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Camitan Vs CA: Civil Procedure Topic: Kinds of Denial Negative Pregnant Case Title: GR No.: Date: Ponente

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CIVIL PROCEDURE TOPIC: KINDS OF DENIAL; NEGATIVE PREGNANT

CASE TITLE: GR No.: 128099


Camitan vs CA Date: December 20, 2006
Ponente: TINGA, J.:
SUMMARY
Petitioners put their unmistakably sparse denial of respondent’s allegations relative to the execution of the deed
of sale in its favor and its possession of the Owner’s Copy under the heading "SPECIFIC DENIALS" and
anteceding it with the adverb "specifically,’ but according to the court the same cannot function as an operative
denial within the purview of the Rules.

DOCTRINE
A denial is not specific simply because it is so qualified by the defendant. A general denial does not become
specific by the use of the word "specifically." When the matters of whether the defendant alleges having no
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief, are plainly and necessarily within the defendant’s
knowledge, his alleged ignorance or lack of information will not be considered as a specific denial
FACTS
On 13 December 1967, the spouses Mateo Camitan and Lorenza Alcazar (spouses Camitan) sold to Fidelity
Investment Corporation (respondent) a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
(11982)T-3188 located in Barangay Maunong, Calamba, Laguna. Upon the execution of the Deed of Absolute
Sale, the spouses Camitan delivered to respondent corporation (respondent) the owner’s duplicate certificate
of title (Owner’s Copy). From then on, respondent has been paying the real estate taxes due on the property
and has remained in actual physical possession thereof.1

On 29 December 1993, after the death of the spouses Camitan, without the knowledge of respondent, the
heirs of the spouses-petitioners herein - filed a petition for the issuance of a new Owner’s Copy,2 However, it
appears that respondent was not given notice of such proceedings. The trial court issued an order of general
default.3 After an ex parte presentation of evidence by the petitioners, the trial court granted the petition and
directed the Register of Deeds of Laguna to issue a new Owner’s Copy, while at the same time declaring void
the first Owner’s Copy, per its Order dated 08 March 1995.4

When respondent learned of the petition and order for the first time in March 1995, it caused the annotation of
a notice of sale on the title of the property. Thereafter, on 26 April 1995, it filed a Notice of Adverse Claim with
the Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna.
RULING OF LOWER COURTS
The trial court granted the petition and directed the Register of Deeds of Laguna to issue a new Owner’s
Copy, while at the same time declaring void the first Owner’s Copy, per its Order dated 08 March 1995.

Petition for annulment of judgment and cancellation of title before the Court of Appeals;

The Court of Appeals granted the petition and ordered the annulment of the impugned Order.8 It found that
the Owner’s Copy is in the possession of respondent since 1967. Thus, petitioners do not own the property,
nor do they have any interest thereon that could have been the subject of succession. Moreover, the Court of
Appeals found that petitioners committed perjury in executing their Joint Affidavit of Loss in support of their
petition before the trial court as they made it appear that the Owner’s Copy was still in the possession of the
spouses Camitan, when in fact, as early as 1967, the same had already been given to respondent. Finally,
citing Demetriou v. Court of Appeals9 the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court could not have
acquired jurisdiction over the petition because the Owner’s Copy was never lost in the first place.10 Petitioners
sought reconsideration of the Resolution, but the motion was denied for lack of merit.
CONTENTION OF THE PARTIES

In a Petition6 for annulment of judgment and cancellation of title before the Court of Appeals, respondent
argued that the Order dated 08 March 1995 is null and void, having been issued by the trial court without
jurisdiction since the Owner’s Copy of TCT No. T-(11982)T-3188 exists and has been in its possession, and
not lost as petitioners alleged. Moreover, it claimed that petitioners have no standing to file the petition, not
being the registered owners of the property, nor persons in interest, since all the rights and interest of the
spouses Camitan had already been transferred to respondent upon the sale of the property. Respondent
further accused petitioners of perjury; intentionally suppressing from the trial court the fact that they were not
in possession of the property; and not serving notice on respondent despite knowledge that it was in actual
possession of the property. (ruling of CA refer to the rulings of lower courts)

PETITIONER

Petitioners now claim that they have no knowledge of the purported sale and that they were not aware of any
claim whatsoever over the property in question for over twenty-seven-(27) years, stressing that property is still
registered, declared for taxation, and realty taxes paid thereon in the name of the spouses Camitan.12 They
argue that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the Owner’s Copy was not lost but was in fact in the
possession of respondent since there was no documentary proof to support such conclusion. According to
petitioners, respondent was not able to present even a photocopy of the Owner’s Copy to prove its
possession thereof since 1967 and thus the Court of Appeals did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition for
annulment.13

Petitioners add that respondent is guilty of estoppel and laches in asserting its alleged rights over the
property. The unexplained concealment for a long time of its possession of the purported deed of absolute
sale and Owner’s Copy, and its non-registration of the deed in its name run counter to the natural course of
things and are devoid of credence.14

Lastly, petitioners allege that the property in question could be a portion of the land surrendered to the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) as part of the ill-gotten wealth of former President
Ferdinand Marcos, and that the sole purpose of respondent’s concealment of the deed of absolute sale is to
prevent sequestration thereof.

RESPONDENTS

respondent argues that its non-registration of title does not affect its ownership of the property because by the
execution of the deed of absolute sale, the spouses Camitan had effectively divested themselves of all the
rights, title and interest over the property. Moreover, save for their bare allegations, petitioners have not been
able to rebut the presumptive authenticity of the deed of absolute sale. Lastly, respondent posits that there is
no basis for the allegation that the property in question is part of the former President’s ill-gotten wealth.
Anent the claim that it failed to attach even a photocopy of the Owner’s Copy, respondent claims that there is
no rule which requires that the such document should be included in a petition for annulment of judgment.
Besides, petitioners never disputed respondent’s possession of the title, but in fact merely categorized such
possession as one in bad faith. More importantly, the argument that respondents should have attached the
Owner’s Copy of the title was raised for the first time in petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of this Court’s
resolution dated 18 June 1997 dismissing the instant petition.17 Finally, respondent maintains that petitioners
are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals since they actively participated in the
proceedings therein.

ISSUE/S
Whether or not petitioners put their unmistakably sparse denial of respondent’s allegations relative to the
execution of the deed of sale in its favor and its possession of the Owner’s Copy under the heading
"SPECIFIC DENIALS" and anteceding it with the adverb "specifically”.
RULING
No. The same cannot function as an operative denial within the purview of the Rules
RATIO
Although petitioners put their unmistakably sparse denial of respondent’s allegations relative to the execution
of the deed of sale in its favor and its possession of the Owner’s Copy under the heading "SPECIFIC
DENIALS" and anteceding it with the adverb "specifically,’ the same cannot function as an operative denial
within the purview of the Rules. A denial is not specific simply because it is so qualified by the defendant. A
general denial does not become specific by the use of the word "specifically." When the matters of whether
the defendant alleges having no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief, are plainly and
necessarily within the defendant’s knowledge, his alleged ignorance or lack of information

will not be considered as a specific denial.24 In one case, it was held that when a respondent makes a
"specific denial" of a material allegation of the petition without setting forth the substance of the matters relied
upon to support its general denial, when such matters were plainly within its knowledge and the defendant
could not logically pretend ignorance as to the same, said defendant fails to properly tender an
issue.25 Petitioners’ "specific denial" in this case is ineffective and amounts to an admission pursuant to Rule
8, Sec. 11 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioners make an issue of the lack of material evidence to support the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the
Owner’s Copy was not lost, because respondent failed to attach the said Owner’s Copy or even a photocopy
thereof. The argument is unavailing.

Firstly, there is no need of proof because of petitioners’ implied admission thereof.

Secondly, the matter should have been raised in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals and not before
this Court. Despite various opportunities, petitioners failed to do so before the Court of Appeals. In fact, it was
only in petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of our

Resolution dated 18 June 1997 dismissing their petition26 that they claimed that the Court of Appeals
committed "grave error tantamount to lack of jurisdiction thereof when it declared annulled the contested
Order x x x x for lack of material evidence to support that the said title was lost."27 We have consistently held
that matters, theories or arguments not brought out in the original proceedings cannot be considered on
review or appeal where they are raised for the first time.28

Finally, having actively participated in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals, petitioners can no longer
question its authority.29

Everything considered, the Court of Appeals was satisfied that the Owner’s Copy of the TCT No. (T-11982) T-
3188 is not lost, but rather, as admitted by petitioners, it has been in the possession of another person. We
find no reason to disturb the said finding.
RELEVANT PROVISIONS
he relevant provisions of the Rules of Court are Sections 10 and 11, Rule 8, which read:

SEC. 10. Specific denial. — A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of
which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters
upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an
averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder.
Where a defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a
material averment made in the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial.
(Emphasis supplied)

SEC.11. Allegation not specifically denied deemed admitted.— Material averment in the complaint,
other than those as to the amount of unliquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted when not
specifically denied. Allegations of usury in a complaint to recover usurious interest are deemed
admitted if not denied under oath. (Emphasis supplied)

FOJAS

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