G.R. No.

L-62207 December 15, 1986

JUAN BONIFACIO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM [Ministry of Education & Culture] and EMPLOYEES'
COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents-appellees.

Cenon, Roncesvalles, Reyes & Leus for petitioner-appellant.

FERNAN, J.:

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Employees Compensation Commission dated August 19,
1982, affirming the denial by the Government Service Insurance System of petitioner's claim for benefits under PD
No. 626, as amended, for the death of his spouse, Lourdes Bonifacio.

The facts are undisputed.

The late Lourdes Bonifacio was a classroom teacher assigned to the district of Bagamanoc, Division of
Catanduanes, Ministry of Education and Culture from August, 1965 until she contracted carcinoma of the breast
with metastases to the gastrointestinal tract and lungs which caused her death on October 5, 1978.

Dra. Corazon Yabes-Almirante of the Ospital ng Bagong Lipunan certified that the late Lourdes Bonifacio
underwent radical mastectomy for cancer of the breast in 1973. In 1976, when her ailment was noted to have
metastasized to her abdomen, she submitted herself to an operation known as "exploratory laparotomy" in
March of the same year. On September 1, 1978, she complained of "abdominal pain, abdominal enlargement,
vomiting, and failure to pass stools inspite of laxatives." Upon operation it was found that her entire
gastrointestinal tract was enveloped by carcinoma. Despite chemotherapy, she died on October 5, 1978 from
carcinoma of the breast metastatic to gastrointestinal tract and lungs.

Thereafter a claim for death benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended, was filed by petitioner with the GSIS. The
same was however denied on the ground that the decedent's principal ailment, carcinoma of the breast with
metastases to gastrointestinal tract and lungs, is not an occupational disease for her particular work as a teacher,
nor is the risk of contracting said disease increased by her working conditions.

The Employees Compensation Commission, on appeal affirmed the decision of the respondent System.

Petitioner now assails the decision of the respondent Commission on the following grounds:

a] The respondent Commission's affirmance of the denial by respondent System totally ignored
the Supreme Court's pronouncements on compensation cases; and

b] Under the law, in case of doubt in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of
the Labor Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, the same shall be resolved in
favor of the laborer.

We hold that the GSIS and the Employees Compensation Commission did not err in denying petitioner's claim.
A compensable sickness means "any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Employees
Compensation Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of
contracting the same is increased by working conditions. For this purpose, the Commission is empowered to
determine and approve occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that may be considered compensable
based on peculiar hazards of employment." [Art. 167(1) Labor Code as amended by P.D. No. 1368, effective May 1,
1978].

Thus, for the sickness or the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an
accepted occupational disease fisted by the Employees Compensation Commission [Annex "A" of the Amended
Rules on Employees Compensation], or any other sickness caused by employment subject to proof by claimant that
the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. [Sec. 1, Rule 11, Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation].

Carcinoma of the breast with metastases to the gastrointestinal tract and lungs is not listed by the Commission as
an occupational disease. As to the "metastases to the gastrointestinal tract and lungs" the Commission lists such
disease as occupational only in the following employment:

Occupational Diseases Nature of Employment

16. Cancer of stomach and other lymphatic and blood Woodworkers, wood products industry carpenters,
forming vessels; nasal cavity and sinuses loggers and employees in pulp and paper mills and
plywood mills

17. Cancer of the lungs, liver and brain. Vinyl chloryde workers, plastic workers.

[Annex A, Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, see p. 38, Rollo.]

The cancer which affected the deceased not being occupational in her particular employment, it became
incumbent upon petitioner to prove that the decedent's working conditions increased the risk of her contracting
the fatal illness. This onus petitioner failed to satisfactorily discharge. We note the following medical report on
breast cancer which the Employees Compensation Commission cited in its decision and which the petitioner failed
to controvert:

... Recent observations on the epidemeology of breast cancer suggest that it is intimately linked to
"estrogenic hormones" [W.A.P Anderson, Mosby, Pathology 5th edition, pp. 1217-1218]. Mammary
carcinoma is likely to metastasize relatively early to the regional lymph nodes-axillary and supra clavicular,
if the primary site is in the outer half of the breast. From thence it spreads primarily to the bones, lungs,
skin and subcutaneous tissues generally; less frequently to the brain. [Wintrobe et. al., Harrison's
Principles of Internal Medicine, 7th edition, pp. 584-585]. (pp. 3-4, ECC decision dated August 19, 1982).

Petitioner's contention that the decision of the Employees Compensation Commission totally ignored the Supreme
Court's pronouncements on compensation cases is unmeritorious. The petitioner evidently overlooked that his
claim is now within the ambit of the Labor Code and the rulings under the old law, Act No. 3428, as amended, no
longer control.

The old law as embodied particularly in Section 43 of RA No. 772 amending Act No. 3812, provided for "the
presumption of compensability and the rule on aggravation of illness, which favor the employee," and "paved the
way for the latitudinarian or expansive application of the Workmen's Compensation Law in favor of the employee
or worker." [Sulit v. ECC, 98 SCRA 483, 489] The presumption in essence states that in any proceeding for the
enforcement of the claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act "it shall be presumed in the
absence of substantial evidence to the contrary that the claim comes within the provisions of the said Act, that
sufficient notice thereof was given, that the injury was not occasioned by the willful intention of the injured
employee to bring about the injury or death of himself or of another, that the injury did not result solely from the
intoxicatiojn of the injured employee while on duty, and that the contents of verified medical and surgical reports
introduced in evidence by claimants for compensation are correct."

Thus, under the Workmen's Compensation Law, it is not necessary for the claimant to carry the burden of proof to
establish his case to the point of demonstration [Abana vs. Quisumbing, 22 SCRA 1278]. It is "not necessary to
prove that employment was the sole cause of the death or injury suffered by the employee. It is sufficient to show
that the employment had contributed to the aggravation or acceleration of such death or ailment." [Fontesa vs.
ECC, 22 SCRA 282] "Once the disease had been shown to have arisen in the course of employment, it is presumed
by law, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that it arose out of it." [Hernandez vs. ECC, et. al. L-
20202, May 31, 1965].

With this legal presumption in the old law, the burden of proof shifts to the employer and the employee no longer
suffers the burden of showing causation. Under the present Labor Code, the "latitudinarian or expansive
application of the Workmen's Compensation Law in favor of the employee or worker" no longer prevails as the
burden of showing proof of causation has shifted back to the employee particularly in cases of sickness or injuries
which are not accepted or listed as occupational by the Employees Compensation Commission. As stated in Sulit
vs. Employees Compensation Commission [supra] "the Labor Code abolished the presumption of compensability
and the rule on aggravation of illness caused by the nature of the employment. "

While we do not dispute petitioner's contention that under the law, in case of doubt in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, the doubt
shall be resolved in favor of the laborer, we find that the same has no application in this case since the pertinent
provisions of the Labor Code leave no room for doubt either in their interpretation or application.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed and the decisions of the GSIS and the Employees Compensation Commission
denying the claim are affirmed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 84811 August 29, 1989

SOLID HOMES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
TERESITA PAYAWAL and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

We are asked to reverse a decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City over a complaint filed by a buyer, the herein private respondent, against the petitioner, for delivery of
title to a subdivision lot. The position of the petitioner, the defendant in that action, is that the decision of the trial
court is null and void ab initio because the case should have been heard and decided by what is now called the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board.
The complaint was filed on August 31, 1982, by Teresita Payawal against Solid Homes, Inc. before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-36119. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant contracted
to sell to her a subdivision lot in Marikina on June 9, 1975, for the agreed price of P 28,080.00, and that by
September 10, 1981, she had already paid the defendant the total amount of P 38,949.87 in monthly installments
and interests. Solid Homes subsequently executed a deed of sale over the land but failed to deliver the
corresponding certificate of title despite her repeated demands because, as it appeared later, the defendant had
mortgaged the property in bad faith to a financing company. The plaintiff asked for delivery of the title to the lot
or, alternatively, the return of all the amounts paid by her plus interest. She also claimed moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.

Solid Homes moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction, this being vested in
the National Housing Authority under PD No. 957. The motion was denied. The defendant repleaded the objection
in its answer, citing Section 3 of the said decree providing that "the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this Decree." After
trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was ordered to deliver to her the title to
the land or, failing this, to refund to her the sum of P 38,949.87 plus interest from 1975 and until the full amount
was paid. She was also awarded P 5,000.00 moral damages, P 5,000.00 exemplary damages, P 10,000.00 attorney's
fees, and the costs of the suit.1

Solid Homes appealed but the decision was affirmed by the respondent court, 2 which also berated the appellant
for its obvious efforts to evade a legitimate obligation, including its dilatory tactics during the trial. The petitioner
was also reproved for its "gall" in collecting the further amount of P 1,238.47 from the plaintiff purportedly for
realty taxes and registration expenses despite its inability to deliver the title to the land.

In holding that the trial court had jurisdiction, the respondent court referred to Section 41 of PD No. 957 itself
providing that:

SEC. 41. Other remedies.-The rights and remedies provided in this Decree shall be in addition to
any and all other rights and remedies that may be available under existing laws.

and declared that "its clear and unambiguous tenor undermine(d) the (petitioner's) pretension that the court a
quo was bereft of jurisdiction." The decision also dismissed the contrary opinion of the Secretary of Justice as
impinging on the authority of the courts of justice. While we are disturbed by the findings of fact of the trial court
and the respondent court on the dubious conduct of the petitioner, we nevertheless must sustain it on the
jurisdictional issue.

The applicable law is PD No. 957, as amended by PD No. 1344, entitled "Empowering the National Housing
Authority to Issue Writs of Execution in the Enforcement of Its Decisions Under Presidential Decree No. 957."
Section 1 of the latter decree provides as follows:

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade and business and in
addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing
Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:

A. Unsound real estate business practices;

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit
buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
 C. Cases involving specific performance of contractuala statutory obligations filed by buyers of
subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
(Emphasis supplied.)

The language of this section, especially the italicized portions, leaves no room for doubt that "exclusive
jurisdiction" over the case between the petitioner and the private respondent is vested not in the Regional Trial
Court but in the National Housing Authority. 3

The private respondent contends that the applicable law is BP No. 129, which confers on regional trial courts
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases mentioned in its Section 19, reading in part as follows:

SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.-Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original
jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

xxx xxx xxx

(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest and cost or the value of the
property in controversy, amounts to more than twenty thousand pesos (P 20,000.00).

It stresses, additionally, that BP No. 129 should control as the later enactment, having been promulgated in 1981,
after PD No. 957 was issued in 1975 and PD No. 1344 in 1978.

This construction must yield to the familiar canon that in case of conflict between a general law and a special law,
the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Thus, it has been held that-

The fact that one law is special and the other general creates a presumption that the special act
is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general act, one as a general law of the land
and the other as the law of the particular case. 4

xxx xxx xxx

The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general act does not change
the principle. Where the special law is later, it will be regarded as an exception to, or a
qualification of, the prior general act; and where the general act is later, the special statute will
be construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by necessary
implication. 5

It is obvious that the general law in this case is BP No. 129 and PD No. 1344 the special law.

The argument that the trial court could also assume jurisdiction because of Section 41 of PD No. 957, earlier
quoted, is also unacceptable. We do not read that provision as vesting concurrent jurisdiction on the Regional Trial
Court and the Board over the complaint mentioned in PD No. 1344 if only because grants of power are not to be
lightly inferred or merely implied. The only purpose of this section, as we see it, is to reserve. to the aggrieved
party such other remedies as may be provided by existing law, like a prosecution for the act complained of under
the Revised Penal Code. 6

On the competence of the Board to award damages, we find that this is part of the exclusive power conferred
upon it by PD No. 1344 to hear and decide "claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyers against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman." It was therefore
erroneous for the respondent to brush aside the well-taken opinion of the Secretary of Justice that-

Such claim for damages which the subdivision/condominium buyer may have against the owner,
developer, dealer or salesman, being a necessary consequence of an adjudication of liability for
non-performance of contractual or statutory obligation, may be deemed necessarily included in
the phrase "claims involving refund and any other claims" used in the aforequoted subparagraph
C of Section 1 of PD No. 1344. The phrase "any other claims" is, we believe, sufficiently broad to
include any and all claims which are incidental to or a necessary consequence of the claims/cases
specifically included in the grant of jurisdiction to the National Housing Authority under the
subject provisions.

The same may be said with respect to claims for attorney's fees which are recoverable either by
agreement of the parties or pursuant to Art. 2208 of the Civil Code (1) when exemplary damages
are awarded and (2) where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to
satisfy the plaintiff 's plainly valid, just and demandable claim.

xxx xxx xxx

Besides, a strict construction of the subject provisions of PD No. 1344 which would deny the HSRC
the authority to adjudicate claims for damages and for damages and for attorney's fees would
result in multiplicity of suits in that the subdivision condominium buyer who wins a case in the
HSRC and who is thereby deemed entitled to claim damages and attorney's fees would be forced
to litigate in the regular courts for the purpose, a situation which is obviously not in the
contemplation of the law. (Emphasis supplied.)7

As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create more and more
administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular fields assigned
to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the
legislature or the courts of justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-
judicial powers in what is now not unreasonably called the fourth department of the government.

Statutes conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally construed to enable them to
discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the legislative purpose. 8 Following this policy in Antipolo Realty
Corporation v. National Housing Authority, 9 the Court sustained the competence of the respondent
administrative body, in the exercise of the exclusive jurisdiction vested in it by PD No. 957 and PD No. 1344, to
determine the rights of the parties under a contract to sell a subdivision lot.

It remains to state that, contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the case of Tropical Homes v. National
Housing Authority 10 is not in point. We upheld in that case the constitutionality of the procedure for appeal
provided for in PD No. 1344, but we did not rule there that the National Housing Authority and not the Regional
Trial Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the cases enumerated in Section I of the said decree. That is what we are
doing now.
It is settled that any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time,
even on appeal before this Court. 11 The only exception is where the party raising the issue is barred by estoppel,
12 which does not appear in the case before us. On the contrary, the issue was raised as early as in the motion to
dismiss filed in the trial court by the petitioner, which continued to plead it in its answer and, later, on appeal to
the respondent court. We have no choice, therefore, notwithstanding the delay this decision will entail, to nullify
the proceedings in the trial court for lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-36119 is SET ASIDE, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate
complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,

INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his
capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director,
Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing,
respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV
of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be
published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286,
298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445,
447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731,
733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165,
1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-
1840, 1842-1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161,
173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-
245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309,
312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440,
444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611,
612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-
1178,1180-1278.
 c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535,
1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-
1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754,
1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826,
1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866,
1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-
2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522,
524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-
604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95,
107, 120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that
petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the
absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-
publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to
institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required
to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its
object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to
be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this
Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in
those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be
protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively
to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless,
"when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a
public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the
proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to
show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies,
3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the
mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of
municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the
relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be
enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable
to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular
case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular
circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance
upon the rule may well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United
States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person
could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear
and represent the people in cases of this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply
squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this
proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the
Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his
appearance for respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since
the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication
in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the
Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of
decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining
its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for
the date when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact
of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily
reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law
itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3]
decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be
deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes
of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of
 documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general
applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish
or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital
significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed
solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in
the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity
accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of
knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones,
Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette
... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given
substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to
our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such
publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise
impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential
issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders
need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability"
is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be
officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law
of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette
as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders
and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published,
shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling
effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were
published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of
invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too
familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot
County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to
be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no
 duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S.
425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that
such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken
with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct,
private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light
of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These
questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts,
state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the
Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this
Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette
is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by
petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278,
and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs
can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is
undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In
Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise
the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected
thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the
manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations
of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even
though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.