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    Husserl

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    Juan Pablo Cotrina
    This document discusses Kant's claim in the B-Deduction that the principle of the necessary unity of apperception is an analytic proposition. While Kant unambiguously states this, many commentators see it as a stumbling block, as it seems strange that such a substantive principle could be analytic. The author aims to take Kant's claim seriously and argue that the principle, in the form it appears in the first part of the B-Deduction, is indeed analytic. The document is divided into three parts: 1) outlining arguments against the analyticity claim, 2) attempting to show how the principle can be analytic consistently with Kant's view, and 3) considering implications of this analyticity for

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    Husserl

    Uploaded by

    Juan Pablo Cotrina
    25 views2 pages
    This document discusses Kant's claim in the B-Deduction that the principle of the necessary unity of apperception is an analytic proposition. While Kant unambiguously states this, many commentators see it as a stumbling block, as it seems strange that such a substantive principle could be analytic. The author aims to take Kant's claim seriously and argue that the principle, in the form it appears in the first part of the B-Deduction, is indeed analytic. The document is divided into three parts: 1) outlining arguments against the analyticity claim, 2) attempting to show how the principle can be analytic consistently with Kant's view, and 3) considering implications of this analyticity for

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    Husserl

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    This document discusses Kant's claim in the B-Deduction that the principle of the necessary unity of apperception is an analytic proposition. While Kant unambiguously states this, many commentators see it as a stumbling block, as it seems strange that such a substantive principle could be analytic. The author aims to take Kant's claim seriously and argue that the principle, in the form it appears in the first part of the B-Deduction, is indeed analytic. The document is divided into three parts: 1) outlining arguments against the analyticity claim, 2) attempting to show how the principle can be analytic consistently with Kant's view, and 3) considering implications of this analyticity for

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
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    25 views2 pages

    Husserl

    Uploaded by

    Juan Pablo Cotrina
    This document discusses Kant's claim in the B-Deduction that the principle of the necessary unity of apperception is an analytic proposition. While Kant unambiguously states this, many commentators see it as a stumbling block, as it seems strange that such a substantive principle could be analytic. The author aims to take Kant's claim seriously and argue that the principle, in the form it appears in the first part of the B-Deduction, is indeed analytic. The document is divided into three parts: 1) outlining arguments against the analyticity claim, 2) attempting to show how the principle can be analytic consistently with Kant's view, and 3) considering implications of this analyticity for

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    of 2

    APPERCEPTION AND ANALYTICITY

    IN THE B-DEDUCTION

    Henry E. ALLISON
    University of Califomia, San Diego

    In the B-Deduction Kant states that, although it "reveals the neces-


    sity of a synthesis of the manifold given in intuition", the "principle
    of the necessary unity of apperception is ... an identical, and there-
    fore analytic proposition" (B 135). Moreover, as if to emphasize that
    thjs was not a momentary slip, he remarks shortly thereafter that the
    proposition which "makes synthetic unity a condition of all thought
    ... is, as already stated, itself analytic". This, he continues, is because:
    [I]t says no more than that all my representations in any given intuition
    must be subject to that condition under which alone I can ascribe them
    to the identical self as my representations, and so can comprehend them
    as synthetically combined in one apperception through the general
    expression, 'I think'(B 138).
    But, in spite of Kant's unambiguous pronouncements, this claim
    has proven to be a stumbling block for even the most sympathetic
    and thorough commentators.' To be sure, one could regard as
    analytic the trivial claim that all my representations must be subject
    to those conditions, whatever they may be, that allow them to be
    my representations. As the above citations indicate, however, Kant
    took the analyticity to extend also to the apparently substantive
    claim that the essential condition of the possibility of such self-
    ascription is that the representations be unifiable in a single self-
    consciousness. In short, Kant regards the principle of the necessary
    synthetic unity of apperception as itself analytic. And it is here that

    1. See, for example, H.l. Paton, Kant' sMetaphysic 01Experience, New York:
    Macmillan, 1936, vol. 1 pp. 518, H.l. de Vleeschauwer, La Deduction transcen-
    dentale dans I'oeuvre de Kant, 3 vols. Paris etc. 1934-37, Reprinted New York
    & London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1976, Vol. III, pp. 115-16.
    234

    the problems begin; for it certainly seems strange that Kant, of all
    philosophers, would characterize wh at he terms "the highest prin-
    ciple in the whole sphere of human knowledge" (B 135) as analytic.
    How could such a principle be analytic, and if it is, how could it
    ground the possibility of synthetic apriori knowledge?
    In Kant's Transcendental Idealism, I attempted to take this claim
    seriously, making the analyticity of apperception into a key for
    interpreting the B-Deduction as a whole. In the present paper, I
    would like to return to this issue, considering the thesis both in light
    of Kant's overall teachings on apperception and of some of the
    literature that has appeared since the publication of my book. The
    paper is divided into three parts. The first sketches the main argu-
    ments against the thesis that the principle of apperception is analytic.
    The second attempts to show that the principle, in the form in which
    it appears in the first part of the B-Deduction, is in fact analytic and
    that this is is consistent with the significance Kant attributes to it.
    The third considers the implications of the analyticity of the prin-
    ciple of apperception for the overall proof-structure of the B-Deduc-
    tion. In particular, it argues that such an understanding of this
    principle is not only compatible with the two steps in a single proof
    schema noted by Dieter Henrich in his classical paper, but also serves
    to explain why the proof proceeds in two sharply distinguished
    steps.2

    Perhaps the most serious discussion of Kant's claim for the analy-
    ticity of the principle of apperception in the recent literature is that
    of Paul Guyer, who considers this claim in light of his overall
    interpretation of the Transcendental Deduction. According to Guyer,
    the Deduction in both editions is a patchwork of radically different
    argumentative tactics. Some, resting on the presupposition of
    knowledge of objects, argue for the categories as necessary condi-
    tions of the possibility of such knowledge. Since this li ne of argu-

    2. Dieter Henrich, "The Proof-Structure ofKant's Transcendental Deduction",


    Review 01 Metaphysics, 22 (1968-69), pp. 640-659.

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