IOT Hack

Hacking The IoT (Internet of Things) -
PenTesting RF Operated Devices
Erez Metula
Application Security Expert
Founder, AppSec Labs
ErezMetula@AppSec-Labs.com
About Me
Founder of AppSec Labs

OWASP IL Board
Application security expert
Book author
Managed Code Rootkits (Syngress)
Speaker & trainer
Presented at BlackHat, Defcon, RSA, OWASP USA,
OWASP IL, etc..
Secure coding/hacking trainer
Agenda
Intro
Basic RF terminology & Intro to SDR (Software Defined Radio)
Capturing & replaying RF transmissions
Reverse engineering unknown RF protocol: step-by-step
Playing with an IoT wireless alarm system
Breaking car key FOB (and RF operated devices in general)
Replay, transmission and message tampering
Jamming
Why Focus on RF?
Common IoT Architecture
..and the target system for today..
Common RF Protocols
Used in IoT
Bluetooth/BLE (2.4GHz)
Zigbee (2.4GHz)
Z-wave (900MHz)
Wifi (2.4GHz)
Cellular (900/1800/1900/2100MHz)
Custom RF (?)
The focus of this talk will be custom RF as it doesn’t

have any generic tool but rather a set of
tools/techniques
Common Unlicensed Bands
Common ISM bands used in IoT systems

315 MHz
433 MHz
902-928 MHz
863 – 870 MHz
2.4 GHz
5.8 GHz
Reverse Engineering Unknown
RF Transmissions
Some basic questions we’ll need to answer
Frequency
Channel width
Modulation
Bit rate
Preamble
Sync word
CRC?
Whitening
WARNING
WARNING
The spectrum is a limited public resource

Playing with illegal radio might get you arrested...
arrested..
It can interfere with critical systems, homeland security,
army, etc.
etc
It is advised to use a Faraday cage (“RF cage”)
Software Defined Radio (SDR)
a radio communication system where components

that have been typically implemented in hardware (
mixers, filters, amplifiers,modulators, etc.) are
instead implemented by means of software
Drag and drop components and create a flowgraph!

Software Defined Radio (SDR)
gnuradio
HackRF One
A Software Defined Radio peripheral capable of

transmission or reception of radio signals from 1
MHz to 6 GHz.
One of the best peripherals that are out there
Can receive and transmit
Cost: 300$
RTL-SDR
RTL-SDR is a very cheap software defined radio that

uses a DVB-T TV tuner dongle based on the
RTL2832U chipset.
Essentially, this means that a cheap $20 TV tuner
USB dongle with the RTL2832U chip can be used as a
computer based SDR.
Drawback – receive only. But still great for analysis!
DEMO – Disarming an Alarm
System Using Replay Attack
Zero knowledge replay attack
Record
hackrf_transfer -r 433780000.raw -f 433780000
Transmit
hackrf_transfer -t 433780000.raw -f 433780000 -x 20
Replay Advantage/Disadvantage
Advantage
Zero knowledge
Effective even if the message is encrypted
Disadvantage
Cannot create a valid message from scratch
Cannot “play” with messages - many times you’d like to modify
a message based on the original one
Tamper with ID
Tamper with command
Perform input validation attacks
Etc.
We must be able to analyze the signal so we can recreate

it manually “from scratch”
Planning
1. Information gathering
2. Frequency
3. Modulation
4. Deviation
5. Preamble/syncword
6. Symbol rate
7. Transmission!
Step 1 – Information Gathering
A good starting point – if you have some luck –

search for the FCC ID
https://www.fcc.gov/general/fcc-id-search-page
https://fccid.io/ demo: https://fccid.io/Y8PFJ17-1
Information extracted from the FCC site

Do some hardware research (optional)

Open the device, and look at the PCB
Identify major electric components,
mainly the microcontroller and the RF
module
Look for UART/serial/etc.
Use a logical analyzer
Etc.
Step 2 - Frequency
Use a spectrum analyzer
Gqrx:
You can then dump the signal to a file:

rtl_sdr -f 433950000 -s 2000000 -g 20 captured.cu8
Step 3 - Modulation
Representing digital data as variations in the carrier

wave
Step 4 - Deviation
Often relevant for FSK

Step 5 - Preamble/Sync Word
Preamble = start of message

Sync word = start of data
Step 6 - Symbol Rate
Symbol = 0 or 1
Symbol rate = symbols per second
DEMO – Analyzing the Signal
Capture a signal (“disarming”)

Analyze the signal
Extract all the required info
Checklist - What We
Know So Far..
Frequency = 433.92 MHz
Modulation = ASK/OOK
Bit rate = 3000 bits per second
Sync word = no
Preamble = no
Message structure = System ID, Command
Step 7 – Transmission!
Now it’s time to generate the message from scratch

Option 1 – use a flow graph
Too complicated, not interactive
Option 2 - use a commandline RF tool

Simple to use
Interactive!
Yardstick One and RFCat
Yardstick one - a sub-1 GHz wireless test tool

(developed by Michael Ossmann)
Rfcat – Python-based firmware for transmitting and
receiving RF (Developed by atlas)
DEMO – Disarming an Alarm System
by Rebuilding the Transmission From
Scratch
Setup rfcat with all required info
Send our own transmissions!
So we know..
What is the actual message

The message structure
20 bit system ID, 4 bit command ID
We can brute force ANY system in about 2 hours
Demo – if time permits
Brute force calculation
Command ID fuzzing
Jamming
A device that deliberately interferes

with authorized wireless communications
Resembles DoS
JAMMING IS ILLEGAL
Disable any commands that are sent to the system
Example: prevent the alarm system from arming
Disrupt any information that is sent between the
components
Example: disrupt the PIR movement sensor
Attack is against the receiver (though logically it is
against the sender)
Demo – Simple “Jamming”
No more motion detection..

Crypto Challenges
Encryption is less used (compared to traditional

“modern” applications)
Hardware challenges
CPU
Memory
Flash space (example: 2k RSA key)
Battery power
Lack of receiving ability (i.e. transmitter only hardware)
We’ll often encounter
No encryption at all
Lack of challenge response
Weak crypto algorithms
Rolling Code ("Hopping Code“)
Prevents replay attacks – attacker might record a

fixed code transmission and replays it at a later time
to cause the receiver to 'unlock‘
Useful in 1-way only communications systems
Common implementation
Common PRNG — in both transmitter and receiver
Transmitter sends 'next' code in sequence
Receiver compares 'next' to its calculated 'next' code. A
tolerance of next 256 codes is accepted in case receiver
missed some transmitted keypresses.
Rolling Code Attacks
It was demonstrated in 2015 by Samy Kamkar how a simple

but clever attack can break rolling codes
Steps
The device transmits a jamming signal to block the vehicle's reception
of rolling code signals sent by the victim
The victim tries again, sending the 2nd code
The device records these signals from both 1st and 2nd attempts
needed to unlock the vehicle.
The recorded 1st code is forwarded to the vehicle only when the
owner makes the 2nd attempt
The recorded 2nd code is retained for future use
Shift-Registers
It is common for bits that are read from the air to be

stored in a shift-register
A portion of the stream (“window”) is examined
each time
Each output is connected to the next input
A circuit that shifts the 'bit array' stored in it by one
position
The Meaning
If there are some extra bits before/after the real

value, it will be accepted by the receiver!
We can sent 13 bits to test two 12-bit
codes instead of sending a full 24 bits
De-Bruijn Sequences
a cyclic sequence in which every possible length-n

string on A occurs exactly once as a substring
Such a sequence is denoted by B(k, n) and has length
kn, which is also the number of distinct substrings of
length n on A; De Bruijn sequences are therefore
optimally short
De-Bruijn Sequences
There are distinct De Bruijn sequences B(k, n)
Example –
The pin code is composed of 0-9 digits, length = 4
Trying all codes separately would require 4 (byte) × 10000
(possibilities) = 40000 byte.
Using De-Bruijn we have B(10, 4) solutions, with length
10000. Therefore, only at most 10000 + 3 = 10003 (as the
solutions are cyclic) bytes are needed to open the lock.
Demo – if Time Permits
Summary
IoT security requires you to look beyond the server

side and mobile app security
For simple a replay, a good SDR device will just do
It is advised to analyze the transmissions and reverse
engineer them
“security by obscurity” is often encountered
Now go hack the RF world.. ☺
QUESTIONS ?
Thank You!
…now go to see Tal’s talk..
Erez Metula
Chairman & Founder, AppSec Labs
ErezMetula@AppSec-Labs.com

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Hacking The IoT (Internet of Things) -

PenTesting RF Operated Devices

Founder of AppSec Labs

The focus of this talk will be custom RF as it doesn’t

Common ISM bands used in IoT systems

The spectrum is a limited public resource

a radio communication system where components

Drag and drop components and create a flowgraph!

A Software Defined Radio peripheral capable of

RTL-SDR is a very cheap software defined radio that

We must be able to analyze the signal so we can recreate

A good starting point – if you have some luck –

Information extracted from the FCC site

Do some hardware research (optional)

Use a spectrum analyzer

You can then dump the signal to a file:

Representing digital data as variations in the carrier

Often relevant for FSK

Preamble = start of message

Capture a signal (“disarming”)

Now it’s time to generate the message from scratch

Option 2 - use a commandline RF tool

Yardstick one - a sub-1 GHz wireless test tool

What is the actual message

A device that deliberately interferes

No more motion detection..

Encryption is less used (compared to traditional

Prevents replay attacks – attacker might record a

It was demonstrated in 2015 by Samy Kamkar how a simple

It is common for bits that are read from the air to be

If there are some extra bits before/after the real

a cyclic sequence in which every possible length-n

There are distinct De Bruijn sequences B(k, n)

IoT security requires you to look beyond the server

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