ANTICHRESIS

Cotonor- Zacarias vs Revilla

The term “antichresis” has a Greek origin with “anti” (against) and “chresis” (use) devoting
the action of giving a credit against the use of property.

FACTS:
Alfredo Revilla and Paz Castillo-Revilla (Revilla spouses) are the owners in fee simple of
a 15,000-square-meter unregistered parcel of land in Silang, Cavite. In 1983, the Revilla
spouses faced financial difficulties in raising funds for Alfredo Revilla’s travel to Saudi
Arabia, so Paz Castillo-Revilla borrowed money from Amada Cotoner-Zacarias (Amada).
By way of security, the parties verbally agreed that Amada would take physical possession
of the property, cultivate it, then use the earnings from the cultivation to pay the loan and
realty taxes. Upon full payment of the loan, Amada would return the property to the Revilla
spouses. Unknown to the Revilla spouses, Amada presented a fictitious document entitled
"Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" before the Provincial Assessor of Cavite, which was
executed on March 19, 1979 with the Revilla spouses as sellers and Amada as buyer of
the property. Amada sold the property to the spouses Adolfo and Elvira Casorla (Casorla
spouses) by "Deed of Absolute Sale Unregistered Land." In turn, the Casorla spouses
executed a deed of absolute sale dated December 16, 1991 in favor of the spouses Rodolfo
and Yolanda Sun (Sun spouses). Alfredo Revilla returned from Saudi Arabia. He asked
Amada why she had not returned their tax declaration considering their full payment of the
loan. He then discovered that the property’s tax declaration was already in the name of the
Sun spouses.

HELD:
Antichresis involves an express agreement between parties such that the creditor will have
possession of the debtor’s real property given as security, and such creditor will apply the
fruits of the property to the interest owed by the debtor, if any, then to the principal amount.

Antichresis requires delivery of the property to the antichretic creditor**, but the latter
cannot ordinarily acquire this immovable property in his or her possession by prescription.
Similar to the prohibition against pactum commissorium since creditors cannot "appropriate
the things given by way of pledge or mortgage, or dispose of them," an antichretic creditor
also cannot appropriate the real property in his or her favor upon the non-payment of the
debt. Antichresis also requires that the amount of the principal and the interest be in writing
for the contract to be valid. However, the issue before us does not concern the nature of
the relationship between the parties, but the validity of the documents that caused the
subsequent transfers of the property involved. The reinstatement of the property in favor
of respondents Revilla spouses was anchored on the lower courts’ finding that their
signatures as sellers in the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" were forged. This court has
held that the question of forgery is one of fact.

Dizon vs. Gaborro

In consideration of the payment of mortgagor’s indebtedness to mortgagee, payor was

FACTS:
Jose Dizon was the owner of three parcels of land situated in Mabalacat, Pampanga. He
constituted a first mortgage to DBP to secure a loan of P38,000 and a second mortgage to
PNB for P93,831.91. Petitioner defaulted in the payment of his debt, thus DBP
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. Gaborro took an interest in the lands of petitioner
but since the same were already foreclosed, Dizon and Gaborro entered into a contract
entitled “Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgagee”. They entered into a second contract
called “Option to Purchase Real Estate”. After the execution of the contract and its
conditions to him, Gaborro made several payments to the DBP and PNB. He improved,
cultivated the kinds raised sugarcane and other crops produce.

Dizon through his lawyer, wrote a letter to Gaborro informing him that he is formally
offering to reimburse Gaborro of what he paid to the banks. Gaborro did not agreed to the
demands of the petitioner, hence, Dizon instituted a complaint in the CFI of Pampanga,
alleging that the documents Deed of Sale With Assumption of Mortgage and the Option to
Purchase Real Estate did not express the true intention and agreement between the
parties. Petitioner, contended that the two deeds constitute in fact a single transaction that
their real agreement was not an absolute sale of the land but merely an equitable mortgage
or conveyance by way of security for the reimbursement or refund by Dizon to Gaborro of
any and all sums which the latter may have paid on account of the mortgage debts in favor
of the DBP and the PNB.

HELD: The true agreement between the plaintiff and defendant is that the defendant would
assume and pay the indebtedness of the plaintiff to DBP and PNB, and in consideration
therefore, the defendant was given the possession and enjoyment of the properties in
question until the plaintiff shall have reimbursed to defendant fully the amount of
P131,831.91 plus 8% interest per annum from October 6, 1959 until full payment, said right
to be exercised within one year from the date the judgment becomes final, if he fails to do
so within the said period, then he is deemed to have lost his right over the lands forever.

Pando vs. Gimenez

FACTS:
Gimenez was indebted to Pando in the amount of P8000. To secure payment of such loan,
he executed and delivered a real estate mortgage over a building; and the leasehold rights
on the lot upon which the building was erected, with Hacienda Tuason as lessor. Before
leaving Manila to attend to business in Cagayan, he gave Pando full control and complete
and absolute administration over the property he mortgaged, on the condition that the latter
would: (1) attend to the administration, care and preservation of the building and property;
(2) pay the premium on the insurance of the building; (3) pay the taxes that might become
due on the building; (4) pay the rents of the leased property; (5) collect the rents from the
tenants of the building, the same shall be applied to the payment of all expenses necessary
for the preservation and maintenance of the building and the rents of the leased property.

Pando, however, failed to pay the taxes that fell due over several years. He also failed to
pay the lessor the rents due the latter. Subsequently, the building was sold at a public
auction to satisfy the taxes due.

HELD:
The administration of the property taken up by Pando is antichretic in character. Art. 2135
of the Civil Code expressly states that the antichretic creditor is obliged to pay the taxes
and charges which burden the estate, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary.
Such an obligation arises from the very nature of the contract, and is correlated with the
antichretic creditor’s acquired right to take charge of the property and collect the fruits for
himself. Having failed to pay the taxes as obligated, he is required to pay indemnity for
damages.

Rosales vs. Tanseco

FACTS:
Severina Rosales and Pureza Congzon are the widow and daughter, respectively, of
Eustaquio Congzon, who owned with his wife a piece of land with improvements in
Catbalogan, Samar. Loecadio S. Tanseco prepared fictitious mortgage of the land in favor
of Tan Tay San, which he made Eustaquio Congson sign without consideration. That
document was subsequently cancelled to be substituted in May 30, 1930 by another
"mortgage" for P26,000 in favor of defendant Tan Sun, which Eustaquio Congzon again
signed thru fraud and without consideration. Tan Sun transferred all his rights to defendant
Tan Tay San, who in turn assigned his interests to defendant Leocadio Tanseco. Congzon
never enjoyed the possession and fruits of the land. He also paid for the taxes, the amount
of which is much more than that of the credit of Tan Sun secured by the mortgage.

HELD:
In a contract of antichresis the creditor is obliged to pay the taxes on the property, unless
the contract says otherwise. The contract between Eustaquio Congzon and Tan Sun said
nothing about taxes. Hence it was the obligation of the creditor or creditors to pay the taxes
on the property at issue herein. Bearing in mind that the credit was only P26,000 it is plain
to see that under the second cause of action the plaintiffs affirmed in effect that they had
already discharged their debt (by advancing the taxes which the creditor should have paid)
and are entitled to the return of their property free from all encumbrance. At least there was
good ground for accounting. Consequently, it was error to dismiss upon a mere motion
filed before the answer.

Alberto Barretto vs. Leonardo Barretto; Angelica Barretto, et. al, as interveners

FACTS:
This case begun by Alberto who claimed delivery to him of a piece of land called Hacienda
Balintagac together with its fruits or value, and also a lot situated therein with its rents.
Cause of action:
1.) He is the owner of the whole hacienda and that he was in possession of the same
quietly, peacefully and continuously, as were his predecessors since 1884 until may 1912.
2.) He alleges that defendant Leonardo as illegally and unduly usurped a portion of
land and since that time, had been receiving 2/3 of the fruits which the usurped portion
annually produced and that he refused to return that portion of land with its fruits or value,
in spite of demand.
Interveners Angelica Barretto, et. al. filed a complaint stating that hacienda Balintagac was
owned and possessed by Juan Antonio Barreto, sr. who left it to his 7 children upon his
death. 2 of his children are now deceased and they succeeded by their children. Also, they
are the current possessors of the hacienda through agents and representatives.
Amalia also subsequently find a complaint of intervention.
As a special defense, Alberto alleged that Juan Antonio Barreto Grandpre, Jr., then
executor of his deceased father Juan Antonio Barretto, sr., declaring himself to be the
absolute owner of all the hacienda Balintagac, borrowed money from Antonio Vicente
Barreto for the expenses of the hacienda. It is with the obligation to pay for delinquency
and interests, payable quarterly in advance, and as guaranty for said loan, he mortgaged
specifically the cultivated half of the hacienda and other properties mentioned in the
instrument. To this effect the brothers of said Juan Antonio Barretto Grandpre intervened
and procured the granting of the loan for the purpose, inducing the creditor (Antonio
Vicente) to grant said loan on the security of the mortgage; that for the failure of the debtor
to pay his debt, the creditor Antonio Vicente, brought an action to foreclose the mortgage
against Grandpre in his (Grandpre) own behalf and as executor of his father (Juan Antonio
Sr.).
Since Juan Antonio, Jr. and his brother were not able to pay, they delivered all the hacienda
to Antonio Vicente (Creditor). Juan Antonio’s brothers administered the entire hacienda
acknowledging Antonio Vicente as the absolute owner of all of it and delivering all its
products until April 1896. Antonio Vicente also leased the whole hacienda annually to Luis
Bonifacio Barretto who administered it til his (Luis) death in 1902 with the knowledge and
without objection of Leonardo, attorney in fact and representative of his brothers and
coheirs.
When Antonio Vicente died, his 3 children succeeded him and Antonio Maria, one of his
children, was appointed as administrator and continuously administered it until May or June
1912, when Leonardo illegally took possession of 2 portions of the hacienda.
On 1913, Antonio and Ricardo sold the 2/3 portion to Alberto Barretto. Guadalupe
eventually donated all her interests to Alberto, on the condition that Alberto would dived
what was donated into 9 equal parts among himself, his 6 living brothers and the heirs of
their 2 deceased brothers, each receiving 1/9 part.
As a special defense and as an estoppel, Alberto alleged that Juan Antonio, jr. and his
brothers induced Antonio Vicente to believe that Juan Antonio, Jr. had full and absolute
power to dispose of all the hacienda, by reason of which Antonio executed the loan on the
security of the said property and then his brothers acknowledge Antonio as the owner of
the whole hacienda and Leonardo, as attorney in fact of Juan Antonio, jr. and
representatives of his coheirs agreed to the adjudication of the attached and cultivated half
of the referred hacienda in favor of Antonio in payment of the sum due.
Lastly, Antonio alleges prescription for the reason that Antonio, in his own behalf and that
of his successors and through his representatives, since 1889 and 1890, had been in
possession of the hacienda publicly, quietly, and peacefully, til May or June 1912, as the
owner of the whole hacienda by means of which they had acquired the dominion and
ownership of all the said hacienda by acquisitive prescription and that the rights and actions
which Leonardo and the interveners had have all prescribed. Therefore, Alberto asked the
court to dismiss the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alberto is in possession of the hacienda as owner
HELD:
NO. The verbal contract entered into with Alberto was not in the nature of an assignment
or sale but merely one of Antichresis, meaning a creditor acquires a right to receive the
fruits of real property of his debtor, with the obligation to apply them to the payment of the
interest, if due, and afterwards to the principal of his credit. Tthe debtors have limited
themselves to give to the creditor the right to collect his credit from the fruits of the hacienda
of Balintagac, conferring upon him the possession of the property, but not transferring to
him the dominion of the same, since such transfer does not in any way appear to be proved
in the present action.
The creditor does not acquire through possession the ownership of the real property
delivered by virtue of an antichresis, for failure to pay the debt within the stipulated time —
any agreement to the contrary being void — nevertheless, the debtor according to the
preceding article 1883 (of the Old Civil Code) cannot recover the use of the real property
given in antichresis to the creditor, without previously fully paying the creditor, who in case
of insolvency may ask for the sale of the real property which he possesses by virtue of the
covenant in antichresis, unless the pending debt be paid.
The creditor in antichresis can never by prescription acquire the ownership of the real
property received in antichresis, as he entered into the possession of the same not as an
owner but as a creditor with the right only to collect his credit from the fruits of said real
property.
The extinguishment of the right as creditor and the termination of his use and possession
of the real property given in antichresis depends upon the full payment of the debt and its
interests, after the liquidation of the amounts entered on the account of the debtors and
received by the creditor.

Macapinlac vs. Gutierrez Repide

FACTS:
The case was instituted for the purpose of declaring plaintiff as owner of a real estate
property and to nullify the Torrens title, which was in respondent’s name. It must also be
noted that one of the named defendants, Francisco Gutierrez Repide, died after the
institution of the action hence, his executrix Maria Sanz was admitted as defendant in his
stead.

Plaintiff also wanted to recover possession over the property with damages. Plaintiff owned
the real estate property located in Pampanga called Hacienda Dolores. Later, plaintiff
acquired a loan to Bachrach Garage & Taxicab for a price of an automobile. To secure
payment, plaintiff executed fourteen promissory notes: 11 in the hands of Bachrach and 3
in the hands of the payee of the company. As security and guaranty of payment, plaintiff
executed a deed of sale with a right to repurchase. More than a year later, respondent
acquired the rights of Bachrach over the properties by paying P5000. Be it noted that during
the conveyance of rights, Repide knew of the purpose of the transfer of title to secure the
debt owing to Bachrach by the plaintiff. He also knew that the debt had been paid and that
only a half of the debt existed. Afterwards, Repide caused for the transfer of title into his
name by making it appear that the purported sale was true. During those times, respondent
Repide was in actual possession of the property and was enjoying its fruits.Plaintiff filed a
case to recover possession in which the Court of First Instance decided in favour of
respondent. Due to this, plaintiff filed for a review of the case.

ISSUE: What are the legal rights of the plaintiff as against the estate of Repide

HELD:
By reference to the appropriate provisions of the (Old) Civil Code (arts. 1881-1884), while
non-payment of the debt does not vest the ownership of the property in the creditor,
nevertheless the debtor cannot recover the enjoyment of the property without first paying
in full what he owes to his creditor. At the same time, however, the creditor is under
obligation to apply the fruits derived from the estate in satisfaction, first, of the interest on
the debt, if any, and secondly, to the payment of the principal. From this is necessarily
deduced the obligation of the creditor to account to the debtor for said fruits and the
corresponding right of the debtor to have the same applied in satisfaction of the mortgage
debt, as recognized in Barretto vs. Barretto.

If the mortgagee acquires possession in any lawful manner, he is entitled to retain such
possession until the indebtedness is satis ed and the property redeemed; that the non-
payment of the debt within the term agreed does not vest the ownership of the property in
the creditor; that the general duty of the mortgagee in possession towards the premises is
that of the ordinary prudent owner; that the mortgagee must account for the rents and pro
ts of the land, or its value for purposes of use and occupation, any amount thus realized
going towards the discharge of the mortgage debt; that if the mortgagee remains in
possession after the mortgage debt has been satis ed, he becomes a trustee for the
mortgagor as to the excess of the rents and pro ts over such debt; and, lastly, that the
mortgagor can only enforce his rights to the land by an equitable action for an account and
to redeem.
Even before acquiring the interest of Bachrach in the Hacienda Dolores, the defendant
Francisco Gutierrez Repide had taken over from the Archbishop of Manila a mortgage on
the property in favor of said Archbishop, paying therefor the sum of P35,000; and we infer
from the complaint that Repide had probably discharged other liens on the property either
before or after he acquired the interest of Bachrach. If so, his executrix will be entitled to
charge the plaintiff with the amount paid to free the property from such liens, and to retain
possession until all valid claims against the estate are satis ed, in obedience to the maxim
that he who seeks equity must do equity.

Tavera vs. El Hogar Filipino, Inc. and Tavera-Luna, Inc.

FACTS:
Defendant corporation, Tavera-Luna, Inc., obtained a loan of Php 1,000,000 and
subsequently Php 300,000 from El Hogar to construct a building on its premises. To secure
the loan, Tavera-Luna executed a first mortgage on the premises and building to be
erected. Tavera-Luna defaulted and El Hogar foreclosed the mortgage and proceeded with
the extra-judicial sale of the building with El Hogar being the highest bidder.

A day before the expiration of the redemption period, Carlos Y. Pardo de Tavera and
Carmen Pardo de Tavera Manzano, in their capacity as stockholders of Tavera-Luna, filed
for an annulment of the two secured loans as well as the sale.

ISSUE: Whether or not a contract of antichresis may be extra-judicially foreclosed.

HELD:
Regardless of whether the contract is that of a mortgage or antichresis, the extra-judicial
foreclosure of the security is VALID. Stipulations in a contract of antichresis for the extra-
judicial foreclosure of the security may be allowed in the same manner as they are allowed
in contracts of pledge and mortgage.

Valencia vs. Acala

FACTS:
Plaintiff Dionisia Valencia and her deceased husband, Daniel Adepueng conveyed land to
Severino Agbagala and his wife Francisca Cadapan. Cadapan later on conveyed the same
to Juan Cagayat and Josefa Galendis. The possession then passed to Pedro Acala, one
of the defendants, and he sold the land unconditionally to Bagayanan for Php 70.

In an action for redemption, the following agreement was presented in evidence: "We,
Daniel Adepueng and Dionisia Valencia, acknowledge being indebted to Severino
Agbagala in the sum of P6.75, which we will pay with the fruits of the land and the
possession of which we now turn over to him. We have mortgaged it for P6.75, it being
covenanted that we may redeem it by paying the same price, without taking into account
the fruits of the land and the interest of the money."

ISSUE: Whether the contract is that of a pacto de retro sale or antichresis.

HELD:
That such a contract is not one of purchase and sale with light to repurchase, but one of
ANTICHRESIS, as there was a sum of money delivered as a loan by virtue of which the
debtor turned over to the creditor the possession of a realty to hold it in usufruct,
compensating the interest of the money with the fruits of the land.

The legal nature of the contract in question having thus been determined, it is evident that
the antichretic creditor and his successors in interest cannot acquire ownership by
prescription of the realty given in antichresis. The defendants Acala could not sell
unconditionally the same land to their codefendant Bagayanan, is proved by the agreed
statement of facts according to which the possession of the predecessor in interest of the
Acala people was the same precarious possession of his assignor Juan Cagayat.

Trillana vs. Manasala

FACTS:
In 1950, petitioner Nazario Trillana filed a complaint over a parcel of land while the
defendants Faustino Manansala, et. Al., set up title through sale and prescription. Both
parties derive ownership from registered owner Marcos Bernardo. Plaintiff presented a
contract of absolute sale while the defendants presented a document stating that Marcos
Bernardo mortgaged to Manansala on July 1934 and that failure to pay the amount due in
April 1944, the property mortgaged shall be paid to Manansala.

The CFI found the document to be a forgery and ruled in favor of the plaintiff. Prescription
could not lie as defendants did not have just title. The CA, on the other hand, was not
convinced of its falsity and taking possession in 1934, the action filed in 1950 was too late.
More than 15 years of adverse possession forfeited the plaintiff’s right to recover.

ISSUE: Whether the transaction was a mortgage or antichresis.

HELD:
A mortgage, which, coupled with delivery of possession of the land to the creditor,
amounted to ANTICHRESIS. The antichretic creditor cannot ordinarily acquire by
prescription the land surrendered to him by the debtor. The most defendants could contend
under the document is that it was a pacto de retro sale. Under such contract, prescription
does not run during the period of redemption. It is the understanding of the Court that the
stipulation regarding payment using the land to the creditor in case of failure to repay the
debt simply means that Manansala was authorized to get payment thru proceedings
prescribed in the mortgages, otherwise it would amount to pactum commissorium, which
is prohibited by law.

Ramirez vs. CA

FACTS:
In 1959, petitioners-spouses Hilario Ramirez and Valentina Bonifacio filed an application
for registration of a parcel of riceland. After notice and publication, nobody appeared to
oppose the application. An order of general default was issued. Petitioners presented parol
evidence that they acquired the land in question by purchase from Gregoria Pascual but
the contract of sale was lost and no copy or record of the same was available. The decree
of registration was subsequently issued.

Private respondents in this case filed a petition to review the decree on the ground of fraud.
They based their claim that they are the legal heirs of Agapita Bonifacio, who died intestate,
and that Valentina Bonifacio is a sister of the deceased Agapita, they being the children of
Gregoria Pascual. Pascual during her lifetime, from 1916, possessed the property in the
concept of an owner which possession was continued by Agapita in 1928. In 1938,
respondents obtained a loan from petitioners which they secured with a mortgage on the
land by way of antichresis. The Tax Declarations were issued in the names of petitioners
and that they began paying taxes on the land. After several attempts to redeem the land
were refused by petitioners, the respondents filed a complaint in the CFI for the recovery
of possession and ownership. The spouses Ramirez based their claim to the land on two
deeds of sale which they allegedly found accidentally in March 1960.
The court found the deeds of sale spurious and further found that respondents took
possession of the land as owners after the death of Agapita in 1938, mortgaged it to the
spouses Ramirez to secure the payment of a loan in the amount of Php 400. It was agreed
that respondents could not redeem the property within a period of 5 years and that the
petitioners would take possession of the land, enjoy its fruits, and pay the land taxes. The
CFI ruled in favor of the respondents and ordered the reconveyance of the property. The
decision was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged possession by the petitioners may serve as title for
acquiring dominion

HELD:
NO. While there was an admission that the petitioners have been in actual possession of
the disputed land since 1938, it was made to show and prove the fact that THE
PETITIONERS ARE ONLY ANTICHRETIC CREDITORS. The respondents never
admitted that they have not possessed the land at all. On the contrary, they alleged that
they and their predecessors-in-interest namely Gregoria Pascual and Agapita Bonifacio
have been in possession of the land since time immemorial and that the petitioners were
placed in possession of the land pursuant to a contract of antichresis.

This court has on several occasions held that the antichretic creditor cannot ordinarily
acquire by prescription the land surrendered to him by the debtor. The petitioners are not
possessors in the concept of owner but mere holders placed in possession of the land by
its owners. Thus, their possession cannot serve as a title for acquiring dominion.