Here Comes The Sun – There Goes The Ice, spelled

out in semaphore by artist Chris Wainwright,

using the Arctic dusk as his canvas.

THE FUTURE IN PRACTICE

THE STATE OF SUSTAINABILITY LEADERSHIP 2012

2052: A global forecast

for the next forty years
Professor Jorgen Randers

1
The Future in Practice: The State of Sustainability Leadership 2012

2052: A global forecast

for the next forty years
Professor Jorgen Randers

Jorgen Randers is Professor of Climate

If I could persuade you of one thing, it should be
Strategy at the BI Norwegian Business
this: the world is small and fragile, and humanity School. He is a non-executive member
is huge, dangerous and powerful. This is a total of a number of corporate boards in
reversal of the biblical perspective on humanity, and Norway, and sits on the sustainability
the way in which man has thought during most of councils of British Telecom in the UK
and the Dow Chemical Company in
his presence on Earth. But this is the perspective we
the US. He chaired the Commission on
need to take if we’re to be sure that sustainability
Low Greenhouse Gas Emissions, which
emerges or, at least, that the world as we know it reported in 2006 to the Norwegian
survives for a couple of hundred more years. cabinet on how to cut emissions by
two-thirds by 2050. He was President of
the Norwegian School of Management
I have spent the past four decades trying to
make the world a sustainable place, preaching 1981–89, and Deputy Director-General
about what ought to be done from all kinds of of WWF International in Switzerland
different positions. Last year, I succumbed to 1994–99. He has authored a number
the temptation to try to think through what
of books and scientific papers, and co-
will happen over the next 40 years. Not what I
would like to happen, but what the parliaments authored The Limits to Growth (1972) –
and voters and semi-authoritarian regimes the original report to the ‘Club of Rome’
of the world will actually do. How is that – and its two sequels in 1992 and 2004.
future going to look? This is, of course, much

This article is adapted from Professor Randers’ lecture in the 10th Annual Distinguished Lecture Series in Sustainable Development, hosted by the
University of Cambridge Programme for Sustainability Leadership and the Centre for Sustainable Development in the Department of Engineering
on 14 March 2012. It is based on his most recent book, 2052: A Global Forecast for the Next Forty Years (2012) – also a report to the Club of Rome
– with permission from Chelsea Green Publishing, www.chelseagreen.com. 2052 is distributed in the UK by Green Books, www.greenbooks.co.uk.
All figures in this article are extracts from 2052, and the data is also available at www.2052.info.

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 less of a scientific activity than the type of
scenario analysis I commonly do; it is educated I don’t like what I see. This is not the
guesswork. This article is about what I found in world I would have created if I were
my crystal-ball-gazing exercise.
in charge. It is not the kind of future I
The danger in forecasting is, of course, that if have been working for all along.
one sees something ugly coming up it might
demotivate the constructive forces trying to fertility develops the way that it does, why
create a better world. The main reason why I societies only invest 25 per cent of their GDP,
still wanted to look ahead was because I have and so on. I have also had advice and criticism
only about 20 more years to live, and I want from world-class experts. But while my forecast
to optimise my remaining years rather than is as good as I can make it, forecasting is not
continuing to struggle in directions which a scientific activity. Things could happen
might be hopeless. So, partly, 2052 was written tomorrow to put us on a totally different path;
for my own purposes. Secondly, I am so old nothing is totally fixed. We will see in 40 years if
that I’ve started to evaluate the effect of how it was worth the effort.
I’ve spent the past 40 years, and I’m fairly
sceptical about what we old gentlemen who One final introductory comment: I don’t like
created and ran the environmental movement what I see. This is not the world I would have
have been able to achieve. But in order to created if I were in charge. It is not the kind of
make that assessment properly, one needs to future I have been working for all along.
know what will happen over the next 40 years,
to see the effort in full perspective. Finally, I So let me walk you through the future, as
hope my analysis can be used for something logically as I can. Most of the graphs which
constructive. Once you know what will happen, follow cover the period 1970–2050, based
it’s much easier to derive where one should on a spreadsheet model which describes the
put in one’s own little effort in order to create world as a sum of five regions. The shaded area
a better future. Instead of working against to the left represents historical numbers, and
something which may be hopeless, you can my forecast appears to the right. I’ll address
try to concentrate on an area where you might population, world GDP, wealth and investment,
trigger some serious results. resources, food, water, energy, temperatures,
and wilderness over the next 40 years.
My forecast is internally consistent and draws
on a broad base of knowledge, with a strong Future population
sense of causality; I think I understand why When people think about the future, world
population often comes first. My forecast, as
you can see in Figure 1, is that the population
will peak in 2040 at 8.1 billion people, and
then start to decline and continue declining
throughout the second half of this century.
This is very low compared to the UN forecast,
which talks about 9 billion people in 2050 and
numbers rising from there. I have such a low
forecast because I think fertility trends will
continue downwards at the stupendous rate
that has occurred over the past 40 years.

The number of children per woman throughout

her reproductive years used to be very high,
but this is falling very quickly due to the
Figure 1: World Population 1970–2050. Scales: Population (0–9 billion people); education of women, increased urbanisation,
birth and death rate (0–4 per cent per year). and more easily-available contraception.

3
 medical progress is going to continue over
the next 40 years. But the effect of declining
fertility is stronger than the effect of rising
life expectancy, which means the global
population will actually plateau around
2040. This may be surprising to you, but we
have already seen a decline in the Japanese
population, for example, for a decade because
of this combined effect. Furthermore, Germany
is already plateauing. Among the rich countries
it is only nations like Norway and the USA, with
wide-open borders and a lot of immigration,
which still have rapid population growth.
China’s population will peak in 2030 because
of the continuation of Deng’s wise one-child
Figure 2: Fertility decline in EU15, 1960–2010. Definition: Total fertility =
number of children born to each woman on average throughout her policy, which will help solve China’s biggest
reproductive life. Scales: Total fertility (0–3 children per woman). problem: how to create a sustainable society
within the country’s borders. The reason why
the death rate rises in Figure 1 is that the
number of old people will rise faster than the
rise in life expectancy over the next 40 years.

For those of you who doubt my central

assumptions here, Figure 2 shows fertility in
the EU15 over the past 50 years. When total
fertility falls below 2.1 children per woman, the
population will decline in the long run, and this
has been the case in the EU since 1970. Had
it not been for immigration, the population
would have been declining. Extreme cases like
Italy, for example, have had a fertility rate of
1.3 for decades. Italian women don’t want to
have children because it’s difficult to combine
Figure 3: World gross labour productivity, 1970–2050. Definition: Gross children and a job in Italy; then, experience
labour productivity = GDP divided by people aged 15 to 65 years. Scales: Gross
shows, women overwhelmingly choose to have
labour productivity (0–20,000 US$ per person-year); growth in productivity and
long-term trend (0–7 per cent per year).
a job. So things are already developing along
the lines of my forecast.

Even poor people (I mean this ironically, of Future world GDP

course) are wise enough to understand that Next, people are generally interested in world
having a large family is not a good idea when GDP. What will be the total global production of
you live in an urban area. It was a good idea to goods and services? The way I calculate future
have many children in the countryside when GDP is to take the number of people who can
people were farming their own food, but it work – say, everyone between 15 and 65 – and
doesn’t work in cities. You can see this already multiply this number by how much each of
in existing fertility statistics, which are coming them produces per year. The upper curve in
down very rapidly. Figure 3 is the aggregated productivity, the
gross output of goods and services per person
The downward trend in fertility is countered in the potential workforce. I predict that the
by increasing life expectancy. In my forecast, output per person will continue to increase,
life expectancy rises to around 75 years as but at a declining rate, and that it will level off
a world average by 2050, because I think around 2050.

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 per cent a year. (The trend is more important
When total fertility falls below 2.1 children per than the fluctuations around it.) Now that the
woman, the population will decline in the long run, US economy is more mature, you can see that
and this has been the case in the EU since 1970. the trend has come down to below 1 per cent
a year. If you extend the forecast to 2020, there
will be no productivity growth. And the US is
If you multiply a workforce which is declining the world’s most productive economy, so it
with a productivity that reaches a plateau, shows where everyone else will end up.
you get a GDP which will plateau around 2050
and then start to decline. This is what happens It’s not only the City analyst who will worry
in my forecast: something no Wall Street or about my forecast of slowing economic growth
City analyst would ever dare to think about. in the rich world over the coming decades;
The world production of goods and services most people feel that growth is desirable.
levels off, and finally – in the second half of the The fundamental reason why most people
century – starts a continuing decline. favour growth is that it is the only way modern
society has found to solve three problems
Why is the growth rate in productivity effectively: poverty, unemployment, and
declining? The reason is that when an economy pensions. Economic growth reduces poverty at
matures, all the people who were initially the national level by increasing average labour
working in agriculture shift into manufacturing, productivity. Growth furthermore increases
and then onwards to service production. total employment, and providing new jobs
Then, as an economy gets really rich, like in is the only politically-feasible technique to
Norway and the US today, most people end achieve the large-scale redistribution of income
up working in services and ultimately in social in a capitalist society: if you have a job, at least
care. Finally, you get to a point where there are you get a piece of the total pie. Thirdly, growth
so few people in agriculture, forestry, fisheries, is needed to fund pensions, especially in an
and manufacturing that any productivity ageing population.
increase has to occur in services. But increasing
productivity in offices, research groups, If society were to get away from growth,
universities or care homes isn’t easy. So the it would need an alternative which
productivity rise slows once you move towards simultaneously eliminated poverty, solved
a mature economy. unemployment and provided adequate
pensions. That alternative is not obvious,
In Figure 4, for example, you can see that in the hence society pursues old-fashioned economic
early 1950s the US economy was growing at 4 growth. Another solution could be to stabilise
GDP and distribute that finite production in
an equitable manner. This would take a wise
populous! The majority would have to resolve
that, rather than expanding the production
of goods and services every year, they would
instead keep production constant, taking
increasing amounts of leisure time, and
redistributing outputs. They would deliberately
shift work and income from those who have
a job, and give to those who don’t. It’s doable,
but is very unlikely to happen at scale during
the next 40 years. Authoritarian regimes
like China might succeed, that is, create
employment in spite of the market; and some
Figure 4: US gross labour productivity, 1950–2010. Definition: Labour will do so with positive results. But in free-
productivity = GDP divided by people aged 15–65. Scales: Change in labour market democracies it is unlikely that large-
productivity (-6.0 to 10 per cent per year). scale redistribution will happen in a peaceful

5
 In summary – and everything else follows from
Over the next 40 years, in addition this view – the world population will grow for
to all the resource, pollution and a while, but stagnate at some 8 billion people
inequity problems that we have around 2040 and then decline. Global GDP will
continue to grow, but not at the rates we have
already, humanity will run into more
been used to in the past; and the total world
problems of depletion, pollution, economy will stabilise after the middle of this
adaptation and repair of climate century, passing 2.2 times current GDP in 2052.
damage, because we will be trying to
fit an excessive amount of activity on Future investment share of GDP
to a small globe. In rough terms, world GDP will double in the
next 40 years. Global society will be producing
manner. As a consequence, these societies will roughly twice as many goods and services,
continue to strive for growth – but with less and since the population will only grow from
and less success. 7 billion to 8 billion, average consumption per
head will go up.
Returning to my growth predictions, the
industrialised world (Europe, Japan, Australia, But there is one very important and third
New Zealand and the mature East Asian tiger central idea in my forecast: a substantial
economies) will follow in the tracks of the increase in the fraction of GDP which will be
United States, with gradually declining growth required for investments in infrastructure
rates. China and other successful emerging and the like – the ‘investment share’ of GDP.
economies will catch up, but while these latter Over the next 40 years, in addition to all the
countries are capable of showing very high resource, pollution and inequity problems that
economic growth rates for a while, these too we have already, humanity will run into more
will decline as they catch up with the old problems of depletion, pollution, adaptation,
industrial world. You can already see this repair of climate damage, etc, because we will
happening in China: in the current Five Year be trying to fit an excessive amount of activity
Plan, the planned growth rate has been lowered onto a small globe. At first, society will pretend
from something like 10 per cent per year in the that the problem does not exist. Then, after
past to 7.5 per cent in the future. I am afraid I a while, we will start understanding that the
believe that the poorest region I look at, problem is real – for example, that there isn’t
containing the world’s poorest 2 billion people, any cheap conventional oil left. At that time we
will continue to experience the same slow will (grudgingly) put up the necessary money
growth in the next 40 years as it did over the past in order to get oil from the Arctic, from a great
40, and therefore still be rather poor in 2052. depth, or from shale oil.

6
 and investment goods (the things we produce
in order to have consumption in the future).
As you can see from Figure 5, the investment
share of spending has been around 25 per
cent of GDP over the past 40 years – amazingly
stable. We consume three quarters, and invest
one quarter in infrastructure to support future
consumption: roads and factories, ships, anti-
pollution equipment, education and so on.
Lord Stern has estimated that dealing with the
climate problem will cost around 1–2 per cent
of GDP. This means that we will need to invest
26–27 per cent of future GDP to live in a world
without climate damage. Adding in all the
Figure 5: World production and consumption, 1970–2050. Scales: Consumption
other things we need to spend money on, such
and GDP (0–150 trillion US$ per year); investment share (0–40 per cent). as more expensive energy systems which don’t
run on fossil fuels, I predict that in an extreme
case we might have to increase the investment
share up to about 40 per cent. This growth in
investment, of course, means that consumption
will not grow as rapidly as GDP.

What about future employment? Luckily

the number of jobs is not governed by
consumption alone. You also need people to
produce investment goods and services. Total
employment is governed by GDP, and thus
increases irrespective of whether we increase
the production of toys for kids or of offshore oil
platforms. Both consumption and investment
involve jobs. The difference is that in the first
instance, you produce a consumer good which
Figure 6: World consumption per person, 1970–2050. Scales: Consumption
per person (0–12,000 US$ per person-year); consumption (0–150 trillion US$ people enjoy in the short-term. In the second
per year). case, you produce a future income stream
which will make people happy in the future
instead. So my forecast is that we will shift more
Similarly, once climate damage destroys homes of the world’s labour and capital away from
and infrastructure it will be necessary to spend the production of consumption goods and
funds on reconstruction. And the same with services, towards the production of investment
pollution damage. When CFCs destroyed goods and services. That means that disposable
the ozone layer, money was allocated to the income will not grow as fast as it would
invention of new technologies, and to build otherwise. This is illustrated in Figure 6, using
new factories to produce a substitute. consumption per person.

So I believe we will be facing an increasing This graph shows the global average, but
number of problems over the next 40 years, hides surprising results at the regional level.
and that society will respond by making For example, per capita disposable income
investments in order to try to get rid of these in the USA will stagnate over the next 20
problems. I have tried to estimate how much years, and then go down for the following 20
this will cost. World GDP can be divided into years, in spite of continued hard work by its
consumer goods (the goods and services that people. The decline will not be associated with
we consume each year in order to be happier) unemployment; the decline in purchasing

7
 consumption, however, of course continued
I don’t foresee a real oil crisis, nor any other resource to grow: humanity simply moved from the
crises – only a shift from cheap materials to more most easily available conventional oil, which
you got in Texas or in Saudi Arabia by literally
expensive substitutes, and luckily, it looks as if this is sticking poles in the ground, to less accessible
going to be fast enough to avoid the type of shocks deep offshore oil, which requires expensive
that might derail the whole system. investments in monstrous platforms. These
days, unconventional and expensive shale oils
are also entering the picture.
power will occur because the US will have to
use a much larger portion of its workforce and In my forecast there will be enough oil to cover
its capital on investment goods, rather than on demand, but the cost of producing it will go up,
the production of consumer goods. The same and so will the costs of production in terms of
thing, more or less, is the case with Europe, but environmental damage. Furthermore, demand
Europe is in a slightly better starting position will stagnate and then decline as renewables
because it doesn’t have a huge debt like the US. take over. So I don’t foresee a real oil crisis,
nor do I see any other resource crises on the
Future resources horizon. I only see a shift from cheap materials
Many people believe that there are not enough to more expensive substitutes, and luckily, it
resources – minerals and crops – in the world to looks as if the shift is going to be fast enough to
solve the problems we face. I disagree. It seems avoid the type of shocks that might derail the
to me that, luckily, because of much slower whole system. But once again, this ‘optimistic’
population and economic growth over the next forecast is a consequence of the slow global
40 years, we will have enough of everything to growth I expect in GDP over the next 40 years.
maintain the expansion. In 2052, I calculate the
‘non-energy footprint’ of humanity. This is the Future food
amount of land needed to maintain our current On the food side, what do I think? There will not
standard of living: crop land for food, grazing be enough food to avoid starvation completely,
land for meat, forest land for wood, fish banks but there will be enough food to feed those
for fish, and the land we use for infrastructure who can pay. The world can produce very much
and urban areas. Luckily, this non-energy more food than it does today. The reason it
footprint is well below the amount of available does not is that the world’s hungry cannot pay
land, which I refer to as the world’s ‘biocapacity’. what it takes to convince farmers to make the
It is true that the amount of surplus unused extra-cheap food they require. In other words,
biocapacity is being reduced (see Figure 12, our ability to produce a lot of expensive food
below); and, yes, this discussion of land use does not solve the problem of those who starve.
disregards the climate effect, which must be There are currently some two billion relatively
included in the full footprint. But as long as we poor people in the world. In my forecast, there
limit ourselves to physical land, there seems to will be about the same number in 2050. This is
be enough for the next 40 years. one negative side effect of slower economic
growth: in the next 40 years, growth will
Beyond that, around 2050, I expect us to start primarily be in China and in the big emerging
seeing the destruction of the global ecosystem. economies. In the rest of the world, many will
Our current ways are not sustainable in the stay poor and unable to buy enough food.
long run. But my forecast only examines the
next 40 years.
Those who can afford food will eat
Many people seem to believe that limited better and better, while the poor will
oil is going to stop expansion. I think not. remain hungry… Starvation is the
The production and use of conventional
effect of skewed income distribution,
oil, measured in million tons of oil per year,
already peaked in the early 1980s. Total oil not a physical lack of food.

8
 Agricultural land use has, more or less, been
constant for the past 40 years; it will increase The emerging water scarcity will
a little over the next 40 years because
come to an end once you put a price
there is land in Brazil, the former USSR, and
elsewhere. So we have land available, and as on irrigation water. Water will no
the purchasing power of the Chinese continues longer be used in the wasteful ways
to increase, there will be increased food that it is at the moment.
production. This will be done by increasing
yields by adding more fertiliser, irrigation, and
GMOs. If we take food production (the red line average will rise. This means that those who
on Figure 7), and divide by population, you can afford it will eat better and better, while
see that food production per person (the blue the poor will remain hungry, due to a lack of
line) will also go up – at least a little. Presently, income. Of course, I don’t like this, but this is
the average food per capita in the world is 2–3 what I foresee.
times subsistence levels. So, we are already at
a fairly high average food production, and this Future water
The next question that people typically ask
is about irrigation water. My view is that the
emerging scarcity will come to an end once
you put a price on irrigation water. Water will
no longer be used in the wasteful ways that it is
at the moment, and desalination will enter the
picture at even larger scale.

But won’t that affect the price of food? Yes, it

will affect the price of food. Does that mean
that a lack of water for irrigation is going to lead
to more starvation? Yes. But we would have
starvation even if water remained as cheap
as it is now. Starvation is the effect of skewed
Figure 7: World food production, 1970–2050. Scales: Food production (0–10.5 income distribution, not a physical lack of food.
billion tonnes per year); cultivated land (0–3 billion hectares); gross yield (0–8
tonnes per hectare-year); food per person (0–1.4 tonnes per person-year). Future energy
Once I have my forecast for future GDP, it is
simple to make a forecast for energy use, based
on the assumption that energy per unit of
GDP – energy intensity, the yellow line – will
continue its downwards trend, as shown in
Figure 8. I forecast that the energy efficiency
improvements we’ve seen over the past 40
years will continue. I assume that engineers will
succeed in making cars, houses and industrial
plants that use ever less energy per unit of
output, so we’ll continue the reduction in the
amount of energy we use per dollar of GDP.
To obtain future energy use (the blue line), I
multiply my GDP forecast with future energy
per GDP. This produces something interesting:
Figure 8: World total energy use, 1970–2050. Definition: Energy intensity =
energy use divided by GDP. Scales: Energy use (0–20 billion tonnes of oil
the energy consumption of the world is going
equivalent per year), GDP (0–150 trillion US$ per year); energy use per GDP to peak around 2030 – very soon. When I die,
(0–300 tonnes of oil equivalent per million US$). the peak will roughly have been reached, and

9
 Gas will increase dramatically, because this
will be the cheapest and most politically-
expedient energy source in many industrialised
countries like the UK and the US. Particularly
in countries which tend to postpone difficult
decisions, new generating capacity will not
be built until there are brown-outs. When
brown-outs are a fact, the fastest thing to do
is to build new gas-powered utilities. They can
be ordered and built within two years, and
this is the backstop solution that is probably
going to happen in the UK and in many other
places. In the US, utilities running on shale gas
are currently much cheaper than the nuclear
Figure 9: World energy use by type, 1970–2050. Scales: Energy uses (0–7 alternative. This will accelerate the rapid shift
billion tonnes of oil equivalent per year). to gas. Gas is better than coal because it emits
one-third as much CO2 per kilowatt-hour. Gas
also has a beneficial future use as a back-up
for intermittent sources like wind and solar, for
when it’s night or the wind doesn’t blow.

I forecast a tremendous increase in the

installed capacity of wind, solar and biomass
energy, but in 2050 renewables will still only
make up around 40 per cent of total energy
consumption. In my forecast, nuclear faces
decades of slow decline. By 2050 there will
be few nuclear plants in the industrial world.
Most of those plants are currently in the US
and the UK, France, and Russia. Forty years
down the line they will largely have moved to
Figure 10: World C02 emissions from energy use, 1970–2050. Definition: China, India, Pakistan and the big emerging
Climate intensity = CO2 emissions divided by total energy use. Scales: CO2 economies.
emissions (0–45 billion tonnes of CO2 per year); energy use (0–20 billion tonnes
of oil equivalents per year); climate intensity (0–4 tonnes of CO2 per tonne of oil
equivalent); fraction renewable energy (0–40 per cent). Once I know future energy use, I multiply the
use of each energy type with its CO2 emissions
per ton of oil equivalent. This gives me the
then the annual use of oil, coal, gas, and wind central variable in international climate change
etc will start to decline. This follows directly negotiations: global CO2 emissions per year.
from my forecasts of GDP and energy intensity. This is the red line in Figure 10. The right-hand
part of Figure 10 is my forecast for what will
Figure 9 shows what kind of energy sources come out of the ongoing negotiations, which,
we will be using: oil, coal gas, nuclear or as far as I can understand, will go on for another
renewables. Coal use will expand dramatically 20 years with little result. You can see that CO2
over the next 20 years. This is largely because emissions will not peak in 2015, as is required
of China and the big emerging economies. to keep global warming below 2°C, but
Total oil use – the sum of conventional oil and around 2030, and then decline fairly rapidly.
unconventional oil – is very close to its peak, as Interestingly, emissions in 2050 will be more
mentioned above. I think there will be a 20-year or less the same as they are today. The agreed
period of flat consumption before it declines. UN goal is to halve 1990 emissions by 2050. My
‘Peak oil’ will occur, but not as a sharp peak. forecast is that we will not reach that goal.

10
 Future temperatures
If you take my CO2 forecast and you put it into In free-market democracies it is
one of the climate models, you can see how
warm it’s going to get in my future.
unlikely that large-scale
redistribution will happen in a
That’s the red line in Figure 11: a rise in global peaceful manner. As a consequence,
temperatures of more than 2°C in 2050 relative these societies will continue to
to pre-industrial times. Out of curiosity, in my
strive for growth – but with less and
research I also looked further ahead: I assumed
that CO2 emissions will reach zero in 2100, by less success.
which time we will have phased out all use of
coal, oil and gas. The climate model I used gave
me a peak temperature of plus 2.8°C in 2080.
We don’t know for sure, but plus 2.8° may
well be a problem. Global society has agreed
that 2°C might be OK; plus 2.8°C might melt
the Tundra and start self-reinforcing climate
change. Oceans will continue to expand,
and will be up another foot over these next
40 years.

Future wilderness
People like me love the wilderness, the forest
and untouched nature. Will there be anything
for us tree-huggers in the future?

In Figure 12, I’ve taken the unused biocapacity,

the biologically-productive areas of the world
that are not being used for human purposes,
Figure 11: World climate change, 1970–2050. Scales: Temperature rise from and divided them by the number of people.
pre-industrial times (0–2.5°C); sea level rise from pre-industrial times (0–1 metre); This is my (very approximate) indicator for how
CO2 in atmosphere (0–600 parts per million); CO2 equivalent in atmosphere much wilderness there will be for each of us.
(0–6000 parts per million equivalent). It’s going down pretty rapidly, so in 2050, I am
afraid there will be no real nature outside parks.
Most untouched nature will be inside protected
areas. Everything outside will either have been
cut down or used for agriculture or urban areas.

We will also have the problem of rising

temperatures, which will move the climate
zones some five kilometres per year towards
the poles: northwards in the northern
hemisphere and southwards in the southern
hemisphere. This means the ecosystems will
escape the carefully-made national parks,
which sit still. For me, the tree-hugger, this is
very sad, but completely unstoppable. The
only good thing is that most of the damage,
the serious damage, has already occurred.
Figure 12: World biological capacity, 1970–2050. Scales: Unused biocapacity Untouched forests have already been reduced
(0–12.5 billion global hectares); unused biocapacity per person (0–1.3 global dramatically in area, and coral reefs are already
hectares per person). being bleached. Luckily I don’t see any other

11
 do something. This is particularly true for
Rising temperatures will move the climate zones the climate problem. We already know the
technologies that can cut greenhouse gas
some five kilometres per year towards the poles.
emissions sufficiently to avoid dangerous
Ecosystems will escape the carefully-made national warming. These technologies are more
parks, which sit still. I don’t see any huge, sudden expensive than the traditional solutions, but
biodiversity collapse, just the sad continuing not very much so. It will only cost one or two
impoverishment of all things natural. per cent of GDP to make the shift to a climate-
friendly future.

huge, sudden biodiversity collapse, just the So why don’t we do this? The root cause,
sad continuing impoverishment of all things as I see it, is the fact that human activity is
natural. dominated by short-term considerations.
Neither the capitalist system nor democratic
A mild crash with global limits society appears to be willing to sacrifice short-
So, in sum I don’t expect a global collapse term advantage in order to create a better life
within the next 40 years. The world will for our grandchildren. So my sad future will be
continue, more or less, its sad ways, building imposed on us by our own decisions – which
towards a climate crisis – which will not,
largely mean the pursuit of maximum short-
however, reach full bloom until the second
term advantage. This short-termism is actually
half of the 21st century. The world economy in
2050 will be much smaller than most people
one of the reasons why it is intellectually
expect, and many will be less well-off than possible to make a forecast for the next 40
anticipated. This relative poverty will occur in years, because there is a certain stability in the
two areas: in the rich world the majority will be decision-making structure that underlies all the
poorer because we won’t have much economic important national and international action. For
development over the next 40 years, and in the example, I think the short-termism of voters will
poorest parts of the world, there will be many stop politicians from agreeing on the type of
poor because we won’t have succeeded in regulation that could easily steer our capitalist
lifting their incomes substantially. markets to work for the social good – rather
than only for maximum profit.
Another effect of the smaller GDP is a beneficial
one, namely that the ecological footprint
Bluntly speaking, short-termism in democracies
of humanity will be smaller than it would
and in capitalism will hinder a meaningful
otherwise have been. So, in many ways, we will
not hit the resource ceiling and the pollution response. If we just decided to do something, it
absorption capacity of the world with as high a could easily be done. The problem is not a lack
speed as we once feared. The crash into global of technology, nor the economic cost, but the
limitations will be further softened by rising way we have chosen to organise our societal
investment to counter depletion, pollution decision-making.
and other ills. Thus, global society will, to
some extent, be rational and start to meet
the challenges; but this will limit growth in
disposable income. Citizens of the rich world
Neither the capitalist system nor
will not be very much richer in 2050 than today. democratic society appears to
be willing to sacrifice short-term
The root cause: short-termism advantage in order to create a better
Personally I am saddened by this forecast, life for our grandchildren. So my sad
because it is so absolutely unnecessary. future will be imposed on us by our
Global challenges could be solved if we only
own decisions.
pulled ourselves together and decided to
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Figure 13: Consumption per person, 1970–2050 (in 2005 US$ purchasing power parity per person-year).

Regional futures get higher, partly because the US economy is

Finally, to make the forecast a little less abstract, the world’s most mature, partly because of the
nation’s huge debt, and partly because of the
Figure 13 shows per capita disposable income
inability of the US government to make forceful
(consumption per person) over the past and
and quick decisions on any issue involving the
the next 40 years, for each of the five regions I
redistribution of income and wealth. I love the
use in my forecast. Let’s start with the red curve,
US, but I am afraid its decision-making ability
which is China. There will be a tremendous
won’t improve within my lifetime.
expansion in the income of ordinary Chinese
people. Their per capita real disposable income
Then, you have what I call ‘BRISE’: Brazil,
will go up by a factor of about five. By 2050, the
Russia, India, South Africa and the ten largest
red line gets close to the green curve, which is emerging economies, including Thailand and
OECD countries except the US. In this part of Venezuela. Big things are about to occur there,
the industrial world (which includes the UK), and I predict they’ll do a fairly good job over
disposable income will be more or less the the next 40 years, doubling or perhaps trebling
same over the next 20 years. It will perhaps go per capita incomes.
up a little, and then go down a little. In practical
terms, the typical Brit will have an endless Finally there is the rest of the world, an eclectic
feeling that the rent and the gas are always mix of some 140 different nations, which I don’t
expensive. think is going to get very far in this period
because of a continuing inability to achieve
The US is in a slightly worse situation, in my dramatic economic development – for various
book, than the rest of the OECD. As far as I reasons. These countries will continue to
can understand, actual per capita disposable experience slow growth over the next 40 years,
income in the US is already at its peak. It won’t as during the past 40.

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 40 years down the line, the feeling will be one
of stagnation: it has been the same all along,
Actual per capita disposable income in the US is
it is still expensive to pay the rent, it is still
already at its peak… partly because the US expensive to get hold of the fuel for your car.
economy is the world’s most mature, partly
because of huge debt, and partly because of the And there will be two new irritating elements.
inability of the US government to make forceful First whenever you take your vacation in the
Mediterranean, the Canary Island or Spain,
decisions on any issue involving the redistribution there are these hordes of Chinese and Indians!
of income and wealth. And second you will hear people say: “Where
did all that cheap clothing go? You know, all
those cheap goods; everything was so cheap
in 2010. You could get a heater and cooker and
Individual perspectives washing machine for nothing!”
So is this good or bad? It depends on who
you ask. In 2052, if you ask a Chinese peasant, The reason, of course, is that the Chinese,
who is by then living on the 36th floor in high who currently produce these things for us at
rise number 115 in town 72, he will tell you ridiculously low prices, will by then be five
that the past 40 years have been the most times richer and will only produce expensive
marvellous epoch in the history of China. He stuff. You might ask, why couldn’t we get
will say: “I have this wonderful apartment, I cheap things from those other places that are
have a view, there’s fresh air outside, I have the still poor in 2052? We could, if we managed
most unbelievable electronic entertainment, to engineer economic development in those
the gaming and the Internet and all. What countries; but I don’t think we will.
else could anyone want? I can even, once
in a lifetime, go to Rome, although it’s very What to do?
crowded.” So from a Chinese peasant’s point of So what should we do about this sad story?
view the next 40 years is going to be great.
First, have fewer children, and that’s particularly
Then you can ask someone in the manufacturing important when you’re rich. I’ll repeat this:
sector in middle America. If I go there and ask my daughter, who is 29 and Norwegian, is the
about quality of life today, he says, “I haven’t most dangerous animal on the surface of the
had a raise since 1980.” The real disposable Earth. She consumes between 10–30 times as
income for automobile workers in the US has many resources and generates 10–30 times as
essentially been constant for 30 years. Workers much pollution as an Indian child. So, it’s much
have not had a raise; the élite has taken almost more important to have one less rich kid than
all of the new added value in the country. If I go it is to have 10–30 fewer Indians. I’m serious.
and visit the same autoworker 40 years down Population control in the rich world should be
the line, he will say, “The past 40 years have the prime focus.
been endless hell. I am worse off now than I
was 40 years ago. My children didn’t have as Secondly, reduce your CO2 footprint. Don’t drive
good life as I had in the 1990s. They couldn’t big cars, don’t drive them so far, don’t fly so
buy a decent house in 2010, and have been long, and insulate your home.
living in rental.” So from the US autoworker you
will get a totally, dramatically, opposite story to
that of the Chinese peasant.
You might ask, why can’t we get
cheap things from those other places
What do I think a UK office worker is going to that are still poor in 2052? We could,
say in 2050? Her real disposable income will if we managed to engineer economic
be essentially the same as it is today, with no development in those countries; but I
real change in the goods and services which
she can buy for her money. That means that
don’t think we will.

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We don’t have strong government... or, to be exact, we don’t have support for strong
government. Civilised, solution-oriented citizens ought to be in favour of collective action.

around with half-baked quota systems that

Third, support strong government. As provide insufficient incentives – which might
mentioned above, most of the solutions to modify development somewhat, but doesn’t
today’s global problems exist, and the only solve the problem.
reason they’re not implemented is that we
don’t have strong government. Or to be exact, And then, fourth and finally, if we want to help
we don’t have support for strong government. the world’s poor, we (the rich) should build and
Thus civilised, solution-oriented citizens ought pay for a complete clean energy infrastructure
to be in favour of collective action. I think we in the poor world. This would ensure that they
will see 40 years down the line that it was don’t have to build a cheaper, carbon-intensive
the Chinese who did, in the end, solve the energy system for the energy they sorely need:
climate problem for us – through collective electricity, fuel and heat. If we did nothing else,
action. They will produce the electric cars and that would solve a substantial part of the future
the technologies we will need, and they will climate and poverty problem.
implement them in China through centralised
decisions. Meanwhile, we will be fiddling That, my friends, is what I see. I don’t like it... but
still, feel free to shoot the messenger.

The State of Sustainability Leadership is CPSL’s annual thought leadership report, delivering insight
and challenge from our world-wide network of business leaders, policymakers and academic experts.
This year’s edition, to be published in full in December 2012, is focused on the theme of business and
the long-term – what leaders can do to understand and shape the future. CPSL is an institution within
the University of Cambridge’s School of Technology. www.cpsl.cam.ac.uk

In 2010 the artist Chris Wainwright

journeyed with Cape Farewell
on an art and science expedition
to the High Arctic. Struck by
the light against the quickly
changing landscape, he used
semaphore, the tool of last resort
for lost travellers, to spell out his
amazement and concern: “Here
comes the sun, there goes the ice”.
CPSL is proud to be working with
Cape Farewell, which works with
artists and scientists on a cultural
response to climate change.
www.capefarewell.com

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