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Environmental Pollution and

Common Law Remedies


V. K. BEENA KUMARI*

The environmental law as it is known today is an amalga-


mation of common law and statutory principles. 1 Even before
specific laws came into force, there were certain common law
remedies against pollution. Common law is the body of custo-
mary law of England based upon judicial decisions and is em-
bodied in the reports of decided cases. Common law had been
administered by the common law courts of England since the
middle ages. 2 The term 'common law' is derived from Latin,
lex communis.
In common law, pollution cases generally fall under four
categories. They are Nuisance, Trespass, Negligence and Strict
liability. The dominant water law theories and the public trust
doctrine also had influence on the use of staple resources of
water and land.3

N UISANCE
The deepest doctrinal roots of modern environmental law
are found in the common law principles of nuisance. A well
known writer says that the substantive law for the protection of
the citizen's environment is basically that of common law relat-
ing to nuisance.4

* B.Sc. (Kerala), LL.M. (Cochin).


William H. Rodgers, Jr., Hand book on Environmental Law, (1977),
p. 100.
Encyclopaedia Britannica, (1964), Vol. 6, p. 160.
These do not come within the scope of this paper.
R. N. D. Hamilton, "Private Recourse for Environmental Harm",
(f. n. contd.)
102 COCHIN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

There is much difficulty in employing tortious actions based


on nuisance as an effective remedy against environmental pollu-
tion because of the exhaustive and diverse definitions of the
term "nuisance". 5 "Nuisance" ordinarily means anything which
annoys, hurts or that which is offensive. 6 Nuisance includes any
act, omission, injury, damage, annoyance or offence to the sense
of sight, smell, hearing or which is or may be dangerous to life
or injurious to health or property.'
The failure to distinguish between trespass and nuisance is
another difficulty. The former is a direct infringement of one's
right to property. In the latter, the infringement is the result of
an act which is not wrongful in itself; but the consequences which
may follow such act infringe the right of other persons.8

Kinds of Nuisance
In common law, nuisance are of two types namely public
and private nuisance. 9 A public nuisance can be defined as an
unreasonable interference with a right common to general public.
A private nuisance is a substantial and unreasonable interference
with the use and enjoyment of land.") A public nuisance has been
defined in Section 268 of the Indian Penal Code also."

in Stephen C. McCaffrey & Robert E. Lutz (Ed.), Environmental


Pollution and Individual Rights: An International Symposium,
(1978), p. 19.
See the remarks of Kenworthy, J. in Essick v. Shillam 347 Pa. 373
as cited in James E. Krier, Environmental Law and Policy, (1971),
p. 90.
Durga Prasad v. State, A.I.R. 1962 Raj. 92.
The Cantonment Act, 1924, Sec. 2 (xxii).
James E. Krier, op. cit., p. 90.
Salmond, The Law of Torts, (8th ed. 1934), p. 233.
Rodgers, op. cit., p. 102.
Sec. 268 of the Indian Penal Code reads: "Public nuisance:- A
person is guilty of a public nuisance, who does any act or is guilty
of an illegal omission which causes any common injury, danger or
annoyance to the public or to the people in general who dwell or
occupy property in the vicinity or which must necessarily cause
(f. n. contd.)
V. K. BEENA KUMAR! 103

The importance of the division of nuisance into public and


private lies partly in the difference of the remedies and defences
applicable to each and partly in the fact that a private individual
has no right of action in respect of a public nuisance unless he
can show that he has sustained some "special" damage over and
above that inflicted on the community at large.

In India, public nuisance action can be brought before a


court either by a civil or by a criminal action. Section 91 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ensures the right of action in the
case of public nuisance. 12 The procedure for removal of a public
nuisance is laid down in Sections 133 to 143 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973. In England, all civil proceedings
brought in respect of public nuisance other than a private action
by an individual who or a public or local authority which, has
suffered particular damage or an action brought by a local autho-
rity in its own name to protect the inhabitants of its area must
be brought with the sanction and in the name of the Attorney
General.' 3 A private individual or a public authority may bring
a private action on public nuisance in his or its name when and
only when he or it can show that he or it has suffered some
particular foreseeable and substantial damage over and above
that sustained by the public at large or when the interference

injury, obstruction, danger or annoyance to persons who may have


occasion to use any public right.
A common nuisance is not excused on the ground that it causes
some convenience or advantage".
12. Section 91 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads: "Public nuisances
and other wrongful acts affecting the public:- (1) In the case of a
public nuisance or other wrongful act affecting, or likely to affect,
the public, a suit for a declaration and injunction or for such other
relief as may be appropriate in the circumstances of the case, may
be instituted,—
by the Advocate-General, or
with the leave of the court, by two or more persons, even
though no special damage has been caused to such persons by
reason of such public nuisance or other wrongful act.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to limit or otherwise
affect any right of suit which may exist independently of its
provisions".
13. Halsbury's Laws of England, (4th edn. 1980), Vol. 34, p. 136.
104 COCHIN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

with the public right involves a violation of some private right


of his or its own."

The Standard of Liability in Nuisance

Foreseeability is an essential element in determining liability


for nuisance. Liability may arise even where utmost care is
taken. Although negligence is not an essential element in deter-
mining liability, fault of some kind on the part of the defendant
is almost always necessary and the fault generally involves fore-
seeability. Reasonable foreseeability is the test applied in deter-
mining liability for nuisance. For example in the Wagon Mound
(No. 2) case, i5 an action in negligence and nuisance was brought
against the defendants by the owners of the corrimal which was
being repaired in Sheerlegs wharf and was badly damaged by fire
caused through carelessness of the defendants in allowing bunker-
ing oil to spill from ship into water.The Privy Council held16that
the outbreak of fire was reasonably foreseeable and the appel-
lants are liable in damages."

Reasonableness

Reasonableness of defendant's conduct is the central


problem in nuisance cases. In nuisance cases, the burden
of proving unreasonbleness is often difficult because the reason-
ableness of the defendant's conduct is determined by weighing
its utility against the gravity of harm to the plaintiff. In cases
where the major polluters are large industrial firms, it is often
difficult to prove unreasonableness in the conduct of their busi-
ness having regard to their high economic and social status.I8

Id., p. 135.
Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Miller S. S. Co. Pty., [1966) 2
All E.R. 709.
Id., p. 719.
The decision of the Court in Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v.
Moils Dock and Engg. Co. Ltd., The Wagon Mound (No. 1), [1961]
A.C. 388; [1961] All E.R. 404, was thus overruled in the Wagon
Mound (No. 2) case.
See also the observation of Calabresi, "Some Thoughts on Risk Con-
tribution and the Law of Torts", (1961) 70 Yale L.J. 499 at 537-38.
V. K. BEENA KUMARI 105

However, courts have sometimes held that the "relative utility"


test is not sufficiently great to bar an injunction.
The common defences in pollution cases are (1) the right
obtained by prescription to pollute, (2) estoppel, (3) compa-
rative injury and (4) statutory authorisation. In deciding whether
a particular act is or is not an actionable nuisance, the court
must consider the locality, 19 the nature of the nuisance 20 and
other questions of similar nature.

Remedies for Nuisance

There are four classes of remedies for nuisance namely


abatement without recourse to legal proceedings, civil proceed-
ings for damage or injunction, summary proceedings for penalties
or abatement of statutory nuisance and criminal proceedings.21
According to Rodgers remedial opportunities often fall into four
broad categories namely (1) damages (2) land use accommoda-
tions, (3) technological accommodations and (4) operational
controls.22
The damages remedy is aimed at making whole the plain-
tiff's losses by a money judgment. The land use remedy requires
that one or the other party should relocate. The technological
accommodation requires the defendant to instal the best control
technology and operate it with maximum efficiency. The fourth
remedy, the operational controls interfere least with one's enter-
prises. It requires only that the conduct of one's enterprise should
be with more skill and care or in a different manner or at a
different time to minimise the harm. The four dominant remedial
approaches are seen combined in the case of Smith v. Staso

19, The importance of the place of the hurt lies in the distinction bet-
ween a nuisance per se and a nuisance in fact. A nuisance per se is
defined as an activity, occupation or structure which constitutes a
nuisance anywhere regardless of how it is operated. A nuisance in
fact is an activity, operation or structure which constitutes a nui-
sance only because of its location or manner of operation. See
Rodgers, op. cit., p. 129.
See Rodgers, op. cit., p. 112.
Supra, n. 13 at p. 125.
Rodgers, op. cit., p. 143.
106 COCHIN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Milling Company 23 where the owner of a summer residence was


beseiged by water, air and noise pollution from the defendant's
crushing mill. Here each aspect of nuisance was remedied dif-
ferently. Courts may allow plaintiff to recover special damages
also when he suffers loss before tria1. 24 However, the plaintiff
cannot secure both a damages judgment for reduced market value
due to permanent injury to property and an injunction abating
the cause of the depreciation. In considering the grant of injunc-
tive relief, the courts most often will "balance the equities." The
courts will consider the relative economic hardship 25 which will
result to the parties from grant or denial of an injunction, the
good faith or intentional misconduct of the parties and the public
interest in the continuation of the defendant's activities.

T RESPASS
Trespass is a theory closely related to nuisance and is
occasionally invoked in environmental cases. Trespass requires
an intentional invasion of the plaintiff's interest in the exclusive
possession of property, whereas nuisance requires a substantial
and unreasonable interference with his use and enjoyment of it.
No substantial injury need be shown for a plaintiff to succeed
in an action for trespass. The only requirement to establish a
trespass is that there must be an intentional unprivileged physical
entry by a person or object on land possessed by another. Upon
proof of technical trespass plaintiff is always entitled to nominal
damages. The plaintiff could also get injunctivity relief against
a technical trespass. Another advantage of trespass action over
an action for nuisance is that an action for trespass has a con-
siderably longer statute of limitations. 26

Most of the important aspects of pollution control where

18 F. 2d 736 (1927) cited in Rodgers, op. cit., p. 143.


Lassiter v. Norfolk & Carolina R. R. 126 N.C. 509 (1900) cited in
Rodgers, op. cit., p. 145.
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y. 2d 219, (1970) cited in
Rodger W. Findley & Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Law in a
Nutshell, (1983), p. 59.
James E. Krier, op. cit., p. 211.
V. K. BEENA KUMAR! 107

trespass is used as the theory of action have been discussed by


courts in many cases.
In Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Company 27 the court
observed that aluminium is produced by the defendant plant in
a manner that unavoidably caused fluorides to be discharged
into the atmosphere and recognised that fluorides of some of the
types escaping from the plants, if ingested in excessive quanti-
ties, are capable of causing damage to cattle. Nevertheless the
court found for the defendants on the ground that large scale
production of aluminium is essential to national defence.
In Fairview Farms, Incorporated v. Reynolds Metals Com-
pany 28 the court held that air borne liquids and solids deposited
upon Fairview land constituted trespass and allowed damages
for six year period applying the statute of limitations. However,
injunctive relief was denied on the ground that pollution was not
reasonably certain to be repeated and the defendant had appa-
rently done all it could to control the pollution.
In Martin v. Reynolds Metals Company 29 the defendant
argued that mere setting of fluoride deposits upon the plantiff's
land was not sufficient to constitute a trespass. The court refus-
ing the contention, defined trespass as "the invasion of land
owner's right to exclusive possession, whether by visible or
invisible substances". This departure from the traditional defini-
tion of trespass would impose a heavy burden on industry.
Nevertheless trespass theory is inadequate to control air pollu-
tion. The difficulty in identifying the correct source of air pollu-
tion in an area, the cost of litigation and willingness of the people
to accept the status quo etc. tend to discourage the filing of tres-
pass suits. A change in judicial attitude can be seen in later cases.
For instance, in Renken v. Harvey Aluminium Incorporated "the

125 F. Supp. 481 (W.D. Wash, 1954), aff'd, 236 F.2d 224 (9th
Cir. 1956), Cert. denied, 352 U.S. 968 (1957) as cited in James E.
Krier, op. cit., p. 189.
176 F. Supp. 178 (D. Ore. 1959) as cited in James, E. Krier, op.
cit., p. 190.
135 F. Supp. 379 as cited in James, E. Krier, op. cit., pp. 190-191.
226 F. Supp. 169 (D. Ore. 1963) as cited in James, E. Krier, op.
cit., p. 177.
108 COCHIN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

court refused to balance the equities before granting injunction


and relied on Martin 31 in concluding that the emissions from
Harvey Aluminium Company were trespassory.

N EGLIGENCE
Negligence is another specific tort on which a common law
action for preventing environmental pollution can be based. It
is the failure to exercise that care which the circumstances
demand in any given situation. Where there is a duty to take
care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions
which can be reasonably foreseen 32 to be likely to cause physical
injury to persons or property. The degree of care required in a
particular case depends on the accompanying circumstances and
may vary according to the amount of risk to be encountered and
to the magnitude of the prospective injury. Where there is no
duty to exercise care, negligence in the popular sense has no
legal consequence.33
The act of negligence may also constitute a nuisance if it
interferes unlawfully and for a substantial length of time with the
enjoyment of another's right in land or it occasions on the high
way a dangerous state of affairs as contrasted with a single
isolated act. 34 Equally, it may also be a breach of the rule in
Rylands v. Fletcher 35 if the negligent act allows the escape of a
non-natural and dangerous thing which the defendant has brought
on his land. 36
The causal relation between negligence and the plaintiff's
injury must be shown by the plaintiff in an action for damages

See supra n. 29.


"The reasonable man is presumed to be free both from over-appre-
hension and from over-confidence . " per Lord Mac Millan in
Glasgow Corporation v. Muir, [1943] A.C. 448 (H.L.) at p. 457.
Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills Ltd., [1936] A.C. 85 (D.C.) at
p. 103; Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.) at p. 618.
Stone v. Bottom, [1950] 1 K.B. 201 (C.A.) reversed on the issue of
negligence in Bottom v. Stone [1951] A.C. 850 (H.L.); (1951) I
All E.R. 1078.
(1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
Attorney General v. Cory Brothers Ltd., [1921] A.C. 521 (H.L.).
V. K. BEENA KUMARI 109

based on negligence. When the plaintiff has proved to the satis-


faction of the jury the existence of facts which are claimed and
outlined, then a prima facie case of negligence is presented. It
thereupon becomes the duty of the defendant to come forward
with evidence to show that the act was not negligent.
The causal relation between the negligent act and the injury
suffered is not particularly onerous task when a deadly pollutant
like carbon monoxide is discharged in the air admittedly under
the defendant's exclusive control as in Greyhound Corporation
v. Blakley. 37 However, where one brings an action for lung
damage caused by fine dust particles against a local cement plant
or glass factory, the case gets extremely difficult from a causation
standpoint.
In Hagy v. Allied Chemical and Dye Corporation, 38 Mrs.
Hagy successfully sued the defendant for damages suffered to
her larynx when she and her husband drove through smog which
she alleged to have contained injurious sulphuric acid compo-
nents negligently emitted from the defendant's plant. The defen-
dant asserted before the appellate court that as a matter of law the
evidence was insufficient to permit the jury to find causal con-
nection between the smog and Mrs. Hagy's condition. The court
affirmed the verdict of the court below on the ground that the
burden was rather upon the appellants to convince the jury that
the operation would have been ultimately necessary in any event,
eventhough the cancerous larynx had not been traumatized by
the irritation of the smog. In Suko v. North Western Ice and
Cold Storage Co., 39 a water tank maintained by the defendant
burst and dropped a large quantity of water upon the plaintiff's
adjoining land and caused personal injury to the plaintiff. Here
the Oregan Supreme Court did not adopt the so called Rylands
doctrine. The court adopted the pure and simple rule of negli-
gence with the test of ordinary due care and gave the plaintiff

262 F. 2d 401 (9th Cir. 1958), as cited in James E. Krier, op. cit.,
p. 169.
122 Cal. App. 2d 361 (1954), as cited in James E. Krier, op. cit.,
p. 169.
166 Or. 557, 113 P. 2d 209, as cited in James E. Krier, op. cit.,
p. 154.
110 COCHIN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

the benefit and evidentiary aid of the so-called res ipsa loquitor
that the instrumentality which caused the injury was in the
exclusive possession and control of the defendant. Reynolds
Metals Company v. Y turbide" leaves the "standard of care"
question unanswered. However, in Ure v. United States 4I where
the plaintiff was injured by over flow of water from the irrigation
canal maintained by the defendant, the court observed that a
very high degree of danger calls for a very high degree of care.
The dangers caused by environmental pollution are often poten-
tial dangers difficult to evaluate. Moreover the standard of care,
no doubt, will be seriously affected not only by the state of
scientific knowledge as to the causes and effects of air pollution
but also by the state of technology and the extent to which pre-
vailing pollution control devices are effective and economically
feasible.
D OCTRINE OF STRICT LIABILITY
The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, 42 although normally dealt
with as a separate tort, can be considered as an extension of the
law of unisance. The rule enunciated by Blackburn, J. in that
case is that "the person who for his own purpose brings on his
lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to be a mischief
if it escapes, must keep it at his peril, and if he does not do so
is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural
consequence of its escape". Use of care, skill and public benefit
are not defences. However, "the act of God" excludes liability
under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher.'"
The doctrine of strict liability - liability without fault - is
worth considering in relation to cases arising from environmental
pollution. In Waschak v. Moffat," hydrogen sulphide gas was
emitted from two of the defendant's culm banks which damaged

258 F. 2d 321, (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 358 U.S. 840 (1958), as cited
in James E. Krier, op. cit., pp. 170-171.
D.C. Or., 93 F. Supp. 779 as cited in James E. Krier, op. cit.,
pp. 153-154.
(1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
Ibid.
379 Pa. 441, 109 A. 2d 310 (1954) as cited James E. Krier, op. cit.,
p. 87.
V. K. BEENA KUMARI 111

the paint on plaintiff's dwelling. The defendant did not know


and had no reason to anticipate the emission of the gas and the
results which might follow. The Supreme Court held the
plaintiff liable on the ground that a different chemical content in
the foreign coal which the defendant brought to the borough and
processed there, accounted for the presence of the gas in the
atmosphere. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania distinguished
three theories for allowing recovery against one from whose
property material has escaped without negligence or fault and
caused damage to another:
The English rule of Rylands v. Fletcher
Absolute Nuisance Doctrine
Restatement Rules.
Under the cover of "absolute nuisance" in Rylands v.
Fletcher,45 the concept of strict liability has gained acceptance in
the majority of American jurisdictions.
An activity is hazardous if it (a) necessarily involves a risk
of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others which
cannot be eliminated by the exercise of utmost care and (b) is
not a matter of common usage. In Fritz v. E. I. du Pont de
Nemous and Company, 46 the plaintiff suffered injuries from
chlorine gas and fumes which escaped in a manner unknown to
the defendant. The court held 47 that the use of chlorine gas
was not so unusual and that the defendant should have become
liable as an insurer in case of injury. The "common usage"
limitation is of doubtful utility in cases where the principle of
strict liability is applied. 48
Scope of the rule
The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher," was meticulously inter-
preted by later decisions. It was applied to a variety of

See supra n. 42.


45 Del. 427, 75A. 2d 256 (1950) as cited in James E. Krier, op, cit.,
p. 173.
Ibid.
Rodgers, op. cit., p. 161.
See suprc, n. 42.
112 COCHIN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

circumstances." Damage due to fire, gas, explosions, electri-


city," oil, noxious fumes, 52 colliery spoi1, 53 rusty wire from
a decayed fence,54 vibrations,55 poisonous vegetation 56 etc. were
held to be coming under this doctrine. Lord Viscount Simon
stated" that Rylands v. Fletcher 58 was conditioned by two ele-
ments which he called (a) "the condition of 'escape' from the
land of something likely to do mischief if it escapes", and (b)
"the condition of `non-natural' use of the land". Unless there is
an "escape" of the substance from the land of the defendant
where it is kept, there is no liability under the rule and the non-
natural use must be some special use bringing with it increased
dangers to others and must not merely be the ordinary use of
the land or such a use as is proper for the general benefit of the
community.59

The court must investigate not only the reasonableness of


the accumulation but also the defendant's responsibility for its
actual escape.

C ONCLUSIONS AND S UGGESTIONS

The courts' tendency to balance hardships and deny injunc-


tions and lack of "standing" to sue are factors which make the
nuisance law inadequate to control widespread pollution. In

For a list of cases where the rule has been applied see Stallybrass,
"Dangerous Things and the Non-natural User of Land", (1929) 3
Camb. L.J. 376 at 382-385.
Eastern and S. African Telegraph Co. Ltd. v. Cape Town Tramways
Companies Ltd., [1902] A.C. 381.
West v. Bristol Tramways Co., [1908] 2 K.B. 14.
Attorney General v. Cory Bros Ltd., [1921] 1 A.C. 521.
Firth v. Bowling Iron Co., (1878) 3 C.P.D. 254.
Hoare & Co. v. Mc Alpine [1923] 1 Ch. 167.
Crowhurst v. Amersham Burial Board, [1978] 4 Ex. 5.
Read v. J. Lyons & Co. Ltd., [1946] 2 All E.R. 471, at p. 474.
See supra n. 42.
See also Note, "The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher", [1947] 63 L.Q.R.
160.
V. K. BEENA KUMARI 113

private actions on public nuisance, "special injury" is to be


proved if the action is to succeed. The "special injury" suffered
by the plaintiff must be different in kind from that suffered by
the general public and not just different only in degree. If the
eiurts insist on this, the nuisance action by private individuals
against pollution, against air pollution in particular, will be less
effective. Still another difficulty is the burden of proving material
harm attributable to unreasonable conduct of the defendant since
it is impossible to point out any particular polluter responsible
for the poor air or water quality.

The common law action of trespass is not suited to deal
with the general issues or questions of environmental degrada-
tion in view of the fact that it requires some direct physical inter-
ference by one against the person or property of another.
Environmental degradation tends, generally, to be indirect in its
nature and effect. Persons aggrieved by it may find it difficult to
establish a successful legal action for trespass. The requirement
tbat an aggrieved party has to prove that there is a causal con-
nection between the negligent act and the plaintiff's injury makes
it extremely difficult for the plaintiff to succeed in an action for
negligence. The degree of reasonable care depends on various
factors taken into consideration by the courts in deciding the
matter. Moreover the standard of care is seriously affected not
only by the state of scientific knowledge as to the causes and
effects of air and water pollution but, also by the state of techno-
logy and the extent to which prevailing pollution control devices'
are effective economically and feasible.
The Rylands rule has a more restricted application than
those rules applied in nuisance cases. To invoke the Rylands
rule there must be an accumulation of pollutants and it must be
of a nuisance, likely to cause injury if it escapes. The problem
to be resolved in pollution cases is however different. The pro-
blem is to control or prevent pollution, rather than to decide
the liability of the wrong doer. Insurance against abnormally
dangerous harm may be a proper remedy in deciding the ques-
tion of liability. Considering the pollution problem in its totality,
interests of the public may considerably overshadow the interests
114 COCHIN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

of the parties concerned. When such a situation occurs, a sound


pollution control programme is called for. This requires that the
public point of view be searched out and decisions be taken in
the light the social policy.
The inherent inability of courts to deal efficiently with
issues of a scientifically complex nature is another problem. In
environmental degradation situations, often a considerable time
elapses before symptoms of disease caused from pollution
become manifest. The chemical, biological, physiological and
other scientific evidence required to prove the causal connection
between the alleged discharge of pollutants and the harm caused
to the plaintiff is often highly technical. It may be impossible
for even the most alert judge to assimilate and evaluate them.
There are other difficulties like high costs of litigation, limited
administrative capabilities etc. which make judiciary an unfit
organ to provide adequate remedies.
The policy adopted by the government also has an import-
ant role to control or prevent environmental pollution. There
should be insistence on observance of uniform methods of pollu-
tion control methods by all persons engaged in one industry.
Selective approach may not be successful for the reason that cost
of production incurred by an industry is connected with the
method of pollution control adopted which ultimately affects the
price of the product.
It is suggested to create expert bodies and entrust them with
the task of ensuring protection and development of environment.
They may be urged to hold public hearing while settling stand-
ards and drafting plans for implementation.
In addition to these expert bodies, special courts should be
created to deal with common law action against environmental
pollution. The success of the endeavour against pollution depends
mainly on the civic consciousness of the people and on the recog-
nition of good environment and ecological balance in nature.

Mode of Citation [1984] C.U.L.R.

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