1. The case examines whether members of the Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) Board of Directors and its full-time consultants are entitled to a year-end benefit.
2. The Commission on Audit disallowed the year-end benefit, but BCDA claimed it was allowed under their charter and the Constitution.
3. The Supreme Court ruled that the Board members and consultants are not entitled to the benefit. Their compensation is limited by law and the charter does not provide for such a benefit. Full-time consultants also do not receive a salary.
1. The case examines whether members of the Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) Board of Directors and its full-time consultants are entitled to a year-end benefit.
2. The Commission on Audit disallowed the year-end benefit, but BCDA claimed it was allowed under their charter and the Constitution.
3. The Supreme Court ruled that the Board members and consultants are not entitled to the benefit. Their compensation is limited by law and the charter does not provide for such a benefit. Full-time consultants also do not receive a salary.
Original Description:
Bases Conversion and Development Authority v Commission on Audit
1. The case examines whether members of the Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) Board of Directors and its full-time consultants are entitled to a year-end benefit.
2. The Commission on Audit disallowed the year-end benefit, but BCDA claimed it was allowed under their charter and the Constitution.
3. The Supreme Court ruled that the Board members and consultants are not entitled to the benefit. Their compensation is limited by law and the charter does not provide for such a benefit. Full-time consultants also do not receive a salary.
1. The case examines whether members of the Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) Board of Directors and its full-time consultants are entitled to a year-end benefit.
2. The Commission on Audit disallowed the year-end benefit, but BCDA claimed it was allowed under their charter and the Constitution.
3. The Supreme Court ruled that the Board members and consultants are not entitled to the benefit. Their compensation is limited by law and the charter does not provide for such a benefit. Full-time consultants also do not receive a salary.
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BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY V COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 178160 February 26, 2009
FACTS:
On 13 March 1992, Congress approved Re public Act
(RA) No. 7227 creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA). Section 9 of RA No. 7227 states that the BCDA Board of Directors (Board) shall exercise the powers and functions of the BCDA. Under Section 10, the functions of the Board include the determination of the organizational structure and the adoption of a compensation and benefit scheme at least equivalent to that of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).
Pursuant to this, the board adopted a new compensation
and benefit scheme which included a ₱10,000 year-end benefit granted to each contractual employee, regular permanent employee, and Board member which thereafter approved by then President Ramos.
Commission on Audit disallowed in notice of
disallowance the grant of year-end benefit to the Board members and ful-time consultants being contrary to Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Circular Letter No. 2002-2 dated 2 January 2002. BCDA claims that such grants are allowed because:
First, it is in accordance with Section 10 of RA No.
7227,which states the functions of the Board include the adoption of a compensation and benefit scheme.
Second, it is consistent with Sections 5 and 18, Article II
of the Constitution.
Third, that the denial of year-end benefit to the Board
members and full-time consultants violates Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.
Fourth, the BCDA claims that the Board can grant the year-end benefit to its members and the full-time consultants because RA No. 7227 does not expressly prohibit it from doing so.
Fifth, that the Board members and full-time consultants
are entitled to the year-end benefit because (1) President Ramos approved the granting of the benefit to the Board members, and (2) they have been receiving it since 1997. ISSUE:
Whether the members of BCDA and its full time
consultants are entitled to year-end benefit.
HELD:
1.
The Board members and full-time consultants of the
BCDA are not entitled to the year-end benefit.
1. First, the Board’s power to adopt a compensation and benefit scheme is not unlimited. Section 9 of RA No. 7227 states that Board members are entitled to a per diem: Members of the Board shall receive a per diem of not more than Five thousand pesos (₱5,000) for every board meeting: Provided, however, That the per diem collected per month does not exceed the equivalent of four meetings: Provided, further, That the amount of per diem for every board meeting may be increased by the President but such amount shall not be increased within two (2) years after its last increase. The Court held in previous cases that the specification of compensation and limitation of the amount of compensation in a statute indicate that Board members are entitled only to the per diem authorized by law and no other.
Also, DBM Circular Letter No. 2002-2 states that,
"Members of the Board of Directors of agencies are not salaried officials of the government. As non- salaried officials they are not entitled to PERA, ADCOM, YEB and retirement benefits unless expressly provided by law." RA No. 7227 does not state that the Board members are entitled to a year-end benefit.
With regard to the full-time consultants, DBM Circular
Letter No. 2002-2 states that, "YEB and retirement benefits, are personnel benefits granted in addition to salaries. As fringe benefits, these shall be paid only when the basic salary is also paid." The full- time consultants are not part of the BCDA personnel and are not paid the basic salary. The full-time consultants’ consultancy contracts expressly state that there is no employer-employee relationship between the BCDA and the consultants, and that the BCDA shall pay the consultants a contract price.
Since full-time consultants are not salaried employees of
BCDA, they are not entitled to the year-end benefit which is a "personnel benefit granted in addition to salaries" and which is "paid only when the basic salary is also paid."
Second, Article II of the Constitution is entitled
Declaration of Principles and State Policies. By its very title, Article II is a statement of general ideological principles and policies. It is not a source of enforceable rights. the Court held that Sections 5 and 18, Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing provisions. In one case, the Court held that the constitutional provisions Sections 5 and 18 of 1987 Costitution— the provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to be non self-executing."
Third, Every presumption should be indulged in
favor of the constitutionality of RA No. 7227 and the burden of proof is on the BCDA to show that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.
A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong
presumption of constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and unequivocal one. To invalidate [a law] based on x x x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.
The BCDA failed to show that RA No. 7227 unreasonably
singled out Board members and full-time consultants in the grant of the year-end benefit. It did not show any clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The claim that there is no difference between regular officials and employees, and Board members and full-time consultants because both groups "have mouths to feed and stomachs to fill" is fatuous. Surely, persons are not automatically similarly situated — thus, automatically deserving of equal protection of the laws — just because they both "have mouths to feed and stomachs to fill." Otherwise, the existence of a substantial distinction would become forever highly improbable.
Fifth, the State is not estopped from correcting a public
officer’s erroneous application of a statute, and an unlawful practice, no matter how long, cannot give rise to any vested right.
