Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive

Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection

1988

The impact of group technology-based shipbuilding

methods on naval ship design and acquisition practices

Heffron, John Sutherland

http://hdl.handle.net/10945/23258
 DEPARTMENT OF OCEAN ENGINEERING
MASSACHUSETTS OF TECHNOLOGY
INSTITUTE
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02139

THE IMPACT OF GROUP TECHNOLOGY-BASED SHIPBUILDING METHODS

ON NAVAL SHIP DESIGN AND ACQUISITION PRACTICES

by

John Sutherland Heffron

THESIS
Course XIII A & B H42ISS May 1988
 THE IMPACT OF GROUP TECHNOLOGY-BASED SHIPBUILDING METHODS
ON NAVAL SHIP DESIGN AND ACQUISITION PRACTICES

by

JOHN SUTHERLAND HEFFRON

B. S., Computer Science, Louisiana State University (1974)

M. S., Applied Mathematics, University of Arkansas (1976)

Submitted to the Department of

Ocean Engineering
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degrees of

NAVAL ENGINEER

and

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN OCEAN SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT

at the

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

May, 1988

© John Sutherland Heffron, 1988

The author hereby grants to M.I.T. and to the United States

Government permission to reproduce and to distribute copies
a£ this thesis document in whole or in part.
 :

THE IMPACT OF GROUP TECHNOLOGY-BASED SHIPBUILDING METHODS

ON NAVAL SHIP DESIGN AND ACQUISITION PRACTICES

by

JOHN SUTHERLAND HEFFRON

Submitted to the Department of Ocean Engineering

on May 6, 1988 in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Degrees of Naval Engineer and
Master of Science in Ocean Systems Management

ABSTRACT

Modern shipbuilding practices in the United States have

evolved from the requirem ent to build naval ships as econom-
ically as possible while still retaining the desired level
of quality and the abilit y to fulfill naval mission require-
ments. The highly compet itive environment that shipbuilders
are now in has further st imulated their search for more
efficient and productive ship construction methods. As a
result, group technology- based shipbuilding methods have
been developed and implem ented over the last few years,
These new construction te chnologies have profound effects on
the manner in which naval ship acquisition is, or should be,
conducted. In particular, there are serious consequences
regarding engineering and design, CAD/CAM, ship work break-
down structures, and cost and schedule control systems.

First, a brief history of nav al ship design and acqui-

sition practices, leading to a des cription of the current
shipbuilding technologies, is give n. Then the effects these
technologies have on the above-men tioned areas of the naval
ship acquisition process are descr ibed. Included are
detailed examples of how modern sh ipbuilding methods have
affected selected naval ship acqui sition programs. Finally,
changes in some of these areas wil 1 be recommended so that
modern ship construction and outfi tting techniques can be
more fully meshed into the total n aval ship acquisition pro-
cess, thereby enhancing the produc tivity gains these tech-
niques have already made.

Thesis Supervisor: Henry S. Marcus, D.B.A.

Title: Associate Professor of Marine Systems

 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author extends his gratitude and thanks to

Professor Hank Marcus whose guidance and support made

this thesis possible.

to my wife, Elizabeth, and ray daughter, Sarah
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ABSTRACT 2

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 3

TABLE OF CONTENTS 5

LIST OF TABLES 7

LIST OF FIGURES 8

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 10

1 . 1 Background 10

1.2 Thesis Overview and Objectives 12

References to Chapter 1 15

CHAPTER 2 - NAVAL SHIP ACQUISITION AND SHIPBUILDING,

WORLD WAR II TO PRESENT 16

2.1 Post World War II Naval Ship Acquisition ... 16

2.1.1 Introduction 16
2.1.2 The Basic Process 17
2.1.3 The Conventional Period 19
2.1.4 The Total Package Procurement Period. . 22
2.1.5 The Post McNamara Period 26
2.1.6 The Current Period 37

2.2 A Brief History of Modern Shipbuilding Methods 43

2.3 Modern Shipbuilding in the United States Today 46

2.3.1 Introduction 46
2.3.2 Group Technology 46
2.3.3 Product-Oriented Work Breakdown
Structures 49
2.3.4 Planning for Production 53
2.3.5 Process Flow Lanes 60
2.3.6 Zone Construction Methods 62
2.3.7 Accuracy Control 73

References and Notes to Chapter 2 76

 5

CHAPTER 3 - MODERN SHIPBUILDING AND NAVAL SHIP

ACQUISITION PRACTICES 80

3 . 1 Introduction 80

3.2 Design and Engineering 80

3.2.1 Group Technology Design and

Engineering - General Concepts. .... 81
3.2.2 Group Technology Design and
Engineering - Examples 87
3.2.3 Group Technology Design and
Standardization 94
3.2.4 Design Changes in a Group Technology
Engineering Environment 99
3.2.5 Group Technology Design Products. . . . 107

3.3 CAD/CAM 109

3.4 Work Breakdown Structures (WBS) and Cost

and Schedule Control Systems (C/SCS) 118

3 . Learning Curve Effects in Group Technology

Shipbuilding 126

References to Chapter 3 129

CHAPTER 4 - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 131

4.1 Conclusions 131

4.2 Recommendations 133

APPENDICES 141

Appendix A - MILSTD 881A 142

Appendix B - Extended Ship Work Breakdown

Structure 145

Appendix C - Product Work Breakdown Structure . . 147

 LIST OF TABLES

Page

2.1 The Navy Expanded Ship Work Breakdown Structure

(ESWBS) Major Groups 50

3.1 Engineering Effort for the TAO 187 88

3.2 TAO 187 Machinery Space Design and Construction

Results 91

3.3 Engineering Impact of Selected Changes in the

CG 47 and DDG 51 Shipbuilding Programs 104

3.4 Engineering-related Man-hours for DDG 51

Spiral-wound Gasket Filler Material Change 106

3.5 Description of Contract WBS Elements for the

LSD 44 Shipbuilding Program 123

3.6 Recurring Ship Production Costs for the

TAO 187 Program 127
 LIST OF FIGURES

Page

2.1 Comparison of the Development Sequence of the

Navy's Earlier Ship Acquisition Methods 21

2.2 OPNAV/NAVSEA Ship Design Dialogue 40

2.3 Summary of Naval Ship Design Approaches 42

2.4 An Example of the ESWBS Organization 50

2.5 Elements of the Three-dimensional PWBS Matrix 54

2.6 Iterative Development of Work Packages 54

2.7 System and Zone Orientation in the Shipbuilding

Process 56

2.8 PWBS Ship Design Process 58

2.9 Process Flow Lanes in Modern Shipbuilding 61

2.10 PWBS Components 63

2.11 HBCM Manufacturing Levels 65

2.12 HBCM Classification by Product Aspects 67

2.13 ZOFM Manufacturing Levels 69

2.14 ZOFM Classification by Product Aspects 71

2.15 ZPTM Manufacturing Levels 72

2.16 ZPTM Classification by Product Aspects 74

3.1 Conventional vs. Group Technology Design and

Engineering 83

3.2 Avondale Industries' Design and Construction

Methods, Conventional vs. Current 88

3.3 Classification of Standards 95

3.4 Standard Structural Assembly Detail 95

3.5 Standard Machinery Arrangement Module 96

3.6 Standard Piping Layout Module 96

3.7 Standard Outfit Unit Module 97

3.8 The Relationship of a Shipbuilding Data Base

to the Ship Design Process 111

3.9 Advanced Integrated CAD/CAM Network 113

3.10 Notional CALS System 116

3.11 Principal Data Transfer Interfaces in a CALS

System 117

3.12 LSD 44 Program Contract WBS Physical Elements 122

3.13 A Portion of the LSD 44 Program Responsibility

Assignment Matrix 125
 ,

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1 . 1 Background

In April of 1986 the President's Commission on Defense

Management published a report on defense acquisition [1].

The commission had been formed, in part, to help deal with

Department of Defense problems related to overpriced spare

parts, test deficiencies, and cost and schedule overruns.

Their analysis led to the conclusion that the defense acqui-

sition process has fundamental problems that must be cor-

rected. These problems are deeply entrenched and have

developed over several decades as a result of an expanding

bureaucracy with its tendency for overregulation . As a

result, too many weapon systems cost too much, take too loni

to develop, and, by the time they are fielded, feature obso-

lete technology. The typical acquisition cycle time, from

the time a mission or system requirement is defined until

the system is operational, has grown to twelve or fifteen

years or more for complex systems.

In the opinion of the President's commission it should

be possible to cut this cycle time in half by implementing

the following recommendations:

* streamline acquisition organization and

procedures

* expand the use of commercial products,

* increase the use of competition,

10
 .

* enhance the quality of acquisition personnel,

* balance cost and performance,

* stabilize programs, and

* use technology to reduce costs and schedules.

It is the last recommendation that is central to this

thesis. In the broadest context this thesis is about the

effects modern construction technologies have on defense

acquisition practices. In particular it is about the

effects they have on naval ship acquisition practices and

shipbuilding productivity.

Many discussions of naval ship acquisition begin with

the acknowledgment that major defense weapons systems are

the most technically complex of any in existence. And it

can be argued that the most complex of weapons systems are

naval ships

Ships are the largest mobile objects on Earth and naval

ships represent an integration of a multitude of major and

minor related systems of which many are extremely complex in

their own right. A nuclear-powered aircraft carrier is over

1100 feet long, displaces over 90,000 tons of sea water, and

is propelled at speeds in excess of 30 knots by power plants

rated at over 200,000 shaft horsepower. It is also an air-

port with a capacity of 100 or more jet aircraft. Addition-

ally, it is a self-contained city with a population of over

5,000 people. Its mult i -reactor nuclear plant, various

electronic systems and aircraft launching and recovery sys-

11
 . .

terns take years to design and test before they are ready for

installation and use in the fleet.

Unfortunately, the complexity of the hardware in ques-

tion is perhaps only matched by the complexity of the

bureaucracy and process concerned with the acquisition of

the hardware. During World War II, the entire Navy Depart-

ment in Washington, D. C., charged with directing an effort

involving, at the peak of the war, thousands of ships, con-

sisted of about 200 people. Today there are in excess of

20,000 people in the Washington, D. C. area employed by the

Navy. The active fleet today consists of close to 600

ships

As indicated earlier, it commonly takes twelve to fif-

teen years to conceive, develop, design, and construct a new

U. S. Navy ship class. The problems of long range fiscal

forecasting and engineering development in an unstable

political and economic environment, coupled with rapid

technological advances, are mind boggling. Any technology

or methodology that offers to reduce the cycle time and the

costs of the acquisition process deserves close study and

development

1 . 2 Thesis Overview and Objectives

Modern shipbuilding practices in the United States have

evolved from the requirement to build naval ships as econom-

ically as possible while still retaining the desired level

12
of quality and the ability to fulfill naval mission require-

ments. The highly competitive environment that shipbuilders

are now in has further stimulated their search for more

efficient and productive ship construction methods. As a

result, group technology-based shipbuilding methods have

been developed and implemented over the last few years.

These new construction technologies have profound effects on

the manner in which naval ship acquisition is, or should be,

conducted. In particular, there are serious consequences

regarding engineering and design, CAD/CAM, ship work break-

down structures, and cost and schedule control systems.

The second chapter of the thesis begins with a discus-

sion of the four distinct strategies employed in defense

systems acquisition since World War II. The reader should

gain from this material background knowledge about the naval

ship acquisition process and environment. Included is a

description of the naval ship design process as viewed by

the Naval Sea Systems Command ( NAVSEA )
, the organization

within the U. S. Navy responsible for acquiring ship sys-

tems. Next is a brief history of the development of modern

shipbuilding methods in the United States, their subsequent

transfer to and improvement in Japan, and finally their

return to the United States. The chapter ends with a tech-

nical overview of ship produc ibi 1 i ty and modern shipbuilding

methods. Included here is a discussion of group technology;

product-oriented work breakdown structures; planning for

13
production; process flow lanes; zone construction, outfit-

ting, and painting methods; and accuracy control. Since

this material has been recently collected in a comprehensive

treatment of modern ship production methodology and prac-

tices, the discussion is brief [2],

With the above information established, Chapter 3 then

considers the impacts modern shipbuilding methods have on

the naval ship acquisition process. The particular areas

considered are design and engineering, CAD/CAM, ship work

breakdown structures, and cost and schedule control systems.

Included are detailed examples of how modern shipbuilding

methods have affected selected acquisition programs. The

programs considered include the TAO 187 class fleet oiler

shipbuilding program, the DDG 51 class destroyer shipbuild-

ing program, and the SSBN 726 class Trident ballistic mis-

sile submarine shipbuilding program.

Based on the discussions of Chapter 3, the final chap-

ter offers conclusions and recommendations on how the naval

ship acquisition process may be changed so that the improve-

ments thus far made in ship construction methods may further

reduce ship acquisition construction times and costs.

14
 ,

REFERENCES TO CHAPTER 1

1. "A Formula for Action, A Report to the President on

Defense Acquisition by the President's Blue Ribbon Commis-
sion on Defense Management", April, 1986.

2. Storch, R. L. Hammon C. P.
, , and Bunch, H. M.
,

Ship Production Cornell Maritime Press, Centreville, Mary-

,

land, 1988.

15
 CHAPTER 2

NAVAL SHIP ACQUISITION AND SHIPBUILDING,

WORLD WAR II TO PRESENT

2 . 1 Post World War II Naval Ship Acquisition

2.1.1 Introduction

An overview of the structure and process of naval ship

acquisition in the United States since World War II is

presented in this section. Four distinct periods are iden-

tifiable: the conventional period (until the early 1960's),

the total package procurement period (also called the con-

cept formulation/contract definition or the McNamara period,

after the then Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara)

which began in the early 1960's and ended about 1969, the

post McNamara period which ended about 1979, and the current

period. Although the major policies and characteristics of

the four periods differ considerably, it is not always pos-

sible to categorize a particular ship acquisition project as

being a result of the policies of any one period. For

example, the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier project

(Nimitz Class) was conceived during the conventional period,

continued through the total package procurement and post

McNamara periods, and remains an ongoing project. It has

characteristics of all four policy periods. The ships were

designed primarily by the Navy ("in house") with the aid of

a design agent, typical of the conventional, post McNamara,

16
 .

and current periods. Some of the ships were constructed

under a multi-ship, multi-year contract, which is character-

istic of the total package procurement and post McNamara

periods

Thus, as the different periods are described, it should

be remembered that ship projects are long (twelve to fifteen

years or more) and often transcend major acquisition policy

shifts. Additionally, like any large bureaucracy, new poli-

cies and strategies from top management (the Secretary of

Defense) often do not take effect at the working level (the

ship projects) for two or three years, if at all.

2.1.2 The Basic Process

Although policies and organizational structures for

designing and acquiring ships for the United States Navy

have changed over the years, the basic process remains much

the same. Also, though differing in details and nomencla-

ture, the acquisition of ships, at the most basic level, is

similar to the acquisition of other major defense systems.

A need is identified; a requirement based on that need is

established; a weapon system is selected, designed, devel-

oped and constructed to fill the requirement. Sometimes

technological breakthroughs motivate a new acquisition but

attempts are made to ensure that a legitimate need, and not

"technology push", precedes the development and construction

of a new system.

17
 The Navy and other services are charged with identify-

ing needs and defining, developing, and producing systems to

satisfy those needs [1]. Establishing overall acquisition

policy, passing on the validity of needs, and monitoring the

performance of the services in carrying out the policy is

the responsibility of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

[2] .

National defense policies and objectives are provided

by the Secretary of Defense and translated by the Joint

Chiefs of Staff into military policies and objectives.

Planning and programming by the services are keyed to these

objectives. Evaluation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff guid-

ance may lead to research and development objectives formu-

lation by the services to satisfy deficiencies in their

capabilities to perform their respective missions [3]. The

Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) is the budget for this

effort and for the weapons systems which emerge from the

research and development efforts [4],

The POM is part of the Department of Defense Planning,

Programming, and Budgeting System ( PPBS ) . Funding for weap-

ons systems is obtained through the PPBS. However, a series

of approvals by intra-service organizations and the top

level Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council ( DSARC ) is

also currently required before a new weapons system is

built. The role of the DSARC will be discussed in more

detail later in this section.

18
 2.1.3 The Conventional Period

At the end of World War II the U. S. Navy deactivated

most of its fleet and ship production virtually ceased. Dur-

ing the Korean conflict most of the required ships were

reactivated World War II-era ships. Finally, in 1952, the

Navy directed the construction of 31 major ships [5].

Acquisition practices were characterized by an itera-

tive design process accomplished by the Navy or by an inde-

pendent design agent working for the Navy. Their products

included a complete construction bid package with little

documentation. The major emphasis was on ship performance

and production contracts were often split between two or

more shipbuilders. There was little involvement by the

Office of the Secretary of Defense. The acquisition process

was basically decentralized to the service level.

Initially, the entire design and procurement effort

would be coordinated by a few people. They relied on vari-

ous functional organizations to perform the necessary design

and acquisition work required. Different organizations

would be responsible for various systems on the ship. For

example, the Bureau of Ordnance was responsible for weapons.

Later, starting with the Polaris ballistic missile program,

the trend was toward project manager-type organizations.

Production contracts were spread among several ship-

yards to facilitate more rapid delivery of ships and to aid

in preserving the shipbuilding and ship mobilization indus-

19
trial base. Of course, regional political and economic

pressures also played a role.

As shown in Figure 2.1, the conventional approach

involved Navy personnel formulating a ship concept. This

activity included cost and feasibility studies and possibly

advanced research and development. Assuming budgetary

approval was obtained, increasingly refined design stages,

termed preliminary design and contract design followed. This

approach did not employ systems analysis techniques.

The resulting product was a bid package, including

complete contract plans and specifications. The bid package

could result in any number of procurement contracts. Lead

ships were often built in Navy shipyards. The amphibious

ships LPD 7 through 15 were built under four contracts by

two shipbuilders. Exclusive of the costs of changes to the

contracts, these ships were delivered to the Navy at an

average of 25% over the initial contract price and 27 months

behind schedule [7]. Escalation due to inflation and claims

against the government accounted for most of the cost over-

runs. These results became increasingly typical. Low or

negative profit performance precipitated many of the claims.

The basis for the claims was usually a dispute over inter-

pretation of the complex and detailed contract specifica-

tions. Also, production facilities were becoming antiquated

and uncompeteti ve in the world market. Support of the ships

was costly and often inadequate due to lack of standardiza-

20
 )

Conventional Period

Conceptual Preliminary Contract Detail - Production

Studies * Design ""*"
Design """"Design *"

— Navy
|-« » |
— Navy
« or Design Agent-»»|-« Shipbuilder — »-|

Total Package Procurement Period

Contract Definition

Concept
Formulation

Navy i
*"
Ship-

ABC
Ship- Ship-
builder builder builder

Shipbuilder i .
W-»-
Detail
—^"Design ——

Single
Production

Competition ' Shipbuilder

Post McNamara Period

Feasibility Concept Preliminary Lead Ship

Studies ^Design *" Design K Contract Design +-

Navy ^-4-» Navy with Shipbuilder ( s )

Lead Ship Detail Design_ Follow Ship Contract Design,

and Production Detail Design and Production

Shipbuilder ( s

Figure 2.1 Comparison of the Development Sequence of the

Navy's Earlier Ship Acquisition Methods [6]

21
 .

tion among ships of a given class and among classes of

ships

2.1.4 The Total Package Procurement Period

A radically different approach to weapons design and

acquisition was formulated in the early 1960's by the Office

of the Secretary of Defense under Robert S. McNamara. The

new approach centralized major decision authority in McNa-

mara's office. Objectives were:

a) optimization of cost effectiveness by using systems

analysis techniques;

b) reduction or elimination of contractor claims

against the government by using contractor-prepared perfor-

mance oriented specifications instead of government-imposed

detailed specifications;

c) reduction of cost overruns by transferring financial

risk to the contractors for the design and acquisition

phases through the use of fixed price contracts;

d) significant capitalization increases in shipbuilding

facilities by using multi-ship, multi-year contract awards

to a single shipbuilder (This was expected to provide long

term financial security, thus enabling large-scale capital-

ization and expansion of facilities to accommodate delivery

schedule demands);

e) reduction of unique systems and subsystems prolif-

eration which had resulted from split production contracts;

22
 f) introduction of producibili ty and innovation into

designs by having the shipbuilder design the system;

g) lower acquisition costs by taking advantage of the

learning curve effect made possible through single-producer

serial production; and

h) more accurate total cost estimates and reduction of

poor ship support by making the contractor responsible for

all on-board systems, crew training, initial repair parts,

support facilities, and other logistics details [8].

A project manager-type organization was directed for

all major programs [9]. As outlined in Figure 2.1, the

services still conducted research and development and iden-

tified the desired performance characteristics of the weapon

system during the concept formulation stage. Assuming

approval by the Secretary of Defense, a contract definition

period followed. A request for proposal ( RFP ) was prepared

by the Navy and issued to selected shipbuilders to prepare

design analyses based on the specified performance charac-

teristics. The RFP contained both mandatory and desirable

performance specifications and were supposed to encourage

alternatives and stimulate initiative and creativity on the

part of the contractors [10].

After evaluation of the proposals by the Navy, normally

two or more contractors were awarded fixed price contracts

to develop a complete shipbuilding proposal. Required in

these proposals were contract plans and specifications,

23
detailed construction plans, management plans, and a com-

plete analysis of life cycle costs [11]. Life cycle costs

are the total costs of acquisition and ownership, including

development, production, deployment, operation, and mainte-

nance .

No longer than six months was allowed for the contract

definition phase. This was followed by a source selection

process during which a detailed analysis of the proposals

was conducted by the procuring service. Negotiation was

conducted with one or more of the potential contractors. At

the conclusion of the evaluation period a recommendation was

sent to the Office of the Secretary of Defense to award a

multi-year, multi-ship contract to the selected contractor,

to conduct further contract definition, or to defer or

abandon the effort. The single contract award was fixed

price, with or without incentive clauses.

The Navy conducted three total package procurement ship

competitions. The Fast Deployment Logistics ship was not

funded by Congress. The Amphibious Helicopter Assault ships

( LHA class) and the SPRUANCE class destroyers were funded

and their acquisition programs completed. Litton Industries

won all three competitions [12].

The USS Spruance was the first ship delivered under

either contract and was accepted by the Navy in 1975. How-

ever, the acquisitions were beset by many of the same prob-

lems that characterized defense weapons procurement during

24
the previous period - large cost and schedule overruns.

This was particularly true of the LHA contract. The first

LHA was delivered years behind schedule, even after the

original contract was renegotiated, allowing for a higher

contract price and later delivery date.

By the late 1960 's, cost and schedule overruns and

performance shortfalls of new weapons systems were daily

newspaper fare. In 1971 the Department of Defense Com-

ptroller conducted a survey of 35 major development and

production programs [13]. Only two of the programs were

found to be on, or ahead of, schedule. That same year the

General Accounting Office made a survey of 61 weapon systems

and found that cost estimates for them had increased $33.4

billion over the initial estimates [14]. Contractor costs

soared and profits plummeted. The term "contractor bailout"

became a household word as one producer after another

threatened to cease production unless relief from the fixed

price contracts was provided.

By 1970 a number of studies had found serious flaws in

the management of the weapons acquisition process. As a

result, on May 28, 1970, Deputy Secretary of Defense David

Packard issued a memorandum which stated that the total

package procurement approach to developing and acquiring

major weapon systems was unsatisfactory and that a new pol-

icy would soon be established [15]. The Navy was still

years away from delivery of its first ship procured under

25
 ) ,

the canceled policy. The overall conclusion was that the

long term objectives of total package procurement were never

met. It is a fact that the sole source multi-year contracts

resulted in the construction of a new shipyard by Litton

Industries in Pascagoula, Mississippi. However, Litton had

problems in developing an adequate design and production

force and in making the new facility operationally efficient

during the performance period of their contracts.

2.1.5 The Post McNamara Period

The major policies and trends of ship acquisition fol-

lowing the demise of total package procurement included:

a) emphasis on constrained design ("design-to-cost"),

b) emphasis on proven hardware (

" f ly-bef ore-you-buy " )

c) required review and approval to proceed by the DSARC

at key milestones,

d) a prohibition against total package procurement,

e) improvement in cost estimating,

f flexibility in contract type and liberalization of

contract escalation (due to inflation) clauses,

g) use of contractors for "in-house" ship design, and

h) tailoring of acquisition approaches to each project.

The cancellation of the key top level policy directive

[16] for the total package procurement period in 1970 left a

guidance void that was not formally filled until the issu-

26
ance of Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, "Acquisition

of Major Defense Systems", on July 13, 1971. It was during

this same period that then Chief of Naval Operations Elmo

Zumwalt directed the rapid development of a large class of

austere, relatively inexpensive Guided Missile Frigates ( FFG

class) to bolster the size of the rapidly diminishing fleet

[17]. They provided the "low" end of the so called "high

mix/low mix" fleet concept.

After a year of feasibility studies, Admiral Zumwalt

directed that the design would not violate constraints which

were set on the average follow ship acquisition cost, fully

loaded displacement, and maximum number of accommodations

[18]. Performance capability above the minimum specified

was to be traded-off to stay within the constraints. This

method of ship design, commonly termed "design-to-cost", was

revolutionary to the Navy, but was common in industry for

new product development.

A major program consideration was that "discrete cost

elements (e.g., unit production cost, operating and support

cost) shall be translated into 'design to' requirements"

[19]. In October, 1973 the major services' material com-

mands issued the "Joint Design-to-Cost Guide" [20]. This

directive required that "design-to-cost" methodology be used

for most major systems.

Historically, performance requirements for new ships

had been dictated by the Chief of Naval Operations to the

27
material command in brief "single sheet characteristics"

[21]. These were used by the material command to develop

preliminary designs and cost estimates leading to more

detailed characteristics statements, and ultimately to pro-

curement specifications [22]. Costs were considered but

were usually secondary to maximizing performance.

"Design-to-cost" elevated the importance of acquisition

cost to the same level as performance in the design process.

As a result, a new performance-cost tradeoff dialogue

between the customer (Chief of Naval Operations) and pro-

ducer (Chief of Naval Material) organizations was required.

"Top Level Requirements and Top Level Specifications for the

Development of Naval Ships", Chief of Naval Operations

Instruction 9010.300, was issued early in 1974. It detailed

a procedure which provided for a working level group (the

Ship Acquisition and Improvement Council) to develop the

performance parameters for a baseline ship which would meet

the established mission requirements. The group also speci-

fied allowable variations in performance parameters and

alternative system selections for the ship class [23].

After a period of feasibility studies during which the

impact of the alternative performance parameters and systems

selections were evaluated, the Chief of Naval Operations

prepared a draft of the Top Level Requirements ( TLR ) . This

document was revised as the Naval Material Command (parent

command of NAVSEA , for whom acquisition projects worked

28
directly) developed a conceptual design for the ship class

and provided cost and design information to the Chief of

Naval Operations. Assuming approval from the Chief of Naval

Operations to proceed with a selected design, a "conceptual

baseline" and a "cost goal" for the average follow ship

acquisition were presented to the DSARC, which is composed

of high level officials in the Office of the Secretary of

Defense. If DSARC and Secretary of Defense approval were

given to proceed into preliminary design, a draft Top Level

Specification was initiated by the Naval Material Command.

This companion document to the TLR translates the TLR into a

physical ship description [24],

The large performance shortfalls, schedule delays, and

cost increases referred to earlier in this chapter were at

least partially a result of overly optimistic estimates of

ultimate system capabilities and the time required to design

and perfect them [25]. There had been a great deal of

reliance on "paper studies" rather than on actual perfor-

mance demonstrations. Thus, a major program consideration

of the post McNamara period was to ensure that achievement

of program objectives was assured prior to full-scale prod-

uction [26]. The goal was to eliminate technical and cost

risks. A supporting Department of Defense directive was

issued in January of 1973 to establish test and evaluation

policy for the acquisition of defense systems [27],

29
 The key practice which grew from recognition of the

need for increased test and evaluation during the acquisi-

tion process was prototyping. This is sometimes known as

the "f ly-bef ore-you-buy" policy and was used in the Navy's

air-cushioned landing craft ( LCAC ) program. However, it is

not feasible to build and evaluate prototypes prior to

beginning follow ship design and production for large ships.

The time required, small number of ships usually involved,

and threat of obsolescence dictated a modified approach.

In such a modified approach, the FFG program developed

a plan which provided for:

a) early construction of land based test facilities

(LBTFs) for complete propulsion and combat systems testing,

and

b) a delay of two years between construction contract

awards for the lead and follow ships [28].

This plan permitted testing of the two major high risk

subsystems prior to installation on the lead ship and time

to incorporate changes resulting from the test and evalua-

tion program into the design of the follow ships. The LBTFs

were also useful for crew training.

The DSARC was mentioned earlier and will be explained

more fully now. It was established in the Office of the

Secretary of Defense by then Deputy Secretary of Defense

David Packard in May, 1969 [29]. The purpose of the council

30
was to review and evaluate the status of major defense sys-

tems acquisitions at critical milestones.

Formal documentation for the DSARC reviews and deci-

sions was provided by the project-prepared Decision Coordi-

nating Paper (DCP), formerly called the Development Concept

Paper. It was a summary document that recorded the primary

information on a program. Included were thresholds, risks, a

statement of need, alternatives, rationales for decisions,

and af f ordabi 1 i ty considerations. When signed by the Secre-

tary of Defense, it provided the authority for the service

to proceed to the next step in the program. His decision

set the limits of authority within which the project was

obligated to stay [30].

A long series of intra-service briefings and reviews

was generally required of an acquisition project prior to a

DSARC presentation.

As more and more contractors failed to perform under

the total package procurement fixed price contracts, the

need for increased government involvement with its contrac-

tors was realized. The fixed price contracts and the lack

of government involvement in the design supposedly trans-

ferred any financial risks from the government to the con-

tractor and thus the role of the acquisition projects was

basically that of monitoring, with little control leverage.

During the post McNamara period the top level acquisi-

31
 )

tion policy directive specified that the contract type

should be consistent with all program characteristics,

including risk. Also stipulated was that cost-type con-

tracts were preferable where substantial development effort

was involved [31]. The use of cost-type contracts allowed

the possibility of increased government involvement.

Apart from the lack of governmental control leverage

resulting from fixed price contracts, attempts at effective

contractor cost and schedule control by the projects had

historically been hampered by:

a) a reluctance of the contractors to share what it

considered to be proprietary information,

b) the preoccupation of project managers with the

annual funding approval process and the continuity of funds

control as opposed to cost control,

c) the proliferation of various information and cost

control systems imposed on contractors by the different

services and projects (validity of the information was often

lost in the translation from the contractor's system to the

government imposed system(s) ),

d) the exclusion in the reporting systems of the bud-

geted cost of work performed,

e) improper allocation of contractor costs between

overhead (indirect) and direct costs,

f inability of the project personnel to evaluate the

detailed information they require of the contractor, and

32
 .

lack of correspondence between reported data and the con-

tractor's own data,

g) retroactive changing of financial plans to conform

to work performed to date (the so-called "rubber baseline"),

and

h) contractor use of nonintegrated work breakdown

structures and nonintegrated charts of cost accounts (sum of

budget dollars for work at one level may exceed budget at

next higher level). [32]

In a survey conducted during the 1960's, it was found

that most program managers were satisfied if their funds

control reports indicated that funds were being expended at

the planned monthly rate and their PERT network reports [33]

showed no significant schedule slippage [34]. Schedule

network reporting based on starts rather than completions,

untimely or inaccurate reporting, and the lack of perfor-

mance of scheduled noncritical path work all served to build

in cost overruns which often went undiscovered until it was

too late to take any meaningful cost or schedule control

action

In 1967 the Department of Defense issued a directive

entitled "Performance Measurement for Selected Acquisi-

tions" [35]. The system may be summarized as follows:

a) Part One of the program requires that contractors

use internal planning and control systems that meet minimum

government criteria. These criteria are called the "Cost

33
 ,

and Schedule Control Systems Criteria" (CSCSC).

b) Part Two of the program requires that contractors

regularly submit Cost Performance Reports ( CPRs ) which con-

tain information on the budgeted cost of work performed to

date. The criteria themselves do not require the submission

of any reports to the government, but specify the reporting

capabilities which contractors' internal systems must have,

and the types of data the systems should be able to produce.

The contractor is free to design this internal planning and

control systems to correspond to the manner in which he

organizes his work units and assigns responsibility for

performing work [36].

The goal of CSCSC is to provide a reliable means of

measuring schedule variance, SV , and cost variance, CV

periodically over the course of a particular contract. This

is done by calculating the following values, referenced to

the same time period:

ACWP = actual cost of work performed

BCWP = budgeted cost of work performed

BCWS = budgeted cost of work scheduled
CV and SV may then be calculated as follows:

CV r ACWP - BCWP

SV = BCWS - BCWP

During the performance period of a contract, a positive

CV indicates a cost overrun and a positive SV indicates a

schedule slippage. Either situation is a cause for project

34
office concern.

An important concept in the reporting criteria is that

the contract cost status reports must be based strictly on

the number of jobs completed to date.

Five years after the CSCSC had been developed, only 16

defense contractors had been certified as complying with the

criteria. The Navy was singled out by the Senate Armed

Services Committee as being particularly slow in implement-

ing the new system [37], In 1971 an additional twenty con-

tractors complied with the criteria and all three services

were actively implementing the program and training person-

nel in its use [38].

As indicated, the FFG program pioneered many of the

reforms of the post McNamara period. In addition to those

aspects already discussed, a key element of the period was

to select a lead and a secondary contractor early in the

design effort. The function of the lead shipbuilder was to

assist in the in-house design effort and ultimately to build

the lead ship under a cost plus fee type of contract. The

purpose of this was to introduce producibil i ty into the

design, to promote design familiarity and acceptance of per-

formance characteristics by the contractor, and to reduce

the development time [39].

The secondary shipbuilder was involved to prevent the

introduction of producibi 1 i ty bias by the lead shipbuilder,

35
 ,

which would result in unfair advantage when bidding on the

follow ship contracts, and to provide a fallback position in

case lead ship contract negotiations failed. When the first

increment of follow ship fixed price contract bids were

received in 1975, the Navy was dismayed to receive bids from

only two contractors - the lead and secondary contractors.

Moreover, the bid prices were well in excess of the

"design-to-cost" constraint. The lack of participation in

the bidding by other shipbuilders and the high bids sub-

mitted were due to one or more of the following:

a) shipyard loading by other (mainly merchant ship)

contracts

b) poor profit and loss experience on previous con-

tracts ,

c) a reluctance to accept the required involvement by

the government in the contractor's procedures and oper-

ations ,

d) fear that the escalation provided for inflation

would be insufficient, as it had been in the past, and

e) the Navy's cost estimate was far too low.

These difficulties in the FFG program are generally

considered to have been the result of past project problems

and not an indication of failure of the post McNamara period

reforms. It is interesting to note that the FFG 61, the

last of the FFG 7 class, is due for delivery late in 1988.

36
 2.1.6 The Current Period

If the total package procurement and post McNamara

periods can be described as periods of radical changes in

ship acquisition policy, then the current period is one of

evolutionary change. It can therefore be described most

conveniently in terms of the ways in which it differs from

the previous period.

During the 1980 's the watchwords of defense procurement

have been "competition" and "acquisition streamlining". The

Navy has responded to DoD initiatives in these areas by

creating within the Navy Secretariat the positions of Navy

Competition Advocate General ( CAG ) and Navy Specification

Control Advocate (SPECAG). Both of these positions are

under the Navy Acquisition Executive, who is the Assistant

Secretary of the Navy for Shipbuilding and Logistics

(ASN(S&L)) [40].

The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 requires

that full and open competition be used wherever possible in

procurement of services and material. Each ship acquisition

project manager (SHAPM) must therefore ensure that competi-

tion is provided for in his acquisition plan ( AP ) . Any

deviation from full and open competition must be justified

by the SHAPM and approved by ASN S&L) ( . There are seven

exceptions to full and open competition and they include:

* existence of only one responsible source

37
 * unusual or compelling urgency

* industrial mobilization

* international agreement
* authorization or requirement by statute
* national security considerations
* and public interest considerations. [41]

Since ship acquisitions rarely fall into any of these cate-

gories, and since domestic commercial ship production is

almost nonexistent, competition among the Navy's shipbuild-

ers has become intense over the last decade. This competi-

tion partially accounts for the recent development and use

of more efficient shipbuilding methods by U. S. shipbuild-

ers .

However, there is concern in the U. S. defense industry

that the emphasis on competition is being carried too far.

There is evidence in recent procurements that, in the face

of increasing competitive pressures, some contractors have

been "low balling" or "buying-in" to contracts with the hope

that anticipated contract changes will offer the opportunity

to recoup what would otherwise have been an almost certain

loss. There is concern within both industry and the govern-

ment that such practices may be the prelude to a return to

the bitter claims era of the 1960s and early 1970s [42].

Acquisition streamlining is any action taken to reduce

cost and time of acquisition while maintaining or improving

38
product quality. The objective of streamlining is to iden-

tify, develop and implement improvements in the acquisition

process. This includes ensuring that only innovative and

cost-effective acquisition requirements are included in

shipbuilding solicitations and contract specifications.

Management requirements specified in the contract should be

the minimum required to satisfy program needs while allowing

the contractor the flexibility he may need to incorporate

improvements into his shipbuilding system. The concept of

acquisition streamlining calls upon industry to be involved

early in the acquisition process by recommending cost-

effective solutions to shipbuilding problems.

SHAPMs are required to fulfill the objectives of

acquisition streamlining in their specification and contract

development. After contract design they must certify to the

SPECAG that all streamlining requirements have been met

[43] .

The basic steps of naval ship design prior to the

issuing of an RFP are largely unchanged from those of the

post McNamara period, as can be seen in Figure 2.2. [44]

This figure illustrates the dialogue that takes place

between the Chief of Naval Operations ( OPNAV ) and the Naval

Sea Systems Command ( NAVSEA ) . An important element of the

organization in OPNAV that has yet to be mentioned is the

Ship Characteristics Improvement Board (SCIB). It includes

39
 WORKING WORKING WORKING WORKING
OPNAV GROUP
SCIB
GROUP
SCIB
GROUP
SCIB
GROUP
TOR OR TLR

CDR
SPECS.
DOP PDR DWGS
FEASIBILITY PRELIMINARY CONTRACT m
NAVSEA STUDIES DESIGN DESIGN rfp

TOR - TENTATIVE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

DOP - DEVELOPMENT OPTIONS PAPER
OR - OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
PDR - PRELIMINARY DESIGN REPORT
TLR - TOP LEVEL REQUIREMENTS
CDR - CONTRACT DESIGN REPORT
RFP - REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL

Figure 2.2 OPNAV/NAVSEA Ship Design Dialogue [44]

40
all the principal warfare sponsors and other high-

ranking members of OPNAV's staff. It is their job to pass

judgment on all ship designs proposed by NAVSEA [44].

Examination of the post World War II acquisition stra-

tegies has revealed that the acquisition approaches employed

in the decades of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s represent not

only fundamentally different strategies from each other, but

also that for each of these periods there was a reasonably

well-defined strategy. The success or failure of these

strategies may be debated but there is general agreement as

to what these approaches were supposed to be.

Unlike these previous periods, there is no one dominant

strategy for accomplishing naval ship design in the present

decade. Rather, the precise approach to be used on a new

ship acquisition is decided on a case-by-case basis at the

beginning of each ship acquisition and is stated in that

program's AP . As a result, the contract design approach

employed on the SSN 21 design differed markedly from that

used on the DDG 51 design. And LHD , SWATH TAGOS , MSH, and

MHC all have their own approaches. This evolution in acqui-

sition strategies is shown in Figure 2.3.

It might be argued that unnecessary confusion and delay

occurs at the beginning of each new ship design until the

strategy is determined. However, the technical and manage-

ment complexities associated with the design of a modern

41
 COMBINATIONS
OF EARLIER
APPROACHES
DEPENDING ON
ACQUISITION
PLAN
CENTRALIZED 1980s
MANAGEMENT
NAVY DESIGN
-FARM OUT BY TASKS
DESIGN TO COST
SHIPBUILDER
INVOLVEMENT
TOTAL PACKAGE 1970s
PROCUREMENT
CONTRACTOR DESIGN
SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

NAVY 1960s
IN-HOUSE DESIGN
PRELIMINARY
DESIGN
CONTRACT DESIGN
PRE 1960s

Figure 2.3 Summary of Naval Ship Design Approaches [44]

42
warship are such that this approach will be increasingly

necessary in the future.

2 . 2 A Brief History of Modern Shipbuilding Methods

In 1942 the German Navy was sinking Allied shipping

faster than the Allies could produce ships. However, by

mid-1943 that problem had been turned around and American

shipyards were producing ships faster than they were being

sunk. This success was largely the result of industrial

engineering techniques brought to the shipbuilding industry

by industrialist Henry J. Kaiser. He and his organization

had never built a ship prior to 1942 and therefore they

brought few preconceived notions to the problem of effi-

ciently producing ships.

He introduced the concept of group technology, that is,

organizing work by the problems inherent to manufacturing,

to American shipbuilding. This product-oriented approach,

vice the traditional systems-oriented approach, allowed

Kaiser's yards to achieve benefits normally associated only

with production lines [45]. Welding was done in a downhand

position only, both because this was faster and because

there was a scarcity of experienced welders during the war.

Also to facilitate welding, ship's bows were built sideways,

deckhouses upside down and the sides of ships on the ground,

rather than from high, often precarious, and costly scaf-

folding. The governing principle was to organize the work

43
 )

to fit the worker.

As a result of his methods, Kaiser's Liberty ships were

delivered in two-thirds the time and at three-fourths the

cost of those built by traditional shipbuilders [46].

After World War II, Elmer Hann , a former general sup-

erintendent at one of Kaiser's yards, brought Kaiser's

methods to Japan, whose shipyards were intentionally left

untouched by the Allies during the war. After the war,

Japan desired to use its shipbuilding capacity and Elmer

Hann taught the Japanese the organization of work in accor-

dance with the principles of group technology, welding

without distortion to control costs, and the importance of

college-educated middle managers trained in the entire

shipbuilding system. With these methods and only pre-World

War II shipyards, Japanese yards were producing 40 percent

of the world's total shipbuilding tonnage by 1964 [47].

A contemporary of Hann ' s was Dr. W. Edwards Deming, a

professor of statistics from New York University. He

introduced the notion of statistical control methods ( SCM

to Japanese industry. Statistical control radically

improved quality, laid the foundation of modern ship con-

struction methods, and made it possible to develop automated

and specialized welding.

With the application of SCM, management systems began

to furnish workers with meaningful indicators of how work

processes performed. For the first time, it was possible to

44
evaluate the impact on work processes of even the smallest

innovations. This, in turn, gave rise to quality circles,

and as a result, people at all levels in a modern Japanese

shipyard participate in problem solving on a daily basis

[48].

Dr. Hisashi Shinto initially worked for Elmer Hann as

his chief engineer. After Hann and other Americans returned

home, Shinto became the head of the Ishikawa j imi-Har ima

Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. ( IHI ) shipyard at Kure . Using

techniques he had learned in the United States, together

with a Japanese material-control system and SCM, Dr. Shinto

developed an improved shipbuilding system based on Kaiser's

logic. By 1979, the IHI system enabled a worker to achieve

in one hour the work for which three man-hours were required

in a traditional U.S. shipyard [49].

This same technology, highly refined, is now coming

back to the United States, partly due to the Merchant Marine

Act of 1970. This act contained the authority for the joint

government/industry National Shipbuilding Research Program

(NSRP), whose numerous publications have detailed much of

the modern Japanese methods. Also,- shipyards such as Avon-

dale Industries, Inc. and Bath Iron Works, Inc. have

directly contracted with IHI in the hope of improving the

productivity of their yards.

This section has identified the start of modern ship-

building methods in the United States, how they were trans-

45
ferred to Japan and, after significant development, how they

are returning to the United States. It is now appropriate

to consider just what these modern shipbuilding methods are.

2 . 3 Modern Shipbuilding in the United States Today

2.3.1 Introduction

This section contains an overview of ship producibi li ty

and modern shipbuilding methods. Included is a discussion

of group technology; product-oriented work breakdown struc-

tures; planning for production; process flow lanes; zone

construction, outfitting, and painting methods; and accuracy

control . For a much more complete treatment of these topics

the reader is directed to reference 2 of Chapter 1.

2.3.2 Group Technology

Group technology began as an outgrowth of an attempt

to develop a more efficient system of classification and

coding for use in the management of industrial processes.

It is an innovation in the field of management of manufac-

turing processes, not just a technique of keeping track of

material, parts, subassemblies, modules, etc.

The purpose of addressing group technology here is to

better understand shipbuilding and how productivity can be

improved in the shipbuilding industry.

Two definitions of group technology are offered:

1 . ) Group technology is the logical arrangement and

46
 .

sequence of all facets of company operation in order to

bring the benefits of mass production to high variety, mixed

quantity production [50]. This definition emphasizes a

systems approach to management and, as such, supports a

central concept, put forth by Mitrofanov, that the group

technology process is a manifestation of the systematization

and generalization of the experience of a manufacturing

industry [51]. The systems approach also emphasizes the

importance of integration of all parts of the company.

2.) Group technology is a technique for manufacturing

small to medium lot size batches of parts of similar pro-

cess, of somewhat dissimilar materials, geometry and size,

which are produced in a committed small cell of machines

which have been grouped together physically, specifically

tooled, and scheduled as a unit [52]. This definition is

worth dissecting, phrase-by-phrase:

* small to medium lot size batches - Group technology

is not applicable to lot sizes which can be efficiently

produced on an assembly line. Rather it is a means of

realizing certain benefits of mass production for essen-

tially similar small batch interim products. It is not mass

production

* similar process - This implies categorizing interim

products by problem areas or by the problems common to their

manufacture. These problem areas include the specific type

of work and similar production techniques, tools, and worker

47
 .

skills

* somewhat dissimilar materials, geometry, and size -

This means that the same problem area does not imply identi-

cal material, shape, and size. For example, installation of

pipe and air-conditioning ducts may pose the same problems

and therefore be installed by the same crew.

* processed in a committed small cell of machines which

have been grouped together physically - The main idea con-

veyed by this phrase is parallelism. A cell or group within

the shipyard is responsible for completing all aspects of a

given block, unit, or module, regardless of overlapping

functional systems involved. Therefore, subassemblies can

be completed simultaneously, rather than systems being

completed sequentially.

* specifically tooled - This implies that each work

station, including its workers, is specifically equipped for

only the particular job at hand.

* scheduled as a group - This implies beginning work on

a particular unit or subassembly only when all resources for

the job are in hand. This hao important implications for

management, engineering, and material control. In particu-

lar, these functions must be more responsive to production

control than they had been when using traditional system-

oriented shipbuilding methods.

Group technology is not the same thing as classifica-

48
tion and coding. However, classification of the elements of

production is perhaps the first step in the successful

implementation of group technology [53]. One classification

system, the product work breakdown structure, is discussed

in the next section.

Classification and coding are often used as if they

were the same thing. They are not and the distinction is

that the code is the vehicle or mechanism by which a clas-

sification system is made usable.

2.3.3 Product-Oriented Work Breakdown Structures

A work breakdown structure is a classification system.

Ones commonly used in shipbuilding are either systems or

product-oriented. The U. S. Navy currently uses a sys-

tems-oriented breakdown called the Expanded Ship Work Break-

down Structure (ESWBS). It is used throughout the entire

ship life cycle and is used in the areas of cost, weight,

specifications, system function and effectiveness, design,

production, and maintenance [54], All major classification

groups are defined by a three-digit code as described in

Table 2.1. The last two groups are used primarily for cost

estimating and progress reporting. Each major group is bro-

ken down into hierarchical subdivisions called subgroups and

elements as shown in Figure 2.4.

A classification scheme to subdivide work in accord-

49
 000 General Guidance and Administration
100 Hull Structure
200 Propulsion Plant
300 Electric Plant
400 Command and Surveillance
500 Auxiliary Systems
600 Outfit and Furnishings
700 Armament
800 Integration/Engineering
900 Ship Assembly and Support Services

Table 2.1 The Navy Expanded Ship Work Breakdown Structure

(ESWBS) Major Groups [54]

(Group) 100 - Hull Structure

(Element) 101 - General Arrangement
(Subgroup) 110 - Shell and Supporting Structure
(Element) 111 - Shell Plating
(Element) 112 - Shell Plating, Submarine Non-
Pressure Hull
(Subgroup) 120 - Hull Structural Bulkheads
(Element) 121 - Longitudinal Structural
Bulkheads
(Element) 122 - Transverse Structural
Bulkheads

Figure 2.4 An Example of the ESWBS Organization [54]

50
ance with an interim product view is a product-oriented

work breakdown structure ( PWBS ) [55]. Parts and subassem-

blies are grouped by common permanent characteristics, and

classified by both design and manufacturing attributes. The

classification system typically specifies parameters, such

as form, dimensions, tolerances, material, and types and

complexity of production machinery operations. Classifica-

tion by product aspects relates a part or subassembly to a

zone of a ship and also to work processes by problem area

and by work stage. Therefore, product families are deter-

mined by both design and manufacturing attributes.

First, PWBS divides the shipbuilding process into three

basic types of work: hull construction, outfitting, and

painting, because each imposes its own unique set of manu-

facturing problems. These types of work are further subdi-

vided into fabrication and assembly classifications. Within

the painting classification, fabrication applies to the

manufacture of paint, and assembly refers to its applica-

tion. The assembly subdivisions are naturally linked to

zones and are the basis for the zone dominance seen in

shipbuilding management.

Second, PWBS classifies interim products in accordance

with their needs for resources. Resources include material,

manpower, facilities, and expenses.

Third, PWBS classifies interim products by the four

product aspects needed for control of production processes.

51
 :.

Two product aspects, system and zone, are means for dividing

a ship design into planned and manageable portions. Each

zone is usually addressed by a separate work package. The

other two product aspects, problem area and stage, are means

for dividing the work process from material procurement to

complete ship delivery. These four terms many be defined as

follows

* System - a structural function or an operational

function of a product, e. g., longitudinal bulkhead, fire

main system, lighting system, etc.

* Zone - an objective of production which is any geo-

graphical division of the total product, e. g., superstruc-

ture, engine room, etc., and their subdivisions or combina-

tions, e. g. , a structural block or outfit unit, a subas-

sembly of either, and ultimately a part or component.

* Problem area - a division of the production process

into similar types of work problems such as:

- by feature (e. g., curved vs. flat plate, steel vs.

aluminum material, small vs. large diameter pipe)

- by quantity (e. g., job-by- job vs. flow lane)

- by quality (e. g., grade of worker required, grade

of facilities required)

- by kind of work (e. g., marking, cutting, bending,

welding, painting, testing, cleaning)

- by anything else that defines a different work

problem

52
 * Stage - a division of the production process by

sequences, i. e., substeps of fabrication, subassembly,

assembly, erection, and outfitting.

The classification system and categories described

above are illustrated in Figure 2.5.

After an interim product has been identified by its

product aspects, it is necessary to evaluate its efficiency

as a work package. This efficiency is a function of the

time it takes to complete the product, the number of units

of resources, and the quality of the work environment (e.g.,

downhand vs. overhand welding). If the efficiency is not

high enough, the work package must be redefined. This iter-

ative development and evaluation of work packages through

the planning process is illustrated in Figure 2.6.

2.3.4 Planning for Production

In order to successfully include production considera-

tions in preplanning or planning, each shipyard must develop

its own build strategy. This strategy reflects the capabil-

ities, practices, and preferences of the yard, modified to

fit the specifics of the ship to be built. It helps to

define and prioritize decisions about the shipbuilding pro-

ject at its earliest stages. An overview of design and

material definition, the importance of overlap of these

stages with production, and their impact on PWBS will be

treated in this section.

53
 -VP€ OF WORK AXIS ^OCDUCT ASPECTS AJ<IS

c *8lft ASSlAI SYSTEM ZONE

I'll i'a
MOLL MI
Ml
(Ml JBOBLE?" STAGE
AR£A '4|
OUTTfT FI F» I'D

PAINT
Pf P»

PROOUCT RESOURCES
MIS
MATERIAL I'll

MANPOWER 1*2)

FACILITIES 1*31

DtPENSES 1**1

Figure 2.5 Elements of the Three-dimensional PWBS Matrix

[55]

BASIC DESIGN

FUNCTIONAL DESIGN
BY SYSTEM

TRANSITION DESIGN
INTERRELATIONSHIP OF
SYSTEMS 4 ZONES

OETAIL DESIGN
SPECIFICATION OF
INTERIM PROOUCTS
BY ZONE.AREA/STAGE

/i/ORK P»C*AGE
PRODUCTIVITY VALUE
ANALYSES

^o""
^_
ACCEf TABLE
POODU CT1VITV
'
^
^^>

Figure 2.6 Iterative Development of Work Packages [55]

54
 .

Significant overlap of design, material procurement,

and production is essential for reducing the overall con-

struction time, but overlap reduces the time available to

organize information developed by the designers. Therefore,

from the beginning, design information must be formatted to

more fully anticipate needs relating to material and pro-

duction .

In addition to overlap in time, there is an overlap

between functional systems and product aspects. PWBS allows

for this dual grouping. Each phase of the shipbuilding man-

agement cycle (estimating, planning, scheduling, execution,

and evaluation) is addressed in terms of system versus zone

orientation

Figure 2.7 indicates the primary emphasis, either sys-

tem or zone, of each of the phases in the shipbuilding pro-

cess. The process begins with a systems orientation. This

is a view of the ship as a whole, broken down by systems.

During preliminary design the key transformation from system

to zone orientation takes place. Later, near the end of the

contract, the transformation back to a system orientation

occurs to permit overall ship evaluation, in terms of both

systems performance and cost performance. The ability to

make these transformations is key to the successful imple-

mentation of group technology-related or PWBS-related ship-

building .

Design, which is considered part of planning, is

55
 ]

Tra/islofm»lion
m accounting

pnm«nlY

Figure 2.7 System and Zone Orientation in the Shipbuilding

Process 55
[

56
divided into:
* Basic Design (In Navy parlance this includes all

design through contract design.)

* Functional Design - up to the detail level

* Transition Design - from system to zone

* Work Instruction Detail - down to the worker level

These divisions of the design process are described in Fig-

ure 2.8. The design process continues until each zone is

broken down to components that are to be purchased and to

material requirements for parts that are to be fabricated.

This is the lowest hierarchical level of classification.

The most important point is that each successive stage comes

closer to transforming the developing design into a format

better suited to the end users' needs.

Design as well as production groups are organized

according to classes of problems in such a way as to com-

plement the established zones. Each design group prepares

key drawings, working drawings, and material lists in

accordance with the established zones. Within each group it

is essential to have good "horizontal" communication between

the different engineering disciplines. The group focuses on

composite drawings, which show how the ship is to be built,

and material lists. System arrangement drawings are no

longer needed, as the interference-free and simplified com-

posites, either drawings or scale models, are developed

directly from diagrammat ics . Therefore, the principJes of

57
 —

STS'(»*rtJN| £OW?0BUM aRE>/S7AaU

detail 0ES»On iv/OR«jng 0»*wm«C»

TRANSITION CX S>Gn
'
ASUWdLT I

FUNCrONAL OESKX PLAN

shipwright SUB-aSSEWBlTT-*
BASIC DESIGN Dimension:
PLAN _VanJ
HULL BLOCK CUTTING
ERECTION PLAN
SHELL
EXPANSION
J mull SLOCK
SARFS LIST
plan
CURVEOI
PANE L
|
^n
SUB-ASSEMBLY
. I

[-•
PLAN
BLOCK
construction PLAN CUTTING
PROPH.E
PLAN

SUPERSTRUCTURE
ASSJM3LY
PLAN
ROUGH CUTTING
general PLAN SUB-ASStMBLY
arrangement
FAS. 1
LANE PLAN
ASS.
PLAN

CUTTING
PLAN
J
MiOSw»
SECTION COMPOS.TES WORK INSTRUCTION 4 MATERIAL DETAIL CESiGnORawnGS

PIPE CLTTTINO
PI PINO PLAN
MACHINERY i
DIAGRAM) r"
ANO
->lPl*<i PIPE PIECE
ARRANGEMENT PI«*NG AND COMPONENTS MLf
- M ANUF-
MLS COMPONENTS PiTTInC 0« LANE PLAN
ARRANGEMENT UNIT

CABIN SYSTEMS PLAN

PLAN

f
PIPING MLF
P°«L,M'NARY PIPING PIPING FITTING OR
2LCCX OtAGIUM ARRANGEMENT UNIT
PLAN ORAwinG

COMPONENTS
SYSTEMS COMPONENTS FITTING 0«
a. plan ARRANGEMENT UNIT
01 e C»AW1NQ CABLE
a CA8LE CUTTING
o J LIST
PLAN
CABLE) I
il ;vi*»inG
i 1
1

WIPING PiTTtHG 0«
5 2. ARRANGEMENT UNIT MLF -J
N _ WIRING
OIAGRAM OM*w/iNG
>* o c
e " - §
2%=
to
3
0.0
I MLS COMPONENTS
COMPONENTS
FITTING
ARRANGEMENT
DRAWING

« IS * »rt

jj j J JZ
PIPING A.NO MLP
STEEL COMPONENTS
FITTING OR UNIT
22 2 2 PIPING DRAWING
I I I
I
DIAGRAM I

CUflNlTuPE
22 Piping anO
FITTING
Drawing MATERIAL
COMPONENTS r— LIST
AHRANGEMENT
jOinES COMPONENTS
SYSTEMS components manuf ano
PLAN fitting purchase
DRAWING Plan

camcr PLANE KIT PLANS TAEB PLANS wtt ostwciilw plans

Figure 2.8 PWBS Ship Design Process [55]

58
group technology apply to design as well as to production.

Zone-oriented scheduling is necessary to control work

flows so that interim products are produced in such a way

as to anticipate only immediate needs. The scheduling must

coordinate all production work and allow time for the tran-

sportation of interim products to the next assembly site.

The goal is to minimize buffer storage while at the same

time creating no bottlenecks or controlling paths. Thus,

integrated schedules are essential for fabrication through

final outfitting and testing.

Shipyards and the Navy desire accurate progress repor-

ting of schedule as well as manpower and material costs.

This is facilitated by having relatively small work pack-

ages. Progress reporting and cost collections are zone-

oriented. This gives both the yard and the Navy accurate

indications of work completed so that work and resources

required for completion can be forecasted. In order for the

Navy (or shipyard) estimators to obtain realistic costs on a

system basis some sort of allocation of costs back to the

system level must be established and agreed upon.

This indirect collection of costs by system may be

viewed as a degradation of system cost data, particularly in

the area of manpower costs. However, the PWBS philosophy

argues that a PWBS-based system produces more accurate data

due to inherently better control. Material usage and costs

can fairly easily be collected by system and cost, particu-

59
larly where functional designers are required to identify

all materials for each diagrammatic.

2.3.5 Process Flow Lanes

The process flow lane or process lane concept may be

defined as the "categorization and separation of similar

types of work, and the subsequent development of work cen-

ters specifically designed to efficiently perform that kind

of work" [56]. The keys to effective process flow lanes are

planning, scheduling, and material control. The goal of the

shipyard is to establish process flow lanes which produce

repeatable interim products and which are uniformly loaded,

both for an individual shipbuilding program and for other

shipyard projects as well. Figure 2.9 shows process flow

lanes for a notional shipyard. The process flow lanes are

organized by classes or problem areas and demonstrate how

their end products must integrate for zone-oriented produc-

tion. Fabrication shops and assembly shops are grouped

along the various process flow lanes.

Hull construction has historically been the responsi-

bility of a single shop with a single trade union, so the

introduction of hull block construction in process flow

lanes is fairly easily managed in most American shipyards.

However, the establishment of outfitting process flow lanes

and the integration of the entire ship assembly process cuts

across traditional shop and trade union lines. As a result,

60
 . '

NUL L ERECT on
INI GRATED W- H
ON BOARD
OUT 11 IINC
f

SHAPf SHAPE

BUM » UP
BUM I U<" —
TART

z
SIMILAR WO«"
CONIINI IN
SMALL
OUANTIT*
o
INTFflNAI - '

PLATE
MMH *« won* TRAMF FOn
1 UNIENl IN
•;< largf
z - 1

quantity PANEL

If
PART FOR
FLAT
PANEL
FLAT
PANEL
1
FLAT
PANEL
Block
<
'
.

par I onr TAHT F OH

CURVED CURVED
CL'RVFP cutivrn l! PANEL
PANE I
PANEL PANl I BLOCK

MARKING

o
PLA1( JOINING &
,'AG( MATERIAL CUTTING
RENDING ASSEMBLY EGG BO« FHAMiNG ASSEMBLY
SUB(ULX>
MATERIAL PARI FARHIi AtiQN ASSEMBLY BLOCK ASSEMBL V
f -/t

Dl CK ( OMIfiNf N»

1
Df CK
CURVED
BLOCK
P I
DECK
CURVED
BLOC"
P I
,
DECK
CURVED PL
BLOCK -o C
~©
1

DECK DECK DECK

l
FLAT P*L f LAT P I HAT PI
BLOCK BLOCK A BLOCK

R
. 1

-»»
MACHINFRV
CURVED PL
BLOCK
MACHINFRV
CURVED P I
BLOCK B
MACHINERY
CURVEO P"L
BLOCK
-© ©©
ACCOMW
1
FIAT
BLOCK
P I
ACCOMW
FLAT PL
BLOCK
ACCOMM
Fl
BLOCK
AT PL
h© ©5e

Figure 2.9 Process Flow Lanes in Modern Shipbuilding [55]

61
 )

progress past the modern hull block construction stage has

been slow in most yards. In shipyards that have completely

adopted zone-oriented methods, many trades have been com-

bined in various ways: a ship fitter may do some welding, a

pipe fitter may do some electrical work, etc.

2.3.6 Zone Construction Methods

The product-oriented breakdown of ship construction

accommodates the following zone-oriented methods:

* Hull Block Construction Method (HBCM)

* Zone Outfitting Method ( ZOFM

* Zone Painting Method (ZOPM)

Also, since large quantities and varieties of pipe pieces,

ventilation ducting, wire ways, etc. are needed, PWBS

accommodates problem area-oriented family manufacturing

(FM), or pipe piece family manufacturing ( PPFM ) . This is

shown diagrammatically in Figure 2.10. The integration of

HBCM, ZOFM, and ZOPM represents the application of the prin-

ciples of group technology to shipbuilding. Together they

form a total shipbuilding system. PPFM is different in that

it represents the application of group technology to a spe-

cific shop. For more information on PPFM the interested

reader is directed to reference 2 of Chapter 1. HBCM, ZOFM,

and ZOPM will now be discussed briefly.

Optimum block (or zone) size is the basis for control

62
 PRODUCT WORK
BREAKDOWN
STRUCTURE
(PWBS)

PIPE PIECE
FAMILY
MANUFACTURING
(PPFM)

HULL BLOCK
CONSTRUCTION ZONE OUTFITTING ZONE PAINTING
METHOD METHOO METHOD
(ZOFM) (ZPTM)
(HBCM)

Figure 2.10 PWBS Components [56]

63
 .

in HBCM . But blocks also directly impact zone outfitting

and painting. As a result, the determinations of block

dimensions and location, compared to other interim products,

have the greatest influence on shipbuilding productivity.

Blocks are designed so that:

* they are assignable to one work package group

* they are inherently stable, balanced structures

* they require minimum working times

* they have maximum accessibility for outfitting and

painting

Also, they should be similar in work content as much as

possible so that work can be distributed evenly throughout

the fabrication and assembly levels. Planners and designers

should also try to maximize the amount of downhand welding

and design the blocks to be the largest size capable of

being handled by the shipyard's lifting and moving equip-

ment .

It is usually practical to plan hull construction in

seven levels as shown in Figure 2.11. Work assigned to the

grand block level minimizes the duration required for erec-

tion on the ways. For maximum productivity, the main work

flow path must be level-loaded.

Within each level other than the top two, the interim

products are examined for similarities in their product

aspects. Then they are grouped by these similarities in

order to further modularize the production process, justify

64
Figure 2.11 HBCM Manufacturing Levels [57]

65
expensive but highly efficient facilities, and achieve man-

power savings. Typical groupings by product aspect are

shown in Figure 2.12. Horizontal combinations characterize

the various types of work packages that are needed for work

to be performed at each level . Vertical combinations of

work packages denote the process flow lanes for hull con-

struction work flow which correspond to the process flow

lanes in Figure 2.9. Maximum productivity is obtained when

work is evenly allocated to work packages grouped by their

product aspects, and there are quick responses to potential

work imbalance, such as shifting workers among manufacturing

levels and/or process flow lanes, authorizing overtime, or

even short-term schedule changes [57].

Since both follow the same logic, ZOFM is a natural

consequence of HBCM. Shipyards which have advanced to the

point of using ZOFM assemble most outfit components indepen-

dent of or on hull blocks.

ZOFM planners must consider the block zones previously

defined for hull construction. Then they are usually other-

wise free to devise zones which best suit their system. So,

while there is generally greater freedom in defining outfit

zones, specifying zone by problem area by stage work pack-

ages affords absolute control of work, even in a confined

area of the ship that contains multiple systems. Outfitting

packages which correspond to a zone/problem area/stage orga-

66
 product asrects COOES
plan-o: MFC
LEVEL LEVEL
ZONE AREA staoe ZONE AREA STAQE

UJ
CI
O 2 3 TEST
.J
3 5
r X
1 7 SHIP UJ O UJ

9 Z
o 5 £ $
< z < UJ
u.
a.
ERECTION
5?
•" ' -
BACK NIL
PRE ERECTION

2 «
FLAT CURVED
PANEL PANEL PRE -ERECTION NIL

a
JOINING NIL

BACH ASSEMBLY NIL

3
< _ o <2 ASSEMBLY
UJ
> g
3
3 5
5 uj J
* a
3
^§
3 0.
(J
1/1
I FRAMING NIL
UJ
z a.
3 PLATE JOINING NIL

BACK ASSEMBLY NIL

4 4 ASSEMBLY

SIMILAR SIMILAR PLATE JCHNINQ NIL

WORK WORK
CONTENT IN CONTENT IN
A LARGE A SMALL
QUANTITY QUANTITY BACK ASSEMBLY NIL

5 3
Z »o CD O
GO u
ASSEMBLY

i
3 BENCH NO NIL

6
SUB-BLOCX BIM.T-OR
2
PART PART

ASSEMBLY

UJ
BENDING NIL
< £
3 a.
is J" a
7 s UJ
I MARKING 4 CUTTING I o a o
1
< ?° < O
a da £2 5 a. (j a u
f?
z
c
± <
u. o. PLAYE
z < z 2 NIL
Q.
a.
JOINING

Note : "Nil" indicates no product aspect exists.

Figure 2.12 HBCM Classification by Product Aspects [55]

67
nization are sometimes called pallets. Pallets sequenced in

the order they are built make up the ship's outfitting plan.

On-unit outfitting refers to a zone which defines an

arrangement of equipment and supporting structure which is

assembled independent of hull structure. On-block outfit-

ting refers to the assembly of equipment on any structural

subassembly (semi-block, block, or grand block). On-board

outfitting refers to assembly of equipment during or after

hull erection and launching. A zone for on-board outfitting

is usually defined by a compartment, shell, bulkhead, or

deck. In general, on-unit outfitting is the safest and most

efficient, followed by on-block outfitting, and finally on-

board outfitting. Every effort is made to minimize the

amount of on-board outfitting.

Maximum productivity is achieved when work is equally

apportioned to work packages grouped by product aspects at

the most efficient manufacturing levels and uniform and

coordinated work flows are maintained. Other considerations

are shifting work, especially welding, from difficult posi-

tions to downhand positions; selecting and designing com-

ponents so as to maximize on-unit outfitting; transferring

work from difficult or unsafe locations to open, spacious,

low, and otherwise safe places; and planning simultaneous

execution of the maximum number of work packages. These

considerations have led to the practice of planning outfit-

ting in six manufacturing levels as shown in Figure 2.13.

68
 OPERATION
anO
TEST

ON-aOAMO
OUTTTTTINO

ON-BLOCK
OUTFITTING

OKANO-uNrr OUANO-UNIT
jOihimo JOIHIMO

UNIT UNTT UNIT UNIT

ASSEMBLY ASSEMBLY ASSEMBLY ASSEMBLY

COMPONENT COMPONENT COMPONENT COMPONENT COMPONENT COMPONENT COMPONENT COMPONENT

PROCUREMENT PROCUREMENT PROCUREMENT PROCUREMENT PROCUREMENT PROCUREMENT PROCUREMENT PROCUREMENT

Figure 2.13 ZOFM Manufacturing Levels [57]

69
 As in HBCM , interim products with similar product

aspects are grouped to further modularize the production

process, justify expensive but highly efficient facilities,

and achieve manpower savings. Typical groupings by product

aspects are shown in Figure 2.14. It should be noted that

these groupings are for a commercial shipbuilding project.

For a naval combatant the sixth manufacturing level product

aspect area would need to be expanded to include command and

surveillance, and armament. Horizontal combinations charac-

terize types of work packages that are required for work to

be performed at each manufacturing level. Vertical combina-

tions of work package types denote process lanes for outfit-

ting work flow which correspond to the process flow lanes

shown in Figure 2.9. As the use of ZOFM increases, the need

for more balanced planning and scheduling, and cooperation

among hull construction, outfitting, and painting increases.

ZPTM is a natural consequence of HBCM and ZOFM. Much

of the painting work is transferred from the building dock

or outfit pier to preceding manufacturing levels by inte-

grating painting with hull construction and outfitting.

ZPTM manufacturing levels are shown in Figure 2.15. The

prerequisites to successful use of ZPTM are that the paint-

ing interval between one coat and the next coat must be

shorter than the allowable exposure time for the former

coat; each hull block should be virtually finished in order

70
 COO€»
HMtt tttrw9
LXVO. uvtt
ZONI AIWA STAO* ZDNE AIWA STAO*

OPERATION
I s
TEST

WfLOMQ Mt.

3>i QN-CUMtO-S#ACJ WTTINQ

1 1 C Iz
wej>NO Mi
3 Is
JH-GPEX-4PACI PTTT1NO
§

2
SPECIALTY/ SPEC4ALTYI a
I

COMPONENTS|COMPONENT3 QN^VOOK PITTING 3

5c
I*
ia 1
\
1 4 BLOCK n A N A -* l9xi
LA»Qi SMAU. S" z<
QUANTITY Quantity 8!
O «»
5
ON-CEJUNO PITTING

veld* no
z<J
f 3 NH. Oft
z z
03
.OININQ

LAflOS-
sta
ii H
UNIT
WELDING
3 <

I 2 3 ?
SIZE
UNIT
§8
II

oall£tiz)no
1
ji 3 is.
• 1 COMPONENT MANUPACTUHINa
z!5
0E3IGN ANO 3a
MATERIA!. O
pwepaaat>on 3

Figure 2.14 ZOFM Classification by Product Aspects [55]

71
 NlSH
r,

3AINT

FINISH FINISH-
UNOER-COAT UNOEB-COAT
PAINT PAINT

PRIMER PRIMER PRIMER PRIMER PRIMER

SHOP SHOP SHOP

PRIMER PRIMER PRIMER

Figure 2.15 ZPTM Manufacturing Levels [57]

72
to minimize surface preparation and painting rework caused

by further cutting, fitting, and welding, and the shop

primers applied to plates and shapes should not impede cut-

ting and welding. Managers must ensure effective accuracy

control to limit the need for surface preparation and rework

resulting from inaccurately made interim products.

The main objectives of shifting painting to earlier

manufacturing levels are to shift position from overhead to

downhand or vertical, from high places to low places, and

from confined to readily accessible places; facilitate the

use of environment-controlled buildings; provide a safer

setting for painting; prevent in-process rust and subsequent

rework; minimize the use of scaffolding; and facilitate

level-loading work throughout the shipyard. Typical clas-

sification of paint work packages by their product aspects

are shown in Figure 2.16. Horizontal combinations charac-

terize the types of work packages that are required to be

performed at each level. Vertical combinations denote the

process flow lanes for painting work flow.

2.3.7 Accuracy Control

A shipbuilding system based on group technology, using

a PWBS , and integrated hull, outfitting, and painting,

requires good controls on accuracy. An accuracy control

system is initially justified by the need to monitor the

construction of interim products to minimize delays and re-

73
 PRX30UCT ASPECTS COOES
PLANQ MTO
LEVEL LEVEL
ZONE AREA STAGE ZONE AREA STAGE

PAINTING NIL

SI
z
i5uj2o J _ <
'OUCM UP SI ui 20
j3 2*w 3 3 'J
O. i-* P.U.
i 4 < 3 u. y O 5 --J -
J a z 1
Z SO. z 3 CLEANING < a
s$ 1 S
?11 »a z 3
u. Z
SURFACE PREPARATION

PAINTING AFTER
NIL
OVERTURNING
TOUCH UP AFTER NIL < 01
OVERTURNING _ <
$2* 2
CLEANING AFTfR Z'2* 82
*2 OVERTURNING Ow 3 5 a
: 3 <3 = ?z is
3tf
SURFACE PREPARATION NIL x <o < a
AFTER OVERTURNING » a
z 3 s
? ?2 < 2 PAINTING z
IA, a
rOUCH UP
g
CLEANING
SURFACE PREPARATION a
a
PAINTING M
AFTER
OVERTURNING 5
UJ

CLEANING 8
AFTER NIL
ill OVERTURNING
Zai
JO
uiO
3U
.' Ou. j
SURFACE PREPARATION J J Q
: 2 igs AFTER
<t
_ u* ^
OvER t URninG 2 5 S3
z a S 1 9 < IS
< ii a. 2
3
3AINTING
Z z
:leaning
SURFACE PREPARATION

PAINTING 2 ui

3
i 1 < o <
1
il I| ul
£* <
O a
SHOT BLASTING r
M

Figure 2.16 ZPTM Classification by Product Aspects [55]

74
 .

work during erection. However, when fully operational,

accuracy control forms a major part of the total shipbuild-

ing system. It involves the regulation of accuracy as a

technique for improving shipbuilding productivity by focus-

ing attention on areas where improvements offer significant

benefits. It also provides the means for monitoring work by

individual work process or problem area. A fully imple-

mented accuracy control system establishes a quantitative

feedback loop between production and planning, design, and

engineering

The use of the statistical quality control methods

developed by Deming in the 1940's (see Section 2.2) is an

essential element in an accuracy control system. Accuracy

control should not be confused with quality assurance.

Accuracy control is the regulation of accuracy in order to

achieve maximum productivity. This involves a trade-off

between better accuracy and the downstream improvement in

assembly and erection, and the cost to achieve such accu-

racy [ 58 ] .

This chapter has provided background and laid the foun-

dation upon which the rest of this thesis is based. We are

now ready to discuss the ways in which modern ship produc-

tion methods have affected naval ship acquisition practices.

75
 ,

REFERENCES and NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1. Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, "Acquisi-

tion of Major Defense Systems", July 13, 1971.

2. Ibid.

3. "Ship Acquisition Reef Points", Naval Sea Systems

Command, February 26, 1976.

4. Ibid.

5. Carpenter, John D. and Finne, Peter C, "Naval Ship

Procurement", Naval Engineers' Journal Vol. 84, No. 6,
,

December, 1972.

6. Graham, Clark, "The Navy's Approach to Ship Design

and Acquisition", unpublished paper.

7. Carpenter and Finne, op cit.

8. Ibid.

9. Department of Defense Directive 5010.14, "Sys-

tem/Project Management", May 4, 1965.

10. Department of Defense Directive 3200.9, "Init-

iation of Engineering and Operational Systems Development"
July 1, 1965.

11. Ibid.

12. Fox, J. Ronald, Arming America: How the U.S. Buys

Weapons Harvard Business School, Division of Research,
,

Boston, 1974.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Policy

Guidance on Major Weapons System Acquisition", May 28, 1970.

16. Department of Defense Directive 3200.9, op cit.

17. Newcomb, John W. and DiTrapani Anthony R., "The

,

Patrol Frigate Program - A New Approach to Ship Design and

Acquisition", Naval Engineers' Journal Vol. 85, No. 4,
,

August, 1973.

18. Ibid.

76
 ... ..
.

19. Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, op cit.

20. Naval Material Command Publication P5242, "Joint

Design-to-Cost Guide", October 29, 1973.

21. Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 9010.300,

"Top Level Requirements and Top Level Specifications for the
Development of Naval Ships", January 4, 1974.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25 Fox , op ci t

26. Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, op cit.

27. Department of Defense Directive 5000.3, "Test and

Evaluation", January 19, 1973.

28. Newcomb and DiTrapani , op cit.

Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Estab-

29.
lishment of a Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council",
May 30, 1969.

30. Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, "The

Decision Coordinating Paper DCP and the Defense Systems
( )

Acquisition Review Council (DSARC)", February 23, 1973.

31. Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, op cit.

32 Fox , op cit

33. Program Evaluation and Review Technique is a

schedule network analysis method which determines the
"critical path" (controlling path of key milestones). PERT
reports were required of contractors by Department of
Defense Directive 3200.9, op cit.

34 . Fox , op cit

35. Department of Defense Instruction 7000.2, "Per-

formance Measurement for Selected Acquisitions", April 25,
1972.

36 Fox , op ci t

77
 . . . .

37. U.S. Senate, Armed Service Committee, Report

92-359, Authorizing Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year
1972 .

38 Fox , op ci t

39. Newcomb and DiTrapani , op cit.

40. "Ship Acquisition Management for Engineers", Naval

Sea Systems Command, 1986.

41. Ibid.

42. Lachica, Eduardo "Defense Firms Claim Reforms Hit ,

Them Hard", The Wall Street Journal March 16, 1988. ,

43. "Ship Acquisition Management for Engineers", op

cit

44. Tibbitts, B. F. et al "Naval Ship Design - Evo- ,

lution or Revolution?", to be published in Naval Engineers'

Journal May 1988. ,

45. Chirillo, L. D. and Chirillo, R. D., "The History

of Modern Shipbuilding Methods: The U.S. -Japan Inter-
change", The Journal of Ship Production Vol. 1, No. 1, ,

February 1985 ,

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. Chirillo, R. D., "Analytical Quality Circles",

University of Washington Shipbuilding Technology Course,
Seattle, 3 October 1983.

49. Chirillo and Chirillo, op cit.

50. Ranson, G. N., Group Technology: A Foundation for

Better Total Company Operation McGraw-Hill, London, 1972. ,

51. Mitrofanov, S. P., Scientific Principles of Group

Technology English translation by E. Harris, National Len-
,

ding Library for Science and Technology, Boston Spa,

England, 1966.

52. Hyde, W. F., Improving Productivity by Classifi-

cation, Coding, and Data Base Standardization Mercel Dek- ,

ker, Inc., New York, 1981.

53. Storch et al , op cit., Chapter 1, reference 2.

78
 54. Expanded Ship Work Breakdown Structure Naval Sea
,

Systems Command, Washington, D. C., 13 February 1985.

55. Okayama Y. and Chirillo, L. D., Product Work

,

Breakdown Structure National Shipbuilding Research Program,

,

Maritime Administration in cooperation with Todd Pacific

Shipyards Corp., December 1982.

56. Storch et al , op cit.

57. Ibid.

58. Chirillo, L. D., Chirillo, R. D., Storch, R. L.,

and Nakanishi, S., Process Analysis Via Accuracy Control,

National Shipbuilding Research Program, Maritime Adminis-

tration in cooperation with Todd Pacific Shipyards Corp.,
February, 1982.

79
 CHAPTER 3

MODERN SHIPBUILDING

AND NAVAL SHIP ACQUISITION PRACTICES

3 . 1 Introduction

This chapter considers the consequences of modern ship-

building methods on the naval ship acquisition process as

well as the influence the U. S. Navy has on shipyard prac-

tices. The particular areas considered are design and engi-

neering, CAD/CAM, ship work breakdown structures, and cost

and schedule control systems. It is important to remember

that the information in Section 2.3 was presented from an

idealized and generic point of view, as seen by the

researchers and authors of the various National Ship

Research Program's publications. The information presented

in this chapter will relate how real implementations of

group technology shipbuilding in U. S. shipyards interact

with the U. S. Navy and its ship acquisition process. This

will be accomplished in both a general way as well as in a

specific way by considering examples from actual shipbuild-

ing programs in specific shipyards.

3 . 2 Design and Engineering

Section 2.1 of Chapter 2 discussed ship design and

engineering as viewed by NAVSEA. Section 2.3 of Chapter 2

discussed this topic from the perspective of a group tech-

80
nology shipbuilder. Application of group technology prin-

ciples requires alterations in the conventional ship design

and engineering process. This section provides a descrip-

tion of the design and engineering process associated with

group technology shipbuilding, with particular emphasis on

that portion of the process which is under NAVSEA control.

3.2.1 Group Technology Design and Engineering -

General Concepts

The principal output of the design process for a con-

ventional shipbuilder is a set of detailed plans and speci-

fications which are suitable for use by any shipyard. On

the other hand, the outputs for a group technology ship-

builder are unique work instruction packages that provide

specific information for construction organized by the prob-

lem areas defined by an individual shipyard. Also, the mod-

ern process must allow for timely identification of material

and production requirements to enable the shipyard to pro-

cure, plan, and schedule in a manner consistent with its

management and building strategy. Figure 2.7 showed the

management cycle proceeding from system to zone and then back

to a system orientation. Design and engineering follow a

similar pattern. The design stages employed in group tech-

nology shipbuilding were shown in Figure 2.8 and include

basic design, functional design, transition design, and work

instruction design.

81
 In the Navy context, basic design includes the design

iterations up through contract design. This is shown in

Figure 3.1. Significant differences from conventional

design are the elimination of many expensive and time-

consuming system arrangement drawings, identification of

outfit work packages by product aspects on composite draw-

ings, the terminology used, and the organization of design

stages. The four design stages are described as follows:

Basic Design describes a ship as a total system. It is

based on Navy requirements which fix what the ship is to be

and how it is to perform. The end products are specifica-

tions and contract plans which vary greatly in thoroughness

and detail, depending on the program's acquisition strategy.

Functional Design addresses each system in quasi-

arranged diagrammatics for piping and wiring and in system

plans. These diagrammatics are sufficient for Navy approv-

als and are called key plans. A material list by system

(MLS) is prepared for each key plan.

Transition Design regroups information organized by

systems into information organized by zones. This first

interrelationship of systems and zones, drawn on yard plans,

is needed for the development of work instructions.

Work Instruction Design groups design information by

additional product aspects, problem area, and stage, which

are specific to a given shipyard's manufacturing processes.

A material list for fitting ( MLF ) is prepared for each fit-

82
 )

Conventional-

FEASIBILITY STUDIES
CONCEPT DESIGN

BIDS
PRELIM. CONTRACT ANO DETAILED LEAD SHIP
DESIGN DESIGN AWARD DESIGN CONSTRUCTION

(YEARS)

Group Technology- I

similar to
the above Lead Ship

( years

A - Functional Design

B - Transition Design

C - Work Instruction Design

Figure 3.1 Conventional vs. Group Technology Design and

Engineering

83
ting work instruction. A material list for manufacturing a

pipe piece (MLP) or a material list for manufacturing any

other component ( MLC ) is prepared for each manufacturing

work instruction [1].

In addition to the altered design process and the dif-

ferences between group technology shipbuilding design and

conventional design already described, other major charac-

teristics of group technology design are:

* greater engineering detail is required

* design and engineering must be completed earlier

* material definition must be completed earlier

* greater coordination with production is required

* design and assembly details should be standardized.

Additional information must be provided by engineering and

the design must take into consideration additional factors.

These include:

* assembly sequences

* welding sequences

* tolerances, excess and edge preparation

* coating requirements

* subassembly, unit and block interfaces

* special tools needed for production

* work sites

* structural integrity of subassemblies, units and

blocks, both upright and upside down

* support and pick points for moving and turning sub-

84
 , ,

assemblies, units and blocks

* minimization of distortion of subassemblies, units

and blocks during turning and moving.

Some of this information may be provided by other shipyard

groups, such as mold loft, planning, or production, but

greater detail and more documentation is required than for

conventional shipbuilding. Overall, the engineering effort

is more intense in a group technology environment.

The Navy's principal influence in ship design and engi-

neering occurs during the basic design stage. It is there-

fore worthwhile to examine this stage in more detail in

order to discern the interactions that do, or should, occur

between the Navy and its shipbuilders early in a shipbuild-

ing program.

Contract plans and specifications are the output of

contract design, which is the last stage of basic design.

These documents provide a general overview of the ship to be

built and, as such, represent the ship in a systems orienta-

tion. Among the documents developed are:

* general arrangements
* ship ' s lines

* midship section,

* machinery arrangement,
* other specific space arrangements,

* diagrammat ics of major systems,

85
 * electric one-line diagrams,

* contract specifications.

Also, as part of the feasibility, preliminary, and contract

design processes, normal naval architectural calculations

are performed. Among these are:

* weight estimates,

* longitudinal strength,

* Bonjean curves,

* tank capacities,

* hydrostatics,

* intact trim and stability,

* damaged stability,

* loading conditions,

* wake survey,

* resistance,

* electric load analysis,

* HVAC analysis,

* propeller design,
* shafting arrangement.

Development of the building strategy is also considered

during basic design. This involves preliminary determina-

tion of the block plan, the breakdown for outfitting on-

unit, on-block, and on-board, and the preliminary determina-

tion of the outfit pallet list.

In a preliminary way, basic design:

* defines simple, logical block boundaries,

86
 * defines blocks of maximum size and weight allowed by

the yard's lifting and moving facilities,

* minimizes the number of blocks needed,

* minimizes scaffolding, lifting, and turnovers,
* identifies zone, problem area, and stage classifica-

tions for organizing work flows.

The block pre-def init ion mentioned above considers how to

efficiently fit components and machinery into compartments;

arrange deck machinery, mooring fittings, etc.; and perform

as much painting as possible before hull erection.

Basic design is also concerned with the development of

procurement specifications for long lead time and other

important outfit items. These include main engines, power

generating equipment, electric motors, steering gear,

nuclear propulsion equipment ( in the case of a nuclear-

powered ship), and combat system equipment [2].

3.2.2 Group Technology Design and Engineering -

Examples

We have seen that there is an intensification of the

engineering effort in a group technology environment. Table

3.1 summarizes this effect for the Navy's TAO 187 shipbuild-

ing program. The numbers for conventional construction were

estimated through discussion with Avondale Industries' Ship-

yard Division chief engineer during the TAO 187 program [3],

The group technology-related numbers were provided by Avon-

87
 Conventional Group Technology
Construction Construction

Total engineering man-hours 520,000 740,000

Percent complete at
fabrication start 40 80
Months from contract to
fabrication start 19 17
Man-hours per month prior to
fabrication start 10,900 34,800

Table 3.1 Engineering Efforts for the TAO 187 [3] [4]

»•• LAV
kAUMCM

ON

va »aoouCTioa e«AfT imoit uTinziaa

cenvtaTiOMAi. oitiaa ado co«it«uctio» »it«ooi

eoatatcT CAT
A«fA«« l.AUc^^• » ,,,,
o
Kill. l ,

MOOUCTIOH

v* raeeucTioa c««»t if«o<' uriuziaa

Figure 3.2 Avondale Industries' Design and Construction

Methods, Conventional vs. Current [5]

88
dale's Program Services Division. [4] As can be seen in

this table, the intensity of the engineering effort more

than tripled with the application of group technology meth-

ods. Figure 3.2 further demonstrates this. Of course, the

extra expense involved in this higher intensity effort is

worthwhile only if savings greater than the extra engineer-

ing expense are realized in the course of the production

effort. The shortened production period and earlier deliv-

ery date shown when using Avondale's current methods indi-

cate this was indeed the case for the TAO 187. See Figure

3.2 for details.

Theoretically, most or all of basic design should be

completed prior to contract signing. This poses a problem

for naval ship acquisition managers since the shipbuilder is

not determined until after contract design is completed and

much of the work done during basic design assumes a specific

shipbuilder has already been selected. Attempts were made

to solve this problem in the DDG 51, SSN 21, and TAGOS 19

programs and these will be discussed later.

The machinery arrangement drawings for the TAO 187 were

provided as contract guidance drawings and required modifi-

cations to suit Avondale's construction methods and produ-

cibility improvements. These changes included:

* revisions to suit the main engine purchased in lieu

of the engine assumed in the contract guidance drawings,

89
 , ,

* revisions to built-in tankage to suit system devel-

opments ,

* improved functional grouping of auxiliary systems and

components

* development of package unit boundaries to suit ove-

rall arrangements and construction sequence,

* minimizing equipment mounted directly on curved side

shell

* integration of ventilation and wireway routings into

space arrangements,

* integration of access and handling of main engine

special tools and spares into space arrangements,

* detailed development of systems to enable racking of

pipe runs, grouped deck and bulkhead penetrations, etc. [6],

Consideration of accessibility for operation and main-

tenance of all components throughout the ship's life was a

primary objective throughout the design process. This con-

sideration was consistent with basic shipyard producibility

considerations in that the greater the ease of accessibility

in the ship the greater the shipyard productivity.

Table 3.2 summarizes the results of various producibil-

ity and productivity measures undertaken in the machinery

spaces of the TAO 187. It should be noted that some weight

impacts are positive and some are negative. Although no

proof was offered, it is Avondale's position that the sum of

the weight impacts did not adversely affect the ship [7],

90
 Attribute Result

Weight 15% increase in

foundation weight

Pipe Footage 5% decrease in

piping footage

Accessibility Improved

Operability Improved

Maintainability Improved

Construction Cost 15% - 20% reduction

Construction Schedule Machinery Space Equip-

ment and System
Installation not on
the critical path of
ship construction

Table 3.2 TAO 187 Machinery Space Design and Construction

Results [7]

91
 When most or all of the drawings in the Navy's contract

design package are provided for "guidance only" , the con-

tractor has the maximum latitude for developing the detailed

design that best accommodates his build strategy and ship-

yard capabilities. However, there is a growing trend for

the Navy to make drawings in the contract design package

contract documents. This was true in the LSD 44 program and

is now true in the AOE 6 program. Such drawings, which have

not had the benefit of producibili ty considerations, will

result in higher ship construction costs, and possible oper-

ational limitations and contractual disputes.

In some programs the Navy has tried to come to grips

with this problem. These programs include the DDG 51, SSN

21, TAGOS 19, and LSD 44 (Cargo Variant) programs. For the

SSN 21 basic design phase there were only two qualified

shipyards and both participated heavily in preliminary and

contract design. For the LSD 44 (Cargo Variant) program,

NAVSEA awarded a contract for contract design to Avondale

Industries. Producibility , at least from Avondale's per-

spective, was thus assured to some degree. But since this

is basically a modified repeat design, there are still many

of the original contract drawing problems. Also, Avondale's

final design product had to be sufficiently general to

ensure other shipyards could bid on the detail design and

construction contract on a competitive basis with Avondale.

In the DDG 51 program, a great deal of industry input

92
 .

was requested prior to and during contract design. The var-

ious contractors were compensated for their efforts, but

only at a minimal level. Most spent far more than they were

paid for their efforts, considering it a calculated business

investment. In the end, one contract design package was

developed and it incorporated many producibili ty ideas, but

due to the competitive nature of the following detail design

and construction contract, no one shipyard's proposals could

be exclusively followed in the producibility area. Also in

spite of the open and generally productive atmosphere the

DDG 51 contract design was conducted in, it is probable that

some shipyards kept some of their best producibility ideas

to themselves and would have incorporated them into the

design only after winning the detail design and construction

contract

In the DDG 51 program two of the main basic design par-

ticipants, Bath Iron Works and Ingalls Shipbuilding Division

of Litton Industries, won the lead and follow yard con-

tracts, respectively. In the TAGOS 19 program, the basic

design was carried out in a manner similar to the DDG 51 's.

However, none of the seventeen initial participants in the

basic design process won the competition for the detail

design and construction of the first ship. This situation

will certainly not encourage shipbuilders to use their best

talent to assist in similar basic designs in the future,

especially when the compensation provided in these programs

93
 . .

has been minimal

3.2.3 Group Technology Design and Standardization

Standardization is the principle of design for produc-

tion that could theoretically lead to the greatest improve-

ments in productivity [8]. The discussion of group tech-

nology and PWBSs has emphasized the concept of organization

of work by problem area. The ultimate goal is to develop a

group of standard building blocks that can be combined to

produce very different final products.

Efforts at standardization are usually concentrated at

the component, subassembly, block, and outfit unit levels.

Standards may be classified in two groups [9]. These are

basic standards and standard drawings. Basic standards

include material and component standards, outfitting stan-

dards, design standards, production engineering standards,

and inspection standards. Standard drawings show typical

subassemblies and outfit units that may be used directly on

new designs or as guidance in preparing new drawings. Fig-

ure 3.3 organizes this classification of standards in more

detail

Figures 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 are simplified examples

of standard drawings for a structural subassembly, machinery

arrangement, piping layout, and outfit unit, respectively.

The widespread use of standards is easier to realize in

94
 1

r Hiw materia]
-SO teste components
(Basic iMicertii
standards) -SuacUrd fixings

'Design iu_acUxd»
-Produce on «ag.
— SOT- standards
(Eagineer'g 4ns pecaoa
Saipbldg. Jtandajds) standards
Standards
- SD1 Machinery Standard drwg.
-SD2 Practice drwir.
S03 Components k Amng
SD standard drwg.
(Standard -S04 Standard diagrams
drawings) -SOS Design manuals
"— SD6 Production manuals

Figure 3.3 Classification of Standards [9]

-U^±^i.J--A
&&
l

j -
r i

i(T!

O 0=
a p

ct: CL*__ J-f.

r 1

JL

Figure 3.4 Standard Structural Assembly Detail [8]

95
 FLAT ^4AK€ OIVISION
MAIN R.OOP PA2-4.7
^JEAS£ EXTRACTOR

SO 2 OBAIN PUMP

NO 2 *A IN CONO p UNP
NO I DRAIN PUMP
.NO I MAIN CONO PUMP
NO 2 L.O.PUMP ^_
NO I
"a
L.O.PUMP^-^Qi —T- 1

47
42 *4

A) BASE MOOULE
R.AT S4AME OIVISION
MAIN ?LOOR F42-*7 GREASE EXTBAC'OP-

ORAI n PUMP^f .
<rn\
NO 2 OPAINn pump .
.
Jj i-gv *%^ /
NO 2 MAIN CONO PUMP
NO ORAlN PUMP
I
:< ,1b
NO I MAIN COM3 PUMP -<"^ t. i±
NO 2 L.O.PUMP-
NO I
"a
L.O.PUMP^^Qj
47
42 44
I I I I I I I I I

(B) MOOIFIED MODULE

Figure 3.5 Standard Machinery Arrangement Module [8]

1 5 FOIO 092

ATKtSP>€PZC ORAIN v*
INACTION TV*

Figure 3.6 Standard Piping Layout Module [8]

96
Figure 3.7 Standard Outfit Unit Module [8]

97
commercial ship design and construction than in naval ship

programs. Over the years numerous Military Specifications

(MILSPECs) and Military Standards (MILSTDs) have been devel-

oped and routinely invoked in shipbuilding contracts. At

the time each was developed it responded to some real or

perceived need which resulted from a battle casualty, equip-

ment failure, personnel casualty, or similar problem.

Unfortunately, over the years not much effort has gone into

reviewing these MILSPECs and MILSTDs for current usefulness

and they have proliferated to the point where the whole sys-

tem has become unmanageable and to some extent, outdated.

There are numerous examples of MILSPECs which are still in

effect simply because they proved useful decades ago. Few

attempts have been made to update them after new materials,

technologies, or processes became available.

If, for example, a shipbuilder wished to use some new

structural detail or welding process which would enhance

producibility and reduce construction costs, the shipbuilder

would typically bear the responsibility, risk, and cost for

shock qualifying or otherwise obtaining approval of the new

detail or process. And then, even if this is done, the

approval is typically restricted to the class or type of

ship for which the approval was originally requested. In

such an environment, where contractors have little incentive

to improve the system, it is not surprising that attempts at

achieving standardization are few [10].

98
 3.2.4 Design Changes in a Group Technology
Engineering Environment

Design changes in naval ship acquisition programs are

very common. In fact, to deal with the large volume of

changes frequently encountered in a major combatant program,

the Navy has developed an extensive system which is more or

less standardized across various shipbuilding programs.

Design changes occur for a variety of reasons and

can be broadly broken down into two categories: changes that

occur due to Navy actions and changes that occur due to

contractor actions. These include:

* Navy
- correction of errors discovered in specifications

or contract drawings

- correction on follow ships of problems uncovered dur-

ing operation of the first ship of a class

- the desire to continually incorporate the latest

technology in combat systems and other ship systems

- different thinking and new preferences that develop

over time

- application of new rules and regulations

- new interpretations of existing rules and regula-

tions

- application of recommendations received after con-

tract award

99
 * Contractor
- revised fitting stages
- revised equipment or component locations
- revised manufacturing process
- revised material availability or sources
- revision of hull structure
- resolution of a design reservation.

A number of contractor changes are the inevitable result of

the calculated risk of allowing each of the outfit design

groups to simultaneously conduct functional, transition, and

work instruction design. Certain aspects of the design

progress conditionally, pending the resolution of interfer-

ence problems.

There is no doubt that group technology ship design and

construction is a much more change-intolerant environment

than conventional shipbuilding was. This is an anticipated

and natural consequence of a system that requires much more

documentation and, at the work instruction level, much more

paperwork in order to construct a ship. Also, the timing

and intensity of the engineering effort tend to make design

changes more expensive and have a greater impact on the

total effort. This greater expense and impact on the ship-

building program is justified only if the downstream savings

in ship construction costs and shorter construction sched-

ules more than compensate for the greater expense and impact

100
of design changes.

In the TAO 187 program a special effort was made to

hold the number of contract changes to a minimum. Items that

were "nice to have" but not essential were not considered.

Also, since the TAO 187 is an auxiliary ship and not a com-

batant, there is less of a concern with achieving the state-

of-the-art. There is also traditionally less Navy oversight

of auxiliary ship programs and so there are fewer possible

inputs for changes. To accommodate the few changes that did

occur (in the neighborhood of 100 [11]) a streamlined change

control process was instituted. This mainly involved the

NAVSEA program office giving more authority to the local

Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair office

for negotiating contract changes. As a result, the impact

of changes on the TAO 187 program was minimal and the first

four ships of this class were delivered on schedule and at

or under budget. This was true even though Avondale Indus-

tries has possibly the most advanced implementation of group

technology shipbuilding in the U. S. and is therefore pre-

sumably the most change-intolerant.

In the CG 47 and DDG 51 Aegis shipbuilding programs the

impact of changes has been much more severe. The CG 47

program has had literally tens of thousands of changes to

date. The large number was mainly due to the parallel

design efforts involved in the shipbuilding program and the

Aegis combat system development. Since the combat system

101
was planned for installation in an existing hull ( DD 963

design), the number of changes was actually less than other-

wise might have been expected. The effects of these changes

on the contractors' shipbuilding systems were mitigated by

the fact that neither Aegis shipbuilder had a fully devel-

oped group technology-related system at the start of the

Aegis shipbuilding program.

The same conditions do not exist in the DDG 51 program.

This program features a new hull design coupled with the

existing, but still very much developing, Aegis combat sys-

tem. The number of contract changes are expected to rival

that of the CG 47 program. To study the potential impact of

these changes, a study was made of representative changes in

the CG 47 and DDG 51 programs at both Bath Iron Works (BIW)

and Ingalls Shipbuilding (IS). The purpose of the study was

to obtain some measure of the engineering impact of changes

in a group technology environment.

BIW claims to have essentially a fully implemented

group technology shipbuilding system for the DDG 51 program,

while IS's system is not so fully developed. The changes

selected for evaluation were from among those that were

essentially the same for both the CG 47 and DDG 51 programs

from a production and ship impact standpoint. This allowed

for the comparison of engineering man-hours between the same

changes in the two yards to be used as a valid basis for

measuring the differences between the two yards' engineering

102
 .

departments

The changes considered were:

* addition of a light to the Officer of the Deck's

(OOD's) stand on the bridge

* increasing power of the weapons pallet truck by

changing the power supply voltage from 12 to 24 volts

* replacing the existing rudder stock seal with a new

type of seal to prevent leakage problems

* changing the control system for the ship's vertical

package conveyor system

* permanent installation of a strain gage shaft align-

ment system

* changing the gasket material in some fuel oil and

lube oil piping [12].

Table 3.3 gives an indication of the engineering impact of

these changes in a group technology engineering environment

No multi-system, single zone change was found. Such a

change could be the addition of a damage control locker to

the ship. One zone might be affected but numerous piping

and electrical systems would need do be rerouted to make

room for the space.

A multi-system, multi-zone change will generally have

the greatest impact on the engineering effort in terms of

man-hours required to process the change in a group tech-

nology engineering environment. For this reason the gasket

material change will now be considered in detail. It must

103
 Single Multi- Single Multi-
System system System system

Single Single Multi- Multi-

Zone Zone zone Zone

00D light

Pallet truck

Rudder stock
seal

Vertical
package
conveyor

Strain gage

Gasket
material

Direction of greater
engineering impact

Table 3.3 Engineering Impact of Selected Changes in the

CG 47 and DDG 51 Shipbuilding Programs [12]

104
be remembered that this analysis applies to only the engi-

neering portion of the change.

In April of 1985, NAVSEA directed the replacement of

asbestos-filled spiral-wound gaskets with non-asbestos spi-

ral-wound paper/chlorite AMFU gaskets for raised-flange

applications [13]. Unfortunately, these gaskets leaked when

used in fuel and lube oil systems. Eventually, after par-

tial testing, a decision was made to use non-asbestos spi-

ral-wound graphite-filled gaskets. It is interesting to

note that test results did not conclusively confirm that the

graphite-filled gaskets will solve the leakage problems and

another solution may need to be found in the future.

From a material standpoint this change simply involves

substituting one type of gasket for another. The number of

gaskets totaled 1415, of 57 different types, ranging in size

from 1/4 inch to 10 inches. From a production standpoint,

the installation of these gaskets may prove more difficult

than for the asbestos-filled ones. This is because a higher

quality flange face finish, truer pipe alignment, and

greater torque are required to ensure leak-free operation.

Generally, these material and production aspects are of

equal consequence to both yards. However, the engineering

effort, in terms of man-hours required to implement this

change, varies considerably from BIW to IS.

Table 3.4 gives a breakdown of the engineering-related

man-hours required to implement this change at BIW. A simi-

105
 ,

Number of Estimated
Documents Man-hours

"Drawings" 18 280

CAD documents 48 3,560

and files

Supervision and
staff 516

Checking 430

Production
planning 172
and control

Finance and
administration 91

Administrative 225

TOTAL .5,274 man-hours

or 2.54 man-years

Notes : "Drawings" includes actual drawings,

BIW engineering standards, and other
engineering documents.

CAD documents and files includes CAD

system changes, computer data set models,
and material lists.

Table 3.4 Engineering-related Man-hours for the DDG 51

Spiral-wound Gasket Filler Material Change [12]

106
lar breakdown was not available for IS but the total number

of engineering-related man-hours required to implement this

change was approximately 10% of the total shown in Table

3.4. This large difference for essentially the same engi-

neering change is mostly attributable to BIW's CAD implemen-

tation and the expense of altering and reissuing numerous

documents at the detail work instruction level. Similar

differences for other changes are common in the Aegis pro-

gram and account for the skeptical attitude toward group

technology shipbuilding exhibited by some Aegis program per-

sonnel. It is the opinion of the Technical Director for the

DDG 51 shipbuilding program that more conventional ship

design methods should be used for major combatants, at least

for the first few ships of the class. Then, after most

changes have been processed, a more economical transition to

the work instruction level of detail could be accomplished.

While this approach might reduce the cost of the engi-

neering portion of changes and make them easier to accept

politically, it might also have the effect of increasing

ship production costs. The cost of engineering changes must

be evaluated in the context of the entire shipbuilding pro-

gram .

3.2.5 Group Technology Design Products

It has been mentioned previously that with the advent

of group technology design and engineering, shipbuilders

107
have been freed from the need to develop individual detail

system arrangement drawings. This has caused great concern

among some sectors of the NAVSEA ship design community [14].

Traditionally, detail system arrangement drawings have been

used for planning future ship alteration (SHIPALT) and over-

haul work packages. With these drawings no longer developed

by the shipbuilder, some systems engineers believe they will

not have the resources required for adequate SHIPALT and

overhaul planning. However, the information typically con-

tained in detail system arrangement drawings can be found in

detail zone arrangement drawings. In addition, other infor-

mation not generally found on detail system arrangement

drawings, such as system interferences, is available. As a

result, detail zone arrangement drawings may prove to be

more useful as planning documents than detail system arran-

gement drawings. The biggest problem will be overcoming the

institutional mindset that believes detail system arrange-

ment drawings are necessary [15].

Another problem is concerned with the format of zone

drawings. At this time each shipbuilder has his own method

of developing them. Typically the drawings include redun-

dant information with both the Navy's and the contractor's

nomenclature included. And in some cases, too many systems

are included on one sheet of the same drawing. All of this

results in cluttered and difficult to read drawings. In

order to alleviate these problems the Navy needs to develop

108
 . ) .

a standardized zone drawing format and invoke it in ship-

building contracts, as MILSTD 100 and MILSTD 1000 are now

invoked [ 16] { 17]

3.3 CAD/CAM

Computers were initially used in the shipbuilding

industry as accounting tools. Their application has

expanded dramatically over the years and the many current

uses of the computer in shipyards has expanded beyond the

capability implied by the term CAD/CAM. A list of modern

computer-aided functions could include:

* computer-aided design (CAD)
* computer-aided drafting
* computer-aided engineering ( CAE

* computer-aided manufacturing (CAM)

* computer-aided material definition

* computer-aided process planning ( CAPP )

Other than the above items, computer applications in ship-

building have grown to include:

* estimating
* accounting

* purchasing
* numerical control (N/C) operations

* robotics

* accuracy control
* quality assurance

109
 : . .

* inventory control

As a result, the term CAD/CAM may be somewhat misleading. A

more descriptive term is computer-integrated manufacturing

(CIM). The major problem now facing shipbuilders in the

application of CIM is the lack of a unified shipbuilding

data base that provides the capability of interfacing with

all the applications mentioned above [18]. The relationship

of the data base to the design cycle and its outputs is

shown in Figure 3.8. Information required in the data base

includes

* numerical and geometrical data on past designs

* weight and space scaling relationships

* systems and equipment

* structural design data

* resistance and propulsion data

* cost data

* typical block plans

* typical outfit plans

* shipyard and military standards and specifications

* material lists.

Implementation of a CIM system permits the evaluation

of additional design options as well as consideration of

alternate building strategies. Computer-generated plans,

lists, and work instructions may be used for the various

design cycle stages as well as for shipbuilding management

functions

110
 BASIC DESIGM- COMPUTE* *• CONTRACT PLANS
STAGS DATA BASE

DESIGN REFINEMENT

COMPUTER
DATA SASE UPDATED CONTRACT PLANS

FINAL 122 SCANTLINGS

COMPUTES KEY PLANS

DATA BASE UPDATED CONTRACT PLANS

SHIPYARD CONSTRUCTION
REQUIREMENTS * PLANNING
(E.J., WELDING, PIECE nARKS
SLOCK NUMBERS i ETC.)

COMPUTER YARD PLANS

DATA 3AS: -» UPDATED KEY. PLANS
UPDATED CONTRACT PLANS

LOFTING INFORMATION
'ERECTION STOCK
REQUIREMENTS)

COMPUTER
DATA BASE

NUMERICAL CONTROL
LOFTING (N/C) TAPES
AND WORK INSTRUCTIONS

Figure 3.8 The Relationship of a Shipbuilding Data

Base to the Ship Design Process [19]

111
 The ultimate goal of a CIM system is improvement in

shipbuilding productivity. Among the manifestations of

increased productivity are:

* the ability to produce concept and feasibility ship

design studies more quickly and accurately

* the ability to rapidly evaluate design options and

choose the optimum one

* the ability to perform design calculations with

greater confidence due to having a proven data base

* the ability to transfer data in digital form to ship-

yard design offices and manufacturing facilities

* the ability to establish and use shipyard standards.

A coordinated system should lead to simplification of all

aspects of the design and production process. See Figure

3.9 for a descriptive summary.

A recent attempt to improve the state-of-the-art in

CAD/CAM implementation has taken place in the SSN 21 pro-

gram. NAVSEA, together with the Electric Boat Division of

General Dynamics, Inc. and Newport-News Shipbuilding and

Drydock , Inc. have implemented the National Bureau of Stan-

dards Initial Graphics Interchange Specification ( IGES ) on

the detail design of the submarine. This allows the two

shipyards, with their different and normally incompatible

brands of CAD/CAM equipment, to exchange all forms of digi-

tal data between their two design departments.

112
 TAPE TO OWNER FOR
APPROVAL OF OESIGN

TAPE TO CLASSIFICATION
SOCIETY FOR APPROVAL OF
DESIGN

DITTO TO REGULATORY BODY

WORK STATION DATA

STRUCTURE
PIPE
HVAC
ELECTRICAL /OUTFIT
NC AND OTHER STRUCTURE
PROCESSING DATA

PIPE PROCESSING DATA

SHEET METAL PROCESSING

DATA

Figure 3.9 Advanced Integrated CAD/CAM Network [19

113
 As mentioned earlier, a fully developed CIM system

requires the development of a unified shipbuilding data

base. Part of this development involves the preparation of

a "standard library" which contains a considerable level of

information covering standard outfit items. This library

requires many man-hours and is a task unto itself, necessi-

tating verification prior to using it to prepare interferen-

ce-free working drawings. Experience has shown that, while

optimistic forecasts of advanced CAD/CAM installations have

eventually been successful, they have not very often been

put into service within their required schedule [20]. Such a

realization caused the project team for the Service Life

Extension Program for the USS Kitty Hawk ( CV 63) to modify

its original plans for use of group technology on the pro-

gram [ 21 ] .

CAD/CAM projects currently being pursued within the

Navy generally fall under the cognizance of the DoD program

known as Computer Aided Logistic Support ( CALS ) . CALS was
initiated in 1985 by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in an

effort to achieve major improvements in weapon system

designs, and to improve the accuracy, timeliness, and use of

logistic technical information. The ultimate goal is to

move from current paper- intensive weapon system support pro-

cesses to a largely automated and integrated system [22].

Figure 3.10 provides a graphic presentation of a notional

114
CALS system.

NAVSEA has identified two intermediate goals in support

of CALS. They are:

* identify and specify the digital products that are to

be received at the conclusion of each ship acquisition and

support phase and

* have the facilities and software in place to receive

those digital products and use them as the basis for all

support activities [23].

The principal technical problem to be solved is finding

a way for computer communication links to be made among the

varied and numerous participants. Figure 3.11 shows a flow

chart of the CALS process. The lettered arrows are the

communications links. A joint industry/Navy committee has

been formed to research this problem. It is called The

Navy/Industry Digital Data Exchange Steering Committee.

Demonstration data transfer projects are currently underway

in the DDG 51 program and, as already mentioned, in the SSN

21 program. These programs have been mainly concerned with

the links lettered "A" and "B" in Figure 3.11.

115
 FOLLOW YARD
NAVSEA DESIGN AGENT SHIPBUILDER PLANNING YARD
DIGITIZED
CAO/CAE ENGINEERING
PRELIMINARY/
DETAILED DESIGN
CAM
DESIGN DATA/
CONTRACT DESIGN PRODUCT MOOEL PRODUCT MOOEL
DATA INTEGRATE RAM

SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS
INFLUENCE
NAVSEA
DESIGN
CALS * SHIPBOARD
LSA SYSTEM NETWORK MCLUOMG STORAGE
REPOSITORIES * RETRIEVAL

SUPPORTABILITY
FEEDBACK
DESIGN AGENT/NAVY THRU
EXPERT SYSTEMS MAINTENANCE
a HISTORY DATA.
AUTOMATED DIGITAL LOGISTICS PRODUCTS
ETC.
PROCESSES

Figure 3.10 Notional CALS System [23]

116
 EARLY STAGE
DESIGN
(NAVSCA/AOENT)

LEAD VARO

O.D. A CONST.

FOLLOW VARO

0.0. A CONST.

LOGISITCS SUPPORT MANAGERS

LOGISTIC SUPPORT
TECN DATA
© FLEET
PRO00CT ©
GENERATION TRAINING

SUPPLY © DATA
REPOSITORY
PLANNING VARO ©
(NAVV/COMLI ©
OTHER NAVY
USES

MODERNIZATION
I NAVY/COM L >

TIME

Figure 3.11 Principal Data Transfer Interfaces in a CALS

System [23]

117
3 . 4 Work Breakdown Structures WBS and Cost and ( )

Schedule Control Systems (C/SCS)

Navy shipbuilding contracts routinely call for WBSs

and require that they conform with MILSTD 881A, which is

entitled "Work Breakdown Structures for Defense Material

Items". In addition, shipbuilding contracts frequently

require adherence to further Navy-defined WBSs. Two that

are currently invoked are called the ship work breakdown

structure ( SWBS ) and the expanded ship work breakdown

structure (ESWBS). ESWBS was briefly described in Section

2.3.3. Their most important feature is that both are organ-

ized along functional or ship system lines.

The WBS that makes the most sense for group technology-

oriented shipbuilders, however, is a product oriented work

breakdown structure ( PWBS ) . This was described in detail in

Section 2.3.3. Further, Chapter 32, Part 196 of the Code of

Federal Regulations, entitled "Work Breakdown Structures for

Defense Material Items", requires that government contrac-

tors have complete flexibility in extending the generic WBSs

described in MILSTD 881A (see Appendix A) to reflect how the

contractor's work is to be accomplished. This has led some

people, both shipbuilder and Navy personnel, to contend that

the Navy-imposed SWBS and ESWBS are therefore, at best,

unneeded documents, and are, at worst, illegal documents

[24] .

If this conflict between Navy requirements for a tra-

ditional system-oriented WBS and contractor requirements for

118
 .

a product-oriented WBS , which reflects the way the ship is

actually constructed and managed, is not resolved, ship-

builders will continue to manage by one system and report to

the Navy by another. The inefficiencies and inaccuracies

that result are not only expensive but also lead to the Navy

not being able to adequately monitor cost and schedule

progress

The Navy's SWBS was originally issued in March 1973 as

a structured system (3-digit numbers providing 5 levels of

breakdown) which was intended for use in specification pre-

paration, cost estimating, cost progressing, management,

weight control, drawing numbering, shipyard job order cod-

ing, and similar purposes. ESWBS provides two additional

levels of breakdown of functional systems so that ESWBS can

be used for logistic support, maintenance, and life cycle

support purposes. ESWBS is now being specified contractu-

ally and is used as the basis for C/SCS reporting. Appendix

B provides more details.

As described in Section 2.3.3, the PWBS was developed

to support group technology shipbuilding. As such, it pro-

vides a natural breakdown for schedule reporting and for

collection of financial data as required by C/SCS instruc-

tions. A shipbuilder's PWBS is hardware or product-

oriented, and is consistent with the methods of planning,

scheduling, and construction actually being used by the

119
shipbuilder. Appendix C provides further details.

Effective management control must be based on the items

or products produced. The PWBS used on a particular ship-

building program should be based on the products produced

and on the coding system used within the shipbuilder's man-

agement structure. For example, on the LSD 44 program at

Avondale Industries, Inc., ships are fabricated by assemb-

ling units which are numbered from 000 to 799. The units'

locations are usually determined by the digit in the

hundred's column. Material is scheduled and assembled by

unit number and work is budgeted and authorized by units or

groups of units. The unit number is the focal point of the

PWBS and units are easily summarized by series: 100, 200,

etc., for reporting purposes. Where there is a process or

effort which spans unit boundaries, the definition of MILSTD

881A are used to define these efforts and are summarized at

the series level for reporting. Other activities such as

testing, program management, or other services are similarly

summarized to coincide with MILSTD 881A definitions at lev-

els 2 and 3. All of the reporting is developed and used to

manage, control, and report financial status directly from

the labor and material coding used in Avondale 's accounting

system. If reporting was done based on an ESWBS system, the

information would somehow have to be back-allocated into the

traditional functional or system categories. This would be

needlessly time-consuming and probably inaccurate for both

120
schedule and cost reporting. Figure 3.12 depicts the physi-

cal ship elements of the LSD 44 program contract WBS and

Table 3.5 describes all summary elements. Figure 3.13 is a

portion of the program's responsibility assignment matrix

(RAM). The element numbers in the matrix indicate summary

work package numbers. A review of the RAM quickly discloses

which work group (with the name of the corresponding work

group superintendent) is responsible for its portion of the

work in a particular zone or within a particular element.

The initial steps to resolve the conflicts between

shipbuilder and Navy desires regarding WBSs have been taken

[27]. At an industry conference on WBSs attended by repre-

sentatives of various shipbuilders, NAVSEA, ASN(S&L), and

the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), a decision was

made for the industry conferees to submit their requested

revisions of MILSTD 881A to the Navy and OSD for review. An

ad hoc industry committee was formed and prepared a proposal

which was submitted to representatives of OSD, ASN(S&L), and

NAVSEA at a follow-up meeting on September 24, 1987 [28].

The recommendations were well-received by the government

attendees and a formal response to the industry position was

promised by October 28, 1987. Unfortunately, the Navy has

been unable to obtain the approval of the other services for

the proposed changes to the MILSTD. This stems from the

other services' reluctance to approve a WBS which allows

121
 I 1

90) 104

J — / I

1 L .,/
U)
!

1*9
1
|».
10)
1 1) "^n
702 '11 /
11) ,„ 10) its 113 111
u* 1*4 139 »4 '••/
!)• !!• t 11* 10* 10* 11* 124 701
1)1 '" 111 101 10) 11) 111 Ul 14) 10
1)1
» 111 121 in
i
3
212 101 104 11* ui 132 U) Ml TOO
1

/ 1

11 u

MSC 2M MM 10* MM M» mm 'oe

. 1

Figure 3.12 LSD 44 Program Contract WBS Physical

Elements [25]

122
 . .

Contract WBS Element Description

or Zone

000 Includes units which are special

fabrications installed through-
out the ship. Work under this
element includes material man-
,

power, inspection test, super-

vision, and the effort to in-
stall government furnished
equipment

100 Includes units between frames

43 and 98 and baseline to the
02 level.

200 Includes units between frames

98 and 137 and baseline to the
main deck level

300 Includes units between frames

13.2 and 43 and baseline to the
02 level.

400 Includes units between frames

13.2 and 92 and above 02 level.

500 Includes units between frames

92 and the stern and above the
main deck.

600 Includes units between frames

137 and the stern and from
baseline to the main deck.

700 Includes units between the stem

and frame 13.2 and from base-
line to the main deck.

Ship Assembly Includes efforts and material

associated with the ship as a
whole and which cannot be
identified with other zones.

Table 3.5 Description of Contract WBS Elements for

the LSD 44 Shipbuilding Program [25]

123
 ) . . .

Contract WBS Element Description

or Zone

Integration/ Includes labor and material for

Engineering the design of the ship.

Program Management Includes efforts and material

to provide management necessary
to ensure cost, schedule, and
technical performance under the
contract

Test and Evaluation Includes efforts and material

to conduct all testing for the
ship

Data Includes all deliverable data

to be submitted, as listed on
contract data requirements
list

Spares, Support, Includes efforts and material

Jigs, and Dies necessary to procure, handle,
and store spare components,
assemblies, repair parts, and
special production equipment,
etc

Table 3.5 Description of Contract WBS Elements for

the LSD 44 Shipbuilding Program [25]
(continued

124
 \JO •* LSO 44 LSD "

1, 1
, 1 1 ,1,1,1
«? J
S ii
*' I?
¥ !

EL

Figure 3.13 A Portion of the LSD 44 Program Responsibility

Assignment Matrix [26]

125
for transitions from a system to a zone and then back to a

system orientation. Even within the Navy there is opposi-

tion to this process because of fear that every shipbuilder

would try to avail itself of a unique cost performance

reporting system. It appears at this time that the use of

MILSTD 881A as the vehicle to establish the so-called "two

track" reporting system may not be feasible. Nevertheless,

ASN(S&L) and NAVSEA appear committed to finding a way to

facilitate the use of a PWBS . NAVSEA is preparing an

internal decision paper on the issue and it is expected in

the very near future.

3 . 5 Learning Curve Effects in Group Technology

Shipbuilding

It is widely believed that the group technology

approach to shipbuilding is worthwhile for even one-of-kind

ships. And, of course, as more ships of the same class are

built, further savings accrue due to decreased production

costs. But does the data indicate these savings are con-

stant or is there any evidence that savings continue to

increase as the number of ships produced increases? In

other words, does any "learning" take place? To help answer

this question, the TAO 187 shipbuilding program at Avondale

Industries, Inc. was considered. Table 3.6 shows the

results of examining the cost data summary reports prepared

for the TAO 187, 188, 189, and 190. It is clear that some

slight benefit arises from series production. As was noted

126
 Ship Recurring Production Costs

TAO 187 1 .000

TAO 188 0.991

TAO 189 0.943

TAO 190 0.938

Note : Data are reported on a relative basis with

the recurring costs for the TAO 187 set
arbitrarily to 1.000. This was done due to
the proprietary nature of the cost data.

Table 3.6 Recurring Ship Production Costs for the

TAO 187 Program [29]

127
 .

earlier, few changes were made during the course of this

shipbuilding program. This is the only military shipbuild-

ing contract that has been completed and has used the group

technology approach from beginning to end. (More TAOs are

being built under new contracts.) It will be interesting in

to analyze the return costs for other shipbuilding programs

at other shipyards in the future to see if there is evidence

of this slight learning trend or if there are more dramatic

results

128
 .

REFERENCES TO CHAPTER 3

1. Storch, R. E., Hammon, C. P., Bunch, H. M., Ship

Production , Cornell Maritime Press, Centreville, Maryland,
1988.

2. Ibid.

3. Private communication with Mr. Alan Nierenberg,

Avondale Industries, 24 March 1988.
4. Private communication with Mr. Eric Houin, Avondale
Industries, 24 March 1988.

5. TAO 188 Keel Laying Ceremony Program, Avondale

Industries, 17 December 1984.

6. Private communication with Mr. Alan Nierenberg, op

ci t

7. Ibid.

8. Storch, R. E., op cit.

9. Ichinose, Y., "Improving Shipyard Production with

Standard Components and Modules", SNAME STAR Symposium,
1978.

10. Private communication with Mr. Alan Nierenberg, op

ci t

11. Ibid.

12. Private communication with Mr. Randall Fortune,

DDG 51 Program Office Technical Director, NAVSEA, 21 March
1988, some data received 9 April 1988.

13. NAVSEA letter 112002Z of April 1985.

14. Private communication with Mr. Vince Copolla, NAV-

SEA Fluid Systems Branch Head, 21 March 1988.

15. Private communication with Mr. Andy Summers, DDG 51

Ship Design Manager, NAVSEA, 21 March 1988.

16. Ibid.

17. Private communication with Dr. James Wilkins, Wil-

kins Enterprises, Kenner, Louisiana, 24 March 1988.

18. Storch, R. E., op cit.

129
 19. Lamb, T., "CAD/CAM in Shipbuilding", Washington
Society of Professional Engineers, Bremerton, Washington,
January 1983.
,

" 20. "Report on Survey of Philadelphia Naval Shipyard

and Recommendations on Application of Zone Logic Technology
to Hull Expansion Project of USS Kitty Hawk CV-63", IHI
Marine Technology, Inc., New York, November 1986.

21. Ibid.

22. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum to all Ser-

vice Secretaries, 24 September 1985.

23. Higgins, J. A., "Naval Ship Production in Commer-

cial Shipyards: Technical Status and Future Opportunities",
Technical Report 1-87, Stanley Associates, 15 February 1987.

24. Private conversation with Mr. Chuck Sell, ASN(S&L)

Staff, August 1987.

25. Program documents for the LSD 44 shipbuilding

obtained from Avondale Industries, Inc., 1987.

26. Ibid.

27. Industry Conference on Work Breakdown Structures,

sponsored by the Shipbuilders Council of America, New
Orleans, Louisiana, 28 & 29 July 1987.

28. Follow-up meeting on Work Breakdown Structures,

sponsored by the Shipbuilders Council of America, Arlington,
Virginia, 23 & 24 September 1987.

29. Cost Data Summary Reports for the TAO 187 Ship-
building Program, Avondale Industries, Inc., 31 December
1987.

130
 .

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4 . 1 Conclusions

As was noted in Section 2.1.6, the strategies used in

today's naval ship acquisition programs are decided on a

case-by-case basis at the beginning of each acquisition pro-

gram. The approach taken is articulated in the program's

acquisition plan. The technical and managerial complexities

associated with the design and construction of modern naval

ships make such an approach preferable to the rigid

approaches used in the past. This is particularly true

today since the building capabilities of potential ship-

builders must be taken into account at the beginning of the

program if the Navy is to obtain the best ship for the

stated mission in the shortest period of time at the least

cost

The group technology-based design and construction

methods employed today by successful U. S. shipbuilders have

significant effects on the manner in which NAVSEA approaches

its primary task of ship acquisition. It has been argued

that in today's technical environment NAVSEA must be aware

of the specific capabilities of all of its potential ship-

builders if it is to obtain the best ships for the tax-

payers' money. And in today's political and economic envi-

ronment, with the Navy entering what will undoubtedly be a

131
 .

period of prolonged budget shortfalls in its shipbuilding

program, it is essential that the Navy make every effort to

obtain the most "bang for the buck" . By encouraging and

supporting modern group technology shipbuilding and promot-

ing attention to produci bi li ty among its shipbuilders, the

Navy will be the ultimate recipient of the benefits which

accrue

Recent design efforts have included attempts to ensure

that producibility is given a high priority. The AOE 6 pro-

gram held several design reviews with prospective shipbuild-

ers to identify producibility improvements in the design.

The DDG 51 design had a group of shipbuilders review the

design and perform separate studies to evaluate various pro-

ducibility concepts. The SWATH TAGOS program collocated a

diverse group of shipbuilders with the NAVSEA design team

and used their suggestions to improve the producibility of

the design. The SSN 21 program took steps to ensure that

both submarine shipbuilders in this country addressed produ-

cibility in their design efforts. All of these efforts

have heightened the sensitivity of NAVSEA's designers and

the Navy's shipbuilders to designing naval ships with produ-

cibility in mind. As indicated earlier, the benefactor of

these efforts is the Navy. It has received better ships for

fewer dollars in a shorter period of time. It is therefore

in the Navy's best interests to do even more to ensure that

producibility and the other attendant benefits of group

132
 . . .

technology shipbuilding are realized in the future. Spe-

cific areas in which the Navy should concentrate its efforts

are now suggested.

4 . 2 Recommendations
As has been discussed, significant advances have been

made in implementing group technology methods in naval

shipbuilding and in improving the producibility of Navy

ships. However, there are specific areas in the naval ship

acquisition process where further improvements can be made.

These changes and improvements should help to further

increase productivity and reduce ship construction times and

costs

In the areas of CAD/CAM, WBSs, and C/SCSs , specific

recommendations are:
* The Computer Aided Logistics Support program deserves

strong support from the highest levels in DoD and the Navy.

It has great potential for very large cost savings for the

Navy.

* The joint Navy/Industry Digital Data Exchange Steer-

ing Committee should be encouraged and their efforts

expanded

* Efforts to include public shipyards and shipyard

equipment vendors in the CALS program and NIDDESC should be

encouraged

133
 * The Navy needs to find a way to facilitate the use of

product work breakdown structures among all its shipbuild-

ers. It might be as simple as changing the Cost Performance

Reporting Handbook issued by NAVSEA and ensuring that con-

tract requirements are revised to reflect the new systems.

If this is not done the Navy will continue to impose need-

less extra work on its shipbuilders and receive cost and

schedule data of doubtful quality and usefulness.

As was pointed out in Section 2.2, the genesis for much

of the current progress in naval ship producibili ty and

group technology shipbuilding was the National Ship Research

Program (NSRP). This program can continue to save the Navy

money in three ways. One is to continue on the present

course of solving productivity and producibili ty problems in

new ship construction. The second is to use some of the

NSRP initiatives and methodologies in ship repair, overhaul,

and modernization. In the years to come new construction

will decline and the importance of maintaining and moderni-

zing ships economically will increase. The third area to

reap additional savings is in applying NSRP initiatives and

methodologies to the Navy's vendor community. Emphasis in

the past has been on applying producibil ity concepts to the

prime contractor in a shipbuilding program, namely, the

shipbuilder. It is important to remember, though, that

today the cost of a modern warship system is divided almost

134
equally between the ship itself and its combat system and

other government furnished equipment. Applying group tech-

nology to the vendor community should therefore be worth-

while and should be pursued.

In the Navy's attempts to find ways to save money in

the next few years, much attention will be given to justify-

ing current research and development programs. The NSRP is

a program which has paid and continues to pay for itself

many times over. What it lacks, though, is a program cham-

pion to save it from the budgeteer's ax. It is in the best

interests of the Navy and the NSRP to correct this defi-

ciency immediately and for the Navy to continue to support

the NSRP.

The greatest productivity and producibility gains of

the future may come in the area of combatant ship design.

This is because this area has historically been the most

constrained due to issues of ship safety, survivability, and

maintainability. Design practice changes will be driven by

the severe cost constraints placed on today's naval ships

and by the involvement of shipbuilders in the design pro-

cess. This involvement has heightened NAVSEA ship design-

ers' sensitivity to the benefits of producibility. NAVSEA

must provide designs which enable the application of ship-

yard producibility expertise.

The conventional wisdom has been that since ship con-

135
struction facilities and methods vary widely among ship-

yards, the Navy cannot tailor a contract design for a spe-

cific shipbuilder. Perhaps this indicates that the Navy

should get out of the contract design business. It might be

more advantageous for the Navy to award contract design con-

tracts to all shipbuilders interested in a specific program.

Each shipbuilder could then maximize the producibili ty meth-

ods used in its own shipyard and provide the Navy with a

contract design which is most economical for it to produce.

Such an environment requires that the Navy minimize the num-

ber of contract drawings and maximize the amount of informa-

tion given for guidance only. The increased costs incurred

from multiple contract design efforts should be more than

offset by the decrease in production costs realized from

allowing the winning shipyard to maximize the use of its

producibility methods.

It is recognized that this approach may be too radical

for the Navy bureaucracy, and in particular for NAVSEA, to

accept. Other approaches may be more acceptable. There are

many potential early stage design producibility concepts

which could be beneficially applied by all modern shipbuild-

ers and these are now suggested.

Contract guidance drawings that identify functionally

related package units could be developed as part of the pre-

liminary design process. Basic entities such as fuel oil

136
 .

pump and heater packages, lube oil filter and cooler pack-

ages, auxiliary sea water pump packages, main engine jacket

water pump and cooler packages, modularized berthing com-

partments, etc. are certainly identifiable at early stages

of design and, regardless of the shipbuilder selected, the

most cost effective and operationally viable arrangement of

these packages or systems could be obtained.

Other general concepts have been identified and form a

core group of opportunities for enhancing producibi 1 i ty

They should be evaluated in specific designs where they are

applicable. They include:

* Hull Form:

- use of parallel midbodies and flat bottoms

- maximum use of flat plates

- minimal use of compound curves
- minimal use of combined shear and camber
- use of flat, rather than curved, transoms.

* Structures (Most suggestions in this area would

require significant changes to MILSPECs and MILSTDs, as

alluded to in Section 3.2.3):

- maximum use of uniform plate sizes
- use of flat bars or angles as stiffeners

- use of lapped or bracketed end connections for

stiffeners
- maximum use of uniform stiffener sizes
- use of flat innerbottoms

137
 .

- running deck longitudinals parallel to the ship

centerline at the bow and stern.

* Arrangements:
- grouping functionally related compartments together
- as describe earlier, arranging equipment to aid in

the preoutf i tting of package units.

* Machinery:
- increasing commonalty of equipment (standardiza-

tion )

- centralizing parts of a system to minimize piping

runs

- using commercial equipment where acceptable

- arranging equipment to allow for installation

access

* Combat Systems

- using modular systems

- distributing combat system support services verti-

cally using armored trunks.

In order for NAVSEA designers to consider and evaluate

producibility concepts, there are certain actions NAVSEA

should take. These include:

* training ship design engineers in modern ship con-

struction practices and producibility concepts (It should

be mentioned here that the Education and Training Panel of

the Ship Production Committee of SNAME is now in the process

138
 )

of developing a certificate course in manufacturing engi-

neering and ship production.

* developing evaluation methodologies and cost estima-

ting relationships to allow evaluation of producibility

concepts during early stage design (The lack of non-

proprietary numerical data will make this task difficult

and poses a separate problem in itself.)

* considering changes to the ship design process which

will facilitate design for modular construction during early

design stages

* developing standard design practices to include pro-

ducibility in ship designs

* developing a lessons learned mechanism that provides

feedback or communication with shipbuilders and researchers

in the ship producibility area.

It must be kept in mind that design for producibility

is only one of many design considerations. Adoption of

alternatives for enhanced producibility must be based on

analyses of their impacts on other design considerations and

life cycle costs. To do this will require knowledge of cost

factors and modern ship production technology. For example,

it has been suggested that selection of slightly larger

ships, which are more producible, is preferable to selection

of more costly and less producible, but more compact, ships.

This argument implies that heavier systems for machinery or

139
 .

structure are likely to be chosen in favor of lighter, but

less producible, ones. When this situation is evaluated

with regard to increased life cycle costs incurred due to

propelling a larger, heavier ship through the water for sev-

eral decades, the ultimate decision might be to use the less

producible design. Therefore, producibil ity concepts which

significantly affect ship performance (the heavier ship will

also be slower), or which significantly affect other design

considerations or life cycle costs, should be evaluated as

trade-offs. Other producibility concepts which will reduce

the cost of ship construction and which have no significant

impact on these other areas should be eagerly accepted and

encouraged

140
APPENDICES

141
 . .

APPENDIX A

MILSTD 881A (25 April 1975)

Work Breakdown Structures for Defense Material Items

MILSTD 881A is mandatory for:

- All defense material items (or major modifications)

being established as an integral program element of the

5-year Defense Plan ( FYDP )

- All defense material items (or major modifications)

being established as a project within an aggregated program

element where the project is estimated to exceed $100 mil-

lion in RDT&E financing, and

- All production follow-on of the above.

Functional or System Orientation

- It establishes criteria governing the preparation and

employment of WBSs
- It establishes a standard system-oriented family tree

of hardware, services and data.

MILSTD 881A rules and practices include the following:

- A preliminary contract WBS shall be identified in the

government's solicitation.
- The project summary WBS is structured by the DoD com-

ponent .

- The contract WBS will be negotiated with each indi-

vidual contractor.

142
 .

- The contractor shall extend the negotiated WBS to

lower levels to form a project WBS.

- Contractors may propose changes to the preliminary

WBS during negotiation.

- Preordained structure shall not be imposed on the

contractor
- Configuration items will be identified as WBS ele-

ments .

- Families of specifications and drawings which result

from systems engineering activities shall conform to the

evolved project WBS.

- The contract WBS shall serve as a framework for the

contractor's management control system which will provide

auditable or otherwise traceable summarizations of internal

data generated by his performance measurement procedures.

- Integrated Logistics Support shall be accommodated by

the summary level WBS.

- Reporting requirements shall be consistent with the

contract WBS.
- The lowest level of the extended contract WBS for

project planning control and support shall reflect the way

the work is actually performed. (This is not possible using

SWBS or ESWBS with today's construction methods.)

143
 Summary WBS and Definitions of Ship Systems as Defined

in Appendix E of MILSTD 881A

- Level 1 - Program or contract

- Level 2 - Individual ship plus services
- Level 3 - Systems or functional segments described by

a 3-digit code as described in Table 2.1.

144
 APPENDIX B

S9040-AA-10X-010/SWBS 5D - 13 February 1985

ESWBS for all Ships and Ship/Combat Systems

ESWBS is mandatory for:

- Configuration identification, status accounting, spe-

cifications, design, production and maintenance where break-

down below level 3 is specified in a contract.

Functional or System Orientation

- It establishes a standard product-orientd family tree

of hardware, services and data down to level 7.

ESWBS rules and practices include the following:

- The contract WBS is identified in the solicitation.

- The project summary WBS is structured by the Navy.

- Preordained structure is_ imposed for all end items of

a program throughout its life (contrary to Appendix A).

- Configuration items will be identified as WBS ele-

ments .

- Families of specifications and drawings resulting

from systems engineering activities shall conform to the

project WBS.

- The contract WBS shall serve as a framework for the

contractor's management control system which will provide

auditable or otherwise traceable summarizations of internal

data generated by his performance measurement procedures.

145
 .

- Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) shall be accommo-

dated by the summary level WBS

- Reporting requirements shall be consistent with the

contract WBS.
- The lowest level of the extended contract WBS (level

7) for project planning control and support shall reflect

the way the work is actually performed.

ESWBS Organization

- Level 1 - Program or contract

- Level 2 - Individual ship plus services
- Level 3 - Systems or functional segments as defined

in MILSTD 881A

- Levels 4 through 6 - Functional description of sys-

tems/equipments
- Level 7 - Equipment.

146
 APPENDIX C

Product Work Breakdown Structure

National Shipbuilding Research Program

U. S. Department of Commerce Maritime Administration

in cooperation with Todd Pacific Shipyards Corporation

November 1980

PWBS is mandatory for:

- Any large construction project where work must be

logically subdivided in order to be readily analyzed and

managed.

- Support of zone outfitting and group technology con-

struction methods.

Product Orientation
- The interim product is viewed as the focal point of

the PWBS system.

- Classification of products is selected by the indi-

vidual shipbuilder to provide maximum improvement in produc-

tivity using the shipbuilder's facilities.

PWBS rules and practices include the following:

- It conforms with the way the ship is built.

- The focus is on needed parts and subassemblies or the

interim products which are required for larger assemblies.

- Interim products are classified by product aspects:

system, zone, area and stage as described in Section 2.3.3.

147
 - Use of a PWBS results in natural work packages, ideal

for planning, scheduling, and execution.

- Subdivisions are small and facilitate control of work
flow and progress reporting.
- Individual shipyards have the flexibility of estab-

lishing their own expanded work breakdown structures which

can be reflective of the way ships are actually built at

that shipyard.

PWBS Organization

- Level 1 - Program or contract

- Level 2 - Individual ship plus services
- Level 3 - Interim products (units, modules, zones or

processes, etc.)

- Levels 4 and beyond - components, subassemblies, pro-

cesses or activities, as required.

148
 Thesis
H effr
0n
The
. impact of
f Sroup
tec hnolo£
V .

g m et h ° ds
«*P des ig n on navaI
tl0 and
« Practiced aCquis i-

Thesis
H42155 Hetrrun
c.l The impact of g^-oup
technology-based ship-
building methods on naval
ship design and acquisi-
tion practices.

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