Valeroso vs. CA PDF

8/13/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 598
Notes.—In job contracting, the principal is jointly and severally

liable with the contractor and insolvency or unwillingness to pay by
the contractor or direct employer is not a prerequisite for the joint
and several liability of the principal. (Development Bank of the
Philippines vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 233 SCRA
250 [1994])
When a company contracted for security services with a security
agency, as it was the latter who hired the security guards, said
company became an indirect employer of the security guards
pursuant to Article 107 of the Labor Code. (Manila Electric
Company vs. Benamira, 463 SCRA 331 [2005])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 164815. September 3, 2009.*
SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Motions for Reconsideration; While

a second motion for reconsideration is, as a general rule, a prohibited
pleading, it is within the sound discretion of the Court to admit the same,
provided it is filed with prior leave whenever substantive justice may be
better served thereby.—After considering anew Valeroso’s arguments
through his Letter-Appeal, together with the OSG’s position recommending
his acquittal, and keeping in mind that substantial rights must ultimately
reign supreme over technicalities, this Court is swayed to reconsider. The
Letter-Appeal is actually in the nature of a second motion for
reconsideration. While a second motion for reconsideration is, as a general
rule, a prohibited pleading, it is within the sound discretion of the Court to
admit the same, provided it is filed with prior leave whenever substantive
justice may be better served thereby.
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
42
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016c89a7560308cd23cc003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/17
Same; Same; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Rules of procedure

are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice—courts are
not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion.—
Suspension of the rules of procedure, to pave the way for the re-examination
of the findings of fact and conclusions of law earlier made, is not without
basis. We would like to stress that rules of procedure are merely tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They are conceived and
promulgated to effectively aid the courts in the dispensation of justice.
Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial
discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to
be, conscientiously guided by the norm that, on the balance, technicalities
take a backseat to substantive rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if
the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than to promote
justice, it would always be within our power to suspend the rules or except a
particular case from its operation.
Searches and Seizures; As a general rule, the procurement of a warrant
is required before a law enforcer can validly search or seize the person,
house, papers, or effects of any individual.—The right against unreasonable
searches and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution
which states: SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized. From this constitutional provision, it can readily be gleaned that,
as a general rule, the procurement of a warrant is required before a law
enforcer can validly search or seize the person, house, papers, or effects of
any individual.
Same; Warrantless Searches; In the exceptional instances where a
warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, what constitutes
a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including
the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable
cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or
thing searched, and the
43
character of the articles procured.—The above proscription is not, however,

absolute. The following are the well-recognized instances where searches
and seizures are allowed even without a valid warrant: 1. Warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest; 2. [Seizure] of evidence in “plain
view.” The elements are: a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of
their official duties; b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the
police who have the right to be where they are; c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent; and d) “plain view” justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search; 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly
regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that
the occupant committed a criminal activity; 4. Consented warrantless
search; 5. Customs search; 6. Stop and Frisk; 7. Exigent and emergency
circumstances. 8. Search of vessels and aircraft; [and] 9. Inspection of
buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and
building regulations. In the exceptional instances where a warrant is not
necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, what constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable
from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of
the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner
in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and
the character of the articles procured.
Same; Same; Arrests; Searches Incident to Lawful Arrest; Words and
Phrases; When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter
might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape, and, in addition, it is
entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any
evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or
destruction; A valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous
weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his
immediate control; The phrase “within the area of his immediate control”
means the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence.—We would like to stress that the scope of the
warrantless search is not without limitations. In People v. Leangsiri (252
44
SCRA 213 [1996]), People v. Cubcubin, Jr. (360 SCRA 690 [2001]), and
People v. Estella (395 SCRA 553 [2003]), we had the occasion to lay down
the parameters of a valid warrantless search and seizure as an incident to a
lawful arrest. When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting
officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapon that the
latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the
officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In
addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and
seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its
concealment or destruction. Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the
duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless
search not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area
within the latter’s reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure
of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested
or within the area of his immediate control. The phrase “within the area of
his immediate control” means the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a

drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting
officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested.
Same; Same; Same; A cabinet which is locked could no longer be
considered as an area within the arrestee’s immediate control because there
is no way for him to take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that could
be used against him.—We can readily conclude that the arresting officers
served the warrant of arrest without any resistance from Valeroso. They
placed him immediately under their control by pulling him out of the bed,
and bringing him out of the room with his hands tied. To be sure, the cabinet
which, according to Valeroso, was locked, could no longer be considered as
an “area within his immediate control” because there was no way for him to
take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be used against him.
The arresting officers would have been justified in searching the person of
Valeroso, as well as the tables or drawers in front of him, for any concealed
weapon that might be used against the former. But under the circumstances
obtaining, there was no comparable justification to search through all the
desk drawers and cabinets or the other closed or concealed areas in that
room itself. It is worthy to note that the purpose of the exception
(warrantless
45
search as an incident to a lawful arrest) is to protect the arresting officer

from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a
concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within
reach. The exception, therefore, should not be strained beyond what is
needed to serve its purpose. In the case before us, search was made in the
locked cabinet which cannot be said to have been within Valeroso’s
immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of what may be
considered as an incident to a lawful arrest.
Same; Same; Plain View Doctrine; The “plain view doctrine” may not
be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures or to
extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of
defendant’s guilt.—Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified
under the “plain view doctrine.” The “plain view doctrine” may not be used
to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures or to extend a
general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant’s guilt.
The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object.
Same; Same; Same; The plain view doctrine does not apply where the
police officers did not just accidentally discover the subject firearm and
ammunition but actually searched for the evidence.—The police officers
were inside the boarding house of Valeroso’s children, because they were
supposed to serve a warrant of arrest issued against Valeroso. In other
words, the police officers had a prior justification for the intrusion.
Consequently, any evidence that they would inadvertently discover may be

used against Valeroso. However, in this case, the police officers did not just
accidentally discover the subject firearm and ammunition; they actually
searched for evidence against Valeroso. Clearly, the search made was illegal,
a violation of Valeroso’s right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Consequently, the evidence obtained in violation of said right is
inadmissible in evidence against him.
Same; Same; Presumption of Regularity; While the power to search
and seize may at times be necessary for public welfare, still it may be
exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional
rights of the citizens, for no enforcement of any statute
46
is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of

government; Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a
constitutional right, peace officers who conduct it cannot invoke regularity
in the performance of official functions.—Unreasonable searches and
seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford
full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be
necessary for public welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced
without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for no
enforcement of any statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference
to the basic principles of government. Those who are supposed to enforce
the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of an individual in the
name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty.
Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace
officers who conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the performance of
official functions.
Same; Same; Bill of Rights; Constitutional Law; The Bill of Rights is
the bedrock of constitutional government.—The Bill of Rights is the
bedrock of constitutional government. If people are stripped naked of their
rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive and government becomes
meaningless. This explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in
Article III of the Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in the
fundamental law way above the articles on governmental power.
Same; Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; It would be better to
set free ten men who might probably be guilty of the crime charged than to
convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit.—Without the
illegally seized firearm, Valeroso’s conviction cannot stand. There is simply
no sufficient evidence to convict him. All told, the guilt of Valeroso was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt measured by the required moral certainty
for conviction. The evidence presented by the prosecution was not enough
to overcome the presumption of innocence as constitutionally ordained.
Indeed, it would be better to set free ten men who might probably be guilty
of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not
commit.
47
LETTER-APPEAL FOR REVIEW of the Decision and Resolution

of the Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Pablito A. Carpio and Nicolas P. Lapeña, Jr. for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
For resolution is the Letter-Appeal1 of Senior Inspector (Sr.
Insp.) Jerry C. Valeroso (Valeroso) praying that our February 22,
2008 Decision2 and June 30, 2008 Resolution3 be set aside and a
new one be entered acquitting him of the crime of illegal possession
of firearm and ammunition.
The facts are briefly stated as follows:
Valeroso was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No.
1866, committed as follows:
“That on or about the 10th day of July, 1996, in Quezon City,

Philippines, the said accused without any authority of law, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her possession and
under his/her custody and control
One (1) cal. 38 “Charter Arms” revolver bearing serial no. 52315
with five (5) live ammo.
without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by the
proper authorities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”4
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 229-232.

2 Id., at pp. 148-165.
3 Id., at p. 227.
4 Records, p. 1.
48
When arraigned, Valeroso pleaded “not guilty.”5 Trial on the merits

ensued.
During trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses: Senior
Police Officer (SPO)2 Antonio Disuanco (Disuanco) of the Criminal
Investigation Division of the Central Police District Command; and
Epifanio Deriquito (Deriquito), Records Verifier of the Firearms and
Explosives Division in Camp Crame. Their testimonies are
summarized as follows:
On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., Disuanco received a
Dispatch Order from the desk officer directing him and three (3)
other policemen to serve a Warrant of Arrest, issued by Judge

Ignacio Salvador, against Valeroso for a case of kidnapping with
ransom.6
After a briefing, the team conducted the necessary surveillance
on Valeroso checking his hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan, and Bulacan.
Eventually, the team members proceeded to the Integrated National
Police (INP) Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City, where
they saw Valeroso about to board a tricyle. Disuanco and his team
approached Valeroso. They put him under arrest, informed him of
his constitutional rights, and bodily searched him. They found a
Charter Arms revolver, bearing Serial No. 52315, with five (5)
pieces of live ammunition, tucked in his waist.7
Valeroso was then brought to the police station for questioning.
Upon verification in the Firearms and Explosives Division in Camp
Crame, Deriquito presented a certification8 that the subject firearm
was not issued to Valeroso, but was licensed in the name of a certain
Raul Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila.9
_______________
5 Id., at p. 33.
6 Rollo, p. 149.
7 Id.
8 Exh. “C,” Folder of Exhibits.
9 Rollo, pp. 149-150.
49
On the other hand, Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol, Jr.

(Timbol), and Adrian Yuson testified for the defense. Their
testimonies are summarized as follows:
On July 10, 1996, Valeroso was sleeping inside a room in the
boarding house of his children located at Sagana Homes, Barangay
New Era, Quezon City. He was awakened by four (4) heavily armed
men in civilian attire who pointed their guns at him and pulled him
out of the room.10 The raiding team tied his hands and placed him
near the faucet (outside the room) then went back inside, searched
and ransacked the room. Moments later, an operative came out of
the room and exclaimed, “Hoy, may nakuha akong baril sa loob!”11
Disuanco informed Valeroso that there was a standing warrant for
his arrest. However, the raiding team was not armed with a search
warrant.12
Timbol testified that he issued to Valeroso a Memorandum
Receipt13 dated July 1, 1993 covering the subject firearm and its
ammunition, upon the verbal instruction of Col. Angelito Moreno.14
On May 6, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 97,
Quezon City, convicted Valeroso as charged and sentenced him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day, as minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum. The gun
subject of the case was further ordered confiscated in favor of the

government.15
_______________
10 Id., at p. 39.
11 Valeroso’s testimony was corroborated by Yuson; id., at p. 151.
12 Rollo, p. 152.
13 Exh. “1,” Folder of Exhibits.
14 Rollo, p. 152.
15 The decision was penned by Judge Oscar L. Leviste; id., at pp. 38-45.
50
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed16 the RTC

decision but the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty was
lowered to four (4) years and two (2) months.
On petition for review, we affirmed17 in full the CA decision.
Valeroso filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 which was denied
with finality19 on June 30, 2008.
Valeroso is again before us through this Letter-Appeal20
imploring this Court to once more take a contemplative reflection
and deliberation on the case, focusing on his breached constitutional
rights against unreasonable search and seizure.21
Meanwhile, as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) failed to
timely file its Comment on Valeroso’s Motion for Reconsideration, it
instead filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment.22
In its Manifestation, the OSG changed its previous position and
now recommends Valeroso’s acquittal. After a second look at the
evidence presented, the OSG considers the testimonies of the
witnesses for the defense more credible and thus concludes that
Valeroso was arrested in a boarding house. More importantly, the
OSG agrees with Valeroso that the subject firearm was obtained by
the police officers in violation of Valeroso’s constitutional right
against illegal search and seizure, and should thus be excluded from
the evidence for the prosecution. Lastly, assuming that the subject
firearm was admissible in evidence, still, Valeroso could not be
convicted of the crime, since he was able to establish his authority to
_______________
16 Embodied in a decision dated May 4, 2004, penned by Associate Justice

Andres B. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices Danilo B. Pine and Edgardo F. Sundiam,
concurring; Rollo, pp. 16-31.
17 Rollo, pp. 148-165.
18 Id., at pp. 169-177.
19 Id., at p. 227.
20 Supra note 1.
21 Rollo, p. 230.
22 Id., at pp. 239-270.
51
possess the gun through the Memorandum Receipt issued by his

superiors.
After considering anew Valeroso’s arguments through his Letter-
Appeal, together with the OSG’s position recommending his
acquittal, and keeping in mind that substantial rights must ultimately
reign supreme over technicalities, this Court is swayed to
reconsider.23
The Letter-Appeal is actually in the nature of a second motion for
reconsideration. While a second motion for reconsideration is, as a
general rule, a prohibited pleading, it is within the sound discretion
of the Court to admit the same, provided it is filed with prior leave
whenever substantive justice may be better served thereby.24
This is not the first time that this Court is suspending its own
rules or excepting a particular case from the operation of the rules.
In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,25 despite the denial of De
Guzman’s motion for reconsideration, we still entertained his
Omnibus Motion, which was actually a second motion for
reconsideration. Eventually, we reconsidered our earlier decision and
remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan for reception and
appreciation of petitioner’s evidence. In that case, we said that if we
would not compassionately bend backwards and flex technicalities,
petitioner would surely experience the disgrace and misery of
incarceration for a crime which he might not have committed after
all.26 Also in Astorga v. People,27 on a second motion for
reconsideration, we set aside our earlier decision, re-examined the
records of the case, then finally acquitted Benito Astorga of the
crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of reasonable doubt.
And
_______________
23 See De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, 326 Phil. 182; 256 SCRA 171 (1996).
24 Astorga v. People, G.R. No. 154130, August 20, 2004, 437 SCRA 152, 155.
25 Supra note 23.
26 De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, id., at p. 191; p. 180.
27 Supra note 24.
52
in Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante,28 by virtue

of the January 13, 2004 En Banc Resolution, the Court authorized
the Special First Division to suspend the Rules, so as to allow it to
consider and resolve respondent’s second motion for reconsideration
after the motion was heard on oral arguments. After a re-
examination of the merits of the case, we granted the second motion

for reconsideration and set aside our earlier decision.
Clearly, suspension of the rules of procedure, to pave the way for
the re-examination of the findings of fact and conclusions of law
earlier made, is not without basis.
We would like to stress that rules of procedure are merely tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They are conceived
and promulgated to effectively aid the courts in the dispensation of
justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of
judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as
they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that, on the
balance, technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights, and not
the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would
tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it would always be
within our power to suspend the rules or except a particular case
from its operation.29
Now on the substantive aspect.
The Court notes that the version of the prosecution, as to where
Valeroso was arrested, is different from the version of the defense.
The prosecution claims that Valeroso was arrested near the INP
Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City, while he was about to
board a tricycle. After placing Valeroso under arrest, the arresting
officers bodily searched him, and they found the subject firearm and
ammunition. The defense, on the other hand, insists that he was
arrested inside
_______________
28 G.R. Nos. 112526 and 118838, March 16, 2005, 453 SCRA 432.
29 Astorga v. People, supra note 24, at pp. 155-156.
53
the boarding house of his children. After serving the warrant of

arrest (allegedly for kidnapping with ransom), some of the police
officers searched the boarding house and forcibly opened a cabinet
where they discovered the subject firearm.
After a thorough re-examination of the records and consideration
of the joint appeal for acquittal by Valeroso and the OSG, we find
that we must give more credence to the version of the defense.
Valeroso’s appeal for acquittal focuses on his constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure alleged to have been
violated by the arresting police officers; and if so, would render the
confiscated firearm and ammunition inadmissible in evidence
against him.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured
by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution which states:
“SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”
From this constitutional provision, it can readily be gleaned that,

as a general rule, the procurement of a warrant is required before a
law enforcer can validly search or seize the person, house, papers, or
effects of any individual.30
To underscore the significance the law attaches to the
fundamental right of an individual against unreasonable searches
and seizures, the Constitution succinctly declares in Article III,
Section 3(2), that “any evidence obtained in viola-
_______________
30 People v. Sevilla, 394 Phil. 125, 139; 339 SCRA 625, 635 (2000).
54
tion of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in

evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.”31
The above proscription is not, however, absolute. The following
are the well-recognized instances where searches and seizures are
allowed even without a valid warrant:
“1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. [Seizure] of evidence in “plain view.” The elements are: a) a prior
valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; b) the evidence was
inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they
are; c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and d) “plain view”
justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government,
the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially
when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk;
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.32
8. Search of vessels and aircraft; [and]
9. Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of
fire, sanitary and building regulations.”33
_______________
31 Id.
32 People v. Tudtud, G.R. No. 144037, September 26, 2003, 412 SCRA 142, 153-
154; Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 263, 277; 373 SCRA 221, 232 (2002);
People v. Sevilla, supra note 30, at pp. 139-140; p. 636 People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868,
879-880; 288 SCRA 626, 638 (1998).
33 Nachura, Antonio Eduardo B., Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2009, pp.
139-142.
55
In the exceptional instances where a warrant is not necessary to

effect a valid search or seizure, what constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or
absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of
the articles procured.34
In light of the enumerated exceptions, and applying the test of
reasonableness laid down above, is the warrantless search and
seizure of the firearm and ammunition valid?
We answer in the negative.
For one, the warrantless search could not be justified as an
incident to a lawful arrest. Searches and seizures incident to lawful
arrests are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court,
which reads:
“SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.—A person lawfully

arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may
have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without
a search warrant.”
We would like to stress that the scope of the warrantless search is

not without limitations. In People v. Leangsiri,35 People v.
Cubcubin, Jr.,36 and People v. Estella,37 we had the occasion to lay
down the parameters of a valid warrantless search and seizure as an
incident to a lawful arrest.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer
to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapon that the
latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.
Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the
arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is
_______________
34 Caballes v. Court of Appeals, supra note 32, at p. 278; p. 232.

35 322 Phil. 226; 252 SCRA 213 (1996).
36 413 Phil 249; 360 SCRA 690 (2001).

37 443 Phil. 669; 395 SCRA 553 (2003).
56
entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize
any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its
concealment or destruction.38
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the
right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search
not only on the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area
within the latter’s reach.39 Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the
seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of
the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control.40 The
phrase “within the area of his immediate control” means the area
from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence.41 A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of
one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as
one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested.42
In the present case, Valeroso was arrested by virtue of a warrant
of arrest allegedly for kidnapping with ransom. At that time,
Valeroso was sleeping inside the boarding house of his children. He
was awakened by the arresting officers who were heavily armed.
They pulled him out of the room, placed him beside the faucet
outside the room, tied his hands, and then put him under the care of
Disuanco.43 The other police officers remained inside the room and
ransacked the locked cabinet44 where they found the subject firearm
and ammuni-
_______________
38 People v. Estella, id., at p. 685; p. 566.

39 People v. Cueno, 359 Phil. 151, 163; 298 SCRA 621, 632 (1998).
40 People v. Cubcubin, Jr., supra note 36, at p. 271; p. 708; see People v.
Leangsiri, supra note 35.
41 People v. Estella, supra note 37, at p. 685; p. 566.
42 Id.
43 TSN, February 19, 1997, pp. 21-25.
44 TSN, March 17, 1997, p. 27.
57
tion.45 With such discovery, Valeroso was charged with illegal

possession of firearm and ammunition.
From the foregoing narration of facts, we can readily conclude
that the arresting officers served the warrant of arrest without any
resistance from Valeroso. They placed him immediately under their
control by pulling him out of the bed, and bringing him out of the
room with his hands tied. To be sure, the cabinet which, according to
Valeroso, was locked, could no longer be considered as an “area
within his immediate control” because there was no way for him to
take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be used
against him.
The arresting officers would have been justified in searching the
person of Valeroso, as well as the tables or drawers in front of him,
for any concealed weapon that might be used against the former. But
under the circumstances obtaining, there was no comparable
justification to search through all the desk drawers and cabinets or
the other closed or concealed areas in that room itself.46
It is worthy to note that the purpose of the exception (warrantless
search as an incident to a lawful arrest) is to protect the arresting
officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be
armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from
destroying evidence within reach. The exception, therefore, should
not be strained beyond what is needed to serve its purpose.47 In the
case before us, search was made in the locked cabinet which cannot
be said to have been within Valeroso’s immediate control. Thus, the
search exceeded the bounds of what may be considered as an
incident to a lawful arrest.48
_______________
45 Id., at p. 3.
46 People v. Estella, supra note 37, at p. 685; p. 566.
47 Id.
48 Id., at p. 686; p. 567.
58
Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under the
“plain view doctrine.”
The “plain view doctrine” may not be used to launch unbridled
searches and indiscriminate seizures or to extend a general
exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant’s guilt.
The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.49
As enunciated in People v. Cubcubin, Jr.50 and People v.
Leangsiri:51
“What the “plain view” cases have in common is that the police officer
in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of
which[,] he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification—whether
it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful
arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a
search directed against the accused—and permits the warrantless seizure. Of
course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it

is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them;
the “plain view” doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory
search from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges.”52
Indeed, the police officers were inside the boarding house of

Valeroso’s children, because they were supposed to serve a warrant
of arrest issued against Valeroso. In other words, the police officers
had a prior justification for the intrusion. Consequently, any
evidence that they would inadvertently dis-
_______________
49 People v. Cubcubin, Jr., supra note 40, at p. 271; p. 708; People v. Leangsiri,
supra note 35, at p. 249; p. 231.
50 Supra note 40.
51 Supra note 35.
52 People v. Cubcubin, Jr., supra note 36, at p. 272; p. 709; People v. Leangsiri,
supra note 35, at pp. 249-250; p. 231.
59
cover may be used against Valeroso. However, in this case, the

police officers did not just accidentally discover the subject firearm
and ammunition; they actually searched for evidence against
Valeroso.
Clearly, the search made was illegal, a violation of Valeroso’s
right against unreasonable search and seizure. Consequently, the
evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible in
evidence against him.
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which
the constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power
to search and seize may at times be necessary for public welfare,
still it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing
the constitutional rights of the citizens, for no enforcement of any
statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government. Those who are supposed to enforce the
law are not justified in disregarding the rights of an individual in the
name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of
liberty.53
Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional
right, peace officers who conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the
performance of official functions.54
The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If
people are stripped naked of their rights as human beings,
democracy cannot survive and government becomes meaningless.
This explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article III
of the Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in the

fundamental law way above the articles on governmental power.55
Without the illegally seized firearm, Valeroso’s conviction cannot
stand. There is simply no sufficient evidence to convict
_______________
53 People v. Aruta, supra note 32, at p. 895; p. 653.

54 People v. Cubcubin, Jr., supra note 36, at pp. 270-271; pp. 707-708.
55 People v. Tudtud, supra note 32, at p. 168.
60
him.56 All told, the guilt of Valeroso was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt measured by the required moral certainty for
conviction. The evidence presented by the prosecution was not
enough to overcome the presumption of innocence as
constitutionally ordained. Indeed, it would be better to set free ten
men who might probably be guilty of the crime charged than to
convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit.57
With the foregoing disquisition, there is no more need to discuss
the other issues raised by Valeroso.
One final note. The Court values liberty and will always insist on
the observance of basic constitutional rights as a condition sine qua
non against the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of
the government.58
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the February 22, 2008
Decision and June 30, 2008 Resolution are RECONSIDERED and
SET ASIDE. Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso is hereby ACQUITTED of
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr.

and Peralta, JJ., concur.
Judgment and resolution reconsidered and set aside, Sr. Insp.

Jerry Valeroso acquitted of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition.
Notes.—Where the accused were lawfully arrested in Room 504

of a hotel and a warrantless search was conducted in Room 413, the
search is illegal and the evidence obtained
_______________
56 People v. Sarap, 447 Phil. 642, 652; 399 SCRA 503, 511 (2003).
57 Id., at pp. 652-653; p. 512.
58 People v. Januario, 335 Phil. 268, 304; 267 SCRA 608, 643 (1997).

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8/13/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 598

Notes.—In job contracting, the principal is jointly and severally

G.R. No. 164815. September 3, 2009.*

SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Motions for Reconsideration; While

Same; Same; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Rules of procedure

character of the articles procured.—The above proscription is not, however,

possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a

search as an incident to a lawful arrest) is to protect the arresting ofﬁcer

Consequently, any evidence that they would inadvertently discover may be

is of sufﬁcient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of

LETTER-APPEAL FOR REVIEW of the Decision and Resolution

“That on or about the 10th day of July, 1996, in Quezon City,

1 Rollo, pp. 229-232.

When arraigned, Valeroso pleaded “not guilty.”5 Trial on the merits

other policemen to serve a Warrant of Arrest, issued by Judge

On the other hand, Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol, Jr.

subject of the case was further ordered conﬁscated in favor of the

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) afﬁrmed16 the RTC

16 Embodied in a decision dated May 4, 2004, penned by Associate Justice

22 Id., at pp. 239-270.

possess the gun through the Memorandum Receipt issued by his

in Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante,28 by virtue

examination of the merits of the case, we granted the second motion

the boarding house of his children. After serving the warrant of

“SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

From this constitutional provision, it can readily be gleaned that,

tion of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in

“1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

In the exceptional instances where a warrant is not necessary to

“SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.—A person lawfully

We would like to stress that the scope of the warrantless search is

34 Caballes v. Court of Appeals, supra note 32, at p. 278; p. 232.

36 413 Phil 249; 360 SCRA 690 (2001).

38 People v. Estella, id., at p. 685; p. 566.

tion.45 With such discovery, Valeroso was charged with illegal

course, the extension of the original justiﬁcation is legitimate only where it

Indeed, the police ofﬁcers were inside the boarding house of

cover may be used against Valeroso. However, in this case, the

of the Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in the

53 People v. Aruta, supra note 32, at p. 895; p. 653.

Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr.

Judgment and resolution reconsidered and set aside, Sr. Insp.

Notes.—Where the accused were lawfully arrested in Room 504

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