Security Council, the United States has it-self taken the view that
failure to observe the requirement to make a report contradicted a State’s claim
to be acting on the basis of collective self-defence (S/PV.2187).
236. Similarly, while no strict legal conclusion may be drawn from the date
of El Salvador’s announcement that it was the victim of an armed attack, and
the date of its official request addressed to the United States concerning the
***
40. The entitlement to resort to self-defense under Article 51 is subject to
certain constraints. Some of these constraints are inherent in the very concept
of self-defense. Other requirements are specified in Article 51.
41. The submission of the exercise of the right of self-defense to the condi-
tions of necessity and proportionality is a rule of customary international law.
As the Court stated in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America): there is a
“specific rule whereby self-defense would warrant only measures which are
proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a rule well
established in customary international law” (I.C.J. Reports 1986, p.94, para. 176).
This dual condition applies equally to Article 51 of the Charter, whatever the
means of force employed.
42. The proportionality principle may thus not in itself exclude the use of
nuclear weapons in self-defense in all circumstances. But at the same time, a
134
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports
1996, p. 226.
use of force that is proportionate under the law of self-defense, must, in order
to be lawful, also meet the requirements of the law applicable in armed con-
flict which comprise in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.
43. Certain States have in their written and oral pleadings suggested that in
the case of nuclear weapons, the condition of proportionality must be evaluated
in the light of still further factors. They contend that the very nature of nuclear
weapons, and the high probability of an escalation of nuclear exchanges, mean
that there is an extremely strong risk of devastation. The risk factor is said
to negate the possibility of the condition of proportionality being complied
with. The Court does not find it necessary to embark upon the quantification
of such risks; nor does it need to Enquirer into the question whether tactical
nuclear weapons exist which are sufficiently precise to limit those risks: it suf-
fices for the Court to note that the very nature of all nuclear weapons and the
profound risks associated therewith are further considerations to be borne in
mind by States believing they can exercise a nuclear response in self-defense
in accordance with the requirements of proportionality.
44. Beyond the conditions of necessity and proportionality, Article 51 spe-
cifically requires that measures taken by States in the exercise of the right of
self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council; this article
further provides that these measures shall not in any way affect the authority
and responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter to take at any time
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international
peace and security. These requirements of article 51 apply whatever the means
of force used in self-defense….
96. Furthermore, the Court cannot lose sight of the fundamental right of
every State to survival, and thus its right to resort to self-defence, in accordance
with Article 51 of the Charter, when its survival is at stake.
Nor can it ignore the practice referred to as “policy of deterrence,” to which
an appreciable section of the international community adhered for many years.
The Court also notes the reservations which certain nuclear-weapon States have
appended to the undertakings they have given, notably under the Protocols
to the Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga, and also under the declarations
made by them in connection with the extension of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, not to resort to such weapons.
97. Accordingly, in view of the present state of international law viewed
as a whole, as examined above by the Court, and of the elements of fact at its
disposal, the Court is led to observe that it cannot reach a definitive conclusion
as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a State in an ex-
treme circumstance of self-defense, in which its very survival would be at stake.
135
Ruth Wedgwood, “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and the Use of Force,”
5 Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 69 (2001).
136
When military force is not used in an intelligent and morally responsible way, it
on the ground in Bosnia with the very limited mandate of delivering food and
humanitarian assistance….
The real peacekeeping lesson of the last ten years is that the idea of separat-
ing chapter 61/2 from chapter 7 is not realistic. Peacekeeping is not segregable
from robust peace enforcement. Too many situations quickly turn sour, and
one cannot always predict the course of events in advance. One almost needs
a “Powell-Weinberger” doctrine for the U.N. itself – a willingness to go in with
overwhelming force, in the confidence that the capacity to respond is the best
guarantee of cooperation. It is an illusion that the international personality of
the U.N. will suffice to deter combatants in civil conflicts, and the illusion has
repeatedly led to disaster.
sometimes leads the international community to use other forms of coercion, such
as economic sanctions, which can be much harder on a civilian population, as we
have seen in Haiti and Iraq. Attitudes towards the discrete use of military force must
take account of the often greater cost of alternatives.
137
E-journal of Ministry of Justice, Turkey. http://www.justice.gov.tr/e-journal/pdf/
LW7042.pdf [reprinted with permission of the author].
138
Amy E. Eckert, Comment, “United Nations Peacekeeping in Collapsed States,” 5 J.
Int’l L. & Prac. 273, 282- 84 (1996).
139
Katherine E. Cox, “Beyond Self-Defense: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
and the Use of Force,”(1999) 27 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 239.
140
Viseman, H. “Peacekeeping in the International Context” in Rikhye, I.J., and Skjels-
baek, K. (ed.) “The United Nations and Peacekeeping: Results, Limits and Prospects,”
( International Peace Academy, New York, 1990) p.32.
141
Murphy, R., “United Nations Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia, and the Use of
Force” 8 J. Conflict & Security L. 71 (2003).
142
Sloan, J., “The Use of Offensive Force in U.N. Peacekeeping: A Cycle of Boom and
Bust?” Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 385 (2007).
143
Ibid.
144
Miskolc Journal of International Law. http://www.uni-miskolc.hu/~wwwdrint/mjil.
htm. Reprinted with permission of the author. [Citations omitted]
vessel was abandoned by all hands, the only efforts of its crew being to flee.
Thus captured, the vessel was left to the possession of the British forces that
cut her loose, towed her into the current of the river, set her on fire and let
her descend the current towards the Niagara Falls, where she was destroyed.
Twelve persons were initially said to have been killed or disappeared.
As was established after investigations, it is a force of 45 men in 5 boats
under the command of Commander Andrew Drew (Royal Navy), acting upon
orders of Colonel McNab, that boarded, set fire to and let the ship descend
adrift. The place where the Caroline was moored was at Schlosser, a small
landing point in the State of New York less than 5 kilometres upstream from
the Niagara Falls, rather than Fort Schlosser, an old and abandoned American
fort of the War of 1812 between the United States and Great Britain which
was higher upstream from the falls.
Contrary to the opinions expressed at first, it is not 12 persons that died
during that night, but two: Amos Durfee, killed on the docks by a bullet in the
head, and a cabin boy known as “Little Billy,” shot while trying to escape the
Caroline. Two prisoners were made: an American citizen of 19 years old and
a Canadian fugitive. Both were let go: the American with enough money to
pay for the ferry back to the United States and the Canadian after spending
some time in the guard room at Chippewa.
On January 5, 1838, President Van Buren sent a message to Congress to
ask for full power to prevent injuries being inflicted upon neighbouring na-
tions by unlawful acts of American citizens or persons within the territories
of the United States and General Scott was sent to the frontier with letters
to the Governors of New York and Vermont, calling the militias. The rebels
were dispersed, but some continued the struggle within secret societies called
Hunters’ Lodges. This led to another short-lived rebellion in Canada in 1838,
but it was harshly and swiftly dealt with. In Canada, the impact of these rebel-
lions was the Act of the Union of both Canadas into a single province of the
Dominion, attempting to assimilate French-Canadian to diminish the likeli-
hood of another attempt. The impact on the relations of the United States
and the British Crown was one where a true settlement of the North-eastern
boundary had to be reached if war was to be averted. While the facts of the
incident could be made light of were it not for the death of two persons, they
are nonetheless of much importance as the whole doctrine of anticipatory
self-defence rest upon them.
The legal argument concerning the case started with the note sent on
January 5, 1838 by the American Secretary of State Forsyth to the British
Minister at Washington, Fox, expressing surprise and regret for this incident
and warning that this incident would be made the subject of a demand for
redress. Mr. Fox replied by letter on February 6, 1838 and stated three de-
fences for the actions of the British forces, namely: 1) the piratical nature of
the vessel, 2) the fact that the ordinary laws of the United States were not
being enforced at the time, and were in fact overtly overborne by the rebels
and 3) self-defence and self-preservation. This curt response to the American
government marked an attitude of not taking the matter too seriously by the
British Authorities. This exchange prompted the report of the Law Officers,
but did not move the British Authorities to recognise any wrong-doing. This
being judged unsatisfactory by the American government, the matter was
brought up by the American ambassador in London, Stevenson, to the British
Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, who promised to look into the matter.
The matter was indeed looked upon once more by the Law Officers. But their
conclusion of March 25, 1838 and added to their report of February 21, 1838,
was while the incident was regrettable, they felt that the actions of the British
Authorities were absolutely necessary for the future and not retaliation for
the past. As a result, they believed that the conduct of the British force had
been, under the circumstances, justifiable by the Law of Nations. Arguments
and reminders were made back and forth during the ensuing period, but
none led to a satisfactory settlement of the question.
Meanwhile, the relations between the two nations remained difficult. The
local population at Buffalo seemed inclined toward retaliation and conflict
was quite possible. Also, British nationals in the United States suspected of
having taken part in the events of the Caroline were made to stand Juridical
Examination on charges of participating in the attack. A man named Christie
was arrested those charges on August 23, 1838. The Queen’s Advocate, seized
of the case, counseled the British Minister in Washington, Fox, in a dispatch
dated November 6, 1838, that such an arrest cannot hold due to the fact that
the actions that Mr. Christie is accused of are acts of public persons obeying
the orders of superior authorities. Therefore, Mr. Christie could not be held
accountable for these acts even if he had taken part in them.
Following this, a Canadian deputy sheriff named Alexander McLeod
boasted of his part in the events of the Caroline during a passage through
Lewiston, New York, on November 12, 1840. Acting on his ill-advised words,
the American authorities arrested him immediately on charges of the murder
of Amos Durfee and arson in connection of the burning of the Caroline.
On December 13, 1840, Fox addressed a note to Forsyth taking again the
principles laid in the Christie case and by which public persons could not be
held accountable for acts of governments. Forsyth replied that the arrest of
McLeod was made by the authorities of the State of New York and therefore
infringement by the Federal government in the state’s sphere of jurisdiction
would not be appropriate. It is important to recall that President Van Buren
was a former governor of the State of New York and was vying for re-election
at the time of the exchange between Fox and Forsyth. The argument about
States’ jurisdiction and Federal competences was one of the most sensitive
political issues in the American Union at that precise moment. Martin Van
Buren lost the elections and the new government of William Henry Harrison
took a more pragmatic approach to the problem of relations with Great
Britain from its inaugural ceremony on March 4, 1841. Apt Minister, Fox felt
the change of Administration opportune to demand the release of Alexander
McLeod and sent a demand on March 12, 1841 to the new Secretary of State,
Daniel Webster, who took a more lenient view than his predecessor on the
matter. Indeed, the Harrison administration was of the opinion that while
the Constitution of the United States created very clear fields of jurisdiction,
the Federal Government was the one concerned with foreign relations and
as a result it is most apt to intervene with the State of New York and obtain
the release of a foreign national. Webster replied on March 15, 1841 that the
American government is guided by the opinion that an individual who acts as
part of a public force cannot answer personally for those acts. This principle
applied to criminal lawsuits as well as civil ones.
Nonetheless, a last hurdle had to be crossed before McLeod could be
released: that of judicial process. Since McLeod was accused and confined by
reason of judicial process, he could only be released in this manner, this mean-
ing that he had to be brought to courts so the prosecutor could enter a plea of
nolle prosequi – no prosecution. Webster addressed a letter to Fox on April 24,
1841 explaining that while the laws of Great Britain permitted the prosecu-
tor to enter this measure of nolle prosequi at any time during procedure, the
laws of the State of New York only permitted this during sessions of the court.
This displeased Fox immensely as he pointed out that the whole point
was not that McLeod be found not guilty but that he be not judged at all. Still,
the Supreme Court of New York refused leave to enter a nolle prosequi and
also refused a writ of habeas corpus. The only manner in which the court
could see this done was by trial by jury. The trial of The People v. McLeod
took place and no evidence of McLeod’s participation could be brought to
court. He was acquitted in October 1841.
This long delay of releasing McLeod and the still precarious relations
between the North American neighbours led Great Britain to send a Special
Minister to Washington to negotiate both issues in the person of Alexander
Baring, 1st Baron of Ashburton. During the course of their negotiations, both
he and Secretary of State Webster exchanged a number of letters that formed
the root of anticipatory self-defence.
The first such recorded instance is in the letter of July 27, 1842 where
Webster expresses the notion that the principle of non-intervention is of a
salutary nature and that simple neutrality is not sufficient for the government
of the United States, and that it has therefore actively sought to prevent injury
to Great Britain in its North American Provinces. Webster position therefore
was that since the United States had respected its obligation under the Law
of Nations, it was for Great Britain to justify its actions by demonstrating a:
“necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving
no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. It will
be for it to show, also, that the local authorities of Canada,-
even supposing the necessity of the moment authorized them
to enter the territories of the United States at all,-did nothing
unreasonable or excessive; since the act justified by the necessity
of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly
within it. It must be strewn that admonition or remonstrance
to the persons on board the “Caroline” was impracticable, or
would have been unavailing; it must be strewn that daylight
could not be waited for; that there could be no attempt at
discrimination, between the innocent and the guilty; that it
would not have been enough to seize and detain the vessel; but
that there was a necessity, present and inevitable, for attacking
her, in the darkness of the night, while moored to the shore,
and while unarmed men were asleep on board, killing some,
and wounding others, and then drawing her into the current,
above the cataract, setting her on fire, and, careless to know
whether there might not be in her the innocent with the guilty,
or the living with the dead, committing her to a fate, which fills
the imagination with horror.”
It was clearly the belief of Webster that Ashburton could not demonstrate
this and that the terms were too strict to be interpreted in such a way as to
justify the British actions, therefore preparing the way for reparations to be
given to the United States. In this, he was sorely disappointed with the inge-
nious response of Lord Ashburton in his letter of July 28, 1842. Ashburton
assented to the conditions presented by Webster as general principles of
international law applicable to the case. He fully recognised the inviolability
of the territories of independent nations for the maintenance of peace and
order amongst nations. However, he adds that there are occasional practices,
including that of the United States, where this principle may and must be
suspended.
Ashburton sets such instances as those where, for the shortest possible
time and due to an overruling necessity and within the narrow confines of
such a necessity, self-defence may be invoked. He firstly states that self-defence
is the first law of nature and is recognised by every code that regulates the
condition and the relations of man. Doing so, he recognises fully the gen-
eral principles laid down by Webster and set his argument upon them but
establishes a difference between expeditions across national border and the
case of the Caroline. He presents the example of a situation where a man
standing on grounds where you have no legal rights to chase him presents
himself with a weapon long enough to reach you. He then asks how long
one is supposed to wait when he has asked for succour and asked for relief
and none are forwarding. By doing so, he recognised the efforts made by the
United States to prevent American taking part in the Canadian rebellion, by
underlines the inefficiency of its attempts.
Furthermore, Ashburton includes in his version of the events that the
initial efforts to capture the Caroline was to seize her in British waters at
Navy Island, and not on the American side but that since the orders of the
rebel leaders were disobeyed, the Caroline went, docked and was moored at
Schlosser point. It is only as he passed the point of Navy Island that Com-
mander Drew did not see the ship there but on the American shore and
that pursuant with his mission forged ahead. This statement addressed the
question by which not a moment was left to deliberation, that the expedi-
tion was not planned with the intent of invading American territory from
the outset by those circumstances and that the necessity of preventing the
rebels from further use of the ship as a mean of invasion overwhelmed the
normal respect of national territory.
Having recognised the general principles and explained the particulars of
the overwhelming immediacy of the decision, Ashburton then turns toward
the notion of necessity to answer the claims of Webster that nothing could
justify the attack in the middle of the night against men asleep, killing and
wounding some, then drawing the ship into the current, setting her on fire
and letting her adrift into the current to be destroyed in the falls without
knowing if guilty or innocents were on board.
Ashburton responded that the time of the night was purposely selected
to ensure that the mission would result in the least loss of life possible and
that it is the strength of the current that did not permit the vessel to be car-
ried off to the Canadian side. For this reason, it became necessary to set her
on fire and drawn into the stream to prevent injury to persons or property
at Schlosser. He finishes the letter by recognizing that Her Majesty’s Govern-
ment should have apologized nonetheless for the matter, but that it does
not make it wrongful in itself. And further continues to support that the
treatment of individuals made personally responsible for acts of government
was as unacceptable.
Webster responded to this note on August 6, 1842. In his letter, he further
reaffirms the criterion laid in his letter of July 27 and while agreeing with
the matters of apologies still recognised the general principles debated but
still did not corroborate the facts of the case. Nonetheless, satisfied with the
apologies, the President stipulated through Webster that this matter would
not be brought forward again.
As a result the affair of the Caroline in 1837 and the subsequent case of
The People vs. McLeod have established principles now firmly entrenched
in ius ad bellum and ius in bello. In the case of the laws of armed conflicts,
McLeod’s case has confirmed the separation between public acts and indi-
vidual responsibility. With regards to the right to use force in international
law, the affair of the Caroline case has once again confirmed the right of
self-defence and, more importantly, has established clear criterion for its
invocation and that of anticipatory self-defence.
145
Rabinder Singh QC and Alison Macdonald, Matrix Chambers, Gray’s Inn London.
WC1R 5LN. 10 September, 2002. [Reprinted with permission of the author].
strongly on the fact that Iraq has breached resolutions of the UN Security
Council, which he appears to consider justifies military action.
5. The factual background to these decisions is unclear to the public. Such
information as the United Kingdom has about Iraq’s military capabilities and
Saddam Hussein’s intentions is not available to the public….
The Use of Force in International Law
6. The United Nations Charter provides the framework for the use of force
in international law. Almost all States are parties to this Charter, including
Iraq, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Charter emphasises
that peace is the fundamental aim of the Charter, and is to be preserved if
at all possible. The preamble expresses a determination ‘to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war’, ‘to practise tolerance and live together
in peace with one another as good neighbours’, ‘to unite our strength to
maintain international peace and security’, and to ensure ‘that armed force
shall not be used, save in the common interest.’
7. Article 1 of the Charter sets out the United Nations’ purposes, the first
of which is: ‘To maintain international peace and security; and to that end: to
take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats
to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches
of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with
the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.’
8. The other provisions of the Charter must be interpreted in accordance
with this aim: see the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article
31, which provides that a (Johannesburg, that they consider that the return
of weapons inspectors to Iraq is ‘still possible’.) treaty must be interpreted in
accordance with its objects and purposes, including its preamble.
9. The Charter goes on to set out two fundamental principles:
‘2(3) All Members shall settle their international disputes by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace
and security, and justice, are not endangered.
2(4) All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state, or any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United nations.’
10. Article 2(4) has been described by the International Court of Justice
(I.C.J.) as a peremptory norm of international law, from which States cannot
derogate (Nicaragua v United States, [1986] I.C.J. Reports 14, at para 190). The
effect of Articles 2(3) and 2(4) is that the use of force can only be justified
as expressly provided under the Charter, and only in situations where it is
consistent with the UN’s purposes.
11. The Charter authorises the use of force in the situations set out in
Chapter VII. Article 42 states that, if peaceful means have not succeeded in
obtaining adherence to Security Council decisions, it ‘may take such action
by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore inter-
national peace and security.’ In effect, this means that States require a UN
Security Council resolution in order to use force against another State (subject
to Article 51: see below). Force is only justified where there are no peaceful
means available for resolving the dispute. We stress that, in our view, where
Members believe that another State has breached a resolution of the Security
Council, they do not have a unilateral right under Article 42 to use force to
secure adherence to it or to punish that State: what action should be taken
is a matter for the Security Council.
12. Article 51 of the Charter reserves States’ rights to self-defence. This
right is additional to the provisions of Article 42. A State does not require a
Security Council resolution in order to defend itself by force but even the
right of self-defence is subject to action by the Security Council, as is clear
from the terms of Article 51: ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack
occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall
be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way
affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the pres-
ent Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.’
13. As exceptions to the fundamental principle of the prohibition on the
use of force, Articles 42 and 51 must be interpreted narrowly.
14. According to the UN Charter, there are only two situations in which
one State can lawfully use force against another:
(1) In individual or collective self-defence (a right under
customary international law, which is expressly preserved
by Article 51 of the Charter).
(2) Pursuant to a UN Security Council resolution.
15. In this Opinion, we do not review any of the arguments about the
legality of the use of force by the United States. We consider only the argu-
ments directly relating to the United Kingdom.
16. We take it to be uncontroversial that the United Kingdom has not been
the subject of any direct attack which could even arguably be linked with
Iraq. It is clear that the right of self-defence in response to an armed attack
does not arise. The only possible justification is as an anticipatory form of
self-defence against a future threat. We turn to consider whether such a right
is known to international law. Is there a right of anticipatory self-defence in
international law?
17. Article 51 of the Charter is silent about whether ‘self-defence’ includes
the pre-emptive use of force, in addition to the use of force in response to
an attack. In order to answer the question, other conventional sources of
international law must be used, including state practice and the works of
learned writers on international law….
18. State practice is ambiguous, but tends to suggest that the anticipa-
tory use of force is not generally considered lawful, or only in very pressing
circumstances. There are numerous examples of States claiming to have used
force in anticipatory self-defence, and being condemned by the international
community. Examples of state practice are given by Professor Antonio Cassese,
former President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yu-
goslavia, in International Law, (Oxford, 2001) at 309-31. One particularly
relevant example is the international reaction to an Israeli bombing attack
on an Iraqi nuclear reactor:
“When the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor was discussed in the
[Security Council], the USA was the only State which (implicitly) indicated that
it shared the Israeli concept of self-defence. In addition, although it voted for
the SC resolution condemning Israel (resolution 487/1991), it pointed out after
the vote that its attitude was only motivated by other considerations, namely
Israel’s failure to exhaust peaceful means for the resolution of the dispute. All
other members of the SC expressed their disagreement with the Israeli view,
by unreservedly voting in favour of operative paragraph 1 of the resolution,
whereby ‘[the SC] strongly condemns the military attack by Israel in clear viola-
tion of the Charter of the UN and the norms of international conduct.’ Egypt
and Mexico expressly refuted the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence. It is
apparent from the statements of these States that they were deeply concerned
that the interpretation they opposed might lead to abuse. In contrast, Britain,
while condemning ‘without equivocation’ the Israeli attack as ‘a grave breach
of international law’, noted that the attack was not an act of self-defence. Nor
[could] it be justified as a forcible measure of self protection.” (p310).
19. Cassese concludes that, ‘[i]f one undertakes a perusal of State practice
in the light of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
it becomes apparent that such practice does not evince agreement among
States regarding the interpretation or the application of Article 51 with regard
to anticipatory self-defence.’ (International Law (Oxford, 2001) at p309).
20. Oppenheim states that:
‘while anticipatory action in self-defence is normally unlawful, it is not
necessarily unlawful in all circumstances, the matter depending on the facts
of the situation including in particular the seriousness of the threat and the
degree to which pre-emptive action is really necessary and is the only way of
avoiding that serious threat; the requirements of necessity and proportional-
ity are probably even more pressing in relation to anticipatory self-defence
than they are in other circumstances.’ (R Jennings QC and A Watts QC (eds),
Oppenheim’s International Law: Ninth Edition1991 pp41-42).146
21. Detter states that, ‘it must be emphasised that anticipatory force
falls under the prohibition of force in Article 2(4) of the Charter entailing a
presumption that it is illegal. A mere threat of attack thus does not warrant
military action...’ (The Law of War, Second Edition, (Cambridge, 2000), p86)….
23. In conclusion, we are of the view that States may have the right to defend
themselves by using force to pre-empt an imminent and serious attack. However,
such use of force would have to be in accordance with the general rules and
principles governing self-defence. These are well summarised by Oppenheim:
‘The development of the law, particularly in the light of more recent state
practice, in the 150 years since the Caroline incident suggests that action,
even if it involves the use of armed force and the violation of another state’s
territory, can be justified as self-defence under international law where:
(a) an armed attack is launched, or is immediately threatened,
against a state’s territory or forces (and probably its nationals);
(b) there is an urgent necessity for defensive action against that
attack;
(c) there is no practicable alternative to action in self-defence,
and in particular another state or other authority which has
the legal powers to stop or prevent the infringement does
not, or cannot, use them to that effect;
146
It should be noted that Sir Robert Jennings was the British Judge on the I.C.J. and
was its President.
147
New Zealand Armed Forces Law Review. p.11-17, 2003. [Citations omitted].
CHAPTER 2
HUMAN RIGHTS
Introduction
What are Human Rights?
148
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), http://www.ohchr.
org/en/issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx.
creates legal obligations for them and giving concrete expression to univer-
sality. Some fundamental human rights norms enjoy universal protection by
customary international law across all boundaries and civilizations.
Human rights are inalienable. They should not be taken away, except in
specific situations and according to due process. For example, the right to
liberty may be restricted if a person is found guilty of a crime by a court of law.
Interdependent and indivisible
All human rights are indivisible, whether they are civil and political rights,
such as the right to life, equality before the law and freedom of expression;
economic, social and cultural rights, such as the rights to work, social security
and education , or collective rights, such as the rights to development and
self-determination, are indivisible, interrelated and interdependent. The im-
provement of one right facilitates advancement of the others. Likewise, the
deprivation of one right adversely affects the others.
Equal and non-discriminatory
Non-discrimination is a cross-cutting principle in international human
rights law. The principle is present in all the major human rights treaties and
provides the central theme of some of international human rights conven-
tions such as the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women.
The principle applies to everyone in relation to all human rights and free-
doms and it prohibits discrimination on the basis of a list of non-exhaustive
categories such as sex, race, colour and so on. The principle of non-discrim-
ination is complemented by the principle of equality, as stated in Article 1 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “All human beings are born free
and equal in dignity and rights.”
Both Rights and Obligations
Human rights entail both rights and obligations. States assume obliga-
tions and duties under international law to respect, to protect and to fulfill
human rights. The obligation to respect means that States must refrain from
interfering with or curtailing the enjoyment of human rights. The obligation
to protect requires States to protect individuals and groups against human
rights abuses. The obligation to fulfill means that States must take positive
action to facilitate the enjoyment of basic human rights. At the individual
level, while we are entitled our human rights, we should also respect the
human rights of others.
149
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
ProfessionalInterest/Pages/InternationalLaw.aspx.
150
OHCHR available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/
FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf.
ted it to the Economic and Social Council “for reference to the Commission
on Human Rights for consideration . . . in its preparation of an international
bill of rights” (resolution 43 (I)). The Commission, at its first session early in
1947, authorized its officers to formulate what it termed “a preliminary draft
International Bill of Human Rights.” Later the work was taken over by a formal
drafting committee, consisting of members of the Commission from eight
States, selected with due regard for geographical distribution.
Towards the Universal Declaration
In the beginning, different views were expressed about the form the
bill of rights should take. The Drafting Committee decided to prepare two
documents: one in the form of a declaration, which would set forth general
principles or standards of human rights; the other in the form of a conven-
tion, which would define specific rights and their limitations. Accordingly,
the Committee transmitted to the Commission on Human Rights draft ar-
ticles of an international declaration and an international convention on
human rights. At its second session, in December 1947, the Commission
decided to apply the term “International Bill of Human Rights” to the series
of documents in preparation and established three working groups: one on
the declaration, one on the convention (which it renamed “covenant”) and
one on implementation. The Commission revised the draft declaration at its
third session, in May/June 1948, taking into consideration comments received
from Governments. It did not have time, however, to consider the covenant
or the question of implementation. The declaration was therefore submitted
through the Economic and Social Council to the General Assembly, meet-
ing in Paris. By its resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948, the General
Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the first of
these projected instruments.
Towards the International Covenants
On the same day that it adopted the Universal Declaration, the General
Assembly requested the Commission on Human Rights to prepare, as a matter
of priority, a draft covenant on human rights and draft measures of imple-
mentation. The Commission examined the text of the draft covenant in 1949
and the following year it revised the first 18 articles, on the basis of comments
received from Governments. In 1950, the General Assembly declared that “the
enjoyment of civic and political freedoms and of economic, social and cultural
rights are interconnected and interdependent” (resolution 421 (V), sect. E). The
Assembly thus decided to include in the covenant on human rights economic,
social and cultural rights and an explicit recognition of the equality of men
and women in related rights, as set forth in the Charter. In 1951, the Commis-
sion drafted 14 articles on economic, social and cultural rights on the basis of
proposals made by Governments and suggestions by specialized agencies. It
also formulated 10 articles on measures for implementation of those rights
under which States parties to the covenant would submit periodic reports.
After a long debate at its sixth session, in 1951/1952, the General Assembly
requested the Commission “to draft two Covenants on Human Rights, . . . one
to contain civil and political rights and the other to contain economic, social
and cultural rights” (resolution 543 (VI), para. 1). The Assembly specified that
the two covenants should contain as many similar provisions as possible. It also
decided to include an article providing that “all peoples shall have the right of
self-determination” (resolution 545 (VI)).The Commission completed prepa-
ration of the two drafts at its ninth and tenth sessions, in 1953 and 1954.The
General Assembly reviewed those texts at its ninth session, in 1954, and decided
to give the drafts the widest possible publicity in order that Governments might
study them thoroughly and that public opinion might express itself freely. It
recommended that its Third Committee start an article-by-article discussion
of the texts at its tenth session, in 1955. Although the article-by-article discus-
sion began as scheduled, it was not until 1966 that the preparation of the two
covenants was completed.
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights were adopted by the
General Assembly by its resolution 2200 A (XXI) of 16 December 1966. The
first Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, adopted by the same resolution, provided international machinery
for dealing with communications from individuals claiming to be victims of
violations of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant.
Worldwide influence of the International Bill of Human Rights
From 1948, when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted
and proclaimed, until 1976, when the International Covenants on Human
Rights entered into force, the Declaration was the only completed portion of
the International Bill of Human Rights. The Declaration, and at a later stage
the Covenants, exercised a profound influence on the thoughts and actions
of individuals and their Governments in all parts of the world.
The International Conference on Human Rights, which met at Teheran
from 22 April to 13 May 1968 to review the progress made in the 20 years
since the adoption of the Universal Declaration and to formulate a pro-
gramme for the future, solemnly declared in the Proclamation of Teheran:
1. It is imperative that the members of the international community fulfill
their solemn obligations to promote and encourage respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions of any kind such as
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinions;
2. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states a common under-
standing, of the peoples of the world concerning the inalienable and invio-
lable rights of all members of the human family and constitutes an obligation
for the members of the international community;
3. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Declaration on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
as well as other conventions and declarations in the field of human rights
adopted under the auspices of the United Nations, the specialized agencies
and the regional intergovernmental organizations, have created new stan-
dards and obligations to which States should conform;…
Thus, for more than 25 years, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights
stood alone as an international “standard of achievement for all peoples and
all nations.” It became known and was accepted as authoritative both in States
which became parties to one or both of the Covenants and in those which
did not ratify or accede to either. Its provisions were cited as the basis and
justification for many important decisions taken by United Nations bodies;
they inspired the preparation of a number of international human rights
instruments, both within and outside the United Nations system; they exer-
cised a significant influence on a number of multilateral and bilateral treaties;
and they had a strong impact as the basis for the preparation of many new
national constitutions and national laws.
Treaty Bodies
Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Monitoring the Core
International Human Rights Treaties151
What are the treaty bodies?
The human rights treaty bodies are committees of independent experts that
monitor implementation of the core international human rights treaties. They
are created in accordance with the provisions of the treaty that they monitor.
151
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/bodies/treaty/index.htm.
There are nine human rights treaty bodies and the Subcommittee on
Prevention of Torture (SPT):
The Human Rights Committee (CCPR) monitors implementa-
tion of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(1966) and its optional protocols;
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CE-
SCR) monitors implementation of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966);
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(CERD) monitors implementation of the International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(1965);
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) monitors implementation of the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(1979) and its optional protocol (1999);
The Committee Against Torture (CAT) monitors implementa-
tion of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment (1984);
The Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) monitors
implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(1989) and its optional protocols (2000); and
The Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW) monitors imple-
mentation of the International Convention on the Protection of
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families
(1990).
The Committee on the Right of Persons with Disabilities
(CRPD) monitors implementation of the International Conven-
tion on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006).
The Committee on Enforced Disappearance (CED) monitors
implementation of the International Convention for the Protec-
tion of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (2006)
Each treaty body receives secretariat support from the Human Rights
Treaties Branch of OHCHR in Geneva. CEDAW, which was supported until 31
December 2007 by the Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW), meets
once a year in New York at United Nations Headquarters. Similarly, the Human
Rights Committee usually holds its session in March/April in New York. The
other treaty bodies meet in Geneva, either at Palais Wilson or Palais des Nations.
What do the treaty bodies do?
The treaty bodies perform a number of functions in accordance with the
provisions of the treaties that created them. These include:
• Consideration of State parties’ reports
• Consideration of individual complaints or communications
They also publish general comments on the treaties and organize discus-
sions on related themes.
Consideration of State parties’ reports
When a country ratifies one of these treaties, it assumes a legal obligation
to implement the rights recognized in that treaty. But signing up is only the
first step, because recognition of rights on paper is not sufficient to guarantee
that they will be enjoyed in practice. So the country incurs an additional ob-
ligation to submit regular reports to the monitoring committee set up under
that treaty on how the rights are being implemented. This system of human
rights monitoring is common to most of the UN human rights treaties.
To meet their reporting obligation, States must report submit an initial
report usually one year after joining (two years in the case of the CRC) and
then periodically in accordance with the provisions of the treaty (usually
every four or five years). In addition to the government report, the treaty
bodies may receive information on a country’s human rights situation from
other sources, including non-governmental organizations, UN agencies,
other intergovernmental organizations, academic institutions and the press.
In the light of all the information available, the Committee examines the
report together with government representatives. Based on this dialogue,
the Committee publishes its concerns and recommendations, referred to as
“concluding observations.”
Consideration of individual complaints or communications
In addition to the reporting procedure, some of the treaty bodies may
perform additional monitoring functions through three other mechanisms:
the inquiry procedure, the examination of inter-state complaints and the
examination of individual complaints.
Four of the Committees (CCPR, CERD, CAT and CEDAW) can, under
certain conditions, receive petitions from individuals who claim that their
rights under the treaties have been violated.
General Comments
The Committees also publish their interpretation of the content of hu-
man rights provisions, known as general comments on thematic issues or
methods of work.
Meeting of chairpersons and inter-committee meeting
The treaty bodies coordinate their activities through the annual meeting of
chairpersons of human rights treaty bodies and through the inter-committee
meeting. The treaty bodies are continually seeking ways to enhance their
effectiveness through streamlining and harmonization of working methods
and practices.
***
Article 6
1. The Constitution shall have supreme legal force and direct application
in the Kyrgyz Republic.
2. The Constitution shall serve the basis for the adoption of constitutional
laws, laws as well as other regulatory legal acts.
3. International treaties to which the Kyrgyz Republic is a party that
have entered into force under the established legal procedure and also the
universally recognized principles and norms of international law shall be the
constituent part of the legal system of the Kyrgyz Republic.
The provisions of international treaties on human rights shall have direct
action and be of priority in respect of provisions of other international treaties.
[The Kyrgyz Constitution has been redrafted several times. Consider the
Opinion on the following page of the Venice Commission.]
152
Adopted by popular referendum June 10, 2010 and entered into force July 10,
2010.
***
4. Section II: Fundamental rights
16. The Venice Commission welcomes the provision of Article 6, which
provides that International treaties on human rights have a direct effect. But,
it is not clear whether these treaties have a higher hierarchical status than
Kyrgyz laws. Furthermore, the effect of other treaties on the Kyrgyz legal sys-
tem in cases of conflict remains unclear. It would be advisable to point out
that international treaties ratified by the Kyrgyz Republic have precedence
over Kyrgyz laws. It would also be helpful to accept as a general rule that all
norms have to be interpreted in the light of international human rights trea-
ties ratified by Kyrgyzstan.
17. The section on human rights and freedoms deserves praise for its
far-reaching promises. In relation to the 2007 version, this version is edited
more clearly, since the various rights are set out in different articles instead
of being paragraphs or sub-paragraphs in one in two simple articles. This
part of the Constitution includes a catalogue of guarantees the protection
of human rights, which seems to fully correspond to international standards.
***
Principle of Non-Discrimination
Article 2
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and
to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction
the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any
153
Adopted by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe at its 83rd Plenary
Session (Venice, 4 June 2010), http://www.venice.coe.intCDL-AD.
154
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Assembly resolution
2200A (XXI), GAOR (Supp. (No. 16) at 52), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S.
171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Article 3
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal
right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set
forth in the present Covenant….
Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any dis-
crimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall
prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective
protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, prop-
erty, birth or other status.
155
Shirin Aumeeruddy-Cziffra and 19 other Mauritian women v. Mauritius, Communica-
tion No. 35/1978, Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 at 67 (1984).
Their claim to be “victims” within the meaning of the Optional Protocol has
to be examined.
9.2 (b) 2 (i) 1 First, their relationships to their husbands clearly belong
to the area of “family” as used in article 17 (1) of the Covenant. They are
therefore protected against what that article calls “arbitrary or unlawful in-
terference” in this area.
9.2 (b) 2 (i) 2 The Committee takes the view that the common residence
of husband and wife has to be considered as the normal behaviour of a
family. Hence, and as the State party has admitted, the exclusion of a person
from a country where close members of his family are living can amount to
an interference within the meaning of article 17. In principle, article 17 (1)
applies also when one of the spouses is an alien. Whether the existence and
application of immigration laws affecting the residence of a family member
is compatible with the Covenant depends on whether such interference is
either “arbitrary or unlawful” as stated in article 17 (1), or conflicts in any
other way with the State party’s obligations under the Covenant.
9.2 (b) 2 (i) 3 In the present cases, not only the future possibility of de-
portation, but the existing precarious residence situation of foreign husbands
in Mauritius represents, in the opinion of the Committee, an interference by
the authorities of the State party with the family life of the Mauritian wives
and their husbands. The statutes in question have rendered it uncertain for
the families concerned whether and for how long it will be possible for them
to continue their family life by residing together in Mauritius. Moreover, as
described above (para. 7.4) in one of the cases, even the delay for years, and
the absence of a positive decision granting a residence permit, must be seen
as a considerable inconvenience, among other reasons because the granting
of a work permit, and hence the possibility of the husband to contribute to
supporting the family, depends on the residence permit, and because depor-
tation without judicial review is possible at any time.
9.2 (b) 2 (i) 4 Since, however, this situation results from the legislation
itself, there can be no question of regarding this interference as “unlawful”
within the meaning of article 17 (1) in the present cases. It remains to be
considered whether it is “arbitrary” or conflicts in any other way with the
Covenant.
9.2 (b) 2 (i) 5 The protection owed to individuals in this respect is subject
to the principle of equal treatment of the sexes which follows from several
provisions of the Covenant. It is an obligation of the State parties under article
2 (1) generally to respect and ensure the rights of the Covenant “without
distinction of any kind, such as ... (inter alia) sex,” and more particularly under
article 3 “to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment” of
all these rights, as well as under article 26 to provide “without any discrimi-
nation” for “the equal protection of the law.”
9.2 (b) 2 (i) 6 The authors who are married to foreign nationals are suf-
fering from the adverse consequences of the statutes discussed above only
because they are women. The precarious residence status of their husbands,
affecting their family life as described, results from the 1977 laws which do
not apply the same measures of control to foreign wives. In this connection
the Committee has noted that under section 16 of the Constitution of Mau-
ritius sex is not one of the grounds on which discrimination is prohibited….
10.1 Accordingly, the Human Rights Committee acting under article 5 (4)
of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, is of the view that the facts…disclose violations of the Covenant, in
particular of articles 2 (1), 3 and 26 in relation to articles 17 (1) and 23 (1)…,
because the coming into force of the Immigration (Amendment) Act, 1977,
and the Deportation (Amendment) Act, 1977, resulted in discrimination
against [the three married women] on the ground of sex.…
11. The Committee, accordingly, is of the view that the State party should
adjust the provisions of the Immigration (Amendment) Act, 1977 and of the
Deportation (Amendment) Act, 1977 in order to implement its obligations
under the Covenant, and should provide immediate remedies for the victims
of the violations found above.
Non-discrimination
(Thirty-seventh session, 1989)
1. Non-discrimination, together with equality before the law and equal
protection of the law without any discrimination, constitute a basic and
general principle relating to the protection of human rights. Thus, article
2, paragraph 1, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
obligates each State party to respect and ensure to all persons within its ter-
ritory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status. Article 26 not only entitles all persons to equality before the law as
156
U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 146 (2003).
well as equal protection of the law but also prohibits any discrimination
under the law and guarantees to all persons equal and effective protection
against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth
or other status.
2. Indeed, the principle of non-discrimination is so basic that article 3
obligates each State party to ensure the equal right of men and women to the
enjoyment of the rights set forth in the Covenant. While article 4, paragraph
1, allows States parties to take measures derogating from certain obligations
under the Covenant in time of public emergency, the same article requires,
inter alia, that those measures should not involve discrimination solely on
the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin. Further-
more, article 20, paragraph 2, obligates States parties to prohibit, by law, any
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred which constitutes incitement
to discrimination.
3. Because of their basic and general character, the principle of non-
discrimination as well as that of equality before the law and equal protection
of the law are sometimes expressly referred to in articles relating to particular
categories of human rights. Article 14, paragraph 1, provides that all persons
shall be equal before the courts and tribunals, and paragraph 3 of the same
article provides that, in the determination of any criminal charge against
him, everyone shall be entitled, in full equality, to the minimum guarantees
enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (g) of paragraph 3. Similarly, article 25
provides for the equal participation in public life of all citizens, without any
of the distinctions mentioned in article 2.
4. It is for the States parties to determine appropriate measures to imple-
ment the relevant provisions. However, the Committee is to be informed about
the nature of such measures and their conformity with the principles of non-
discrimination and equality before the law and equal protection of the law.
5. The Committee wishes to draw the attention of States parties to the
fact that the Covenant sometimes expressly requires them to take measures
to guarantee the equality of rights of the persons concerned. For example,
article 23, paragraph 4, stipulates that States parties shall take appropriate
steps to ensure equality of rights as well as responsibilities of spouses as to
marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. Such steps may take the
form of legislative, administrative or other measures, but it is a positive duty
of States parties to make certain that spouses have equal rights as required
by the Covenant. In relation to children, article 24 provides that all children,
without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national
or social origin, property or birth, have the right to such measures of pro-
tection as are required by their status as minors, on the part of their family,
society and the State.
6. The Committee notes that the Covenant neither defines the term “dis-
crimination” nor indicates what constitutes discrimination….
7. While these conventions deal only with cases of discrimination on
specific grounds, the Committee believes that the term “discrimination” as
used in the Covenant should be understood to imply any distinction, exclu-
sion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons,
on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms.
8. The enjoyment of rights and freedoms on an equal footing, however,
does not mean identical treatment in every instance. In this connection, the
provisions of the Covenant are explicit. For example, article 6, paragraph 5,
prohibits the death sentence from being imposed on persons below 18 years
of age. The same paragraph prohibits that sentence from being carried out on
pregnant women. Similarly, article 10, paragraph 3, requires the segregation
of juvenile offenders from adults. Furthermore, article 25 guarantees certain
political rights, differentiating on grounds of citizenship….
10. The Committee also wishes to point out that the principle of equal-
ity sometimes requires States parties to take affirmative action in order to
diminish or eliminate conditions which cause or help to perpetuate dis-
crimination prohibited by the Covenant. For example, in a State where the
general conditions of a certain part of the population prevent or impair their
enjoyment of human rights, the State should take specific action to correct
those conditions. Such action may involve granting for a time to the part of
the population concerned certain preferential treatment in specific matters
as compared with the rest of the population. However, as long as such action
is needed to correct discrimination in fact, it is a case of legitimate differen-
tiation under the Covenant….
Right to Life
Yekaterina Pavlovna Lantsova v. Russia, Decision of the
Human Rights Committee, 2002157
1. The author of the communication is Yekaterina Pavlovna Lantsova,
mother of Vladimir Albertovich Lantsov, deceased. Mrs. Lantsova claims that
her son, who was born on 27 June 1969, was a victim of violations by Russia
of article 6, paragraph 1, article 7 and article 10, paragraph 1 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. She is represented by counsel….
The facts as presented by the author
2.1 In August 1994, Mr. Lantsov, during an argument, inflicted injuries on
another person, as a consequence of which both criminal and civil charges
were pressed against him. On 1 March 1995, he made full reparation to the
plaintiff for damages determined in the civil case. Awaiting his criminal trial,
set for 13 April 1995, Mr. Lantsov was initially released. However, on 5 March
1995, after failing to appear for a meeting with the investigator, he was placed
pre-trial detention at Moscow’s pre-trial detention centre, ‘Matrosskaya
Tishina’, where he died on 6 April 1995, at the age of 25.
2.2 Mrs. Lantsova submits that her son was healthy when he first entered
Matrosskaya Tishina, but that he fell ill due to the very poor conditions at the
prison. She complains that her son was given no medical treatment despite
repeated requests. Finally, she complains that the Russian Federation has
failed to bring those responsible to justice.158
2.3 The author submits that the conditions at Moscow’s pre-trial deten-
tion centres are inhuman, in particular because of extreme overcrowding,
poor ventilation, inadequate food and appalling hygiene. She refers to the
1994 report of the Special Rapporteur against torture to the Commission
on Human Rights [UN doc. E/CN.4/1995/34/Add.l], Regarding access to
health care, the report states that overcrowding exacerbates the inability
of the staff to provide food and health care, and notes the high incidence
of disease in the centres. Matrosskaya Tishina is held out for particular
157
Yekaterina Pavlovna Lantsova v. Russia, Communication No. 763/1997, 26 March
2002, Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. A/57/40 (26 March 2002). [Citations
omitted].
158
The communication also indicates that notification of Mr. Lantsov’s death was
not given to the family or to the local registry office until 11 April 1995, after Mr.
Lantsov’s lawyer had discovered the fact of his death while at the detention centre
to meet with him.
criticism in the report: ‘The conditions are cruel, inhuman and degrading;
they are torturous’ [para. 71].
2.4 According to Mrs. Lantsova, based on statements from other detainees
in the cell with her son, shortly after he was brought to Matrosskaya Tishina
his physical and mental state began to deteriorate. He began to lose weight
and developed a temperature. He was coughing and gasping for breath. Sev-
eral days before his death he stopped eating and drank only cold water. He
became delirious at some point and eventually lost consciousness.
2.5 It appears that other detainees requested medical assistance for Mr.
Lantsov some time after the first week of his detention, that a medical doctor
attended to him once or twice in the cell and that he was given aspirin for
his temperature. However, between 3 and 6 April, during what was a rapid
and obvious deterioration in his condition, he received no medical attention,
despite repeated requests for assistance by the other detainees. On 6 April,
after the other detainees cried out for assistance, medical personnel arrived
with a stretcher. Mr. Lantsov died later that day in the prison clinic. His death
certificate identifies the cause of death as ‘acute cardiac/circulatory insuf-
ficiency, intoxication, cachexia of unknown etiology’.
2.6 …Mrs. Lantsov has made timely and repeated applications for a criminal
investigation to be opened, but these were consistently denied. She therefore
concludes that she has exhausted domestic remedies.
2.7 The procurator’s decisions refusing to open a criminal investigation
are based on the conclusion that the death in this case resulted from a com-
bination of pneumonia and the stressful conditions of confinement, and
that under these circumstances it would be impossible to find the detention
centre personnel liable….
The complaint
3. Mrs. Lantsova claims that the Russian Federation violated her son’s
fundamental human rights by causing his death as a result of confinement
under conditions unfit for human survival, and that it also failed in its ob-
ligation to provide any meaningful legal protection against such violations.
In her opinion, this constitutes violations of articles 6, paragraph 1, article 7
and article 10, paragraph 1 of the Covenant….
The State party’s observations on the merits of the communication
6.1 In its observations on the merits of the communication, dated 28
December 1998, the State party states that Mr. Lantsov was arrested on 5
March 1995 and that on 7 March 1995 he was moved to a pre-trial detention
Human Trafficking
Modern-Day Slavery
159
Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking
in Human Beings, OSCE, public doc. available at: http://www.osce.org/cthb/74755.
food and lodging, as well as for making contact with the outside world. They
are not free to leave, as they have no real and acceptable alternative but to
submit to exploitation.
People are trafficked for:
• Sexual exploitation;
• Labour exploitation, including domestic servitude;
• Other purposes, including forced begging, forced criminality
and the removal of organs.
Trafficking in human beings still remains greatly misunderstood and
is insufficiently addressed in both policy and practice. Although signifi-
cant progress has been made during the past ten years, there is still much
work to be done in the areas of prevention, prosecution and protection
of victims’ rights.
The number of arrests, prosecutions and convictions of traffickers re-
mains low, in stark contrast to the estimated number of victims. Too often,
such victims remain unidentified, and many are deported or even prosecuted
for criminal activities in which they have been involved as a direct result of
having been trafficked. Trafficking in human beings is a gross violation of
human rights, fundamental freedoms and human dignity, and is often a form
of violence against women.
Trafficking in human beings is also largely a business of organized crime,
which has reached a massive scale and generates huge profits. Trafficking
therefore thrives upon and feeds corruption, and undermines the rule of law
and economic stability. It constitutes a real threat to the lives and well-being
of citizens and society at large.
As a consequence, trafficking is nowadays a serious transnational threat
to security in the OSCE region and beyond….
What is the smuggling of migrants?160
Awareness of the constituent elements of the smuggling of migrants and
related conduct is a prerequisite for identifying, investigating and prosecuting
the crime. Article 3 of the Smuggling of Migrants Protocol defines smuggling
of migrants as:
160
UNDOC Basic training manual on investigating and prosecuting the smuggling
of migrants, Module 1: Concepts and categories of the smuggling of migrants and
related conduct (2010).
Self-Determination
General Comment 12, Human Rights Committee, Treaty
Body for the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights161
The right to self-determination of peoples
1. In accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations, article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights recognizes that all peoples have the right of self-determination. The
right of self-determination is of particular importance because its realiza-
tion is an essential condition for the effective guarantee and observance of
individual human rights and for the promotion and strengthening of those
rights. It is for that reason that States set forth the right of self-determination
in a provision of positive law in both Covenants and placed this provision as
article 1 apart from and before all of the other rights in the two Covenants.
2. Article 1 enshrines an inalienable right of all peoples as described in its
paragraphs 1 and 2. By virtue of that right they freely “determine their politi-
cal status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”
The article imposes on all States parties corresponding obligations. This right
and the corresponding obligations concerning its implementation are inter-
related with other provisions of the Covenant and rules of international law.
3. Although the reporting obligations of all States parties include article 1,
only some reports give detailed explanations regarding each of its paragraphs.
The Committee has noted that many of them completely ignore article 1, pro-
vide inadequate information in regard to it or confine themselves to a refer-
ence to election laws. The Committee considers it highly desirable that States
parties’ reports should contain information on each paragraph of article 1.
4. With regard to paragraph 1 of article 1, States parties should describe
the constitutional and political processes which in practice allow the exercise
of this right.
5. Paragraph 2 affirms a particular aspect of the economic content of the
right of self-determination, namely the right of peoples, for their own ends,
freely to “dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to
any obligations arising out of international economic cooperation, based upon
161
Article 1 (Twenty-first session, 1984), Compilation of General Comments and
General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 134 (2003).
the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people
be deprived of its own means of subsistence.” This right entails corresponding
duties for all States and the international community. States should indicate any
factors or difficulties which prevent the free disposal of their natural wealth
and resources contrary to the provisions of this paragraph and to what extent
that affects the enjoyment of other rights set forth in the Covenant.
6. Paragraph 3, in the Committee’s opinion, is particularly important in
that it imposes specific obligations on States parties, not only in relation
to their own peoples but vis-à-vis all peoples which have not been able to
exercise or have been deprived of the possibility of exercising their right to
self-determination. …
162
General Assembly resolution 2649, of 30 November 1970, GAOR (25th Sess., Supp.
No. 27), UN Doc. A/RES/2649.
that right in accordance with the relevant international instruments and the
principles and spirit of the Charter;
4. Considers that the acquisition and retention of territory in contra-
vention of the right of the people of that territory to self-determination is
inadmissible and a gross violation of the Charter;
5. Condemns those Governments that deny the right to self-determination
of peoples recognized as being entitled to it, especially of the peoples of
southern Africa and Palestine;
6. Requests the Commission on Human Rights to study, at its twenty-sev-
enth session, the implementation of the United Nations resolutions relating
to the right of peoples under colonial and alien domination to self-determi-
nation, and to submit its conclusions and recommendations to the General
Assembly, through the Economic and Social Council, as soon as possible.
1915th plenary meeting,
30 November 1970.
163
President and CEO of the International Crisis Group, Excerpt of speech to the
Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, 22 September 2010. The Hon-
orable Ms. Arbour is the former United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights and before that served as a Justice on the Supreme Court of Canada.
trump each other. Only by understanding when – and how – the right to self-
determination applies can we effectively put in place processes which stand
some chance of averting – or rapidly ending – secessionist-based conflicts.
So let’s start with the legal framework. And in that regard, the recent opin-
ion by the International Court of Justice on the legality of Kosovo’s unilateral
declaration of independence provides a useful, but not a dispositive, backdrop.
On 22 July 2010, The I.C.J. rendered its non-binding opinion on the question
posed to it by the General Assembly, which was: ‘Is the unilateral declaration
of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo
in accordance with international law?’
…It concluded that, in the circumstances, the Kosovo unilateral declara-
tion was not in violation of international law. The court, however, went no
further. It explicitly refrained from ruling on the legality of secession itself.
As such it did not address the efficacy of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of
independence, or of the level of international recognition that it attracted,
in creating an independent, sovereign Kosovo state.
The I.C.J.’s opinion in the Kosovo case may or may not lead to a wave
of additional recognition for Kosovo’s independence – these will be politi-
cal reactions to the court’s opinion. As the court points out, some unilateral
declarations of independence have in the past been specifically repudiated by
the international community – those of Southern Rhodesia in 1965, Northern
Cyprus in 1983 and of the Republika Srpska in Bosnia in 1992. But in all these
instances, the Security Council made a determination based on the concrete
situation existing at the time those declarations were made. The illegality of
those declarations of independence stemmed not from their unilateral char-
acter but from the fact that they were, or would have been, connected with
the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of interna-
tional law. The exceptional character of the resolutions regarding Southern
Rhodesia, Northern Cyprus and of the Republika Srpska confirmed, in the
view of the I.C.J., that no general prohibition against unilateral declarations
of independence could be inferred from previous Security Council decisions.
So while secessionists elsewhere would be wise to take limited comfort
from the court’s opinion in the Kosovo case; equally would those authorities
who currently assert the sanctity of their existing borders as an absolute bar
to any secessionist demands. The I.C.J.’s Kosovo judgement leaves unanswered
the important legal question of whether a right to secession can be found in
the right to self-determination and if so, in what circumstances….
On its face, the right of peoples to freely determine their political status does
not address how and when this right is to be exercised. Whether the exercise of
***
25. However, it may be wondered how the time-hallowed principle has
been able to withstand the new approaches to international law as expressed
in Africa, where the successive attainment of independence and the emer-
gence of new States have been accompanied by a certain questioning of
traditional international law. At first sight this principle conflicts outright with
another one, the right of peoples to self-determination. In fact, however, the
maintenance of the territorial status quo in Africa is often seen as the wisest
course, to preserve what has been achieved by peoples who have struggled
for their independence, and to avoid a disruption which would deprive the
continent of the gains achieved by much sacrifice. The essential requirement
of stability in order to survive, to develop and gradually to consolidate their
independence in all fields, has induced African States judiciously to consent
164
Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 554, and
Separate Opinion by Judge Luchaire, p. 652.
***
Article 7
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without
his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.
165
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General Assembly resolution
2200A (XXI), GAOR (Supp. (No. 16) at 52), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S.
171, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.
Article 10
1. All persons deprived of liberty shall be treated with humanity and re-
spect for the inherent dignity of the human person.
166
Otabek Akhadov v. Kyrgyzstan, Communication No. 1503/2006, Human Rights
Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/101/D/1503/2006, (29 April 2011).
author was also forced to take psychotropic substances. The author also
provides the names of two high-ranked officials, who, according to him were
aware of the fact that he has been tortured.
2.3 On 7 July 2000, after the papers regarding the author’s arrest were
formalized, the investigators assigned him a lawyer whom he did not choose.
The latter did not take any steps to protect him. On 9 July 2000, unable to
support the beatings and threatened with further ill-treatment, the author
signed a confession admitting the commission of the crimes he was ac-
cused of by the investigators. On 10 July 2000, acquaintances of the author
commissioned another lawyer, Ms Golisheva, to represent the author. On
the same date the lawyer filed a complaint regarding the ill-treatment of
the author and requested a medical examination of the author in order to
establish that he had been tortured. The Senior Investigator based on that
lawyer’s request, issued an order for a medical examination to be conducted,
but the examination did not take place until 10 August 2000. The medical
expert provided an expertise, concluding that the traces on the author’s
body were consistent with the type of injuries he described and the timing
of those injuries. The lawyer did not make any further complaints and did
not submit any motions, because, according to the author, she was afraid
of reprisals….
2.6 Throughout the court proceedings the author denied his guilt. In his
written testimony, submitted to the Bishkek City court on 22 July 2002, he
complained that the confession he made during the investigation was ex-
tracted under torture and proclaimed his innocence. On an unspecified date
in July 2002, the author also complained to the President of the Republic
that he had been subjected to torture. Neither complaint was investigated….
The complaint
3.1 The author claims to be a victim of violations by Kyrgyzstan of his
rights under article 6, article 7, article 9, article 10, paragraph 1, article 14,
paragraph 1, article 2, paragraph 3, together with article 14, paragraph 3
(b), article 14, paragraph 3 (g), and article 15, paragraph 1, of the Covenant.
3.2 The author submits that his rights under article 2, paragraph 3, to-
gether with article 14, paragraph 3 (b) were violated by the State party since
he was not informed of his rights to refuse to testify and not to testify against
himself. He was not represented by a lawyer from the moment of his arrest;
he was not informed of his right to have legal assistance assigned to him
despite the fact that he requested to be provided with such assistance from
the moment of his detention….
following a trial held in violation of the fair trial guarantees, the Committee
concludes that the author is also a victim of a violation of his rights under
article 6, read in conjunction with article 14, of the Covenant….
8. The Human Rights Committee, acting under article 5, paragraph 4, of the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
is of the view that the State party has violated article 6, read in conjunction
with article 14; article 7 and article 14, paragraph 3 (g); article 9; and article
14, paragraph 1, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
9. Pursuant to article 2, paragraph 3(a), of the Covenant, the Committee
considers that the State party is under an obligation to provide the author
with an effective remedy including: conducting full and thorough investiga-
tion into the allegations of torture and ill-treatment and initiating criminal
proceedings against those responsible for the treatment to which the author
was subjected; considering his retrial in conformity with all guarantees en-
shrined in the Covenant or his release; and providing the author with appro-
priate reparation, including compensation. The State party is also under an
obligation to take steps to prevent similar violations occurring in the future….
167
Dimitry L. Gridin v. Russian Federation, Communication No. 770, Human Rights
Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/69/D/770/1997 (2000).
ing glasses, it appears from the material before it that most of these allega-
tions were not raised before the trial court. All the arguments were raised on
appeal but the Supreme Court found them to be unsubstantiated. In these
circumstances, the Committee finds that the author has not substantiated a
claim within the meaning of article 2 of the Optional Protocol.
6.5 With regard to the allegation that his lawyer was not informed of
the dates of the court actions which dealt with medical issues the Commit-
tee notes that this matter was reviewed by the Supreme Court which found
it to be in accordance with law and consequently considers that this claim
remains unsubstantiated for purposes of admissibility….
8.1 With respect to the allegation that the author was arrested without a
warrant and that this was only issued more than three days after the arrest,
in contravention of national legislation which stipulates that a warrant must
be issued within 72 hours of arrest, the Committee notes that this matter has
not been addressed by the State party. In this regard, the Committee consid-
ers that in the circumstances of the present case the author was deprived of
his liberty in violation of a procedure as established by law and consequently
it finds that the facts before it disclose a violation of article 9, paragraph 1.
8.2 With regard to the author’s claim that he was denied a fair trial in
violation of article 14, paragraph 1, in particular because of the failure by
the trial court to control the hostile atmosphere and pressure created by the
public in the court room, which made it impossible for defence counsel to
properly cross-examine the witnesses and present his defence, the Committee
notes that the Supreme Court referred to this issue, but failed to specifically
address it when it heard the author’s appeal. The Committee considers that
the conduct of the trial, as described above, violated the author’s right to a
fair trial within the meaning of article 14, paragraph 1.
8.3 With regard to the allegation of a violation of the presumption of
innocence, including public statements made by high ranking law enforce-
ment officials portraying the author as guilty which were given wide media
coverage, the Committee notes that the Supreme Court referred to the is-
sue, but failed to specifically deal with it when it heard the author’s appeal.
The Committee refers to its General Comment No 13 on article 14, where
it has stated that: “It is, therefore, a duty for all public authorities to refrain
from prejudging the outcome of a trial.” In the present case the Committee
considers that the authorities failed to exercise the restraint that article 14,
paragraph 2, requires of them and that the author’s rights were thus violated….
8.5 With respect to the allegation that the author did not have a
lawyer available to him for the first 5 days after he was arrested…[t]he
Committee finds that denying the author access to legal counsel after
he had requested such access and interrogating him during that time
constitutes a violation of the author’s rights under article 14, paragraph
3 (b). Furthermore, the Committee considers that the fact that the author
was unable to consult with his lawyer in private, allegation which has not
been refuted by the State party, also constitutes a violation of article 14,
paragraph 3 (b) of the Covenant.
168
Felix Kulov v. Kyrgyzstan, Communication No. 1369/2005, Human Rights Com-
mittee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/99/D/1369/2005 (26 July 2010).
8.3 The Committee notes the author’s allegations under article 9, para-
graph 1, that the decision to detain him was unlawful, as the investigators had
no evidence that he wanted to escape or to obstruct the inquiries…. remand
in custody must be necessary in all the circumstances, for example, to prevent
flight, interference with evidence or the recurrence of crime. The State party
has not shown that these factors were present in the instant case.169 In the
absence of any further information, the Committee concludes that there has
been a violation of article 9, paragraph 1, of the Covenant.
8.4 As for the author’s claims under articles 9, paragraph 3, read together
with article 2, paragraphs 1 and 2, that the decision to place him in pretrial
detention was made by a prosecutor, i.e. a representative of the executive
branch, under the national legislation, in his absence, and that he was not
brought before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judi-
cial power. The Committee notes that the State party has not provided any
information, showing that the prosecutor had the institutional objectivity
and impartiality necessary to be considered an “officer authorized to exercise
judicial power” within the meaning of article 9, paragraph 3, of the Covenant….
The Committee concludes that the facts as submitted reveal a violation of
the author’s rights under article 9, paragraph 3, of the Covenant.
8.5 The author also claimed violation of article 9, paragraph 4, as he was
allegedly kept in an investigation detention centre since 6 February 2001,
due to the opening of a third case against him. His detention was allegedly
prolonged on several occasions between 2001 and 2003 by the investiga-
tors, and with the prosecutor’s authorization, but in absence of any judicial
control. The author allegedly appealed with the General Prosecutor’s Office,
but all his appeals were rejected. According to him, the appeal to courts was
not necessary because of their ineffectiveness. The State party did not com-
ment on these allegations. In the absence of any further information, the
Committee concludes that there has been a violation of article 9, paragraph
4, of the Covenant….
8.7 The Committee notes the author’s allegations of violation of pre-
sumption of innocence, as the authorities allegedly used national media to
portray him as a criminal; his lawyers were given only limited time to study
the evidence, and “obstacles” were added to examine the additional evidence
presented by the prosecution; he had been judged already two times for mal-
practice in office but a third set of criminal proceedings was still pending at
the time of submission of the present communication, on the same grounds;
169
Communication No. 305/1988, Alphen v Netherlands. Views adopted on 23
July 1990.
***
1.1 The authors of the communications are Zhakhongir Maksudov, Adil
Rakhimov, Yakub Tashbaev and Rasuldzhon Pirmatov, all Uzbek nationals born
in 1975, 1974, 1956 and 1959, respectively. At the time of submission of their
cases, all authors were granted refugee status by the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and were detained in a detention
170
Zhakhongir Maksudov and Adil Rakhimov, Yakub Tashbaev and Rasuldzhon Pirmatov
v. Kyrgyzstan, Communication Nos. 1461,1462,1476& 1477/2006, Human Rights
Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/93/D/1461,1462,1476& 1477/2006 (31 July 2008).
171
On 22 September 2005, the Department of Migration Services under the Kyrgyz
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was transformed by the Resolution of the Zhogorku
Kenesh (Parliament) into the State Committee on Migration and Employment of
the Kyrgyz Republic.
172
[FN3] The author refers to Article 104 of the Kyrgyz CPC (correctly: article 110,
read together with article 435 of the same Code).
the demonstration. He added that he did not notice that armed individuals in
civilian clothes were present during the demonstration, although this fact was
corroborated by numerous witness accounts collected by the international non-
governmental organizations (NGOs).173 These circumstances were interpreted
by DMS as an attempt by Maksudov to hide some facts about the demonstration
and his participation in it. It concluded, therefore, that Maksudov fell under the
exclusion clause of article 1 F-b of the Refugee Convention…. On 26 July 2005,
the DMS issued a decision rejecting Maksudov’s asylum application…..
2.11 On 3 August 2005, the DMS decision was appealed to the Interre-
gional City Court of Bishkek by Maksudov’s counsel….
b) Neither DMS nor the Prosecutor’s Office provided evidence that
Maksudov had personally participated in the attack on the police station or
the siege of the Andijan Regional Administration building.
On 14 October 2005, the DMS appealed the decision of the Interregional
City Court of Bishkek on cassation to the Judicial Chamber for Economic and
Administrative Cases of the Bishkek City Court (Bishkek City Court).
2.13 On 28 October 2005, Maksudov was granted refugee status by UNHCR.
According to a UNHCR note verbale of 28 October 2005 addressed to the Per-
manent Mission of Kyrgyzstan to the United Nations Office at Geneva, the deci-
sion had been made after a thorough review of all circumstances surrounding
Maksudov’s case, including the assessment of the extradition materials and other
elements related to the consideration of the exclusion clauses which UNHCR
found not to be applicable. In the same note, UNHCR informed the Kyrgyz au-
thorities that it was prepared to provide a durable solution for Maksudov’s case
through resettlement to a third country, should he be released from detention.
2.14 On 31 October 2005, Maksudov’s counsel filed objections to the
cassation appeal lodged by the DMS with the Bishkek City Court.
2.15 …[T]he Bishkek City Court of 13 December 2005. Under article 359,
paragraph 1, of the Kyrgyz Civil Procedure Code, the ‘resolution of a review
instance court becomes executory after its adoption, it is final and cannot
be appealed’….
Committee’s considerations:
12.2 …The first issue before the Committee [was] whether the authors’ depri-
vation of liberty [had been] in accordance with the State party’s relevant laws. The
173
[FN5] Reference is made to the Human Rights Watch Publication “Bullets Were
Falling Like Rain,” the Andijan Massacre, May 13, 2005.
authors claimed that contrary to article 110 of the Kyrgyz CPC their placement
in custody was not authorised by the Kyrgyz prosecutor and was done in the
absence of their counsel and therefore violated relevant domestic provisions.
In the absence of a reply from the State party, due weight must be given to the
authors’ allegations, to the extent that they are substantiated, and it must be
assumed that the events occurred as described by the authors. Consequently,
the Committee [found] a violation of article 9, paragraphs 1, of the Covenant.
12.3 Under the above circumstances and in the light of the finding of a
violation of article 9, paragraph 1, the Committee [did] not deem it neces-
sary to separately examine the authors’ claims under article 9, paragraph 3.
12.4 As to whether the authors’ extradition from Kyrgyzstan to Uzbekistan
exposed them to a real risk of torture or other ill-treatment in the receiving
State, in breach of the prohibition of refoulement contained in article 7 of the
Covenant, the Committee observe[d] that the existence of such a real risk must
be decided in the light of the information that was known, or ought to [had]
been known, to the State party’s authorities at the time of the extradition, and
[did] not require proof of actual torture having subsequently occurred although
information as to subsequent events is relevant to the assessment of initial risk.
In determining the risk of such treatment in the present cases, the Committee
must consider all relevant elements. The existence of assurances, their content
and the existence and implementation of enforcement mechanisms are all ele-
ments which are relevant to the overall determination of whether, in fact, a real
risk of proscribed ill-treatment existed. In this regard, the Committee reiterate[d]
that States parties must not expose individuals to the danger of torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon return to another country
by way of their extradition, expulsion or refoulement.174 This principle should
not be subject to any balancing with considerations of national security or the
type of criminal conduct an individual is accused or suspected of.
12.5 The Committee consider[ed] at the outset that it was known, or should
have been known, to the State party’s authorities at the time of the authors’ extra-
dition that there were widely noted and credible public reports that Uzbekistan
resorted to consistent and widespread use of torture against detainees175 and
that the risk of such treatment was usually high in the case of detainees held for
174
Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20: Prohibition of torture and
cruel treatment or punishment (article 7), 10 March 1992 (HRI/GEN/1/Rev.8),
para.9.
175
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the question of torture, Theo van Boven, on the
mission to Uzbekistan (E/CN.4/2003/68/Add.2); and the OHCHR Report on the Mis-
sion to Kyrgyzstan concerning the events in Andijan, Uzbekistan,[citation omitted].
political and security reasons. In the Committee’s view, these elements in their
combination show[ed] that the authors faced a real risk of torture in Uzbekistan if
extradited. Moreover, the offences for which the authors were sought by Uzbeki-
stan were punishable by death in that country. Given the risk of a conviction and
death sentence being procured by treatment incompatible with article 7, there
was also a similar risk of a violation of article 6, paragraph 2, of the Covenant.
The procurement of assurances from the Uzbek General Prosecutor’s Office,
which, moreover, contained no concrete mechanism for their enforcement,
was insufficient to protect against such risk. The Committee reiterate[d] that at
the very minimum, the assurances procured should contain such a monitoring
mechanism and be safeguarded by arrangements made outside the text of the
assurances themselves which would provide for their effective implementation.176
12.6 The Committee recall[ed]177 that if a State party remove[d] a person
within its jurisdiction to another jurisdiction and there are substantial grounds
for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm in the other jurisdic-
tion, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant, the State
party itself may be in violation of the Covenant. Since the State party [had]
not shown that the assurances procured from Uzbekistan were sufficient to
eliminate the risk of torture and of imposition of the death penalty consistent
with the requirements of article 6, paragraph 2, and article 7, the Committee
conclude[d] that the authors’ extradition thus amounted to a violation of
article 6, paragraph 2, and article 7 of the Covenant.
12.7 As to the claim that no effective remedies were available to chal-
lenge the Kyrgyz General Prosecutor’s extradition decision of 8 August 2006,
the Committee note[d] that given the presence of a real risk of torture and
of imposition of the death penalty, article 2 of the Covenant, read together
with article 6, paragraph 2, and article 7, require[d] that an effective remedy
be available for violations of the latter provisions. In this regard, the Com-
mittee note[d] that all of the authors’ proceedings in the State party’s courts
were related to asylum, and not to extradition proceedings. It further note[d]
that Kyrgyz laws [did] not allow for judicial review of the General Prosecu-
tor’s extradition decisions before the extradition takes place and that in the
case of the authors these decisions were implemented the following day. The
176
See, Communication No. 1416/2005, Alzery v. Sweden, Views adopted on 25 Oc-
tober 2006, para.11.5.
177
Communication No.469/1991, Ng v. Canada, Views adopted on 5 November 1993,
para. 6.2; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 29 March
2004 (HRI/GEN/1/Rev.8), para. 12.
178
See, Alzery v. Sweden, [citation omitted].
179
Ismayilov v. Azerbaijan, Application no. 4439/04, § 38, European Court of Human
Rights, 17 January 2008.
not independent and impartial, and that the domestic remedies were not
effective in lawsuits filed by public associations against the Ministry of Justice
of Azerbaijan.
The Law
I. Alleged Violation of Article 11 of the Convention
***
B. Merits
1. The parties’ submissions.
43. The Government argued that there had been no interference with
the applicant’s freedom of association,…
44. Moreover, the Government argued that the lack of the status of a
legal entity did not prevent the association from continuing its activities. In
this connection, they noted that the association had published a book as a
part of its actual activity even without a status of a legal entity.
45. The Government further submitted that the founders “did not com-
ply with the duty of diligence” during the registration process, as the public
association’s constituent documents had not been prepared in accordance
with the requirements of the law. Even if the Ministry had committed proce-
dural errors, they had not amounted to a violation of the applicant’s rights
under Article 11.
46. The applicant argued that the delay in responding to the founders’
registration requests,… had constituted … a violation of, his right to freedom
of association, Article 11….
47. The applicant also noted that, without acquiring the status of a legal
entity through state registration, the association had been unable to function
properly and to engage in its primary activities. As for the book to which the
Government referred, the applicant noted that the book had not been pub-
lished by the Public Association “Humanity and Environment.” He stated that
he was one of the co-authors of the book, and the name of the unregistered
association was mentioned next to his name simply to show his occupation
and activities in the field of non-governmental organisations.
2. The Court’s assessment
48. The Court has found previously that the failure by the Ministry of
Justice to reply, within the statutory time-limits, to requests for state regis-
tration of a public association, amounted to a de facto refusal to register the
association. Lacking the status of a legal entity, the association’s legal capacity
180
Raihon Hudoyberganova v. Uzbekistan, Communication No. 931/2000, Decision of
the Human Rights Committee, UN Doc CCPR/C/82/D/931/2000 (5 November 2004).
touch with a dangerous religious group which could damage her and that she
wore the hijab in the Institute and refused to leave her courses. The father,
due to her mother serious illness, took his daughter home. She returned to
the Institute on 1 December 1997 and the Deputy Dean on Ideological and
Educational matters called her parents and complained about her attire; al-
legedly, following this she was threatened and there were attempts to prevent
her from attending the lectures.
2.3 On 17 January 1998, she was informed that new regulations of the
Institute have been adopted, under which students had no right to wear
religious dress and she was requested to sign them. She signed them but
wrote that she disagreed with the provisions which prohibited students from
covering their faces. The next day, the Deputy Dean on Ideological and Edu-
cational matters called her to his office during a lecture and showed her the
new regulations again and asked her to take off her headscarf. On 29 January
the Deputy Dean called the author’s parents and convoked them, allegedly
because Ms. Hudoyberganova was excluded from the students’ residence. On
20 February 1998, she was transferred from the Islamic Affairs Department
to the Faculty of languages. She was told that the Islamic Department was
closed, and that it was possible to re-open it only if the students concerned
ceased wearing the hijab.
2.4 On 25 March 1998, the Dean of the Farsi Department informed the
author of an Order by which the Rector had excluded her from the Institute.
The decision was based on the author’s alleged negative attitude towards
the professors and on a violation of the provisions of the regulations of the
Institute. She was told that if she changed her mind about the hijab, the order
would be annulled.
2.5 [The Author filed court challenges]. On 15 July 1998, the author filed
an appeal against the District’s court decision (of 30 June 1998) in the Tash-
kent City Court and on 10 September, the City Court upheld the decision. At
the end of 1998 and in January 1999, she complained to the Parliament, to
the President of the Republic, and to the Supreme Court; the Parliament and
the President’s administration transmitted her letters to the Supreme Court.
On 3 February 1999 and on 23 March 1999, the Supreme Court informed her
that it could find no reasons to challenge the courts’ decisions in her case.
2.6 On 23 February 1999, she complained to the Ombudsman, and on 26
March 1999 received a copy of the reply to the Ombudsman of the Institute’s
Rector, where the Rector reiterated that Ms. Hudoyberganova constantly
violated the Institute’s regulations and behaved inappropriately with her
professors, that her acts showed that she belonged to an extremist organisa-
tion of Wahabits, and that he had no reason to readmit her as student. [She
exhausted all appeals].
State party’s observations
…4.2 The State party explains that according to the Court’s civil case, it
transpired that the author was admitted in the Faculty of Languages in the
Institute in 1995, and in 1996 she continued her studies in the Faculty of
History (Islamic Department). According to paragraph 2 (d) of the Internal
Regulations (regulating the rights and obligations of the Institute’s students),
in the Institute, students are forbidden to wear clothes “attracting undue at-
tention,” and forbidden to circulate with the face covered (with a hijab). This
regulation was discussed at a general meeting of all students on 15 January
1998. The author was presented the text and she made a note that she dis-
agrees with the requirements of paragraph 2 (d). On 26 January 1998, the
Dean of the Faculty of History warned her that she violated the provisions of
paragraph 2 (d), of the Institute’s regulations. The author refused to sign the
warning and a record in this respect was made on 27 January 1998.
4.3 On 10 February 1998, by order of the Dean of the Faculty of History,
the author was reprimanded for infringement of the Internal Regulations. By
order of the Rector of the Institute of 16 March 1998, Ms. Hudayberganova
was excluded from the Institute. The order was grounded on the “rough im-
moral attitude toward a teacher and infringement of the internal regulations
of the Institute, after numerous warnings.” According to the State party, no
cassation appeal was introduced against this decision. Her claim under the
supervisory procedure (nadzornaya zhaloba) gave no result….
Examination of the merits
6.2 The Committee has noted the author’s claim that her right to free-
dom of thought, conscience and religion was violated as she was excluded
from University because she refused to remove the headscarf that she wore
in accordance with her beliefs. The Committee considers that the freedom
to manifest one’s religion encompasses the right to wear clothes or attire in
public which is in conformity with the individual’s faith or religion. Further-
more, it considers that to prevent a person from wearing religious clothing in
public or private may constitute a violation of article 18, paragraph 2, which
prohibits any coercion that would impair the individual’s freedom to have or
adopt a religion. As reflected in the Committee’s General Comment No. 22
(para.5), policies or practices that have the same intention or effect as direct
coercion, such as those restricting access to education, are inconsistent with
article 18, paragraph 2. It recalls, however, that the freedom to manifest one’s
religion or beliefs is not absolute and may be subject to limitations, which are
prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or
morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others (article 18, para-
graph 3, of the Covenant). In the present case, the author’s exclusion took
place on 15 March 1998, and was based on the provisions of the Institute’s
new regulations. The Committee notes that the State party has not invoked
any specific ground for which the restriction imposed on the author would
in its view be necessary in the meaning of article 18, paragraph 3. Instead, the
State party has sought to justify the expulsion of the author from University
because of her refusal to comply with the ban. Neither the author nor the
State party have specified what precise kind of attire the author wore and
which was referred to as “hijab” by both parties. In the particular circum-
stances of the present case, and without either prejudging the right of a State
party to limit expressions of religion and belief in the context of article 18
of the Covenant and duly taking into account the specifics of the context,
or prejudging the right of academic institutions to adopt specific regulations
relating to their own functioning, the Committee is led to conclude, in the
absence of any justification provided by the State party, that there has been
a violation of article 18, paragraph 2.
7. The Human Rights Committee, acting under article 5, paragraph 4, of
the Optional Protocol to the Covenant, is of the view that the facts before it
disclose a violation of article 18, paragraph 2, of the Covenant.
Individual opinion (dissenting) by Committee member Mr. Hipolito
Solari-Yrigoyen
My dissenting opinion regarding this communication is based on the
following grounds:
In order to comply with the provisions of article 5, paragraph 1, of the
Optional Protocol, the communication should be studied in the light of all
the information supplied by the parties. In the present case, it is the author
who has provided most of the information, although her statements fail to
underpin her own allegations, and even contradict them.
According to the author (para. 2.4), she was excluded from the Tashkent
State Institute for Eastern Languages by the Rector, after numerous warnings,
on the following grounds:
1. Her negative attitude towards the teaching staff;
2. Her infringement of the regulations of the Institute.
Regarding her negative attitude towards the teachers, the decision of
Mirabad district court revealed that the author had accused one of the teach-
***
2.1 On 3 March 2004, the Youth Human Rights Group (YHRG), a public
association for which the author works as a legal consultant, requested the
Central Directorate of Corrections (CDC) of the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) to
provide it with information on the number of individuals sentenced to death
in Kyrgyzstan as of 31 December 2003, as well as on the number of individuals
sentenced to death and currently detained in the penitentiary system…. On
5 April 2004, the CDC refused to provide this information, due to its clas-
sification as ‘confidential’ and ‘top secret’ by the by-laws of the Kyrgyzstan.
2.3 The author argued that the information on individuals sentenced to
death had to do with human rights and fundamental freedoms and that its
disclosure could not have had any negative impact on defence capability,
safety, or economic and political interests of the State. Therefore, it did not
fulfil the criteria in article 5 of the Law ‘On protection of state secrets’ for it
181
Nurbek Toktakunov v. Kyrgyzstan, Communication No. 1470/2006, Decision of the
Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/101/D/1470/2006 (28 March 2011).
which included a list of data within the system of the CDC of the MoJ that
would be subject to classification as secret. This new list was expected to be
endorsed at a later stage by relevant state bodies. Thus, the MoJ concluded that
the refusal to provide information on the number of individuals sentenced
to death was justified and in compliance with the law in force.
The complaint
…3.2 The author further claims that, by failing to provide him with an
effective judicial remedy for a violation of his right of access to information,
the State party’s authorities have also violated his rights under article 2, read
together with article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant.
State party’s observations on the merits
4.1 On 26 July 2006, the State party submits that, according to the infor-
mation provided by the CDC of the MoJ, general data on the mortality rates in
the penitentiary system, as well as data on individuals sentenced to death, has
been declassified and pursuant to the by-laws it can now be used exclusively
‘for service purposes’. This information remains confidential for the press….
Author’s comments on the State party’s observations
…5.2 The author argues that the data on individuals sentenced to death
cannot be considered declassified as long as the general public’s and press’
access to such data is restricted by the by-laws.
Issues and proceedings before the Committee
Consideration of admissibility
…6.3 The Committee… notes that the reference to the right to ‘seek’ and
‘receive’ ‘information’ as contained in article 19, paragraph 2, of the Covenant,
includes the right of individuals to receive State-held information, with the
exceptions permitted by the restrictions established in the Covenant. It ob-
serves that the information should be provided without the need to prove
direct interest or personal involvement in order to obtain it, except in cases
in which a legitimate restriction is applied….
Consideration of the merits
7.2 The Committee notes that, in its submission on the author’s allega-
tions, the State party has not addressed any of the arguments raised by him
in the communication to the Committee with regard to article 19, paragraph
2, of the Covenant. The State has merely stated that ‘data on individuals sen-
tenced to death had been declassified’ and that ‘pursuant to the by-laws it
could be used exclusively for service purposes’ but remained confidential for
the press. In the absence of any other pertinent information from the State
party, due weight must be given to the author’s allegations, to the extent that
they have been properly substantiated….
8. The Human Rights Committee, acting under article 5, paragraph 4, of
the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, is of the view that the facts before it disclose a violation by the State
party of article 19, paragraph 2….
Individual opinion by Committee member, Mr. Gerald L. Neuman, (con-
curring)
I agree with the Committee that the State party has violated the author’s
rights under Article 19(2) with regard to the requested information….
The traditional right to receive information and ideas from a willing
speaker should not be diluted by subsuming it in the newer right of ac-
cess to information held by government. This modern form of “freedom
of information” raises complexities and concerns that can justify limita-
tions on the satisfaction of the right, based on considerations such as cost
or the impairment of government functions, in circumstances where the
suppression of a similar voluntary communication would not be justified.
In explaining and applying the right of access, it is important to observe
this distinction, and to be careful not to undermine more central aspects
of freedom of expression.
Freedom of Elections
United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights
(1948)
***
Article 21.
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country,
directly or through freely chosen representatives.
(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.
(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of govern-
ment; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which
shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or
by equivalent free voting procedures.
***
Article 3
The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reason-
able intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free
expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.
182
Application no. 9267/81, 2 March 1987, available at: http://www.math.uni-augs-
burg.de/stochastik/bazi/ECHR-Mathieu.pdf.
mentary oath in French and will accordingly join the French-language group in
the House of Representatives or the Senate and sit on the French Community
Council, or else for candidates who will take the oath in Dutch and so belong
to the Dutch-language group in the House of Representatives or the Senate
and sit on the Flemish Council. This is not a disproportionate limitation such
as would thwart “the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice
of the legislature” (see paragraphs 51, 52 and 53 in fine above).
The Court accordingly finds that there has been no breach of Article 3 of
Protocol No. 1 (P1-3) taken alone….
Joint Dissenting Opinion Of Judges Cremona, Bindschedler-Robert, Bern-
hardt, Spielmann and Valticos
To our regret we are unable to share the opinion of the majority of the
Court, since it appears to us that in law the position in which the French-
speaking electorate and the French-speaking elected representatives of the
administrative district of Halle-Vilvoorde are placed is not compatible with
Belgium’s obligations under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-3), whether taken
by itself or together with Article 14 (art. 14+P1-3) of the Convention.
The system currently in force in respect of that district (which as an
administrative district comes within the Flemish Region, while for electoral
purposes - with different boundaries - it is part of the electoral district of
Brussels) has the effect in substance, under the Special Act of 8 August 1980
(section 29(1)), that the members of the House of Representatives and the
Senate elected in the district of Halle-Vilvoorde cannot, if they take the
parliamentary oath in French, sit on the Flemish Council (a body which in-
disputably has legislative powers) and are therefore unable to defend their
Region’s interests in a number of important fields (such as regional planning,
environment, housing, economic policy, energy and employment), whereas
elected representatives who take the oath in Dutch are automatically mem-
bers of the Flemish Council. Halle-Vilvoorde has a population of more than
100,000 French-speakers out of a total population of more than 500,000,
the average number of votes required to elect a member of the House of
Representatives varying from 22,000 to 25,000.
The practical consequence is that unless they vote for Dutch-speaking
candidates, the French-speaking voters in this district will not be represented
on the Flemish Council.
In our opinion, such a situation, excluding, as it does in practice, representa-
tion of the French-speaking electorate of Halle-Vilvoorde at regional level, does
not ensure “the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of
***
IV. Internally Displaced Persons
Victims of natural disasters who are generally displaced inside their
country of origin often seek to return to their community when safe, rather
than engage in permanent migration or relocation. That is, people tend to
move temporarily to nearby urban centers to cope with the disaster, seek-
ing employment and aid until they are able to return.184 The World Health
183
Michelle Leighton, “Population displacement, relocation, and migration,” The
Law of Adaptation to Climate Change U.S. and International Aspects, eds., Michael
Gerrard and Katrina Kuh (June 2012, American Bar Association, Washington D.C.),
[reprinted with permission of the author, editors and American Bar Association].
184
Oliver-Smith, A. 2009. Climate change and population displacement: disasters and
diasporas in the twenty first century. In Crate, S. & Nuttall, M. eds., Anthropology
and Climate Change: From Encounters to Actions. Left Coast Press. Walnut Creek.
185
World Health Organization, Family, Health and Research, statistics published by
WHO, see http://www.searo.who.int/en/Section13/Section390_8282.htm.
186
Trends in World Migration, [citation omitted].
187
See, e.g., Skeldon,[citation omitted].
188
Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Inter-
nally Displaced persons, Francis Deng, on Guiding Principles on Internal Displace-
ment, (“Guiding Principles on IDPs”), Feb. 11, 1998, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2.
189
Id.
they apply to “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged
to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence as a result of or in
order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence,
violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have
not crossed an internationally recognized state border.”190
The IDP principles codify the state’s human rights obligations towards
those displaced in its territory, including the right to life, dignity and se-
curity of persons displaced. IDPs have the right to move to other parts of
the country or to leave their country, to have their family members remain
together or be reunited if separated. They have the right to an adequate
standard of living, food, water, basic shelter and housing, property restitu-
tion, essential medical services and sanitation and they continue to enjoy
the right to seek employment and participate in economic activities.191
The principles reiterate that governments are prohibited from discrimi-
nating against IDPs in the distribution of aid or other treatment and must
adhere to human rights protections in the resettlement and reintegration
of IDPs.192
Studies suggest that there are gender differences in disaster impacts that
raise issues of discrimination. Women suffer higher mortality rates than men
during and after disasters. Earlier discrimination trends against women or
other minorities tends to be exacerbated, and human trafficking may also
increase in the wake of disasters.193 The principles require governments to
consider these issues in disaster management.
Most governments appear to accept these principles, evidenced by a
number of recent confirmations as to their importance and adoption by the
190
Id.
191
See also, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on
the relationship between climate change and human rights, at 19, U.N. Doc. A/
HRC/10/61 (15 Jan. 2009).
192
The Human Rights Committee and Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimina-
tion have also commented on the key issues of concern related to a government’s
discriminatory treatment of those displaced. See, e.g., Concluding Observations of
these bodies relating to treatment of displaced persons after Hurricane Katrina in
relation to the right of return, housing and other assistance by the United States
(para 26, CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1, Concluding Observations on United States,
2006) and Convention on Elimination of Racial Discrimination (para 31, CERD/C/
USA/CO/6, Concluding Observations on United States, 2008).
193
Neumayer, E. and Plumper, T., 2007. The gendered nature of natural disasters: the
impact of catastrophic events on the gender gap in life expectancy 1981-2002.
(available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=874965).
OSCE…194 Most recently, the IDP principles served as the foundation for the
African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally
Displaced Persons in Africa (“Kampala Convention”) concluded in Novem-
ber, 2009. The Kampala Convention recognizes that climate change may
cause internal displacement and provides detailed description of govern-
ment obligations, including reparations for failure to act, and encourages
non-governmental and other assistance in the region for IDPs when a state
affected by disaster is unable to provide full assistance.
Under human rights doctrine, governments may violate their international
treaty and customary law obligations if they fail to prevent disasters or im-
pacts where such harm is foreseeable. International treaty bodies, including
the Human Rights Committee (established to monitor implementation of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), the Inter-American
Commission and Court of Human Rights, and the European Court of Human
Rights, have reinforced this principle through legal declarations and decisions
that discuss the state’s positive obligation to take precautions against foresee-
able harm.195 In one prominent case, the European Court found a violation
for foreseeable environmental harm. After several storms led to devastating
mudslides in the Central Caucuses region, the local government’s failure to
repair infrastructure, prepare the public, or take other public safety measures
to prevent harm, led to extreme vulnerability of the community during the
next storm. This resulted in more death and injury, as well as property de-
struction that left many in the community without homes. Russia was found
in violation of its treaty obligations before the European Court of Human
Rights because it knew the potential but failed to take measures that could
have reduced the damage to human life and property caused by the natural
disasters.196 As a member of the Council of Europe and party to the European
Convention on Human Rights, Russia is obligated to comply with decisions
of the European Court of Human Rights. The Court found similarly against
Turkey in a case involving foreseeable harm from a methane explosion.197
194
See, e.g., discussion of national adoption and OSCE incorporation in Neussl, P.,
Bridging the national and international response to IDPs, 20 Forced Migration
Review 42 (2004).
195
Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the rela-
tionship between climate change and human rights, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/61
(15 Jan. 2009).
196
Budayeva and others v. Russia, Applications nos. 153339/02, 21166/02, 20058/02,
European Court of Human Rights judgment of 20 March 2008.
197
Case of Öneryildiz v. Turkey, European Court of Human Rights, (2002), available
at: http://eu.vlex.com/vid/case-of-v-turkey-26840475.
198
See Recommendation 1614, Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, available
at: http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc04/
EDOC10041.htm.
199
Kalin, W. and Haenni Dale, C., “Disaster Risk Mitigation, Why Human Rights Mat-
ter,” Forced Migration Review 31 at 39, 2008.
200
Paul Hunt, State obligations, indicators, benchmarks and the right to education,
Background Paper submitted to the Office of the High Commission of Human Rights
(University of Waikato, New Zealand)(ICESCR Day of Discussion, Nov. 30, 1998).
In other words, the minimum core content will not be subject to the notions
of progressive realization and resource availability.
(c) The variable dimension. Given article 2 (1), it is difficult to resist the
conclusion that States parties’ obligations under the Covenant have a variable
or shifting dimension. Because of the progressive realization and resource
availability phrases, the precise content of at least some State obligations is
likely to vary from one State to another - and over time in relation to the
same State.
7. In these circumstances, it is important to establish effective techniques
and processes which are able to identify and monitor this variable dimension
of State obligations. Without such arrangements, article 2 (1) can provide
“recalcitrant States” with the “escape hatch” which Leckie warns us about. In
my view, indicators and benchmarks have a role to play in both identifying
and monitoring the variable component of States parties’ obligations under
the Covenant. The usefulness of indicators and benchmarks is not necessar-
ily confined to this third, variable dimension of States parties’ obligations.
They might also have a role, for example, in the definition of minimum core
content.
8. This also seems to be the position of CESCR which has remarked: “it
may be useful for States to identify specific benchmarks or goals against which
their performance in a given area can be assessed ... global benchmarks are of
limited use, whereas national or other more specific benchmarks can provide
an extremely valuable indication of progress.” (General Comment 1, para.6.)
Housing Rights
The Government of the Republic of South Africa, et al. v.
Grootboom 201
Yacoob, J.
A. Introduction
The people of South Africa are committed to the attainment of social
justice and the improvement of the quality of life for everyone....The Consti-
tution declares the founding values of our society to be “[h]uman dignity, the
achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms.”
This case grapples with the realisation of these aspirations for it concerns
201
Constitutional Court of South Africa, Case CCT 11/00, Judgment of 4 October 2000.
in the Western Cape in 1968. Despite the harsh application of influx control in
the Western Cape, African people continued to move to the area in search of
jobs. Colonial dispossession and a rigidly enforced racial distribution of land
in the rural areas had dislocated the rural economy and rendered sustainable
and independent African farming increasingly precarious. Given the absence
of formal housing, large numbers of people moved into informal settlements
throughout the Cape peninsula. The cycle of the apartheid era, therefore, was
one of untenable restrictions on the movement of African people into urban
areas, the inexorable tide of the rural poor to the cities, inadequate hous-
ing, resultant overcrowding, mushrooming squatter settlements, constant
harassment by officials and intermittent forced removals. Mrs. Grootboom
and most of the other respondents previously lived in an informal squatter
settlement called Wallacedene…. The conditions under which most of the
residents of Wallacedene lived were lamentable. . . . About half the popula-
tion were children; all lived in shacks. They had no water, sewage or refuse
removal services and only 5% of the shacks had electricity. The area is partly
waterlogged and lies dangerously close to a main thoroughfare.
Many had applied for subsidised low-cost housing from the municipality
and had been on the waiting list for as long as seven years. Despite numerous
enquiries from the municipality no definite answer was given. Clearly it was
going to be a long wait. Faced with the prospect of remaining in intolerable
conditions indefinitely, the respondents began to move out of Wallacedene at
the end of September 1998. They put up their shacks and shelters on vacant
land that was privately owned and had been earmarked for low-cost housing.
They called the land “New Rust.”
They did not have the consent of the owner and on 8 December 1998 he
obtained an ejectment order against them in the magistrates’ court. The order
was served on the occupants but they remained in occupation beyond the
date by which they had been ordered to vacate. Mrs. Grootboom says they had
nowhere else to go: their former sites in Wallacedene had been filled by others...
The validity of the eviction order has never been challenged and must be
accepted as correct. However, no mediation took place and on 18 May 1999,
at the beginning of the cold, windy and rainy Cape winter, the respondents
were forcibly evicted at the municipality’s expense. This was done prematurely
and inhumanely: reminiscent of apartheid-style evictions. The respondents’
homes were bulldozed and burnt and their possessions destroyed. Many of
the residents who were not there could not even salvage their personal be-
longings... The respondents went and sheltered on the Wallacedene sports
field under such temporary structures as they could muster.
worse, their possessions and building materials were not merely removed,
but destroyed and burnt….
In light of these conclusions…[t]he [court] order requires the state to
act to meet the obligation imposed upon it…This includes the obligation to
devise, fund, implement, and supervise measures to provide relief to those
in desparate need.
Labor Rights
Elida Nogoibaeva, “The Application of International
Labor Law in the Legal System of the Kyrgyz Republic”202
International law doctrine recognizes three basic theories of interrelation
between international law and the national legislation.203 The first, known
as the dualistic (pluralistic) theory according to which the international law
and the national legislation, are two separate legal systems which exist inde-
pendently from each other. This theory has been supported by works of such
scientists, as Dionisio Antsilotti and N. Тripel.204 Today in the world it is very
difficult to find examples of application dualistic or monistic approaches in
the pure state irrespective of what legal system to take as an example.
Another approach concerning a parity of international law and the na-
tional legislation is known as monistic theory. This doctrine understands both
international, and the internal law as a component of the same legal order.
One of the leaders of monistic doctrine is Hans Kelsen who looks at the state
as on the founder of international law, within the limits of fundamental laws
and the privileges received by the state as the subject of international law.
Examples of monistic theory are Holland or Switzerland as they consider the
national legislation and international law as equal parts of one system. The
international norms become a part of the Swiss legal system from the mo-
ment of their occurrence or the introduction into validity.205
202
Nogoibaeva E.K., Dean of IBL Department, AUCA [reprinted with permission of
the author].
203
P. Malanchuk, Современное Введение в Международное Право. Дуалистическая
и Монистическая теории, 7-ая дополненное издание(T. J. International Ltd,
Padstow, Cornwall, 1997), стр.63.
204
G. Gadja, Позитивизм и Дуализм у Дионисио Анцелотти, изд.3, Европейский
Журнал Международного Права(1992), стр. 134.
205
M. Shaw, Международное Право, 4-ое издание. A Grotius Publication Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge 1997, стр.100.
206
Взаимодействие между международным и национальным правом, совместное
мнение Федерального Офиса Правосудия и Директората по Международному
и Национальному Relation between international and domestic law, Joint opinion
of the Federal Office of Justice and the Directorate for International Law of 26
April 1989 in “Verwaltungspraxis der Bundesbehцrden,” http://www.eda.admin.
ch/sub_dipl/e/home/thema/intlaw/relat.html.
207
Art. 6, Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, June 27, 2010.
208
Law KR N 241 № 34 “О нормативно-правовых актах” от 20 июля 2009 года.
209
See, В редакции Закона КР от 30 марта 2009 года N 103.
210
Note, this law is no longer in force. Утратил силу с 4 августа 2004 г.
them has the right to make the decision and independently to vote, and all
delegates possess equal rights.
The ILO convention is a multilateral international contract which after
ratification and corresponding official publication joins in the legal system of
the Kyrgyz Republic, but does not lose the qualities of the international labor
norms. The convention, as well as the recommendation of the ILO acts as the
form of international legal regulation of labor, and the ILO is developed and
is accepted at the International Conference of Labor in an order established
by the Charter of the ILO211. At ratification of the convention, the state incurs
the obligation on its performance, and should accept the corresponding act
or incorporate conventional labor norms in the operating labor legislation,
LC of КR.
Right to Health
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Articles 11 and 12
Article 11
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of ev-
eryone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including
adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of
living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the
realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of
international co-operation based on free consent.
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing the fundamental
right of everyone to be free from hunger, shall take, individually and through
international co-operation, the measures, including specific programmes,
which are needed:
(a) To improve methods of production, conservation and
distribution of food by making full use of technical and
scientific knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the
principles of nutrition and by developing or reforming
agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the most
efficient development and utilization of natural resources;
211
“What is international labour law for?” Brian Langille. International Labour Orga-
nization (International Institute for Labour Studies) 2005. С. 15.
3. The right to health is closely related to and dependent upon the realization
of other human rights, as contained in the International Bill of Rights, including
the rights to food, housing, work, education, human dignity, life, non-discrimina-
tion, equality, the prohibition against torture, privacy, access to information, and
the freedoms of association, assembly and movement. These and other rights
and freedoms address integral components of the right to health….
5. The Committee is aware that, for millions of people throughout the
world, the full enjoyment of the right to health still remains a distant goal.
Moreover, in many cases, especially for those living in poverty, this goal is
becoming increasingly remote. The Committee recognizes the formidable
structural and other obstacles resulting from international and other factors
beyond the control of States that impede the full realization of article 12 in
many States parties….
I. NORMATIVE CONTENT OF ARTICLE 12
…9. The notion of “the highest attainable standard of health” in article
12.1 takes into account both the individual’s biological and socio-economic
preconditions and a State’s available resources. There are a number of aspects
which cannot be addressed solely within the relationship between States and
individuals; in particular, good health cannot be ensured by a State, nor can
States provide protection against every possible cause of human ill health.
Thus, genetic factors, individual susceptibility to ill health and the adoption
of unhealthy or risky lifestyles may play an important role with respect to an
individual’s health. Consequently, the right to health must be understood as a
right to the enjoyment of a variety of facilities, goods, services and conditions
necessary for the realization of the highest attainable standard of health….
11. The Committee interprets the right to health, as defined in article 12.1,
as an inclusive right extending not only to timely and appropriate health
care but also to the underlying determinants of health, such as access to safe
and potable water and adequate sanitation, an adequate supply of safe food,
nutrition and housing, healthy occupational and environmental conditions,
and access to health-related education and information, including on sexual
and reproductive health. A further important aspect is the participation of the
population in all health-related decision-making at the community, national
and international levels….
II. STATES PARTIES’ OBLIGATIONS
General legal obligations
30. While the Covenant provides for progressive realization and acknowl-
edges the constraints due to the limits of available resources, it also imposes
***
The legal bases of the right to water
2. The human right to water entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, accept-
able, physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic
uses. An adequate amount of safe water is necessary to prevent death from
dehydration, to reduce the risk of water-related disease and to provide for
consumption, cooking, personal and domestic hygienic requirements.
212
Arts. 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.
213
OHCHR Fact Sheet available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4ca45fed2.
html.
214
WaterAid Ethiopia and Progynist, “Making the links: Mapping the relationship be-
tween water, hygiene and sanitation and HIV/AIDS—a joint think piece” (2004).
Available from www.wateraid.org.
be avoided. All these things require extra water, yet this is something that is
not always readily available.
Right to Food
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Fact
Sheet No. 34
***
The right to food in international law
The right to food is a human right recognized by international human
rights law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes, in the
context of an adequate standard of living, that: “Everyone has the right to a
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of
his family, including food, ...” (art. 25).
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
which is part of the International Bill of Human Rights, recognizes the right
to adequate food as an essential part of the right to an adequate standard
of living (art. 11 (1)). It also explicitly recognizes “the fundamental right of
everyone to be free from hunger” (art. 11 (2))….
The right to food is also recognized in other international conventions
protecting specific groups, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979),10 the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (1989)11 and the Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities (2006).12 The right to food is also recognized in some region-
al instruments, such as the Additional Protocol to the American Convention
on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, known
as the Protocol of San Salvador (1988),13 the African Charter on the Rights
and Welfare of the Child (1990)14 and the Protocol to the African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (2003).
The right to food is also recognized implicitly through other rights. The
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has interpreted the right
to food as being implicitly protected under the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights (1981) through the right to life, the right to health, and
the right to economic, social and cultural development.
Group Rights
Ethnic Minorities
or social origin, and birth or other status. Important safeguards from which
individual members of minorities stand to benefit include recognition as a
person before the law, equality before the courts, equality before the law, and
equal protection of the law, in addition to the important rights of freedom
of religion, expression and association.
Non-discrimination provisions are contained in the United Nations
Charter of 1945 (arts. 1 and 55), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
of 1948 (art. 2) and the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights
and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 (art. 2). Such provisions
also appear in a number of specialized international instruments, includ-
ing: ILO Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment
and Occupation No. 111 of 1958 (art. 1); International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1965 (art. 1); UNESCO
Convention against Discrimination in Education of 1960 (art. 1); UNESCO
Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice of 1978 (arts. 1, 2 and 3); Declara-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination
based on Religion or Belief of 1981 (art. 2); and the Convention on the Rights
of the Child of 1989 (art. 2).
Non-discrimination clauses are also included in all of the basic regional
human rights documents, such as the European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the European Social
Charter and the Framework Convention on National Minorities (Council of
Europe), the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on
the Human Dimension of the OSCE (Organization for Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe); the American Convention on Human Rights (Organization
of American States); and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(Organization of African Unity).
Special rights for minorities
What are special rights?
Special rights are not privileges but they are granted to make it possible
for minorities to preserve their identity, characteristics and traditions. Spe-
cial rights are just as important in achieving equality of treatment as non-
discrimination. Only when minorities are able to use their own languages,
benefit from services they have themselves organized, as well as take part in
the political and economic life of States can they begin to achieve the status
which majorities take for granted. Differences in the treatment of such groups,
or individuals belonging to them, is justified if it is exercised to promote ef-
fective equality and the welfare of the community as a whole. (4) This form
of affirmative action may have to be sustained over a prolonged period in
215
Application 4916/07, 21 October 2010.
on grounds of public order, for the prevention of riots and the protection of
health, morals and the rights and freedoms of others.
Along with official decisions, mass media repeatedly quoted the words
of the mayor and his employees that no gay parade would be allowed in
Moscow under any circumstances, “as long as he was the city mayor.” Ad-
ditionally, the mayor called for an “active mass-media campaign and social
commercials with the use of petitions brought by individuals and religious
organizations” against the marches.
Having received the refusals, the organizers tried to picket the same date
and time as the march. However, the picket was refused permission on the
same grounds as those given for the refusal to hold the march. Alekseyev
unsuccessfully challenged these decisions before a court.
Relying on Articles 11, 13 and 14 of ECHR, the applicant alleged a violation
of his right to peaceful assembly on account of the repeated ban on public
events. He also complained that he had not had an effective remedy against
the alleged violation of his freedom of assembly and that the Moscow authori-
ties’ treatment of his applications to hold the events had been discriminatory.
Decision
The court found a violation of article 11 of ECHR. It stated that this
norm protects the right to hold peaceful demonstration that may annoy or
cause offence to persons opposed to the ideas or claims that it is seeking to
promote. The court also emphasized that the participants must be able to
hold the demonstration without having to fear that they will be subjected to
physical violence by their opponents. However, the mere existence of a risk
is insufficient for banning the event.
Moscow authorities systematically during three years inadequately as-
sessed the risks of security for the participants and public order. Though
counter-protesters indeed could go on the street against the marches, the
authorities of Moscow city could have made arrangements to ensure that both
events proceeded peacefully and lawfully, allowing both sides to achieve the
goal of expressing their views without clashing with each other.
The Court also noted that security risks played a secondary role in the
authorities’ decision to impose the ban, they were in any event secondary to
considerations of public morals. The Court further reiterates that it would
be incompatible with the underlying values of the Convention if the exer-
cise of Convention rights by a minority group were made conditional on its
being accepted by the majority. The purpose of the marches and picketing,
as declared in the notices of the events, was to promote respect for human
rights and freedoms and to call for tolerance towards sexual minorities. The
marches were not aimed to exhibit nudity, engage in sexually provocative
behaviour or criticise public morals or religious views. There is no ambigu-
ity about the other member States’ recognition of the right of individuals to
openly identify themselves as gay, lesbian or any other sexual minority, and to
promote their rights and freedoms, in particular by exercising their freedom
of peaceful assembly.
Consequently, that the ban on the events for marches on gays’ rights and
pickets was not necessary in a democratic society and is a violation of Article
11 of the Convention….
Concerning Article 14 of the Convention, it has been established that the
main reason for the ban imposed on the events organised by the applicant
was the authorities’ disapproval of demonstrations which they considered to
promote homosexuality. The Government did not provide any justification
showing that the impugned distinction was compatible with the standards
of the Convention, the Court also considers it established that the applicant
suffered discrimination on the grounds of his sexual orientation. Therefore,
there has been a violation of Article 14….
108. The Court reiterates that sexual orientation is a concept covered by
Article 14 (see, among other cases, Kozak v. Poland, no. 13102/02, 2 March
2010). Furthermore, when the distinction in question operates in this intimate
and vulnerable sphere of an individual’s private life, particularly weighty rea-
sons need to be advanced before the Court to justify the measure complained
of. Where a difference of treatment is based on sex or sexual orientation the
margin of appreciation afforded to the State is narrow, and in such situations
the principle of proportionality does not merely require the measure chosen
to be suitable in general for realising the aim sought; it must also be shown
that it was necessary in the circumstances. Indeed, if the reasons advanced for
a difference in treatment were based solely on the applicant’s sexual orienta-
tion, this would amount to discrimination under the Convention (ibid, § 92).
109. It has been established above that the main reason for the ban im-
posed on the events organised by the applicant was the authorities’ disap-
proval of demonstrations which they considered to promote homosexuality
(see paragraphs 77-78 and 82 above). In particular, the Court cannot disregard
the strong personal opinions publicly expressed by the mayor of Moscow
and the undeniable link between these statements and the ban. In the light
of these findings the Court also considers it established that the applicant
suffered discrimination on the grounds of his sexual orientation and that
of other participants in the proposed events. It further considers that the
Government did not provide any justification showing that the impugned
distinction was compatible with the standards of the Convention.
110. Accordingly, the Court considers that in the present case there has
been a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 11 of the Convention.
Rights of Children
The Convention on the Rights of the Child216
The Convention on the Rights of the Child is a universally agreed set of
standards and obligations which place children center-stage in the quest for
a just, respectful and peaceful society.
It spells out the basic human rights for all children, everywhere, all the
time: the right to survival; to develop to the fullest; to protection from harmful
influences, abuse and exploitation; and to participate fully in family, cultural
and social life. The Convention protects these rights by setting standards in
health care, education as well as legal, civil and social services. These standards
are benchmarks against which progress can be assessed and States that ratify
the Convention are obliged to keep the best interests of the child in mind in
their actions and policies.
The Convention rests on four foundation principles:
1. non-discrimination (article 2);
2. best interests of the child (article 3);
3. the child’s right to life, survival and development (article 6);
4. and respect for the views of the child (article 12).
Every child – regardless of where they are born, the race or ethnic group
they belong to, whether they are a boy or girl, rich or poor – must have a full
opportunity to become a productive member of society and must have the
right to speak up and be heard.
The Convention defines a child as a boy or girl under the age of 18 and
considers a child as both an individual as well as a member of a family and a
community. A child is a human being with the full range of rights.
216
Excerpt from UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/specialsession/rights/index.html.
217
2 February 2007, CRC/C/OPSC/KGZ/CO/1.
including all purposes and forms of the Sale of Children, Child Pornography
and Child...[T]he Committee recommends that the State party undertake a
legal study…to identify inconsistencies and gaps between the national legal
system and the Protocol and to seek assistance from UNICEF and other rel-
evant international organisations….
17. The Committee welcomes recent attempts to conduct investigations
and prosecutions for incidents involving the Sale of Children and Child
Prostitution. However, the Committee remains concerned that in a number
of cases investigations and prosecutions have not been initiated.
18. The Committee recommends that the State party increase the num-
ber of investigations and prosecutions for incidents involving the Sale of
Children and Child Prostitution and especially for Pornography and make
the data available.
19. The Committee is concerned that the provisions of article 8 of the
Optional Protocol have not been adequately integrated into the relevant
laws of the State party, in particular that the status of the victim is not well
defined in the Criminal Code and the Code of the Kyrgyz Republic on Children
and that legislation fails to provide clear sanctions for physical and psycho-
logical pressure during interrogations. It is further concerned that measures
undertaken, for the physical and psychological recovery of child victims of
sale, child prostitution and child pornography are exclusively carried out by
non-governmental organizations and…no funds are specifically allocated by
the State party for the support of child victims.
20. The Committee recommends that the State party:
a) …protect child victims and witnesses at all stages of the criminal justice
process, by taking into account the UN Guidelines on Justice in Matters involv-
ing Child Victims and Witnesses of Crime (ECOSOC Resolution No. 2005/20);
b) collaborate with non-governmental organizations and IOM to ensure
that adequate services are available for child victims…;
c) ensure that all child victims of the offences described in the Protocol
have access to adequate procedures to seek, without discrimination, com-
pensation for damages from those legally responsible,…; and
d) allocate adequate founds to programmes and measures necessary for
the rehabilitation of child victims.
21. The Committee is deeply concerned about the information that child
victims of crimes…are often stigmatized and socially marginalized and may
be held responsible, tried and placed in detention.
22. The Committee recommends that the State party ensure that child
victims of exploitation and abuse are neither criminalized nor penalized….
23. The Committee recommends that the State party establish…a 24-hour,
toll-free helpline number to assist child victims…[I]t recommends…the State
party ensure…children are aware of and can access the helpline, and facilitate
the collaboration of the helpline with child-focused NGOs, the police, health
and social workers.
25. The Committee remains concerned about allegations of complicity
by State officials in trafficking and that corruption impedes the effectiveness
of prevention measures.
27. The Committee is especially concerned about the difficult situation
of certain groups of children, such as street children and working children,
who are particularly vulnerable to all forms of exploitation.
28. The Committee recommends that the State party pay particular atten-
tion to the situation of vulnerable groups of children who are at particular risk
of being exploited and abused. In this respect it recommends that the State
party allocate adequate human and financial resources for the implementa-
tion of programmes for the protection of the rights of vulnerable children,
with special attention to their education and health care. More attention
should also be devoted to raising awareness among these children of their
rights.
Rights of Women
Overview of Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women218
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly, is often described as
an international bill of rights for women. Consisting of a preamble and 30
articles, it defines what constitutes discrimination against women and sets
up an agenda for national action to end such discrimination.
The Convention defines discrimination against women as “...any distinc-
tion, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect
or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise
218
U.N. Division for the Advancement of Women: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/
daw/cedaw/.
219
A.S. v Hungary, Communication No. 4/2004,Decision of the Committee on Elimi-
nation of Discrimination Against Women, (14 August 2006).
220
David Weissbrodt, Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Joan Fitzpatrick, & Frank Newman, Interna-
tional Human Rights: Law, Policy and Practice,(LexisNexis, 4th ed., 2009) [excerpt
reprinted with permission of the authors.].
221
http://www.un.orglicty/glance-e/index.htm.
222
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, available at http://untreaty.
un.org/ NGLISWbible/englishinternetbible/partVchapterXVIII/treatylO.asp.
permit the prosecution of war crimes, genocide, other crimes against human-
ity, and eventually aggression once a provision is adopted defining the term.
The ICC has complementary jurisdiction over individuals whom governments
have failed to prosecute in their national courts or when governments lack
the capacity to prosecute nationally. The International Criminal Court sits in
the Hague, Netherlands, with 18 judges who are elected for nine year terms
(one third every three years) by the States parties.
The International Court of Justice (I.C.J.), having replaced the Permanent
Court of International Justice,223 is the judicial organ of the United Nations.
The court sits at the Peace Palace in The Hague, Netherlands, with 15 judges
who are elected to nine year terms (one-third every three years) by the Gen-
eral Assembly and the Security Council. The Charter of the United Nations
provides for both contentious (adversary) and advisory jurisdiction. Adver-
sarial jurisdiction extends only to matters that States parties have referred to
it and in instances where treaties and conventions provide for adjudication by
the I.C.J.. Article 38(1) of the I.C.J. Statute specifies the sources of law which
the court is to apply in rendering its decisions: international conventions,
international custom, and general principles of law. Decisions of the I.C.J.
are only binding between the immediate parties and only in respect to that
particular case. In other words, stare decisis does not apply. The decisions,
however, are widely relied upon as statements of international law.
During the period after World War I the Permanent Court of International
Justice (PCIJ) rendered several advisory opinions under the Minority Treaties
developed pursuant to the Treaty of Versailles that were relevant to human
rights.224 For example, in the 1923 the Court concluded in an advisory opin-
ion that the government of Poland had in a Minorities Treaty undertaken “to
assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of
Poland without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.”225
223
The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) was authorized in the
Covenant of the League of Nations. It held its inaugural sitting in 1922 and was
dissolved in 1946. The PCIJ was the first permanent international tribunal with
general jurisdiction; its jurisprudence made possible the clarification of a number of
aspects of international law, and contributed to the development of international
law. Between 1922 and 1940 the PCIJ dealt with 29 contentious cases between
states, and delivered 27 advisory opinions.
224
Stephen M. Schwebel, Human Rights in the World Court, 24 Vanderbilt J. Int’l 945,
948 (1991).
225
Advisory Opinion No. 6, Gennan Settlers in Poland, 1923 P.C.U. (ser. B.) No.6, at 20
(Sept. 10); see also Advisory Opinion No. 44, Treatment of Polish Nationals and
Other Persons of Police Origin or Speech in the Danzig Territory, 1932 P.C.U. (ser.
The Court determined that the eviction of German settlers from Poland would
violate the government’s obligations under the Minorities Treaty -particularly
the property rights of the German minority in Poland. In two advisory opin-
ions relating to the City of Danzig, the PCIJ applied the principle of Nullum
crimen sin lege (no crime without law) to find a violation of fundamental
rights a decree that a person may be punished in “accordance with the fun-
damental idea of a law and in accordance with sound popular feeling.”226
Similarly, in another advisory opinion the Court held in Jurisdiction of the
Courts of Danzig227 that individuals -in this case, Danzig railway officials -have
the capacity to assert their rights under international law, that is against the
Polish Railways Administration under the relevant treaty.
Soon after its establishment, the International Court of Justice rendered
its first advisory opinion with regard to a human rights issue in holding that
a reservation to the Convention on Genocide could not be sustained unless
it was consistent with the object and purpose of the treaty. The Court noted
“the [human rights) principles underlying the Convention are principles
which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without
any conventional obligation.”228 In an advisory opinion of 1970, the I.C.J.
found that South Africa’s continued presence in Namibia was a violation of
international law because the government of South Africa had “pledged itself
to observe and respect, in a territory having an international status, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race. To
establish instead, and to enforce, distinctions ... based on grounds of race ...
which constitute a denial of fundamental human rights is a flagrant violation
of the purposes and principles of the Charter ....”229 The International Court of
Justice in its 1980 judgment in the Case Concerning United States Diplomatic
and Consular Staff in Tehran said that “[w]rongfully to deprive human beings
of their freedom and to subject them to physical constraint in conditions of
hardship is in itself manifestly incompatible with the principles of the Charter
NB) No. 44, at 28 (Feb. 4); Advisory Opinion No. 64, Minority Schools in Albania,
1935 P.C.U. (ser. NB) No. 64, at 17 (Apr. 6).
226
Advisory Opinion No. 65, Consistency of Certain Danzig Legislative Decrees with
the Constitution of the Free City, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. NB) No. 65, at 45 (Dec. 4).
227
Advisory Opinion No. 15, Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. B)
No. 15, at 4 (Mar. 3).
228
Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28).
229
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970),1971
I.C.J. 15 (June 21).
230
Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, 1980 I.C.J
. 3, 42 (May 24). Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran, 1980 I.C.J. 3, 42 (May 24).
231
Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 129-30 (June 27).
232
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United States of America),
1998 I.C.J. 248 (Provisional Measures, Order of9 Apr.) and 1998 I.C.J. 266 (Apr. 9);
1998 I.C.J. 426 (Nov. 10); 1998 J.C.J. 272 (June 8). The case was discontinued by
the I.C.J. at Paraguay’s request on 10 Nov. 1998.
233
LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of America), 1999 I.C.J. 9 (Provisional
Measures, Order).
234
See Menno T. Kamminga, Interstate Accountability for Violations of Rights of Man
9 & 99 (1990).
expertise to the Council in the manner and form requested by the Council,
focusing mainly on studies and research-based advice.”235
The Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) was established by the
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1946. When the Commission
was first established, it was created as a sub-commission of the Commission
on Human Rights. It only took one year, however, to realize the importance
of this topic and thus to establish the full commission. The Commission on
the Status of Women (CSW) is currently composed of representatives from
45 United Nations member states, elected by ECOSOC for four-year terms. Its
functions are to prepare recommendations and reports to the ECOSOC on
promoting women’s rights and equality in political, economic, civil, social, and
educational fields. The CSW may also make recommendations to the ECOSOC
on problems in the field of women’s rights that require immediate attention.
The CSW has a procedure for receiving confidential communications on hu-
man rights violations, but that procedure has not been well-publicized, is not
often invoked, and has not been particularly efficacious. The CSW’s objec-
tives are to implement the principle that men and women shall have equal
rights, to develop proposals that give effect to its recommendations, and to
adopt its own resolutions and decisions. The Commission is located in New
York. The Inter-American Commission of Women and the Commission on
the Status of Arab Women submit reports to each session of the Commission
on the Status of Women.
The U.N.’s crime prevention and criminal justice program was, until
1992, administered by the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control, a
subsidiary organ of ECOSOC. The Committee, composed of twenty-seven
experts, planned the quinquennial Congresses on the Prevention of Crime
and the Treatment of Offenders, submitted proposals, and implemented the
Congresses’ recommendations. The Committee’s primary roles were to foster
the exchange of information concerning criminal justice and to generate
standards against which state performance may be judged. The Committee
was very successful in drafting important human rights standards such as
the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement
Officials, Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, and Guidelines on the Role
of Prosecutors.
In 1992 ECOSOC, pursuant to a request by the General Assembly, dis-
banded the Committee and replaced it with the Commission on Grime
Prevention and Criminal Just-ice. The Commission is composed of 40 gov-
235
Human Rights Council, HRC 5/2007 (2007).
236
Protocol No. 14 has not come into force, and remains inoperative pending Russian
ratification.
of grave country situations. It has issued many individual decisions, but has
had difficulty in achieving compliance.
The Commission initiates country studies if it receives a large number of
complaints charging a particular government with serious and widespread
human rights violations. The Commission prepared its first country reports on
Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic in the 1960s. Although the govern-
ments of Cuba and Haiti refused to admit the Commission into their countries,
the Dominican Republic allowed the Commission to visit and thus became
the subject of the Commission’s first on-site investigation. Since then, the
Commission has conducted on-site investigations in a number of other OAS
countries, including Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Guate-
mala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Suriname, and Uruguay.
The Commission can also receive individual petitions alleging human rights
violations by OAS member states, whether or not the state in question has ratified
the American Convention. The Commission determines admissibility, engages in
fact-finding, attempts to arrange friendly settlements and, if necessary, decides
whether a violation of the American Convention or the American Declaration has
been committed. The Commission may also refer cases involving State parties to
the American Convention to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. A State
party to the Convention must specifically recognize the Court’s competence to
hear contentious cases in order to be subject to the Court’s jurisdiction. The Court
also exercises a broadly defined advisory jurisdiction, and has issued significant
advisory opinions concerning the meaning of the American Convention and
other human rights instruments. In addition to the OAS Charter, the American
Declaration, and the American Convention, the OAS has promulgated several
other treaties and protocols relating to economic, social and cultural rights; the
death penalty; disappearances; torture; and violence against women. For more
on the Inter-American system, see chapter 11, Infra.
c. African Union
The African Union (AU) is the successor organization to the Organization
for African Unity (OAU). The OAU was originally formed to rid the African
continent of the last vestiges of colonialism, but it also took steps to promote
human rights. The Charter of the OAU, adopted in 1963, reaffirms adherence
to the principles of the U.N. ChaIier and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. In 1981 the OAU adopted its principal human rights treaty, the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The African Charter entered into force
in 1986 and has been ratified by all 53 current members of the AU. In 2002
the AU was formed. Among other goals the AU aims “to encourage internal
cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and the
237
See The Objectives of the African Union, available at http://www.african-union.org/.
238
Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, Application no. 44774/98, Decision of the European Court
of Human Rights (10 November 2005).
6. Judgement
(a) The relevant principles
In democratic societies, in which several religions coexist within one and
the same population, it may be necessary to place restrictions on freedom
to manifest one’s religion or belief in order to reconcile the interests of the
various groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected (Kokkinakis,
cited above, p. 18, § 33).
A margin of appreciation is particularly appropriate when it comes to
the regulation by the Contracting States of the wearing of religious symbols
in teaching institutions, since rules on the subject vary from one country
to another depending on national traditions (see paragraphs 53-57 above)
and there is no uniform European conception of the requirements of “the
protection of the rights of others” and of “public order” (Wingrove, cited
above, § 58; and Casado Coca, cited above, § 55). It should be noted in this
connection that the very nature of education makes regulatory powers
necessary (see, mutatis mutandis, Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v.
Denmark judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A no. 23, p. 26, § 53, X v. the
United Kingdom, no. 8160/78, Commission decision of 12 March 1981, DR
22, p. 27; and 40 mothers v. Sweden, no. 6853/74, Commission decision of
9 March 1977, DR 9, p. 27).
(b) Application of the foregoing principles to the present case
In order to assess the “necessity” of the interference caused by the circular
of 23 February 1998 imposing restrictions as to place and manner on the
rights of students such as Ms Şahin to wear the Islamic headscarf on university
premises, the Court must put the circular in its legal and social context and
examine it in the light of the circumstances of the case. Regard being had to
the principles applicable in the instant case, the Court’s task is confined to
determining whether the reasons given for the interference were relevant
and sufficient and the measures taken at the national level proportionate to
the aims pursued.
It must first be observed that the interference was based, in particular, on
two principles – secularism and equality – which reinforce and complement
each other (see paragraphs 34 and 36 above).
In its judgment of 7 March 1989, the Constitutional Court stated that
secularism in Turkey was, among other things, the guarantor of democratic
values, the principle that freedom of religion is inviolable – to the extent
that it stems from individual conscience – and the principle that citizens are
equal before the law (see paragraph 36 above). Secularism also protected the
239
Richard B. Lillich, Hurst Hannum, S. James Anaya, Dinah L. Shelton, [excerpt re-
printed with permission from the authors and Aspen Publishers].
relatives and friends of the missing person; they live in a state of uncertainty
for years and sometimes decades, not knowing the fate or whereabouts of
their loved one. Disappearance also poses problems for human rights inter-
governmental and non-governmental human rights bodies, because it is
designed to conceal and destroy all evidence that would connect the perpetra-
tors to the victims. This chapter examines the practice of the Inter-American
Human Rights system in addressing human rights violations, by focusing on
the problem of disappearances in Argentina.240
A long phase of political and social instability began in Argentina in 1930.
It gave rise to institutional crises, the establishment of irregular or de facto
governments, an internal state of war, state of siege and martial law, attempts
at totalitarian or joint rule, changes in the organization of state powers, enact-
ment of repressive legislation and especially in the last ten years, an abrupt
increase in terrorist violence by the extreme left and the extreme right, as a
means of armed conflict. All of this has been detrimental to the rule of law.
In the last fifty years only two governments have completed their consti-
tutional mandate: that of General Agustin P. Justo, 1932 to 1938, and that of
General Juan Domingo Peron, 1946-1952. Military takeovers have prevented
the completion of the other legal mandates during that same period and
since 1952 [until 1980], no government has completed its constitutional
term of office.
Such conditions have had a direct effect on the constitutional legal order
and have made it difficult to realize the representative and republican form
of government provided for in Article 1 of the Constitution.
The political organization of the Argentine State... has been substantially
altered by the military takeover of March 24, 1976, the date on which the
Armed Forces, “in view of the current state of the country,” proceeded to “take
over the reins of Government of the Republic” in accordance with a public
proclamation. To achieve this, they resolved to adopt measures concerning
the organization and operation of the state authorities. In the Act for the
National Reorganization Process the following measures were included: a) to
establish a military junta with the General Commanders of the Armed Forces,
“which shall assume the political power of the Republic,” b) to declare the
terms of office of the President and of the Governors and Vice Governors
of the provinces to be null and void, c) to dissolve the National Congress,
240
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human
Rights in Argentina, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.49, doc. 19, corr. 1, April 11, 1980,
pp. 14-15,18-19, 21, 53-56.
that the armed groups that carry out the operations in the homes apprehend
the victim and occasionally his spouse and children, carry out a search of
the home, looting the belongings of the residents, and as a general rule, take
away all members of the family after placing hoods over their heads and eyes.
The persons affected by these operations, included in the lists at the IA-
CHR, are mostly men and women between 20 and 30 years of age, although
older persons and minors have also been known to disappear. Some of the
children, kidnapped with their parents, have been released and delivered to
relatives or have been abandoned in the streets. Other children, however,
continue to be listed among the disappeared.
According to the Commission’s information the phenomenon of the dis-
appeared affects professionals, students, union workers, employees in various
areas of business, journalists, religious leaders, military recruits and business
men; in other words, most elements of Argentine society.
II. Evolution of the Human Rights System in the Americas
The Inter-American system as it exists today began with the transforma-
tion of the Pan American Union, which dates back to the nineteenth century,
into the Organization of American States (OAS). Article 3 of the OAS Charter
proclaims the “fundamental rights of the individual” as one of the Organi-
zation’s basic principles (Documentary Supplement, page xxx).* Concern
with human rights not only inspired the Organization of American States to
refer to human rights in its Charter but led it to adopt the Inter-American
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man in May 1948, half a year before
the United Nations completed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The Commission may prepare country reports and conduct on-site visits
to individual countries, examining the human rights situation in the particular
country and making recommendations to the government. Country reports
have been prepared on the Commission’s own initiative and at the request
of the country concerned. The Commission also may appoint special rap-
porteurs to prepare studies on hemisphere-wide problems.
Like the European system, the Inter-American system has expanded
its protections over time through the adoption of additional human rights
norms. …
The Commission has been given competence over matters relating to
the fulfillment of obligations undertaken by states parties to all human rights
conventions adopted in the regional framework, with the exception of the
Convention on Persons with Disabilities, which creates a separate supervisory
committee.
The early history and basic structure of the inter-American system is sum-
marized in the following extract.
Cecelia Medina, “The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Reflections on a Joint Venture”
12 Hum. Rts. Q. 439-447 (1990)
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was... originally con-
ceived as a study group concerned with abstract investigations in the field
of human rights. However, the creators of the Commission did not foresee
the appeal this organ would have for the individual victims of human rights
violations. As soon as it was known that the Commission had been created,
individuals began to send complaints about human rights problems in their
countries. Prompted by these complaints, the Commission started its ac-
tivities with the conviction that in order to promote human rights it had to
protect them.
A significant part of the Commission’s work was addressing the problem
of countries with gross, systematic violations of human rights, characterized
by an absence or a lack of effective national mechanisms for the protection
of human rights and a lack of cooperation on the part of the governments
concerned. The main objective of the Commission was not to investigate
isolated violations but to document the existence of these gross, systematic
violations and to exercise pressure to improve the general condition of hu-
man rights in the country concerned. For this purpose, and by means of its
regulatory powers, the Commission created a procedure to “take cognizance”
of individual complaints and use them as a source of information about gross,
systematic violations of human rights in the territories of the OAS member
states.
The Commission’s competence to handle individual communications
was formalized in 1965, after the OAS reviewed and was satisfied with the
Commission’s work. The OAS passed Resolution XXII, which allowed the
Commission to “examine” isolated human rights violations, with a particular
focus on certain rights. This procedure, however, provided many obstacles for
the Commission. Complaints could be handled only if domestic remedies had
been exhausted, a requirement that prevented swift reactions to violations.
Environmental Rights
Laurie R. Tanner, “Kawas vs. Honduras – Protecting
Environmental Defenders,” 2011242
Environmental activists find themselves in a special situation of double
vulnerability. This is due to the fact that the majority of the cases they defend
confront not only State interests but also the interests of powerful economic
groups in connivance with, and much more powerful than, the State, with their
own armed forces and an enormous degree of impunity.
241
See Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-first Session, Supplement No.
53 (A/61/53), part one, chap. II, sect. A.
242
Laurie R. Tanner, “Kawas vs. Honduras – Protecting Environmental Defenders,” 3
Journal of Human Rights Practice 309 (Issue 3) (2011)[reprinted with permission
of the author].
the advances she achieved for preserving diverse areas, along with plant
and animal species … was a major obstacle for commercial developers who
wanted to exploit the area, despite it having been declared a National Park
through Kawas’s efforts….
In its ruling, the Court found the Honduran government legally respon-
sible for Kawas’s assassination. The Court held that the Honduran govern-
ment, which had colluded with those commercial interests operating in
the area, failed to properly investigate her murder and prosecute her killers.
This cover-up resulted in a continuation of the State culture of impunity in
violations of the human rights of environmental defenders, and this is the
situation currently found throughout the hemisphere….
RIGHT TO LIFE & DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS
…Despite Honduras’s denial, the Court found that, although the Kawas
assassination was under orders from private interests, her killing was fa-
cilitated by the intervention of government agents; at least one agent of the
state participated in the events that ended Kawas’s life; and, these acts were
motivated by her “vision regarding environmental protection.”…
The Court also established Honduras’s responsibility for failing to guar-
antee access to justice (Articles 8.1 and 25) to the next-of-kin, as well as for
violating their right to humane treatment (Article 5.1) , noting that Kawas’s
murder remained unpunished, with the legal proceedings still in preliminary
stages, even as Judgment was passed April 2009. In light of the Convention,
the judges opined that fourteen years largely exceeds any reasonable term,
and that all impediments encountered were the Honduran judicial authori-
ties’ complete responsibility.
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 16: RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
…[T]hose who are protected by the Convention not only have the right
and freedom to associate freely with other persons, without the interference
of the public authorities limiting or obstructing the exercise of the respective
right, which thus represents a right of each individual; but they also enjoy the
right and freedom to seek the common achievement of a licit goal, without
pressure or interference that could alter or change their purpose.
The Court emphasized the importance of protecting human rights ad-
vocates for the role they play in defending and promoting the rights in a
democratic society , pointing out that the States have the duty to provide the
necessary means for human rights defenders to conduct their activities freely;
to protect them when they are subject to threats in order to ward off any
attempt on their life or safety; to refrain from placing restrictions that would
hinder the performance of their work, and to conduct serious and effective
investigations of any violations against them, thus preventing impunity….
In arriving at the strategic conclusion that environmental defenders
should be considered human rights defenders, the tribunal expounded on
the concept that human rights defense is “not limited to civil and political
rights, but necessarily involves economic, social and cultural rights monitor-
ing, reporting and education …”
Additionally, the Court commented, with extensive footnotes, on the “un-
deniable link between the protection of the environment and the enjoyment
of other human rights” and the multi-faceted issue of “the right to healthy
environment,” citing to case law both of this Court and the European Court
of Human Rights, as well as OAS Resolutions, the Convention’s Protocol of
San Salvador Article 11, and domestic national constitutions in the region.…
REPARATIONS: GUARANTEES OF NON-REPETITION & DUTY TO PROTECT
The noteworthy recognition by the Inter-American Court that environ-
mental activists are human rights defenders, and that those advocates who
are shown to be “at-risk” require protection by States, is manifested in the
Judgment’s “Reparations” Chapter, as well as in the “Preservation of the En-
vironment” section of the Separate Opinion by Judge García-Ramírez that
accompanies the Judgment.
In this remedies chapter, the Court ordered the State to:
• pay the victim’s relatives compensation for material and
nonmaterial damages and expenses;
• provide the fees to cover long-term psychological support
for the next-of-kin;
• finally conclude its investigation of the crime and have the
case settled in a reasonable period; and
• conduct various public acts of international recognition to
honor Jeannette Kawas….
Kawas reached its decisive and critical holding regarding protection of “at-
risk” environmental defenders in that same paragraph, when it declared that:
... the State has a duty to adopt [and] fulfill [all] measures guaranteeing the
free performance of environmental advocacy activities; the instant protection
of environmental activists facing danger or threats as a result of their work;
and the instant, responsible and effective investigation of any acts endanger-
ing the life or integrity of environmentalists on account of their work.
243
Mouvement Burkinabé des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples v. Burkina Faso,
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Comm. No. 204/97 (2001).
CHAPTER 3
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
Sources of International
Humanitarian Law
The First Geneva Convention244
Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Geneva, 12 August 1949
Chapter I. General Provisions
ARTICLE 1
The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect
for the present Convention in all circumstances.
ARTICLE 2
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime,
the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation
of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets
with no armed resistance. Although one of the Powers in conflict may not
be a party to the present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto
shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be
bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts
and applies the provisions thereof.
ARTICLE 3
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict
244
Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field. Geneva, 12 August 1949; available at www.icrc.org.
ARTICLE 6
In addition to the agreements expressly provided for in Articles 10, 15,
23, 28, 31, 36, 37 and 52, the High Contracting Parties may conclude other
special agreements for all matters concerning which they may deem it suit-
able to make separate provision.
No special agreement shall adversely affect the situation of the wounded
and sick, of members of the medical personnel or of chaplains, as defined by
the present Convention, nor restrict the rights which it confers upon them.
Wounded and sick, as well as medical personnel and chaplains, shall
continue to have the benefit of such agreements as long as the Convention
is applicable to them, except where express provisions to the contrary are
contained in the aforesaid or in subsequent agreements, or where more fa-
vorable measures have been taken with regard to them by one or other of
the Parties to the conflict.
245
Source: “Annex to Study on customary international humanitarian law: A contri-
bution to the understanding and respect for the rule of law in armed conflict,”
by Jean-Marie Henckaerts, IRRC, Volume 87, No. 857, March 2005, pp. 198-212;
available on www.icrc.org.
Rule 6. Civilians are protected against attack, unless and for such time as
they take a direct part in hostilities.
Distinction between Civilian Objects and Military Objectives
Rule 7. The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between
civilian objects and military objectives. Attacks may only be directed against
military objectives. Attacks must not be directed against civilian objects.
Rule 8. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited
to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an ef-
fective contribution to military action and whose partial or total destruction,
capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a
definite military advantage.
Rule 9. Civilian objects are all objects that are not military objectives.
Rule 10. Civilian objects are protected against attack, unless and for such
time as they are military objectives.
Indiscriminate Attacks
Rule 11. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited.
Rule 12. Indiscriminate attacks are those:
(a) which are not directed at a specific military objective;
(b) which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be di-
rected at a specific military objective; or
(c) which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which
cannot be limited as required by international humanitarian law;
and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military
objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.
Rule 13. Attacks by bombardment by any method or means which treats as
a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military
objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar
concentration of civilians or civilian objects are prohibited.
Proportionality in Attack
Rule 14. Launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a com-
bination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited.
Precautions in Attack
Rule 15. In the conduct of military operations, constant care must be
taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. All feasible
precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.
Rule 16. Each party to the conflict must do everything feasible to verify
that targets are military objectives.
Rule 17. Each party to the conflict must take all feasible precautions in
the choice of means and methods of warfare with a view to avoiding, and
in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians
and damage to civilian objects.
Rule 18. Each party to the conflict must do everything feasible to assess
whether the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated.
Rule 19. Each party to the conflict must do everything feasible to cancel
or suspend an attack if it becomes apparent that the target is not a military
objective or that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated.
Rule 20. Each party to the conflict must give effective advance warning
of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do
not permit.
Rule 21. When a choice is possible between several military objectives
for obtaining a similar military advantage, the objective to be selected must
be that the attack on which may be expected to cause the least danger to
civilian lives and to civilian objects.
SPECIFICALLY PROTECTED PERSONS AND OBJECTS
Medical and Religious Personnel and Objects
Rule 25. Medical personnel exclusively assigned to medical duties must
be respected and protected in all circumstances. They lose their protection if
they commit, outside their humanitarian function, acts harmful to the enemy.
Rule 29. Medical transports assigned exclusively to medical transportation
must be respected and protected in all circumstances. They lose their protec-
tion if they are being used, outside their humanitarian function, to commit
acts harmful to the enemy.
Rule 30. Attacks directed against medical and religious personnel and
objects displaying the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions in
conformity with international law are prohibited.
Humanitarian Relief Personnel and Objects
Rule 31. Humanitarian relief personnel must be respected and protected.
Rule 32. Objects used for humanitarian relief operations must be respected
and protected.
Personnel and Objects Involved in a Peacekeeping Mission
Rule 33. Directing an attack against personnel and objects involved in a
peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians and civilian
objects under international humanitarian law, is prohibited.
Journalists
Rule 34. Civilian journalists engaged in professional missions in areas of
armed conflict must be respected and protected as long as they are not tak-
ing a direct part in hostilities.
Protected Zones
Rule 35. Directing an attack against a zone established to shelter the
wounded, the sick and civilians from the effects of hostilities is prohibited.
Rule 36. Directing an attack against a demilitarized zone agreed upon
between the parties to the conflict is prohibited.
Rule 37. Directing an attack against a non-defended locality is prohibited.
[IAC/NIAC]
Cultural Property
Rule 38. Each party to the conflict must respect cultural property:
A. Special care must be taken in military operations to avoid damage to
buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, education or charitable purposes
and historic monuments unless they are military objectives.
B. Property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people
must not be the object of attack unless imperatively required by military
necessity.
Poison
Rule 72. The use of poison or poisoned weapons is prohibited.
Biological Weapons
Rule 73. The use of biological weapons is prohibited.
Chemical Weapons
Rule 74. The use of chemical weapons is prohibited.
Expanding Bullets
Rule 77. The use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human
body is prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Exploding Bullets
Rule 78. The anti-personnel use of bullets which explode within the hu-
man body is prohibited. [IAC/NIAC]
Weapons Primarily Injuring by Non-detectable Fragments
Rule 79. The use of weapons the primary effect of which is to injure by
fragments which are not detectable by X-rays in the human body is prohib-
ited. [IAC/NIAC]
Booby-traps
Rule 80. The use of booby-traps which are in any way attached to or as-
sociated with objects or persons entitled to special protection under inter-
national humanitarian law or with objects that are likely to attract civilians
is prohibited.
Landmines
Rule 81. When landmines are used, particular care must be taken to mi-
nimise their indiscriminate effects.
Rule 82. A party to the conflict using landmines must record their place-
ment, as far as possible.
Rule 83. At the end of active hostilities, a party to the conflict which has
used landmines must remove or otherwise render them harmless to civilians,
or facilitate their removal.
Incendiary Weapons
Rule 84. If incendiary weapons are used, particular care must be taken to
avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians and damage to civilian objects.
heavier penalty be imposed than that which was applicable at the time the
criminal offence was committed.
Rule 102. No one may be convicted of an offence except on the basis of
individual criminal responsibility.
Rule 103. Collective punishments are prohibited.
Rule 104. The convictions and religious practices of civilians and persons
hors de combat must be respected.
Rule 105. Family life must be respected as far as possible.
Combatants and Prisoner-of-War Status
Rule 106. Combatants must distinguish themselves from the civilian
population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation
preparatory to an attack. If they fail to do so, they do not have the right to
prisoner-of-war status.
Rule 107. Combatants who are captured while engaged in espionage do
not have the right to prisoner-of-war status. They may not be convicted or
sentenced without previous trial.
Rule 108. Mercenaries, as defined in Additional Protocol I, do not have
the right to combatant or prisoner-of-war status. They may not be convicted
or sentenced without previous trial.
The Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Rule 109. Whenever circumstances permit, and particularly after an en-
gagement, each party to the conflict must, without delay, take all possible
measures to search for, collect and evacuate the wounded, sick and ship-
wrecked without adverse distinction.
The Dead
Rule 112. Whenever circumstances permit, and particularly after an en-
gagement, each party to the conflict must, without delay, take all possible mea-
sures to search for, collect and evacuate the dead without adverse distinction.
Missing Persons
Rule 117. Each party to the conflict must take all feasible measures to
account for persons reported missing as a result of armed conflict and must
provide their family members with any information it has on their fate.
Persons Deprived of their Liberty
Rule 118. Persons deprived of their liberty must be provided with adequate
food, water, clothing, shelter and medical attention.
***
37. The Court will now address the question of the legality or illegality
of recourse to nuclear weapons in the light of the provisions of the Charter
relating to the threat or use of force.
38. The Charter contains several provisions relating to the threat and
use of force….
39. …A weapon that is already unlawful per se, whether by treaty or custom,
does not become lawful by reason of its being used for a legitimate purpose
under the Charter.
40. The entitlement to resort to self-defense under Article 51 is subject to
certain constraints. Some of these constraints are inherent in the very concept
of self-defense. Other requirements are specified in Article 51.
41. The submission of the exercise of the right of self-defense to the con-
ditions of necessity and proportionality is a rule of customary international
law. As the Court stated in the case concerning Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America)
(I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 94, para.176):
“there is a specific rule whereby self-defense would warrant only measures
which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it,
a rule well established in customary international law”….
42. The proportionality principle may thus not in itself exclude the use of
nuclear weapons in self-defense in all circumstances. But at the same time, a
use of force that is proportionate under the law of self-defense, must, in order
to be lawful, also meet the requirements of the law applicable in armed con-
flict which comprise in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law.
43. Certain States… contend that the very nature of nuclear weapons, and
the high probability of an escalation of nuclear exchanges, mean that there
is an extremely strong risk of devastation. The risk factor is said to negate
the possibility of the condition of proportionality being complied with. The
Court does not find it necessary to embark upon the quantification of such
risks; nor does it need to enquire into the question whether tactical nuclear
246
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports
1996, p. 226
weapons exist which are sufficiently precise to limit those risks: it suffices
for the Court to note that the very nature of all nuclear weapons and the
profound risks associated therewith are further considerations to be borne in
mind by States believing they can exercise a nuclear response in self-defense
in accordance with the requirements of proportionality….
51. Having dealt with the Charter provisions relating to the threat or use
of force, the Court will now turn to the law applicable in situations of armed
conflict. It will first address the question whether there are specific rules in
international law regulating the legality or illegality of recourse to nuclear
weapons per se; it will then examine the question put to it in the light of
the law applicable in armed conflict proper, i.e. the principles and rules of
humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict, and the law of neutrality.
Prohibition of the use of such weapons, but they do not constitute such
a prohibition by themselves. As to the treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga
and their Protocols, and also the declarations made in connection with the
indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weap-
ons, it emerges from these instruments that:
(a) a number of States have undertaken not to use nuclear weapons in
specific zones (Latin America; the South Pacific) or against certain other
States (nonnuclear- weapon States which are parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons);
(b) nevertheless, even within this framework, the nuclear-weapon States
have reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in certain circumstances; and
(c) these reservations met with no objection from the parties to the Tla-
telolco or Rarotonga Treaties or from the Security Council.
…63. These two treaties, the security assurances given in 1995 by the
nuclear-weapon States and the fact that the Security Council took note of
them with satisfaction, testify to a growing awareness of the need to liberate
the community of States and the international public from the dangers result-
ing from the existence of nuclear weapons. The Court moreover notes the
signing, even more recently, on December 15, 1995, at Bangkok, of a Treaty
on the Southeast Asia Nuclear- Weapon-Free Zone, and on April 11, 1996, at
Cairo, of a treaty on the creation of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Africa. It
does not, however, view these elements as amounting to a comprehensive
and universal conventional prohibition on the use, or the threat of use, of
those weapons as such.
64. The Court will now turn to an examination of customary interna-
tional law to determine whether a prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear
weapons as such flows from that source of law. As the Court has stated, the
substance of that law must be “looked for primarily in the actual practice
and opinio juris of States” (Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 29, para.27).
65. States which hold the view that the use of nuclear weapons is illegal
have endeavored to demonstrate the existence of a customary rule prohibit-
ing this use. They refer to a consistent practice of non-utilization of nuclear
weapons by States since 1945 and they would see in that practice the ex-
pression of an opinio juris on the part of those who possess such weapons.
66. Some other States, which assert the legality of the threat and use of
nuclear weapons in certain circumstances, invoked the doctrine and practice
of deterrence in support of their argument. They recall that they have always,
in concert with certain other States, reserved the right to use those weapons
in the exercise of the right to self-defense against an armed attack threatening
their vital security interests. In their view, if nuclear weapons have not been used
since 1945, it is not on account of an existing or nascent custom but merely
because circumstances that might justify their use have fortunately not arisen.
67. …[T]he Members of the international community are profoundly
divided on the matter of whether non-recourse to nuclear weapons over
the past fifty years constitutes the expression of an opinio juris. Under these
circumstances the Court does not consider itself able to find that there is
such an opinio juris.
68. According to certain States, the important series of General Assembly
resolutions, beginning with resolution 1653 (XVI) of November 24, 1961,
that deal with nuclear weapons and that affirm, with consistent regularity, the
illegality of nuclear weapons, signify the existence of a rule of international
customary law which prohibits recourse to those weapons….
70. The Court notes that General Assembly resolutions, even if they are not
binding, may sometimes have normative value. They can, in certain circum-
stances, provide evidence important for establishing the existence of a rule or
the emergence of an opinio juris. To establish whether this is true of a given
General Assembly resolution, it is necessary to look at its content and the con-
ditions of its adoption; it is also necessary to see whether an opinio juris exists
as to its normative character. Or a series of resolutions may show the gradual
evolution of the opinio juris required for the establishment of a new rule.
71. Examined in their totality,… several of the resolutions under consid-
eration in the present case have been adopted with substantial numbers of
negative votes and abstentions; … they… fall short of establishing the existence
247
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić,
IT-94-1-AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision, 2 October 1995. [Citations omitted].
“The High Contracting Parties, Proclaiming their earnest wish to see peace
prevail among peoples,
Recalling that every State has the duty, in conformity with the Charter of
the United Nations, to refrain in its international relations from the threat or
use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes
of the United Nations,
Believing it necessary nevertheless to reaffirm and develop the provi-
sions protecting the victims of armed conflicts and to supplement measures
intended to reinforce their application,
Expressing their conviction that nothing in this Protocol or in the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 can be construed as legitimizing or autho-
rizing any act of aggression or any other use of force inconsistent with the
Charter of the United Nations,
Reaffirming further that the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949 and of this Protocol must be fully applied in all circumstances
to all persons who are protected by those instruments, without any adverse
distinction based on the nature or origin of the armed conflict or on the
causes espoused by or attributed to the Parties to the conflict.
This complete separation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello implies
that IHL applies whenever there is de facto an armed conflict, no matter
how that conflict is qualified under jus ad bellum, and that no jus ad bel-
lum arguments may be used to interpret it; it also implies, however, that the
rules of IHL are not to be drafted so as to render jus ad bellum impossible to
implement, e.g., render efficient self-defense impossible.
Some consider that the growing institutionalization of international rela-
tions through the United Nations, concentrating the legal monopoly of the
use of force in its hands or a hegemonic international order, will return IHL
to a state of temperamenta belli addressing those who fight for international
legality. This would fundamentally modify the philosophy of existing IHL.
Article 19
***
Effect of this chapter
This chapter is without prejudice to the international responsibility, un-
der other provisions of these articles, of the State which commits the act in
question, or of any other State.
248
ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, United Nations, International Law
Commission, Report on the work of its fifty-third session (23 April-1 June
and 2 July-10 August 2001), General Assembly, Official Records, Fifty-fifth Session,
Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/. The UN
General Assembly took note of the Draft Articles in Resolution A/RES/56/83 of 12
December 2001.
CHAPTER V
CIRCUMSTANCES PRECLUDING WRONGFULNESS
Article 20
Consent
Valid consent by a State to the commission of a given act by another State
precludes the wrongfulness of that act in relation to the former State to the
extent that the act remains within the limits of that consent.
Article 21
Self-defense
The wrongfulness of an act of a State is precluded if the act constitutes a
lawful measure of self-defense taken in conformity with the Charter of the
United Nations.
Commentary
…2) Self-defense may justify non-performance of certain obligations other
than that under Article 2, paragraph (4), of the Charter, provided that such
non-performance is related to the breach of that provision. Traditional inter-
national law dealt with these problems by instituting a separate legal regime
of war, defining the scope of belligerent rights and suspending most treaties
in force between the belligerents on the outbreak of war. In the Charter pe-
riod, declarations of war are exceptional and military actions proclaimed as
self-defence by one or both parties occur between States formally at “peace”
with each other. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties leaves such
issues to one side by providing in article 73 that the Convention does not
prejudice “any question that may arise in regard to a treaty… from the outbreak
of hostilities between States.”
3) This is not to say that self-defense precludes the wrongfulness of
conduct in all cases or with respect to all obligations. Examples relate to
international humanitarian law and human rights obligations. The Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and Protocol I of 1977 apply equally to all the parties
in an international armed conflict, and the same is true of customary inter-
national humanitarian law. Human rights treaties contain derogation provi-
sions for times of public emergency, including actions taken in self-defense.
As to obligations under international humanitarian law and in relation to
non-derogable human rights provisions, self-defense does not preclude the
wrongfulness of conduct….
Article 25
Necessity
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the
wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation of
that State unless the act:
(a) Is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against
a grave and imminent peril; and
(b) Does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States
towards which the obligation exists, or of the international community as
a whole.
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for
precluding wrongfulness if:
(a) The international obligation in question excludes the possibility of
invoking necessity; or
(b) The State has contributed to the situation of necessity.
Commentary
…19) …Subparagraph (2) (a) concerns cases where the international
obligation in question explicitly or implicitly excludes reliance on neces-
sity. Thus certain humanitarian conventions applicable to armed conflict
expressly exclude reliance on military necessity. Others while not explicitly
excluding necessity are intended to apply in abnormal situations of peril for
the responsible State and plainly engage its essential interests. In such a case
the non-availability of the plea of necessity emerges clearly from the object
and the purpose of the rule….
21) As embodied in article 25, the plea of necessity is not intended to
cover conduct which is in principle regulated by the primary obligations.
This has a particular importance in relation to the rules relating to the use of
force in international relations and to the question of “military necessity,”… [a]
doctrine… which is, in the first place, the underlying criterion for a series of
substantive rules of the law of war and neutrality, as well as being included in
terms in a number of treaty provisions in the field of international humanitar-
ian law. [footnote 435: See e.g. art. 23 (g) of the Hague Regulations Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land (annexed to Convention II of 1899 and
Convention IV of 1907), which prohibits the destruction of enemy property
“unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the neces-
sities of war”…. Similarly, art. 54 (5) of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva
***
IV. ANALYSIS
146. In order to facilitate the analysis of key events and issues raised in
this case, this report will examine those events and issues under the follow-
ing three headings:
the attack on and the recovery of the military base; the events that fol-
lowed the surrender of the attackers and the arrest of their alleged accom-
plices; and the trial of those same persons for the crime of rebellion in the
Abella case.
A. THE ATTACK AND RECAPTURE OF THE MILITARY BASE
147. In their complaint, petitioners invoke various rules of International
Humanitarian Law, i.e. the law of armed conflict, in support of their allega-
tions that state agents used excessive force and illegal means in their efforts
to recapture the Tablada military base. For its part, the Argentine State, while
rejecting the applicability of interstate armed conflict rules to the events in
question, nonetheless have in their submissions to the Commission charac-
terized the decision to retake the Tablada base by force as a military opera-
tion. The State also has cited the use of arms by the attackers to justify their
prosecution for the crime of rebellion as defined in Law 23.077. Both the
Argentine State and petitioners are in agreement that on the 23 and 24 of
January 1989 an armed confrontation took place at the Tablada base between
attackers and Argentine armed forces for approximately 30 hours.
148. The Commission believes that before it can properly evaluate the
merits of petitioners claims concerning the recapture of the Tablada base
249
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 55/97, Case No. 11.137:
Argentina, OEA/ Ser/L/V/II.98, Doc. 38, December 6 rev., 1997, citations partially
omitted. Available at http://www.cidh.org
by the Argentine military, it must first determine whether the armed con-
frontation at the base was merely an example of an internal disturbance or
tensions or whether it constituted a non-international or internal armed
conflict within the meaning of Article 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva
conventions (Common Article 3). Because the legal rules governing an in-
ternal armed conflict vary significantly from those governing situations of
internal disturbances or tensions, a proper characterization of the events at
the Tablada military base on January 23 and 24, 1989 is necessary to deter-
mine the sources of applicable law. This, in turn, requires the Commission
to examine the characteristics that differentiate such suspension under
these humanitarian law instruments, the Commission should conclude that
these derogation measures are in violation of the State Parties obligations
under both the American Convention and the humanitarian law treaties
concerned….
V. PETITIONERS’ CLAIMS
172. Petitioners do not dispute the fact that some MTP members planned,
initiated and participated in the attack on the military base. They contend,
however, that the reason or motive for the attack – to stop a rumored military
coup against the Alfonsin government – was legally justified by Article 21 of
the National Constitution which obliged citizens to take up arms in defense
of the Constitution. Consequently, they assert that their prosecutions for the
crime of rebellion was violative of the American Convention. In addition,
petitioners argue that because their cause was just and lawful, the State, by
virtue of its excessive and unlawful use of force in retaking the military base,
must bear full legal and moral responsibility for all the loss of life and material
damage occasioned by its actions.
173. The Commission believes that petitioners’ arguments reflect certain
fundamental misconceptions concerning the nature of international hu-
manitarian law. It should be understood that neither application of Common
Article 3, nor of any other humanitarian law rules relevant to the hostilities
at the Tablada base, can be interpreted as recognizing the legitimacy of the
reasons or the cause for which the members of the MTP took up arms. Most
importantly, application of the law is not conditioned by the causes of the
conflict. This basic tenant of humanitarian law is enshrined in the preamble
of Additional Protocol I which states in pertinent part:
Reaffirming further that the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of
August 12, 1949 … must be fully applied in all circumstances ... without any
adverse distinction based on the nature or origin off [sic] the armed conflict
or on the causes espoused by or attributed to the Parties of the Conflict.
174. Unlike human rights law which generally restrains only the abusive
practices of state agents, Common Article 3’s mandatory provisions expressly
bind and apply equally to both parties to internal conflicts, i.e., government
and dissident forces. Moreover, the obligation to apply Common Article 3
is absolute for both parties and independent of the obligation of the other.
[Footnote 27 reads: A breach of Article 3 by one party, such as an illegal
method of combat, could not be invoked by the other party as a ground for its
non-compliance with the Article’s obligatory provisions. See generally, Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 60.] Therefore, both the MTP attack-
ers and the Argentine armed forces had the same duties under humanitarian
law, and neither party could be held responsible for the acts of the other.
250
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 1125
U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.
251
Third Geneva Convention, Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950.
forces to which they belong and which are engaged in combat, or where they
fail to comply with a summons made to them with a view to internment.
(2) The persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated in the
present Article, who have been received by neutral or non-belligerent Pow-
ers on their territory and whom these Powers are required to intern under
international law, without prejudice to any more favourable treatment which
these Powers may choose to give and with the exception of Articles 8, 10,
15, 30, fifth paragraph, 58-67, 92, 126 and, where diplomatic relations ex-
ist between the Parties to the conflict and the neutral or non-belligerent
Power concerned, those Articles concerning the Protecting Power. Where
such diplomatic relations exist, the Parties to a conflict on whom these per-
sons depend shall be allowed to perform towards them the functions of a
Protecting Power as provided in the present Convention, without prejudice
to the functions which these Parties normally exercise in conformity with
diplomatic and consular usage and treaties.
C. This Article shall in no way affect the status of medical personnel and
chaplains as provided for in Article 33 of the present Convention.
ARTICLE 5
The present Convention shall apply to the persons referred to in Article
4 from the time they fall into the power of the enemy and until their final
release and repatriation. Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having
committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy,
belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall
enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status
has been determined by a competent tribunal.
252
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, G.A. res.
49/59, 49 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 299, U.N. Doc. A/49/49 (1994).
2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure the safety
and security of United Nations and associated personnel. In particular, States
Parties shall take all appropriate steps to protect United Nations and associ-
ated personnel who are deployed in their territory from the crimes set out
in article 9.
3. States Parties shall cooperate with the United Nations and other States
Parties, as appropriate, in the implementation of this Convention, particularly
in any case where the host State is unable itself to take the required measures.
Article 8: Duty to release or return United Nations and associated person-
nel captured or detained
Except as otherwise provided in an applicable status-of-forces agreement,
if United Nations or associated personnel are captured or detained in the
course of the performance of their duties and their identification has been
established, they shall not be subjected to interrogation and they shall be
promptly released and returned to United Nations or other appropriate au-
thorities. Pending their release such personnel shall be treated in accordance
with universally recognized standards of human rights and the principles and
spirit of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
Article 9: Crimes against United Nations and associated personnel
1. The intentional commission of:
(a) A murder, kidnapping or other attack upon the person or liberty of
any United Nations or associated personnel;
(b) A violent attack upon the official premises, the private accommo-
dation or the means of transportation of any United Nations or associated
personnel likely to endanger his or her person or liberty;
(c) A threat to commit any such attack with the objective of compelling
a physical or juridical person to do or to refrain from doing any act;
(d) An attempt to commit any such attack; and
(e) An act constituting participation as an accomplice in any such attack,
or in an attempt to commit such attack, or in organizing or ordering others
to commit such attack, shall be made by each State Party a crime under its
national law.
2. Each State Party shall make the crimes set out in paragraph 1 punish-
able by appropriate penalties which shall take into account their grave nature.
253
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associ-
ated Personnel, New York, 8 December 2005; available at untreaty.un.org.
254
Iyad v. State of Israel, Supreme Court of Israel, 1 CrimA 6659/06, 11 June
2008, available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/06/590/066/n04/06066590.
n04.pdf.
was extended from time to time by the military commander and upheld on
judicial review by the Gaza Military Court. The second appellant is also an
inhabitant of Gaza, born in 1972, and he was placed under administrative
detention on 24 January 2003 pursuant to the aforesaid order. The detention
of the second appellant was also extended from to time and reviewed by
the Gaza Military Court. On 12 September 2005 a statement was published
by the Southern District Commander with regard to the end of military rule
in the territory of the Gaza Strip. On the same day, in view of the change in
circumstances and also the change in the relevant legal position, internment
orders were issued against the appellants;
1. The appellant in this case was initially referred to as Anonymous, but
his name was subsequently released. [Note of the authors]
2. On 22 September 2005 a judicial review proceeding began in the Tel-
Aviv-Jaffa District Court […] in the appellants’ case. On 25 January 2006 the
District Court held that there had been no impropriety in the procedure of
issuing internment orders against the appellants and that all the conditions
prescribed in the Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law were satisfied,
including the fact that their release would harm state security. The appellants
appealed this decision to the Supreme Court, and on 14 March 2006 their
appeal was denied […]. In the judgment it was held that from material that
was presented to the court it could be seen that the appellants were clearly
associated with the Hezbollah organization and that they participated in
combat activities against the citizens of Israel before they were detained. The
court emphasized in this context the individual threat presented by the two
appellants and the risk that they would return to their activities if they were
released, as could be seen from the material presented to the court.
The Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law – the background to its
legislation and its main purpose
6. The Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law gives the state authorities
power to detain ‘unlawful combatants’ as defined in section 2 of the law, i.e.,
persons who participate in hostilities or are members of forces that carry out
hostilities against the State of Israel and who do not satisfy the conditions
that grant a prisoner of war status under international humanitarian law. As
we shall explain below, the law allows the internment of foreign persons who
belong to a terrorist organization or who participate in hostilities against the
security of the state, and it was intended to prevent these persons returning
to the cycle of hostilities against Israel….
of the law it was not intended to apply to local parties (citizens and residents
of Israel) who endanger state security. For these there are other legal measures
that are intended for a security purpose, which we shall address later.
It is therefore possible to summarize the matter by saying that an ‘unlaw-
ful combatant’ under section 2 of the law is a foreign party who belongs to a
terrorist organization that operates against the security of the State of Israel.
This definition may include residents of a foreign country that maintains a
state of hostilities against the State of Israel, who belong to a terrorist organi-
zation that operates against the security of the state and who satisfy the other
conditions of the statutory definition of ‘unlawful combatant.’ This definition
may also include inhabitants of the Gaza Strip which today is no longer held
under belligerent occupation. In this regard it should be noted that since the
end of Israeli military rule in the Gaza Strip in September 2005, the State of
Israel has no permanent physical presence in the Gaza Strip, and it also has
no real possibility of carrying out the duties required of an occupying power
under international law, including the main duty of maintaining public order
and security. Any attempt to impose the authority of the State of Israel on the
Gaza Strip is likely to involve complex and prolonged military operations. In
such circumstances, where the State of Israel has no real ability to control what
happens in the Gaza Strip in an effective manner, the Gaza Strip should not
be regarded as a territory that is subject to a belligerent occupation from the
viewpoint of international law, even though because of the unique situation
that prevails there, the State of Israel has certain duties to the inhabitants of
the Gaza Strip […] [See Case No. 137, Israel, Power Cuts in Gaza]. In our case, in
view of the fact that the Gaza Strip is no longer under the effective control of
the State of Israel, we are drawn to the conclusion that the inhabitants of the
Gaza Strip constitute foreign parties who may be subject to the Internment
of Unlawful Combatants Law in view of the nature and purpose of this law.
With regard to the inhabitants of the territory (Judaea and Samaria) that
is under the effective control of the State of Israel, […] I tend to the opinion
that in so far as this is required for security reasons, the administrative de-
tention of these inhabitants should be carried out pursuant to the security
legislation that applies in the territories and not by virtue of the Internment
of Unlawful Combatants Law. […]
Conformity of the definition of ‘unlawful combatant’ to a category recog-
nized by international law
12. The appellants argued before us that the definition of ‘unlawful com-
batant’ in section 2 of the law is contrary to the provisions of international
humanitarian law, since international law does not recognize the existence
255
Hamdan v Rumsfeld, United States Supreme Court, 548 U.S. 577 (2006).
***
SEC. 2. CONSTRUCTION OF PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH
MILITARY COMMISSIONS.
The authority to establish military commissions under chapter 47A of
title 10, United States Code, as added by section 3(a), may not be construed
to alter or limit the authority of the President under the Constitution of the
United States and laws of the United States to establish military commissions
for areas declared to be under martial law or in occupied territories should
circumstances so require….
‘‘§ 948a. Definitions
‘‘In this chapter:
‘‘(1) UNLAWFUL ENEMY COMBATANT.—
(A) The term ‘unlawful enemy combatant’ means—
‘‘(i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and
materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents
who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is part of the
Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces); or
‘‘(ii) a person who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the
Military Commissions Act of 2006, has been determined to be an unlaw-
ful enemy combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another
competent tribunal established under the authority of the President or the
Secretary of Defense.
‘‘(B) CO-BELLIGERENT.—In this paragraph, the term ‘cobelligerent’, with
respect to the United States, means any State or armed force joining and
directly engaged with the United States in hostilities or directly supporting
hostilities against a common enemy.
‘‘(2) LAWFUL ENEMY COMBATANT.—The term ‘lawful enemy combatant’
means a person who is—
‘‘(A) a member of the regular forces of a State party engaged in hostilities
against the United States;
256
United States Department of Defense, “Military Commission Act of 2006,” Pub. L.
No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
257
United Nations, “Montreux Document on pertinent international legal obliga-
tions and good practices for States related to operations of private military
and security companies during armed conflict,” U.N. Doc. A/63/467–S/2008/636,
6 October 2008; available at www.un.org.
258
Second Geneva Convention, Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition
of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea75 U.N.T.S.
85, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950.
***
Chapter II. Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
ARTICLE 12
Members of the armed forces and other persons mentioned in the fol-
lowing Article, who are at sea and who are wounded, sick or shipwrecked,
shall be respected and protected in all circumstances, it being understood
that the term “shipwreck” means shipwreck from any cause and includes
forced landings at sea by or from aircraft.
Such persons shall be treated humanely and cared for by the Parties to
the conflict in whose power they may be, without any adverse distinction
founded on sex, race, nationality, religion, political opinions, or any other
similar criteria. Any attempts upon their lives, or violence to their persons,
shall be strictly prohibited; in particular, they shall not be murdered or ex-
terminated, subjected to torture or to biological experiments; they shall not
willfully be left without medical assistance and care, nor shall conditions
exposing them to contagion or infection be created.
Only urgent medical reasons will authorize priority in the order of treat-
ment to be administered.
Women shall be treated with all consideration due to their sex.
ARTICLE 13
The present Convention shall apply to the wounded, sick and ship-
wrecked at sea belonging to the following categories:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as
members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps,
including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to
the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this ter-
ritory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including
such organized resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war.
***
2. THE CHARGE
The prisoners were: Kapitanleutnant Heinz Eck, Leutnant zur See August
Hoffmann, Marine Stabsarzt Walter Weisspfennig, Kapitanleutnant (Ing) Hans
Richard Lenz, Gefreiter Schwender.
They were charged jointly with:
“Committing a war crime in that you in the Atlantic Ocean on the
night of 13/14th March, 1944, when Captain and members of the crew
of Unterseeboat 852 which had sunk the steamship “Peleus” in violation
of the laws and usages of war were concerned in the killing of members
of the crew of the said steamship, Allied nationals, by firing and throwing
grenades at them.”…
259
The United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law Reports of Trials of War Crimi-
nals, vol. I, 1947, pp. 1-21.
260
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Annual Report 1967, ICRC, pp.
15-17.
261
See ICRC News: Afghanistan: Women gradually being re-admitted to Kabul
Hospitals, 97/47, November 26, 1997.
262
Perrin, J.-P., “Les hôpitaux de Kaboul interdits aux femmes,” in Libération,
October 23, 1997, original in French, unofficial translation.
female employees of the Karte Se hospital, which may soon cease to function
because male workers are not willing to take charge of the laundry. Worse
still, the decision whereby hospitals could treat women in emergencies, taken
under Western NGO pressure by the Minister of Health, Mullawi Abbas, has
been widely condemned. Already the emergency departments of two of the
four large Kabul hospitals are refusing to admit women. At the beginning of
October a woman in a deep coma was turned away and sent home. In Septem-
ber, another woman suffering from a highly contagious form of tuberculosis
was also sent home before she had completed her course of treatment, thus
exposing her entire family to the risk of infection. And recently a doctor at
one of the large hospitals disclosed that he had not dared to treat a woman
suffering from 80% burns because he would have had to remove her clothing.
The NGOs present in Kabul are even more “sickened” by the violence with
which the ministerial directives are applied. On September 27, the Ministry
decided to close down all private clinics with in-patient facilities, and just
two days later members of the Taliban entered one of these clinics and vio-
lently ejected two women who were in the process of giving birth. “What
we are seeing is the total destruction of a health system which until now, in
contrast to the education system, has remained relatively unscathed. People
should be aware that today women are dying at home in Kabul because the
Taliban will not allow them access to treatment. First of all, these women are
afraid to go out. And then, when they do pluck up the courage to leave their
homes, it is often too late and their condition is irremediable. The same ap-
plies to their children,” declared Pierre Salignon, the coordinator of the MSF
mission in Kabul….
What the military/religious order of the Taliban is endeavouring to estab-
lish is a system of health care conforming to the ideal Islamic society which
they are advocating, a system in which men and women are kept strictly
apart, the women often living a completely cloistered life. The most incred-
ible aspect of the situation is that this policy of apartheid is being financed,
initiated even, by the World Health Organization. MSF notes in its report
that the notorious directive depriving Kabul’s female inhabitants of medical
treatment coincided with the beginning of work on the renovation of the
Rabia Balkhi hospital, which is destined to become the only “women’s hos-
pital” in the capital and might open in a year’s time. The main donor for this
construction project turns out to be WHO, which has made a contribution
of $64,000 for the first six months.
263
United Nations Security Council resolution 1193, U.N.Doc. S/Res/1193 (August 28,
1998).
Protection of Civilians
The Fourth Geneva Convention 1949264
Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949
ARTICLE 12
In cases where they deem it advisable in the interest of protected persons,
particularly in cases of disagreement between the Parties to the conflict as to
the application or interpretation of the provisions of the present Convention,
the Protecting Powers shall lend their good offices with a view to settling
the disagreement.
For this purpose, each of the Protecting Powers may, either at the invita-
tion of one Party or on its own initiative, propose to the Parties to the conflict
a meeting of their representatives, and in particular of the authorities respon-
sible for protected persons, possibly on neutral territory suitably chosen. The
Parties to the conflict shall be bound to give effect to the proposals made to
them for this purpose. The Protecting Powers may, if necessary, propose for
approval by the Parties to the conflict a person belonging to a neutral Power,
or delegated by the International Committee of the Red Cross, who shall be
invited to take part in such a meeting.
PART II. GENERAL PROTECTION OF POPULATIONS AGAINST CERTAIN
CONSEQUENCES OF WAR
ARTICLE 13
The provisions of Part II cover the whole of the populations of the coun-
tries in conflict, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race,
nationality, religion or political opinion, and are intended to alleviate the
sufferings caused by war.
ARTICLE 14
In time of peace, the High Contracting Parties and, after the outbreak of
hostilities, the Parties thereto, may establish in their own territory and, if the
need arises, in occupied areas, hospital and safety zones and localities so orga-
nized as to protect from the effects of war, wounded, sick and aged persons,
children under fifteen, expectant mothers and mothers of children under seven.
264
The Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950.
Upon the outbreak and during the course of hostilities, the Parties con-
cerned may conclude agreements on mutual recognition of the zones and
localities they have created. They may for this purpose implement the provi-
sions of the Draft Agreement annexed to the present Convention, with such
amendments as they may consider necessary.
The Protecting Powers and the International Committee of the Red Cross
are invited to lend their good offices in order to facilitate the institution and
recognition of these hospital and safety zones and localities.
ARTICLE 15
Any Party to the conflict may, either direct or through a neutral State or
some humanitarian organization, propose to the adverse Party to establish,
in the regions where fighting is taking place, neutralized zones intended to
shelter from the effects of war the following persons, without distinction:
(a) wounded and sick combatants or non-combatants;
(b) civilian persons who take no part in hostilities, and who, while they
reside in the zones, perform no work of a military character.
When the Parties concerned have agreed upon the geographical position,
administration, food supply and supervision of the proposed neutralized zone,
a written agreement shall be concluded and signed by the representatives
of the Parties to the conflict. The agreement shall fix the beginning and the
duration of the neutralization of the zone.
ARTICLE 16
The wounded and sick, as well as the infirm, and expectant mothers, shall
be the object of particular protection and respect.
As far as military considerations allow, each Party to the conflict shall
facilitate the steps taken to search for the killed and wounded, to assist the
shipwrecked and other persons exposed to grave danger, and to protect them
against pillage and ill-treatment.
ARTICLE 17
The Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to conclude local agreements
for the removal from besieged or encircled areas, of wounded, sick, infirm,
and aged persons, children and maternity cases, and for the passage of min-
isters of all religions, medical personnel and medical equipment on their
way to such areas.
ARTICLE 18
Civilian hospitals organized to give care to the wounded and sick, the
infirm and maternity cases, may in no circumstances be the object of attack
but shall at all times be respected and protected by the Parties to the conflict.
States which are Parties to a conflict shall provide all civilian hospitals
with certificates showing that they are civilian hospitals and that the build-
ings which they occupy are not used for any purpose which would deprive
these hospitals of protection in accordance with Article 19.
Civilian hospitals shall be marked by means of the emblem provided for
in Article 38 of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949, but
only if so authorized by the State. The Parties to the conflict shall, in so far as
military considerations permit, take the necessary steps to make the distinc-
tive emblems indicating civilian hospitals clearly visible to the enemy land,
air and naval forces in order to obviate the possibility of any hostile action.
In view of the dangers to which hospitals may be exposed by being close
to military objectives, it is recommended that such hospitals be situated as
far as possible from such objectives.
ARTICLE 19
The protection to which civilian hospitals are entitled shall not cease un-
less they are used to commit, outside their humanitarian duties, acts harmful
to the enemy. Protection may, however, cease only after due warning has been
given, naming, in all appropriate cases, a reasonable time limit and after such
warning has remained unheeded. The fact that sick or wounded members of
the armed forces are nursed in these hospitals, or the presence of small arms
and ammunition taken from such combatants and not yet been handed to
the proper service, shall not be considered to be acts harmful to the enemy.
ARTICLE 20
Persons regularly and solely engaged in the operation and administra-
tion of civilian hospitals, including the personnel engaged in the search for,
removal and transporting of and caring for wounded and sick civilians, the
infirm and maternity cases shall be respected and protected.
In occupied territory and in zones of military operations, the above
personnel shall be recognizable by means of an identity card certifying their
status, bearing the photograph of the holder and embossed with the stamp
of the responsible authority, and also by means of a stamped, water-resistant
armlet which they shall wear on the left arm while carrying out their duties.
This armlet shall be issued by the State and shall bear the emblem provided for
in Article 38 of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949.
Other personnel who are engaged in the operation and administration
of civilian hospitals shall be entitled to respect and protection and to wear
the armlet, as provided in and under the conditions prescribed in this Article,
while they are employed on such duties. The identity card shall state the duties
on which they are employed. The management of each hospital shall at all
times hold at the disposal of the competent national or occupying authorities
an up-to-date list of such personnel.
ARTICLE 21
Convoys of vehicles or hospital trains on land or specially provided ves-
sels on sea, conveying wounded and sick civilians, the infirm and maternity
cases, shall be respected and protected in the same manner as the hospitals
provided for in Article 18, and shall be marked, with the consent of the State,
by the display of the distinctive emblem provided for in Article 38 of the
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949.
ARTICLE 22
Aircraft exclusively employed for the removal of wounded and sick civil-
ians, the infirm and maternity cases or for the transport of medical personnel
and equipment, shall not be attacked, but shall be respected while flying at
heights, times and on routes specifically agreed upon between all the Parties
to the conflict concerned. They may be marked with the distinctive emblem
provided for in Article 38 of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of
12 August 1949. Unless agreed otherwise, flights over enemy or enemy oc-
cupied territory are prohibited. Such aircraft shall obey every summons to
land. In the event of a landing thus imposed, the aircraft with its occupants
may continue its flight after examination, if any.
ARTICLE 23
Each High Contracting Party shall allow the free passage of all consign-
ments of medical and hospital stores and objects necessary for religious
worship intended only for civilians of another High Contracting Party, even
if the latter is its adversary. It shall likewise permit the free passage of all con-
signments of essential foodstuffs, clothing and tonics intended for children
under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity cases.
The obligation of a High Contracting Party to allow the free passage of the
consignments indicated in the preceding paragraph is subject to the condi-
tion that this Party is satisfied that there are no serious reasons for fearing:
(a) that the consignments may be diverted from their destination,
(b) that the control may not be effective, or
(c) that a definite advantage may accrue to the military efforts or economy
of the enemy through the substitution of the above-mentioned consignments
for goods which would otherwise be provided or produced by the enemy or
through the release of such material, services or facilities as would otherwise
be required for the production of such goods.
The Power which allows the passage of the consignments indicated in
the first paragraph of this Article may make such permission conditional on
the distribution to the persons benefited thereby being made under the local
supervision of the Protecting Powers. Such consignments shall be forwarded
as rapidly as possible, and the Power which permits their free passage shall
have the right to prescribe the technical arrangements under which such
passage is allowed.
ARTICLE 24
The Parties to the conflict shall take the necessary measures to ensure
that children under fifteen, who are orphaned or are separated from their
families as a result of the war, are not left to their own resources, and that their
maintenance, the exercise of their religion and their education are facilitated
in all circumstances. Their education shall, as far as possible, be entrusted to
persons of a similar cultural tradition.
The Parties to the conflict shall facilitate the reception of such children
in a neutral country for the duration of the conflict with the consent of the
Protecting Power, if any, and under due safeguards for the observance of the
principles stated in the first paragraph.
They shall, furthermore, endeavour to arrange for all children under twelve
to be identified by the wearing of identity discs, or by some other means.
ARTICLE 25
All persons in the territory of a Party to the conflict, or in a territory occu-
pied by it, shall be enabled to give news of a strictly personal nature to mem-
bers of their families, wherever they may be, and to receive news from them.
This correspondence shall be forwarded speedily and without undue delay.
If, as a result of circumstances, it becomes difficult or impossible to ex-
change family correspondence by the ordinary post, the Parties to the conflict
concerned shall apply to a neutral intermediary, such as the Central Agency
provided for in Article 140, and shall decide in consultation with it how to
ensure the fulfillment of their obligations under the best possible conditions,
in particular with the cooperation of the National Red Cross (Red Crescent,
Red Lion and Sun) Societies.
If the Parties to the conflict deem it necessary to restrict family correspon-
dence, such restrictions shall be confined to the compulsory use of standard
forms containing twenty-five freely chosen words, and to the limitation of
the number of these forms despatched to one each month.
ARTICLE 26
Each Party to the conflict shall facilitate enquiries made by members of
families dispersed owing to the war, with the object of renewing contact with
one another and of meeting, if possible. It shall encourage, in particular, the
work of organizations engaged on this task provided they are acceptable to
it and conform to its security regulations.
PART III. STATUS AND TREATMENT OF PROTECTED PERSONS
Section I. Provisions common to the territories of the parties to the con-
flict and to occupied territories
ARTICLE 27
Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their
persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and
practices, and their manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely
treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threats
thereof and against insults and public curiosity.
Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in
particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault.
Without prejudice to the provisions relating to their state of health, age
and sex, all protected persons shall be treated with the same consideration
by the Party to the Convention.
265
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 1125
U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.
(i) murder;
(ii) torture of all kinds, whether physical or mental;
(iii) corporal punishment; and
(iv) mutilation;
(b) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrad-
ing treatment, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault;
(c) the taking of hostages;
(d) collective punishments; and
(e) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.
3. Any person arrested, detained or interned for actions related to the
armed conflict shall be informed promptly, in a language he understands, of
the reasons why these measures have been taken. Except in cases of arrest or
detention for penal offences, such persons shall be released with the mini-
mum delay possible and in any event as soon as the circumstances justifying
the arrest, detention or internment have ceased to exist.
4. No sentence may be passed and no penalty may be executed on a
person found guilty of a penal offence related to the armed conflict except
pursuant to a conviction pronounced by an impartial and regularly consti-
tuted court respecting the generally recognized principles of regular judicial
procedure, which include the following:
(a) the procedure shall provide for an accused to be informed without
delay of the particulars of the offence alleged against him and shall afford the
accused before and during his trial all necessary rights and means of defence;
(b) no one shall be convicted of an offence except on the basis of indi-
vidual penal responsibility;
(c) no one shall be accused or convicted of a criminal offence on account
or any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under the
national or international law to which he was subject at the time when it
was committed; nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that which was
applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed; if, after the
commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of a
lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby;
(d) anyone charged with an offence is presumed innocent until proved
guilty according to law;
(e) anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to be tried in
his presence;
(f) no one shall be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt;
(g) anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to examine, or
have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and
examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as wit-
nesses against him;
(h) no one shall be prosecuted or punished by the same Party for an
offence in respect of which a final judgement acquitting or convicting that
person has been previously pronounced under the same law and judicial
procedure;
(i) anyone prosecuted for an offence shall have the right to have the
judgement pronounced publicly; and
(j) a convicted person shall be advised on conviction or his judicial and
other remedies and of the time-limits within which they may be exercised.
5. Women whose liberty has been restricted for reasons related to the
armed conflict shall be held in quarters separated from men’s quarters. They
shall be under the immediate supervision of women. Nevertheless, in cases
where families are detained or interned, they shall, whenever possible, be
held in the same place and accommodated as family units.
6. Persons who are arrested, detained or interned for reasons related to
the armed conflict shall enjoy the protection provided by this Article until
their final release, repatriation or re-establishment, even after the end of the
armed conflict.
7. In order to avoid any doubt concerning the prosecution and trial of
persons accused of war crimes or crimes against humanity, the following
principles shall apply:
(a) persons who are accused of such crimes should be submitted for the
purpose of prosecution and trial in accordance with the applicable rules of
international law; and
(b) any such persons who do not benefit from more favourable treat-
ment under the Conventions or this Protocol shall be accorded the treatment
provided by this Article, whether or not the crimes of which they are accused
constitute grave breaches of the Conventions or of this Protocol.
5 . The death penalty for an offence related to the armed conflict shall
not be executed on persons who had not attained the age of eighteen years
at the time the offence was committed.
ARTICLE 78. Evacuation of children
1. No Party to the conflict shall arrange for the evacuation of children,
other than its own nationals, to a foreign country except for a temporary
evacuation where compelling reasons of the health or medical treatment of
the children or, except in occupied territory, their safety, so require. Where
the parents or legal guardians can be found, their written consent to such
evacuation is required. If these persons cannot be found, the written con-
sent to such evacuation of the persons who by law or custom are primarily
responsible for the care of the children is required. Any such evacuation
shall be supervised by the Protecting Power in agreement with the Parties
concerned, namely, the Party arranging for the evacuation, the Party receiving
the children and any Parties whose nationals are being evacuated. In each
case, all Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible precautions to avoid
endangering the evacuation….
Chapter III. Journalists
ARTICLE 79. Measures or protection for journalists
1. Journalists engaged in dangerous professional missions in areas of
armed conflict shall be considered as civilians within the meaning of Article
50, paragraph 1.
2. They shall be protected as such under the Conventions and this Pro-
tocol, provided that they take no action adversely affecting their status as
civilians, and without prejudice to the right of war correspondents accred-
ited to the armed forces to the status provided for in Article 4 (A) (4) of the
Third Convention.
3. They may obtain an identity card similar to the model in Annex II of
this Protocol. This card, which shall be issued by the government of the State
of which the Journalist is a national or in whose territory he resides or in
which the news medium employing him is located, shall attest to his status
as a journalist.
266
United Nations, U.N. Doc S/2001/331, 30 March 2001, available at www.un.org.
hope now is to move beyond an analysis of our past failures and to identify
ways in which the international system can be strengthened to help meet the
growing needs of civilians in war…. In the of recommendations already agreed
upon, it should be possible to ensure that future efforts will be more effec-
tive in bringing genuine relief and protection to civilians in armed conflict….
B. 2009 Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict
***
III. The five core challenges
26. Ultimately, the enduring need to strengthen the protection of civil-
ians stems from the fundamental, and equally enduring, failure of parties to
conflict to comply fully with their legal obligations to protect civilians. It is
a failure that demands reinvigorated commitment and determined action so
as to meet the following core challenges: enhancing compliance with inter-
national law; enhancing compliance by non-State armed groups; enhancing
protection through more effective and better resourced United Nations
peacekeeping and other relevant missions; enhancing humanitarian access;
and enhancing accountability for violations.
A. Enhancing compliance
27. A defining feature of most, if not all, contemporary conflicts is the
failure of the parties to respect and ensure respect for their legal obligations
to protect civilians and spare them from the effects of hostilities….
28. Constant care must be taken to spare the civilian population from the
effects of hostilities. This requires, inter alia, strict compliance by parties to
conflict with international humanitarian law and, in particular, the principles
of distinction and proportionality, and the requirement to take all feasible
precautions in attack and defence. Under no circumstances do violations of
these rules by one party to a conflict justify violations by others….
33. I would remind all parties to conflict of their obligations scrupulously
to respect and ensure respect for the relevant rules. I would also urge them
to consider practical steps that could be taken to spare civilians from the ef-
fects of hostilities, a process that may in some situations benefit from more
267
United Nations, U.N. Doc. S/2009/277, 29 May 2009, available at www.un.org.
discussion with local populations and their leaders, civilian authorities, civil
society or humanitarian actors….
37. The Security Council also has a critical role in promoting systematic
compliance with the law. In particular, the Council should:
(a) Use all available opportunities to condemn violations, without excep-
tion, and remind parties of, and demand compliance with, their obligations;
(b) Publicly threaten and, if necessary, apply targeted measures against
the leadership of parties that consistently defy the demands of the Security
Council and routinely violate their obligations to respect civilians;
(c) Systematically request reports on violations and consider mandating
commissions of inquiry to examine situations where concerns exist regarding
serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law,
including with a view to identifying those responsible and prosecuting them at
the national level, or referring the situation to the International Criminal Court.
B. Enhancing compliance by non-State armed groups
[See also Part I, Chapter 12, The Law of Non-International Armed Con-
flicts, VIII. Who Is Bound by the Law of Non-International Armed Conflicts?]
38. Together with the increased prevalence of non-international armed
conflicts, pitting States against non-State armed groups, or two or more such
groups against each other, a common feature of contemporary conflicts is
the proliferation and fragmentation of such groups. They encompass a range
of identities, motivations and varying degrees of willingness to observe inter-
national humanitarian law and human rights standards.
39. Armed groups are bound by international humanitarian law and must
refrain from committing acts that would impair the enjoyment of human
rights. For some groups, attacks and the commission of other violations
against civilians are deliberate strategies, intended to maximize casualties and
destabilize societies. Others may be less inclined to attack civilians deliberately,
but their actions still have an adverse impact on the safety and security of
civilians. We need urgently to develop a comprehensive approach towards
improving compliance by all these groups with the law, encompassing actions
that range from engagement to enforcement.
40. As stated in common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and in Ad-
ditional Protocol II thereto, the application of international humanitarian law
does not affect the legal status of non-State parties to a conflict. In order to spare
civilians the effects of hostilities, obtain access to those in need and ensure that
aid workers can operate safely, humanitarian actors must have consistent and
sustained dialogue with all parties to conflict, State and non-State. Moreover,
while engagement with non-State armed groups will not always result in im-
proved protection, the absence of systematic engagement will almost certainly
mean more, not fewer, civilian casualties in current conflicts.
41. The extensive experience of ICRC in working with armed groups, as
well as that of United Nations actors and various non-governmental orga-
nizations, has demonstrated the possible benefits of dialogue on protection.
Engagement can take the form of dissemination and training on international
humanitarian law and human rights law standards. The incentives for armed
groups to comply with the law should be emphasized, including increased
likelihood of reciprocal respect for the law by opposing parties.
42. Bearing in mind that armed groups have legal obligations, engagement
may be based around the conclusion of codes of conduct, unilateral declara-
tions and special agreements, as envisaged under international humanitarian
law, through which groups expressly commit themselves to comply with their
obligations or undertake commitments that go above and beyond what are
required by the law. Such instruments have been concluded in a number of
contexts, including in Colombia, Liberia, Nepal, the Philippines, Sierra Leone,
Sri Lanka, the Sudan and the former Yugoslavia. Their conclusion can send a
clear signal to the groups’ members and lead to the establishment of appro-
priate internal disciplinary measures. They also provide an important basis
for follow-up interventions. It is, however, critically important that such tools
and the commitments and principles therein are incorporated into instruc-
tions and communicated to the groups’ members.
43. Other initiatives include those of my Special Representative on Children
and Armed Conflict with respect to ending the recruitment and use of children
by armed groups. Another specific and successful example is the Geneva Call
Deed of Commitment, which seeks to end the use of anti-personnel mines by
armed groups [See Case No. 202, Geneva Call, Puntland State of Somalia adher-
ing to a total ban on anti-personnel mines]. To date, 38 groups have signed the
Deed and have, for the most part, refrained from using anti-personnel mines,
cooperated in mine action in areas under their control and destroyed stockpiles.
44. Member States can themselves promote compliance by armed
groups. Members of such groups have little legal incentive to comply with
international humanitarian law if they are likely to face domestic criminal
prosecution for their mere participation in a non-international armed con-
flict, regardless of whether they respect the law or not. Granting amnesty for
merely participating in hostilities, though not in respect of any war crimes
and serious violations of human rights law which may have been commit-
268
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Ku-
narac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic, IT-96-23 and IT-96-23/1, Appeals
Chamber, Decision 12 June 2002, citations omitted.
123. …Slavery may exist even without torture. Slaves may be well fed, well
clothed, and comfortably housed, but they are still slaves if without lawful
process they are deprived of their freedom by forceful restraint. We might
eliminate all proof of ill-treatment, overlook the starvation, beatings, and
other barbarous acts, but the admitted fact of slavery – compulsory uncom-
pensated labour – would still remain. There is no such thing as benevolent
slavery. Involuntary servitude, even if tempered by humane treatment, is still
slavery. The passage speaks of slavery; it applies equally to enslavement.
124. For the foregoing reasons, the Appeals Chamber is of the opinion
that the Trial Chamber’s definition of the crime of enslavement is not too
broad and reflects customary international law at the time when the alleged
crimes were committed. The Appellants’ contentions are therefore rejected;
the appeal relating to the definition of the crime of enslavement fails.
D. DEFINITION OF THE CRIME OF RAPE…
2. Discussion
127. After an extensive review of the Tribunal’s jurisprudence and domes-
tic laws from multiple jurisdictions, the Trial Chamber concluded:
the actus reus of the crime of rape in international law is constituted by:
the sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus of the victim
by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator;
or (b) the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; where such
sexual penetration occurs without the consent of the victim. Consent for
this purpose must be consent given voluntarily, as a result of the victim’s free
will, assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances. The men’s rea
is the intention to effect this sexual penetration, and the knowledge that it
occurs without the consent of the victim.
128. The Appeals Chamber concurs with the Trial Chamber’s definition
of rape. Nonetheless, the Appeals Chamber believes that it is worth empha-
sising two points. First, it rejects the Appellants’ “resistance” requirement, an
addition for which they have offered no basis in customary international law.
The Appellants’ bald assertion that nothing short of continuous resistance
provides adequate notice to the perpetrator that his attentions are unwanted
is wrong on the law and absurd on the facts.
129. Secondly, with regard to the role of force in the definition of rape,
the Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber appeared to depart from
the Tribunal’s prior definitions of rape. [footnote 158: See, e.g., Furundzija
Trial Judgement, para. 185 [available on http://www.icty.org] Prior attention
has focused on force as the defining characteristic of rape. Under this line of
133. In conclusion, the Appeals Chamber agrees with the Trial Chamber’s
determination that the coercive circumstances present in this case made con-
sent to the instant sexual acts by the Appellants impossible. The Appellants’
grounds of appeal relating to the definition of the crime of rape therefore fail….
VII. CUMULATIVE CONVICTIONS…
B. The Instant Convictions…
2. Intra-Article Convictions under Article 5 of the Statute
(a) Rape and Torture
179. The Appeals Chamber will now consider the Appellants’ arguments
regarding intra-Article convictions. The Appellants contend that the Trial
Chamber erred by entering convictions for both torture under Article 5(f)
and rape under Article 5(g) of the Statute on the theory that neither the law
nor the facts can reasonably be interpreted to establish distinct crimes. The
Trial Chamber found that the crimes of rape and torture each contain one
materially distinct element not contained in the other, making convictions
under both crimes permissible. As its earlier discussion of the offences of rape
and torture make clear, the Appeals Chamber agrees. The issue of cumulative
convictions hinges on the definitions of distinct offences under the Statute
which are amplified in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal. That torture and
rape each contain a materially distinct element not contained by the other
disposes of this ground of appeal.
That is, that an element of the crime of rape is penetration, whereas an
element for the crime of torture is a prohibited purpose, neither element
being found in the other crime….
181. In the Celebici Trial Judgement, the Trial Chamber considered the is-
sue of torture through rape. The Appeals Chamber overturned the Appellant’s
convictions under Article 3 of the Statute as improperly cumulative in relation
to Article 2 of the Statute, but the Trial Chamber’s extensive analysis of torture
and rape remains persuasive. Grounding its analysis in a thorough survey of
the jurisprudence of international bodies, the Trial Chamber concluded that
rape may constitute torture. Both the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights and the European Court of Human Rights have found that torture may
be committed through rape. And the United Nations Special Rapporteur on
Torture listed forms of sexual assault as methods of torture.
182. For rape to be categorised as torture, both the elements of rape and
the elements of torture must be present. Summarising the international case-
law, the Trial Chamber in the Celebici case concluded that “rape involves the
269
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 1125
U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.
270
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases,
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, Geneva, 94 L.N.T.S. 65, entered into
force Feb. 8, 1928.
271
John H. McNeill , The International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion in the
Nuclear Weapons Cases - A first appraisal, No. 316 International Review of the Red
Cross (Feb. 28, 1997), available at: http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/
misc/57jnft.htm. Reprinted with permission of ICRC Bishkek, contributing editor.
“... that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary
to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict…. However, in
view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at
its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use
of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance
of self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake”….
Law of permission or prohibition?
The final clause of Paragraph 2E of the Court’s findings states: “... the Court
cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons
would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in
which the very survival of a State would be at stake “.The UN General Assembly
asked the Court to advise on whether” ... the threat or use of nuclear weapons
in any circumstance [is] permitted under international law.” Phrased in this
way, the question incorrectly assumed that international law addressing the
use of weapons is permissive rather than prohibitory. The Court affirmed
that “State practice shows that the illegality of the use of certain weapons as
such does not result from an absence of authorization but, on the contrary,
is formulated in terms of prohibition.” The Court thus correctly recast the
General Assembly’s question and proceeded to evaluate whether the threat
or use of nuclear weapons is prohibited.
Application of international humanitarian law
The Court, having found no conventional or customary international
law proscribing the threat or use of nuclear weapons per se, moved to a
consideration of whether “recourse to nuclear weapons must be considered
as illegal in the light of the principles and rules of international humanitarian
law applicable in armed conflict and of the law of neutrality”
It is beyond reasonable dispute that international humanitarian law ap-
plies to nuclear weapons in the same way as it applies to conventional weap-
ons. Analysis of international humanitarian law begins with the fundamental
principle that the “right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy
is not unlimited “. There are two cardinal” rules. First, the principle of distinc-
tion holds that States must not make civilians the object of attack and must
not use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and
military targets. Second, it is prohibited to use weapons that cause unnecessary
suffering, that is, weapons that cause “harm greater than that unavoidable to
achieve legitimate military objectives.”
The Court found that the Martens clause is part of customary international
law. The Martens clause first found expression in Hague Convention II with
Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1899. The Court quoted
from Article 1, paragraph 2, of Additional Protocol I of 1977 as a modern
formulation of the Martens clause:
“In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agree-
ments, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority
of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from
the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.”
Parenthetically, the Court perceived no need to rule on the applicability of
Additional Protocol I of 1977 to nuclear weapons, because that Protocol in no
way replaced the general customary rules applicable to all means and meth-
ods of combat, including nuclear weapons. In particular, the Court recalled
that all States are bound by those rules in Additional Protocol I which, when
adopted, were merely the expression of the pre-existing customary law [34].
The Court briefly considered the principle of neutrality, which had been raised
by several States. It declined to elaborate on the specific content of the principle
of neutrality, which has been debated since the adoption of the UN Charter, stat-
ing merely that the rules of neutrality apply to “all international armed conflict,
whatever type of weapons might be used” [35]. We think this is correct.
The Court proceeded to determine whether the threat or use of nuclear
weapons is inherently incompatible with international humanitarian law or
the law of neutrality. The proponents of the illegality of nuclear weapons
argued, in essence, that the destructive force of nuclear weapons is so great
that any use of them whatsoever would necessarily violate the principles of
distinction and prevention of unnecessary suffering. The States that assert
the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons in certain circumstances
argued that the Court had insufficient evidence to conclude that any and every
use of nuclear weapons would violate the principles of distinction and pre-
venting unnecessary suffering. The Court concluded, we think correctly, that
“it does not have sufficient elements to enable it to conclude with certainty
that the use of nuclear weapons would necessarily be at variance with the
principles and rules of law applicable in armed conflict in any circumstance.”
The first two of the Court’s six findings were:
“(2) A. Unanimously,
There is in neither customary nor conventional international law any
specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons;
(2) B. By eleven votes to three [against, Judges Shahabuddeen, Weera-
mantry and Koroma],
Implementation of International
Humanitarian Law
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory272
History of the proceedings (paras. 1-12)
The Court first recalls that on 10 December 2003 the Secretary-General of
the United Nations officially communicated to the Court the decision taken
by the General Assembly to submit the question set forth in its resolution ES-
10/14, adopted on 8 December 2003 at its Tenth Emergency Special Session,
for an advisory opinion. The question is the following:
“What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of the
wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, as described in the report
of the Secretary-General, considering the rules and principles of international
272
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory of 9 July 2004, International Court of Justice Summary, I.C.J. Summaries
2004/2 (2004).
law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, and relevant Security
Council and General Assembly resolutions?”
Jurisdiction
The Court concludes that it has jurisdiction to give an opinion on the
question put to it by the General Assembly and that there is no compelling
reason for it to use its discretionary power not to give that opinion.
International humanitarian law
As regards international humanitarian law, the Court first recalls that Is-
rael is not a party to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, to which Hague
Regulations are annexed. It considers, however, that the provisions of the
Hague Regulations have become part of customary law, as is in fact recognized
by all the participants in the proceedings before the Court. The Court also
observes that, pursuant to Article 154 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, that
Convention is supplementary to Sections II and III of the Hague Regulations.
Section III of those Regulations, which concerns “Military authority over the
territory of the hostile State,” is particularly pertinent in the present case.
Secondly, with regard to the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Court takes
note that differing views have been expressed by the participants in these
proceedings. Israel, contrary to the great majority of the participants, disputes
the applicability de jure of the Convention to the Occupied Palestinian Ter-
ritory. The Court recalls that the Fourth Geneva Convention was ratified by
Israel on 6 July 1951 and that Israel is a party to that Convention; that Jor-
dan has also been a party thereto since 29 May 1951; and that neither of the
two States has made any reservation that would be pertinent to the present
proceedings. The Court observes that the Israeli authorities have indicated
on a number of occasions that in fact they generally apply the humanitarian
provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention within the occupied territories.
However, according to Israel’s position, that Convention is not applicable de
jure within those territories because, under Article 2, paragraph 2, it applies
only in the case of occupation of territories falling under the sovereignty of a
High Contracting Party involved in an armed conflict. Israel explains that the
territories occupied by Israel subsequent to the 1967 conflict had not previ-
ously fallen under Jordanian sovereignty. The Court notes that, according to
the first paragraph of Article 2 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, when two
conditions are fulfilled, namely that there exists an armed conflict (whether
or not a state of war has been recognized), and that the conflict has arisen
between two contracting parties, then the Convention applies, in particular,
in any territory occupied in the course of the conflict by one of the contract-
ing parties. The object of the second paragraph of Article 2, which refers to
Whilst taking note of the assurance given by Israel that the construc-
tion of the wall does not amount to annexation and that the wall is of a
temporary nature, the Court nevertheless considers that the construction
of the wall and its associated régime create a “fait accompli” on the ground
that could well become permanent, in which case, and notwithstanding the
formal characterization of the wall by Israel, it would be tantamount to de
facto annexation.
Self-defense and state of necessity (paras. 138-141)
The Court recalls that Annex I to the report of the Secretary-General states,
however, that, according to Israel: “the construction of the Barrier is consis-
tent with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, its inherent right to
self-defense and Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001).”
The Court considers further whether Israel could rely on a state of ne-
cessity which would preclude the wrongfulness of the construction of the
wall. In this regard, citing its decision in the case concerning the Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), it observes that the state of necessity
is a ground recognized by customary international law that “can only be in-
voked under certain strictly defined conditions which must be cumulatively
satisfied” (I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 40, para. 51), one of those conditions being
that the act at issue be the only way for the State to guard an essential inter-
est against a grave and imminent peril. In the light of the material before it,
the Court is not convinced that the construction of the wall along the route
chosen was the only means to safeguard the interests of Israel against the peril
which it has invoked as justification for that construction. While Israel has
the right, and indeed the duty to respond to the numerous and deadly acts
of violence directed against its civilian population, in order to protect the life
of its citizens, the measures taken are bound to remain in conformity with
applicable international law. Israel cannot rely on a right of self-defense or on
a state of necessity in order to preclude the wrongfulness of the construction
of the wall. The Court accordingly finds that the construction of the wall, and
its associated régime, are contrary to international law.
Conclusion
The Court considers that its conclusion that the construction of the wall
by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is contrary to international
law must be placed in a more general context. Since 1947, the year when
General Assembly resolution 181 (II) was adopted and the Mandate for Pal-
estine was terminated, there has been a succession of armed conflicts, acts
of indiscriminate violence and repressive measures on the former mandated
territory. The Court would emphasize that both Israel and Palestine are under
Implementation of International
Humanitarian Law in the Kyrgyz Republic
ICRC, Advisory Services on International Humanitarian
Law273
The three main priorities of the ICRC’s Advisory Service are to encourage
ratification of IHL treaties, to promote national implementation of the obli-
gations arising from these treaties and to collect and facilitate the exchange
of information on national implementation measures.
Why promote international humanitarian law?
Currently, dozens of conflicts are raging throughout the world. Each day
brings news of yet another atrocity perpetrated in the name of war: massacres,
tortures, summary executions, rape, deportation of civilians, children taking
a direct part in hostilities... the list is endless.
Some may argue that these are just some of war’s necessary evils. They are
not. They are illegal. They are outright violations of a universally recognized
body of law known as international humanitarian law (IHL).
As part of its humanitarian mission to protect the lives and dignity of vic-
tims of armed conflict, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
273
ICRC, Advisory Services on International Humanitarian Law, available at:
www.icrc.org.
strives to promote respect for the rules of IHL. Universal ratification of IHL
instruments and effective implementation of the obligations they contain are
promoted to ensure maximum protection for the victims of armed conflict.
How can IHL be implemented by States?
Adherence to IHL treaties is just the first step. The following measures
must be taken before States can comply with their obligations arising from
the Geneva Conventions of 1949, their Additional Protocols of 1977, the 1954
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property and its two Protocols,
other treaties relating to the prohibition and use of certain weapons, as well
as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court:
– translation of IHL treaties into national languages
– adoption of criminal legislation punishing war crimes and
other violations of IHL
– adoption of measures to prevent and punish misuse of the
red cross and red crescent emblems and other signals and
emblems recognized by the treaties
– definition and guarantee of the status of protected persons
– protection of fundamental and procedural guarantees in the
event of armed Conflict
– establishment and/or regulation of National Societies,
organization of civil defense and National Information
Bureaux
– dissemination of IHL
– appointment of legal advisers for armed forces
– identification and marking of protected people, places and
property
– observance of IHL in the location of military sites, and in the
development and adoption of weapons and military tactics
How can the ICRC help?
The ICRC set up its Advisory Service in 1996 to step up its support to
States committed to implementing IHL.
Aims:
– encourage all States to ratify IHL treaties
– encourage States to fulfill their obligations under these
treaties at the national level
Structure:
– a unit attached to the ICRC’s Legal Division in Geneva, i.e. one
supervisor plus three legal advisers, one specialized in civil
law, one in common law and one in the Advisory Service’s
database
– a team of legal experts based in each continent
What can the Advisory Service offer?
The Advisory Service works closely with governments, taking into ac-
count their specific needs and their respective political and legal systems. It
also works with the following:
– National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
– academic institutions
– international and regional organizations
Specifically, the Advisory Service:
– Organizes meetings of experts
– A r r a n g e s n a t i o n a l a n d r e g i o n a l s e m i n a r s o n t h e
implementation of IHL and meetings of experts on selected
topics; takes part in international forums
– Offers legal and technical assistance in incorporating IHL
into national law
– Translates IHL treaties; carries out studies on the compatibility
of national law with the obligations arising from these
treaties; provides legal advice
– Encourages States to set up national IHL committees and
assists them in their work
– Supports the work of advisory bodies to governments with
respect to implementing, developing and disseminating IHL
– Promotes the exchange of information
– Manages a collection of texts on legislation, case law, national
studies and manual for the armed forces; a database on the
implementation of IHL accessible on the ICRC’s website
(www.icrc.org) and on the ICRC’s CD-ROM on IHL
– Publishes specialist documents
3. The National Red Crescent society of the Kyrgyz Republic (NRCS of the
Kyrgyz Republic) shall use the Red Crescent emblem with open ends to the
left on a white background, as well as the title “Red Crescent.”
Article 3 of the Charter of the National Red
Crescent society of the Kyrgyz Republic.
1. Illegal use of the emblems in a peace time
can lead to distortion of their actual meaning and
loss of their value.
After beginning of military actions to fight
against abusing its usage can be too late; victims of
armed conflicts will appear left to mercy of their
fates; rendering of humanitarian assistance to them will become a hardly
resolvable problem.
Each of us can promote preservation and increase of the emblem’s value
as a protective mark.
All of us bear personal responsibility for providing protection stipulated
by the emblems, which will perhaps rescue lives tomorrow!’
274
Dated August 20, 2010.
CHAPTER 4
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
275
Yusuf Aksar, Implementing International Humanitarian Law, The Ad Hoc Tribunals to
a Permanent International Criminal Court. pp. 3-4, 6-7 (Routledge, New York, 2004).
276
Trial Chamber, Tadic Case, Jurisdiction Decision, para.4; and also see paras. 5, 8, 40,
and the explanation made on p.25 under the heading of ‘In the Trial chamber’ above.
277
Fox, pp. 435-6; see also Id. for the explanation made under ‘In the Appeals Cham-
ber’, p. 34.
278
Separate Opinion of Judge Li, para. 2.
279
[citations omitted].
280
[citations omitted].
***
56. The Court will now address Belgium’s argument that immunities accorded
to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs can in no case protect them where
they are suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity.
In support of this position, Belgium refers in its Counter-Memorial to various legal
instruments creating international criminal tribunals, to examples from national
legislation, and to the jurisprudence of national and international courts….
281
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, p. 3.
58. The Court has carefully examined State practice, including national
legislation and those few decisions of national higher courts, such as the
House of Lords or the French Court of Cassation. It has been unable to deduce
from this practice that there exists under customary international law any
form of exception to the rule according immunity from criminal jurisdiction
and inviolability to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs, where they are
suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity.
The Court has also examined the rules concerning the immunity or
criminal responsibility of persons having an official capacity contained in
the legal instruments creating international criminal tribunals, and which are
specifically applicable to the latter (see Charter of the International Military
Tribunal of Nuremberg, Art. 7; Charter of the International Military Tribunal
of Tokyo, Art. 6; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, Art. 7, para. 2; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, Art. 6, para. 2; Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 27). It
finds that these rules likewise do not enable it to conclude that any such an
exception exists in customary international law in regard to national courts.
Finally, none of the decisions of the Nuremberg and Tokyo international
military tribunals, or of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, cited by Belgium deal with the question of the immunities of
incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs before national courts where they
are accused of having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity. The
Court accordingly notes that those decisions are in no way at variance with
the findings it has reached above.
In view of the foregoing, the Court accordingly cannot accept Belgium’s
argument in this regard.
59. It should further be noted that the rules governing the jurisdiction
of national courts must be carefully distinguished from those governing
jurisdictional immunities: jurisdiction does not imply absence of immunity,
while absence of immunity does not imply jurisdiction. Thus, although vari-
ous international conventions on the prevention and punishment of certain
serious crimes impose on States obligations of prosecution or extradition,
thereby requiring them to extend their criminal jurisdiction, such extension
of jurisdiction in no way affects immunities under customary international
law, including those of Ministers for Foreign Affairs. These remain opposable
before the courts of a foreign State, even where those courts exercise such a
jurisdiction under these conventions.
60. The Court emphasizes, however, that the immunity from jurisdiction en-
joyed by incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs does not mean that they enjoy
282
12th Raymond & Beverly Sackler Distinguished Lecture Series (October 25, 2006).
283
Liesbeth Zegveld, The Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International
Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p 3.
284
Inter-American Commission Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights in
Commission on Human Rights once noted “the adverse effects [the actions
of armed groups] might have on the enjoyment of human rights.”285 The UN
Secretary-General in his 1999 report on Fundamental Standards of Humanity,
noted that “some argue that non-State actors should also be held accountable
under international human rights law, especially in situations where the State
structures no longer exist or where States are unable or unwilling to mete out
punishment for crimes committed by non-State actors.”286 This is however
rather equivocal, the practice of the international human rights bodies by
no means establishing decisively the international responsibility of armed
opposition groups engaged in hostilities against the State. Indeed, in various
instances in which governments alleged violations of human rights by armed
opposition groups, the Commission on Human Rights resisted characterizing
acts of armed groups as violations of human rights.287
(b) Direct responsibility of private sector entities for complicity with
the State
United States federal law presents the possibility of private litigants es-
tablishing the direct responsibility of private sector entities for complicity
with the State in violations of human rights. This position, which is unusual
in national legislation generally, owes to the Alien Tort Claims Act, which
provides that “[t]he [federal] district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States.”288 After a long period of obscu-
rity, the Act was applied to establish jurisdiction over a claim by Paraguayan
nationals against a Paraguayan official for alleged acts of torture, Filartiga v
Pena-Irala289 triggering a modern discussion over the meaning of the 18th
century expression “violations of the law of nations.”290 Lower courts oscillated
291
See Tel-Oren v Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 724, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1984, Bork J
concurring).
292
542 U.S. 692 (2004).
293
456 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006; Fisher CJ; Bybee CJ dissenting).
294
453 F.Supp.2d 633, 12 September 2006 (Cote J).
295
456 F.3d 1069, 1074.
law.296 The lower court, though dismissing on the grounds noted, held that
“if proven, the allegations supported liability against Rio Tinto for certain
acts committed by the PNG government” and that the plaintiffs had stated
“cognizable ATCA claims for racial discrimination, crimes against humanity
and violations of the laws of war.”297
Command Responsibility
Prosecutor v. Juvénal Kajelijeli298
***
740. From the evidence presented in the present section and these find-
ings regarding the Accused’s active involvement in the killings that occurred
in Mukingo, Nkuli and Kigombe communes in April 1994, it follows that the
Accused knew that Interahamwe from Mukingo and Nkuli communes—who
were under his effective control at that time—were participating in those
killings. The Chamber finds that the Accused failed to take any measures
to prevent or stop those acts. In making this finding, the Chamber found
further corroboration in the testimony of Prosecution Witness GBH, who
stated that he pleaded with the Accused to stop the killings but the Accused
refused, saying that “it was necessary to continue, look for those or hunt
for those who had survived”299. Thus, even though the Prosecution failed to
provide any evidence establishing that the Accused indeed had authority to
issue circulation passes (laissez-passer) between the 1 January 1994 and 26
June 1994 or that he refused to do so, the Chamber finds that the Accused
failed to prevent or stop the killings of early to mid-April 1994 in Mukingo,
Nkuli and Kigombe communes….
770. Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute addresses the criminal responsibil-
ity of a superior by virtue of his or her knowledge of the acts and omissions
of subordinates and for failure to prevent, discipline, or punish the criminal
acts of his or her subordinates in the preparation and execution of the crimes
charged. The principle of superior responsibility, which derives from the prin-
ciple of individual criminal responsibility as applied in the Nuremberg and
296
ibid, 1075.
297
Sarei v Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp.2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002), 1148-9, 1139-63.
298
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Judgment of 1 December 2003 Case
No. ICTR-98-44A-T.
299
T. 17 July 2001, pp. 59-61 (GBH).
300
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ICTR Statute, Article 6(3).
301
Semanza, Judgment (TC), para. 400; Bagilishema, Judgment (AC), paras. 50 and 51;
Kayishema and Ruzindana, Judgment (TC), para. 294; Musema, Judgment (TC),
para. 148; Celebici, Judgment (AC), paras. 192-196.
302
Semanza Judgment (TC), para. 400.
303
For example, crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
304
Celebici, Judgment (AC), paras. 189-198, 225-226, 238-239, 256 and 263; Celebici,
Judgment (TC), para. 346; Blaskic, Judgment (TC), para. 294; Aleksovski, Judgment
(TC), para. 69; Kordic, Judgment (TC), para. 401; Kunarac and Kovac, Judgment
(TC), para. 395; Kayishema and Ruzindana, Judgment (TC), paras. 217-231; Bagil-
ishema, Judgment (AC), paras. 26-62 ; Bagilishema, Judgment (TC), paras. 38-50;
Semanza, Judgment (TC), para. 400; Niyitegeka, Judgment (TC), para. 477.
Genocide
Application of the Convention for the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)308
***
186. The Court notes that genocide as defined in Article II of the Con-
vention comprises “acts” and an “intent.” It is well established that the acts -
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [and]
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group”
- themselves include mental elements. “Killing” must be intentional, as
must “causing serious bodily or mental harm.” Mental elements are made
explicit in paragraphs (c) and (d) of Article II by the words “deliberately” and
“intended,” quite apart from the implications of the words “inflicting” and
305
Semanza, Judgement (TC), para. 404; Bagilishema, Judgment (TC), paras. 44-45;
Akayesu, Judgment (TC), para. 489.
306
Semanza, (TC), para. 404; Bagilishema, Judgment (TC), para. 45.
307
Semanza, Judgement (TC), para. 405 ; Bagilishema, Judgment (TC), para.46; Celebici,
Judgment (TC), paras. 384-386.
308
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2007, p. 43.
“imposing”; and forcible transfer too requires deliberate intentional acts. The
acts, in the words of the ILC, are by their very nature conscious, intentional or
volitional acts (Commentary on Article 17 of the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes
against the Peace and Security of Mankind, ILC Report 1996, Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, 1996, Vol. II, Part Two, p. 44, para. 5).
187. In addition to those mental elements, Article II requires a further
mental element. It requires the establishment of the “intent to destroy, in
whole or in part,… [the protected] group, as such.” It is not enough to estab-
lish, for instance in terms of paragraph (a), that deliberate unlawful killings
of members of the group have occurred. The additional intent must also be
established, and is defined very precisely. It is often referred to as a special
or specific intent or dolus specialis; in the present Judgment it will usually
be referred to as the “specific intent (dolus specialis).” It is not enough that
the members of the group are targeted because they belong to that group,
that is because the perpetrator has a discriminatory intent. Something more
is required. The acts listed in Article II must be done with intent to destroy
the group as such in whole or in part. The words “as such” emphasize that
intent to destroy the protected group.
188. The specificity of the intent and its particular requirements are
highlighted when genocide is placed in the context of other related criminal
acts, notably crimes against humanity and persecution, as the Trial Chamber
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereinafter
“ICTY” or “the Tribunal”) did in the Kupreškić et al case:
“the mens rea requirement for persecution is higher than
for ordinary crimes against humanity, although lower than for
genocide. In this context the Trial Chamber wishes to stress that
persecution as a crime against humanity is an offence belonging
to the same genus as genocide. Both persecution and genocide
are crimes perpetrated against persons that belong to a particular
group and who are targeted because of such belonging. In
both categories what matters is the intent to discriminate: to
attack persons on account of their ethnic, racial, or religious
characteristics (as well as, in the case of persecution, on account
of their political affiliation). While in the case of persecution
the discriminatory intent can take multifarious inhumane forms
and manifest itself in a plurality of actions including murder,
in the case of genocide that intent must be accompanied by
the intention to destroy, in whole or in part, the group to
which the victims of the genocide belong. Thus, it can be said
***
3. The applicant, invoking Article 5 § 1 (a) and Article 6 § 1 of the Con-
vention, alleged that the German courts had not had jurisdiction to convict
him of genocide. He further argued that, due, in particular, to the domestic
courts’ refusal to call any witness for the defence who would have had to be
summoned abroad he had not had a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6
§§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention. Moreover, he complained that his conviction
for genocide was in breach of Article 7 § 1 of the Convention in particular
because the national courts’ wide interpretation of that crime had no basis
in German or public international law….
8. On 16 December 1995 the applicant was arrested when entering Ger-
many and placed in pre-trial detention on the ground that he was strongly
suspected of having committed acts of genocide….
309
Jorgic v. Germany, Application no. 74613/01, European Court of Human Rights,
12 July 2007.
18. Furthermore, the court found that the applicant had acted with intent
to commit genocide within the meaning of Article 220a of the Criminal Code.
Referring to the views expressed by several legal writers, it stated that the
“destruction of a group” within the meaning of Article 220a of the Criminal
Code meant destruction of the group as a social unit in its distinctiveness and
particularity and its feeling of belonging together (“Zerstörung der Gruppe
als sozialer Einheit in ihrer Besonderheit und Eigenart und ihrem Zusam-
mengehörigkeitsgefühl”); a biological-physical destruction was not necessary.
It concluded that the applicant had therefore acted with intent to destroy
the group of Muslims in the North of Bosnia, or at least in the Doboj region….
35. Article 220a of the Criminal Code was inserted into the German Crimi-
nal Code by the Act of 9 August 1954 on Germany’s accession to the Genocide
Convention and entered into force in 1955. Articles 6 no. 1 and 220a of the
Criminal Code ceased to be effective on 30 June 2002 when the Code on
Crimes against International Law (Völkerstrafgesetzbuch) entered into force.
Pursuant to Article 1 of the new Code, it applies to criminal offences against
international law such as genocide (see Article 6 of the new Code) even when
the offence was committed abroad and bears no relation to Germany….
99. The Government conceded that in its judgment of 2 August 2001 in
the case of Prosecutor v. Krstic, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY, as upheld on
appeal, had expressly rejected the Federal Constitutional Court’s interpreta-
tion of the notion of “intent to destroy” in its judgment in the present case.
Relying on the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, the ICTY had argued for
the first time that the offence of genocide under public international law was
restricted to acts aimed at the physical or biological destruction of a group.
However, this narrower interpretation of the scope of the crime of genocide
by the ICTY in 2001 – which, in the view, was not convincing – did not call
into question the fact that it had been foreseeable for the applicant, when he
committed his offences in 1992, that these would be qualified as genocide. In
any event, the German courts had not qualified ethnic cleansing in general
as genocide, but had found that the applicant, in the circumstances of the
case, was guilty of genocide as he had intended to destroy a group as a social
unit and not merely to expel it….
105. The Court notes that the domestic courts construed the “intent to
destroy a group as such” systematically in the context of Article 220a § 1 of the
Criminal Code as a whole, having regard notably to alternatives no. 4 (imposi-
tion of measures which are intended to prevent births within the group) and
no. 5 (forcible transfer of children of the group into another group) of that
provision, which did not necessitate a physical destruction of living members of
the group in question. The Court finds that the domestic courts’ interpretation
of “intent to destroy a group” as not necessitating a physical destruction of the
group, which has also been adopted by a number of scholars (see paragraphs 36
and 47 above), is therefore covered by the wording, read in its context, of the
crime of genocide in the Criminal Code and does not appear unreasonable….
113. In view of the foregoing, the Court concludes that, while many au-
thorities had favoured a narrow interpretation of the crime of genocide, there
had already been several authorities at the material time which had construed
the offence of genocide in the same wider way as the German courts. In
these circumstances, the Court finds that the applicant, if need be with the
assistance of a lawyer, could reasonably have foreseen that he risked being
charged with and convicted of genocide for the acts he had committed in
1992. In this context the Court also has regard to the fact that the applicant
was found guilty of acts of a considerable severity and duration: the killing
of several people and the detention and ill-treatment of a large number of
people over a period of several months as the leader of a paramilitary group
in pursuit of the policy of ethnic cleansing….
***
803. As with other crimes, the crime of genocide requires a finding of both
mens rea and actus reus. The mens rea for genocide comprises of the specific
intent or dolus specialis described in the general clause of Article 2(2) of the
Statute – i.e. the commission of a genocidal act ‘with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group’. And the actus reus consists
of any of the five acts listed under Article 2(2) of the Statute, as shown above311.
Proof of specific intent
804. In determining the specific intent of the crime of genocide it is instructive
to consider the following pronouncement of Trial Chamber I in the Akayesu Case:
“[i]ntent is a mental factor which is difficult, even impossible,
to determine. This is the reason why, in the absence of a confession
from the accused, his intent can be inferred from a certain number
of presumptions of fact. The Chamber considers that it is possible
to deduce the genocidal intent inherent in a particular act charged
310
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Judgment of: 1 December 2003. Case
No. ICTR-98-44A-T.
311
See above: Part IV, Section D.
312
Akayesu, Judgment (TC), para. 523.
313
Kayishema and Ruzindana, Judgment (TC), para. 93.
314
The Chamber drew conclusions from a legal text, which cited the Final Report of
Commission of Experts to the effect that the specific intent may be inferred from
sufficient facts such as the number of group members affected: see Kayishema and
Ruzindana, Judgment (TC), para. 93.
315
Kayishema and Ruzindana, Judgment (TC), para. 93.
316
Jelisic, Judgment (TC), 14 December 1999, para. 82.
317
See “ILC Report 1996; Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
In whole or in part
809. Under Article 2, an accused may be liable if he ‘intends to destroy
in whole or in part a … group.’ As has been explained in judgments of this
Tribunal, in order to establish an intent to destroy ‘in whole or in part’, it is
not necessary to show that the perpetrator intended to achieve the complete
annihilation of a group from every corner of the globe. Nevertheless, the per-
petrator must have intended to destroy more than an imperceptible number
of the targeted group318. In effect, the Semanza Trial Chamber was correct in
observing that while the Prosecution must establish, beyond reasonable doubt,
the intent of the perpetrator to destroy the target group in whole or in part,
there is no numeric threshold of victims necessary to establish genocide.319…
Protected groups
811. It is required to show under Article 2 that the Accused, in committing
genocide intended to destroy ‘a national, ethnical, racial or religious’ group. Trial
Chambers of this Tribunal have noted that the said concept enjoys no generally
or internationally accepted definition, rather each concept must be assessed in
the light of a particular political, social, historical and cultural context320. Ac-
cordingly, “[f]or purposes of applying the Genocide Convention, membership of
a group is, in essence, a subjective rather than an objective concept [where] the
victim is perceived by the perpetrator of genocide as belonging to a group slated
for destruction.”321 A determination of the categorized groups should be made
on a case-by-case basis, by reference to both objective and subjective criteria.322
The acteus reus
812. The acteus reus for the crime of genocide is provided for under Ar-
ticle 2(2) of the Statute. As the issues arising in the present case are so limited,
the Chamber shall only review the meaning of the requirements: (a) “killing
members of the group”; and (b) “causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group.”
Mankind,” p. 90; Semanza, Judgment (TC), 15 May 2003, para. 315; Kayishema and
Ruzindana, Judgment (TC), para. 95.
318
See “ILC Report 1996; Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind,” p. 90; Bagilishema, Judgment (TC), para. 64; Kayishema and Ruzindana,
Judgment (TC), para. 96; Akayesu, Judgment (TC), para. 496 - 499; Semanza, Judg-
ment (TC), para. 316.
319
Semanza, Judgment (TC), para. 316.
320
Bagilishema, Judgment (TC), para. 65; Musema, Judgment (TC), para. 161.
321
Rutaganda, Judgment (TC), para. 56; Musema, Judgment (TC), para. 161; Semanza,
Judgment (TC), para. 317.
322
Semanza, Judgment (TC), para. 317.
843. The Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the Accused is
criminally responsible for the acts of genocide (killing of members of the
Tutsi ethnic group) committed by his subordinates in Mukingo and Nkuli
Communes and at the Ruhengeri Court of Appeal in Kigombe Commune,
pursuant to Article 6(3) of the Statute.
***
6. Article 4 of the Tribunal’s Statute, like the Genocide Convention,324 covers
certain acts done with “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethni-
cal, racial or religious group, as such.” The Indictment in this case alleged, with
respect to the count of genocide, that Radislav Krstiс “intend[ed] to destroy a
part of the Bosnian Muslim people as a national, ethnical, or religious group.”325
The targeted group identified in the Indictment, and accepted by the Trial
Chamber, was that of the Bosnian Muslims.326 The Trial Chamber determined
that the Bosnian Muslims were a specific, distinct national group, and there-
fore covered by Article 4.327 This conclusion is not challenged in this appeal.328
7. As is evident from the Indictment, Krstiс was not alleged to have in-
tended to destroy the entire national group of Bosnian Muslims, but only a
part of that group. The first question presented in this appeal is whether, in
finding that Radislav Krstiс had genocidal intent, the Trial Chamber defined
the relevant part of the Bosnian Muslim group in a way which comports with
the requirements of Article 4 and of the Genocide Convention.
8. It is well established that where a conviction for genocide relies on the
intent to destroy a protected group “in part,” the part must be a substantial
part of that group. The aim of the Genocide Convention is to prevent the
intentional destruction of entire human groups, and the part targeted must
be significant enough to have an impact on the group as a whole. Although
the Appeals Chamber has not yet addressed this issue, two Trial Chambers
of this Tribunal have examined it. In Jelisiс, the first case to confront the
323
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia Since 1991. Case No: IT-98-33-A. Date: 19 April 2004.
324
Article II of the Genocide Convention.
325
Indictment, para. 21.
326
See Trial Judgement, para. 558 (“the indictment in this case defined the targeted
group as the Bosnian Muslims”).
327
Ibid., paras. 559 - 560.
328
See Defence Appeal Brief, paras. 28, 38.
question, the Trial Chamber noted that, “[g]iven the goal of the [Genocide]
Convention to deal with mass crimes, it is widely acknowledged that the in-
tention to destroy must target at least a substantial part of the group.”329 The
same conclusion was reached by the Sikirica Trial Chamber: “This part of the
definition calls for evidence of an intention to destroy a substantial number
relative to the total population of the group.”330 As these Trial Chambers
explained, the substantiality requirement both captures genocide’s defining
character as a crime of massive proportions and reflects the Convention’s
concern with the impact the destruction of the targeted part will have on
the overall survival of the group.331…
15. In this case, having identified the protected group as the national
group of Bosnian Muslims, the Trial Chamber concluded that the part the
VRS Main Staff and Radislav Krstiс targeted was the Bosnian Muslims of Sre-
brenica, or the Bosnian Muslims of Eastern Bosnia. This conclusion comports
with the guidelines outlined above….
24. The Defence also argues that the Trial Chamber erred in describing
the conduct with which Radislav Krstiс is charged as genocide. The Trial
Chamber, the Defence submits, impermissibly broadened the definition of
genocide by concluding that an effort to displace a community from its tra-
ditional residence is sufficient to show that the alleged perpetrator intended
to destroy a protected group.332
25. The Genocide Convention, and customary international law in gen-
eral, prohibit only the physical or biological destruction of a human group.
The Trial Chamber expressly acknowledged this limitation, and eschewed
any broader definition. The Chamber stated: “[C]ustomary international law
limits the definition of genocide to those acts seeking the physical or biologi-
cal destruction of all or part of the group. [A]n enterprise attacking only the
329
Jelisiс Trial Judgement, para. 82 (citing Report of the International Law Commis-
sion on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session, 6 May – 26 July 1996, G.A.O.R., 51st
session, Supp. No. 10 (A/51/10) (1996), p. 89; Nehemiah Robinson, The Genocide
Convention: A Commentary (1960) (1st ed. 1949), p. 63; Genocide Convention,
Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 18 July 1981), p. 22).
The Jelisiс Trial Judgement was reversed in part by the Appeals Chamber on other
grounds. See Jelisiс Appeal Judgement, para. 72. The Trial Chamber’s definition
of what constitutes an appropriate part of the group protected by the Genocide
Convention was not challenged.
330
Sikirica Judgement on Defence Motions to Acquit, para. 65.
331
Jelisiс Trial Judgement, para. 82; Sikirica Judgement on Defence Motions to Acquit,
para. 77.
332
Defence Appeal Brief, para. 43.
333
Trial Judgement, para. 580. See also ibid., para. 576 (discussing the conclusion of
the International Law Commission, quoted in note 39, supra).
334
Ibid., paras. 547, 594.
335
Ibid., para. 75 & n. 155.
336
Ibid., n. 3.
***
864. The Accused is charged with the acts of Murder, Extermination, Rape,
and Other inhumane acts as Crimes against Humanity338. The commission of
any of these acts by the Accused will only amount to a Crime against Human-
ity, if the Chamber finds that it was committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack on a civilian population on any of the following discrimi-
natory grounds: nationality, political persuasion, ethnicity, race or religion.
865. In relation to each count which charges the Accused with a Crime
against Humanity, the Prosecution is required to prove the elements indicated
above.
866. An act may form part of the widespread or systematic attack without
necessarily sharing all the same features, such as the time and place of com-
mission of the other acts constituting the attack. In determining whether an
act forms part of a widespread or systematic attack, the Chamber will consider
its characteristics, aims, nature, and consequence.
The General Elements
The Attack
867. The Chamber adopts the accepted definition of “attack” within this
Tribunal, where it is generally defined as “an unlawful act, event, or series of
events of the kind listed in Article 3(a) through (i) of the Statute.”339 This defi-
nition has remained constant throughout the jurisprudence of the Tribunal340.
868. Moreover, an attack committed on specific discriminatory grounds
need not necessarily require the use of armed force, it could also involve other
forms of inhumane mistreatment of the civilian population341.
337
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Judgment of: 1 December 2003. Case
No. ICTR-98-44A-T.
338
The Count 7 on Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds as a Crime
Against Humanity was withdrawn by the Prosecution in its Closing brief (Corri-
gendum), 19 June 2003, paras. 138 and 139.
339
Semanza, Judgment (TC), para. 327.
340
Musema, Judgment (TC), para. 205; Rutaganda, Judgment (TC), para. 70; Akayesu,
Judgment (TC), para. 581.
341
Semanza, Judgment (TC), para. 327 ; Musema, Judgment (TC), para.205; Rutaganda,
Judgment (TC), para. 70; Akayesu, Judgment (TC), para. 581.
342
The relevant provision of the French text in Article 3 of the Statute reads “ générali-
sée et systématique ”.
343
Semanza, Judgment (TC), para. 328; Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana, Judgment
(TC), para. 804; Bagilishema, Judgment (TC), para. 77; Musema, Judgment (TC),
paras. 202-203; Rutaganda, Judgment (TC), para. 68; Kayishema and Ruzindana,
Judgment (TC), para. 123; Akayesu, Judgment (TC), para. 579. The same position
has been taken in the ICTY, however it must be emphasized that article 5 of ICTY
Statute does not contain the requirement that the crimes must be committed as
part of a widespread or systematic attack, which has been constructed in ICTY
jurisprudence in line with customary international law. Tadic, Judgment (TC),
paras. 646-648. See also Kunarac, Judgment (AC), para. 93; Tadic, Judgment (AC),
para. 248; Krnojelac, Judgment (TC), para. 55; Krstic, Judgment (TC), para. 480;
Kordic and Cerkez, Judgment (TC), para. 178; Blaskic, Judgment (TC), para. 202;
Kupreskic, Judgment (TC), para. 544; Jelisic, Judgment (TC), para. 53.
344
For a review of the International practice on this issue see: Tadic, Judgment (TC),
paras. 646-648.
345
Semanza, Judgment (TC), para. 328.
346
Semanza, Judgment (TC), para. 329; Niyitegeka, Judgment (TC), para 439; Nta-
kirutimana and Ntakirutimana, Judgment (TC), para. 804; Bagilishema, Judgment
(TC), para. 33; Musema, Judgment (TC), para. 204, Rutaganda, Judgment (TC), para.
69; Kayishema and Ruzindana, Judgment (TC), para. 123; Akayesu, Judgment (TC),
para. 580.
347
Niyitegeka, Judgment (TC), para 439.
348
Ntakirutimana and Ntakiutimana, Judgment (TC), para. 804.
349
Semanza, Judgment, (TC), para. 329; Bagilishema, Judgment (TC), para. 77; Kay-
ishema and Ruzindana, Judgment (TC), para. 123-124.
350
Semanza, Judgment (TC), para. 329; referring to Kunarac, Judgment (AC), para. 98.
351
Akayesu, Judgment (TC), para. 582.
352
Rutaganda, Judgment (TC), para. 72; Musema, Judgment (TC), para. 207; Semanza,
Judgment (TC), para. 330.
353
Bagilishema, Judgment (TC), para. 79, referring to Blaskic, Judgment (TC), para.
214.
875. It was also noted in Bagilishema that the term “population” does
not require that the crimes against humanity be directed against the entire
population of a geographic territory or area354. Semanza further clarified that:
The victim(s) of the enumerated act need not necessarily share geographic
or other defining features with the civilian population that forms the primary
target of the underlying attack, but such characteristics may be used to dem-
onstrate that the enumerated act forms part of the attack.355…
The Attack Must be Committed on Discriminatory Grounds
877. Article 3 of the Statute provides that the attack against the civilian
population be committed on “national, political, ethnical, racial or religious
grounds.” This provision is jurisdictional in nature, limiting the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal to a narrower category of Crimes, and not intended to alter the
definition of Crimes Against Humanity in International Law. The distinction is
a fine one. The Appeals Chamber in the Akayesu Appeals clarified the position:
In the opinion of the Appeals Chamber, except in the case of persecution,
a discriminatory intent is not required by international humanitarian law as
a legal ingredient for all crimes against humanity. To that extent, the Appeals
Chamber endorses the general conclusion and review contained in Tadic, as
discussed above. However, though such is not a requirement for the crime per
se, all crimes against humanity, may, in actuality, be committed in the context
of a discriminatory attack against a civilian population. As held in Tadic: “[i]
t is true that in most cases, crimes against humanity are waged against civil-
ian populations which have been specifically targeted for national, political,
ethnic, racial or religious reasons.” It is within this context, and in light of the
nature of the events in Rwanda (where a civilian population was actually the
target of a discriminatory attack), that the Security Council decided to limit
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal over crimes against humanity solely to cases
where they were committed on discriminatory grounds. This is to say that
the Security Council intended thereby that the Tribunal should not prosecute
perpetrators of other possible crimes against humanity.
The Mental Element for Crimes Against Humanity
880. The clearest statement of the Mental Element of Crimes Against
Humanity so far is to be found in the Semanza Judgment:
354
Bagilishema, Judgment (TC), para. 80, following Tadic, Judgment (TC), para. 644.
355
Semanza, Judgment (TC), para. 330.
The accused must have acted with knowledge of the broader context
of the attack and knowledge that his act formed part of the attack on the
civilian population356.
881. The Chamber fully endorses this position.
***
216. The Prosecution challenges the Trial Chamber’s non-entry, as im-
permissibly cumulative, of Radislav Krstiс’s convictions for extermination
and persecution of the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica between 13 and 19
July 1995, and for murder and inhumane acts as crimes against humanity
committed against the Bosnian Muslim civilians in Potoсari between 10 and
13 July 1995. The Trial Chamber disallowed convictions for extermination
and persecution as impermissibly cumulative with Krstiс’s conviction for
genocide. It also concluded that the offences of murder and inhumane acts
as crimes against humanity are subsumed within the offence of persecution
where murder and inhumane acts form the underlying acts of the persecu-
tion conviction.
217. The Defence urges a dismissal of the Prosecution’s appeal because
the Prosecution does not seek an increase of the sentence in the event its
appeal is successful358. As the Appeals Chamber emphasised, however, the
import of cumulative convictions is not limited to their impact on the sen-
tence. Cumulative convictions impose additional stigma on the accused and
may imperil his eligibility for early release359. On the other hand, multiple
convictions, where permissible, serve to describe the full culpability of the
accused and to provide a complete picture of his criminal conduct360. The
Prosecution’s appeal is therefore admissible notwithstanding the fact that it
does not challenge the sentence….
356
Semanza, Judgment (TC), para. 332; Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana, Judgment
(TC), para. 803; Bagilishema, Judgment (TC), para. 94; Musema, Judgment (TC),
para. 206; Kayishema and Ruzindana, Judgment (TC), para.134.
357
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia since 1991. Case No: IT-98-33-A. 19 April 2004.
358
Defence Response, para. 7.
359
See Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 169; Muciс et al. Judgement on Sentence
Appeal, para. 25.
360
Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 169.
219. The first vacated conviction that the Prosecution seeks to reinstate
is the conviction for extermination under Article 5 based on the killing of
the Bosnian Muslim men of Srebrenica361. The Trial Chamber held that this
conviction was impermissibly cumulative with Radislav Krstiс’s conviction
for genocide under Article 4, which was based on the same facts362. The Pros-
ecution argues that this decision rests on an erroneous premise, namely that
Article 5’s requirement for the enumerated crimes to be part of a widespread
or systematic attack against a civilian population is subsumed within the
statutory elements of genocide363.
220. This issue was confronted by the ICTR Appeals Chamber in Musema.
There, the Appeals Chamber arrived at a conclusion contrary to the one
reached by the Trial Chamber in this case. Echoing the Prosecution’s argu-
ment here, the ICTR Appeals Chamber permitted convictions for genocide
and extermination based on the same conduct because “[g]enocide requires
proof of an intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial
or religious group, [which] is not required by extermination,” while “[e]
xtermination as a crime against humanity requires proof that the crime was
committed as a part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian
population, which proof is not required in the case of genocide.”364
221. The Trial Chamber in this case concluded that the requirement of
a widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population was sub-
sumed within the genocide requirement that there be an intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.365 In the Trial
Chamber’s opinion, in order to satisfy this intent requirement, a perpetrator
of genocide must commit the prohibited acts “in the context of a manifest
pattern of similar conduct,” or those acts must “themselves constitute a con-
duct that could in itself effect the destruction of the group, in whole or part,
as such.”366 Because this requirement excluded “random or isolated acts,” the
Trial Chamber concluded that it duplicated the requirement of Article 5 that
a crime against humanity, such as extermination, form a part of a widespread
or systematic attack against a civilian population367….
361
Prosecution Appeal Brief, paras. 1.6, 3.38.
362
Trial Judgement, paras. 682, 685 - 686.
363
Prosecution Appeal Brief, para. 3.34.
364
Musema Appeal Judgement, para. 366. At the Appeal hearing, the Defence conceded
that, under the reasoning of Musema, convictions for extermination and genocide
are not impermissibly cumulative. See AT, p. 281.
365
Trial Judgement, para. 682.
366
Ibid.
367
Ibid.
368
Tadiс Appeal Judgement, para. 248; see also Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, paras.
85, 96, 102.
369
See, e.g., 1 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary
(Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, John R.W.D. Jones, eds, 2002), at p. 340 (under
customary international law, “it is only for crimes against humanity [and not for
genocide] that knowledge of the widespread or systematic practice is required”).
370
Trial Judgement, para. 685.
371
Jelisiс Appeal Judgement, para. 48.
372
See ibid.
373
Kunarac et al. Appeal Judgement, para. 98
Prosecutor v. Tadic374
***
271. The Trial Chamber correctly recognised that crimes which are unre-
lated to widespread or systematic attacks on a civilian population should not
be prosecuted as crimes against humanity. Crimes against humanity are crimes
of a special nature to which a greater degree of moral turpitude attaches than
to an ordinary crime. Thus to convict an accused of crimes against human-
ity, it must be proved that the crimes were related to the attack on a civilian
population (occurring during an armed conflict) and that the accused knew
that his crimes were so related….
285. As rightly submitted by the Prosecution, the interpretation of Article
5 in the light of its object and purpose bears out the above propositions. The
aim of those drafting the Statute was to make all crimes against humanity
punishable, including those which, while fulfilling all the conditions required
by the notion of such crimes, may not have been perpetrated on political,
racial or religious grounds as specified in paragraph (h) of Article 5. In light
of the humanitarian goals of the framers of the Statute, one fails to see why
they should have seriously restricted the class of offences coming within the
purview of “crimes against humanity,” thus leaving outside this class all the
possible instances of serious and widespread or systematic crimes against ci-
vilians on account only of their lacking a discriminatory intent. For example,
a discriminatory intent requirement would prevent the penalization of ran-
dom and indiscriminate violence intended to spread terror among a civilian
population as a crime against humanity. A fortiori, the object and purpose of
Article 5 would be thwarted were it to be suggested that the discriminatory
grounds required are limited to the five grounds put forth by the Secretary-
General in his Report and taken up (with the addition, in one case, of the
further ground of gender) in the statements made in the Security Council
by three of its members.347 Such an interpretation of Article 5 would create
significant lacunae by failing to protect victim groups not covered by the listed
discriminatory grounds. The experience of Nazi Germany demonstrated that
crimes against humanity may be committed on discriminatory grounds other
than those enumerated in Article 5 (h), such as physical or mental disability,
age or infirmity, or sexual preference. Similarly, the extermination of “class
enemies” in the Soviet Union during the 1930s (admittedly, as in the case of
Nazi conduct before the Second World War, an occurrence that took place
374
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Case No. IT-94-1-A. Date: 15 July 1999.
in times of peace, not in times of armed conflict) and the deportation of the
urban educated of Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge between 1975-1979,
provide other instances which would not fall under the ambit of crimes
against humanity based on the strict enumeration of discriminatory grounds
suggested by the Secretary-General in his Report….
292. This warrants the conclusion that customary international law, as
it results from the gradual development of international instruments and
national case-law into general rules, does not presuppose a discriminatory
or persecutory intent for all crimes against humanity….
305. The Prosecution was correct in submitting that the Trial Chamber
erred in finding that all crimes against humanity require a discriminatory
intent. Such an intent is an indispensable legal ingredient of the offence only
with regard to those crimes for which this is expressly required, that is, for
Article 5 (h), concerning various types of persecution.
War Crimes
Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita375
The crimes alleged to have been permitted by the accused in violation of
the laws of war may be grouped into three categories:
(1) Starvation, execution or massacre without trial and
maladministration generally of civilian internees and prisoners
of war;
(2) Torture, rape, murder and mass execution of very large
numbers of residents of the Philippines, including women
and children and members of religious orders, by starvation,
beheading, bayoneting, clubbing, hanging, burning alive, and
destruction by explosives;
(3) Burning and demolition without adequate military
necessity of large numbers of homes, places of business, places
of religious worship, hospitals, public buildings, and educational
institutions. In point of time, the offences extended throughout
the period the accused was in command of Japanese troops in
the Philippines. In point of area, the crimes extended throughout
375
US Military Commission, Case No. 21. Manila. (8th October – 7th December, 1945),
and U.S. Supreme Court of the (Judgments delivered on 4th February, 1946) at 8, 14.
376
Trial of Wilhelm Von Leeb and thirteen others. US Military Tribunal, Case NO. 72,
Nuremberg, 30th December, 1947 – 28th October, 1948.
Council Law No. 10, in that they participated in the initiation of invasions of
other countries and wars of aggression in violation of international laws and
treaties, including but not limited to the planning, preparation, initiation, and
waging of wars of aggression, and wars in violation of international treaties,
agreements and assurances.
2. The defendants held high military positions in Germany and committed
Crimes against Peace in that they were principals in, accessories to, ordered,
abetted, took a consenting part in, were connected with plans and enterprises
involving, and were members of organizations and groups connected with,
the commission of Crimes against Peace….
Count II-War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: Crimes against Enemy
Belligerents and Prisoners of War
45. Between September, 1939, and May, 1945, all of the defendants herein,
with divers other persons including the co-participants listed in Appendix A,
committed War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, as defined in Article II
of Control Council Law No. 10, in that they participated in the commission
of atrocities and offences against prisoners of war and members of armed
forces of nations then at war with the Third Reich or under the belligerent
control of or military occupation by Germany, including but not limited to
murder, ill-treatment, denial of status and rights, refusal of quarter, employ-
ment under inhumane conditions and at prohibited labour of prisoners of
war and members of military forces, and other inhumane acts and violations
of the laws and customs of war. The defendants committed War Crimes
and Crimes against Humanity in that they were principals in, accessories to,
ordered, abetted, took a consenting part in, were connected with plans and
enterprises involving, and were members of organizations and groups con-
nected with, the commission of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity.
46. Unlawful orders initiated, drafted, distributed and executed by the de-
fendants directed that certain enemy troops be refused quarter and be denied
the status and rights of prisoners of war, and that certain captured members
of the military forces of nations at war with Germany be summarily executed.
Such orders further directed that certain members of enemy armed forces be
designated and treated by troops of the German armed forces, subordinate
to the defendants, either as ‘ partisans, communists, bandits, terrorists ‘ or by
other terms denying them the status and rights of prisoners of war. Prison-
ers of war were compelled to work in war operations and in work having a
direct relation to war operations, including the manufacture, transport and
loading of arms and munitions, and the building of fortifications. This work
was ordered within the combat zone as well as in rear areas. Pursuant to a
CHAPTER 5
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Although the Charter of the United Nations does not specifically mention
the environment or sustainable development, the Preamble to the Charter
states that the United Nations is determined “to promote social progress and
better standards of life in larger freedom,” while Chapter 1 declares that one
of the basic purposes of the United Nations is “to achieve international co-
operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural
or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language or religion.”
The United Nations first considered environmental issues at the 45th ses-
sion of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), when in resolution 1346
(XLV) of 30 July 1968 it recommended that the General Assembly consider con-
vening a United Nations conference on “problems of the human environment.”
At its 23rd session the General Assembly adopted resolution 2398 (XXIII)
of 3 December 1968 convening a United Nations Conference on the Hu-
man Environment noting the “continuing and accelerating impairment of
the quality of the human environment” and its “consequent effects on the
condition of man, his physical, mental and social well-being, his dignity and
his enjoyment of basic human rights, in developing as well as developed
countries,” thus relating the Charter to emerging environmental issues. The
resolution also recognized that “the relationship between man and his envi-
ronment is undergoing profound changes in the wake of modern scientific
and technological developments.”
The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment took place
in Stockholm from 5 to 16 June 1972 and led to the establishment of the
377
U.N. Commission on Sustainable Development, http://www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/
index.php?menu=17.
378
Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger and Ashfaq Khalfan, Sustainable Development
Law: Principles, Practices, and Prospects, pp. 78-84 and 99-106 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004), reprinted with permission from the authors and Oxford
University Press.
379
As discussed above, sustainable development law focuses on integration of envi-
ronmental, social and economic norms for development that can last. According
to both the 1992 Rio Declaration, and the 1987 Brundtland Report, sustainable
development centres on human beings and their communities, seeking to satisfy
the needs of present generations, without compromising the ability of future gen-
erations to meet their own needs. Sustainable development law involves poverty
eradication, social cohesion, sustained use of natural and other resources, and
equitable sharing of benefits. It is about empowering human beings and their
communities to improve their quality of life, though in order to be sustainable,
this must be done in a way that respects environmental limits. Environmental law,
in contrast, focuses on preservation, conservation and protection of the environ-
ment. It involves the needs of all species and natural systems, which it values for
their intrinsic worth. Both are valuable and essential areas of international law with
significant overlaps and intersections, but they should not be artificially conflated.
See M. C Cordonier Segger, “Significant Developments in Sustainable Development
Law and Governance: A Proposal” (2004) United Nations Natural Resources Forum
283. See also M.-C Cordonier Segger and CG. Weeramantry, eds., Sustainable Justice
(Leiden: Martima Nijhoff, 2004).
380
For further resources, see D. Hunter, J. Sommer and S. Vaughan, Concepts and
Principles of International Law (Nairobi: UNEP, 1998). See also N. de Sadeleer,
Environmental Principals – From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002).
381
1 Moore’s Int’l Arb. Awards 755.
382
See A. Cassese, International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 376.
383
Ibid.
384
Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v Canada), 3 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 1911
(1938), reprinted in 33 AJIL 182 (1939), 3 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 19938 (1941), re-
printed in 35 AJIL 684 (1941) (further note omitted).
385
See further X. Hanqin, Transboundary Damage in International Law (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003).
386
As provided in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Envi-
ronment, UN Doc. Ale. 48/14 (1972), 11 ILM 1461 (1972) (and, more recently,
Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, supra note 5), “States have, in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law,... the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not
cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction. For further analysis and critical commentary, see M. Bow-
man and A. Boyle, Environmental Damage in International and Comparative Law
-Problems of Definition and Valuation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
387
See, e.g., the 1991 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Trans-
boundary Content (25 Feb. 1991) 30 ILM 800, 803 at Art. 21(1), or the 1989 Basel
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal (Basel Convention) (opened for signature 22 March 1989, entered
into force 5 May 1992) (1989) 28 ILM 649 at Art. 2(8).
388
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed
Conflict, Advisory Opinion, [1996] I.C.J. Rep. 226. See also the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, UN Doc. AlCONF.62/122; 21
ILM 1245 (entered into force 16 November 1994) at Pan XII and the IUCN, Draft
International Covenant on Environment and Development (Gland, Switzerland:
IUCN, 1995) at Article 11. See also the 1985 ASEAN Agreement on the Conserva-
tion of Nature and Natural Resources (9 July 1985, Kuala Lumpur) at Art. 20.
389
See F. Perrez, “The Relationship Between Permanent Sovereignty and the Obligation
Not to Cause Transboundary Environmental Damage” (1996) 26 Environmental
Law 1187. See also F. Perrez, Cooperative Sovereignty: From Independence to
Interdependence in International Environ• mental Law (London: Kluwer Law
International, 2000).
390
N. de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles -From Political Slogans to Legal Rules
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
391
Case Concerning Gabcikovo-Nagymaros [Project (Hungary v Slovakia), para. 140,
ment Operational Policy 4.01 (Washington: IBRD, 1999) at 15-16, which requires
public consultations and disclosure of any adverse effects, as a pre-condition to
the granting of international loans for development projects.
396
This principle is found with related concepts, in Principle 27 and Principle 19 of
the 1992 Rio Declaration. It is embodied in the Convention on the Protection of
the Environment Between Demark, Finland, Norway and Sweden (19 Feb 1974)
13 ILM 591, and recognized by the Inter• national Court of Justice in both the
Lac Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain) [1957] 24 ILR 101 & the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Case, supra note 3.
397
As set forth in the Rio Declaration, supra note 5 at Principle 15, the precautionary
principle states that: “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack
of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost effec-
tive measures to prevent environmental degradation.” See A. Trouwborst, Evolu-
tion and Status of the Precautionary Principle in Inter• national Law (The Hague:
Kluwer Law International, 2002). And see T. O’Riordan, A. Jordan & J. Cameron,
eds., Reinterpreting the Precautionary Principle (London: Cameron May, 2001).
398
Originally recommended by the OF.CD Council in May 1972, the polluter pays prin-
ciple has been increasingly accepted as an international environmental principle.
It has been explicitly adopted in several bilateral and multilateral resolutions and
declarations, including Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration, supra note 5, which
provides: “National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalisation
of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account
the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with
the polluter pays principle ensures that the prices of goods reflect the costs
of producing that good, including costs associated with pollution, resource
degradation, and environmental harm. Environmental costs are reflected (or
“internalized”) in the price of every good. The result is that goods that pollute
less will cost less, and consumers may switch to less polluting substitutes. This
will result in a more efficient use of resources and less pollution.
It is doubtful that these principles have all been accepted as international
customary law, and neither is this brief survey intended to be viewed as an
exhaustive list. For example, the principle of common but differentiated re-
sponsibility, which will be discussed below, has been proposed as a principle
of international environmental law,399 as have principles related to subsidiarity,
access to environmental information, public participation in environmental
decision-making, and a duty to assess environmental impacts.400 Some au-
thors perceive sustainable development itself as a principle of international
environmental law,401 though this is not the approach adopted in this book.
The issue of whether there is a broad principle of State responsibility and
liability for environmental harm remains contested. A distinction continues
to emerge in international environmental law between international “re-
sponsibility” and international “liability”: the former arises from unlawful
acts, the latter can arise from the consequences of otherwise lawful acts
(although it is still used at times with reference to unlawful acts).402 There
is a concern that imposing liability for acts not prohibited by international
law irrespective of fault or the lawfulness of the activity will emphasize the
due regard to the public interest and without distorting international trade and
investment.”
399
See, e.g., P. Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law 2nd ed (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003 at 285.
400
D. Hunter, J., Salzman & D. Zaelke, International Environmental Law and Policy
(New York: Foundation Press 2003) at 379-438.
401
See, P. Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law 2nd ed (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 252. But see V. Lowe, “Sustainable Develop-
ment and Unsustainable Arguments” in International Law and Sustainable Devel-
opment: Past Achievements and Future Challenges, A. Boyle and D. Freestone, eds.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 19-37. [Other citations omitted].
402
Under the rubric of State responsibility, the recent Articles on State Responsibility,
adopted by the International Law Commission, establish that the obligation to
make reparations is premised on “injury” or “damage,” but there is no requirement
that an international dispute be premised on the fact of harm, This is particularly
evident in the analysis of damage in], Crawford, The International Law Com-
mission’s Articles on State Responsibility -Introduction, Texts & Commentaries
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 29-31.
403
The new Articles are highly relevant to cases of environmental harm attributable
to a State, In particular where the obligations breached are peremptory norms of
international law (such as the prohibition on “massive pollution” of the atmosphere
and seas) or obligations owed to the international community as a whole (such as an
obligation aimed at protection of the marine environment, the obligation to refrain
from massive pollution of the sea and atmosphere, or even a general obligation of
States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the envi-
ronment of other States (and of areas beyond national control), recognized by the
I.C.J. in the Nuclear Weapons case and reiterated in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case),
See L Brownlie, Principles of Public. International Law (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1998) 288 [hereinafter Brownlie; (Gabcikovo-Nagymaros decision, para, 53;
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed
Conflict.
404
A. Boyle and D. Freestone, “Past Achievements and Future Challenges” in Lang
(citation omitted).
405
See Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, in Report of the World
Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, South Africa, 26 Aug.-4 Sept.
2002, NCONF.199/20 (New York: United Nations, 2002). See also Johannesburg
Plan of Implementation, Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development,
Johannesburg, South Africa, 4 Sept. 2002, UN Doc. A/CONF.199 http://www.un.org/
esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/POIToc.htm.
406
Rio Declaration, supra note 1, Principle 4. See also the Stockholm Declaration on
the Human Environment, UN Doc. Ale. 48114 (1972), 11 ILM 1461 (1972) Principle
13 [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
407
European Commission, The Law of Sustainable Development (Brussels: EC, 2001).
408
Agenda 21, Report of the UNCED, I (1992) UN Doc. Af/CONF.151126I Rev. l, (1992),
31 ILM 874, para. 39.1 [hereinafter Agenda 21], ch. 39.1, Objectives (a) and (b).
409
See the Climate Change Convention, supra note 2, Art. 3(4), with Kyoto Protocol
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 10 Dec. 1997,
37 ILM 22 (1998), Art. 4(1) (f) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol; and the Biodiversity
Convention [citation omitted].
410
A. Kiss, “The Implications of Global Change for the International Legal System” in
E. Brown, Weiss, ed., Environmental Change and International law (Tokyo: United
Nations University Press, 1992) 319, 345.
development in a way that fully takes into account, and combines, its social, eco-
nomic and environmental aspects. It is a challenging requirement for research,
planning, law-making and judicial decision-making. Indeed, as noted by one
commentator, “if there is no longer much doubt about whether integrative ap-
proaches to research are needed in support of a sustainability transition, how to
achieve such integration in rigorous and useful programs remains problematic.”411
411
W.C. Clark “A Transition towards Sustainability” (200] Symposium: Environment
2000 –New Issues for a New Century, Sustainable Science for a Sustainable Envi-
ronment (2001) 27 Ecology L.Q. 1021.
412
See, United Nations Organizations, at http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/
specenv.htm#environmental.
413
See, United Nations Organizations, at http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/
specenv.htm#treaty.
Water Resources
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Uruguay v. Argentina),
2010414
***
1. The obligation to contribute to the optimum and rational utilization of
the river (Article 1)
170. According to Argentina, Uruguay has breached its obligation to
contribute to the “optimum and rational utilization of the river” by failing
to co-ordinate with Argentina on measures necessary to avoid ecological
change, and by failing to take the measures necessary to prevent pollution.
Argentina also maintains that, in interpreting the 1975 Statute (in particular
Articles 27, 35, and 36 thereof) according to the principle of equitable and
reasonable use, account must be taken of all pre-existing legitimate uses of
the river, including in particular its use for recreational and tourist purposes.
414
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2010, p. 14.
171. For Uruguay, the object and purpose of the 1975 Statute is to establish
a structure for co-operation between the Parties through CARU in pursuit of
the shared goal of equitable and sustainable use of the water and biological
resources of the river. Uruguay contends that it has in no way breached the
principle of equitable and reasonable use of the river and that this principle
provides no basis for favouring pre-existing uses of the river, such as tourism
or fishing, over other, new uses….
175. The Court considers that the attainment of optimum and rational
utilization requires a balance between the Parties’ rights and needs to use
the river for economic and commercial activities on the one hand, and the
obligation to protect it from any damage to the environment that may be
caused by such activities, on the other. The need for this balance is reflected
in various provisions of the 1975 Statute establishing rights and obligations
for the Parties, such as Articles 27, 36, and 41. The Court will therefore assess
the conduct of Uruguay in authorizing the construction and operation of the
Orion (Botnia) mill in the light of those provisions of the 1975 Statute, and
the rights and obligations prescribed therein….
177. Regarding Article 27, it is the view of the Court that its formulation
reflects not only the need to reconcile the varied interests of riparian States
in a transboundary context and in particular in the use of a shared natural
resource, but also the need to strike a balance between the use of the waters
and the protection of the river consistent with the objective of sustainable
development. The Court has already dealt with the obligations arising from
Articles 7 to 12 of the 1975 Statute which have to be observed, according to
Article 27, by any Party wishing to exercise its right to use the waters of the
river for any of the purposes mentioned therein insofar as such use may be
liable to affect the régime of the river or the quality of its waters. The Court
wishes to add that such utilization could not be considered to be equitable
and reasonable if the interests of the other riparian State in the shared re-
source and the environmental protection of the latter were not taken into
account. Consequently, it is the opinion of the Court that Article 27 embod-
ies this interconnectedness between equitable and reasonable utilization
of a shared resource and the balance between economic development and
environmental protection that is the essence of sustainable development….
3. The obligation to co-ordinate measures to avoid changes in the ecologi-
cal balance (Article 36)
181. Argentina contends that Uruguay has breached Article 36 of the 1975
Statute, which places the Parties under an obligation to co-ordinate through
CARU the necessary measures to avoid changing the ecological balance of
the river. Argentina asserts that the discharges from the Orion (Botnia) mill
altered the ecological balance of the river, and cites as examples the 4 Febru-
ary 2009 algal bloom, which, according to it, provides graphic evidence of
a change in the ecological balance, as well as the discharge of toxins, which
gave rise, in its view, to the malformed rotifers whose pictures were shown
to the Court….
183. It is recalled that Article 36 provides that “[t]he parties shall co-ordi-
nate, through the Commission, the necessary measures to avoid any change
in the ecological balance and to control pests and other harmful factors in
the river and the areas affected by it”….
185. In the view of the Court, the purpose of Article 36 of the 1975
Statute is to prevent any transboundary pollution liable to change the eco-
logical balance of the river by coordinating, through CARU, the adoption
of the necessary measures. It thus imposes an obligation on both States to
take positive steps to avoid changes in the ecological balance. These steps
consist not only in the adoption of a regulatory framework, as has been done
by the Parties through CARU, but also in the observance as well as enforce-
ment by both Parties of the measures adopted. As the Court emphasized in
the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case:
“in the field of environmental protection, vigilance and prevention are
required on account of the often irreversible character of damage to the envi-
ronment and of the limitations inherent in the very mechanism of reparation
of this type of damage” (Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 78, para. 140)….
188. This vigilance and prevention is all the more important in the
preservation of the ecological balance, since the negative impact of human
activities on the waters of the river may affect other components of the
ecosystem of the watercourse such as its flora, fauna, and soil. The obliga-
tion to co-ordinate, through the Commission, the adoption of the necessary
measures, as well as their enforcement and observance, assumes, in this con-
text, a central role in the overall system of protection of the River Uruguay
established by the 1975 Statute. It is therefore of crucial importance that the
Parties respect this obligation.
189. In light of the above, the Court is of the view that Argentina has
not convincingly demonstrated that Uruguay has refused to engage in such
co-ordination as envisaged by Article 36, in breach of that provision….
and application, the Court will make a few remarks of a general character on
the normative content of Article 41 before addressing the specific arguments
of the Parties. First, in the view of the Court, Article 41 makes a clear distinc-
tion between regulatory functions entrusted to CARU under the 1975 Statute,
which are dealt with in Article 56 of the Statute, and the obligation it imposes
on the Parties to adopt rules and measures individually to “protect and preserve
the aquatic environment and, in particular, to prevent its pollution.” Thus, the
obligation assumed by the Parties under Article 41, which is distinct from those
under Articles 36 and 56 of the 1975 Statute, is to adopt appropriate rules and
measures within the framework of their respective domestic legal systems to
protect and preserve the aquatic environment and to prevent pollution. This
conclusion is supported by the wording of paragraphs (b) and (c) of Article 41,
which refer to the need not to reduce the technical requirements and severity
of the penalties already in force in the respective legislation of the Parties as
well as the need to inform each other of the rules to be promulgated so as to
establish equivalent rules in their legal systems….
197. Thirdly, the obligation to “preserve the aquatic environment, and in
particular to prevent pollution by prescribing appropriate rules and measures”
is an obligation to act with due diligence in respect of all activities which
take place under the jurisdiction and control of each party. It is an obliga-
tion which entails not only the adoption of appropriate rules and measures,
but also a certain level of vigilance in their enforcement and the exercise of
administrative control applicable to public and private operators, such as the
monitoring of activities undertaken by such operators, to safeguard the rights
of the other party. The responsibility of a party to the 1975 Statute would
therefore be engaged if it was shown that it had failed to act diligently and
thus take all appropriate measures to enforce its relevant regulations on a
public or private operator under its jurisdiction. The obligation of due dili-
gence under Article 41 (a) in the adoption and enforcement of appropriate
rules and measures is further reinforced by the requirement that such rules and
measures must be “in accordance with applicable international agreements”
and “in keeping, where relevant, with the guidelines and recommendations
of international technical bodies.” This requirement has the advantage of
ensuring that the rules and measures adopted by the parties both have to
conform to applicable international agreements and to take account of in-
ternationally agreed technical standards….
(a) Environmental Impact Assessment
203. The Court will now turn to the relationship between the need for an en-
vironmental impact assessment, where the planned activity is liable to cause harm
to a shared resource and transboundary harm, and the obligations of the Parties
under Article 41 (a) and (b) of the 1975 Statute. The Parties agree on the necessity
of conducting an environmental impact assessment. The Parties disagree, however,
with regard to the scope and content of the environmental impact assessment that
Uruguay should have carried out with respect to the Orion (Botnia) mill project.
204. It is the opinion of the Court that in order for the Parties properly
to comply with their obligations under Article 41 (a) and (b) of the 1975
Statute, they must, for the purposes of protecting and preserving the aquatic
environment with respect to activities which may be liable to cause trans-
boundary harm, carry out an environmental impact assessment. As the Court
has observed in the case concerning the Dispute Regarding Navigational
and Related Rights, “there are situations in which the parties’ intent upon
conclusion of the treaty was, or may be presumed to have been, to give the
terms used - or some of them - a meaning or content capable of evolving, not
one fixed once and for all, so as to make allowance for, among other things,
developments in international law” (Dispute Regarding Navigational and
Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Judgment of 13 July 2009, para. 64).
In this sense, the obligation to protect and preserve, under Article 41 (a) of
the Statute, has to be interpreted in accordance with a practice, which in
recent years has gained so much acceptance among States that it may now
be considered a requirement under general international law to undertake
an environmental impact assessment where there is a risk that the proposed
industrial activity may have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary
context, in particular, on a shared resource. Moreover, due diligence, and the
duty of vigilance and prevention which it implies, would not be considered
to have been exercised, if a party planning works liable to affect the régime
of the river or the quality of its waters did not undertake an environmental
impact assessment on the potential effects of such works.
205. The Court observes that neither the 1975 Statute nor general inter-
national law specify the scope and content of an environmental impact as-
sessment. Consequently, it is the view of the Court that it is for each State to
determine in its domestic legislation or in the authorization process for the
project, the specific content of the environmental impact assessment required
in each case, having regard to the nature and magnitude of the proposed de-
velopment and its likely adverse impact on the environment as well as to the
need to exercise due diligence in conducting such an assessment. The Court
also considers that an environmental impact assessment must be conducted
prior to the implementation of a project. Moreover, once operations have
started and, where necessary, throughout the life of the project, continuous
monitoring of its effects on the environment shall be undertaken.
415
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833,
U.N.T.S. 397, entered into force Nov. 16, 1994.
416
U.N. Division of Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, Historical Perspective, UNCLOS,
at: http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_histori-
cal_perspective.htm#Historical%20Perspective.
The Convention
Navigational rights, territorial sea limits, economic jurisdiction, legal status
of resources on the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, passage
of ships through narrow straits, conservation and management of living
marine resources, protection of the marine environment, a marine research
regime and, a more unique feature, a binding procedure for settlement of
disputes between States - these are among the important features of the treaty.
In short, the Convention is an unprecedented attempt by the international
community to regulate all aspects of the resources of the sea and uses of the
ocean, and thus bring a stable order to mankind’s very source of life.
“Possibly the most significant legal instrument of this century” is how the
United Nations Secretary-General described the treaty after its signing. The
Convention was adopted as a “Package deal,” to be accepted as a whole in all
its parts without reservation on any aspect. The signature of the Convention
by Governments carries the undertaking not to take any action that might
defeat its objects and purposes. Ratification of, or accession to, the Convention
expresses the consent of a State to be bound by its provisions. The Conven-
tion came into force on 16 November 1994, one year after Guyana became
the 60th State to adhere to it….
The definition of the territorial sea has brought relief from conflicting
claims. Navigation through the territorial sea and narrow straits is now based
on legal principles. Coastal States are already reaping the benefits of provi-
sions giving them extensive economic rights over a 200-mile wide zone along
their shores. The right of landlocked countries of access to and from the sea
is now stipulated unequivocally.
417
Interstate Commission for Water Coordination of Central Asia http://www.icwc-
aral.uz/.
ICWC was included in the International Fund for saving the Aral Sea (IFAS)
and has the status of an international organization.
418
The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazard-
ous Wastes and their Disposal, adopted 22 March 1989, 28 ILM 652, entered into
force May 5, 1992. Summary provided at: http://www.basel.int/TheConvention/
Overview/tabid/1271/Default.aspx.
419
U.N. Human Rights Council, Fifteenth session, June 24, 2010. Report on Mission
to Kyrgyzstan by the Special Rapporteur OkechukwuIbeanu (30 September to 9
October 2009).
420
Reprinted with permission from Business and Human Rights Resource Center,
London, http://www.business-humanrights.org/Categories/Lawlawsuits/Lawsuits-
regulatoryaction/ LawsuitsSelectedcases/TrafiguralawsuitsreCtedIvoire, visited May
4, 2012.
421
U.N. Environnent Programme, http://www.unep-wcmc.org/about-biodiversity_133.
html.
Threats to Biodiversity422
These include:
• The unsustainable harvesting of natural resources, including
plants, animals and marine species.
• The loss, degradation or fragmentation of ecosystems
through land conversion for agriculture, forest clearing etc.
• Invasive non-native or ‘alien’ species being introduced to
ecosystems to which they are not adapted i.e. where they
have no, or not enough, predators, to maintain an ecological
balance.
• Pollution
• Climate change
The first two have taken place throughout human history, although not on
the current scale. The introduction of invasive species is certainly facilitated,
if not caused, by the level of international transport and traffic of goods of
our trade system. The latter two are definitely products of an industrial age.
422
Id. at http://www.unep-wcmc.org/threats-to-biodiversity_52.html.
423
Overview by CBD Secretariat, http://www.cbd.int/history/.
tions. At the same time, the threat to species and ecosystems has never been
so great as it is today. Species extinction caused by human activities continues
at an alarming rate.
In response, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
convened the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on Biological Diversity in
November 1988 to explore the need for an. international convention on
biological diversity. Soon after, in May 1989, it established the Ad Hoc Work-
ing Group of Technical and Legal Experts to prepare an international legal
instrument for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.
The experts were to take into account “the need to share costs and benefits
between developed and developing countries” as well as “ways and means
to support innovation by local people.”
By February 1991, the Ad Hoc Working Group had become known as
the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee. Its work culminated on 22
May 1992 with the Nairobi Conference for the Adoption of the Agreed Text
of the Convention on Biological Diversity.
The Convention was opened for signature on 5 June 1992 at the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (the Rio “Earth Sum-
mit”). It remained open for signature until 4 June 1993, by which time it had
received 168 signatures. The Convention entered into force on 29 December
1993, which was 90 days after the 30th ratification. The first session of the
Conference of the Parties was scheduled for 28 November – 9 December
1994 in the Bahamas.
The Convention on Biological Diversity was inspired by the world com-
munity’s growing commitment to sustainable development. It represents a
dramatic step forward in the conservation of biological diversity, the sustain-
able use of its components, and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits
arising from the use of genetic resources.
Consider Selected Convention Articles:
Article 6.General Measures for Conservation and Sustainable Use
Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with its particular conditions
and capabilities:
(a) Develop national strategies, plans or programmes for the conservation
and sustainable use of biological diversity or adapt for this purpose existing
strategies, plans or programmes which shall reflect, inter alia, the measures
set out in this Convention relevant to the Contracting Party concerned; and
(b) Integrate, as far as possible and as appropriate, the conservation and
3. For the purpose of this Convention, the genetic resources being pro-
vided by a Contracting Party, as referred to in this Article and
Articles 16 and 19, are only those that are provided by Contracting Par-
ties that are countries of origin of such resources or by the Parties that have
acquired the genetic resources in accordance with this Convention.
4. Access, where granted, shall be on mutually agreed terms and subject
to the provisions of this Article.
5. Access to genetic resources shall be subject to prior informed consent
of the Contracting Party providing such resources, unless otherwise deter-
mined by that Party.
6. Each Contracting Party shall endeavour to develop and carry out scien-
tific research based on genetic resources provided by other Contracting Parties
with the full participation of, and where possible in, such Contracting Parties.
7. Each Contracting Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy
measures, as appropriate, and in accordance with Articles 16 and 19 and,
where necessary, through the financial mechanism established by Articles
20 and 21 with the aim of sharing in a fair and equitable way the results of
research and development and the benefits arising from the commercial and
other utilization of genetic resources with the Contracting Party providing
such resources. Such sharing shall be upon mutually agreed terms….
Article 21. Financial Mechanism
1. There shall be a mechanism for the provision of financial resources
to developing country Parties for purposes of this Convention on a grant or
concessional basis the essential elements of which are described in this Article.
The mechanism shall function under the authority and guidance of, and be ac-
countable to, the Conference of the Parties for purposes of this Convention. …
For purposes of this Convention, the Conference of the Parties shall determine
the policy, strategy, programme priorities and eligibility criteria relating to the
access to and utilization of such resources. The contributions shall be such as
to take into account the need for predictability, adequacy and timely flow of
funds referred to in Article 20 in accordance with the amount of resources
needed to be decided periodically by the Conference of the Parties and the
importance of burden-sharing among the contributing Parties included in
the list referred to in Article 20, paragraph 2. Voluntary contributions may
also be made by the developed country Parties and by other countries and
sources. The mechanism shall operate within a democratic and transparent
system of governance….
424
International Court of Environmental Arbitration and Conciliation, Opinion, Dec.
2000. The International Court of Environmental Arbitration and Conciliation was
established in Mexico D.F. (Distrito Federal) in November 1994, by 28 lawyers from
22 different countries. Their opinions are recommendatory.
because the whole problem of the case consists at this moment predomi-
nately in assuring full protection of the natural habitat of Hyla Meridionalis
as presumption of future development of the protected species.
Endangered natural habitats are protected by provisions of Article 4, par.
1: “Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate and necessary legislative
and administrative measures to ensure the conservation of the habitats of
wild flora and fauna, especially those specified in the Appendices I and the
conservation of endangered habitats.”
Appendix II of the Convention contains the list of strictly protected
fauna species. Only three species of frogs are included into this list –Hyla
Meridionalis among them (besides Hyla Arborea and Hyla Sarda). That means
that Hyla Meridionalis and its habitats is considered as an object of highest
protection in all the actions which could influence the development and
existence of that species.
Another obligation is clearly formulated in Article 4, par. 2, which states:
“The Contracting Parties in their planning and development policies shall
have regard to the conservation requirements of the areas protected under
preceding paragraph, so as to avoid or minimise as far as possible any dete-
rioration of such areas.”
In case of Hyla Meridionalis living in the dam Gurelesa, whether its
habitat should be completely destroyed by the construction of business area
does not come into consideration eventual minimalisation of damage. The
only possibility in this case is to avoid “deterioration” (in this case complete
destruction), to conserve present natural habits of this species.
Chapter III of the Convention contains regulations aimed at the protec-
tion of the species. Each Contracting Party has undertaken the obligation
(Article 6) to take appropriate and necessary legislative and administrative
measures to ensure the special protection of the wild fauna species specified
in Appendix II.
For the cases of protection of Hyla Meridionalis, as a strictly protected
species, the following provisions of this Article can be applied:
-para. b -the deliberate damage to or destruction of breeding or resting
sites is in particular prohibited,
-para. c -the deliberate disturbance of wild fauna, particularly during the
period of breeding, rearing and hibernation, insofar as disturbance would
be significant in relation to the objectives of this Convention, is in particular
prohibited.
Climate Change
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and Kyoto
Protocol425
Over a decade ago, most countries joined an international treaty – the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC) -- to
begin to consider what can be done to reduce global warming and to cope
with whatever temperature increases are inevitable. More recently, a number
of nations approved an addition to the treaty: the Kyoto Protocol which has
more powerful (and legally binding) measures. The UNFCC Secretariat sup-
ports all institutions involved in the climate change process, particularly the
COP, the subsidiary bodies and their Bureau.
The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement linked to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The major feature of the
Kyoto Protocol is that it sets binding targets for 37 industrialized countries
and the European community for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
.These amount to an average of five per cent against 1990 levels over the
five-year period 2008-2012.
The major distinction between the Protocol and the Convention is that
while the Convention encouraged industrialised countries to stabilize GHG
emissions, the Protocol commits them to do so.
Recognizing that developed countries are principally responsible for the
current high levels of GHG emissions in the atmosphere as a result of more
than 150 years of industrial activity, the Protocol places a heavier burden
on developed nations under the principle of “common but differentiated
responsibilities.”
425
Background from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
Secretariat, at http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php. The Kyoto
Protocol was adopted in Kyoto, Japan, on 11 December 1997 and entered into force
on 16 February 2005. The detailed rules for the implementation of the Protocol were
adopted at COP 7 in Marrakesh in 2001, and are called the “Marrakesh Accords.”
***
3. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (‘the
Framework Convention’) was adopted in New York on 9 May 1992, with the
ultimate objective of stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmo-
sphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference
with the climate system. On 11 December 1997 the parties to the Framework
Convention adopted, pursuant to the convention, the Kyoto Protocol to
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (‘the Kyoto
Protocol’), which entered into force on 16 February 2005.
4. The objective of the Kyoto Protocol is to reduce overall emissions of
six greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide (CO2), by at least 5% below
1990 levels in the period 2008 to 2012. The parties included in Annex I to the
Framework Convention have committed themselves to ensuring that their
greenhouse gas emissions do not exceed the percentages assigned them by
the Kyoto Protocol; the parties can fulfil their obligations jointly. The overall
commitment entered into by the European Community and its Member
States under the Kyoto Protocol relates to a total reduction of greenhouse
gas emissions by 8% compared with their 1990 levels during the period of
commitment mentioned above.
Community law
5. The Council of the European Union approved on behalf of the Com-
munity, first, the Framework Convention, by Decision 94/69/EC of 15 De-
cember 1993 concerning the conclusion of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (OJ 1994 L 33, p. 11), and, second, the Kyoto
Protocol, by Decision 2002/358/EC of 25 April 2002 concerning the approval,
on behalf of the European Community, of the Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the joint fulfilment
of commitments thereunder (OJ 2002 L 130, p. 1). In accordance with the first
paragraph of Article 2 of the latter decision, the Community and its Member
States are to fulfil their overall commitment under the Kyoto Protocol jointly….
7. On the basis of Article 175(1) EC, the Commission presented on 23 Octo-
ber 2001 a proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council
426
Societe Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine and others v. Premier Ministre, Ministre de
l’Economie, des Finances et del’Industrie, Ministre de l’Ecologie et du Developpement
Durable, Case C-127/07, Official Journal of the European Union, 26/5/2007, C117/8.
Decision in favor of applicant and Estonia, and against European Commission on
appeal. See, Case C 505/09 P, European Commission v. Republic of Estonia (2009).
establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the
Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (COM (2001) 581 final;
‘the Commission Proposal’), which led to the adoption of Directive 2003/87.
8. As stated in recital 5 in its preamble, that directive aims to make an ef-
fective contribution to fulfilling the commitments of the Community and its
Member States under the Kyoto Protocol to reduce anthropogenic greenhouse
gas emissions, in accordance with Decision 2002/358, through an efficient
European market in greenhouse gas emission allowances (‘allowances’), with
the least possible diminution of economic development and employment….
National law
19. Directive 2003/87 was transposed into French law by Regulation No
2004 330 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trad-
ing of 15 April 2004, which introduced inter alia Articles L.229 5 to L.229 19 of
the Code of the Environment. The detailed rules for the application of those
articles were laid down by Decree No 2004 832 of 19 August 2004. The annex
to Decree No 2004 832 simply reproduced Annex I to Directive 2003/87.
20. The applicants in the main proceedings are undertakings in the steel
sector. They requested the competent French authorities to repeal Article 1 of
Decree No 2004 832 in so far as it made the decree applicable to installations
in the steel sector. As their requests remained unanswered, they brought an
action before the Conseil d’Etat for judicial review of the implied decisions
rejecting those requests, asking for those authorities to be ordered to effect
the repeal in question. In support of their application, they relied on breach
of several constitutional principles, such as the right to property, the freedom
to carry on a business, and the principle of equal treatment.
21. The Conseil d’Etat rejected the pleas in law put forward by the ap-
plicants in the main proceedings, with the exception of the plea of breach
of the constitutional principle of equal treatment as a result of the different
treatment of comparable situations. On that point, it observed in its order
for reference that the plastics and aluminium industries emitted greenhouse
gases identical to those whose emission Directive 2003/87 aimed to restrict,
and that those industries produced materials which could be substituted in
part for those produced by the steel industry, with which they were there-
fore in competition. It considered that, even if the decision not immediately
to include the plastics and aluminium industries in the allowance trading
scheme had been taken because of their relative share of total emissions of
greenhouse gases and the need to ensure that comprehensive legislation was
implemented gradually, the issue of whether the different treatment of the
industries concerned was objectively justified raised a real problem.
and Others [1998] ECR I 2211, paragraph 64, and Joined Cases C 14/06 and
C 295/06 Parliament and Denmark v Commission [2008] ECR I 0000, para-
graph 75 and the case-law cited).
31. While the ultimate objective of the allowance trading scheme is the
protection of the environment by means of a reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions, the scheme does not of itself reduce those emissions but encour-
ages and promotes the pursuit of the lowest cost of achieving a given amount
of emissions reductions, as appears inter alia from point 3 of the Green Paper
and point 2 of the statement of reasons in the Commission Proposal. The
benefit for the environment depends on the stringency of the total quantity
of allowances allocated, which represents the overall limit on emissions al-
lowed by the scheme.
32. It also appears that the economic logic of the allowance trading
scheme consists in ensuring that the reductions of greenhouse gas emissions
required to achieve a predetermined environmental outcome take place at
the lowest cost. By allowing the allowances that have been allocated to be
sold, the scheme is intended to encourage a participant in the scheme to emit
quantities of greenhouse gases that are less than the allowances originally
allocated him, in order to sell the surplus to another participant who has
emitted more than his allowance.
33. So, for the allowance trading scheme to function properly, there must
be a supply and demand for allowances on the part of the participants in the
scheme, which also means that the potential for reduction of emissions at-
tributable to the activities covered by the scheme may vary, even considerably.
Moreover, according to the Green Paper, the wider the scope of the system,
the greater will be the variation in the costs of compliance of individual un-
dertakings, and the greater the potential for lowering costs overall.
34. It follows that, in relation to the subject-matter of Directive 2003/87,
the objectives of that directive referred to in paragraph 29 above, and the
principles on which Community policy on the environment is based, the dif-
ferent sources of greenhouse gas emissions relating to economic activities are
in principle in a comparable situation, since all emissions of greenhouse gases
are liable to contribute to dangerous interference with the climate system
and all sectors of the economy which emit such gases can contribute to the
functioning of the allowance trading scheme.
35. Furthermore, it should be pointed out, first, that recital 25 in the
preamble to Directive 2003/87 states that policies and measures should be
implemented across all sectors of the economy of the Union in order to gener-
ate substantial emissions reductions and, second, that Article 30 of Directive
427
Dubetska and Others v. Ukraine, Application no. 30499/03, European Court of
Human Rights, 10 February 2011.
***
105. The Court refers to its well-established case-law that neither Article
8 nor any other provision of the Convention guarantees the right to preserva-
tion of the natural environment as such (see Kyrtatos v. Greece, no. 41666/98,
§ 52, ECHR 2003-VI). Likewise, no issue will arise if the detriment complained
of is negligible in comparison to the environmental hazards inherent in life
in every modern city. However, an arguable claim under Article 8 may arise
where an environmental hazard attains a level of severity resulting in signifi-
cant impairment of the applicant’s ability to enjoy his home, private or family
life. The assessment of that minimum level is relative and depends on all the
circumstances of the case, such as the intensity and duration of the nuisance
and its physical or mental effects on the individual’s health or quality of life
(see, among other authorities, Fadeyeva, cited above, §§ 68-69).
106. While there is no doubt that industrial pollution may negatively af-
fect public health in general and worsen the quality of an individual’s life, it is
often impossible to quantify its effects in each individual case. As regards health
impairment for instance, it is hard to distinguish the effect of environmental
hazards from the influence of other relevant factors, such as age, profession or
personal lifestyle. “Quality of life” in its turn is a subjective characteristic which
hardly lends itself to a precise definition (see Ledyayeva and Others v. Russia,
nos. 53157/99, 53247/99, 53695/00 and 56850/00, § 90, 26 October 2006)….
108. In addition, in order to determine whether or not the State could be
held responsible under Article 8 of the Convention, the Court must examine
whether a situation was a result of a sudden and unexpected turn of events
or, on the contrary, was long-standing and well known to the State authori-
ties (see Fadeyeva, cited above, §§ 90-91); whether the State was or should
have been aware that the hazard or the nuisance was affecting the applicant’s
private life (see Lopez Ostra v. Spain, 9 December 1994, §§ 52-53, Series A no.
303-C) and to what extent the applicant contributed to creating this situation
for himself and was in a position to remedy it without a prohibitive outlay
(see Ledyayeva, cited above, § 97).
109. The Court reiterates that the present case concerns an allegation
of adverse effects on the applicants’ Article 8 rights on account of industrial
pollution emanating from two State-owned facilities – the Vizeyska coal
mine and the Chervonogradska coal-processing factory (in particular, its
waste heap, which is 60 metres high).
110. The applicants’ submissions relate firstly to deterioration of their
health on account of water, air and soil pollution by toxic substances in excess
legislative framework and empirical studies, was unsafe for residential use
on account of air and water pollution and soil subsidence resulting from the
operation of two State-owned industrial facilities.
119. In these circumstances the Court considers that the environmental
nuisance complained about attained the level of severity necessary to bring
the complaint within the ambit of Article 8 of the Convention….
123. In the Court’s opinion the combination of all these factors shows a
strong enough link between the pollutant emissions and the State to raise an
issue of the State’s responsibility under Article 8 of the Convention….
155. The Court appreciates that tackling environmental concerns associ-
ated with the operation of two major industrial polluters, which had appar-
ently been malfunctioning from the start and piling up waste for over fifty
years, was a complex task which required time and considerable resources,
the more so in the context of these facilities’ low profitability and nationwide
economic difficulties, to which the Government have referred. At the same
time, the Court notes that these industrial facilities were located in a rural
area and the applicants belonged to a very small group of people (appar-
ently not more than two dozen families) who lived nearby and were most
seriously affected by pollution. In these circumstances the Government has
failed to adduce sufficient explanation for their failure to either resettle the
applicants or find some other kind of effective solution for their individual
burden for more than twelve years.
156. There has therefore been a breach of Article 8 of the Convention
in the present case.
***
1. Background facts
13. The town of Tyrnauz is situated in the mountain district adjacent
to Mount Elbrus, in the central Caucasus. Its population is about 25,000 in-
habitants. The general urban plan of the town was developed in the 1950s
as part of a large-scale industrial construction project. Two tributaries of the
428
Budayeva v. Russia, Application nos. 15339/02, 21166/02, 20058/02, 11673/02
and 15343/02, European Court of Human Rights, 20 March 2008.
Baksan River passing through Tyrnauz, the Gerhozhansu and the Kamyksu,
are known to be prone to causing mudslides.
14. The first documentary evidence of a mudslide in the Gerhozhansu
River dates back to 1937. Subsequently mudslides were registered almost every
year; occasionally they hit the town, causing damage. The heaviest mudslides
registered prior to 2000 occurred on 1 August 1960, on 11 August 1977 and
on 20 August 1999. According to the Government, the series of mudslides of
18-25 July 2000 were the strongest and most destructive of all.
15. The inhabitants and authorities of Tyrnauz are generally aware of
the hazard, and are accustomed to the mudslides which usually occur in the
summer and early autumn….
2. The condition of the dam in the summer of 2000
18. On 20 August 1999 a mud and debris flow hit the dam, seriously
damaging it.
19. On 30 August 1999 the director of the Mountain Institute, a state
agency whose mandate included monitoring weather hazards in high-altitude
areas, called for an independent survey of the damage caused to the dam by
the mudslide. He made recommendations to the Minister responsible for
Disaster Relief of the KBR concerning the composition of a State Commis-
sion for the survey.
20. On the same day he also sent a letter to the President of the KBR, call-
ing for emergency clean-up and restoration work to the dam and for an early
warning system to be set up to raise the alarm in the event of a mudslide....
21. On 17 January 2000 the acting director of the Mountain Institute sent
a letter to the Prime Minister of the KBR, warning about the increased risk of
mudslides in the coming season. He stated that the dam was seriously dam-
aged,... the only way to avoid casualties and mitigate the damage was to establish
observation posts to warn civilians in the event of a mudslide, for which he
requested a mandate and financial support (see the full text in Section C below).
22. On 7 March 2000 the Head of the Elbrus District Administration sent
a letter to the Prime Minister of the KBR in which he referred to the imminent
large-scale mudslide and requested financial aid to carry out certain emer-
gency work on the dam. In his request he invoked possible “record losses”
and casualties (see the full text in Section C below).
23. On 7 July 2000 the assistant director and the head of research of the
Mountain Institute attended a session at the Ministry for Disaster Relief of the
KBR. At the meeting they reiterated the warning about the risk of mudslides....
24. On 10 July 2000 the assistant director of the Mountain Institute re-
ported to the agency director that he had warned the Ministry for Disaster
Relief of the KBR of the forthcoming mudslide and requested the setting up
of twenty-four hour observation posts.
25. It would appear that none of the above measures were ever imple-
mented.
3. The mudslide of 18-25 July 2000
26. At about 11 p.m. on 18 July 2000 a flow of mud and debris hit the
town of Tyrnauz and flooded some of the residential quarters.
27. According to the Government, this first wave caused no casualties.
However, the applicants alleged ...to have witnessed the death of her neigh-
bour Ms. B, born in 1934, who was trapped in the debris and drowned in the
mud before anybody could help her. She also alleged that she had witnessed
a Zhiguli vehicle with four men in it being carried away by the mudslide.
28. According to the Government, following the mudslide of 18 July
2000 the authorities ordered the emergency evacuation of the residents of
Tyrnauz. The police and local officials went round people’s homes to notify
them of the mudslide and to help evacuate the elderly and disabled. In ad-
dition, police vehicles equipped with loudspeakers drove round the town,
calling on residents to evacuate because of the mud hazard.
29. ...The applicants agreed that the alarm was indeed raised through
loudspeakers once the mudslide had struck, but no advance warning was
given. They claimed that they had been unaware of the order to evacuate and
doubted that any had been issued. They also alleged that there had been no
rescue forces or other organised on-the-spot assistance at the scene of the
disaster, which became a cauldron of chaos and mass panic.
30. In the morning of 19 July 2000 the mud level lowered and the resi-
dents returned to their homes. The Government alleged that they did so in
breach of the evacuation order, while the applicants claimed that they were
not aware that the mudslide alert was still active, pointing out that there were
no barriers or warnings to prevent people from returning to their homes.
They did not spot any police or emergency officers near their homes, but
could see that their neighbours were all at home and children were playing
outside. Water, gas and electricity supplies had been reconnected after being
cut off during the night.
31. At 1 p.m. on the same day a second, more powerful, mudslide hit
the dam and destroyed it. Mud and debris instantly descended on the town,
sweeping the wreckage of the dam before them. At 17 Otarova Street the
mudslide destroyed part of a nine-story block of flats, with four officially
reported casualties.....
32. The town was hit by a succession of mudslides until 25 July 2000.
33. Eight people were officially reported dead. According to the appli-
cants, a further 19 persons allegedly went missing.
34. According to the Government, on 3 August 2000 the Prosecutor’s
Office of the Elbrus District decided not to launch a criminal investigation
into the accident….
B. The Court’s assessment (citations omitted)
1. General principles applicable in the present case
(a) Applicability of Article 2 of the Convention and general principles
relating to the substantive aspect of that Article
128. The Court reiterates that Article 2 does not solely concern deaths
resulting from the use of force by agents of the State but also,... lays down a
positive obligation on States to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives
of those within their jurisdiction...
129. This positive obligation entails above all a primary duty on the State
to put in place a legislative and administrative framework designed to provide
effective deterrence against threats to the right to life...
130. This obligation must be construed as applying in the context of any
activity, whether public or not, in which the right to life may be at stake (see
Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC],... In particular, it applies to the sphere of industrial
risks, or “dangerous activities,” such as the operation of waste collection sites
in the case of Öneryıldız.
131. The obligation on the part of the State to safeguard the lives of
those within its jurisdiction has been interpreted so as to include ...a positive
obligation to take regulatory measures and to adequately inform the public
about any life-threatening emergency, and to ensure that any occasion of the
deaths caused thereby would be followed by a judicial enquiry.
132. ... in the particular context of dangerous activities the Court has
found that special emphasis must be placed on regulations geared to the
special features of the activity in question, particularly with regard to the
level of the potential risk to human lives. They must govern the licensing,
setting up, operation, security and supervision of the activity and must make
it compulsory for all those concerned to take practical measures to ensure
***
Recognizing that proper regulation, including through national legisla-
tion, of transnational corporations and other business enterprises and their
responsible operation can contribute to the promotion, protection and fulfil-
ment of and respect for human rights and assist in channeling the benefits
of business towards contributing to the enjoyment of human rights and
fundamental freedoms,
Concerned that weak national legislation and implementation cannot
effectively mitigate the negative impact of globalization on vulnerable econo-
mies, fully realize the benefits of globalization or derive maximally the benefits
of activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises, and
that further efforts to bridge governance gaps at the national, regional and
international levels are necessary,…
1. Welcomes the work and contributions of the Special Representative of
the Secretary-General on human rights and transnational corporations and
other business enterprises, and endorses the Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and
Remedy” Framework, as annexed to the report of the Special Representative;…
3. Commends the Special Representative for developing and raising
awareness about the Framework based on three overarching principles of
the duty of the State to protect against human rights abuses by, or involving,
429
Human Rights Council resolution 17/4, July 6, 2011, on Human Rights and Trans-
national Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4 (2011).
430
Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of hu-
man rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John
Ruggie, March 21, 2011, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. HRC/17/31 (2011).
(c) The need for rights and obligations to be matched to appropriate and
effective remedies when breached.
These Guiding Principles apply to all States and to all business enterprises,
both transnational and others, regardless of their size, sector, location, own-
ership and structure….
I. The State duty to protect human rights
A. Foundational principles
1. States must protect against human rights abuse within their territory
and/or jurisdiction by third parties, including business enterprises. This re-
quires taking appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress
such abuse through effective policies, legislation, regulations and adjudica-
tion….
***
II. The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights
B. Operational principles
Human rights due diligence
18. In order to gauge human rights risks, business enterprises should
identify and assess any actual or potential adverse human rights impacts with
which they may be involved either through their own activities or as a result
of their business relationships. This process should:
(a) Draw on internal and/or independent external human rights expertise;
(b) Involve meaningful consultation with potentially affected groups
and other relevant stakeholders, as appropriate to the size of the business
enterprise and the nature and context of the operation.
Commentary
The initial step in conducting human rights due diligence is to identify
and assess the nature of the actual and potential adverse human rights im-
pacts with which a business enterprise may be involved. The purpose is to
understand the specific impacts on specific people, given a specific context of
operations. Typically this includes assessing the human rights context prior to
a proposed business activity, where possible; identifying who may be affected;
cataloguing the relevant human rights standards and issues; and projecting
how the proposed activity and associated business relationships could have
adverse human rights impacts on those identified. In this process, business
enterprises should pay special attention to any particular human rights im-
431
Reprinted courtesy of Business and Human Rights Resource Center http://www.
business-humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home/ReportstoUNHumanRight-
sCouncil/2010/Comments.
432
Reprinted courtesy of Business and Human Rights Resource Center http://www.
business-humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home/ReportstoUNHumanRight-
sCouncil/2010/Comments.
CHAPTER 6
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
433
http://www.wto.org/.
nization (ITO). However, due to the fact that US Congress did not approve
the ITO charter, the International Trade Organization was never established.
In April 1947 at the UN conference in Geneva General Agreement on Trade
and Tariffs (GATT 1947) was negotiated between 23 states and package of
tariff reductions were adopted. In the absence of international trade orga-
nization countries adopted agreement on provisional application of GATT
until the formal international organization would be created. GATT 1947
became the organization and agreement for establishing and enforcing the
international trade rules. In 1995 the agreement on trade in goods became
the World Trade Organization.
Since establishment of GATT 1947 series multilateral trade negotiations
known as “trade rounds” took place to achieve further tariff reduction and
adoption of additional trade agreements. The first rounds mainly concen-
trated on tariff reduction. Then, the Kennedy Round brought about a GATT
Anti-Dumping and a section on development. The Tokyo Round was the ma-
jor attempt to tackle non-tariff barriers to trade. The last round, the Uruguay
Round led to the establishment of WTO and new set of agreements.
***
2.1 The great majority of Argentina’s import tariffs are fixed in ad valorem
terms. Regarding textiles, clothing and footwear, Argentina maintained a regime
of minimum specific import duties as from 1993. Argentina’s had a bound rate
of duty of 35 per cent ad valorem with respect to textiles, apparel and footwear
imported into Argentina. In parallel, Argentina continued to apply a system of
minimum specific import duties in the footwear, textile and apparel sectors.
The system operated as follows: for each relevant HS tariff line of textiles, ap-
parels and footwear, Argentina calculated an average import price. Once it
had determined the average import price for a particular category, Argentina
multiplied that price by the bound rate of 35 per cent, resulting in a specific
minimum duty for all products in that category. Upon the importation of cov-
434
Argentina-Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other
Items, World Trade Organization Panel Report, WT/DS56/R (25 Nov 1997) (cita-
tions omitted).
ered textiles, apparel or footwear, depending on the customs value of the goods
concerned, Argentina applied either the specific minimum duty applicable to
those items or the ad valorem rate, whichever was higher….
6.3 This dispute raises, therefore, various legal issues which we have iden-
tified and grouped as follows:
B. Article II of GATT. Does the imposition of minimum specific duties by
Argentina, which has bound the tariffs at issue at an ad valorem rate, constitute
a violation of Article II? Does Argentina’s tariff system have the potential to
violate Article II and is this potential sufficient to constitute an infringement
thereof? Has Argentina imposed duties in excess of its bound rate of 35 per
cent ad valorem? How should we treat the issues raised by the parties with
regard to proof and evidence submitted to the Panel?
6.22 Article II(1)(a) of GATT reads as follows:
“1. (a) Each Member shall accord to the commerce of the other Members
treatment no less favourable than that provided for in the appropriate Part
of the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement.” The issue for the
Panel is, therefore, to decide what are the obligations covered by the “treat-
ment no less favourable than that provided for in the appropriate… Schedule.”
6.23 The United States claims that the type of duties applied by a WTO
Member - even below any bound rate - must conform to that specified in
the Schedule of such Member. Since Argentina has bound its tariffs at 35 per
cent ad valorem in its Schedule of Concessions (hereafter called “Schedule”),
the United States argues that Argentina may only impose ad valorem du-
ties. Argentina responds that as long as the duties it imposes are below the
equivalent of 35 per cent ad valorem, it can use any type of duties. Therefore,
we have to decide whether the imposition of minimum specific duties by
Argentina, which has bound the tariffs at issue at an ad valorem rate, consti-
tutes a violation of Article II.
6.24 The wording of Article II does not seem to address explicitly whether
WTO Members have an obligation to use a particular type of duty. However,
the wording of Article II must be interpreted in the light of past GATT practice,
as mentioned in Article XVI:1 of the WTO Agreement and paragraph 1(b)(iv)
of Annex 1A incorporating the GATT 1994 into the WTO Agreement, and in-
dicated by the Appellate Body in Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages. Issues
similar to those presented in this case have arisen on a number of occasions….
6.30 The Bananas II panel report clearly recognizes the past GATT practice
and can be read as concluding that the imposition of specific duties when only
ad valorem duties are bound is sufficient to establish a violation of Article II.
6.31 We note that the past GATT practice is clear: a situation whereby
a contracting party applies one type of duties while its Schedule refers to
bindings of another type of duties constitutes a violation of Article II of
GATT, without any obligation for the complaining party to submit further
evidence that such variance leads to an effective breach of bindings. The
fact that Argentina claims that it is simply following its past practice of using
specific duties would not seem to be relevant, since it made ad valorem tariff
concessions on the products in question and thus created an obligation for
itself to impose such type of duties. As a guarantee for predictability and to
ensure the full respect of the negotiations under Article II, GATT practice has
generally required that once a M ember has indicated the type(s) of duties in
specifying its bound rate, it must apply such type(s) of duties. Accordingly,
faced with such a variance in the type duties applied by Argentina from that
reflected in its Schedule, we consider that we do not have to examine the
effects of that variance on possible future imports. Indeed, such a variance
undermines the stability and predictability of Members’ Schedules.
6.32 We, therefore, find that Argentina, in using a system of specific
minimum tariffs although it has bound its tariffs at ad valorem rates only, is
violating the provisions of Article II of GATT and that the United States does
not have to provide further evidence that the resultant duties exceed the
bound tariff rate. Such a variance between Argentina’s Schedule and its ap-
plied tariffs constitutes a less favourable treatment to the commerce of the
other Members than that provided for in Argentina’ s Schedule, contrary to
the provisions of Article II of GATT….
(b) Minimum specific duties necessarily lead to breaches of Argentina’s
bindings
6.41 The United States submits that the way the minimum specific duties
were initially determined by Argentina, i.e. on a “representative international
price” based essentially on the US market price, will always lead to breaches
of the bound tariff rate of 35 per cent for those exports which are priced
sufficiently below such average price. The United States submits the example
of soccer shoes which are subject to a specific minimum duty of US$3.50 and
an applied ad valorem duty of 20 per cent. For shoes imported at a value of
US$5.00, the minimum specific duty assessed of US$3.50 represents a duty of
70 per cent ad valorem. Indeed, all shoes imported at a value below US$10.00
would be subject to an ad valorem duty above 35 per cent. In other words,
every time a good is imported at a price below the “representative interna-
tional price,” the specific duty - which is set on the basis of what Argentina
thought the “price should be” and, as argued by Argentina, to counteract the
a duty in excess of the 35 per cent bound rate when the customs value of
a product is below the representative international price for such product.
6.44 We note that customs duties are normally to be imposed on the
transaction value of imported goods as defined in the Agreement on the
Implementation of Article VII of GATT 1994 (“Customs Valuation Agree-
ment”). The transaction value is defined as “the price actually paid or payable
for the goods when sold for export to the country of importation.” Obviously,
if the customs value declared by the importer does not represent the price
actually paid, the Argentine authorities may take action to counteract a false
declaration through, f or example, revisions of the customs value declared in
specific cases and even criminal prosecutions. However, neither the Customs
Valuation Agreement nor any other provision of the WTO Agreement allows
the breach of tariff bindings made under Article II of GATT on the grounds of
a general suspicion that declared customs values are sometimes understated.
We note, therefore, that mechanisms to counteract alleged underpricing
practices are not justifications for Article II violation.
6.45 In respect of the Argentine argument that the US claim should not
be considered because it addresses only a potential violation - in support
of which it refers to the Tobacco panel report - we note that the Argentine
measures, the specific duties, are mandatory measures. Argentina admits
that its customs officials are obligated to collect the specific duties on all
imports. GATT/WTO case law is clear in that a mandatory measure can be
brought before a panel, even if such an adopted measure is not yet in effect,
and independently of the absence of trade effect of such measure for the
complaining party: “[T]he very existence of mandatory legislation provid-
ing for an internal tax, without it being applied to a particular imported
product, should be regarded as falling within the scope of Article III:2, first
sentence.” We are also of the view that the Tobacco panel report merely
confirms this principle.
6.46 Moreover, in Bananas III192, the Appellate Body confirmed that the
principles developed in Superfund193 were still much applicable to WTO
disputes and that any measure which changes the competitive relationship
of Members nullifies any such Members’ benefits under the WTO Agreement.
“Article III:2, first sentence, cannot be interpreted to protect expectations
on export volumes; it protects expectations on the competitive relationship
between imported and domestic products. A change in the competitive
relationship contrary to that provision must consequently be regarded ipso
facto as a nullification or impairment of benefits accruing under the General
Agreement.” We consider that this principle is also appropriate when dealing
435
Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, World Trade Organization Appellate Body
Report, WT/DS8/AB/R; WT/DS10/AB/R; WT/DS11/AB/R (4 Oct 1996) (citations
omitted).
the WTO, they have agreed to exercise their sovereignty according to the
commitments they have made in the WTO Agreement.
One of those commitments is Article III of the GATT 1994, which is
entitled “National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation.” For the
purpose of this appeal, the relevant parts of Article III read as follows:
Article III: National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation
1. The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal
charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale,
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products,
and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or
use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied
to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic
production.
2. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into
the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or
indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of
those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no
contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges
to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the principles set
forth in paragraph 1.
A tax conforming to the requirements of the first sentence of paragraph
2 would be considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of the second
sentence only in cases where competition was involved between, on the one
hand, the taxed product and, on the other hand, a directly competitive or
substitutable product which was not similarly taxed.
The broad and fundamental purpose of Article III is to avoid protectionism
in the application of internal tax and regulatory measures. More specifically,
the purpose of Article III “is to ensure that internal measures ‘not be applied
to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic
production’“. Toward this end, Article III obliges Members of the WTO to
provide equality of competitive conditions for imported products in relation
to domestic products. “[T]he intention of the drafters of the Agreement was
clearly to treat the imported products in the same way as the like domestic
products once they had been cleared through customs. Otherwise indirect
protection could be given.” Moreover, it is irrelevant that “the trade effects”
of the tax differential between imported and domestic products, as reflected
in the volumes of imports, are insignificant or even non-existent; Article III
protects expectations not of any particular trade volume but rather of the
with this principle of effectiveness, and with the textual differences in the
two sentences, we believe that Article III:1 informs the first sentence and
the second sentence of Article III:2 in different ways.
H. Article III:2
1. First Sentence
Article III:1 informs Article III:2, first sentence, by establishing that if im-
ported products are taxed in excess of like domestic products, then that tax
measure is inconsistent with Article III. Article III:2, first sentence does not
refer specifically to Article III:1. There is no specific invocation in this first
sentence of the general principle in Article III:1 that admonishes Members
of the WTO not to apply measures “so as to afford protection.” This omis-
sion must have some meaning. We believe the meaning is simply that the
presence of a protective application need not be established separately from
the specific requirements that are included in the first sentence in order to
show that a tax measure is inconsistent with the general principle set out in
the first sentence. However, this does not mean that the general principle
of Article III:1 does not apply to this sentence. To the contrary, we believe
the first sentence of Article III:2 is, in effect, an application of this general
principle. The ordinary meaning of the words of Article III:2, first sentence
leads inevitably to this conclusion. Read in their context and in the light of
the overall object and purpose of the WTO Agreement, the words of the
first sentence require an examination of the conformity of an internal tax
measure with Article III by determining, first, whether the taxed imported
and domestic products are “like” and, second, whether the taxes applied to
the imported products are “in excess of” those applied to the like domestic
products. If the imported and domestic products are “like products,” and if
the taxes applied to the imported products are “in excess of” those applied
to the like domestic products, then the measure is inconsistent with Article
III:2, first sentence.
This approach to an examination of Article III:2, first sentence, is con-
sistent with past practice under the GATT 1947.42 Moreover, it is consistent
with the object and purpose of Article III:2, which the panel in the prede-
cessor to this case dealing with an earlier version of the Liquor Tax Law, Ja-
pan - Customs Duties, Taxes and Labeling Practices on Imported Wines and
Alcoholic Beverages (“1987 Japan - Alcohol”), rightly stated as “promoting
non-discriminatory competition among imported and like domestic products
[which] could not be achieved if Article III:2 were construed in a manner al-
lowing discriminatory and protective internal taxation of imported products
in excess of like domestic products.”
helpful sign of product similarity. With these modifications to the legal rea-
soning in the Panel Report, we affirm the legal conclusions and the findings
of the Panel with respect to “like products” in all other respects.
(b) “In Excess Of”
The only remaining issue under Article III:2, first sentence, is whether the
taxes on imported products are “in excess of” those on like domestic products.
If so, then the Member that has imposed the tax is not in compliance with
Article III. Even the smallest amount of “excess” is too much. “The prohibi-
tion of discriminatory taxes in Article III:2, first sentence, is not conditional
on a ‘trade effects test’ nor is it qualified by a de minimis standard.” We agree
with the Panel’s legal reasoning and with its conclusions on this aspect of the
interpretation and application of Article III:2, first sentence.
2. Second Sentence
Article III:1 informs Article III:2, second sentence, through specific refer-
ence. Article III:2, second sentence, contains a general prohibition against
“internal taxes or other internal charges” applied to “imported or domestic
products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.” As
mentioned before, Article III:1 states that internal taxes and other internal
charges “should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to
afford protection to domestic production.” Again, Ad Article III:2 states as
follows:
A tax conforming to the requirements of the first sentence of paragraph
2 would be considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of the second
sentence only in cases where competition was involved between, on the one
hand, the taxed product and, on the other hand, a directly competitive or
substitutable product which was not similarly taxed.
Article III:2, second sentence, and the accompanying Ad Article have
equivalent legal status in that both are treaty language which was negotiated
and agreed at the same time. The Ad Article does not replace or modify the
language contained in Article III:2, second sentence, but, in fact, clarifies its
meaning. Accordingly, the language of the second sentence and the Ad Article
must be read together in order to give them their proper meaning.
Unlike that of Article III:2, first sentence, the language of Article III:2,
second sentence, specifically invokes Article III:1. The significance of this dis-
tinction lies in the fact that whereas Article III:1 acts implicitly in addressing
the two issues that must be considered in applying the first sentence, it acts
explicitly as an entirely separate issue that must be addressed along with two
other issues that are raised in applying the second sentence. Giving full mean-
ing to the text and to its context, three separate issues must be addressed to
determine whether an internal tax measure is inconsistent with Article III:2,
second sentence. These three issues are whether:
(1) the imported products and the domestic products are “directly com-
petitive or substitutable products” which are in competition with each other;
(2) the directly competitive or substitutable imported and domestic
products are “not similarly taxed”; and
(3) the dissimilar taxation of the directly competitive or substitutable
imported domestic products is “applied ... so as to afford protection to do-
mestic production.”
Again, these are three separate issues. Each must be established separately
by the complainant for a panel to find that a tax measure imposed by a Mem-
ber of the WTO is inconsistent with Article III:2, second sentence.
(a) “Directly Competitive or Substitutable Products”
If imported and domestic products are not “like products” for the narrow
purposes of Article III:2, first sentence, then they are not subject to the stric-
tures of that sentence and there is no inconsistency with the requirements
of that sentence. However, depending on their nature, and depending on
the competitive conditions in the relevant market, those same products may
well be among the broader category of “directly competitive or substitutable
products” that fall within the domain of Article III:2, second sentence. How
much broader that category of “directly competitive or substitutable prod-
ucts” may be in any given case is a matter for the panel to determine based
on all the relevant facts in that case. As with “like products” under the first
sentence, the determination of the appropriate range of “directly competi-
tive or substitutable products” under the second sentence must be made on
a case-by-case basis.
In this case, the Panel emphasized the need to look not only at such mat-
ters as physical characteristics, common end-uses, and tariff classifications,
but also at the “market place.” This seems appropriate. The GATT 1994 is a
commercial agreement, and the WTO is concerned, after all, with markets. It
does not seem inappropriate to look at competition in the relevant markets
as one among a number of means of identifying the broader category of
products that might be described as “directly competitive or substitutable.”
Nor does it seem inappropriate to examine elasticity of substitution as
one means of examining those relevant markets. The Panel did not say that
cross-price elasticity of demand is “the decisive criterion” for determining
To interpret “in excess of” and “not similarly taxed” identically would
deny any distinction between the first and second sentences of Article III:2.
Thus, in any given case, there may be some amount of taxation on imported
products that may well be “in excess of” the tax on domestic “like products”
but may not be so much as to compel a conclusion that “directly competitive
or substitutable” imported and domestic products are “not similarly taxed”
for the purposes of the Ad Article to Article III:2, second sentence. In other
words, there may be an amount of excess taxation that may well be more
of a burden on imported products than on domestic “directly competitive
or substitutable products” but may nevertheless not be enough to justify a
conclusion that such products are “not similarly taxed” for the purposes of
Article III:2, second sentence. We agree with the Panel that this amount of
differential taxation must be more than de minimis to be deemed “not simi-
larly taxed” in any given case. And, like the Panel, we believe that whether
any particular differential amount of taxation is de minimis or is not de
minimis must, here too, be determined on a case-by-case basis. Thus, to be
“not similarly taxed,” the tax burden on imported products must be heavier
than on “directly competitive or substitutable” domestic products, and that
burden must be more than de minimis in any given case.
In this case, the Panel applied the correct legal reasoning in determin-
ing whether “directly competitive or substitutable” imported and domestic
products were “not similarly taxed.” However, the Panel erred in blurring the
distinction between that issue and the entirely separate issue of whether the
tax measure in question was applied “so as to afford protection.” Again, these
are separate issues that must be addressed individually. If “directly competitive
or substitutable products” are not “not similarly taxed,” then there is neither
need nor justification under Article III:2, second sentence, for inquiring further
as to whether the tax has been applied “so as to afford protection.” But if such
products are “not similarly taxed,” a further inquiry must necessarily be made.
(c) “So As To Afford Protection”
This third inquiry under Article III:2, second sentence, must determine
whether “directly competitive or substitutable products” are “not similarly
taxed” in a way that affords protection. This is not an issue of intent. It is
not necessary for a panel to sort through the many reasons legislators and
regulators often have for what they do and weigh the relative significance
of those reasons to establish legislative or regulatory intent. If the measure
is applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to
domestic production, then it does not matter that there may not have been
any desire to engage in protectionism in the minds of the legislators or the
436
Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting The Automobile Industry, World Trade Or-
ganization Panel Report, WT/DS54/R; WT/DS55/R; WT/DS59/R; WT/DS64/R (2
July 1998) (citations omitted).
and their parts and components imported from Korea are to be considered
“like” any motor vehicle and parts and components imported from other
Members. The European Communities argue that imported parts and com-
ponents and motor vehicles are all like the relevant domestic products since
the definition of “National Cars” and their parts and components is not
based on any factor which may affect per se the physical characteristics of
those cars and parts and components, or their end uses. The United States
argues that cars imported in Indonesia are like the Kia Sephia from Korea.
Japan argues that parts and components and cars imported from Japan, or
any other country, and those imported from Korea constitute “like products.”
14.141. We have found in our discussion of like products under Article III:2 that
certain imported motor vehicles are like the National Car. The same considerations
justify a finding that such imported vehicles can be considered like National Cars
imported from Korea for the purpose of Article I. We also consider that parts
and components imported from the complainants are like imports from Korea.
Indonesia concedes that some parts and components are exactly the same for all
cars. As to the parts and components which arguably are specific to the National
Car, Indonesia does not contest that they can be produced by the complainants’
companies. This fact confirms that the parts and components imported for use
in the National Car are not unique. As before, we note in addition that the criteria
for benefitting from reduced customs duties and taxes are not based on any factor
which may affect per se the physical characteristics of those cars and parts and
components, or their end uses. In this regard, we note that past panels interpreting
Article I have found that a legislation itself may violate that provision if it could
lead in principle to less favourable treatment of the same products.
14.142. We find, therefore, that for the purpose of the MFN obligation
of Article I of GATT, National Cars and the parts and components thereof
imported into Indonesia from Korea are to be considered “like” other similar
motor vehicles and parts and components imported from other Members.
(ii) “unconditional advantages”
14.143. We now examine whether the advantages accorded to National
Cars and parts and components thereof from Korea are unconditionally ac-
corded to the products of other Members, as required by Article I. The GATT
case law is clear to the effect that any such advantage (here tax and customs
duty benefits) cannot be made conditional on any criteria that is not related
to the imported product itself.
14.144. For instance, in the Panel Report on Belgian Family Allowances,
the panel condemned a measure which discriminated against imports de-
pending on the type of family allowances that was in place:
their being used in the assembly in Indonesia of a National Car. The grant-
ing of tax benefits is conditional and limited to the only Pioneer company
producing National Cars. And there is also a third condition for these ben-
efits: the meeting of certain local content targets. Indeed under all these car
programmes, customs duty and tax benefits are conditional on achieving a
certain local content value for the finished car. The existence of these condi-
tions is inconsistent with the provisions of Article I:1 which provides that tax
and customs duty advantages accorded to products of one Member (here on
Korean products) be accorded to imported like products from other Members
“immediately and unconditionally.”
14.147. For the reasons discussed above, we consider that the June 1996
car programme which introduced discrimination between imports in the
allocation of tax and customs duty benefits based on various conditions
and other criteria not related to the imports themselves and the February
1996 car programme which also introduce discrimination between imports
in the allocation of customs duty benefits based on various conditions and
other criteria not related to the imports themselves, are inconsistent with the
provisions of Article I of GATT.
***
2.2. In the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean schools of tuna often swim be-
low herds of dolphin that are visible swimming at or near the surface. Tuna
fishermen in the eastern tropical Pacific therefore commonly use dolphins
to locate schools of tuna, and encircle them intentionally with purse seine
nets on the expectation that tuna will be found below the dolphins. Since the
1960’s, the practice of intentionally setting purse seine nets on dolphins to
catch tuna has resulted in the incidental killing and injury of many dolphins….
2.5. The US Marine Mammal Protection Act of 19723 prohibits the “tak-
ing,” including the harassing, hunting, capturing or killing, of any marine
mammal, whether directly, or incidentally in connection with the harvesting
of fish. The Act further prohibits the import into the United States of any
marine mammal or marine mammal product, and any fish or fish product
437
United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Panel Report, DS29/R (16
June 1994) (citations omitted).
XX (g) and the preamble qualify only the trade measure requiring justifi-
cation (“related to”) or the manner in which the trade measure is applied
(“in conjunction with,” “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination,” “disguised
restriction on international trade”). The nature and precise scope of the
policy area named in the Article, the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources, is not spelled out or specifically conditioned by the text of the
Article, in particular with respect to the location of the exhaustible natural
resource to be conserved. The Panel noted that two previous panels have
considered Article XX (g) to be applicable to policies related to migratory
species of fish, and had made no distinction between fish caught within or
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the contracting party that had invoked
this provision.
5.16. The Panel then observed that measures providing different treat-
ment to products of different origins could in principle be taken under other
paragraphs of Article XX and other Articles of the General Agreement with
respect to things located, or actions occurring, outside the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the party taking the measure. An example was the provision in Article
XX (e) relating to products of prison labour. It could not therefore be said
that the General Agreement proscribed in an absolute manner measures that
related to things or actions outside the territorial jurisdiction of the party
taking the measure.
5.17. The Panel further observed that, under general international law,
states are not in principle barred from regulating the conduct of their nation-
als with respect to persons, animals, plants and natural resources outside of
their territory. Nor are states barred, in principle, from regulating the conduct
of vessels having their nationality, or any persons on these vessels, with re-
spect to persons, animals, plants and natural resources outside their territory.
A state may in particular regulate the conduct of its fishermen, or of vessels
having its nationality or any fishermen on these vessels, with respect to fish
located in the high seas.
5.18. The Panel noted that the parties based many of their arguments on
the location of the exhaustible natural resource in Article XX (g) on envi-
ronmental and trade treaties other than the General Agreement. However,
it was first of all necessary to determine the extent to which these treaties
were relevant to the interpretation of the text of the General Agreement. The
Panel recalled that it is generally accepted that the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties expresses the basic rules of treaty interpretation (see Annex
B attached), and that the parties to the dispute shared this view. It therefore
proceeded to examine the treaties in this light.
5.19. The Panel recalled that the Vienna Convention provides for a general
rule of interpretation (Article 31) and a supplementary means of interpreta-
tion (Article 32). The Panel first examined whether, under the general rule
of interpretation of the Vienna Convention, the treaties referred to might be
taken into account for the purposes of interpreting the General Agreement.
The general rule provides that “any subsequent agreement between the parties
regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions”
is one of the elements relevant to the interpretation of a treaty. However
the Panel observed that the agreements cited by the parties to the dispute
were bilateral or plurilateral agreements that were not concluded among
the contracting parties to the General Agreement, and that they did not ap-
ply to the interpretation of the General Agreement or the application of its
provisions. Indeed, many of the treaties referred to could not have done so,
since they were concluded prior to the negotiation of the General Agreement.
The Panel also observed that under the general rule of interpretation in the
Vienna Convention account should be taken of “any subsequent practice in
the application of the treaty which established the agreement of the parties
regarding its interpretation.” However, the Panel noted that practice under
the bilateral and plurilateral treaties cited could not be taken as practice under
the General Agreement, and therefore could not affect the interpretation of
it. The Panel therefore found that under the general rule contained in Article
31 of the Vienna Convention, these treaties were not relevant as a primary
means of interpretation of the text of the General Agreement.
5.20. The Panel then examined whether the treaties referred to might be
relevant as a supplementary means of interpretation of the General Agreement
under the Vienna Convention. The Panel noted that the supplementary means
permitted by Article 32 of the Vienna Convention include “the preparatory
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion.” However, the
terms of this provision make clear that its applicability is limited. Preparatory
work and other supplementary means of interpretation may only be used “to
confirm” an interpretation reached under the general rule of interpretation,
or when application of the general rule “leaves the meaning ambiguous or
obscure,” or “leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”
Even if interpretation according to the general rule had led to this result, the
Panel considered that those cited treaties that were concluded prior to the
conclusion of the General Agreement were of little assistance in interpreting
the text of Article XX (g), since it appeared to the Panel on the basis of the
material presented to it that no direct references were made to these treaties
in the text of the General Agreement, the Havana Charter, or in the prepara-
tory work to these instruments. The Panel also found that the statements and
drafting changes made during the negotiation of the Havana Charter and
the General Agreement cited by the parties did not provide clear support for
any particular contention of the parties on the question of the location of
the exhaustible natural resource in Article XX(g). In view of the above, the
Panel could see no valid reason supporting the conclusion that the provi-
sions of Article XX (g) apply only to policies related to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources located within the territory of the contracting
party invoking the provision. The Panel consequently found that the policy
to conserve dolphins in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean, which the United
States pursued within its jurisdiction over its nationals and vessels, fell within
the range of policies covered by Article XX (g).
“Related to” the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource; made
effective “in conjunction” with restrictions on domestic production or con-
sumption
5.21. The Panel then examined the second of the above three questions,
namely whether the primary and intermediary nation embargoes imposed
by the United States on yellowfin tuna could be considered to be “related to”
the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource within the meaning of
Article XX (g), and whether they were made effective “in conjunction with”
restrictions on domestic production or consumption. The United States
argued that its measures met both requirements. The EEC disagreed, stating
the measures had to be “primarily aimed” at the conservation of the exhaust-
ible natural resource, and at rendering effective the restrictions on domestic
production or consumption.
5.22. The Panel proceeded first to examine the relationship established
by Article XX (g) between the trade measure and the policy of conserving
an exhaustible natural resource, and between the trade measure and the re-
strictions on domestic production or consumption. It noted that a previous
panel had stated that the scope of the terms relating to” and “in conjunction
with” had to be interpreted in a way that ensured that the scope of provisions
under Article XX (g) corresponded to the purposes for which it was included
in the General Agreement. That panel had stated that widen the scope for
measures serving trade policy purposes but merely to ensure that the com-
mitments under the General Agreement do not hinder the pursuit of policies
aimed at the conservation of exhaustive natural resources.” The previous
panel had concluded that the term “relating to” should be taken to mean
“primarily aimed” at the conservation of natural resources, and that the term
“in conjunction with” should be taken to mean “primarily aimed” at render-
ing effective the restrictions on domestic production or consumption. The
Panel agreed with the reasoning of the previous panel, on the understanding
that the words “primarily aimed at” referred not only to the purpose of the
measure, but also to its effect on the conservation of the natural resource.
5.23. The Panel then proceeded to examine whether the embargoes
imposed by the United States could be considered to be primarily aimed at
the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource, and primarily aimed at
rendering effective restrictions on domestic production or consumption. In
particular, the Panel examined the relationship of the United States mea-
sures with the expressed goal of dolphin conservation. The Panel noted that
measures taken under the intermediary nation embargo prohibited imports
from a country of any tuna, whether or not the particular tuna was harvested
in a manner that harmed or could harm dolphins, and whether or not the
country had tuna harvesting practices and policies that harmed or could harm
dolphins, as long as it was from a country that imported tuna from countries
maintaining tuna harvesting practices and policies not comparable to those
of the United States. The Panel then observed that the prohibition on imports
of tuna into the United States taken under the intermediary nation embargo
could not, by itself, further the United States conservation objectives. The
intermediary nation embargo could achieve its intended effect only if it were
followed by changes in policies or practices, not in the country exporting
tuna to the United States, but in third countries from which the exporting
country imported tuna.
5.24. The Panel noted also that measures taken under the primary na-
tion embargo prohibited imports from a country of any tuna, whether or
not the particular tuna was harvested in a way that harmed or could harm
dolphins, as long as the country’s tuna harvesting practices and policies were
not comparable to those of the United States. The Panel observed that, as in
the case of the intermediary nation embargo, the prohibition on imports of
tuna into the United States taken under the primary nation embargo could
not possibly, by itself, further the United States conservation objectives. The
primary nation embargo could achieve its desired effect only if it were fol-
lowed by changes in policies and practices in the exporting countries. In view
of the foregoing, the Panel observed that both the primary and intermediary
nation embargoes on tuna implemented by the United States were taken so
as to force other countries to change their policies with respect to persons
and things within their own jurisdiction, since the embargoes required such
changes in order to have any effect on the conservation of dolphins.
5.25. The Panel then examined whether, under Article XX (g), measures
primarily aimed at the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, or pri-
438
United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, World Trade
Organization Appellate Body Report, WT/DS2/AB/R ( 29 April 1996).
439
Id. at 22.
are not to be abused or misused, in other words, the measures falling within
the particular exceptions must be applied reasonably, with due regard both
to the legal duties of the party claiming the exception and the legal rights of
the other parties concerned. The burden of demonstrating that a measure
provisionally justified as being within one of the exceptions set out in the
individual paragraphs of Article XX does not, in its application, constitute
abuse of such exception under the chapeau, rests on the party invoking the
exception. That is, of necessity, a heavier task than that involved in showing
that an exception, such as Article XX(g), encompasses the measure at issue.
The enterprise of applying Article XX would clearly be an unprofitable
one if it involved no more than applying the standard used in finding that the
baseline establishment rules were inconsistent with Article III:4. That would
also be true if the finding were one of inconsistency with some other substan-
tive rule of the General Agreement. The provisions of the chapeau cannot
logically refer to the same standard(s) by which a violation of a substantive
rule has been determined to have occurred. To proceed down that path would
be both to empty the chapeau of its contents and to deprive the exceptions
in paragraphs (a) to (j) of meaning. Such recourse would also confuse the
question of whether inconsistency with a substantive rule existed, with the
further and separate question arising under the chapeau of Article XX as to
whether that inconsistency was nevertheless justified. One of the corollar-
ies of the “general rule of interpretation” in the Vienna Convention is that
interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of a treaty. An
interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole
clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility.440
The chapeau, it will be seen, prohibits such application of a measure at
issue (otherwise falling within the scope of Article XX(g)) as would constitute
(a) “arbitrary discrimination” (between countries where the same condi-
tions prevail);
(b) “unjustifiable discrimination” (with the same qualifier); or
(c) “disguised restriction” on international trade.
The text of the chapeau is not without ambiguity, including one relating to
the field of application of the standards it contains: the arbitrary or unjustifi-
able discrimination standards and the disguised restriction on international
trade standard. It may be asked whether these standards do not have dif-
ferent fields of application. Such a question was put to the United States in
440
Id. at 23.
the course of the oral hearing. It was asked whether the words incorporated
into the first two standards “between countries where the same conditions
prevail” refer to conditions in importing and exporting countries, or only to
conditions in exporting countries. The reply of the United States was to the
effect that it interpreted that phrase as referring to both the exporting coun-
tries and importing countries and as between exporting countries. It also said
that the language spoke for itself, but there was no reference to third parties;
while some thought that this was only between exporting countries inter se,
there is no support in the text for that view. No such question was put to the
United States concerning the field of application of the third standard – dis-
guised restriction on international trade. But the United States put forward
arguments designed to show that in the case under appeal, it had met all
the standards set forth in the chapeau. In doing so, it clearly proceeded on
the assumption that, whatever else they might relate to in another case, they
were relevant to a case of national treatment where the Panel had found a
violation of Article III:4. At no point in the appeal was that assumption chal-
lenged by Venezuela or Brazil. Venezuela argued that the United States had
failed to meet all the standards contained in the chapeau. So did Norway
and the European Communities as third participants. In short, the field of
application of these standards was not at issue.
The assumption on which all the participants proceeded is buttressed
by the fact that the chapeau says that “nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party
of measures ...” The exceptions listed in Article XX thus relate to all of the
obligations under the General Agreement: the national treatment obligation
and the most-favoured-nation obligation, of course, but others as well. Effect
is more easily given to the words “nothing in this Agreement,” and Article XX
as a whole including its chapeau more easily integrated into the remainder
of the General Agreement, if the chapeau is taken to mean that the standards
it sets forth are applicable to all of the situations in which an allegation of a
violation of a substantive obligation has been made and one of the exceptions
contained in Article XX has in turn been claimed. Against this background, we
see no need to decide the matter of the field of application of the standards
set forth in the chapeau nor to make a ruling at variance with the common
understanding of the participants.441
P. 25 “Arbitrary discrimination,” “unjustifiable discrimination” and “dis-
guised restriction” on international trade may, accordingly, be read side-by-
side; they impart meaning to one another. It is clear to us that “disguised
441
Id. at 24.
442
Id. at 26.
In the view of the Panel, the United States had reasonably available to it
data for, and measures of, verification and assessment which were consistent
or less inconsistent with Article III:4. For instance, although foreign data may
be formally less subject to complete control by US authorities, this did not
amount to establishing that foreign data could not in any circumstances be
sufficiently reliable to serve U.S. purposes. This, however, was the practical
effect of the application of the Gasoline Rule. In the Panel’s view, the United
States had not demonstrated that data available from foreign refiners was
inherently less susceptible to established techniques of checking, verification,
assessment and enforcement than data for other trade in goods subject to
US regulation. The nature of the data in this case was similar to data relied
upon by the United States in other contexts, including, for example, under
the application of antidumping laws. In an antidumping case, only when the
information was not supplied or deemed unverifiable did the United States
turn to other information. If a similar practice were to be applied in the case
of the Gasoline Rule, then importers could, for instance, be permitted to use
the individual baselines of foreign refiners for imported gasoline from those
refiners, with the statutory baseline being applied only when the source of
imported gasoline could not be determined or a baseline could not be es-
tablished because of an absence of data….
We agree with the finding above made in the Panel Report. There are,
as the Panel Report found, established techniques for checking, verification,
assessment and enforcement of data relating to imported goods, techniques
which in many contexts are accepted as adequate to permit international trade
- trade between territorial sovereigns - to go on and grow. The United States
must have been aware that for these established techniques and procedures
to work, cooperative arrangements with both foreign refiners and the foreign
governments concerned would have been necessary and appropriate.443
[I]t appears to the Appellate Body, that the United States had not pursued
the possibility of entering into cooperative arrangements with the govern-
ments of Venezuela and Brazil or, if it had, not to the point where it encoun-
tered governments that were unwilling to cooperate. The record of this case
sets out the detailed justifications put forward by the United States. But it
does not reveal what, if any, efforts had been taken by the United States to
enter into appropriate procedures in cooperation with the governments of
Venezuela and Brazil so as to mitigate the administrative problems pleaded
by the United States.
443
Id. at 27.
In its submissions, the United States also explained why the statutory
baseline requirement was not imposed on domestic refiners as well. Here,
the United States stressed the problems that domestic refineries would have
faced had they been required to comply with the statutory baseline. Clearly,
the United States did not feel it feasible to require its domestic refiners to
incur the physical and financial costs and burdens entailed by immediate
compliance with a statutory baseline. The United States wished to give
domestic refiners time to restructure their operations and adjust to the re-
quirements in the Gasoline Rule. This may very well have constituted sound
domestic policy from the viewpoint of the EPA and U.S. refiners. At the same
time we are bound to note that, while the United States counted the costs
for its domestic refiners of statutory baselines, there is nothing in the record
to indicate that it did other than disregard that kind of consideration when
it came to foreign refiners.444
We have above located two omissions on the part of the United States:
to explore adequately means, including in particular cooperation with the
governments of Venezuela and Brazil, of mitigating the administrative prob-
lems relied on as justification by the United States for rejecting individual
baselines for foreign refiners; and to count the costs for foreign refiners that
would result from the imposition of statutory baselines. In our view, these
two omissions go well beyond what was necessary for the Panel to determine
that a violation of Article III:4 had occurred in the first place. The resulting
discrimination must have been foreseen, and was not merely inadvertent or
unavoidable. In the light of the foregoing, our conclusion is that the baseline
establishment rules in the Gasoline Rule, in their application, constitute “un-
justifiable discrimination” and a “disguised restriction on international trade.”
We hold, in sum, that the baseline establishment rules, although within the
terms of Article XX(g), are not entitled to the justifying protection afforded
by Article XX as a whole.
444
Id. at 28.
445
Nurzat Myrsalieva, unpublished article (excerpts)(2011).
446
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947, Article XXIV, para 8 (b), Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
447
For the list of registered regional trade agreements visit http://rtais.wto.org/UI/
PublicAllRTAList.aspx.
448
Reasons for failure of regional integration processes in West Africa see: Regional
Integration: Comparative Experiences, Heba Shams, 10-SUM L. & Bus. Rev.Am. 457.
449
Caribbean Single Market and Economy: What is it and can it deliver?, Andrea Ewart,
11 ILSA J.Int’l & Comp. L. 39, p. 39.
450
Regional Integration in the Post-USSR: Legal and Institutional Aspects, Roman
Petrov, 10 SUM L. & Bus.Rev.Am. 631.
451
Trade Policy Review, WT/TPR/S/170, p. 47.
452
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm
Article 2
Administration
1. The Dispute Settlement Body is hereby established to administer
these rules and procedures and, except as otherwise provided in a covered
agreement, the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the cov-
ered agreements. Accordingly, the DSB shall have the authority to establish
panels, adopt panel and Appellate Body reports, maintain surveillance of
implementation of rulings and recommendations, and authorize suspension
of concessions and other obligations under the covered agreements. With
respect to disputes arising under a covered agreement which is a Plurilateral
Trade Agreement, the term “Member” as used herein shall refer only to those
Members that are parties to the relevant Plurilateral Trade Agreement. Where
the DSB administers the dispute settlement provisions of a Plurilateral Trade
Agreement, only those Members that are parties to that Agreement may par-
ticipate in decisions or actions taken by the DSB with respect to that dispute….
4. Where the rules and procedures of this Understanding provide for the
DSB to take a decision, it shall do so by consensus.453
Article 3
General Provisions
1. Members affirm their adherence to the principles for the management
of disputes heretofore applied under Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1947,
and the rules and procedures as further elaborated and modified herein.
2. The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The
Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of
Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions
of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of
public international law. Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add
to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements.
3. The prompt settlement of situations in which a Member considers that
any benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under the covered agreements
are being impaired by measures taken by another Member is essential to the
effective functioning of the WTO and the maintenance of a proper balance
between the rights and obligations of Members.
453
The DSB shall be deemed to have decided by consensus on a matter submitted
for its consideration, if no Member, present at the meeting of the DSB when the
decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed decision.
454
Where the provisions of any other covered agreement concerning measures taken
by regional or local governments or authorities within the territory of a Member
contain provisions different from the provisions of this paragraph, the provisions
of such other covered agreement shall prevail.
panel during the 60-day period if the consulting parties jointly consider that
consultations have failed to settle the dispute.
8. In cases of urgency, including those which concern perishable goods,
Members shall enter into consultations within a period of no more than 10
days after the date of receipt of the request. If the consultations have failed
to settle the dispute within a period of 20 days after the date of receipt of
the request, the complaining party may request the establishment of a panel.
9. In cases of urgency, including those which concern perishable goods,
the parties to the dispute, panels and the Appellate Body shall make every
effort to accelerate the proceedings to the greatest extent possible.
10. During consultations Members should give special attention to the
particular problems and interests of developing country Members.
11. Whenever a Member other than the consulting Members considers
that it has a substantial trade interest in consultations being held pursuant
to paragraph 1 of Article XXII of GATT 1994, paragraph 1 of Article XXII of
GATS, or the corresponding provisions in other covered agreements455, such
Member may notify the consulting Members and the DSB, within 10 days
after the date of the circulation of the request for consultations under said
Article, of its desire to be joined in the consultations. Such Member shall be
joined in the consultations, provided that the Member to which the request
for consultations was addressed agrees that the claim of substantial interest
is well-founded. In that event they shall so inform the DSB. If the request to
be joined in the consultations is not accepted, the applicant Member shall be
free to request consultations under paragraph 1 of Article XXII or paragraph
1 of Article XXIII of GATT 1994, paragraph 1 of Article XXII or paragraph 1
455
The corresponding consultation provisions in the covered agreements are listed
hereunder: Agreement on Agriculture, Article 19; Agreement on the Application
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, paragraph 1 of Article 11; Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing, paragraph 4 of Article 8; Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade, paragraph 1 of Article 14; Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures,
Article 8; Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994, paragraph 2 of
Article 17; Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of GATT 1994, paragraph
2 of Article 19; Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, Article 7; Agreement on
Rules of Origin, Article 7; Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, Article 6;
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Article 30; Agreement on
Safeguards, Article 14; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Article 64.1; and any corresponding consultation provisions in Plurilateral
Trade Agreements as determined by the competent bodies of each Agreement and
as notified to the DSB.
456
If the complaining party so requests, a meeting of the DSB shall be convened for
this purpose within 15 days of the request, provided that at least 10 days’ advance
notice of the meeting is given.
457
In the case where customs unions or common markets are parties to a dispute,
this provision applies to citizens of all member countries of the customs unions
or common markets.
Article 13
Right to Seek Information
1. Each panel shall have the right to seek information and technical
advice from any individual or body which it deems appropriate. However,
before a panel seeks such information or advice from any individual or body
within the jurisdiction of a Member it shall inform the authorities of that
Member. A Member should respond promptly and fully to any request by a
panel for such information as the panel considers necessary and appropriate.
Confidential information which is provided shall not be revealed without
formal authorization from the individual, body, or authorities of the Member
providing the information.
2. Panels may seek information from any relevant source and may consult
experts to obtain their opinion on certain aspects of the matter. With respect
to a factual issue concerning a scientific or other technical matter raised by
a party to a dispute, a panel may request an advisory report in writing from
an expert review group. Rules for the establishment of such a group and its
procedures are set forth in Appendix 4.
Article 14
Confidentiality
1. Panel deliberations shall be confidential.
2. The reports of panels shall be drafted without the presence of the
parties to the dispute in the light of the information provided and the state-
ments made.
3. Opinions expressed in the panel report by individual panelists shall
be anonymous….
Article 16
Adoption of Panel Reports
1. In order to provide sufficient time for the Members to consider panel
reports, the reports shall not be considered for adoption by the DSB until 20
days after the date they have been circulated to the Members.
2. Members having objections to a panel report shall give written reasons
to explain their objections for circulation at least 10 days prior to the DSB
meeting at which the panel report will be considered.
3. The parties to a dispute shall have the right to participate fully in the con-
sideration of the panel report by the DSB, and their views shall be fully recorded.
Article 17
Appellate Review
Standing Appellate Body
1. A standing Appellate Body shall be established by the DSB. The Appel-
late Body shall hear appeals from panel cases. It shall be composed of seven
persons, three of whom shall serve on any one case. Persons serving on the
Appellate Body shall serve in rotation. Such rotation shall be determined in
the working procedures of the Appellate Body….
13. The Appellate Body may uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings
and conclusions of the panel.
Article 19
Panel and Appellate Body Recommendations
1. Where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is in-
consistent with a covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member
concerned458 bring the measure into conformity with that agreement.459 In ad-
dition to its recommendations, the panel or Appellate Body may suggest ways
in which the Member concerned could implement the recommendations.
Article 21
Surveillance of Implementation of Recommendations and Rulings
1. Prompt compliance with recommendations or rulings of the DSB is
essential in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of
all Members.
2. Particular attention should be paid to matters affecting the interests
of developing country Members with respect to measures which have been
subject to dispute settlement.
3. At a DSB meeting held within 30 days460 after the date of adoption of
the panel or Appellate Body report, the Member concerned shall inform the
DSB of its intentions in respect of implementation of the recommendations
and rulings of the DSB. If it is impracticable to comply immediately with the
458
The “Member concerned” is the party to the dispute to which the panel or Appel-
late Body recommendations are directed.
459
With respect to recommendations in cases not involving a violation of GATT 1994
or any other covered agreement, see Article 26.
460
If a meeting of the DSB is not scheduled during this period, such a meeting of the
DSB shall be held for this purpose.
461
The list in document MTN.GNS/W/120 identifies eleven sectors.
462
Where the provisions of any covered agreement concerning measures taken by
regional or local governments or authorities within the territory of a Member
contain provisions different from the provisions of this paragraph, the provisions
of such covered agreement shall prevail.
Article 27
Responsibilities of the Secretariat
1. The Secretariat shall have the responsibility of assisting panels, espe-
cially on the legal, historical and procedural aspects of the matters dealt with,
and of providing secretarial and technical support.
2. While the Secretariat assists Members in respect of dispute settlement
at their request, there may also be a need to provide additional legal advice
and assistance in respect of dispute settlement to developing country Mem-
bers. To this end, the Secretariat shall make available a qualified legal expert
from the WTO technical cooperation services to any developing country
Member which so requests. This expert shall assist the developing country
Member in a manner ensuring the continued impartiality of the Secretariat.
3. The Secretariat shall conduct special training courses for interested
Members concerning these dispute settlement procedures and practices so
as to enable Members’ experts to be better informed in this regard.
APPENDIX 1
AGREEMENTS COVERED BY THE UNDERSTANDING
(A) Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
(B) Multilateral Trade Agreements
Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods
Annex 1B: General Agreement on Trade in Services
Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES
Doubtless, investment is an important determinant of economic growth
of the country. Readiness of an investor to invest in the economy of a state
depends on many economic, political, legal, social and other factors that
determine the conditions of investment risk and security. One of the main
reasons for the lack of direct foreign investment in developing and transi-
tioning countries is the insecurity and instability of its judicial system, which
includes such problems as corruption, non-enforcement of judgments, insuf-
ficient legal framework and others Therefore, investors in transitioning States
in particular seek to have an effective dispute resolution mechanism which
offers a neutral substantive law, speedy and fair trial.
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT) are agreements between states aimed
at solving these problems, which serve as a special tool and mechanism to
promote and attract foreign direct investment. BITs provide stable legal re-
463
1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States 575 UNTS 159, 4 ILM 532 (1965).