827. People v.

Bacamante, 248 SCRA 47

TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

MOISES BACAMANTE y ORDANIZA, accused-appellant.

GR NUMBER G.R. No. 103627

DATE September 5, 1995

PONENTE Division PADILLA, J.

NATURE/ APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of

KEYWORDS/ Manila, Br. 18/ exclusionary rule; violation of rights/ First
DIVISION Division

FACTS Accused-appellant, Moises Bacamante y Ordaniza was

charged with robbery with homicide. Bacamante worked
as an all-around serviceman at Chua Huat Enterprises, a
hardware store.

On December 19, 1985, smoke was seen by a woman-

vendor coming from the hardware store. She informed
Fernando Ngo, Huat's adopted son of the smoke. Ngo
immediately proceeded to the store and found his father
lying in a pool of his own blood and smelling of paint
thinner which had been poured on the dead body and
around the area of the store.

Ngo also discovered an axe with dried blood about 2

meters away from the victim’s body and 3 electric flat
irons connected to electric outlets and placed on top of
cans of paint thinner. The flat irons which caused the
smoke. Ngo also testified that P10,000.00 was missing
from the cash register and vault. Huat's death was
caused by stab wounds in the head, chest and other
parts of the body.

The next morning, all the employees of Chua Huat

Enterprises reported for work except for Bacamante. On
the basis of investigations conducted by members of the
Western Police District (WPD) particularly Pfc. Rodolfo
 Kalaquian, accused Bacamante became a suspect in the
crime.

A police team from the WPD was dispatched to the house

of the accused. Upon seeing the police team, Bacamante
ran to the back of his house, and when Pfc. Kalaquian
fired warning shots, he ran further to a grassy area
beyond his house. The police team convinced
Bacamante's parents to let their son surrender to them.
When accused voluntarily surrendered, the WPD team
took him to Manila, accompanied by his brother Teotimo.

On 25 January 1986, Bacamante executed a statement

admitting his guilt, which was signed by Pfc. Fradejas
and Teotimo Bacamante as witnesses.

But, Bacamante pleaded not guilty when arraigned on 4

April 1986 and after trial, the Regional Trial Court, Br.
18, Manila rendered a decision, dated 28 October 1991,
finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt with
the aggravating circumstances of abuse of confidence,
night-time and evident pre-meditation and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

In this appeal, Bacamante claims that a certain Atty.

Gilbert Zulueta, who was merely visiting the police
station at the time and who, according to the
extrajudicial statement, assisted him as counsel, never in
fact effectively informed him of the consequences of the
extrajudicial confession. Accused also contends that he
was forced to sign the extrajudicial confession since the
police officers mauled him and even refused his request
that his brother Timoteo be allowed to find a lawyer for
him or contact their relatives.

ISSUE(S) 1. W/N the accused-appellant’s extrajudicial confession is

admissible?

RULING(S) 1. No. Patrolman Fradejas of the WPD, testified that he

was the one who was present when accused executed
his extrajudicial confession. Fradejas stated that Atty.
Zulueta was requested to act as counsel for accused
 during the custodial investigation. It is to be noted
however that Fradejas admitted that while accused
was undergoing investigation and answering the
questions propounded to him, Atty. Zulueta would
“come and go” and that Atty. Zulueta was not at all
times within hearing distance of accused but was
merely “within the premises.” Atty. Zulueta himself
admitted that he could not remember having informed
accused of the constitutional presumption of his
innocence. Given the above admissions by witnesses
for the prosecution, the inadmissibility of the
extrajudicial confession of accused Bacamante is
mandated under Sec. 12(1), Sec. 12(3) and Sec. 17,
Article III of the Constitution.
The term “effective and vigilant counsel” necessarily
and logically requires that the lawyer be present and
able to advise and assist his client from the time the
confessant answers the first question asked by the
investigating officer until the signing of the
extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the lawyer should
ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and
that the person under investigation fully understands
the nature and consequence of his extrajudicial
confession in relation to his constitutional rights. A
contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to
the constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel
and to be presumed innocent.

CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing considerations and

premises, the appealed decision is hereby SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellant is ACQUITTED based on reasonable
doubt and ordered RELEASED unless he is also detained
for some other legal ground.
833. People v. Atrejenio – 310 SCRA 229

TITLE THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

RODOLFO ATREJENIO y LIBANAN, accused-appellant.

GR NUMBER G.R. No. 120160

DATE July 13, 1999

PONENTE MENDOZA, J.

NATURE/ APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of

KEYWORDS/ Manila, Br. 12./ exclusionary rule; violation of rights/
DIVISION Second Division

FACTS Accused-appellant, Rodolfo Atrejenio y Libanan was

charged with murder. The prosecution presented two
alleged eyewitnesses, Lito J. Olino and Leonito Toltol.

Lito J. Olino, first cousin of the victim, Bonifacio Olino y

Jose, testified that while he and Bonifacio were walking
along Osmeña St. towards Panday Pira St. in Tondo,
Manila, at about 8 p.m. on July 27, 1986, he saw
Atrejenio, a neighbor of two weeks, standing alone at the
back of a culvert and taking cover in a corner near a
concrete fence, which was eight arm lengths away from
them. When they were about five arm lengths away,
Atrejenio shot Bonifacio with a .38 caliber revolver. Lito
went to the aid of Bonifacio, the latter told Lito that he
had been shot by his enemy, Atrejenio. Bonifacio was
taken to the Mary Johnston Hospital, where he was
declared dead on arrival.

Leonito Toltol, a neighbor of the victim, corroborated

Lito's testimony. Toltol claimed that he saw the shooting
incident but went home immediately without giving
assistance to Bonifacio because he was afraid. However,
on the following day, he informed Lito that he was an
eyewitness.

Lito later accompanied Pfc. Salvador Fradejas to

 Atrejenio's house and identified the latter as the
perpetrator. There were about three persons in
Atrejenio's house at the time he voluntarily went with the
police. Atrejenio was taken to the police detachment at
Pritil St. by a companion of Pfc. Fradejas. He was later
brought by Pfc. Fradejas to the Homicide Section of the
Western Police District (WPD), Manila where, Atrejenio
executed a sworn statement before Cpl. Leonardo Miguel
in the presence of Pfc. Fradejas.

Pfc. Fradejas in his testimony stated that he investigated

the accused-appellant after apprising him of his
constitutional rights. According to him, Atrejenio did not
give any written statement, but he orally admitted his
guilt and that Atrejenio stated that the reason why he
shot the victim was because they had a fight a month
before during a benefit dance in Barrio Magsaysay,
Tondo, Manila.

Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.

The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 12 rendered

its decision finding accused-appellant guilty of murder.
Hence this petition. Atrejenio contends that the trial
court should have acquitted him on the ground of
reasonable doubt.

ISSUE(S) 1. W/N the RTC is correct in disregarding Pfc. Fradejas’s

testimony?

RULING(S) 1. Yes. The trial court correctly disregarded the

testimony since it is clear that the confession was
obtained in violation of the Miranda rights of persons
under investigation for crimes. Article III, §12(1) of
the Constitution provides that “any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
 writing and in the presence of counsel.” Thus, the
confession of accused-appellant is inadmissible in
evidence against him under §12(3).
The remaining evidence, however, fully establishes
the guilt of accused-appellant. The strongest basis for
his conviction was the dying declaration of the victim
that it was his enemy, accused-appellant, who shot
him.

CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Manila, Branch 12, is AFFIRMED.
839. People v. Sequino, 264 SCRA 79

TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ERMELINDO SEQUIÑO, VICENTE TUMANGAN, and
NENITO MELVIDA, accused-appellants.

GR NUMBER G.R. No. 117397

DATE November 13, 1996

PONENTE DAVIDE, JR., J.

NATURE/ APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of

KEYWORDS/ Cebu City, Br. 21/ exclusionary rule; violation of rights/
DIVISION Third Division

FACTS Eugenio Godinez, overseer of Hacienda Jose Ancajas in

Medellin, Cebu, and Pedro Broniola, the hacienda's
bookkeeper, went to the Medellin Rural Bank to withdraw
P50,557.17 The bank's cashier instructed Jimmy Serafin,
janitor and motorcycle driver of the bank, to drive
Godinez and Broniola back to the hacienda on one of the
bank's motorcycles. Serafin drove the motorcycle with
Godinez behind him and Broniola behind Godinez.
Godinez carried the money in a money bag which he
hung over his left shoulder.

As the three were in nearing the hacienda, the accused,

armed with guns, tried to block their path and ordered
them to stop. Godinez heard a gunshot. Broniola had
fallen off the motorcycle. Serafin leapt from the
motorcycle and ran away. The motorcycle toppled over
Godinez, pinning him to the ground. Accused Tumangan,
with gun in hand, approached Godinez, took the money
from the money bag, and fled on foot with his coaccused.
With the assailants gone, Godinez ran home, leaving
Broniola behind. Meanwhile, Serafin had proceeded to
the house of the Broniolas, which was near the crime
scene, and informed Broniola's wife of the incident.

SPO Elpidio Luna went to the crime scene where he

found an abandoned motorcycle. People who by then had
milled around the site informed Luna "that the culprit had
already fled." Luna noticed that the "bushes were
compressed" and found "a piece of paper utilized as toilet
paper with a stool on it. The paper was a bio-data sheet
with the name " Melvida, Nenito" and the entry for the
father's name filled in with "Elpidio Melvida."

After finding Nenito Melvida, Luna asked Melvida to go

with him to the barangay captain's house. Melvida
hesitated at first, but his companions prevailed upon him
to go with Luna.

The barangay captain was not home, so Luna took

Melvida to the police station instead. Melvida was kept at
the station the whole evening of 24 April 1991 for
investigation conducted, first, by Luna, then, by his
fellow policemen Sgt. Pablo Ygot, Cpl. Alfredo Mondigo
and Eliseo Tepait, as Luna had to take his supper.

Melvida was allowed to go home the next day, but only

after the police had filed criminal charges against him, he
had posted bail. Melvida was not assisted by counsel
during the police investigation, although Luna assured
the trial judge that the Municipal Mayor of Medellin, who
is a lawyer, was present. Luna claimed he asked the
Mayor to act as Melvida's counsel, he admitted that this
request did not appear in the record of the investigation.
Luna's investigation of Melvida was not reduced into
writing.

During Luna's investigation, Melvida admitted that he

kept "his share from the loot" in his house. Melvida then
was brought to his house where he got P9,000.00, in one
hundred peso bills, placed inside a shoe which he
delivered to the policemen. During the investigation
conducted by SPO3 Alfredo Mondigo, Melvida admitted
that his companions during the robbery were Vicente
Tumangan and Ermelindo Sequiño.

Mondigo and policeman Proniely Artiquela proceeded to

the house of Hones where they saw Tumangan and
Sequiño on the porch. Noticing something bulging on the
 waist of Tumangan, Mondigo and Artiquela approached
Tumangan and asked him what was bulging at his waist.
Tumangan did not answer. So, Mondigo patted the bulge
which turned out to be a .38 caliber Squires Bingham
revolver with holster and four bullets. When ask if he had
a license for the firearm, Tumangan answered in the
negative. Mondigo and Artiquela then brought Tumangan
and Sequiño to the police station. Tumangan was then
investigated in the presence of the Municipal Mayor.
Tumangan admitted that he was one of the hold-uppers.

Mondigo further declared that the police recovered

P22,526.00, but could not explain any further how the
recovery was made and from whom. As to this amount,
SPO1 Mariano Remulta, property custodian of the
Medellin PNP station, merely declared that he was
entrusted with the P22,526.00 which, according to the
station commander, was "recovered in connection with
the highway robbery case."

The defense interposed alibi and denial and suggested a

frame-up. However, the trial court gave weight to the
prosecution's evidence and in its decision it found the
accused guilty of robbery with homicide.

ISSUE(S) 1. W/N Melvida’s arrest is valid?

2. W/N Melvida's rights to remain silent and to counsel,
and his right to be informed of these rights are
violated?

RULING(S) 1. No. Regardless of Luna’s claim to the contrary,

accused Nenito Melvida was arrested. An arrest “is the
taking of a person into custody in order that he may
be bound to answer for the commission of an
offense,” and it is made “by an actual restraint of the
person to be arrested, or by his submission to the
custody of the person making the arrest.” Melvida’s
voluntarily going with Luna upon the latter’s
“invitation” was a submission to Luna’s custody, and
Luna believed that Melvida was a suspect in the
robbery charged herein, hence, Melvida was being
 held to answer for the commission of the said offense.
Since, he was arrested without warrant, the inquiry
must now be whether a valid warrantless arrest was
effected. Luna’s basis for arresting Melvida was the
bio-data sheet with Melvida’s name on it found at the
crime scene. By no means can this indicate that
Melvida committed the offense charged. It does not
even connote that Melvida was at the crime scene for
the bio-data sheet could have been obtained by
anyone and left at the crime scene long before or after
the crime was committed. Luna, therefore, had no
personal knowledge of facts indicating Melvida’s guilt;
at best, he had an unreasonable suspicion. Melvida’s
arrest was thus illegal.
2. Yes. After his unlawful arrest, Melvida underwent
custodial investigation. The custodial investigation
commenced when the police pinpointed Melvida as
one of the authors of the crime or had focused on him
as a suspect thereof. This brought into operation par.
(1) of Sec. 12, Art. III of the Constitution
guaranteeing the accused’s rights to remain silent and
to counsel, and his right to be informed of these
rights. There was no showing that Melvida was ever
informed of these rights, and Luna admitted that
Melvida was not assisted by counsel during the
investigation.

CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the

challenged decision of Branch 21 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City of 24 February 1994 in Criminal Case
No. CBU-22486 is hereby AFFIRMED.
845. People v. Bariquit, 341 SCRA 600

TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

PEDRO SASAN BARIQUIT, CRISTITUTO SASAN
BARIQUIT, BASELINO LASCUÑA REPE, EMEGDIO
LASCUÑA, JR., accused-appellants.

GR NUMBER G.R. No. 122733

DATE October 2, 2000

PONENTE PER CURIAM

NATURE/ AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial

KEYWORDS/ Court of Cebu City, Br. 18./ exclusionary rule; violation
DIVISION of rights/ En Banc

FACTS On 28 June 1994, Baselino Repe and brothers Pedro and

Cristituto Bariquit, and brothers Emegdio and Rogelio
Lascuña, were charged, in a Second Amended
Information, with Robbery with Homicide.

On 8 February 1994, the accused-appellants armed with

bladed weapons, stole 1 gold necklace; P3,000.00; and 1
blanket which were placed by the owner Spouses Simon
Hermida and Corazon Manabat Hermida on their wooden
trunk, and killed the victims.

During the police interview with the relatives of the

victims, they elicited information that the possible
assailants were accused-appellants Pedro Bariquit,
Emegdio Lascuña, Cristituto Bariquit and accused
Baselino Repe. Acting on such information, the Police
conducted a “hot pursuit” operation and proceeded.

Pedro was arrested in possession of P480.5034, gold

necklace and Japanese wartime money and with his hand
injured when Corazon resisted and stabbed him. Emegdio
and Baselino were jointly arrested, in possession of
P800.00 each. Upon the arrest of Baselino and Emegdio,
the police immediately commenced investigation of the
 two accused by propounding questions regarding the
commission of the crime even while they were still
walking along the highway, on their way to the police
station.

During investigation, Emegdio admitted that “they were

together, but only Pedro and Cristituto were the one(s)
who killed the spouses. Based on such information,
Emegdio and Baselino were brought to the police station
for further investigation, where Emegdio admitted that
Rogelio was also one of their companions. As a
consequence, the police returned to Isabela, where they
invited Rogelio to the police station for questioning.

The trial court resolved to drop and discharge Rogelio

Lascuña as “party-accused”, who was 14 yrs. old at that
time, for the purpose of utilizing him as state witness.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant Pedro Bariquit
entered a plea of guilty while accused-appellants
Cristituto Bariquit, Emegdio Lascuña, Jr. and accused
Baselino Repe, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
However, accused-appellant Pedro Bariquit withdrew his
earlier plea of guilty and, entered a new a plea of not
guilty.

In handing down the judgment of conviction, the trial

court appreciated the presence of conspiracy and relied
on facts culled from the collective testimony of state
witness Rogelio Lascuña and other prosecution
witnesses. Further, the trial court considered the
testimony of co-accused Baselino Repe for the purpose of
establishing the element of robbery in the special
complex crime.

The trial court found the accused-appellants Pedro

Bariquit, Cristituto Bariquit, and Emegdio Lascuña guilty
and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of death, while
Baselino Repe was likewise found guilty, but the trial
court appreciated the privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority on Repe’s favor.

ISSUE(S) 1. W/N interrogation conducted on accused-appellants

Emegdio and Baselino falls under custodial
 investigation?

RULING(S) 1. Yes. The interrogation conducted by the police on

accused-appellants Emegdio and Baselino falls under
the term “custodial investigation” pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence and the provisions of Republic
Act 7438. It may not be amiss to observe that under
R.A. 7438, the requisites of a “custodial investigation”
are applicable even to a person not formally arrested
but merely “invited for questioning.”
In this case, it is of no moment that the questioning
was done along the highway while Baselino and
Emegdio were being led by the police to the station.
To put it differently, the place of interrogation is not at
all a reliable barometer to determine the existence or
absence of custodial investigation. Of striking
materiality and significance is the fact that the tone
and manner of questioning by the police, as gleaned
from the records, reveal that they already presumed
accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime
and singled them out as the despicable authors
thereof.
Under these circumstances, the police authorities
should have properly apprised them of their
constitutionally protected rights, without which such
uncounselled admissions or any other evidence
obtained as a result thereof, or proceeding
therefrom—the putrid source—are deemed likewise
inadmissible in evidence against the accused-
appellants.

CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused Baselino

Repe is hereby ACQUITTED. As to the accused-appellants
Pedro Bariquit, Cristituto Bariquit and Emegdio Lascuña,
this Court finds them guilty of the special complex crime
of Robbery with Homicide.
851. People v. Lapitaje, 397 SCRA 674

TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ARNOLD BACLA-AN LAPITAJE, MARIO REYES, WENDEL
ARELLANO y TANIO and ROMY BALUYOS y PINGKI-AN,
accused-appellants.

GR NUMBER G.R. No. 132042

DATE February 19, 2003

PONENTE AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

NATURE/ AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial

KEYWORDS/ Court of Danao City, Cebu, Br. 25/ exclusionary rule;
DIVISION violation of rights/ En Banc

FACTS Accused-appellants, Arnold Bacla-an Lapitaje, Mario

Reyes, Wendell Arellano y Tanio and Romy Baluyos y
Pingkian were charged of Robbery with Frustrated
Homicide by the trial court for entering the store of
Domingo Colonia, taking P2,000.00 and shooting one
Nelson Saavedra in their escape, causing mortal wounds.
And despite months of medical intervention, said wounds
eventually caused his death, which caused the
Information to be amended to Robbery with Homicide

Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty. Witnesses were

presented and both parties gave their testimonies and
alibis. Domingo Colonia in his testimony, claimed that at
the time of the incident, Domingo instantly recognized
Arnold who pointed a firearm at his wife. Cesar Roldan
also positively identified appellants Arnold and Mario as
two of the three men, armed with pistols, who he saw
fleeing from the store.

Accused-appellants were brought into custody without a

warrant of arrest. Subsequently, firearms were seized by
the police without a search warrant. It was alleged that
those were the weapons used in the perpetration of the
 crime.

The Regional Trial Court of Danao City, found guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
Robbery with Homicide.

ISSUE(S) 1. W/N the warrantless arrest is valid?

2. W/N waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest means
automatic waiver of inadmissibility of evidence?

RULING(S) 1. No. The warrantless arrest of appellant Arnold

together with Wendel and Romy was not lawful. Oarga
testified that he caused the arrest of “four men”
running towards the taxi since they were acting
suspiciously. However, Oarga did not elaborate why
he thought said men were acting suspiciously. Rule
113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure Sec. 5
provides circumstances when arrest without warrant is
lawful. None of the aforesaid circumstances were
attendant in the case at bar. The “four men” were not
prisoners who had just escaped from a penal
establishment. Oarga did not testify that the “four
men” he had seen running towards the taxi have
earlier committed or were actually committing or
attempting to commit an offense in his presence.
Nevertheless, considering that appellant Arnold, had
entered his plea and actively participated in the trial of
the case, he submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial
court thereby curing any defect in his arrest. Legality
of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court
over his person.
2. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also
mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence
seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. The
following searches and seizures are deemed
permissible by jurisprudence: (1) search of moving
vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3) customs searches
(4) waiver or consent searches (5) stop and frisk
 situations (Terry Search) and (6) search incidental to
a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless
search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid
warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is
considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant
of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible
warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante
delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and, (3)
arrests of escaped prisoners.
Thus, the search cannot be justified on the ground
that it involves search of a moving vehicle.
Warrantless search of a moving vehicle is allowed only
when it is not practicable to secure a warrant because
the vehicle carrying the prohibited drugs can be
quickly moved out of the area or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought. In a number of cases this
exception in no way gives the police officers unlimited
discretion to conduct warrantless searches of
automobiles in the absence of probable cause.
When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an
extensive search, such warrantless search has been
held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe
before search that they will find the instrumentality or
evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be
searched. Oarga and his men did not have personal
knowledge of the crime that had just been committed
and therefore had no probable cause to believe that
they will find the instruments or evidence pertaining
to the crime. Consequently, the firearms, empty shell
and live ammunitions as well as the hand grenade
allegedly found during the search cannot be admitted
as evidence.

CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court

found accused-appellants, of Danao City (Branch 25) is
AFFIRMED.
857. People v. Suela, 373 SCRA 163

TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. NERIO SUELA

y HEMBRA, EDGAR SUELA y HEMBRA and EDGARDO
BATOCAN, appellants.

GR NUMBER G.R. Nos. 133570-71

DATE January 15, 2002

PONENTE PANGANIBAN, J.

NATURE/ AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial

KEYWORDS/ Court of Quezon City, Br. 95/ confession to private party
DIVISION / En Banc

FACTS Nerio Suela y Hembra and Edgar Suela y Hembra and

Edgardo Batocan were charged with Robbery with
Homicide.

Prosecution’s Version: On July 26, 1995, between 11:00

P.M. and 12:00 midnight, private complainant Director
Nilo L. Rosas was at the master’s bedroom located at the
second floor of his townhouse residence in Quezon City.
He was watching television with his adopted son, Norman
Rosas, and his former co-teacher and good friend,
Geronimo ‘Gerry’ Gabilo. Suddenly, 3 persons sporting
ski masks, bonnets and gloves, brandishing handguns
and a knife, barged into the room. Rosas and Gabilo
were ordered to drop to the floor and had their hands
tied. The malefactors then ordered them to give their
money. Gabilo obeyed and handed an envelope
containing P200,000.00.

Rosas was then forced to reveal that his money was in

the walk-in closet. The malefactors tried to open it, but
could not. Then, they ordered Gabilo to open it but failed
due to his bound hands. Eventually, they discovered
where the key was and proceeded to take Rosas money.

The malefactors ordered Gabilo to give them his car key

and was dragged to downstairs. Rosas was threatened to
follow. Sensing that the malefactors had left, he went
downstairs and saw Gabilo slumped on the floor in his
blood.

After almost 5 mons. of no leads, Araceli Tubaga,

Director Rosas’ executive secretary received a call from a
male person who demands P200,000.00 in exchange for
information regarding the incident. Director Rosas
informed the Police and the latter immediately
orchestrated an entrapment where they arrested Edgar
Suela. He had an envelope containing a note which
states that the mastermind of the robbery was Nerio
Suela, who is his brother and Rosas' driver.

Nerio Suela was immediately arrested at Director Rosas’

office. When Nerio confirmed the contents of his brother
Edgar’s letter, Capt. Casanova directed SPO1 Carlos
Nicolas and PO2 Orlin Comia to accompany Nerio to his
residence. Thereat, they recovered the Sony Trinitron TV,
and a knife with a wooden scabbard.

While under detention, the Suelas expressed their desire

to give an extra-judicial confession. SPO3 Patriarca,
together with Capt. Casanova and another police officer,
brought the Suelas to Atty. Sansano and Atty. Rous who
informed them of their constitutional rights and
separately interviewed each of the Suelas. In their extra-
judicial confessions, the Suelas mentioned appellant
Edgardo Batocan, their townmate, as a participant in the
crime. Thus, his name was included in the criminal
informations, and a warrant of arrest was issued against
him.

He was immediately brought to Manila and was detained

at the Quezon City Police Station 9. The operatives were
able to recover the gold-plated Citizen watch of Rosas
from Batocan’s girlfriend. While in police custody,
appellant Batocan also indicated his desire to give an
extra-judicial confession.

Batocan's version: He was forced and threatened by the

police officers to admit and confess to the crimes. He was
 also forced to sign a typewritten extrajudicial confession,
the contents of which he did not know as he was not
allowed to read it nor was it read to him. No lawyer was
present at that time and he only met Atty. Rous for the
first time in court.

The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, (Branch 95),

found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of robbery with homicide and simple robbery.

ISSUE(S) 1. W/N Batocan's confession to Rosas is admissible?

RULING(S) 1. Yes. Edgardo Batocan’s confession to Rosas who is not

a police officer is admissible in evidence. The Rules
state that “the declaration of an accused
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of
any offense necessarily included therein, may be
given in evidence against him.” Batocan’s verbal
declarations are not covered by Sections 12 (1) and
(3) of Article III of the Constitution, because they
were not extracted while he was under custodial
investigation.
In People v. Tawat,41 the Court declared: “The rule is
that ‘any person, otherwise competent as a witness,
who heard the confession, is competent to testify as
to the substance of what he heard is he heard and
understood all of it. An oral confession need not be
repeated verbatim, but in such case it must be given
in its substance.’
“Proof of the contents of an oral extrajudicial
confession may be made by the testimony of a person
who testifies that he was present, heard, understood,
and remembers the substance of the conversation or
statement made by the accused.”

CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED

and the appealed Decision MODIFIED.
863. People v. Balisteros - 237 SCRA 499

TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

SALVADOR BALISTEROS y FLORES, NILO AVESTRO y
CARDONA and ERNESTO GALVANTE y BALISTEROS,
accused. SALVADOR BALISTEROS y FLORES and NILO
AVESTRO y CARDONA,** accused-appellants.

GR NUMBER G.R. No. 110289

DATE October 7, 1994

PONENTE REGALADO, J.:

NATURE/ APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of

KEYWORDS/ Malolos, Bulacan, Br. 14/Who May Raise the
DIVISION Question/Second Division

FACTS Accused-appellants Ernesto Galvante, Salvador Balisteros

and Nilo Avestro were charged of murder.

On August 16, 1991 Eliza Merceada reported for work at

the store of Romeo Abad. She brought the merienda of
the farm laborers of Romeo, in the rice field. On her way
there, she saw Nilo Avestros, Salvador Balisteros and
Ernesto Galvante in the hut of Salvador Balisteros (Mang
Badong), drinking Gin. After serving the merienda, she
returned to Romeo's house.

Eliza had to return to the rice field to bring lunch to the

laborers, aboard a truck with Romeo. When they passed
by the hut of Balisteros, Romeo was left in the hut while
she proceeded to the rice field. After the laborers had
finished eating, Romeo arrived, but he did not stay long
because he went to rope graze his horse. After several
minutes passed, she left and proceeded to the place
where the truck was parked. On her way, she heard two
shouts saying, “huwag, huwag” near the bamboo grove,
then she called for Nilo, whom she believed was in the
hut, but no one answered, so she proceeded.
 On her way there, she saw Mang Badong, Nilo and
Ernesto coming out from the bamboo grove. Mang
Badong was half-naked carrying a bolo, who was in a
hurry, followed by Nilo and Ernesto. Mang Badong asked
her where Romeo Abad was, then she also asked Badong
if they have seen Romeo Abad, but Badong did not
answer. While she was walking going to the highway, she
noticed Badong, Nilo and Ernesto were following her.

When she reached the highway, she boarded the truck

and watched the 3 accused going to the highway. Then
she left the truck and went to the store. She and Yolanda
Herno, brought the merienda of the workers once again
in the rice field. When they arrived Romeo was not there,
so she and Yolanda looked for Romeo at the bamboo
grove where she previously heard the two shouts and
there, they saw blood and the body of Romeo Abad his
neck cut and a big wound on his stomach.

During the trial of the case, the prosecution moved for

the exclusion of accused Ernesto Galvante so that he
could become a witness for the Government as particeps
criminis. In an order dated April 22, 1992, the lower
court discharged said accused from the information to be
utilized as a state witness.

A year later, or on April 6, 1993, the Regional Trial Court

of Malolos, Bulacan rendered its decision finding herein
accused-appellant Salvador Balisteros and Nilo Avestro
guilty.

ISSUE(S) 1. W/N Galvante may raise the question of violation of

his rights under Art. III Sec. 12 of the 1987
Constitution?

RULING(S) 1. No. The alleged violation of the Constitution,

particularly Section 12 of Article III, when in
accordance with the present rule for the qualification
of a state witness, Galvante executed a sworn
statement wherein he categorically admitted his guilt
but without the assistance of a counsel. Appellants
also claim that Galvante “made his sworn statement in
 the presence of Atty. Alejandro, the counsel of the
plaintiff, Mr. Matic, the two brothers of the deceased,
the Mayor of Pandi and another person whom he did
not know. With this battery of persons surrounding
him, we could imagine the pressure exerted on
Galvante.” Appellants cannot seek solace in the
provision they have invoked. What is provided by the
modified formulation in the 1987 Constitution is that a
confession taken in violation of said Section 12 and
Section 17 of the same Article “shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him,” meaning the confessant. This
objection can be raised only by the confessant whose
rights have been violated as such right is personal in
nature.

CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is

hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against accused-appellants.
869. People v. Espiritu, 302 SCRA 533

TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

RIZAL ESPIRITU y KINAO, accused-appellant.

GR NUMBER G.R. No. 128287

DATE February 2, 1999

PONENTE PANGANIBAN, J.

NATURE/ APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of

KEYWORDS/ Baguio City, Br. 6/ admissible Evidence / Third Division
DIVISION

FACTS Appellant Rizal Espiritu was convicted as charged for the

crime of murder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua by the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City, along with two others—Gerald Alicoy and
Fred Malicdan.

The conviction was based mainly on his confession and

the corroborating evidence of corpus delicti. His extra-
judicial confession stated that he and Fred Malicdan killed
Sato Sanad after being hired by Gerald Alicoy to do so
for the sum of P20,000.00.

Aside from describing the details of how he had his

cohort killed Sanad, during the ocular inspection, he even
pointed out the place where the killing had been
committed. And when he executed his extra-judicial
confession before the police and during the preliminary
investigation of the case, before the city prosecutor,
wherein he admitted his participation in the said incident,
he was assisted by Atty. Daniel Mangallay.

However,during the trial of the case, the accused denied

any participation in the killing of Sanad. He also assailed
the admissibility of his extra-judicial confession. And, he
claimed that Atty. Mangallay was retained by Alfredo
Kinao (the uncle of the accused) and not by himself and
that the said lawyer was unable to advise or to explain to
him the contents of his extra-judicial confession before
 he signed it.

ISSUE(S) 1. W/N Espiritu’s extrajudicial confession is admissible?

RULING(S) 1. Yes. The right to counsel does not mean that the
accused must personally hire his own counsel. The
constitutional requirement is satisfied when a counsel
is (1) engaged by anyone acting on behalf of the
person under investigation or (2) appointed by the
court upon petition of the said person or by someone
on his behalf. Thus, that Atty. Mangallay was retained
not by the appellant personally but by his uncle,
Alfredo Kinao, is not proof of counsel deprivation. The
fact remains that Kinao, in hiring the counsel, acted
on behalf of Appellant Espiritu. Besides, Espiritu
did not object when Atty. Mangallay represented him
during the investigations before the police and the city
prosecutor. In fact, he expressly acknowledged Atty.
Mangallay as his counsel.
The confession of Appellant Espiritu is admissible in
evidence, as it was satisfactorily shown that it was (1)
voluntary and (2) made with the assistance of a
competent and independent counsel. With respect to
the first requisite, Espiritu readily admitted killing
Sanad when he was confronted by the relatives of the
deceased. Thereafter, without being “invited” by the
investigating officers, he went to the police station
and voluntarily gave his statement to SPO1 Wilfredo
P. Cabanayan. Later, appellant affirmed before
Prosecutor Romeo Carbonell the fact that he, with
Atty. Mangallay, had gone to the police station to
surrender and that the said counsel had assisted him
when the police started taking his statement. In his
confession, appellant admitted that he and Malicdan
killed Sanad, after being hired by Alicoy to do so for
the sum of P20,000. Aside from describing the details
of how he and his cohort killed Sanad, Espiritu, during
 an ocular inspection, even pointed out the place where
the killing had been committed. These acts of the
appellant are clear manifestations that, contrary to his
protestations, no “torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation or any other means” was used against
him to force him to confess.
The meaning of “competent counsel” was explained in
People v. Deniega as follows: The lawyer called to be
present during such investigations should be as far as
reasonably possible, the choice of the individual
undergoing questioning. If the lawyer were one
furnished in the accused’s behalf, it is important that
he should be competent and independent, i.e., that he
is willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of
the accused, as distinguished from one who would
merely be giving a routine, peremptory and
meaningless recital of the individual’s constitutional
rights. The assistance rendered to appellant by Atty.
Mangallay met the standards that had been set in
Deniega for the purpose of safeguarding the right of
the accused against involuntary confession.

CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, the ASSAILED DECISION is hereby

AFFIRMED.
875. *Yap v. CA, 358 SCRA 564

TITLE FRANCISCO YAP, JR., a.k.a. EDWIN YAP, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

GR NUMBER G.R. No. 141529

DATE June 6, 2001

PONENTE GONZAGA-REYES, J.

NATURE/ SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari/

KEYWORDS/ excessive if equal to civil liability / Third Division
DIVISION

FACTS Francisco Yap, petitioner was convicted of estafa for

misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00.
He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed
provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed
earlier in the proceedings.

The motion was denied by the Regional Trial Court of

Pasig City. Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
Motion to fix bail for the Provisional Liberty of accused-
ppellant Pending Appeal, invoking the last paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court.

The Solicitor General opined that the petitioner may be

allowed to post bail in the amount of P5.5 million and be
required to secure a certification/guaranty from the
Mayor of the place of his residence, that he is a resident
of the area and that he will remain to be so until final
judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it
must be with prior notice to the court and private
complainant.

The CA upheld the Solicitor General's recommendation. A

motion for reconsideration was filed, seeking the
reduction of the amount of bail fixed by CA, but was
denied.
ISSUE(S) 1. W/N bail fixed equivalent to civil liability is excessive?

RULING(S) 1. Yes. The purpose for bail is to guarantee the

appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the court. The amount should be high
enough to assure the presence of the accused when
required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to
fulfil this purpose. To fix bail at an amount equivalent
to the civil liability of which petitioner is charged (in
this case, P5,500,000.00) is to permit the impression
that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil
liability that accused is charged of; this we cannot
allow because bail is not intended as a punishment,
nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should
necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court.
The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is
enshrined in the Constitution. The obvious rationale,
as declared in the leading case of De la Camara vs.
Enage, is that imposing bail in an excessive amount
could render meaningless the right to bail. Thus, in
Villaseñor vs. Abano, this Court made the
pronouncement that it will not hesitate to exercise its
supervisory powers over lower courts should the
latter, after holding the accused entitled to bail,
effectively deny the same by imposing a prohibitory
sum or exacting unreasonable conditions.

CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

Petitioner’s bail pending appeal is reduced from
P5,500,000.00 to P200,000.00.
881. People v. Sandiganbayan, 529 SCRA 764

TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN (Special Division) and JOSE “JINGGOY”
ESTRADA, respondents.

GR NUMBER G.R. No. 158754

DATE August 10, 2007

PONENTE GARCIA, J.

NATURE/ SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari/

KEYWORDS/ right to bail / En Banc
DIVISION

FACTS This petition seeks to reverse and set aside the

Resolution of respondent, Sandiganbayan (Special
Division) issued on March 6, 2003 in Criminal Case No.
26558, granting bail to private respondent Senator Jose
Jinggoy Estrada (Jinggoy).

Jinggoy was among the respondents in the crime of

Plunder filed by the Office of the Ombudsman. Jinggoy
filed with the Court an Urgent Motion praying for early
resolution of his Petition for Bail on Medical/Humanitarian
Considerations.

He reiterated his earlier plea for bail filed with the

Sandiganbayan. Jinggoy filed before the Sandiganbayan
an Omnibus Application for Bail against which the
prosecution filed its comment and opposition.

Bail hearings were then conducted, followed by the

submission by the parties of their respective memoranda.
Petitioner suggests that Jinggoy is harboring a plan to
escape, thus a flight risk. But in a Resolution, the
Sandiganbayan granted Jinggoy’s Omnibus Application
for Bail.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was

denied.
ISSUE(S) 1. W/N the grant of Jinggoy’s petition to bail is proper?

RULING(S) 1. Yes. Even if the capital offense charged is bailable

owing to the weakness of the evidence of guilt, the
right to bail may justifiably still be denied if the
probability of escape is great. Here, ever since the
promulgation of the assailed Resolutions a little more
than four (4) years ago, Jinggoy does not, as
determined by Sandiganbayan, seem to be a flight
risk.
The likelihood of escape on the part individual
respondent is now almost nil, given his election on
May 10, 2004, as Senator of the Republic of the
Philippines. The Court takes stock of the fact that
those who usually jump bail are shadowy characters
mindless of their reputation in the eyes of the people
for as long as they can flee from the retribution of
justice. On the other hand, those with a reputation
and a respectable name to protect and preserve are
very unlikely to jump bail. The Court, to be sure,
cannot accept any suggestion that someone who has
a popular mandate to serve as Senator is harboring
any plan to give up his Senate seat in exchange for
becoming a fugitive from justice.
The rulings in Castelo and Ty Sui Wong are not on all-
fours applicable to and of governing sway to the issue
of the propriety of revoking Jinggoy’s release on bail.
As it were, the petitioner erroneously equates the
provisional grant of bail to respondent Jinggoy to his
virtual acquittal in Criminal Case No. 26558. Petitioner
is wrong. Castelo and Ty Sui Wong contextually dealt
with the guilt of culprits therein for the crimes of
murder after all the evidence had been adduced.
Unlike in this proceeding, the propriety of a grant of
bail, given the evidence for or against the bail
application, was not an issue in Castelo and Ty Sui
Wong. And in the present case, respondent
 Sandiganbayan is still in the process of determining
the facts and merits of the main case.

CONCLUSION WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.