EN BANC

CECILIA A. AGNO, A.C. No. 4515

Complainant,
Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,*
ATTY. MARCIANO J. CAGATAN, VELASCO, JR.,
Respondent. NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:

July 14, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Cecilia A. Agno against respondent Atty.
Marciano J. Cagatan for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The record shows that respondent was the President of International Services
Recruitment Corporation (ISRC), a corporation engaged in the recruitment of Filipino workers
for overseas employment. On July 12, 1988, ISRCs recruitment license was cancelled by the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) for violation of labor law provisions and
subsequently, on August 9, 1988, ISRC was forever banned from participating in overseas
 [1]
recruitment.

On Sepetember 19, 1988, the respondent appealed the DOLEs cancellation of ISRCs
license with the Office of the President. The appeal was resolved by the said office in
[2]
respondents favor in the Resolution dated March 30, 1993 which set aside the order of
cancellation and directed both the DOLE and the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency
(POEA) to renew the recruitment license of ISRC subject to the payment of a guarantee bond
which was double the amount required by law.

Since ISRCs recruitment license had already expired on September 17, 1989, ISRC filed
[3]
on April 12, 1994, an application for renewal of its recruitment license with the POEA.

However, during the pendency of the aforementioned appeal with the Office of the
President, particularly on August 9, 1992, the respondent entered into a Memorandum of
[4] [5]
Agreement with a United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) national, Mr. Khalifa H. Juma, the
husband of herein complainant, Cecilia A. Agno. The Memorandum of Agreement is quoted in
toto hereunder:

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

That the undersigned, Mr. JOMA HUMED KHALIFA, U.A.E. national, and Mr.
MARCIANO J. CAGATAN, Filipino citizen, have entered into this Memorandum of Agreement
this 9th day of August 1992, at Manila, Philippines, concerning the joint ownership and operation
of INTERNATIONAL SERVICING AND RECRUITMENT CORPORATION (ISRC) and have
mutually agreed, in connection therewith, as follows:

1. That ISRC shall be jointly owned by the herein parties on a 50-50 basis and accordingly,
immediate steps shall be taken to submit the necessary documents to the Securities and Exchange
Commission to legalize the arrangement and to cause the issuance of the corresponding certificate
of stocks to Mr. Khalifa and his group;

2. That likewise, the sharing of the profits shall be on an equal basis (50-50) after
deducting all the pertinent expenses that the officers of the corporation shall be: Chairman of the
Board of Directors Mr. JOMA HUMED KHALIFA, President and General Manager, Mr.
MARCIANO J. CAGATAN or his designated representative, Treasurer, Ms. Cecilia Agno all of
whom shall be members of the Board of Trustees together with two others;

3. That for and in consideration of the above joint ownership of the corporation, Mr.
KHALIFA undertakes as his contribution to the stock ownership thereof, the following:
 (a) To pay the amount of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P250,000.00) initially on or before AUGUST 25, 1992, said amount to be used to
have the license of ISRC reinstated;

(b) Upon the release of the license, to pay the additional amount of TWO
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P250,000.00) to start the business
operations of the corporation and to liquidate pending government and other
obligations, if any;

4. The management of the corporation shall be handled by Mr. KHALIFA and his group
while the legal and government liaisonship shall be the responsibility of Mr. CAGATAN; mutual
consideration with each other in the course of the business operations shall be maintained in order
to avoid problem with the government, the workers and the employers;

5. There shall be a regular accounting of the business every month, with the assistance of a
qualified accountant and each of the herein parties shall be furnished copy thereof; the share of the
parties may be released to each of them as often as the parties agree, however, advances against
the share of each may be agreed upon by the parties;

6. Any claim of workers or other parties against the ISRC before the signing of this
agreement shall be the sole responsibility of Mr. CAGATAN and Mr. KHALIFA or his 50%
ownership shall be free from such claims.

Manila, August 9, 1992.

JOMA HUMED KHALIFA MARCIANO J. CAGATAN

CECILIA AGNO

WITNESSES:
_______________ _________________

On December 26, 1995, which was more than three (3) years after the execution of the
[6]
aforesaid agreement, a Complaint-Affidavit for disbarment was filed with this Court by the
complainant against the respondent claiming that the latter used fraud, deceit and
misrepresentation, in enticing her husband, Khalifa, to join ISRC and invest therein the amount
of P500,000.00 and that although the respondent received the aforesaid amount, the
complainant learned from her inquiries with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
and the POEA that the respondent failed to comply with the terms of the Memorandum of
Agreement. The complainant found out that the said Memorandum of Agreement could not be
validated without the approval of the Board of Directors of ISRC. While respondent even had
the complainant sign an affidavit stating that she was then the acting Treasurer of ISRC, her
appointment as Treasurer was not submitted to the SEC. The records of the SEC showed that
the Board of Directors, officers and stockholders of ISRC remained unchanged and her name
and that of her husband did not appear as officers and/or stockholders thereof. From the POEA,
on the other hand, the complainant learned that ISRCs recruitment license was yet to be
reinstated.

The complainant claimed that respondent used for his own personal benefit the
P500,000.00 that she and her husband invested in ISRC. When she demanded that respondent
[7]
return the said sum of money, respondent issued a bank check dated March 30, 1994 in favor
of the complainant in the amount of P500,000.00 which was dishonored for being drawn
against a closed account. Despite repeated demands by complainant, the respondent failed to
settle his obligation or redeem his dishonored check, prompting the complainant to file a case
for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against the respondent. An information was filed
before the Municipal Trial Court of Cainta, Rizal, charging the respondent with the said offense
and a warrant of arrest was issued against respondent after the latter failed several times to
attend his arraignment. The complainant prayed for the disbarment of the respondent for issuing
a bouncing check and for his act of dishonesty in assuring her and her husband that the
Memorandum of Agreement would suffice to install them as stockholders and officers of ISRC
which induced them to invest in said corporation the amount of P500,000.00.

[8]
In his Comment, respondent denied the charges against him and averred that while
ISRCs recruitment license was cancelled by the DOLE in 1988, such cancellation was lifted by
the Office of the President on March 30, 1993, on appeal. During the pendency of the said
appeal, he and complainants husband Khalifa entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
because the latter offered to buy shares of stock of ISRC in order to finance the then pending
appeal for the reinstatement of the ISRC license and for Khalifa and the complainant to
undertake the full management and operation of the corporation. The respondent further alleged
that Khalifa H. Juma, through the complainant, paid on various dates the total amount of
P500,000.00, which respondent claimed he used to reimburse borrowed sums of money to
pursue the appeal with the Office of the President. According to the respondent, while there
were still legal procedures to be observed before the sale of shares of ISRC to non-
stockholders, Khalifa and complainant were in a hurry to start the business operation of ISRC.
Consequently, respondent sold and assigned his own shareholdings in ISRC for P500,000.00 to
[9]
Khalifa as evidenced by a Deed of Assignment dated April 26, 1993. The respondent, in
turn, issued a check in the amount of P500,000.00, which was not intended to be encashed but
only to guarantee the reimbursement of the money to Khalifa and the complainant in case the
appeal would be decided adversely against ISRC. Conversely, the check would be returned to
respondent if the appeal is resolved in favor of ISRC. The respondent denied employing fraud
or misrepresentation since allegedly, Khalifa and the complainant decided to buy his shares
after being told, upon inquiry in Malacanang, that ISRC had a good case. The respondent
averred that complainant was motivated by bad faith and malice in allegedly fabricating
criminal charges against him instead of seeking rescission of the Deed of Assignment and
refund of the consideration for the sale of the shares of stock. The respondent surmised that
they decided not to proceed with the Memorandum of Agreement when complainant had
secured her own license after she had received the Deed of Assignment and assumed the
position of acting treasurer of the ISRC. The respondent justified the non-submission of copies
of the Memorandum of Agreement, Deed of Assignment and complainants appointment as
Acting Treasurer with the SEC because of the cancellation of ISRCs license to recruit and the
pendency of the appeal for reinstatement since 1989. Aside from a copy of the Deed of
Assignment in favor of the complainant and her husband Khalifa regarding the five hundred
shares of stock, respondent also presented in support of his allegations copies of 1) his
[10]
Letter dated April 12, 1994 to the POEA requesting the renewal of ISRCs license, and 2) a
[11]
Letter dated May 24, 1994 from the Licensing and Regulation Office of the POEA
requiring him: (1) to submit an escrow agreement with a reputable commercial banking
corporation in the amount of P400,000.00 to answer for any valid and legal claim of recruited
workers; cash bond deposit of P200,000.00; and surety bond of P100,000.00; and (2) to clear
ISRCs pending cases with said agency before respondents request for reinstatement of ISRCs
license as a land based agency.

[12]
In a Resolution dated May 22, 1996, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner Milagros V. San
Juan, held several hearings, the last of which was on November 13, 2003. During those
hearings, the complainant presented her evidence. For his part, the respondent, instead of
presenting his defense before the CBD in open court, opted to present a position paper which
[13]
was allowed by the Order dated April 20, 2004 of Commissioner San Juan. However, in
[14]
lieu of said position paper, the respondent submitted a Memorandum after the complainant
had filed her formal offer of evidence. Eventually, on October 12, 2004, Commissioner San
[15]
Juan submitted her Report and Recommendation. Said the Commissioner in her report:

There is no question that the Memorandum of Agreement between the parties was executed
 on 9 [August] 1992. In said Memorandum, no mention was made of the assignment of shares of
stock in favor of the complainant and her husband. The conditions stated therein was that the
amount to be contributed by the complainant shall be used for the reinstatement of the license of
the ISRC. No mention was made regarding the assignment of shares in favor of the complainant
and her husband. Respondent presented a Deed of Assignment of shares of stock in favor of the
complainant and her husband worth P500,000.00 dated 26 April 1993, however, it is noted that
there is a super imposed date of 24 November 1994 in a notarial series of 1993 of Mario S. Ramos,
Notary Public, which raises doubt as to the date it was executed. Apparently, the Deed of
Assignment was executed when the complainant started her investigation regarding the true
condition of the corporation. Anent the reinstatement of the license of the company there is no
showing that the respondent used the amount he received from the complainant in compliance with
the respondents undertakings in the Memorandum of Agreement. The accusation of enticement
employed by respondent is supported by the fact that complainant was made to appear that she will
be appointed as treasurer of the corporation, however there was no action on the part of the
respondent to change the composition of the Board of Directors and the treasurer in the records of
the corporation on file with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The respondent did not fully
reveal the true condition of the corporation regarding the reinstatement of the corporations license
to operate. Likewise the issuance of a check in favor of the complainant on 30 March 1994 against
a closed account shows the respondent had no desire to return the money entrusted to him for the
reinstatement of the license of the corporation. The letter of the POEA dated 24 May 1994 xxx
clearly show that the payment of surety bond will not suffice to reinstate the license of the
corporation in view of several cases of violations of recruitment pending before the POEA against
said corporation. This fact was not disclosed to complainant when the Memorandum of Agreement
was entered into by the parties.

Thus, the Commissioners recommendation:

Given all the foregoing, it is submitted that respondent manifested lack of candor, when he
knowingly failed to provide the complainant with accurate and complete information due her
under the circumstances. It is respectfully recommended that respondent be SUSPENDED from
the practice of law in the maximum period prescribed by law and to return the money received
from the complainant.

On October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-
[16]
2005-102 adopting and approving, with modification, the afore-quoted report and
recommendation of the investigating commissioner, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,
with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A, and finding, the
Recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering Respondents lack of candor when he knowingly failed to provide complainant with the
accurate and complete information due her, Atty. Marciano J. Cagatan is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for two (2) years and Restitution of the money received from
complainant.
 Two (2) days later, or on November 24, 2005, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
transmitted to this Court the Notice of Resolution together with the records of Administrative
[17]
Case No. 4515.

[18]
On January 4, 2006, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Investigating
Commissioners Report and Recommendation with the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline. In
[19]
IBP Resolution No. XVII-2006-83 dated January 28, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors
denied respondents motion on the ground that it has no more jurisdiction to consider and
resolve a matter already endorsed to the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 12 (b) of Rule 139-
B of the Rules of Court.

After this Court noted the aforementioned IBP Resolution on June 28, 2006, a Motion for
[20]
Reinvestigation was filed by the respondent on September 12, 2006.

Subsequently, on November 15, 2006, the parties were required to manifest within ten
(10) days from notice, if they were willing to submit this case for resolution based on the
[21]
pleadings filed.

[22]
In our Resolution dated March 5, 2007, we noted without action respondents motion
for reinvestigation in view of respondent subsequent compliance and Manifestation dated
December 27, 2006. In the same resolution, the Court noted (1) the said respondents
compliance and manifestation of December 27, 2006 relative to the aforementioned November
15, 2006 Resolution; (2) complainants Manifestation dated December 19, 2006, stating that she
was willing to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed and the resolution of
the IBP Board of Governors; (3) respondents Comment on Complainants Manifestation dated
January 4, 2007; and (4) complainants Manifestation dated January 10, 2007.

At the outset, the Court shall resolve respondents challenge as to complainants

[23]
personality to file this complaint. In his Motion for Reconsideration of the IBP
Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation of October 12, 2004, respondent
contends that complainant, not being a party-in-interest in the agreement between respondent

and Mr. Khalifa H. Juma, has no legal standing to file the instant complaint.

Respondents argument lacks merit.

[24]
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that proceedings for
disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu
proprio, or by the IBP upon the verified complaint of any person. Accordingly, we held in
[25] [26]
Navarro v. Meneses III, as reiterated in Ilusorio-Bildner v. Lokin, that:

The argument of respondent that complainant has no legal personality to sue him is unavailing.
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides that proceedings for the disbarment,
suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu propio or by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The right to
institute a disbarment proceeding is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person
complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters
of public interest and the only basis for judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges.
The evidence submitted by complainant before the Commission on Bar Discipline sufficed to
sustain its resolution and recommended sanctions. (Emphasis ours)

[27]
The rationale was explained by us in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos, viz:

[The] rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for

suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and
the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and
afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for
his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of
the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest
in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. (Word
in brackets ours)

Prescinding therefrom, it is, therefore, immaterial whether or not complainant herein was a
party to the subject transaction. In any event, complainant is actually a party-in-interest thereto
[28]
because she is mentioned as the treasurer of ISRC in the Memorandum of Agreement; as
well as one of the assignees in the Deed of Assignment of shares of ISRC stocks which
[29]
respondent alleged to have executed; and as the payee in the bank check issued by the
 [30]
respondent for the amount of P500,000.00.

We shall now proceed to the merits of the case.

The pivotal issue herein is whether respondent employed fraud, deceit or

misrepresentation when he entered into the Memorandum of Agreement with Khalifa and
received from the latter a sum of money in the amount of P500,000.00.

We rule in the affirmative.

The complainant contends that pursuant to their agreement, she gave the amount of
P500,000.00 to the respondent to be used for the reinstatement of ISRCs recruitment license as
well as to start the business operation of the corporation. The respondent, however, claims that
complainant misinterpreted their agreement because the P500,000.00 the latter gave him was in
payment of his personal shares of ISRC stock, as evidenced by a Deed of Assignment.

We are constrained to give credence to the complainants contention. The due execution and
authenticity of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the parties are undisputed.
Moreover, the terms thereof are clear and explicit that for and in consideration of the joint
ownership of ISRC, the husband of the complainant, Mr. Khalifa Juma, would pay the amount
of P500,000.00, P250,000.00 of which would be used for the reinstatement of ISRCs license,
while the other P250,000.00 was for the start of the operation of the corporation and to liquidate
[31]
pending government and other obligations, if any. Nowhere in said MOA is the alleged
[32]
assignment of shares mentioned. The testimony of the complainant on this score is more
credible than that of the respondent because it conforms with the written stipulations in the
MOA. In contrast, the respondents explanations with respect to the P500,000.00 in question had
been inconsistent. The respondent averred in his Comment that the P500,000.00 was given to
him initially for the purpose of pursuing the appeal with the Office of the President and that he
used the same to pay loans or to reimburse borrowed money spent for the said purpose.
However, respondent also alleged that since the complainant was in a hurry to start the business
operation of ISRC, the money was used to buy his own shareholdings in the corporation for
which he executed a Deed of Assignment in complainants favor, which respondent claimed he
could validly do without the approval of ISRCs Board of Directors. His subsequent
 [33]
Memorandum submitted to the IBP contained new allegations that aside from the
P500,000.00 paid by the complainant for his personal shares of ISRC stocks, an additional
P500,000.00 should have been given to him as fresh capital of the corporation and because of
this failure of complainant to put up the alleged fresh capital, ISRC was not able to put up the
deposits required by the POEA resulting in the non-renewal of the license of ISRC up to the
present.

Indeed, the deceit and misrepresentation employed by the respondent was seemingly
evident right at the outset when he entered into the MOA concerning the joint ownership and
operation of ISRC with the complainants husband, knowing fully well that he could not do so
without the consent of and/or authority from the corporations Board of Directors. The unilateral
execution by respondent of the Deed of Assignment is a lame excuse offered by the respondent.
We agree with the observation of Commissioner San Juan that the said deed, which was not at
all mentioned in the MOA, was executed by the respondent after the complainant had
conducted her investigation of the true condition of the corporation. The so-called guarantee
check appears to have also been issued by respondent for the same reason.

Moreover, while the respondent made it appear in the MOA that the complainant would
be appointed treasurer and her husband Chairman of the Board of ISRC, the respondent had not
[34]
complied with the said undertaking as per the Certification dated October 13, 1995 of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The respondent could not justify his non-
compliance with the terms of the MOA by citing ISRCs inability to comply with other
governmental requirements for the reinstatement of its license for various reasons, since the
respondent failed to disclose the same to the complainant and her husband.

Particularly, the respondent failed to apprise the complainant as to the true state of ISRCs
affairs that the reinstatement of the corporations recruitment license would require not only a
favorable action by the Office of the President on ISRCs appeal and the payment of a surety
bond, but also ISRCs clearance or exoneration in its other cases for recruitment violations
[35]
pending with the POEA. The respondent could not pass the blame to the complainant
because of his belated excuse that complainant failed to infuse an additional amount of
P500,000.00. This new defense is clearly an afterthought and not supported by evidence.

In view of the foregoing, the Court holds that respondent has violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility as well as his attorneys oath.

The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates the following :

Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

The afore-cited canons emphasize the high standard of honesty and fairness expected of a
[36]
lawyer not only in the practice of the legal profession but in his personal dealings as well.
A lawyer must conduct himself with great propriety, and his behavior should be beyond
[37]
reproach anywhere and at all times. For, as officers of the courts and keepers of the publics
faith, they are burdened with the highest degree of social responsibility and are thus mandated
[38]
to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor. Likewise, the oath that
lawyers swear to impresses upon them the duty of exhibiting the highest degree of good faith,
[39]
fairness and candor in their relationships with others. Thus, lawyers may be disciplined for
any conduct, whether in their professional or in their private capacity, if such conduct renders
[40]
them unfit to continue to be officers of the court.

Hence, in this case, we are in accord with the findings of the IBP Commissioner, as
affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors. What is more, we find respondent to be guilty of gross
misconduct for issuing a worthless check.

[41]
In Sanchez v. Somoso, the Court ruled that a lawyer who paid another with a personal
check from a bank account which he knew has already been closed exhibited an extremely low
regard to his commitment to the oath he took when he joined his peers, thereby seriously
tarnishing the image of the profession which he should hold in high esteem. In Moreno v.
[42]
Araneta, we held that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, as the

effect transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and
touches the interests of the community at large.

Respondent herein admitted having issued a check but claimed that it was only to
guarantee the reimbursement of the P500,000.00 given to him by the complainant in case of an
adverse decision in ISRCs appeal with the Office of the President. We note, however, that said
check was issued on March 30, 1994 or one year after the appeal adverted to had already been
favorably acted upon on March 30, 1993. Hence, our conclusion is that the check was issued
only after the complainant demanded the return of their P500,000.00 investment in ISRC. In
any event, respondents act of issuing a guarantee check for P500,000.00, when he was
presumably aware that at the time of his issuance thereof his bank account against which the
check was drawn was already closed, clearly constitutes gross misconduct for which he should
be penalized.

In sum, the amount of P500,000.00 was received by the respondent for the reinstatement
of the license, but there is no showing that it was used for such purpose, as the respondent
failed to give any credible accounting or explanation as to the disbursement of the said amount
in accordance with the stipulations in the MOA. Respondent failed to disclose all the existing
hindrances to the renewal of ISRCs recruitment license, which enticed complainant and her
husband to part with the aforesaid sum of money. He also admittedly issued a check drawn
against a closed account, which evinced his lack of intention to return the money to the
complainant pursuant to his supposed guarantee. It is thus proper for the Court to order its
restitution as recommended by the IBP.

We find the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2)
years by the IBP Board of Governors to be too harsh considering that this is respondents first
administrative offense. It is settled that the appropriate penalty which the Court may impose on
an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding
[43]
facts. Accordingly, for employing deceit and misrepresentation in his personal dealings as
well as for issuing a worthless check, we rule and so hold that the penalty of suspension for one
(1) year and one (1) month from the practice of law is sufficient to be meted out to respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Marciano J. Cagatan is SUSPENDED FOR ONE (1)
YEAR and ONE (1) MONTH from the practice of law with warning that repetition of the
same or similar acts will merit a more severe penalty; and ordered to RESTITUTE the amount

of P500,000.00 to the complainant.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
the Office of the Bar Confidant and spread in respondent's personal records.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
(On leave)

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA RUBEN T. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

* On leave.
[1]
POEA Certification dated June 29, 1995; rollo, p. 181.
[2]
Id., pp. 33-39
[3]
Id., p. 45.
[4]
Id., p. 5.
[5]
Also referred to as Joma Humed Khalifa or Khalifa Humed Juma Al-Nasser.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 1-4.
[7]
Id., p. 15.
[8]
Id, pp. 23-29.
[9]
Id., p. 44.
[10]
Id., p. 45.
[11]
Id., pp. 42-43.
[12]
Id., p. 66.
[13]
Id., p. 194.
[14]
Id., pp. 195-211.
[15]
Id., pp. 512-516.
[16]
Rollo, p. 511.
[17]
Id., p. 510.
[18]
Id., pp. 518-526.
[19]
Id., p. 517.
[20]
Id., pp. 542-546.
[21]
Id., p. 547.
[22]
Id. p. 559.
[23]
Id., pp. 518-526.
[24]
In full, this provision reads:
SECTION 1. How instituted. Proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the
Supreme Court motu propio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The
complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having
personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.
[25]
CBD A.C. No.313, January 30, 1998, 285 SCRA 586.
[26]
A.C. No. 6554, December 14, 2005, 477 SCRA 634.
[27]
A.C No. 2884, January 28, 1998, 285 SCRA 93.
[28]
Paragraph 2, Memorandum of Agreement; Rollo, p. 5.
[29]
Supra, at note 9.
[30]
Supra, at note 7.
[31]
Paragraph 3, Memorandum of Agreement; rollo, p. 5.
[32]
TSN, 19 April 2002, pp. 264, 269 & 283.
[33]
Rollo, pp. 195-211.
[34]
Id., p. 177.
[35]
Letter from POEA; rollo, p. 45.
[36]
Sanchez v. Somoso, A.C. No. 6061, October 3, 2003, 412 SCRA 569, 571.
[37]
Id.
[38]
Olbes v. Deciembre, A.C. No. 5365, April 27, 2005, 457 SCRA 341, 352.
[39]
Id.
[40]
Id.
[41]
Supra at note 17, p. 572.
[42]
A.C. No. 1109, April 27, 2005, 457 SCRA 329, 337.
[43]
Soriano v. Reyes, A.C. No. 4676, May 4, 2006, 489 SCRA 328, 343.