Succession Compiled Cases

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No.
URSULINA GANUELAS, METODIO GANUELAS and ANTONIO GANUELAS, Petitioner
vs.
HON. ROBERT T. CAWED, Judge of the RTC of San Fernando, La Union (Branch 29), LEOCADIA
G. FLORES, FELICITACION G. AGTARAP, CORAZON G. SIPALAY and ESTATE OF ROMANA
GANUELAS DE LA ROSA, represented by GREGORIO DELA ROSA, Administrator, Respondents
G.R. No. 123968 April 24, 2003
CARPIO MORALES, J.
Digested by: Jean Marie L. Abellana
1
DOCTRINE: If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor‘s death, meaning that the full or naked
ownership of the donated properties will pass to the donee only because of the donor‘s death, then it is at that
time that the donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis causa which should be embodied in a last will and
testament. But if the donation takes effect during the donor‘s lifetime or independently of the donor‘s death,
meaning that the full or naked ownership (nuda proprietas) of the donated properties passes to the donee during
the donor‘s lifetime, not by reason of his death but because of the deed of donation, then the donation is inter
vivos.
GONZALO VILLANUEVA, Petitioner
vs.
SPOUSES FROILAN and LEONILA BRANOCO, Respondents
G.R. No. 172804 January 24, 2011
CARPIO, J.
4
DOCTRINE: The transfers inter vivos, consistent with the principle that "the designation of the donation
as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is ‘to take effect at the death
of the donor’ are not controlling criteria but are to be construed together with the rest of the instrument,
in order to give effect to the real intent of the transferor." Indeed, doubts on the nature of dispositions
are resolved to favor inter vivos transfers "to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property
subject of the deed.
JARABINI G. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner,
vs.
ASUNCION G. FERRER, substituted by her heirs, VICENTE, PILAR, ANGELITO, FELIXBERTO,
JR., all surnamed G. FERRER, and MIGUELA FERRER ALTEZA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 187056 September 20, 2010
ABAD, J.:
8
DOCTRINE:The express "irrevocability" of the donation is the "distinctive standard that identifies the
document as a donation inter vivos." The reservation of the "right, ownership, possession, and
administration of the property" and made the donation operative upon the donor’s death in the context
of an irrevocable donation simply means that the donors parted with their naked title, maintaining
only beneficial ownership of the donated property while they lived. Moreover, an acceptance clause
indicates that the donation is inter vivos, since acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of
donations.Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, need not be accepted by the donee
during the donor’s lifetime.
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAÑEZ ARIOLA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005
CALLEJO, SR., J.
DOCTRINE:As a general rule, the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot
exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him and that the heirs succeed not only to the 11
rights of the deceased but also to his obligations. However, the filing of a money claim against the
decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. This requirement is for the purpose of protecting
the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus
enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be
allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the
deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly
requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to
settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.
ESTATE OF K. H. HEMADY, deceased
vs.
LUZON SURETY CO., INC., claimant-Appellant
G.R. No. L-8437 November 28, 1956
REYES, J. B. L., J.
15
DOCTRINE: The responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot exceed the value of
the inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains intact that these heirs succeed not only to
the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations. Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a
party's contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors.
ALVAREZ V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. NO. L-68053 MAY 7, 1990
FERNAN, C.J.
18
DOCTRINE: The general rule is that a party’s contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the
successors.
ROMULO A. CORONEL, ET. AL., V. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

G.R. NO. 103577 OCTOBER 7, 1996
MELO, J.
20
DOCTRINE: It is expressly provided that rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
death of the decedent.
CELESTINO BALUS, V. SATURNINO BALUS AND LEONARDA BALUS VDA. DE CALUNOD.
G.R. NO. 168970 JANUARY 15, 2010
PERALTA, J.
22
DOCTRINE: The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death. In
addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations
existing at the time of his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the
succession.
SICAD V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 125888 AUGUST 13, 1998
NARVASA,C.J.
24
DOCTRINE: A donation which purports to be one inter vivos but withholds from the donee the right to
dispose of the donated property during the donor's lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a donation
mortis causa "the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive."
MARIA USON, v. MARIA DEL ROSARIO, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-4963 January 29, 1953
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.
26
DOCTRINE: The provisions of the NCC shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which
gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation only if no vested rights are impaired.
G.R. No. L-28040 August 18, 1972
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA, administrator-appellee; JOSE DE
BORJA, as administrator, CAYETANO DE BORJA, MATILDE DE BORJA and CRISANTO DE
BORJA (deceased) as Children of Josefa Tangco, vs.
TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA, Special Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja
Digested by: Terry Louise P. Boligor 27
DOCTRINE:Hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the

moment of the death of such predecessor in interest. There is no legal bar to a successor (with
requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such death,
even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.
G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976
ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor) and PONCIANO BONILLA (their
father) who represents the minors v. LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA
BARCENA, MANUEL BARCENA, AGUSTINA NERI, widow of JULIAN TAMAYO and HON.
LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of the Court of First Instance of Abra
Digested by: Terry Louise P. Boligor 30
DOCTRINE:Rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent."
From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owner of his property,
subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto
except by the methods provided for by law. The moment of death is the determining factor when the
heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Petitioner, vs.
MA. IMELDA "IMEE" R. MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND "BONGBONG" R. MARCOS, JR.,
GREGORIO MA. ARANETA III, IRENE R. MARCOS-ARANETA, YEUNG CHUN FAN, YEUNG CHUN
HO, YEUNG CHUN KAM, and PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEA)-PTGWO
G. R. No. 171701 February 8, 2012
32
Digested by: Terry Louise P. Boligor
DOCTRINE:The heirs instantaneously became co-owners of the Marcos properties upon the death of
the President. The property rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a
person are transmitted to another through the decedent’s death.
ANTIPOLO INING v. LEONARDO R. VEGA 35
G.R. No. 174727 August 12, 2013
Del Castillo, J.
DOCTRINE: One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter and
cannot become a co-owner of the decedent’s property. Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of
the co-ownership of the estate that was formed among the decedent’s heirs.
G.R. No. 129008 January 13, 2004
TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA assisted by her husband ZALDY
EVANGELISTA, ALBERTO ORFINADA, and ROWENA O. UNGOS, assisted by her husband BEDA
UNGOS, petitioners,vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ESPERANZA P. ORFINADA, LOURDES P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO
ORFINADA, NANCY P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO JAMES P. ORFINADA, CHRISTOPHER P.
ORFINADA and ANGELO P. ORFINADA,respondents.
38
DOCTRINE: Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal
personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of
Article 777 of the New Civil Code "that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent." The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the property, rights
and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death
to another or others by his will or by operation of law.
FLORDELIZA CALPATURA FLORA, DOMINADOR CALPATURA and TOMAS CALPATURA, JR.,
Heirs of TOMAS CALPATURA, SR.,
vs.
ROBERTO, ERLINDA, DANIEL, GLORIA, PATRICIO, JR. and EDNA, all surnamed PRADO and
NARCISA PRADO
G.R. No. 156879 January 20, 2004
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: 42
DOCTRINE: It is well-settled that in civil cases, the party that alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.
Article 160 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time the sale was entered into, provides that all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is a
condition sine qua non in order for the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership to operate.
EDUARDO FELIPE VS HEIRS OF MAXIMO ALDON
G.R. No. L-60174 February 16, 1983
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
44
DOCTRINE: The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. (Art. 165, Civil Code.)
Subject to certain exceptions, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. (Art. 166, Idem.) And the wife cannot bind the conjugal
partnership without the husband's consent, except in cases provided by law.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC.,
vs.
JOSEPHINE LUCERO
G.R. No. L-60101 August 31, 1983
46
ESCOLIN, J.:
EMILIO EMNACE vs. CA, ESTATE OF VICENTE TABANAO, SHERWIN TABANAO, VICENTE
WILLIAM TABANAO, JANETTE TABANAO DEPOSOY, VICENTA MAY TABANAO VARELA,
ROSELA TABANAO AND VINCENT TABANAO
G. R. No. 126334. November 23, 2001 48

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
PUNO V. PUNO ENTERPRISES

G.R. NO. 177066 SEPTEMBER 11, 2009
NACHURA, J.: 50
DOCTRINE:
Upon the death of a stockholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders of the corporation;
neither are they mandatorily entitled to the rights and privileges of a stockholder.
REYES VS RTC OF MAKATI BRANCH 142
52
GR NO. 165744, AUGUST 11, 2008
HIERS OF SANDEJAS VS ALEX A. LINA
G.R. no. 141634 February 5, 2001 54
G.R. No. 169129 March 28, 2007
SPS. VIRGILIO F. SANTOS & ESPERANZA LATI SANTOS, SPS.VICTORINO F. SANTOS, &
LAGRIMAS SANTOS, ERNESTO F. SANTOS, and TADEO F. SANTOS, Petitioners, vs. SPS. JOSE
58
LUMBAO and PROSERFINA LUMBAO,
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Rodriguez v. Borja
G.R. No. L-21993, June 21, 1966 (17 SCRA 418) 62
BALANAY V. MARTINEZ
G.R. NO. L-39247 JUNE 27, 1975
AQUINO, J. 65
DOCTRINE: Mixed succession is that effected partly by will and partly by operation of law.
BALUS V. BALUS
G.R. NO. 168970 JANUARY 15, 2010
PERALTA, J.
67
DOCTRINE:The inheritance of a person includes not only the property and the transmissible rights and
obligations existing at the time of his death, but also those which have accrued thereto since the
opening of the succession.
HEIRS OF LEANDRO NATIVIDAD v. MAURICIO-NATIVIDAD
G.R. NO. 198434 FEBRUARY 29, 2016
69
PERALTA, J.
VITUG v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 82027 March 29, 1990
SARMIENTO, J.
71
DOCTRINE:A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to
control to a certain degree the disposition of this estate, to take effect after his death.
SEANGIO V. REYES
G.R. NOS. 140371-72 NOVEMBER 27, 2006
AZCUNA, J:
73
DOCTRINE:A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to
control to a certain degree the disposition of this estate, to take effect after his death.
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA
COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000.
PURISIMA, J.:
75
DOCTRINE:A will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person disposes of his
property, to take effect after his death. (Article 783, New Civil Code) Since the will expresses the
manner in which a person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the
testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which
would thereby defeat the very purpose of making a will.
ANTONIO CASTANEDA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSE E. ALEMANY, Defendant-Appellant.
[G.R. No. 1439. March 19, 1904]
WILLARD, J.:
77
DOCTRINE:If a will is signed by the testator or by someone else in his presence and under his express
direction, it is a matter of indifference by whom the mechanical work of writing of the will is done.
BUHAY DE ROMA, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELICIDAD
CARINGAL, as Guardian of Rosalinda De Roma, Respondents.
[G.R. No. L-46903, July 23, 1987.]
CRUZ, J.:
DOCTRINE:When there is an imperfect description, or when no person or property exactly answers the 78
description, mistakes and omissions must be corrected, if the error appears from the context of the will
or from extrinsic evidence, excluding the oral declarations of the testator as to his intention; and when
an uncertainty arises upon the face of the will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the
testator’s intention is to be ascertained from the words of the will, taking into consideration the
circumstances under which it was made, excluding such oral declarations. (Article 789, New Civil Code)
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee, vs. ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON,
BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors-
appellants.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
80
DOCTRINE:The testator’s wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of
testatments, when expressed clearly and precisely in his last will amount to the only law whose
mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and devisees
and legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may substitute their own criterion for
the testator’s will.
LEONOR VILLAFOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellantvs. DELFIN JUICO, in his capacity 83
as Judicial Administrator of the testate estate of FAUSTA NEPOMUCENO, defendant-appellee.
[G.R. No. L-15737, February 28, 1962]
REYES, J.B.L, J.:
DOCTRINE:The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression
some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of
interpreting a will, that one is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy. (Article 791, New Civil Code)
DEL ROSARIO V. DEL ROSARIO
2 PHIL 321, MAY 19, 1903
WILLARD, J
DIGESTED BY: MAIZ
DOCTRINE:Article 907 requires the executor to render accounts to the heir, not to the legatee; and 85
although by article 789 all of the provisions of Chapter II (in which both articles are found) relating to
heirs are made applicable to legatees, we cannot hold that this requires an executor to submit his
accounts to one who has no interest in the estate except to a money legacy when there is no
suggestion that it will not be paid when the right to it is established.
Estate of Rigor v. Rigor
89 SCRA 493
April 30, 1979
DIGESTED BY: MAIZ
88
Doctrine: One canon in the interpretation of the testamentary provisions is that "the testator's intention
is to be ascertained from the words of the will taking into consideration the circumstances under which it
was made", but excluding the testator's oral declarations as to his intention (Art. 789, Civil Code of the
Philippines).
Rabadilla v. CA
G.R. No. 113725, June 29, 2000
Purisima, J:
DIGESTED BY: MAIZ

91
Doctrine: In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to the
application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the
Will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was made. Such construction as will
sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must be adopted.
VDA DE VILLAFLOR V. JUICO
GR NO. L-15737 FEBRUARY 28, 1962
REYES, J,B,L. J:
DIGESTED BY: MAIZ 92
Doctrine: If the testator wanted to give the properties to DoňaFausta then he should have specifically
stated in his will that ownership should belong to DoňaFausta without mentioning any condition.
YAMBAO V. GONZALES
G.R. NO. L-10763 (1961)
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J:
DIGESTED BY: MAIZ

93
Doctrine: The words 'dapat TUNGKULIN O GANGPANAN" mean to do or to carry out as a mandate or
directive, and having reference to the word "pahihintulutan", can convey no other meaning than to
impose a duty upon appellees. To follow an otherwise interpretation would be to devoid the wish of the
testatrix of its real and true meaning.
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA, BELINDA CAPONONG-NOBLE, Petitioner, v.
ALIPIO ABAJA and NOEL ABELLAR, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 147145, January 31, 2005
CARPIO, J.:
Digested by: Cheryll Navarette
DOCTRINE:
The facts and circumstances of record are to be considered in the application of any given
95
rule. If the surrounding circumstances point to a regular execution of the will, and the instrument
appears to have been executed substantially in accordance with the requirements of the law, the
inclination should, in the absence of any suggestion of bad faith, forgery or fraud, lean towards its
admission to probate, although the document may suffer from some imperfection of language, or other
non-essential defect.
Precision of language in the drafting of an attestation clause is desirable. However, it is not

imperative that a parrot-like copy of the words of the statute be made. It is sufficient if from the
language employed it can reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause fulfills what the law
expects of it.
In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA.
100
SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,
vs.
MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-7188, August 9, 1954
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
DOCTRINE:
The validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the testator's death or
at the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided by the
court but at the time the instrument was executed.
MAGIN RIOSA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PABLO ROCHA, MARCELINA CASAS, MARIA CORRAL and
CONSOLACION R. DE CALLEJA, Defendants-Appellees.
G.R. No. 23770. February 18, 1926
AVANCEÑA, C.J. :
DOCTRINE:
For the purposes of the reservation and the rights and obligations created thereby, in
connection with the relatives benefited, the property must not be deemed transmitted to the heirs from
the time the extrajudicial partition was made, but from the time said partition was approved by the court.
The reservor is bound to register the reservation within ninety days from the date of the 102
adjudication of the property to the heirs by the court. After this period, the reservees have the right to
enforce compliance with said obligation.
Where a reservable property is sold by the reservor, without having registered its reservable
character, the obligation to register the same is transferred to the purchaser, when, in making the
purchase, the latter knew the facts which give the property the reservable character.
The law does not require the reservor to secure the reservation with a mortgage or bond as to
the real property, the notation of the reservation in the registry of property being sufficient (art. 977, Civil
Code). This security for the value of the real property, which is required by the law (art. 978, paragraph
4, of the Civil Code), in case it is sold before acquiring the reservable character, in a reservation by the
widowed spouse (art. 968, Civil Code), is not applicable to "reservatroncal" (reservation by ascendant)
(art. 811, Civil Code).
BIENVENIDO A. IBARLE, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS.ESPERANZA, M. PO, DEFENDANT
AND APPELLEE.
G. R. No. L-5064, February 26, 1953
TUASON, J.:

106
DOCTRINE:
The moment of death is the determining factor when the children of a decedent acquire a definite right
to the inheritance, whether such right be pure or contingent. No formal or judicial declaration is needed
to confirm the children’s title. Sale made by the widow of the decedent’s property after his death is null
and void so far as it included the children’s share.
Sale made of decedent’s property with authority of the competent court is legal and effective even if not
registered.
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-
appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
G.R. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963
LABRADOR, J.:
Digested by: Cheryll Navarette 108
DOCTRINE:
Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be
the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.
LOURDES L. DOROTHEO
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE DOROTHEO
G.R. No. 108581 DECEMBER 8, 1999
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. 110
DOCTRINE: Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives
or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession,
the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect.
JULIANA BAGTAS
vs.
ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-6801 MARCH 14, 1912
TRENT, J.
112
DOCTRINE: Mere weakness of mind and body, induced by age and disease do not render a person
incapable of making a will. The law does not require that a person shall continue in the full enjoyment
and use of his pristine physical and mental powers in order to execute a valid will.
ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, ET.AL.
vs.
LORENZO LAXA
G.R. No. 174489 APRIL 11, 2012
DEL CASTILLO, J. 113
DOCTRINE: Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind.

CATALINA BUGNAO
vs.
FRANCISCO UBAG, ET AL.
G.R. No. 4445 SEPTEMBER 18, 1909
CARSON, J.
115
DOCTRINE: Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction in
which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the persons
who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in
which the instrument will distribute his property among the objects of his bounty.
MANUEL TORRES and
LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO
vs.
MARGARITA LOPEZ
G.R. No. L-24569 FEBRUARY 26, 1926
MALCOLM, J.
117
DOCTRINE: Testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually be
insane or of an unsound mind. Weakness of intellect, whether it arises from extreme old age, from
disease, or great bodily infirmities of suffering, or from all these combined, may render the testator in
capable of making a valid will, providing such weakness really disqualifies for from knowing or
appreciating the nature, effects, or consequences of the act she is engaged in.
FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979
GUERRERO, J.:
Digested by: Lyndzelle Jane D. Paniza 119
DOCTRINE: The test of testamentary capacity is at the time of the making of the will. Mere weakness
of mind or partial imbecility from disease of body or from age does not render a person incapable of
making a will.
ALFONSO ALBORNOZ, vs DOLORES ALBORNOZ and JOSE ALBORNOZ
[GR No. 47428. April 8, 1941.]
DIAZ, M.:
Digested by: Lyndzelle Jane D. Paniza 122
DOCTRINE: The fact that two days before the execution of the will, the deceased could barely move
and talk and if she spoke, her words were incoherent and thereafter lost her speech, it was of course
impossible for her to execute her will.
TRINIDAD NEYRAVS. ENCARNACION NEYRA
C.A. No. 8075 March 25, 1946
DE JOYA, J.:
Digested by: Lyndzelle Jane D. Paniza

124
DOCTRINE:Where it appears that a few hours and also a few days after the execution of the will, the
testator intelligently and intelligibly conversed with other persons, although lying down and unable to
move or stand up unassisted, but could still effect the sale of property belonging to him, these
circumstances show that the testator was in a perfectly sound mental condition at the time of the
execution of the will.
EULALIO HERNAEZVS.ROSENDO HERNAEZ
G.R. No. 857 February 10, 1903
126
ARELLANO, C.J.:
DOCTRINE:The fact that an old woman gives contradictory orders, that she walks in a stooping
position, that she has fainting fits, that she received the sacraments some days before making her will,
are circumstances which even if fully demonstrated by proof could no lead the court to establish a
conclusion contrary to the mental soundness of a person who is to be presumed to be in the full
enjoyment of the mental faculties until the contrary is conclusively proven.
SANTIAGO GALVEZ, V. CANUTA GALVEZ
[G.R. NO. 6650. DECEMBER 5, 1913. ]
TORRES, J.:

128
DOCTRINE: In order to hold that a testator, as the result of cholera, was not of sound mind and did not
have full knowledge of his acts and was incapable of executing a valid will, it is indispensable that the
proceedings disclose conclusive proof of his mental incapacity and of his lack of reason and judgment
at the time he executed his will in due form.
JUANA CAGUIOA, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EMIGDIO ZARATE
V.
MARIA CALDERON
G.R. No. 6625, October 24, 1911
JOHNSON, J.
130
DIGESTED BY: Jose Luis P. Pacquiao
DOCTRINE: WILLS; UNDUE INFLUENCE; MENTAL CAPACITY; LAWFUL WILL - Under the facts
stated in the opinion, that the will in question, was duly and legally authorized by the deceased, he
being of sound mind and memory, and that the same was not executed under threats or fear.
TESTATE ESTATE OF VITO BORROMEO
JOSE H. JUNQUERA
vs.
CRISPIN BORROMEO, ET AL.,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-18498, March 30, 1967
DIZON, J.
132
DOCTRINE: The subscribing witnesses to a contested will are regarded as the best witnesses in
connection with its due execution. It is similarly true, however, that to deserve full credit, their test,
testimony must be reasonable and unbiased, and that, as in the case of any other witness, their
testimony may be overcome by any competent evidence - direct or circumstantial.
MANUEL TORRES and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO
vs.
MARGARITA LOPEZ
GR No. 24569, February 26, 1926
MALCOLM, J.
135
DOCTRINE: Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction in
which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the persons
who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in
which the instrument will distribute his property among the objects of his bounty.
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF MARIE GARNIER GARREAU. LIRIO
PFANNENSCHMIDT RAMIREZ
v.
JOSE MA. RAMIREZ
G.R. No. L-19910, May 31, 1971
MAKALINTAL, J.
137
DOCTRINE:Pre-senile Dementia incapacitated testator from making a will. The evidence hereinabove
discussed, cumulatively considered, leads to the definite conclusion that Marie Garnier Garreau was
indeed mentally incapacitated to make a will, that is, "to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of,
the proper objects of (her) bounty, and the character of the testamentary act" (Art. 799. Civil Code).
SAMSON vs. CORRALES TAN QUINTIN
G.R. NO. L-19142, MARCH 5, 1923
OSTRAND, J.
Digested by: Faith Imee D. Roble 140
DOCTRINE: Weakness of the mind is not equivalent to an unsound mind. Evidence on the soundness
of mind must be testified by the Attending Physician
CUYUGAN v. BARON
142
G.R. No. L-41947, JANUARY 16, 1936
BUTTE, J.
Digested by: Faith Imee D. Roble
DOCTRINE: There is testamentary incapacity when the alleged testator harbors the belief that she did
not execute a will nor judge the propriety of revoking such will. Testamentary Incapacity invalidates the
whole will.
ORTEGA v. VALMONTE
G.R. No. 157451, DECEMBER 16, 2005
PANGANIBAN, J.
144
DOCTRINE: The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the
time of its execution. To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be
unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise.
BALTAZAR v. LAXA
G.R. No. 174489, APRIL 11, 2012
DEL CASTILLO, J.
Digested by: Faith Imee D. Roble 147
DOCTRINE: The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as
to render him unfit to execute a will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind.
SUROZA v. HONRADO
A.M. No. 2026-CFI, DECEMBER 19, 1981
AQUINO, J.
149
DOCTRINE: Lack of knowledge cannot be cured by interpretation or explanation of the contents of the
will to the testator.
IN RE WILL OF ANA ABANGAN. GERTRUDIS ABANGAN v. ANASTACIA ABANGAN, ET AL.

G. R. NO. L-13431 NOVEMBER 12, 1919
AVANCEÑA, J.:
151
DOCTRINE:For the presumption that the testatrix knew of the dialect in which the will is written, the
following circumstances must appear: 1) that the will must be in a language or dialect generally spoken
in the place of execution, and, 2) that the testator must be a native or resident of the said locality
TESTACY OF SIXTO LOPEZ. JOSE S. LOPEZ v. AGUSTIN LIBORO

G.R. No. L-1787 AUGUST 27, 1948
TUASON, J.: 152
DOCTRINE:There is no statutory requirement that such knowledge be expressly stated in the will itself.
It is a matter that may be established by proof aliunde.
IN RE ESTATE OF PIRASO. SIXTO ACOP v. SALMING PIRASO, ET AL.
G. R. NO. L-28946 JANUARY 16, 1929.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
153
DOCTRINE:The presumption that the testator is presumed to know the dialect of the locality where he
resides can be overcome by the presentation of evidence and facts as in this case.
TESTATE ESTATE OF MARIA ZUÑIGA VDA. DE PANDO, deceased. JUAN REYES v. DOLORES
ZUÑIGA VDA. DE VIDAL
G.R. NO. L-2862 APRIL 21, 1952
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
154
DOCTRINE:The failure of the witnesses to testify that the testatrix knew and spoke the language used
in a will does not itself alone suffice to conclude that this requirement of law has not been complied with
when there is enough evidence of record which supplies this technical omission
IN RE: WILL OF THE DECEASED LEONICIA TOLENTINO. VICTORIO PAYAD v. AQUILINA
TOLENTINO
G.R. NO. 42258 SEPTEMBER 5, 1936
DIAZ, J,: 156
DOCTRINE:A statute requiring a will to be signed is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator’s
mark.
In re will of TAN DIUCO, deceased. MAMERTA BASE, petitioner-appellant.
G.R. No. L-20475 March 19, 1924
ARAULLO, C.J.:
Digested by: Jan ione R. Salveron

157
DOCTRINE: it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will.
So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that
adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustative of the testator's
last will, must be disregarded
AUREA MATIAS, petitioner, vs. BASILIA SALUD, respondent.
G.R. No. L-10751 June 23, 1958
CONCEPCION, J.:
Digested by: Jan ione R. Salveron 159
DOCTRINE: the validity of a thumbprint should not be limited in cases of illness of infirmity, it shall
always be considered as a valid and sufficient signature in complying with the requirements of Article
805 of the New Civil Code.
In the Matter of the will of ANTERO MERCADO, deceased. ROSARIO GARCIA, petitioner,
vs. JULIANA LACUESTA, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-4067 November 29, 1951
PARAS, C.J.
160
DOCTRINE: a cross seen after the name of the testator shall not be considered as sufficient signature
if it is not the usual signature of the testator.
PEDRO BARUT, petitioner-appellant, vs. FAUSTINO CABACUNGAN, ET AL., opponents-
appellees.
G.R. No. L-6285 February 15, 1912
MORELAND, J.
161
DOCTRINE: It is unimportant whether the person who writes the name of the testatrix signs his own or
not for a will to be valid.
BEATRIZ NERA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. NARCISA RIMANDO, defendant-appellant
G.R. No. L-5971 February 27, 1911
CARSON, J.

162
DOCTRINE: The presence of each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were
actually cast upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at that moment
existing conditions and their position with relation to each other were such that by merely casting the
eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each other sign.
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA VILLACORTE.
CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO, oppositors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964
REYES, J.B.L., J.: 164
DOCTRINE: The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on
account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the
purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently
attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full
observance of the statutory requisites.
Testate Estate of Florencia R. Mateo. PERFECTO GABRIEL, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
RITA R. MATEO, ET AL., opponents-appellants.
G.R. No. L-26545 December 16, 1927 167
AVANCEÑA, C. J.:
DOCTRINE:Over the testimony of experts, we have the categorical and positive declaration of
veracious witnesses who affirm that these signatures were written by the testatrix herself.
RIZALINA GABRIEL GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUTGARDA SANTIAGO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979
GUERRERO, J.:
DOCTRINE:
• The instrumental witnesses in Order to be competent must be shown to have the qualifications
under Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of the disqualifications under Article 821 and for their
169
testimony to be credible, that is worthy of belief and entitled to credence, it is not mandatory that
evidence be first established on record that the witnesses have a good standing in the community or
that they are honest and upright or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, for a person is presumed to
be such unless the contrary is established otherwise.
• The attestation clause which Matilde Orobia signed is the best evidence as to the date of
signing because it preserves in permanent form a recital of all the material facts attending the execution
of the will. This is the very purpose of the attestation clause which is made for the purpose of preserving
in permanent form a record of the facts attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure in
the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty they may still be proved.
In re will of Josefa Zalamea y Abella, deceased. 172
PEDRO UNSON, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO ABELLA, ET AL., opponents-appellants.
G.R. No. 17857 June 12, 1922
VILLAMOR, J.:
Doctrine:The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against
bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and
authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these
primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object
of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation
whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless, and
frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.
Probate of the late Rev. P. Eleuterio Pilapil. ADRIAN MENDOZA,petitioner and appellee,
vs.
Pilapil CALIXTO AND OTHERS,opponents and appellants.
G. R. No. L-47931June 27, 1941
175
DIAZ, J.:
DOCTRINE:The paging in this case was a sufficient compliance with the law. It is sufficient that the
number of pages can be identified.
Fernandez v. de Dios
46 Phil 922
DOCTRINE: 176
Although the numbering of the sheet containing the attestation clause does not appear in the upper part
thereof, yet if that numbering is found in its text, the requirement prescribed by the law is substantially
complied with.
Lopez v. Liboro
81 Phil 429
DOCTRINE:
179
The purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of wills is to guard against fraud, and to afford means
of preventing the substitution or of detecting the loss of any of its pages. The omission to put a page
number on a sheet, if that be necessary, may be supplied by other forms of identification more
trustworthy than the conventional numeral words or characters.
Taboada v. Rosal
G.R. No. L-36033, November 5, 1982
DOCTRINE:
While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial departure from the usual forms
should be ignored, especially where the authenticity of the will is not assailed.
181
The law is to be liberally construed, “the underlying and fundamental objective permeating the
provisions on the law on wills in this project consists in the liberalization of the manner of their ex-
ecution with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes but with
sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and
improper pressure and influence upon the testator. This objective is in accord with the modern tendency
in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will.”
Caneda v. CA
222 SCRA 781
DOCTRINE:
The defects and imperfection must only be with respect to the form of the attestation or the language
employed therein. Such defects or imperfection would not render a will invalid should it be proved that 183
the will was really executed and attested in compliance with Article 805. These considerations do not
apply where the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting witnesses signed each and
every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. In such a situation, the defect is
not only in the form or language of the attestation clause but the total absence of a specific element
required by Article 805 to be specifically stated in the attestation clause of a will.
Lee v.Tambago,
A.C. No. 5281, February 12, 2008
DOCTRINE:
Notaries public are required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before him had
presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax), and to enter its
number, place of issue and date as part of such certification, formalities which are mandatory and
cannot be disregarded. As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was required to 186
faithfully observe the formalities of a will and those of notarization. These formalities are mandatory and
cannot be disregarded, considering the degree of importance and evidentiary weight attached to
notarized documents. A notary public, especially a lawyer, is bound to strictly observe these elementary
requirements.
A notary public, by having allowed the decedent to exhibit an expired residence certificate, failed to
comply with the requirements of both the old Notarial Law and the Residence Tax Act.
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VICENTE CAGRO. JESUSA CAGRO V.PELAGIO CAGRO, ET
AL.
G.R. NO. L-5826, APRIL 29, 1953
PARAS, C. J.
188
Digested by: Nor-Aiza R. Unas
DOCTRINE: The attestation clause is a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will
required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures.
FELIX AZUELA V.COURT OF APPEALS, GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO substituted by ERNESTO G.
CASTILLO
G.R. No. 122880, April 12, 2006
TINGA, J.

189
DOCTRINE: A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is
written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is
fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgment, but
a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will
with all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection.
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE APOLINARIA LEDESMA. FELICIDAD JAVELLANA V.DOÑA
MATEA LEDESMA
G.R. NO. L-7179, JUNE 30, 1955
REYES, J.B.L., J.
193
DOCTRINE: The new Civil Code does not require that the signing of the testator, witnesses and notary
should be accomplished in one single act.
AGAPITA N. CRUZ V.HON. JUDGE GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH
I, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, AND MANUEL B. LUGAY
G.R. NO. L-32213, NOVEMBER 26, 1973
ESGUERRA, J.:

195
DOCTRINE:To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one the attesting and acknowledging
witnesses, would have the effect of having only two attesting witnesses to the will which would be in
contravention of the provisions of Article 80 be requiring at least three credible witnesses to act as such
and of Article 806 which requires that the testator and the required number of witnesses must appear
before the notary public to acknowledge the will.
BELLA A. GUERRERO V. RESURRECCION A. BIHIS
G.R. NO. 174144, April 17, 2007
CORONA, J.

197
DOCTRINE: A notary public is authorized to perform notarial acts, including the taking of
acknowledgments, within that territorial jurisdiction only. Outside the place of his commission, he is
bereft of power to perform any notarial act; he is not a notary public. Any notarial act outside the limits
of his jurisdiction has no force and effect.
IN RE WILL OF ANA ABANGAN, GERTRUDIS ABANGAN v. ANASTACIA ABANGAN, ETAL
G.R. No. L-13431 November 12, 1919
AVANCEÑA, J.
199
DOCTRINE: In a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary
dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second contains
only the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary
that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged.
MARIANO LEANO v. ARCADIO LEAÑO
G.R. No. 9150. March 31, 1915
CARSON, J. 201
DOCTRINE: A cross is sufficient to be considered as signature or mark as long as it is customary.

IN THE MATTER OF THE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED
ANACLETA ABELLANA. LUCIO BALONAN V. EUSEBIA ABELLANA, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-15153. August 31, 1960
LABRADOR, J.
202
DOCTRINE: A will subscribed at the end thereof by some person other than the testator in such
manner that the signature of said person appears above the typewritten statement "Por la Testadora
Anacleta Abellana . . . Ciudad de Zamboanga," may not be admitted to probate for failure to comply
with the express requirement of the law that the testator must himself sign the will or that his name be
affixed thereto by some other person in his presence and by his express direction.
ROMAN ABAYA v. DONATA ZALAMERO
G.R. No. L-3907 March 12, 1908
TORRES, J.
DOCTRINE: Where it appears in a will that the testator has stated that by reason of his inability to sign
204
his name he requested one of the three witnesses present to do so, and that as a matter of fact, the
said witness wrote the name and surname of the testator who, stating that the instrument executed by
him contained his last will, put the sign of the cross between his said name and surname, all of which
details are set forth in a note which the witnesses forthwith subscribed in the presence of the testator
and of each other, said will may be probated.
GERMAN JABONETA v. RICARDO GUSTILO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 1641 January 19, 1906
CARSON, J.
205
DOCTRINE: The true test of vision is not whether the testator actually saw the witness sign, but
whether he might have seen him sign, considering his mental and physical condition and position at the
time of the subscription.
MARAVILLA VS. MARAVILLA
G.R. No. L-23225, FEB. 27, 1971
REYES, J.B.L., J.
DOCTRINE:
In weighing the testimony of the attesting witnesses to a will, the statements of a competent attorney,
206
who has been charged with the responsibility of seeing to the proper execution of the instrument, is
entitled to greater weight than the testimony of a person casually called to participate in the act,
supposing of course that no motive is revealed that should induce the attorney to prevaricate. The
reason is that the mind of the attorney, being conversant with the requisites of proper execution of the
instrument, is more likely to become fixed on details, and he is more likely than other persons to retain
those incidents in his memory
NAYVE VS. MOJAL
G.R. No. L-21755, DEC. 29, 1925
Romualdez, J.
DOCTRINE:
The act of the testator and the witnesses seeing reciprocally the signing of the will is one which cannot
209
be proven by the mere exhibition of the will unless it is stated in the document. And this fact is expressly
stated in the attestation clause now before us. But the fact of the testator and the witnesses having
signed all the sheets of the will may be proven by the mere examination of the document, although it
does not say anything about this, and if that is the fact, as it is in the instant case, the danger of fraud in
this respect, which is what the law tries to avoid, does not exist.
IN RE: ESTATE OF SAGUINSIN
G.R. No. L-15025, MAR. 15, 1920
ARELLANO, C.J.
DOCTRINE:
211
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will
shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be
numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet.
AVERA VS. GARCIA

G.R. No. 15566, SEP. 14, 1921
Street, J.
DOCTRINE: 213
A will otherwise properly executed in accordance with the requirements of existing law is not rendered
invalid by the fact that the paginal signatures of the testator and attesting witnesses appear in the right
margin instead of the left.
GARCIA VS. GATCHALIAN
G.R. No. L-20357, NOV. 25, 1967
Dizon, J.
DOCTRINE: 215
The requirement that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and also by
the witnesses is indispensable for its validity.
LUCIO V. GARCIA v. HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ

G.R. No. L-26615 April 30 1970
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Digested by: Paulo Jose S. Villarin
217
DOCTRINE:The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or
incapable of reading the will himself is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be
able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes.
In the Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of the Deceased Brigido Alvarado,
CESAR ALVARADOv. HON. RAMON G. GAVIOLA, JR.
G.R. No.74695 September 14,1993
Bellosillo,J.: 219
DOCTRINE: Article 808 not only applies to blind testators, but also to those who, for one reason or
another, are incapable of reading their wills.
TEODORO CANEDA ET AL. v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. 103554 MAY 28, 1993
REGALADO, J.:
Digested by: Paulo Jose S. Villarin 222
DOCTRINE:The will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the attesting
witnesses. The attestation clause need not be written in a language known to the testator or even to the
attesting witnesses.
TESTATE ESTATE OF VICENTE CAGRO v. PELAGIO CAGRO
G.R. No. L-5826 APRIL 29,1953
PARAS, C.J.:
225
DOCTRINE:An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses since the
omission of their signatures at the bottom negatives their participation.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE WILL OF DOROTEA PEREZ,
(deceased): APOLONIO TABOADA, v. HON. AVELINO S. ROSAL
G.R. No. L-36033 NOVEMBER 5,1992
GUTIERREZ, JR. J.:
226
DOCTRINE:The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first page of the will
attested not only to the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but also the due execution of the
will as embodied in the attestation clause.
JOSE VILLAFLOR V. DEOGRACIAS TOBIAS ET AL
GR NO. 27440, DECEMBER 24, 1927
OSTRAND, J.
228
Digested by: ALILIAN, ENNA
DOCTRINE: In some circumstances the writing of the attestation clause on a separate page do not
invalidate the will.
FELIX AZUELA V. COURT OF APPEALS, GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO
GR NO. 122880, APRIL 12, 2006
TINGA, J.
229
DOCTRINE: Express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be “acknowledged,” and not merely
subscribed and sworn to.
IN THE MATTER O THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF MELECIA LABEADOR. SAGRADO
LABRADOR, ENRICA LABRADOR AND CRISTOBAL LABRADO V. COIRT OF APPEALS, 1
GAUDENCIO LABRADOR AND JESUS LABRADOR
GR NO. 83843-44, APRIL 5, 1990
PARAS, J. 230
DOCTRINE: Date must be in the will itself and executed in the hands of the estator.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ANDRES G. DE JESUS AND BIBIANA ROXAS
DE JESUS, SIMEON R. ROXAS AND PEDRO ROXAS DE JESUS V. ANDRES R. DE JESUS, JR.
GR NO. L-38338, JANUARY 28, 1985
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
231
DOCTRINE: Purpose of liberal trend pf the Civil Code in the manner of execution of wills in case of
doubt is to prevent intestacy.
JOSE RIVERA V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND ADELAIDO J. RIVERA
GR NOS. 75005-06, FEBRUARY 15, 1990
CRUZ, J.
232
DOCTRINE: A stranger has no personality to contest a will.

ICASIANO vs ICASIANO
11 SCRA 472
233
Digested by: AMORIO, VIKKI MAE
DOCTRINE: The law should not be strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on
account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she has no control of. Where the
purpose of the law is to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages, and there is
no intentional or deliberate deviation existed
CODOY vs CALUGAY
312 SCRA 33
Digested by: AMORIO, VIKKI MAE 234

DOCTRINE: The goal to be achieved by Article 811 of the Civil Code is to give effect to the wishes of
the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their
benefit will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.
AZOALA vs. SINGSON
109 Phil 102
Digested by: AMORIO, VIKKI MAE

236
DOCTRINE:
Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory only for notarial wills. Witnesses needs to be presented for
probate of notarial wills. Article 811 of the Civil Code is discretionary for holographic wills, if not
contested.
FAUSTO E. GAN v. ILDEFONSO YAP
G.R. No. L-12190, August 30, 1958
Digested by: AMORIO, VIKKI MAE 238
DOCTRINE: The execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved
by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.
RODELAS VS ARANZA
G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982
RELOVA, J.
Digested by: ARANCES, JAVY ANN 239
DOCTRINE: A photocopy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court with the
standard writings of the testator.
KALAW VS RELOVA
G.R. NO. L-40207 SEPTEMBER 28, 1984
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
240
Digested by: ARANCES, JAVY ANN
DOCTRINE: Effect of erasures, corrections, and alterations in a holographic will

AJERO VS CA
G.R. No. 106720, September 15, 1994
PUNO, J.
241
DOCTRINE: Nature of probate proceeding
GUEVARA VS GUEVARA
G.R. No. 48840. DECEMBER 29, 1943
OZAETA, J.
243
DOCTRINE: Allowance of wills

TESTATE ESTATE OF SUNTAY
G.R. NOS. L-3087 AND L- 3088, JULY 31, 1954
PADILLA, J.
245
Digested by: BANTILAN, GLADYS
DOCTRINE: Wills executed and probated in a foreign country must be proven before the Philippine
court to obtain similar validity/effectivity.
MICIANO VS. BRIMO
50 PHIL 867, NOVEMBER 1, 1927
ROMUALDEZ, J.
247
DOCTRINE: The national law of the testator shall govern in the disposition of the testator’s properties;
impossible conditions in the will shall be considered as not imposed.
DELA CERNA VS POTOT
12 SCRA 576, DECEMBER 23, 1964
REYES, J.B.L., J.
248
DOCTRINE: Joint will is contrary to law.

GONZALES VS. CA
G.R. No. L-37453, May 25, 1979
Digested by: CAGATIN, KRISTELLE

249
DOCTRINE: There is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time during
the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and for being
reliable, his honesty and uprightness (such attributes are presumed of the witness unless the contrary
is proved otherwise by the opposing party) in order that his testimony may be believed and accepted by
the trial court.
CRUZ V. VILLASOR
54 SCRA 31
Digested by: CAGATIN, KRISTELLE 251
DOCTRINE: The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the
third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will.
CALUYA v. DOMINGO
27 Phil. 330

252
DOCTRINE: The fact that the testator in his will mentioned a sale of real estate, fully consummated
before his death, which he had made to one of the witnesses to his will, does not make such person an
incompetent witness; nor does the fact that he signed the will as one of the attesting witnesses render
the will invalid under section 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
TESTATE ESTATE OF MALOTO v. CA
158 SCRA 451

254
DOCTRINE: A valid revocation must be done with animus revocandi or the intention to revoke coupled
with an overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the
testator or by another person in his presence and under his express direction.
Testate Estate of the Deceased MARIANO MOLO Y LEGASPI. JUANA JUAN VDA. DE MOLO vs.
LUZ, GLICERIA and CORNELIO MOLO
G.R. No. L-2538, September 21, 1951
Digested by: CAGAMPANG, VINA

255
DOCTRINE: The failure of a new testamentary disposition upon whose validity the revocation depends,
is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive conditions, and hence prevents the revocation of the
original will. But a mere intent to make at some time a will in the place of that destroyed will not render
the destruction conditional. It must appear that the revocation is dependent upon the valid execution of
a new will
CRISTINA SAMSON, DELFINA NAVAL, and SOR CONSOLACION EUGENIO vs.NAVAL ET. AL
G.R. No. L-11823 February 11, 1918
ARAULLO, J.:

257
DOCTRINE: A subsequent will containing a clause revoking an earlier will must, as a general rule, be
admitted to probate before the clause of revocation can have any effect, and the same kind, quality,
and method of proof is required for the establishment of the subsequent will as was required for the
establishment of the former will.
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO ET. AL vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 76464 February 29, 1988
SARMIENTO, J.:
260
DOCTRINE: The physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se
constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part
of the testator. It is not imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may
be performed by another person but under the express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of
course, it goes without saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself.
FRANCISCO GAGO vs. CORNELIO MAMUYAC ET. AL
G.R. No. L-26317 January 29, 1927
JOHNSON, J.:

263
DOCTRINE: Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the
testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same
was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready
access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been
destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator.
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED MARIANO MOLO Y LEGASPLJUANA JUAN VDA. DE
MOLO, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. LIRA, GLICEKIA AND COENELIO MOLO,
OPPOSITORS AND APPELLANTS.
[ G. R. No. L-2538, September 21, 1951]
Digested by:CALOPE, LOURIE

265
DOCTRINE: This doctrine is known as that of dependent relative revocation, and is usually applied
where the testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with a
present intention to make a new testamentary disposition as a substitute... for the old, and the new
disposition is not made or, if made, fails of effect for some reason. The doctrine is not limited to the
existence of some other document, however, and has been applied where a will was destroyed as a
consequence of a mistake of law
IN MATTER OF ESTATE OF JESUS DE LEON. IGNACIA DIAZ v. ANA DE LEON
GR No. 17714, May 31, 1922
ROMUALDEZ, J.
268
Digested by: CALOPE, LOURIE
DOCTRINE: The destruction of a will with animo revocandi constitutes, in itself, a sufficient revocation.
ERNESTO M. GUEVARA VS. ROSARIO GUEVARA and her husband PEDRO BUISON
74 Phil 479 December 29, 1943
OZAETA, J.:
Digested by: CALOPE, LOURIE 269
DOCTRINE: No will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the
proper court.
DELA CERNA VS POTOT
REYES, J.B.L., J.
271
Digested by:CALOPE, LOURIE
DOCTRINE: Will probated in a court of competent jurisdiction has conclusive effect and a
final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world.
GALLANOSA VS. ARCANGEL
G.R. NO. L-2930, June 21, 1978
Aquino, J:
Digestedby: CASTOR, JESSETTE

273
DOCTRINE: An action for annulment of the will is not allowed. The Supreme Court said, to contest a
will, an opposition should have been filed in the probate proceedings and to pursue this application in
the appellate court in case the will is admitted to probate. Otherwise, the decree of probate becomes
conclusive as to formal validity and due execution of the will.
NEPOMUCENO VS. CA
G.R. NO. L-62950, October 9, 1985
Gutierrez, Jr., J:
Digestedby: CASTOR, JESSETTE 275
DOCTRINE: The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be
intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed
upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
BALTAZAR VS LAXA
G.R. NO. 174489, April 11, 2012
Del Castillo, J.: 278

DOCTRINE: It is incumbent upon those who oppose the probate of a will to clearly establish that the
decedent was not of sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution of said will. Otherwise, the
state is duty-bound to give full effect to the wishes of the testator to distribute his estate in the manner
provided in his will so long as it is legally tenable.
INRE: PILAPIL
G.R. NO. L-47931, June 27, 1941
Diaz, J.:
Digestedby: CASTOR, JESSETTE 280
DOCTRINE: Probate of wills is mandatory. It is not the parties interested in one way or another in a
matter, who can confer or remove jurisdiction and authority to the Tribunals to resolve and decide what
the same law wants to be resolved and decided.
RAFAELE. MANINANGANDSOLEDADL. MANINANGVS. COURTOFAPPEALS
G.R. No. L-57848
June 19, 1982
PONENTE: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
283
Digestedby: CAUBANG, AVEN SINA
Doctrine:
NowillshallpasseitherrealorpersonalpropertyunlessitisprovedandallowedinaccordancewiththeRulesofCo
urt.
SPOUSESRICARDOPASCUALVS. COURTOFAPPEALS
G.R. No. 115925
August 15, 2003
PONENTE: CARPIO, J.
285
DOCTRINE: Nowillshallpasseitherrealorpersonalpropertyunlessprobated.
ANTILANOG. MERCADOvs. ALFONSOSANTOS
G.R. No. 45629
September 22, 1938
PONENTE: LAUREL, J.:
286
DOCTRINE:Theprobateofawillbytheprobatecourthavingjurisdictionthereofisusuallyconsideredasconclusi
veastoitsdueexecutionandvalidity
RUFINALUYLIMvs. COURTOFAPPEALS
G.R. No. 124715
January 24, 2000
PONENTE: BUENA, J.:
288
DOCTRINE:Aprobatecourtoroneinchargeofproceedingswhethertestateorintestatecannotadjudicateordet
erminetitletopropertiesclaimedtobeapartoftheestateandwhichareequallyclaimedtobelongtooutsideparties
FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS, JOSEPH O. BETTS, JOSE MADARETA, ESTEBAN P. RAMIREZ, and
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR ALBAY PROVINCE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO ALSUA
BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO ALSUA, represented by his guardian,
CLOTILDE S. ALSUA and PABLO ALSUA
G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979
Ponente:GUERRERO, J.
290
Digested by: DELA CRUZ, RALPH
DOCTRINE:
The principle of estoppel is not applicable in probate proceedings relative to question of testamentary
capacity of a person.
In the Matter of the Estate of Emil H. JOHNSON
G.R. No. L-12767 November 16, 1918
Ponente: Street
Digested by: DELA CRUZ, RALPH 293
DOCTRINE:
The allowance by the court of a will of real or personal property shall be conclusive as to its due
execution.
BENEDICTO LEVISTE vs. CA, HON. JUDGE LUIS B. REYES, CFI, ROSA DEL ROSARIO, RITA
BANU, CARMEN DE GUZMANMARQUEZ, JESUS R. DE GUZMAN, RAMON R. DE GUZMAN,
JACINTO R. DE GUZMAN and ANTONIO R. DE GUZMAN 296
G.R. No. L-29184 January 30, 1989
Ponente: Grino-Aquino
DOCTRINE:
LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as Attorney-in-Fact of VICENTE
DOROTHEO and JOSE DOROTHEO, respondents.
G.R. No. 108581 December 8, 1999
Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
299
Doctrine:
A final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world.
MALOLES II vs. PHILLIPS
G.R. NO. 129505, January 31, 2000
MENDOZA, J.
Digested by: DEPERALTA,ERIKA 302
DOCTRINE:Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the testator. However,
Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorize the filing of a petition for probate of the will filed by the testator
himself.
NUGUID vs. NUGUID
G.R. No. L-23445, June 23, 1966
SANCHEZ, J.
304
Digested by: DEPERALTA,ERIKA
DOCTRINE:If a will is null and void because of preterition, a probate procedding would be useless.
PASTOR, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-56340, June 24, 1983
PLANA, J.
Digested by: DEPERALTA,ERIKA 306
DOCTRINE:In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the
extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.
CAYETANO vs. LEONIDAS
G.R. No. L-54919, May 30, 1984
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
Digested by: DEPERALTA,ERIKA

308
DOCTRINE: As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the
will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the
court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated.
CORONADO V. CA,
G.R. NO. 78778, DECEMBER 3, 1990 (191 SCRA 894)
CORONADO V. CA, G.R. NO. 78778, DECEMBER 3, 1990 (191 SCRA 894)
PERALTA J.:
DOCTRINE: 310
The title to ownership of the property does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the
validity or efficiency of the provisions of the will, thus may be impugned as being vicious or null,
notwithstanding its authentication. The question relating to these points remain entirely unaffected and
may be raised even after the will has been authenticated.
SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, PETITIONERS,
VS.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. 106720 SEPTEMBER 15, 1994
PUNO, J.:
313
DOCTRINE:
Unless the authenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the
holographic will or on testator’s signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of
authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.
CELEDONIA SOLIVIO V. COURT OF APPEALS 315
G.R. NO. 83484, FEBRUARY 12, 1990
MEDIALDEA, J.:
DOCTRINE:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may
have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve
such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within
the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came.
The persons involved in reservatroncal are:
1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)—the

ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from his descendants.
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees (reservatarios)—relatives
within the third degree counted from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line
from which the property came.
3. The propositus—the descendant who received by gratuitous title and died without issue,
making his other ascendant inherit by operation of law.
CELSA L. VDA. DE KILAYKO, ENCARNACION L. VDA. DE PANLILIO and REMEDIOS L. VDA. DE

GUINTO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ERNESTO TENGCO of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Bacolod
City, Branch IV and RODOLFO LIZARES and AMELO LIZARES, as Judicial Administrators of the
Estate of the late EUSTAQUIA LIZARES, respondents.
G.R. No. 45965 March 27, 1992
317
ROMERO, J.:
DOCTRINE:
The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final
liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through
mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.
FELIX BALANAY, JR.,
VS.HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ
G.R. NO. L-39247, JUNE 27, 1975
AQUINO, J.:
Digested by: ESCALANTE, LEO 318
DOCTRINE:In Probate proceeding the inquiry as a General Rule is limited only to the EXTRINSIC
VALIDITY of the will. Save in an extreme case where the will on its face is intrinsically void, it is the
probate court's duty to pass first upon the formal validity of the will. Generally, the probate of the will is
mandatory.
PATRICIA NATCHER
VS.COURT OFAPPEALS AND
THE HEIRS OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO
G.R. NO. 133000, OCTOBER 2, 2001
BUENA, J.:
321
Digested by: ESCALANTE, LEO
DOCTRINE: Matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within
the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction. The Regional Trial
Court, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and resolve the
issue of advancement of the real property.
CAROLINA CAMAYA, ET.AL.
VS.BERNARDO PATULANDONG
G.R. NO. 144915, FEBRUARY 23, 2004
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
324
DOCTRINE: A probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally
claimed to belong to outside parties.
HEIRS OF ROSENDO LASAM
VS.VICENTA UMENGAN
G.R. NO. 168156, DECEMBER 6, 2006
326
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
DOCTRINE:Before any will can have force or validity it must be probated.
IRIS MORALES VS. ANA MARIA OLONDRIZ, ALFONSO JUAN OLONDRIZ, JR., ALEJANDRO
MORENO OLONDRIZ, ISABEL ROSA OLONDRIZ AND FRANCISCO JAVIER MARIA OLONDRIZ
G.R. NO. 198994, FEBRUARY 03, 2016
BRION, J. 329
Digested by: ESPINO, ERIK

DOCTRINE: Preterition is the complete and total omission of a compulsory heir from the testator's
inheritance without the heir's express disinheritance.
THELMA M. ARANAS VS. TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO, CARMENCITA M.
SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M. ANDERSON, AND FRANKLIN L.
MERCADO
G.R. NO. 156407, JANUARY 15, 2014
BERSAMIN, J.

331
DOCTRINE: The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for
purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the administrator, but its
determination shall only be provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the decedent, or the
question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by
the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters
incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the
status of each heir and whether property included in the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property
of the deceased spouse.
IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RUPERTA PALAGANAS
WITH PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL MIGUEL
PALAGANAS and BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS vs. ERNESTO PALAGANAS
G.R. NO. 169144, JANUARY 26, 2011
ABAD, J.
DOCTRINE: Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the
same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can
be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who
334
is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the
law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.
Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the
petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the
court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the
decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if
he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province. The rules do not require
proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.
RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC., VS. HON. JANSEN R. RODRIGUEZ, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 6,
JOSEPH CHENG, JAIME CHENG, MERCEDES IGNE AND LUCINA SANTOS, SUBSTITUTED BY
HER SON, EDUARDO S. BALAJADIA
G.R. NO. 192828, NOVEMBER 28, 2011
REYES, J. 336
DOCTRINE: Article 916 of the New Civil Code states that disinheritance can be effected only through a
will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified.
ROBERTS V. LEONIDAS
G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984
Aquino, J.:
Digested by: GONZAGA, NHASSIE JOHN

338
DOCTRINE:The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died
testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be
consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should
continue hearing the two cases.
THE INCOMPETENT, CARMEN CANIZA, REPRESENTED BY HER LEGAL GUARDIAN, AMPARO
EVANGELISTA V. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO ESTRADA AND HIS
WIFE, LEONORA ESTRADA
G.R. NO. 110427. FEBRUARY 24, 1997
NARVASA, C.J. 340
DOCTRINE: A Will has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder until it is admitted to
Probate.
ASUNCION NABLE JOSE, ET AL. vs.
MARIA IGNACIA USON, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-8927, March 10, 1914 342
MORELAND, J.:
DOCTRINE: The court below based its construction upon the theory that the other construction would
be "an admission that the testatrix desired to favor her deceased sister Eufemia Uson, who left three
children, more than her other deceased sister Antonia Uson, who left two children, and moreover both
would be more favored than any of the other four surviving sisters, one of whom was married at the
time of the execution of the said codicil and without doubt had children."
RUBEN AUSTRIA v. ANDRES REYES,
GR No. L-23079, FEBRUARY 27, 1970
CASTRO, J.:
344
DOCTRINE: Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces
an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate
ACAIN V. IAC
G.R. NO. 72706, OCTOBER 27, 1987
PARAS, J.
Digested by: GUINZON, HASNY

346
DOCTRINE: Article 854 – the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not
inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without
prejudice to the right of representation.
MALOLES V. PHILIPS, 324 SCRA 172
G.R. NO. 129505, JANUARY 31, 2000
MENDOZA, J.

348
inofficious.
MORALES V. OLONDRIZ
G.R. NO. 198994, FEBRUARY 3, 2016
BRION, J.

350
inofficious.
JLT AGRO V. BALANSAG
G.R. NO. 141882, MARCH 11, 2005
TINGA, J.
DOCTRINE: Article 854 – the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the 351
inofficious.
INTHEMATTEROFTHEINTESTATEESTATEOFEDWARDE. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFOC. AZNAR, v. MARIALUCYCHRISTENSENDUNCAN
G. R. No. L-24365, June 30, 1966
Digestedby: GULTIANO, ERNIE
353
DOCTRINE: When a testator leaves to a forced heir a legacy worth less than the legitime, but without
referring to the legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other
persons, the heir could not ask that the institution of the heirs be annulled entirely, but only that the
legitime be completed.
SEANGIO v. AMORA. REYES
G.R. Nos. 140371-72, Nov 27, 2006 354
Digestedby: GULTIANO, ERNIE
DOCTRINE: A holographic will must be written, dated and signed by the testator himself.
HEIRSOFPOLICRONIOM. URETAv. HEIRSOFLIBERATOM. URETA
G.R. No. 165748, 14 September 2011
Digestedby: GULTIANO, ERNIE 355
DOCTRINE: Article 1390 is not applicable in this case. Article 1390 (1) contemplates the incapacity of a
party to give consent to a contract.
REYESYBARRETTOv. LUCIAMILAGROSBARRETTO-DATU
GRNo. L-17818, Jan 25, 1967
Digestedby: GULTIANO, ERNIE 357

DOCTRINE: It is that judicial decree of distribution, once final, that vests title in the distributees. Where
a court has validly issued a decree of distribution of the estate, and the same has become final, the
validity or invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant.
NUGUID VS. NUGUID, ET AL.
No. L-23445. June 23, 1966.
Digested by: HERMINO, JONATHAN

359
DOCTRINE: Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left
forced heirs in the direct ascending line·her parents, and her holographic will does not explicitly
disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of preterition of the parents, not
a case of ineffective disinheritance.
PCIB VS. ESCOLIN

No. L-27860 & L-27896. MARCH 29, 1974
361
DOCTRINE: Substitution occurs only when another heir is appointed in a will „so that he may
enter into inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted.
RABADILLA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 113725. JUNE 29, 2000

364
DOCTRINE: In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property
and to transmit the same later to the second heir. In the case under consideration, the instituted heir is
in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the near
descendants or the sister of the testatrix
RAMIREZ VS VDA DE RAMIREZ
No. L-27952. FEBRUARY 15, 1982

367
DOCTRINE: But dying before the testator is not the only case for vulgar substitution for it also
includes refusal or incapacity to accept the inheritance as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra.
Hence, the vulgar substitution is valid.
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ vs. MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-27952, February 15, 1982
ABAD SANTOS, J.
370
Digested by: MACATOL, JHON DAVE
DOCTRINE: Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution "provided such
substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted."
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 113725, June 29, 2000
PURISIMA, J.
Digested by: MACATOL, JHON DAVE 372
DOCTRINE: Under Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is
transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary
substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the second heir.
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK vs. THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN,
Presiding Judge of the CFI of Iloilo, Branch II
and
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES vs. LORENZO CARLES ET AL.
376
G.R. Nos. L-27860, L-27896, L-27936 & L-27937, March 29, 1974
BARREDO, J.

DOCTRINE: There are generally only two kinds of substitution provided for and authorized by our Civil
Code (Articles 857-870), namely, (1) simple or common substitution, sometimes referred to asvulgar
substitution (Article 859), and (2) fideicommissary substitution (Article 863).
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ vs. MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-27952, February 15, 1982
ABAD SANTOS, J.
382
DOCTRINE: Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution "provided such
substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted."
RABADILLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 113725 JUNE 29, 2000
PURISIMA, J.:
Digested by: MATILAC, GRIDLIN 384
DOCTRINE: Testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality an obligation imposed upon the
heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the will itself that such was the
intention of the testator.
CARMEN LAPUZ SY vs. EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY
G.R. No. L-30977 JANUARY 31, 1972
REYES J.B.L., J.:
Digested by: MATILAC, GRIDLIN 386
DOCTRINE: An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights
are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself;
without the decree such rights do not come into existence
JOSE BARITUA and EDGAR BITANCOR, vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NICOLAS NACARIO and VICTORIA RONDA NACARIO
G.R. No. 82233 MARCH 22, 1990
SARMIENTO, J.:
388
Digested by: MATILAC, GRIDLIN
DOCTRINE:The parents of the deceased succeed only when the latter dies without a legitimate
descendant.
SPOUSES NICANOR TUMBOKON (deceased), substituted by: ROSARIO SESPEÑE and their
Children vs. APOLONIA G. LEGASPI, and PAULINA S. DE MAGTANUM
G.R. No. 153736 August 12, 2010
BERSAMIN, J.:
390
Digested by: MATILAC, GRIDLIN
DOCTRINE: Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is
raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter
would have if she were living or if she could have inherited.
REGINA FRANCISCO AND ZENAIDA PASCUAL vs. AIDA FRANCISCO-ALFONSO
G.R. No. 138774 March 8, 2001
Digested by: MIRANDA, VINA
DOCTRINE: 391
The sale which transferred the property of the father to the illegitimate children would deprive the
legitimate child of her share in her father's estate. By law, she is entitled to half of the estate of her
father as his only legitimate child. The legal heirs must be determined in proper testate or intestate
proceedings for settlement of the estate. Compulsory heir cannot be deprived of her share in the estate
save by disinheritance as prescribed by law.
IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA, DOMINADOR CHUA and REMEDIOS CHUA vs. THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH V and SUSANA DE LA TORRE, in her capacity
as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre

393
DOCTRINE:
Pursuant to Article 891 of the Civil Code, in order that a property may be impressed with a reservable
character the following requisites must exist, to wit: (1) that the property was acquired by a descendant
from an asscendant or from a brother or sister by gratuitous title; (2) that said descendant died without
an issue; (3) that the property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and (4) that there
are relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came.
MARIA MENDOZA et.al. vs. JULIA POLl CARPIO DELOS SANTOS, substituted by her heirs
CARMEN P. DELOS SANTOS et. al.
G.R. No. 176422 March 20, 2013 395

DOCTRINE: Reservatroncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a reservable
property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and
avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant.
BEATRIZ L. GONZALES vs COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F.
LEGARDA et.al
G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981
398
DOCTRINE: If there are only two transmissions there is no reserve.
DE PAPA, ET AL. VS. CAMACHO, ET AL.

G.R. NO. L-28032, SEPTEMBER 24, 1986
NARVASA, J.
Digested by: MISTERIO, JOHN KESSLER 401
DOCTRINE: In reservatroncal, the successional rights of the relatives of the praepositus within the 3rd
degree are determined by, and subject to, the rules of intestate succession; so as to exclude uncles
and aunts of the descendant from the reservable property by his niece or nephew.
SIENES, ET AL. VS. ESPARCIA, ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-12957, MARCH 24, 1961
DIZON, J.
Digested by: MISTERIO, JOHN KESSLER 403

DOCTRINE: In reservatroncal the reservor has the legal title and dominion over the reservable property
but subject to a resolutory condition. He may alienate the same but subject to the reservation, i.e., the
rights acquired by the transferee are revoked upon the survival of reservees at the time of death of the
reservor.
PADURA, ET AL. VS. BALDOVINO, ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-11960, DECEMBER 27, 1958
REYES, J.B.L., J
405
Digested by: MISTERIO, JOHN KESSLER
DOCTRINE:
SOLIVIO VS. C.A.
G.R. NO. 83484, FEBRUARY 12, 1990
MEDIALDEA, J.
407
Digested by: MISTERIO, JOHN KESSLER
DOCTRINE: Reserva truncal does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from its ascendant.
195. FLORENTINO V. FLORENTINO
G.R. No. L-14856 November 15, 1919
TORRES, J.:
409
Digested by: MONCANO, IRIS
DOCTRINE: ReservaTroncal
196. EDROSO V. SABLAN
G.R. No. 6878 September 13, 1913
ARELLANO, C.J.:
411
197. CANO V. DIRECTOR
G.R. No. L-10701 January 16, 1959
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
412
198. DEL ROSARIO V. CONANAN
G.R. No. L-37903 March 30, 1977
MAKASIAR, J.
Digested by: MONCANO, IRIS 413
DOCTRINE: Where the nearest surviving relatives of the deceased are his parents, spouse and an
adopted child, Article 343 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 1000 should apply in resolving their
hereditary rights.
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA v. ESTELA DIZON
G.R. NO. L-24561
JUNE 30, 1970
TEEHANKEE, J.
414
Digested by: NEÑARIA, JANINE
DOCTRINE: The testamentary dispositions of the testatrix in favor of compulsory heirs do not have
to be taken only from the free portion of the estate.
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL RIGOR. THE PARISH PRIEST
OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF VICTORIA, TARLAC v. BELINA RIGOR
G.R. NO. L-22036
APRIL 30, 1979
AQUINO, J.
415
DOCTRINE: Legal succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all that belongs to
the testator”.
OFELIA HERNANDO BAGUNU v. PASTORA PIEDAD
G.R. NO. 140975
DECEMBER 8, 2000
VITUG, J.
416
DOCTRINE: Collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent
concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Article 962 of the Civil Code is
an absolute rule.
G.R. NO. 140975
DECEMBER 8, 2000
VITUG, J.
417
DOCTRINE: Right of representation is proper only in the descending never in the ascending line.
Intestate Estate of Petra
VS
Rosales
G.R. No. L-40789, February 27, 1987
GANCAYCO, J.:
418
Digested by: NUÑEZ, ROMMIL
DOCTRINE:
Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the
place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if
he were living or if he could have inherited. (Civil Code Art. 970)
Intestate Estate of Petra
VS
Rosales
G.R. No. L-40789, February 27, 1987
GANCAYCO, J.:
419
DOCTRINE:
The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented. The
representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the person represented
would have succeeded. (Civil Code Art. 971)
Bicomong vs Almanza
G.R. No. L-37365 November 29, 1977
GUERRERO, J.:
Digested by: NUÑEZ, ROMMIL 420
DOCTRINE:
Nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in their own right and they alone do not inherit by right of
representation (that is per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased.
Teotico vs. Del Val
G.R. No. L-18753, March 26, 1965
422
DOCTRINE:
Relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and adopted and does not extend
to the relatives of the adopting parents except only as expressly provided by law.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate
child. (Civil Code Art. 979)
Sayson v. CA
GR 892224-25, January 23, 1992
Digested by OLMEDO, ARMANDO 424
DOCTRINE: Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents…An adopted child
succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate child
HEIRS OF JOAQUIN TEVES VS CA
GR No. 109963, October 13, 1999
Digested by OLMEDO, ARMANDO

426
DOCTRINE: An extrajudicial settlement is a contract and it is a well-entrenched doctrine that the law
does not relieve a party from the effects of a contract, entered into with all the required formalities and
with full awareness of what he was doing, simply because the contract turned out to be a foolish or
unwise investment.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF SUNTAY VS SUNTAY
GR.NO. 183053
Digested by OLMEDO, ARMANDO 428
DOCTRINE: Article 99216 of the Civil Code bars the illegitimate child from inheriting ab intestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother.
DIAZ VS INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 66574, February 21, 1990
Digested by OLMEDO, ARMANDO

430
DOCTRINE: The term relatives in “Article 992 of New Civil Code” in more restrictive sense than it is
used and intended; is not warranted by any rule of interpretation. Besides, when the law intends to use
the term in a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and
1009 of the New Civil Code.
OLIVIA PASCUAL v. ESPERANZA PASCUAL- BAUTISTA
G.R NO. 84240
MARCH 25, 1992
PARAS, J.
431
Digested by: PACQUIAO, JOSE PAOLO
DOCTRINE: The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate

children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent.
TOMAS CORPUS v. ESTATE OF TEODORO R. YANGCO

G.R. NO. L – 22469
OCTOBER 23, 1978
AQUINO, J.
432
DOCTRINE: Legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child.
CRESENCIANO LEORNARDO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. L-51263
FEBRUARY 28, 1983
DE CASTRO, J.
433
DOCTRINE: The right of representation cannot be applied to those children born outside wedlock
or when the putative father and mother’s previous marriage is subsisting.
HEIRS OF SANDEJAS v. ALEX A. LINA
G.R. NO. 141634
FEBRUARY 5, 2001
PANGANIBAN, J.
DOCTRINE: A contract of sale is not invalidated by the fact that it is subject to probate court 434
approval. The transaction remains binding on the seller-heir, but not on the other heirs who have not
given their consent to it. In settling the estate of the deceased, a probate court has jurisdiction over
matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers.
ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner,

vs.
MARIETTA CALISTERIO, respondent.
G.R. No. 136467 April 6, 2000
VITUG, J.
Digested by: PAJARO, VICENTE ADRIAN

435
DOCTRINE A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessaryas long as the
prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional
cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a
competent court." It follows that the burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the
second marriage.
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO SANTILLON, CLARO SANTILLON,

petitioner-appellant,
vs.
PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO U. MIRANDA and ROSARIO CORRALES, oppositors-appellees.
G.R. No. L-19281 June 30, 1965
BENGZON, C.J.:
438
DOCTRINEIf a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse
has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children.
GERTRUDES L. DEL ROSARIO, petitioner,

vs.
DOROTEA O. CONANAN and MARILOU DEL ROSARIO, respondents
G.R. No. L-37903March 30, 197
MAKASIAR, J.
Digested by: PAJARO, VICENTE ADRIAN 440
DOCTRINE: If legitimate ascendants, the surviving spouse and illegitimate children are left, the
ascendants shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance, and the other half shall be divided between
the surviving spouse and the illegitimate children so that such widow or widower shall have one-fourth
of the estate, the illegitimate children the other fourth
FLOCERFINA BARANDA, Assisted by Husband, ELIAS FABON, HERMINIA BARANDA RECATO

represented by LILIA R. TORRENTE, as Attorney-in-Fact, TEODORO BARANDA represented by
JUANITA VICTORIA as Attorney-in-Fact, ALIPIO VILLARTA and SALVACION BARANDA,
petitioners,
vs.
EVANGELINA G. BARANDA, ELISA G. BARANDA, and THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
G.R. No. 73275 May 20, 1987
443
CRUZ, J.:
DOCTRINE Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and nieces, who are the
children of the descendant's brothers and sisters of the full blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and
the latter per stirpes
BICOMONG VS ALMANZA
G.R. NO. L-37365 NOVEMBER 29, 1977
GUERRERO, J.:
446
DOCTRINE: The application of the only difference in the right of succession provided in Art. 1008, NCC
in relation to Article 1006 of the New Civil Code, in effect, entitle the sole niece of full blood to a share
double that of the nephews and nieces of half- blood
GAUDENCIO BICOMONG vs. GERONIMO ALMANZA
L-37365. November 29, 1977
GUERRERO, J.:
Case Digest by: Vikki Mae Amorio 447
DOCTRINE: In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
New Civil Code provides that collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL RIGOR. THE PARISH PRIEST
OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF VICTORIA, TARLAC, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS.
BELINA RIGOR, NESTORA RIGOR, FRANCISCA ESCOBAR DE RIGOR AND JOVITA ESCOBAR
DE FAUSTO, RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.
[ G.R. No. L-22036, April 30, 1979 ]
Aquino J.:
Digested by: RALPH DELA CRUZ 450
Doctrine:
This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960(2), which
provides that legal succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all that belongs to the
testator". There being no substitution nor accretion as... to the said rice lands, the same should be
distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no disposition as
to the said rice lands.
POLLY CAYETANO v. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS,
GR No. L-54919, 1984-05-30
Digested by: NHASSIE JOHN G. GONZAGA

452
DOCTRINE: If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the tine of his death, whether a citizen
or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.
Intestate Estate of the Late Vito Borromeo v. Borromeo,

G.R. No. L-55000, July 23, 1987
Digested by: PONTIMAYOR, WARREN

454
Doctrine:The will of man is changeable. Even just before the moment of his death he may change his
mind. A person who accepts from a living person an inheritance accepts or repudiates nothing at all. If a
person is uncertain of his right to inherit then his acceptance or repudiation is ineffective
Imperial v. CA
G.R. No. 112483, October 8, 1999
456
Doctrine: The repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a public or authentic instrument, or by
petition presented to the court having jurisdiction over the testamentary or intestate proceedings
Imperial v. CA
G.R. No. 112483, October 8, 1999
457
Doctrine: If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated the inheritance, his right shall be
transmitted to his heirs.
Octavio Maloles II vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 133359, January 31, 2000
458
Doctrine: One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in
favor of any person having capacity to succeed.
ROWENA F. CORONA, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
Digested by: PRESTO, JONAH
DOCTRINE:
The executrix’s choice of Special Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the wide 460
latitude of discretion given her by the testratix in her will, is entitled to the highest consideration.
Objection to NenitaAlonte’s appointment on grounds of impracticality and lack of kinship are
overshadowed by the fact that justice and equality demand that the side of the deceased wife and the
faction of the surviving husband be represented in the management of the decedent’s estate.
AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by her duly appointed guardians, AGNES P. ARELLANO 463
and NONA P. ARELLANO,Petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCO PASCUAL and MIGUEL PASCUAL, Respondents
G.R. No. 189776 December 15, 2010
Digested by: PRESTO, JONAH
Doctrine:
The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was at liberty to
donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His
donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid is deemed as donation made to a "stranger,"
chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There being no compulsory heir, however, the
donated property is not subject to collation.
SPOUSES FLORENTINO ZARAGOZA and ERLINDA ENRIQUEZ-ZARAGOZA, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALBERTA ZARAGOZA MORGAN, respondents
Digested by: PRESTO, JONAH 465

Doctrine: It is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done for as long as
legitimes are not prejudiced. Art. 1080 of the Civil Code is clear on this. The legitime of compulsory
heirs is determined after collation.
PARTENZA LUCERNA VDA. DE TUPAS, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
BRANCH XLIII of the HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, respondent,
and TUPAS FOUNDATION, INC., private respondent-appellee.
GR. No. L-65800 October 3, 1986
Digested by: PRESTO, JONAH 467

Doctrine:
Collation contemplates and particularly applies to gifts inter vivos. The further fact that the lots donated
were admittedly capital or separate property of the donor is of no moment, because a claim of
inofficiousness does not assert that the donor gave what was not his, but that he gave more than what
was within his power to give.
BUHAY DE ROMA VS CA,

G.R. NO. L-46903, JULY 23, 1987
CRUZ, J;
Digested by: PUERTOS, LEO ARTEMIO

469
DOCTRINE:The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an
exception to the general rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that intention,
we apply not the exception but the rule, which is categorical enough.
NOCEDA VS. CA,

313 SCRA 505, SEPTEMBER 2, 1999
GONZAGA-REYES,J:

471
DOCTRINE: There is no co-ownership where portion owned is concretely determined and identifiable,
though not technically described, or that said portions are still embraced in one and the same certificate
of title does not make said portions less determinable or identifiable, or distinguishable, one from the
other, nor that dominion over each portion less exclusive, in their respective owners. A partition legally
made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him
HEIRS of JOAQUIN TEVES VS CA

316 SCRA 632, OCTOBER 13, 1999
GONZAGA-REYES,J;

474
DOCTRINE: For a partition pursuant to section 1 of Rule 74 to be valid, the following conditions must
concur: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all had
been paid; (3) the heirs are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are represented by their judicial
guardian or legal representatives; (4) the partition was made by means of a public instrument or
affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds.
HEIRS OF QUIRICO SERASPI v. CA

476
G.R. NO.. 135602, APRIL 28, 2000
MENDOZA, J:
DOCTRINE:Co-ownership rights are effectively dissolved by partition.
CASILANG, SR. VS. CASILANG-DIZON,

691 SCRA 385, G.R. NO. 180269, FEBRUARY 20, 2013
REYES, J.
Digested by: REYES, PAUL VINCENT 478

DOCTRINE:
An agreement of partition may be made orally or in writing. Thus, an oral agreement for the partition of
the property owned in common is valid and enforceable upon the parties.
ZARAGOZA VS. COURT OF APPEALS,

341 SCRA 309, G.R. NO. 106401, SEPTEMBER 29, 2000
QUISUMBING, J.

DOCTRINE:
It is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done for as long as legitimes are
not prejudiced.
J.L.T. AGRO, INC. VS. BALANSAG,

453 SCRA 211, G.R. NO. 141882 MARCH 11, 2005
TINGA, J:
Digested by: REYES, PAUL VINCENT

482
DOCTRINE:
All things, even future ones which are not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a
contract, except that no contract may be entered into with respect to future inheritance, and the
exception to the exception is the partition inter vivos referred to in Article 1080.
LEGASTO VS. VERZOSA,

54 PHIL. 766, NO. 32344 MARCH 31, 1930
VILLA-REAL, J:
DOCTRINE: The partition made by a testator inter vivos in pursuance of a will which has been
disallowed is null and void.
HEIRS OF JOAQUIN TEVES vs. CA

G.R. No. 109963, October 13, 1999
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Digested by: ROXAS, EDITHA 486
DOCTRINE: For the purpose of partition of a real property, the non-registration of an extrajudicial
settlement does not affect its intrinsic validity.
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs SANTIBAÑEZ G.R. No. 149926, February 23, 2005
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Digested by: ROXAS, EDITHA
DOCTRINE: In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will
488
has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a
will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his
property by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other question than
such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requirements or
solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will.
CARLO MAGNO A. CRUCILLO, et al vs IAC

G.R. No. 65416, October 26, 1999
PURISIMA, J.:
490
DOCTRINE:After exercising acts of ownership over their respective portions of the contested estate,
the heirs are estopped from denying or contesting the existence of an oral partition. The oral agreement
for the partition of the property owned in common is valid, binding and enforceable on the parties.
REBECCA VIADO NON, et al. vs CA

G.R. No. 65416, October 26, 1999
PURISIMA, J.:
492
DOCTRINE: Article 1104 of the Civil Code provides that when the preterition is not attended by bad
faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the
share pertaining to her.
PADA-KILARIO VS CA
G.G.R. NO. 134329, JANUARY 19, 2000
DE LEON, JR., J.
494
Digested by: Al Ammen Silo
DOCTRINE: Any act intended to end any indivision among co-heirs, devisees and legatees be it in any
form is a valid partition.
ANGELA I. TUASON v. ANTONIO TUASON,
GR No. L-3404, 1951-04-02
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Digested by: Al Ammen Silo 496
DOCTRINE: Art. 1082. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and
legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, and exchange,
a compromise, or any other transaction. (n)
HEIRS OF ECARMA VS CA
G.R. NO. 193374, JUNE 8, 2016
PEREZ, J.
Digested by: AL AMMEN SILO

500
DOCTRINE: Every co-heir has the right to demand the partition of the estate except when non-partition
is specifically required by the testator.
Partition may take place even in contrary to the testator's instructions when any of the causes for a
partnership dissolution takes place.
SANTOS VS SANTOS
G.R. NO. 139524, OCTOBER 12, 2000
GONZAGA-REYES, J.,
502
DOCTRINE: A partition may be demanded by any of the co-heirs provided such is made with the
consent of the other heirs
IN RE: PETITION FOR PROBATE OF LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF BASILIO SANTIAGO, MA.
PILAR SANTIAGO and CLEMENTE SANTIAGO, Petitioners,
vs.
ZOILO S. SANTIAGO, FELICIDAD SANTIAGO-RIVERA, HEIRS OF RICARDO SANTIAGO, HEIRS
OF CIPRIANO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF TOMAS SANTIAGO, Respondents.
FILEMON SOCO, LEONILA SOCO, ANANIAS SOCO, URBANO SOCO, GERTRUDES SOCO AND
HEIRS OF CONSOLACION SOCO, Oppositors. 504
G.R. No. 179859 August 9, 2010
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Digested by: SORIANO, EMILIO
Doctrine: The prohibition to divide a property in a co-ownership can only last for twenty (20) years.
BAYLON vs. AMADOR
G.R. No. 160701. February 9, 2004

509
Doctrine: The requirement of a written notice is mandatory. It is a long established the rule that,
notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the
selling co-owner in order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions as well as
its efficacy and status.
FRANCISCO GARCIA, PAZ GARCIA, and MARIA GARCIA, petitioners,
vs.
JOSE CALALIMAN, PACIENCIA TRABADILLO & HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Third Division, 512
respondents
G.R. No. L-26855 April 17, 1989
PARAS, J.:
Doctrine: Written notice is indispensable, actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some other
manners by the redemptioner, notwithstanding. He or she is still entitled to written notice, as exacted by
the Code, to remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet any doubt that
the alienation is not definitive. The law not having provided for any alternative, the method of
notifications remains exclusive, though the Code does not prescribe any particular form of written notice
nor any distinctive method for written notification of redemption.
CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.
G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987
CRUZ, J.:
Digested by: SORIANO, EMILIO 517

Doctrine:While the general rule is that to charge a party with laches in the assertion of an alleged right
it is essential that he should have knowledge of the facts upon which he bases his claim, yet if the
circumstances were such as should have induced inquiry, and the means of ascertaining the truth were
readily available upon inquiry, but the party neglects to make it, he will be chargeable with laches, the
same as if he had known the facts.
CUIZON VS.REMOTO
G.R. NO. 143027, OCTOBER 11, 2005
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
522
Digested by: TRINIDAD, JOSE DARWIN
DOCTRINE:One can only sell what he has-Nemo dat quod non-habet

NELSON CABALES and RITO CABALES vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JESUS FELIANO and ANUNCIACION FELIANO
G.R. No. 162421, AUGUST 31, 2007
PUNO, C.J.:
523
Digested by: TRINIDAD, JOSE DARWIN
DOCTRINE: Legal guardian has only plenary power of administration of minor’s property. It does not
include the power to alienate.
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAÑEZ
ARIOLA
G.R. No. 149926, February 23, 2005
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Digested by: TRINIDAD, JOSE DARWIN 525
DOCTRINE:In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among heirs until after the will had
been probated. The law enjoins the probate of the will and the public requires it,because unless the will
is probated, and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property
by will may be rendered nugatory.
JOSEPH CUA,
vs.
GLORIA A. VARGAS, AURORA VARGAS, RAMON VARGAS, MARITES VARGAS, EDELINA
VARGAS AND GEMMA VARGAS,
G.R. No. 156536 October 31, 2006
AZCUNA, J.:
527
Digested by: VOSOTROS, JULES
Doctrine:
Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-
heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale,
provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale
by the vendor.
HEIRS OF JOAQUIN TEVES: RICARDO TEVES v. CA
375 Phil. 96
[ GR No. 109963, Oct 13, 1999 ]
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
531
Doctrine:
The requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has for its purpose the
protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims.
The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others.
CRISTINA F. REILLO, LEONOR F. PUSO, ADELIA F. ROCAMORA, SOFRONIO S.J. FERNANDO,
EFREN S.J. FERNANDO, ZOSIMO S.J. FERNANDO, JR., and MA. TERESA F. PIÑON,
v.
GALICANO E.S. SAN JOSE, represented by his Attorneys-in-Fact, ANNALISA S.J. RUIZ and
RODELIO S. SAN JOSE, VICTORIA S.J. REDONGO, CATALINA S.J. DEL ROSARIO and
MARIBETH S.J. CORTEZ, collectively known as the HEIRS OF QUITERIO SAN JOSE and
ANTONINA ESPIRITU SANTO,
[G.R. NO. 166393 : June 18, 2009]
PERALTA, J 534
Doctrine:
When the subject document and the corresponding title were canceled, the logical consequence is that
the property in dispute, which was the subject of the extrajudicial settlement, reverted back to the estate
of its original owners. It is a basic rule that any act which is intended to put an end to indivision among
co-heirs or co-owners is deemed to be a partition.
REBECCA VIADO NON, JOSE A. NON and DELIA VIADO,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALICIA N. VIADO, CHERRI VIADO and FE FIDES
VIADO,
G.R. No. 137287 February 15, 2000
VITUG, J.:
537
Doctrine:
Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees would be a
partition although it would purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, a donation or an
extrajudicial settlement.
FERNANDEZ VS FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 143256, 363 SCRA 811, August 28, 2001
GONZAGA-REYES, J.
541
Digested by: YAP, ROLAN KLYDE
DOCTRINE: Intrusion of a Stranger in the Partition.

AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY VS COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 128102, March 7, 2000
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.
542
DOCTRINE: Intrusion of a Stranger in the Partition

MENDOZA VS INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT
G.R. No. L-63132, July 30, 1987
FERNAN, J.
544

LANDAYAN VS BACANI
G.R. No. L-30455, September 30, 1982
VASQUEZ, J.
546

URSULINA GANUELAS, METODIO GANUELAS and ANTONIO
GANUELAS, Petitioner
vs.
HON. ROBERT T. CAWED, Judge of the RTC of San Fernando, La
Union (Branch 29), LEOCADIA G. FLORES, FELICITACION G.
AGTARAP, CORAZON G. SIPALAY and ESTATE OF ROMANA
GANUELAS DE LA ROSA, represented by GREGORIO DELA ROSA,
Administrator, Respondents
G.R. No. 123968 April 24, 2003
CARPIO MORALES, J.
Case Digest by: Jean Marie L. Abellana
DOCTRINE: If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor‘s death,

meaning that the full or naked ownership of the donated properties will
pass to the donee only because of the donor‘s death, then it is at that time
that the donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis causa which
should be embodied in a last will and testament. But if the donation takes
effect during the donor‘s lifetime or independently of the donor‘s death,
meaning that the full or naked ownership (nuda proprietas) of the donated
properties passes to the donee during the donor‘s lifetime, not by reason of
his death but because of the deed of donation, then the donation is inter
vivos.
FACTS:
Celestina Ganuelas Vda. de Valin executed a Deed of Donation of

Real Property in favor of petitioner Ursulina Ganuelas. The pertinent
portion of the Deed of Donation reads: ―That for and in consideration of
the love and affection which the DONOR has for the DONEE, and of the
faithful services the latter has rendered in the past to the former, the said
DONOR does by these presents transfer and convey, by way of
DONATION, unto the DONEE the property above, described, to become
effective upon the death of the DONOR; but in the event that the DONEE
should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed
rescinded and of no further force and effect.
However, more than a month before Celestina died, she executed a

document revoking such donation. After her death, Ursulina claimed
ownership over the donated properties and refused to give private
respondents Leocadia G. Flores, et al., niece of Celestina any share in the
produce of the properties despite repeated demands. Thus, prompting
Flores, et al. to file a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
challenging the validity of the Deed of Donation. They alleged that such
donation is void for failure to comply with the formalities of wills and
testaments, which is necessary in a disposition mortis causa.
1
On the other hand, Ursulina maintains that there is no need to comply
with the formalities of wills and testaments because such donation was
inter vivos. The RTC ruled that the Deed of Donation is a disposition mortis
causa, thus, void for failure to comply with the formalities of wills and
testaments.
ISSUE:
Is the Deed of Donation void for failure to comply with the formalities
of wills and testaments, which is necessary in a disposition mortis causa?
RULING:
Yes. The donation is mortis causa. Crucial in the resolution of the

issue is the determination of whether the donor intended to transfer the
ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed. Donation
inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the former, the act is
immediately operative even if the actual execution may be deferred until
the death of the donor, while in the latter, nothing is conveyed to or
acquired by the donee until the death of the donor-testator.
If the donation is made in contemplation of the donor‘s death,

meaning that the full or naked ownership of the donated properties will
pass to the donee only because of the donor‘s death, then it is at that time
that the donation takes effect, and it is a donation mortis causa which
should be embodied in a last will and testament. But if the donation takes
effect during the donor‘s lifetime or independently of the donor‘s death,
meaning that the full or naked ownership (nuda proprietas) of the donated
properties passes to the donee during the donor‘s lifetime, not by reason of
his death but because of the deed of donation, then the donation is inter
vivos.
The distinction between a transfer inter vivos and mortis causa is

important as the validity or revocation of the donation depends upon its
nature. If the donation is inter vivos, it must be executed and accepted with
the formalities prescribed by Articles 748 and 749 of the Civil Code, except
when it is onerous in which case the rules on contracts will apply. If it is
mortis causa, the donation must be in the form of a will, with all the
formalities for the validity of wills, otherwise it is void and cannot transfer
ownership.
The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the

following:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death

of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor
should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while
alive;
2
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the
transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly
by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties
conveyed;
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.
In the donation subject of the present case, there is nothing therein

which indicates that any right, title or interest in the donated properties was
to be transferred to Ursulina prior to the death of Celestina. The phrase
―to become effective upon the death of the DONOR admits of no other
interpretation but that Celestina intended to transfer the ownership of the
properties to Ursulina on her death, not during her lifetime.
3
GONZALO VILLANUEVA, Petitioner
vs.
SPOUSES FROILAN and LEONILA BRANOCO, Respondents
G.R. No. 172804 January 24, 2011
CARPIO, J.
DOCTRINE: The transfers inter vivos, consistent with the principle that "the
designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to
the effect that the donation is ‘to take effect at the death of the donor’ are
not controlling criteria but are to be construed together with the rest of the
instrument, in order to give effect to the real intent of the transferor."
Indeed, doubts on the nature of dispositions are resolved to favor inter
vivos transfers "to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property
subject of the deed.
FACTS:
Gonzalo Villanueva represented by his heirs, sued spouses Branoco

to recover a subject parcel of land. Petitioner claimed ownership over the
Property through purchase in July 1971 from Casimiro Vere (Vere), who, in
turn, bought the Property from Alvegia Rodrigo in August 1970. Spouses
Branoco similarly claimed ownership over the Property through purchase in
July 1983 from Eufracia Rodriguez to whom Rodrigo donated the Property
in May 1965 evidenced by a deed of donation. The Deed of Donation
contained the following stipulations:
I give (devise) said land in favor of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, her

heirs, successors, and assigns together with all the improvements existing
thereon, ….
It is now in the possession of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ since May 21, 1962
in the concept of an owner, but the Deed of Donation or that ownership be
vested on her upon my demise.
THAT I FURTHER DECLARE, and I reiterate that the land above

described, I already devise in favor of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ since May
21, 1962, her heirs, assigns, and that if the herein Donee predeceases me,
the same land will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the
heirs of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ;
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. It treated Deed as a donation

mortis causa which Rodrigo effectively cancelled by selling the Property to
Vere in 1970. Thus, by the time Rodriguez sold the Property to
respondents in 1983, she had no title to transfer.
4
The CA found the Deed as donation inter vivos because Rodriguez
had been in possession of the Property as owner since 21 May 1962,
subject to the delivery of part of the produce to Apoy Alve; the Deed’s
consideration was not Rodrigo’s death but her "love and affection" for
Rodriguez, considering the services the latter rendered; Rodrigo waived
dominion over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her, implying
its inclusion in Rodriguez’s estate; and Rodriguez accepted the donation in
the Deed itself, an act necessary to effectuate donations inter vivos, not
devises.
ISSUE:
What is the contract between the parties’ predecessors-in-interest,
Rodrigo and Rodriguez?
RULING:
The contract was a perfected donation inter vivos because the naked
title passed from Rodrigo to Rodriguez under a perfected donation. The
Supreme Court said that Post-mortem dispositions typically –
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of

the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor
should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property
while alive;
(2) That before the [donor’s] death, the transfer should be revocable
by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided
for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of
the properties conveyed;
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive
the transferee.
[4] The specification in a deed of the causes whereby the act may be
revoked by the donor indicates that the donation is inter vivos, rather
than a disposition mortis causa;
[5] That the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a
provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is "to take effect
at the death of the donor" are not controlling criteria; such statements
are to be construed together with the rest of the instrument, in order
to give effect to the real intent of the transferor; and,
(6) That in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed
donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid
uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed.
It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to
Rodriguez under a perfected donation inter vivos. First, Rodrigo stipulated
that "if the herein Donee predeceases me, the [Property] will not be
reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of x x x Rodriguez,"
signaling the irrevocability of the passage of title to Rodriguez’s estate,
5
waiving Rodrigo’s right to reclaim title. This transfer of title was perfected
the moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguez’s acceptance of the disposition
which, being reflected in the Deed, took place on the day of its execution
on 3 May 1965. Rodrigo’s acceptance of the transfer underscores its
essence as a gift in presenti, not in futuro, as only donations inter vivos
need acceptance by the recipient. Indeed, had Rodrigo wished to retain full
title over the Property, she could have easily stipulated, as the testator did
in another case, that "the donor, may transfer, sell, or encumber to any
person or entity the properties here donated x x x" or used words to that
effect. Instead, Rodrigo expressly waived title over the Property in case
Rodriguez predeceases her.
Second, what Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the beneficial
title to the Property, evident from Rodriguez’s undertaking to "give one
[half] x x x of the produce of the land to Apoy Alve during her lifetime."
Thus, the Deed’s stipulation that "the ownership shall be vested on
[Rodriguez] upon my demise," taking into account the non-reversion
clause, could only refer to Rodrigo’s beneficial title. We arrived at the same
conclusion in Balaqui v. Dongso where, as here, the donor, while "b[inding]
herself to answer to the [donor] and her heirs x x x that none shall question
or disturb [the donee’s] right," also stipulated that the donation "does not
pass title to [the donee] during my lifetime; but when I die, [the donee] shall
be the true owner" of the donated parcels of land. In finding the disposition
as a gift inter vivos, the Court reasoned:
Taking the deed as a whole, it is noted that in the same deed [the
donor] guaranteed to [the donee] and her heirs and successors, the right to
said property thus conferred. From the moment [the donor] guaranteed the
right granted by her to [the donee] to the two parcels of land by virtue of the
deed of gift, she surrendered such right; otherwise there would be no need
to guarantee said right. Therefore, when [the donor] used the words upon
which the appellants base their contention that the gift in question is a
donation mortis causa [that the gift "does not pass title during my lifetime;
but when I die, she shall be the true owner of the two aforementioned
parcels"] the donor meant nothing else than that she reserved of herself the
possession and usufruct of said two parcels of land until her death, at
which time the donee would be able to dispose of them freely.
Indeed, if Rodrigo still retained full ownership over the Property, it

was unnecessary for her to reserve partial usufructuary right over it.
Third, the existence of consideration other than the donor’s death,

such as the donor’s love and affection to the donee and the services the
latter rendered, while also true of devises, nevertheless "corroborates the
express irrevocability of [inter vivos] transfers."
It will not do, therefore, for petitioner to cherry-pick stipulations from

the Deed tending to serve his cause (e.g. "the ownership shall be vested
on [Rodriguez] upon my demise" and "devise"). Dispositions bearing
6
contradictory stipulations are interpreted wholistically, to give effect to the
donor’s intent. In no less than seven cases featuring deeds of donations
styled as "mortis causa" dispositions, the Court, after going over the deeds,
eventually considered the transfers inter vivos, consistent with the principle
that "the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the
deed to the effect that the donation is ‘to take effect at the death of the
donor’ are not controlling criteria [but] are to be construed together with the
rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to the real intent of the
transferor." Indeed, doubts on the nature of dispositions are resolved to
favor inter vivos transfers "to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the
property subject of the deed.
7
JARABINI G. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner,
vs.
ASUNCION G. FERRER, substituted by her heirs, VICENTE, PILAR,
ANGELITO, FELIXBERTO, JR., all surnamed G. FERRER, and
MIGUELA FERRER ALTEZA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 187056 September 20, 2010
ABAD, J.:
DOCTRINE:The express "irrevocability" of the donation is the "distinctive

standard that identifies the document as a donation inter vivos." The
reservation of the "right, ownership, possession, and administration of the
property" and made the donation operative upon the donor’s death in the
context of an irrevocable donation simply means that the donors parted
with their naked title, maintaining only beneficial ownership of the donated
property while they lived. Moreover, an acceptance clause indicates that
the donation is inter vivos, since acceptance is a requirement only for such
kind of donations.Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, need
not be accepted by the donee during the donor’s lifetime.
FACTS:
The spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe Gonzales executed a

document entitled "Donation Mortis Causa" in favor of their two children,
Asuncion and Emiliano, and their granddaughter, Jarabini (daughter of their
predeceased son, Zoilo) covering the spouses’ 126-square meter lot and
the house in equal shares. The deed of donation reads:
It is our will that this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable

and shall be respected by the surviving spouse.
It is our will that Jarabini Gonzales-del Rosario and Emiliano
Gonzales will continue to occupy the portions now occupied by
them.
It is further our will that this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA shall not
in any way affect any other distribution of other properties
belonging to any of us donors whether testate or intestate and
where ever situated.
It is our further will that any one surviving spouse reserves the
right, ownership, possession and administration of this property
herein donated and accepted and this Disposition and Donation
shall be operative and effective upon the death of the DONORS.
Although denominated as a donation mortis causa, which in law is the

equivalent of a will, the deed had no attestation clause and was witnessed
by only two persons. The named donees, however, signified their
acceptance of the donation on the face of the document.
8
Guadalupe, the donor wife, died and a few months later, Leopoldo,
the donor husband, executed a deed of assignment of his rights and
interests in subject property to their daughter Asuncion. Leopoldo died
subsequently. So, Jarabini filed a "petition for the probate of the August 27,
1968 deed of donation mortis causa" before the Regional Trial Court to
which Asuncion opposed, invoking his father Leopoldo’s assignment of his
rights and interests in the property to her.
The RTC rendered a decision finding that the donation was in fact
one made inter vivos, the donors’ intention being to transfer title over the
property to the donees during the donors’ lifetime, given its irrevocability.
Consequently, Leopoldo’s subsequent assignment of his rights and interest
in the property was void since he had nothing to assign. The RTC thus
directed the registration of the property in the name of the donees in equal
shares.
The CA held that Jarabini cannot, through her petition for the probate
of the deed of donation mortis causa, collaterally attack Leopoldo’s deed of
assignment in Asuncion’s favor. The CA held that the donation, being one
given mortis causa, did not comply with the requirements of a notarial
will rendering the same void.
ISSUE:
Is the donation made by spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe to
Asuncion, Emiliano, and Jarabini a donation mortis causa or in fact a
donation inter vivos?
RULING:
The donation is inter vivos. That the document in question in this
case was captioned "Donation Mortis Causa" is not controlling. The Court
has held that, if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not
altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa.
In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that

"irrevocability" is a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of
conveyances mortis causa, where "revocability" is precisely the essence of
the act. A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death

of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the
transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of
the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the

transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for
indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed; and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.
9
The Court thus said in Austria-Magat that the express "irrevocability"
of the donation is the "distinctive standard that identifies the document as a
donation inter vivos." Here, the donors plainly said that it is "our will that
this Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by
the surviving spouse." The intent to make the donation irrevocable
becomes even clearer by the proviso that a surviving donor shall respect
the irrevocability of the donation. Consequently, the donation was in reality
a donation inter vivos.
The donors in this case of course reserved the "right, ownership,

possession, and administration of the property" and made the donation
operative upon their death. But this Court has consistently held that such
reservation (reddendum) in the context of an irrevocable donation simply
means that the donors parted with their naked title, maintaining
only beneficial ownership of the donated property while they lived.
Notably, the three donees signed their acceptance of the donation,

which acceptance the deed required. This Court has held that an
acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos, since
acceptance is a requirement only for such kind of
donations.Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, need not be
accepted by the donee during the donor’s lifetime.
Finally, as Justice J. B. L. Reyes said in Puig v. Peñaflorida, in case

of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed a donation inter vivos rather
than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the
property subject of the deed.
Since the donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it was
immediately operative and final. The reason is that such kind of donation is
deemed perfected from the moment the donor learned of the donee’s
acceptance of the donation. The acceptance makes the donee the absolute
owner of the property donated.
Given that the donation in this case was irrevocable or one given inter
vivos, Leopoldo’s subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in the
property to Asuncion should be regarded as void for, by then, he had no
more rights to assign. He could not give what he no longer had. Nemo dat
quod non habet.
The trial court cannot be faulted for passing upon, in a petition for
probate of what was initially supposed to be a donation mortis causa, the
validity of the document as a donation inter vivos and the nullity of one of
the donor’s subsequent assignment of his rights and interests in the
property. The Court has held before that the rule on probate is not inflexible
and absolute. Moreover, in opposing the petition for probate and in putting
the validity of the deed of assignment squarely in issue, Asuncion or those
who substituted her may not now claim that the trial court improperly
allowed a collateral attack on such assignment.
10
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAÑEZ
ARIOLA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 149926 February 23, 2005
CALLEJO, SR., J.
DOCTRINE:As a general rule, the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of
their decedent cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from
him and that the heirs succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but
also to his obligations. However, the filing of a money claim against the
decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. This requirement is for
the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the
executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to
examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which
should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy
settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the
property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law strictly requires the
prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent's
estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off
its debts and distribute the residue.
FACTS:
The First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M.

Santibañez entered into a loan agreement for the payment of the purchase
price of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor then
executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC. Then, FCCC and Efraim
entered into another loan agreement, which was intended to pay the
balance of the purchase price of another unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-
Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit Howard Rota
motor Model AR 60K. Again, thy executed a promissory note for the said
amount in favor of the FCCC.
When Efraim died he left a holographic will. A testate proceedings

commenced. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving
heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence Santibañez Ariola, executed a Joint
Agreement wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take
possession of the three (3) tractors. Each of them was to assume the
indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor
respectively taken by them.
A Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by

and between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the
FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned all its assets and liabilities
to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank. Demand letters for the settlement of
11
his account were then sent by Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to
Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus,
UBP filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs Edmund and
Florence before the RTC of Makati. Summonses were issued against both,
but the one intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the
United States and there was no information on his address or the date of
his return to the Philippines. In her answer, Florence alleged that the loan
documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering
that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not
approved by the probate court, hence it was null and void.
The RTC found that the claim of the Union Bank should have been
filed with the probate court before which the testate estate of the late
Efraim Santibañez was pending, as the sum of money being claimed was
an obligation incurred by the said decedent. The trial court also found that
the Joint Agreement apparently executed by his heirs, Edmund and
Florence, was in effect, a partition of the estate of the decedent. However,
the said agreement was void, considering that it had not been approved by
the probate court, and that there can be no valid partition until after the will
has been probated. (This was affirmed by the CA).
UBP claims that the obligations of the deceased were transmitted to

the heirs as provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; there was thus no
need for the probate court to approve the joint agreement where the heirs
partitioned the tractors owned by the deceased and assumed the
obligations related thereto. Since Florence signed the joint agreement
without any condition, she is now estopped from asserting any position
contrary thereto. In her comment to the petition, Florence maintains that
UBP is trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim
Santibañez; thus the claim should have been filed with the probate court.
She points out that at the time of the execution of the joint agreement there
was already an existing probate proceedings of which UBP knew about.
However, to avoid a claim in the probate court which might delay payment
of the obligation, UBP opted to require them to execute the said agreement
ISSUE:
Can Florence S. Ariola be held accountable for any liability incurred
by her late father?
RULING:
No. Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties
thereto "have agreed to divide between themselves and take possession
and use the above-described chattel and each of them to assume the
indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as hereinafter stated
which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp." The assumption of
liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each
heir shall take possession and use of their respective share under the
agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of the partition, and that
they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that
12
they were each to receive. The joint agreementexecuted by Edmund and
Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so
since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding
for the probate of their late father’s holographic will covering the said
tractors. Being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not
receive any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability
cannot be given any force and effect.
The loan was contracted by the decedent. UBP, purportedly a

creditor of the late Efraim Santibañez, should have thus filed its money
claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed
barred; exceptions. — All claims for money against the decedent, arising
from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or
contingent, all claims for funeral expenses for the last sickness of the
decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed
within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever,
except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the
executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an
executor or administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action
already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set
forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of
presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual
claims may be set off against each other in such action; and if final
judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined
shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though the
claim had been presented directly before the court in the administration
proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their
present value.
The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the

probate court is mandatory. As the Court held in the vintage case of Py Eng
Chong v. Herrera:
… This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the

deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against
it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a
proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the
rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early
delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law
strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims
against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as
soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue.
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold Florence
S. Ariola accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The
documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the
13
continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the late
Efraim Santibañez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its
money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund
as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and
continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses Edmund may have
as against the petitioner.
The Supreme Court agrees with the finding of the trial court that UBP
had not sufficiently shown that it is the successor-in-interest of the Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC assigned its assets and
liabilities. UBP in its complaint alleged that "by virtue of the Deed of
Assignment dated August 20, 1981 executed by and between First
Countryside Credit Corporation and Union Bank of the Philippines…"
however, the documentary evidence clearly reflects that the parties in the
deed of assignment with assumption of liabilities were the FCCC, and the
Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, with the conformity of Bancom
Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can UBP’s participation therein as a
party be found. Furthermore, no documentary or testimonial evidence was
presented during trial to show that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is
now, in fact, petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines. As the trial court
declared in its decision:
… [T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant that plaintiff
failed to prove or did not present evidence to prove that Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank is now the Union Bank of the Philippines. Judicial notice
does not apply here. "The power to take judicial notice is to [be] exercised
by the courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety
exists; and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be promptly
resolved in the negative."
14
ESTATE OF K. H. HEMADY, deceased
vs.
LUZON SURETY CO., INC., claimant-Appellant
G.R. No. L-8437 November 28, 1956
REYES, J. B. L., J.
DOCTRINE: The responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent
cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him, the
principle remains intact that these heirs succeed not only to the rights of the
deceased but also to his obligations. Under our law, therefore, the general
rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to
the successors.
FACTS:
Luzon Surety Co. had filed a claim against the Estate based on
twenty different indemnity agreements, or counter bonds, each subscribed
by a distinct principal and by the deceased K. H. Hemady, who was a
surety solidary guarantor, in consideration of the Luzon Surety Co.'s of
having guaranteed. The Luzon Surety Co., prayed for allowance, as a
contingent claim, of the value of the twenty bonds it had executed in
consideration of the counterbonds, and further asked for judgment for the
unpaid premiums and documentary stamps affixed to the bonds.
Before answer was filed, and upon motion of the administratrix of

Hemady's estate, the lower court dismissed the claims of Luzon Surety Co.,
on two grounds:
(1) that the premiums due and cost of documentary stamps were not
contemplated under the indemnity agreements to be a part of the
undertaking of the guarantor (Hemady), since they were not liabilities
incurred after the execution of the counter-bonds; and (2) that "whatever
losses may occur after Hemady's death, .are not chargeable to his estate,
because upon his death he ceased to be guarantor."
The lower court has given merit to the contention of the administrator
saying that upon the death of Hemady, his liability as a guarantor
terminated, and therefore, in the absence of a showing that a loss or
damage was suffered, the claim cannot be considered contingent. Upon
the death of Hemady, his integrity was not transmitted to his estate or
successors.
ISSUE:
Can a solidary guarantor’s liability extinguished by his death?
RULING:
15
No.The solidary guarantor's liability is not extinguished by his death,
and that in such event, the Luzon Surety Co., had the right to file against
the estate a contingent claim for reimbursement.
Under the present Civil Code (Article 1311), as well as under the Civil
Code of 1889 (Article 1257), the rule is that: "Contracts take effect only as
between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in the case where the
rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by
their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law."
While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the
debts of their decedent cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they
receive from him, the principle remains intact that these heirs succeed not
only to the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations. (Articles 774
and 776 of the New Civil Code) Under our law, therefore, the general rule is
that a party's contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the
successors.
What did the creditor Luzon Surety Co. expect of K. H. Hemady when
it accepted the latter as surety in the counterbonds? Nothing but the
reimbursement of the moneys that the Luzon Surety Co. might have to
disburse on account of the obligations of the principal debtors.
The contracts of suretyship entered into by K. H. Hemady in favor of

Luzon Surety Co. not being rendered intransmissible due to the nature of
the undertaking, nor by the stipulations of the contracts themselves, nor by
provision of law, his eventual liability thereunder necessarily passed upon
his death to his heirs. The contracts, therefore, give rise to contingent
claims provable against his estate.
There are, however, three exceptions to the transmissibility of

obligations:
Of the three exceptions fixed by Article 1311, the nature of the

obligation of the surety or guarantor does not warrant the conclusion that
his peculiar individual qualities are contemplated as a principal inducement
for the contract. This reimbursement is a payment of a sum of money,
resulting from an obligation to give; and to the Luzon Surety Co., it was
indifferent that the reimbursement should be made by Hemady himself or
by someone else in his behalf, so long as the money was paid to it.
The second exception of Article 1311, is intransmissibility by

stipulation of the parties. A person who enters into a contract is deemed to
have contracted for himself and his heirs and assigns, it is unnecessary for
him to expressly stipulate to that effect; hence, his failure to do so, is no
sign that he intended his bargain to terminate upon his death.
The third exception exists when they are "not transmissible by

operation of law". The provision makes reference to those cases where the
law expresses that the rights or obligations are extinguished by death, as is
16
the case in legal support (Article 300), parental authority (Article 327),
usufruct (Article 603), contracts for a piece of work (Article 1726),
partnership (Article 1830 and agency (Article 1919). By contract, the
articles of the Civil Code that regulate guaranty or suretyship (Articles 2047
to 2084) contain no provision that the guaranty is extinguished upon the
death of the guarantor or the surety.
17
ALVAREZ V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. NO. L-68053 MAY 7, 1990
FERNAN, C.J.
DOCTRINE: The general rule is that a party’s contractual rights and

obligations are transmissible to the successors.
FACTS:
2 real properties involved:
1. Lot 773-A
2. Lot 773-B
**Both lots above were originally known as Lot 773 of the cadastral survey
of Murcia, Negros Occidental.
Lot 773- registered in the name of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes
Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora.
Private respondents in this case are the children of Rufino who died in
1962 while the other private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are
children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita Alib.
Fortunato D. Santiago was issued a TCT covering Lot 773-A and 773-B.
On May 1955, Santiago sold Lots 773-A and 773-B to Fuentebella, Jr.
After Fuentebella's death, his wife, as the administratrix thereof, filed a

Special Proceeding requesting authority to sell Lots 773-A and 773-B.
Hence, Lots 773-A and 773-B were respectively issued and sold to
Rosendo Alvarez.
The Yaneses filed a complaint against Santiago, Fuentebella’s wife,

Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the “return” of
the ownership and possession of the lots, and prayed for an accounting of
the produce of the land from 1944 up to the filing of the complaint, and that
the share or money equivalent due the heirs be delivered to them, and
damages. During the pendency of the case, Alvarez sold the lots to Dr.
Siason.
Lower court - found that Siason, who purchased the properties in question
thru an agent as he was then in Mexico pursuing further medical studies,
was a buyer in good faith for a valuable consideration.
Although the Yaneses were negligent in their failure to place a notice of lis
pendens "before the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental in order to
protect their rights over the property in question" in Civil Case No. 5022,
equity demanded that they recover the actual value of the land because the
18
sale thereof executed between Alvarez and Siason was without court
approval.
Alvarez appealed to the then IAC which in its decision affirmed the lower
court's decision.
ISSUE: Is the sale of the lots made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo
Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his
estate or to his heirs also?
RULING: It will be transmissible to his heirs. The general rule is that a

party’s contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the
successors. The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the

property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance,
of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by
his will or by operation of law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of
a person which are not extinguished by his death.
Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns and
heirs except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the
contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by
provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property
received from the decedent.
In the case of Estate of Hemady vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc. it was held that:
Under our law, therefore. the general rule is that a party's contractual rights
and obligations are transmissible to the successors.
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape
the legal consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the
present claim for damages. That petitioners did not inherit the property
involved herein is of no moment because by legal fiction, the monetary
equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary estate,
and we have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in their
totality for the payment of the debts of the estate.
It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent
of the value of their inheritance. With this clarification and considering
petitioners' admission that there are other properties left by the deceased
which are sufficient to cover the amount adjudged in favor of private
respondents, we see no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions of the Court of Appeals.
19
ROMULO A. CORONEL, ET. AL., V. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 103577 OCTOBER 7, 1996
MELO, J.
DOCTRINE: It is expressly provided that rights to the succession are

transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.
FACTS: On January 19, 1985, defendants-appellants Romulo Coronel, et

al. executed a document entitled "Receipt of Down Payment" in favor of
plaintiff Ramona Patricia Alcaraz. On the same date, plaintiff-appellee
Concepcion D. Alcaraz, mother of Ramona, paid the down payment of
P50,000.00 Pesos.
On February 18, 1985, the Coronels sold the property to intervenor-

appellant Catalina B. Mabanag (hereinafter referred to as Catalina) for
P1,580,000.00 after the latter has paid P300,000.00. For this reason,
Coronels canceled and rescinded the contract with Ramona. Concepcion,
et al., filed a complaint for specific performance against the Coronels and
caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens. They executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale over the subject property in favor of Catalina.
A judgment was handed down for a specific performance ordering

defendant to execute in favor of plaintiffs a deed of absolute sale covering
that parcel of land. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner
before the new presiding judge of the Quezon City RTC but the same was
denied.
ISSUE: Is the petitioners the absolute owners of the property at the

moment of the contested sale?
RULING: YES.Article 774 of the Civil Code defines Succession as a mode

of transferring ownership as follows:

property, rights and obligations to be extent and value of the inheritance of
a person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will
or by operation of law.
Petitioners-sellers in the case at bar being the sons and daughters of the
decedent Constancio P. Coronel are compulsory heirs who were called to
succession by operation of law. Thus, at the point their father drew his last
breath, petitioners stepped into his shoes insofar as the subject property is
concerned, such that any rights or obligations pertaining thereto became
binding and enforceable upon them. It is expressly provided that rights to
the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.
Be it also noted that petitioners' claim that succession may not be declared
unless the creditors have been paid is rendered moot by the fact that they
20
were able to effect the transfer of the title to the property from the
decedent's name to their names on February 6, 1985.
Aside from this, petitioners are precluded from raising their supposed lack
of capacity to enter into an agreement at that time and they cannot be
allowed to now take a posture contrary to that which they took when they
entered into the agreement with private respondent Ramona P. Alcaraz.
The Civil Code expressly states that:
Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered

conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved
as against the person relying thereon.
Having represented themselves as the true owners of the subject property

at the time of sale, petitioners cannot claim now that they were not yet the
absolute owners thereof at that time.
21
CELESTINO BALUS, V. SATURNINO BALUS AND LEONARDA BALUS
VDA. DE CALUNOD.
G.R. NO. 168970 JANUARY 15, 2010
PERALTA, J.
DOCTRINE: The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the

moment of his death. In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the
property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his
death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of
the succession.
FACTS: Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses
Rufo and Sebastiana Balus. Sebastiana died on September 6, 1978, while
Rufo died on July 6, 1984.
On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns, as

security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del
Norte (Bank).
Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property was
foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder at a
public auction held for that purpose. A Certificate of Sale was executed by
the sheriff in favor of the Bank. The property was not redeemed within the
period allowed by law. The sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale in the
Bank's favor. Thereafter, a new title was issued in the name of the Bank.
Petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate

adjudicating to each of them a specific one-third portion of the subject
property. The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained provisions wherein
the parties admitted knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the
subject property to the Bank and that they intended to redeem the same at
the soonest possible time.
Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein

respondents bought the subject property from the Bank. Meanwhile,
petitioner continued possession of the subject lot.
Respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages

against petitioner, contending that they had already informed petitioner of
the fact that they were the new owners of the disputed property, but the
petitioner still refused to surrender possession of the same to them.
Petitioner posits that the subject Extrajudicial Settlement is, in and by itself,
a contract between him and respondents, because it contains a provision
whereby the parties agreed to continue their co-ownership of the subject
property by "redeeming" or "repurchasing" the same from the Bank. This
agreement, petitioner contends, is the law between the parties and, as
such, binds the respondents. As a result, petitioner asserts that
respondents' act of buying the disputed property from the Bank without
22
notifying him inures to his benefit as to give him the right to claim his
rightful portion of the property, comprising 1/3 thereof, by reimbursing
respondents the equivalent 1/3 of the sum they paid to the Bank.
ISSUE: Does co-ownership exists the moment the respondents bought

back the foreclosed property as part of the inheritance?
RULING: NO. Petitioner and respondents are arguing on the wrong

premise that, at the time of the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement,
the subject property formed part of the estate of their deceased father to
which they may lay claim as his heirs.
At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to

the fact that the subject property was exclusively owned by petitioner and
respondents' father, Rufo, at the time that it was mortgaged in 1979. This
was stipulated by the parties during the hearing conducted by the trial court
on October 28, 1996. Evidence shows that a Definite Deed of Sale was
issued in favor of the Bank on January 25, 1984, after the period of
redemption expired. There is neither any dispute that a new title was issued
in the Bank's name before Rufo died on July 6, 1984. Hence, there is no
question that the Bank acquired exclusive ownership of the contested lot
during the lifetime of Rufo.
The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his
death. In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and
transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well
as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession.
In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property
during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed
parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay
claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited the
subject lot from their father.
Petitioner and respondents, therefore, were wrong in assuming that they

became co-owners of the subject lot. Thus, any issue arising from the
supposed right of petitioner as co-owner of the contested parcel of land is
negated by the fact that, in the eyes of the law, the disputed lot did not pass
into the hands of petitioner and respondents as compulsory heirs of Rufo at
any given point in time.
For petitioner to claim that the Extrajudicial Settlement is an agreement

between him and his siblings to continue what they thought was their
ownership of the subject property, even after the same had been bought by
the Bank, is stretching the interpretation of the said Extrajudicial Settlement
too far.
In the first place, as earlier discussed, there is no co-ownership to talk

about and no property to partition, as the disputed lot never formed part of
the estate of their deceased father.
23
SICAD V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 125888 AUGUST 13, 1998

NARVASA,C.J.
DOCTRINE: A donation which purports to be one inter vivos but withholds

from the donee the right to dispose of the donated property during the
donor's lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a donation mortis causa "the
right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still
alive."
FACTS:A deed of donation was executed by the late Aurora Virto DA. de
Motinola of the City of Iloilo. It named as donees her grandchildren,
namely: Catalino Valderrama, Judy Cristina Valderrama and Jesus Antonio
Valderrama: and treated of a parcel of land. The deed also contained the
signatures of the donees in acknowledgment of their acceptance of the
donation.
The Register of Deeds cancelled TCT No. T-16105 (the donor's title) and,
in its place, issued TCT No. T-16622 in the names of the donees.2
Montinola however retained the owner's duplicate copy of the new title (No.
T-16622), as well as the property itself, until she transferred the same ten
(10) years later, on July 10, 1990, to the spouses, Ernesto and Evelyn
Sicad.
On March 12, 1987, Aurora Montinola drew up a deed of revocation of the

donation, 3 and caused it to be annotated as an adverse claim the filed a
petition with the RTC for the cancellation of TCT No. 16622 and the
reinstatement of TCT No. T- 16105 (in her name). Her petition was founded
on the theory that the donation to her three (3) grandchildren was one
mortis causa which thus had to comply with the formalities of a will; and
since it had not, the donation was void and could not effectively serve as
basis for the cancellation of TCT No. T-16105 and the issuance in its place
of TCT No. T-16622.
The donees (Montinola's grandchildren) opposed the petition. They averred

that the donation in their favor was one inter vivos which, having fully
complied with the requirements therefor set out in Article 729 of the Civil
Code.
Trial court: the donation was indeed one inter vivos, and dismissing Aurora
Montinola's petition for lack of merit.
Montinola appealed. She died pending appeal.
CA: affirmed RTC

The Sicad Spouses appealed.
ISSUE: Is the donation mortis cause or inter vivos?
24
RULING: MORTIS CAUSA. The evidence establishes that on December
11, 1979, when the deed of donation prepared by Montinola's lawyer (Atty.
Treñas) was read and explained by the latter to the parties, Montinola
expressed her wish that the donation take effect only after ten (10) years
from her death, and that the deed include a prohibition on the sale of the
property for such period. Accordingly, a new proviso was inserted in the
deed reading: "however, the donees shall not sell or encumber the
properties herein donated within 10 years after the death of the donor."
Not only did Aurora Montinola order the insertion in the deed of that
restrictive proviso, but also, after recordation of the deed of donation, she
never stopped treating the property as her own. She continued, as explicity
authorized in the deed itself, to possess the property, enjoy its fruits and
otherwise exercise the rights of dominion, paying the property taxes as they
fell due — all these she did until she transferred the Property to the Sicad
Spouses on July 10, 1990. She did not give the new certificate of title to the
ostensible donees but retained it, too, until she delivered it to the Sicads on
the occasion of the sale of the property to them. In any event, the delivery
of the title to the donees would have served no useful purpose since, as
just stated, they were prohibited to effect any sale or encumbrance thereof
for a period of ten (10) years after the ostensible donor's decease. And
consistent with these acts denoting retention of ownership of the property
was Montinola's openly expressed view that the donation was ineffectual
and could not be given effect even after ten (10) years from her death. For
this view she sought to obtain judicial approval.
A donation which purports to be one inter vivos but withholds from the
donee the right to dispose of the donated property during the donor's
lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a donation mortis causa "the right of
disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive."
In the instant case, nothing of any consequence was transferred by the

deed of donation in question to Montinola's grandchildren, the ostensible
donees. They did not get possession of the property donated. They did not
acquire the right to the fruits thereof, or any other right of dominion over the
property. More importantly, they did not acquire the right to dispose of the
property — this would accrue to them only after ten (10) years from
Montinola's death. Indeed, they never even laid hands on the certificate of
title to the same. They were therefore simply "paper owners" of the donated
property. All these circumstances, including, to repeat, the explicit
provisions of the deed of donation — reserving the exercise of rights of
ownership to the donee and prohibiting the sale or encumbrance of the
property until ten (10) years after her death — ineluctably lead to the
conclusion that the donation in question was a donation mortis causa,
contemplating a transfer of ownership to the donees only after the donor's
demise.
The donation in question, though denominated inter vivos, is in truth one
mortis causa; it is void because the essential requisites for its validity have
not been complied with.
25
MARIA USON, v. MARIA DEL ROSARIO, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-4963 January 29, 1953

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.
DOCTRINE: The provisions of the NCC shall be given retroactive effect

even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under
the prior legislation only if no vested rights are impaired.
FACTS: This is an action for the recovery of the ownership and possession
of five (5) parcels of land in Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria
del Rosario and her four illegitimate children. Maria Uson was the lawful
wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands
involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his
widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda
died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took possession
illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment.
Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that Uson and her
husband, executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate as
husband and wife and, in consideration of which Uson was given a parcel
of land and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property
that may be left by her husband upon his death. CFI found for Uson.
Defendants appealed.
ISSUE: Does the illegitimate children and his common law wife have
successional rights over the estate?
RULING:NO. The provisions of the NCC shall be given retroactive effect

even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under
the prior legislation only if no vested rights are impaired. Hence, since the
right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested
in 1945 upon the death of her late husband, the new right recognized by
the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased
cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of
Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.
26
G.R. No. L-28040 August 18, 1972
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA,

administrator-appellee; JOSE DE BORJA, as administrator,
CAYETANO DE BORJA, MATILDE DE BORJA and CRISANTO DE
BORJA (deceased) as Children of Josefa Tangco, vs.
TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA, Special Administratrix of the Testate
Estate of Francisco de Borja
Case Digest by: Terry Louise P. Boligor
DOCTRINE:Hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or

vested immediately from the moment of the death of such predecessor in
interest. There is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting
capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such
death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the
subsequent liquidation of the estate.
FACTS:Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco, filed
a petition for the probate of her will. The will was probated on 2 April 1941.
While a widower, Francisco de Borja allegedly took unto himself a second
wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death, Tasiana instituted
testate proceedings where she was appointed special administratrix.
A compromise agreement was entered into by and between "The heir and
son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja
personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco,"
and "The heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second
marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja.
Jose de Borja submitted the agreement for Court approval. Tasiana

Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja opposed in both instances. The genuineness
and due execution of the compromised agreement is not disputed, but its
validity is, nevertheless, attacked by Tasiana Ongsingco on the ground
that: (1) the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first
probating the will of Francisco de Borja; (2) that the same involves a
compromise on the validity of the marriage between Francisco de Borja
and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3) that even if it were valid, it has ceased to
have force and effect.
Tasiana Ongsingco and the Probate Court of Nueva Ecija rely on this
Court's decision in Guevara vs. Guevara. 74 Phil. 479, wherein the Court's
27
majority held the view that the presentation of a will for probate is
mandatory and that the settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis
of intestacy when the decedent left a will, is against the law and public
policy. It is likewise pointed out by appellant Tasiana Ongsingco that
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised Rules explicitly conditions the validity
of an extrajudicial settlement of a decedent's estate by agreement between
heirs, upon the facts that "(if) the decedent left no will and no debts, and
the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial and
legal representatives ..." The will of Francisco de Borja having been
submitted to the Nueva Ecija Court and still pending probate when the
1963 agreement was made, those circumstances, it is argued, bar the
validity of the agreement.
On the other hand, Jose de Borja stresses that at the time it was entered
into, the governing provision was Section 1, Rule 74 of the original Rules of
Court of 1940, which allowed the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of a
deceased person regardless of whether he left a will or not. He also relies
on the dissenting opinion of Justice Moran, in Guevara vs. Guevara, 74
Phil. 479, wherein was expressed the view that if the parties have already
divided the estate in accordance with a decedent's will, the probate of the
will is a useless ceremony; and if they have divided the estate in a different
manner, the probate of the will is worse than useless.
ISSUE: Whether the prerequisite previous probate of the will is applicable

in this case.
HELD: NO. The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara is not applicable to the
case at bar. This is apparent from an examination of the terms of the
agreement between Jose de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco. Paragraph 2 of
said agreement specifically stipulates that the sum of P800,000 payable to
Tasiana Ongsingco —shall be considered as full — complete payment —
settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco de
Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco, and to any properties
bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last
Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or
purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise.
This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara case
is not applicable to the case at bar. There was here no attempt to settle or
distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto before
the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the
conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and
interest, actual or eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa
Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or
28
legatee. And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or
vested immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or
predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777) there is no
legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of
her or his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual
extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of
the estate. Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited
to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir. However, the aleatory
character of the contract does not affect the validity of the transaction;
neither does the coetaneous agreement that the numerous litigations
between the parties (the approving order of the Rizal Court enumerates
fourteen of them, Rec. App. pp. 79-82) are to be considered settled and
should be dismissed, although such stipulation, as noted by the Rizal
Court, gives the contract the character of a compromise that the law favors,
for obvious reasons, if only because it serves to avoid a multiplicity of suits.
It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse

of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana Ongsingco was his compulsory heir under
article 995 et seq. of the present Civil Code. Wherefore, barring
unworthiness or valid disinheritance, her successional interest existed
independent of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and would exist
even if such will were not probated at all. Thus, the prerequisite of a
previous probate of the will, as established in the Guevara and analogous
cases, can not apply to the case of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja.
29
G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976
ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor) and
PONCIANO BONILLA (their father) who represents the minors v.
LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA,
MANUEL BARCENA, AGUSTINA NERI, widow of JULIAN TAMAYO and
HON. LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of the Court of First Instance of Abra
DOCTRINE:Rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of

the death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent,
the heirs become the absolute owner of his property, subject to the rights
and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights
thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The moment of death is
the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the
inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent.
FACTS: On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio

Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil
action in the Court of First Instance of Abra, to quiet title over certain
parcels of land located in Abra. On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed
another motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Fortunata
Barcena is dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. During the
hearing, counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena,
and asked for substitution by her minor children and her husband, the
petitioners herein; but the court after the hearing immediately dismissed the
case on the ground that a dead person cannot be a real party in interest
and has no legal personality to sue.
ISSUE: Whether the children of the deceased, Fortuna Barcena, be

allowed to substitute the deceased plaintiff.
HELD: YES. While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court,
yet he can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case to its
completion. The records of this case show that the death of Fortunata
Barcena took place on July 9, 1975 while the complaint was filed on March
31, 1975. This means that when the complaint was filed on March 31,
1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and therefore, the court had
acquired jurisdiction over her person. If thereafter she died, the Rules of
Court prescribes the procedure whereby a party who died during the
pendency of the proceeding can be substituted.
30
Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." From the
moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owner
of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the decedent, and
they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods
provided for by law. The moment of death is the determining factor when
the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be
pure or contingent. The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased
vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs in the
testate or intestate proceedings. When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died
her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856,
was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon
her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in
litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no
reason for the respondent Court not to allow their substitution as parties in
interest for the deceased plaintiff.
31
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Petitioner, vs.
MA. IMELDA "IMEE" R. MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND

"BONGBONG" R. MARCOS, JR., GREGORIO MA. ARANETA III, IRENE
R. MARCOS-ARANETA, YEUNG CHUN FAN, YEUNG CHUN HO,
YEUNG CHUN KAM, and PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
(PEA)-PTGWO
G. R. No. 171701 February 8, 2012
DOCTRINE:The heirs instantaneously became co-owners of the Marcos

properties upon the death of the President. The property rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are
transmitted to another through the decedent’s death.
FACTS: After the EDSA Revolution, President Corazon C. Aquino

mandated PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former
President Marcos. The PCGG, acting on behalf of the Republic, filed a
Complaint for Reversion, Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and
Damages against Marcos, who was later substituted by his estate upon his
death and his heirs. PCGG amended its Complaint, and added
personalities as defendants.
Closely analyzing petitioner’s Complaint and the present Petition for

Review, it is clear that the Marcos siblings are being sued in two capacities:
first, as co-conspirators in the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth; and
second, as the compulsory heirs of their father, Ferdinand E. Marcos. To
prove the general allegations against the Marcos siblings, petitioner
primarily relied on the Sworn Statement and the Deposition of one of the
financial advisors of President Marcos, Rolando C. Gapud, taken in Hong
Kong on various dates.
The Pantranco Employees Association-PTGWO moved to intervene before

the Sandiganbayan alleging that the trust funds in the account of Pantranco
amounting to 55 million rightfully belonged to the Pantranco employees,
pursuant to the money judgment awarded by NLRC.
32
On 11 March 2002, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution admitting the
pieces of evidence while expressing some reservation. Respondents
subsequently filed their respective Demurrers to Evidence and all were
granted except the one filed by Imelda R. Marcos. Primarily because she
had categorically admitted that she and her husband owned properties
enumerated in the Complaint, while stating that these properties had been
lawfully acquired. The court held that the evidence presented by petitioner
constituted a prima facie case against her, considering that the value of the
properties involved was grossly disproportionate to the Marcos spouses’
lawful income. Thus, this admission and the fact that Imelda R. Marcos was
the compulsory heir and administratrix of the Marcos estate were the
primary reasons why the court held that she was responsible for accounting
for the funds and properties alleged to be ill-gotten.
ISSUE:Are the compulsory heirs of former President Marcos obliged to

render an accounting and return the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses?
HELD: YES. The Marcos siblings are maintained as respondents, because

(1) the action pending before the Sandiganbayan is one that survives
death, and, therefore, the rights to the estate must be duly protected; (2)
they allegedly control, possess or own ill-gotten wealth, though their direct
involvement in accumulating or acquiring such wealth may not have been
proven. Since the pending case before the Sandiganbayan survives the
death of Ferdinand E. Marcos, it is imperative therefore that the estate be
duly represented.
Under the rules of succession, the heirs instantaneously became co-

owners of the Marcos properties upon the death of the President. The
property rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance
of a person are transmitted to another through the decedent’s death. In this
concept, nothing prevents the heirs from exercising their right to transfer or
dispose of the properties that constitute their legitimes, even absent their
declaration or absent the partition or the distribution of the estate.
Article 440 of the Civil Code provides that "the possession of hereditary
property is deemed to be transmitted to the heir without interruption from
the instant of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance be
accepted." And Manresa states that upon the death of a person, each of
his heirs "becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with
respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a
community of ownership being thus formed among the co- owners of the
estate while it remains undivided."
33
In order to reach a final determination of the matters concerning the estate
of Ferdinand E. Marcos – that is, the accounting and the recovery of ill-
gotten wealth – the present case must be maintained against Imelda
Marcos and herein respondent Ferdinand "Bongbong" R. Marcos, Jr., as
executors of the Marcos estate pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 87 of the Rules
of Court. While it was not proven that respondents conspired in
accumulating ill-gotten wealth, they may be in possession, ownership or
control of such ill-gotten properties or the proceeds thereof as heirs of the
Marcos couple. Thus, their lack of participation in any illegal act does not
remove the character of the property as ill-gotten and, therefore, as
rightfully belonging to the State.
34
ANTIPOLO INING v. LEONARDO R. VEGA
G.R. No. 174727 August 12, 2013
Del Castillo, J.
DOCTRINE: One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not
inherit from the latter and cannot become a co-owner of the decedent’s
property. Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of the co-ownership
of the estate that was formed among the decedent’s heirs.
FACTS:Leon Roldan, married to Rafaela Menez, is the owner of a parcel of

land in Kalibo, Aklan covered by Original Certificate of Title. Leon and
Rafaela died without issue. Leon was survived by his siblings Romana
Roldan and Gregoria Roldan Ining, who are now both deceased.
Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson,

herein respondent Leonardo R. Vega. Leonardo in turn is survived by his
wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena
Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega, the substituted respondents.
In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to

him as Romana’s surviving heir, Leonardo filed for partition against
Gregoria’s heirs. Leonardo alleged that on several occasions, he
demanded the partition of the property but Gregoria’s heirs refused to heed
his.
In their Answer, Teodora, Camilo, Adolfo, Lucimo Jr. and Herminigildo

claimed that Leonardo had no cause of action against them. They have
become the sole owners of the subject property through Lucimo Sr. who
acquired the same in good faith by sale from Juan Enriquez, who in turn
acquired the same from Leon, and Leonardo was aware of this fact.
ISSUE:Whether the court erred in reversing the decision of the trial court
on the ground that Lucimo Francisco repudiated the co-ownership only on
February 9,1979?
35
HELD:NO. The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had
long been settled and had become final for failure of petitioners to appeal.
Thus, the property remained part of Leon’s estate.
Leon died without issue; he had siblings, Romana and Gregoria. Since
Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana and Gregoria,
who thus inherited the property in equal shares. In turn, Romana’s and
Gregoria’s heirs – the parties herein – became entitled to the property upon
the sisters’ passing. Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of death.
Gregoria’s and Romana’s heirs are co-owners of the subject property.

Thus, having succeeded to the property as heirs of Gregoria and Romana,
petitioners and respondents became co-owners thereof. As co-owners,
they may use the property owned in common, provided they do so in
accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as
not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners
from using it according to their rights.
For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner. It

has been held that "a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of
the other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In
order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such
positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners;
and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing."
However, it may be argued that Lucimo Sr. performed acts that may be
characterized as a repudiation of the co-ownership, the fact is, he is not a
co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of Gregoria; he is merely
Antipolo’s son-in-law, being married to Antipolo’s daughter Teodora.42
Under the Family Code, family relations, which is the primary basis for
succession, exclude relations by affinity.
Art. 150. Family relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
36
In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property;
Teodora is. Consequently, he cannot validly effect a repudiation of the co-
ownership, which he was never part of. For this reason, prescription did not
run adversely against Leonardo, and his right to seek a partition of the
property has not been lost.
37
G.R. No. 129008 January 13, 2004
TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA assisted by

her husband ZALDY EVANGELISTA, ALBERTO ORFINADA, and
ROWENA O. UNGOS, assisted by her husband BEDA UNGOS,
petitioners,vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ESPERANZA P. ORFINADA, LOURDES P.
ORFINADA, ALFONSO ORFINADA, NANCY P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO
JAMES P. ORFINADA, CHRISTOPHER P. ORFINADA and ANGELO P.
ORFINADA,respondents.
DOCTRINE: Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs

without doubt have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of
the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New
Civil Code "that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment
of the death of the decedent." The provision in turn is the foundation of the
principle that the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of
the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or
others by his will or by operation of law.
FACTS: May 13, 1995- Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in
Angeles City leaving several personal and real properties located in
Angeles City, Dagupan City and Kalookan City. He also left a widow,
respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he married on July 11, 1960 and
with whom he had seven children who are the herein respondents, namely:
Lourdes P. Orfinada, Alfonso "Clyde" P. Orfinada, Nancy P. Orfinada-
Happenden, Alfonso James P. Orfinada, Christopher P. Orfinada, Alfonso
Mike P. Orfinada (deceased) and Angelo P. Orfinada.
Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning his
paramour and their children. They are petitioner Teodora Riofero, who
became a part of his life when he entered into an extra-marital relationship
and co-petitioners Veronica, Alberto and Rowena.
November 14, 1995- respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada

discovered that on June 29, 1995, petitioner Teodora Rioferio and her
children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased
Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the decedent
located in Dagupan City and that accordingly, the Registry of Deeds in
Dagupan issued Certificates of Titles Nos. 63983, 63984 and 63985 in
favor of petitioners Teodora, Veronica, Alberto and Rowena. Respondents
also found out that petitioners were able to obtain a loan of P700,000.00
38
from the Rural Bank of Mangaldan Inc. by executing a Real Estate
Mortgage over the properties subject of the extra-judicial settlement.
December 1, 1995- respondent Alfonso "Clyde" P. Orfinada III filed a

Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City, praying that letters of administration encompassing the estate
of Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. be issued to him.
December 4, 1995- respondents filed a Complaint for the

Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased
Person with Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and Cancellation of Transfer
Certificate of Titles with Nos. 63983, 63985 and 63984 and Other Related
Documents with Damages against petitioners, the Rural Bank of
Mangaldan, Inc. and the Register of Deeds of Dagupan City.
February 5, 1996- petitioners filed their Answer to the aforesaid complaint

interposing the defense that the property subject of the contested deed of
extra-judicial settlement pertained to the properties originally belonging to
the parents of Teodora and that the titles thereof were delivered to her as
an advance inheritance but the decedent had managed to register them in
his name. They also raised the affirmative defense that respondents are
not the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada,
Jr. in view of the pendency of the administration proceedings. Petitioners
then filed a Motion to Set Affirmative Defenses for Hearing on the aforesaid
ground.
The lower court denied the motion on the ground that respondents, as
heirs, are the real parties-in-interest especially in the absence of an
administrator who is yet to be appointed.
This prompted petitioners to file before the Court of Appeals their Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court arguing that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed order which
denied the dismissal of the case on the ground that the proper party to file
the complaint for the annulment of the extrajudicial settlement of the estate
of the deceased is the estate of the decedent and not the respondents. The
Court of Appeals stated that it discerned no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the public respondent judge
when he denied petitioners’ motion to set affirmative defenses for hearing
in view of its discretionary nature.
39
ISSUE:Whether the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate
pending the appointment of an administrator is the issue in this case.
HELD: YES.Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs

without doubt have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of
the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New
Civil Code "that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment
of the death of the decedent." The provision in turn is the foundation of the
principle that the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of
the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or
others by his will or by operation of law.
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the

heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been
appointed.This is the proper modality despite the total lack of advertence to
the heirs in the rules on party representation, namely Section 3, Rule 3 and
Section 2, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. In fact, in the case of Gochan v.
Young, this Court recognized the legal standing of the heirs to represent
the rights and properties of the decedent under administration pending the
appointment of an administrator. Thus:
The above-quoted rules, while permitting an executor or administrator to

represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the
heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to
cases in which an administrator has already been appointed. But no rule
categorically addresses the situation in which special proceedings for the
settlement of an estate have already been instituted, yet no administrator
has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to
wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the
administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights
and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while
the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated.
Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two

exceptions: (1) if the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to
bring suit; and (2) when the administrator is alleged to have participated in
the act complained of and he is made a party defendant. Evidently, the
necessity for the heirs to seek judicial relief to recover property of the
estate is as compelling when there is no appointed administrator, if not
more, as where there is an appointed administrator but he is either
disinclined to bring suit or is one of the guilty parties himself.
40
All told, therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for
the recovery of property of the estate during the pendency of administration
proceedings has three exceptions, (3) the third being when there is no
appointed administrator such as in this case.
41
FLORDELIZA CALPATURA FLORA, DOMINADOR CALPATURA and
TOMAS CALPATURA, JR., Heirs of TOMAS CALPATURA, SR.,
vs.
ROBERTO, ERLINDA, DANIEL, GLORIA, PATRICIO, JR. and EDNA, all
surnamed PRADO and NARCISA PRADO
G.R. No. 156879 January 20, 2004
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
DOCTRINE: It is well-settled that in civil cases, the party that alleges a fact
has the burden of proving it. Article 160 of the Civil Code, which was in
effect at the time the sale was entered into, provides that all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Proof of
acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non in order for the
presumption in favor of conjugal ownership to operate.
FACTS:
On December 19, 1959, Patricio Prado, Sr. died leaving a residential land
situated in Quezon City. Narcisa subsequently married Bonifacio Calpatura.
In order to support her six (6) minor children with her first husband, Narcisa
and her brother-in-law, Tomas Calpatura, Sr., executed an Agreement of
Purchase and Sale whereby the former agreed to sell to the latter the
northern half portion of the property for the sum of
P10,500.00. Subsequently, Narcisa executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of Tomas over the said property.
Tomas’ daughter, Flordeliza Calpatura Flora, then built a two-storey duplex

with firewall on the northern half portion of the property. Respondents, who
occupied the southern half portion of the land, did not object to the
construction. Likewise, Maximo Calpatura, the son of Tomas’ cousin, built a
small house on the northern portion of the property.
Respondents (The Prados) filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of sale

and delivery of possession of the northern half portion of the subject
property against petitioners Flordeliza Calpatura Flora, Dominador
Calpatura and Tomas Calpatura. Petitioners countered that Narcisa owned
9/14 of the property, consisting of 1⁄2 as her share in the conjugal
partnership with her first husband and 1/7 as her share in the estate of her
deceased husband; that the consideration of the sale in the amount of
P10,500.00 had been fully paid as of April 1, 1968. On April 2, 1997, the
RTC dismissed the complaint and found that the sale was valid.
42
ISSUE: Was the sale was valid?
RULING:
Yes. The sale was valid. The subject property belongs to the conjugal
partnership of Patricio and Narcisa.
The Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Narcisa in favor of Tomas is

contained in a notarized document. It was held that a public document
executed and attested through the intervention of a notary public is
evidence of the facts in a clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed.
While the deed of sale between Tomas and Narcisa was never registered
nor annotated on the title, respondents had knowledge of the possession of
petitioners of the northern half portion of the property. Obviously,
respondents recognized the ownership of Tomas, petitioners’ predecessor-
in-interest.
The property being conjugal, upon the death of Patricio Prado, Sr., one-half
of the subject property was automatically reserved to the surviving spouse,
Narcisa, as her share in the conjugal partnership. Particio’s rights to the
other half, in turn, were transmitted upon his death to his heirs, which
includes his widow Narcisa, who is entitled to the same share as that of
each of the legitimate children. Thus, as a result of the death of Patricio, a
regime of co-ownership arose between Narcisa and the other heirs in
relation to the property. The remaining one-half was transmitted to his heirs
by intestate succession. By the law on intestate succession, his six children
and Narcisa Prado inherited the same at one-seventh (1/7) eachpro
indiviso. Inasmuch as Narcisa inherited one-seventh (1/7) of her husband's
conjugal share in the said property and is the owner of one-half (1/2)
thereof as her conjugal share, she owns a total of 9/14 of the subject
property. Hence, Narcisa could validly convey her total undivided share in
the entire property to Tomas. Narcisa and her children are deemed co-
owners of the subject property.
Finally, no particular portion of the property could be identified as yet and

delineated as the object of the sale considering that the property had not
yet been partitioned in accordance with the Rules of Court. While Narcisa
could validly sell one half of the subject property, her share being 9/14 of
the same, she could not have particularly conveyed the northern portion
thereof before the partition, the terms of which was still to be determined by
the parties before the trial court.
43
EDUARDO FELIPE VS HEIRS OF MAXIMO ALDON
G.R. No. L-60174 February 16, 1983
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
DOCTRINE: The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership.

(Art. 165, Civil Code.) Subject to certain exceptions, the husband cannot
alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without
the wife's consent. (Art. 166, Idem.) And the wife cannot bind the conjugal
partnership without the husband's consent, except in cases provided by
law.
FACTS:
Maximo Aldon married Gimena Almosara in 1936. The spouses bought

several parcels of land sometime between 1948 and 1950. In 1960-62 the
lands were divided into three lots, 1370, 1371 and 1415 of the San Jacinto
Public Subdivision, San Jacinto Masbate.
In 1951, Gimena Almosara sold the lots to the spouses Eduardo Felipe and
Hermogena V. Felipe. The sale was made without the consent of her
husband, Maximo.
On April 26, 1976, the heirs of Maximo Aldon, namely his widow Gimena
and their children Sofia and Salvador Aldon, filed a complaint in the CFI of
Masbate against the Felipes. The complaint alleged that the plaintiffs were
the owners of lots 1370, 1371 and 1415; that they had orally mortgaged the
same to the defendants; and an offer to redeem the mortgage had been
refused so they filed the complaint in order to recover the three parcels of
land.
The defendants asserted that they had acquired the lots from the plaintiffs
by purchase and subsequent delivery to them. The Trial Court sustained
the claim of the defendants and rendered that they are the lawful owners of
the subject property.
The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered
the defendants to surrender the lots in question as well as the muniments
of title thereof.
ISSUE: 
W/N the right of action of Sofia and Salvador Aldon was barred by the
statute of limitation.
RULING:
44
NO. The voidable contract of Gimena was subject to annulment by her
husband only during the marriage because he was the victim who had an
interest in the contract. Gimena, who was the party responsible for the
defect, could not ask for its annulment. Their children could not likewise
seek the annulment of the contract while the marriage subsisted because
they merely had an inchoate right to the lands sold. The termination of the
marriage and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership by the death of
Maximo Aldon did not improve the situation of Gimena. What she could not
do during the marriage, she could not do thereafter.
The case of Sofia and Salvador Aldon is different. After the death of
Maximo they acquired the right to question the defective contract insofar as
it deprived them of their hereditary rights in their father's share in the lands.
The father's share is one-half (1/2) of the lands and their share is two-thirds
(2/3) thereof, one-third (1/3) pertaining to the widow.
The petitioners have been in possession of the lands since 1951. It was
only in 1976 when the respondents filed action to recover the lands. In the
meantime, Maximo Aldon died.
The children's cause of action accrued from the death of their father in
1959 and they had thirty (30) years to institute it.They filed action in 1976
which is well within the period.
Judgment is entered awarding to Sofia and Salvador their shares of the

lands as stated in the body of this decision; and the petitioners as
possessors in bad faith shall make an accounting of the fruits
corresponding to the share aforementioned from 1959 and solidarity pay
their value to Sofia and Salvador Aldon.
45
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC.,
vs.
JOSEPHINE LUCERO
G.R. No. L-60101 August 31, 1983
ESCOLIN, J.:
FACTS:
Capt. Julio J. Lucero, Jr. was appointed by Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.,
Company for short, as master/captain to its vessel M/V Eastern Minicon
plying the Hong Kong-Manila route, with the salary of P5,560.00 exclusive
of ship board allowances and other benefits. Under the contract, his
employment was good for one (1) round trip only, i.e., the contract would
automatically terminate upon arrival of the vessel at the Port of Manila,
unless renewed. It was further agreed that part of the captain's salary,
while abroad, should be paid to Mrs. Josephine Lucero, his wife, in Manila.
While the vessel was enroute from Hongkong to Manila, Captain Lucero
sent three distress messages to the company on the following dates:
February l6,1980 7am; February l6/80 3:30pm; FEBRUARY 16/809:50pm.
On the third message he stated that sea water was entering the vessel and
they were preparing to abandon ship.
The company notified the coast guard. Search results were negative.
The insurers of the company confirmed the loss of the vessel. Thereafter,
the Company paid the corresponding death benefits to the heirs of the crew
members, except respondent Josephine Lucero, who refused to accept.
Mrs. Lucero filed a complaint for payment of the accrued salary allotment of
her husband which the Company had stopped since March 1980 and for
continued payment of said allotments until the M/V Minicon shall have
returned to the port of Manila. She contended that the contract of
employment entered into by her husband with the Company was on a
voyage-to-voyage basis, and that the same was to terminate only upon the
vessel's arrival in Manila.
The company refused to pay. The National Seamen Board upheld the
complaint and the decision was affirmed by the NLRC.
ISSUE:
When will the presumption of death arise?
HELD:
The NLRC based its judgment on Art 391regarding the presumption of
death at sea. They argue that it was too early to presume that Mr. Lucero
has died because under the law, four (4) years have not yet passed. Art.
391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the
division of the estate among the heirs: (1) A person on board a vessel lost
46
during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been
heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
The Supreme Court ruled however that a preponderance of evidence from

the telegraph messages and the fact that the vessel was not heard of again
show that it can be logically inferred that the vessel has sunk, and the crew
perished.
There is thus enough evidence to show the circumstances attending the
loss and disappearance of the M/V Eastern Minicon and its crew. The
foregoing facts, quite logically. are sufficient to lead Us to a moral certainty
that the vessel had sunk and that the persons aboard had perished with it.
upon this premise, the rule on presumption of death under Article 391 (1) of
the Civil Code must yield to the rule of preponderance of evidence. As this
Court said in Joaquin vs. Navarro” Where there are facts, known or
knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption
does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls.
The decision of the NLRC subject of this petition is hereby set aside, and
the complaint of respondent Josephine Lucero dismissed. However, Mrs.
Lucero is entitled to death benefits. No costs.
47
EMILIO EMNACE vs. CA, ESTATE OF VICENTE TABANAO, SHERWIN
TABANAO, VICENTE WILLIAM TABANAO, JANETTE TABANAO
DEPOSOY, VICENTA MAY TABANAO VARELA, ROSELA TABANAO
AND VINCENT TABANAO
G. R. No. 126334. November 23, 2001

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
FACTS:
Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were

partners in a business concern known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry.
Sometime in January of 1986, they decided to dissolve their partnership
and executed an agreement of partition and distribution of the partnership
properties among them.
Among the assets to be distributed were five (5) fishing boats, six (6)
vehicles, two (2) parcels of land located at Sto. Niño and Talisay, Negros
Occidental, and cash deposits in the local branches of the Bank of the
Philippine Islands and Prudential Bank.
Throughout the existence of the partnership, and even after Vicente

Tabanao’s untimely demise in 1994, petitioner failed to submit to
Tabanao’s heirs any statement of assets and liabilities of the partnership,
and to render an accounting of the partnership’s finances.
Petitioner also reneged on his promise to turn over to Tabanao’s

heirs the deceased’s 1/3 share in the total assets of the partnership,
amounting to P30,000,000.00, or the sum of P10,000,000.00, despite
formal demand for payment thereof.
Consequently, Tabanao’s heirs, respondents herein, filed against

petitioner an action for accounting, payment of shares, division of assets
and damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents. Petitioner then

filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which was
dismissed.
Hence, this petition.
48
ISSUE:
Whether or not the surviving spouse of Vicente Tabanao has the

legal capacity to sue even if she was never appointed as administratrix or
executrix of his estate.
HELD:
YES. Emnace’s objection in this regard is misplaced.
The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as executrix or

administratrix of the estate before she can file the action. She and her
children are complainants in their own right as successors of Vicente
Tabanao. From the very moment of Vicente Tabanao’s death, his rights
insofar as the partnership was concerned were transmitted to his heirs, for
rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of
the decedent.
Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the

partnership and Emnace were transmitted to respondents by operation of
law, more particularly by succession, which is a mode of acquisition by
virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value
of the inheritance of a person are transmitted. Moreover, respondents
became owners of their respective hereditary shares from the moment
Vicente Tabanao died.
WHEREFORE, petition is DENIED.
49
PUNO V. PUNO ENTERPRISES
G.R. NO. 177066 SEPTEMBER 11, 2009
NACHURA, J.:
DOCTRINE:
Upon the death of a stockholder, the heirs do not automatically become

stockholders of the corporation; neither are they mandatorily entitled to the
rights and privileges of a stockholder.
FACTS:
Carlos L. Puno, who died on June 25, 1963, was an incorporator of

respondent Puno Enterprises, Inc. On March 14, 2003, Joselito Musni
Puno claiming to be an heir of Carlos, initiated a complaint for specific
performance against Puno Enterprises. He claimed that as an illegitimate
child of his father, he should have entitlement to the rights and privileges of
his late father as stockholder of the Enterprise. Puno Enterprises filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that Joselito had no legal personality to
sue because he did not properly proved his filiation to Carlos. After sending
the corrected birth certificate to the court, the Court ordered Puno
Enterprises to file an answer. It decided in favor of Joselito.
CA reversed the ruling of the RTC holding that Joselito was not able to
establish the paternity of and his filiation to Carlos since his birth certificate
was prepared without the intervention of and the participatory
acknowledgment of paternity by Carlos.
ISSUE:
Whether upon death of Carlos, the stocks of a corporation can be

transferred automatically to an illegitimate child.
HELD:
NO. Joselito needed to prove his filiation to Carlos so that he can claim to
be an heir of the latter. Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not
automatically become stockholders of the corporation and acquire the
50
rights and privileges of the deceased as shareholder of the corporation.
The stocks must be distributed first to the heirs in estate proceedings, and
the transfer of the stocks must be recorded in the books of the corporation.
Section 63 of the Corporation Code provides that no transfer shall be valid,
except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of
the corporation. During such interim period, the heirs stand as the equitable
owners of the stocks, the executor or administrator duly appointed by the
court being vested with the legal title to the stock. Until a settlement and
division of the estate is effected, the stocks of the decedent are held by the
administrator or executor. Consequently, during such time, it is the
administrator or executor who is entitled to exercise the rights deceased as
stockholder.
Thus, even if petitioner presents sufficient evidence in this case to establish

that he is the son of Carlos L. Puno, he would still not be allowed to inspect
respondent’s books and be entitled to receive dividends from respondent,
absent any showing in its transfer book that some of the shares owned by
Carlos L. Puno were transferred to him. This would only be possible if
petitioner has been recognized as an heir and has participated in the
settlement of the estate of the deceased
51
REYES VS RTC OF MAKATI BRANCH 142
GR NO. 165744, AUGUST 11, 2008
FACTS: Oscar Reyes and Rodrigo Reyes are two of the four children of
Sps. Pedro and Anastacia Reyes. Pedro, Anastacia, Oscar and Rodrigo
each owned shares of stocks of Zenith Insurance Corporation. In 1964,
Pedro died. His estate was judicially partitioned sometime in 1970s. in
1993, Anastacia died. However there was no settlement/partition of her
estate. As of June 1990, Anastacia owned 136,598 shares of Zenith, which
was part of her estate. Oscar then owned 8,715,637 shares; while Rodrigo
has 4,250. Then Rodrigo sued Oscar, alleging that the latter fraudulently
appropriated for himself the shares of their parents. The complaint was
designated as a derivative suit to obtain an accounting of the funds and
assets of Zenith Insurance Corporation. Oscar moved to declare the
complaint as nuisance. Oscar argued that it is not a bona fide derivative
suit as it partakes the nature of a petition for the settlement of estate of the
deceased Anastacia. The RTC denied Oscar’s Motion to Declare
Complaint as Nuisance. Oscar appealed before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:Does the RTC, sitting as a special commercial court, has

jurisdiction over Rodrigos’ complaint? What is the nature of the action?
RULING: No, the complaint is about the protection and enforcement

of Successional Rights.
The complaint contained no sufficient allegation that justified the need for
an accounting other than to determine the extent of Anastacia’s
shareholdings for purposes of distribution.
Another significant indicator that points us to the real nature of the

complaint are Rodrigo’s repeated claims of illegal and fraudulent transfers
of Anastacia’s shares by Oscar to the prejudice of the other heirs of the
decedent; he cited these allegedly fraudulent acts as basis for his demand
for the collation and distribution of Anastacia’s shares to the heirs. These
claims tell us unequivocally that the present controversy arose from the
parties’ relationship as heirs of Anastacia and not as shareholders of
Zenith. Rodrigo, in filing the complaint, is enforcing his rights as a co-heir
and not as a stockholder of Zenith. The injury he seeks to remedy is one
suffered by an heir (for the impairment of his successional rights) and not
by the corporation nor by Rodrigo as a shareholder on record.
That an accounting of the funds and assets of Zenith to determine the

extent and value of Anastacia’s shareholdings will be undertaken by a
52
probate court and not by a special commercial court is completely
consistent with the probate court’s limited jurisdiction. It has the power to
enforce an accounting as a necessary means to its authority to determine
the properties included in the inventory of the estate to be administered,
divided up, and distributed. Beyond this, the determination of title or
ownership over the subject shares (whether belonging to Anastacia or
Oscar) may be conclusively settled by the probate court as a question of
collation or advancement. We had occasion to recognize the court’s
authority to act on questions of title or ownership in a collation or
advancement situation
Article 777 of the Civil Code declares that the successional rights are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Accordingly, upon
Anastacia’s death, her children acquired legal title to her estate (which title
includes her shareholdings in Zenith), and they are, prior to the estate’s
partition, deemed co-owners thereof.25 This status as co-owners, however,
does not immediately and necessarily make them stockholders of the
corporation. Unless and until there is compliance with Section 63 of the
Corporation Code on the manner of transferring shares, the heirs do not
become registered stockholders of the corporation. Section 63 provides:
Section 63. Certificate of stock and transfer of shares. – The capital stock
of stock corporations shall be divided into shares for which certificates
signed by the president or vice-president, countersigned by the secretary or
assistant secretary, and sealed with the seal of the corporation shall be
issued in accordance with the by-laws. Shares of stock so issued are
personal property and may be transferred by delivery of the certificate or
certificates indorsed by the owner or his attorney-in-fact or other person
legally authorized to make the transfer. No transfer, however, shall be valid,
except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of
the corporation so as to show the names of the parties to the transaction,
the date of the transfer, the number of the certificate or certificates, and the
number of shares transferred. [Emphasis supplied.]
No shares of stock against which the corporation holds any unpaid claim
shall be transferable in the books of the corporation.
Simply stated, the transfer of title by means of succession, though effective

and valid between the parties involved (i.e., between the decedent’s estate
and her heirs), does not bind the corporation and third parties. The transfer
must be registered in the books of the corporation to make the transferee
53
HIERS OF SANDEJAS VS ALEX A. LINA
G.R. no. 141634 February 5, 2001
FACTS:
On February 17, 1981 EliodoroSandejas, Sr. Filed a petition in the lower

court praying that letters of administration be issued in his favour for the
settlement of the estate of his wife Remedios, who died on April 17, 1995.
The letters of administration were issued and EliodoroSandejas was
appointed as administrator.
On November 19, 1981 the 4th floor of Manila City hall was burned and
among the records burned were the records of branch XI of the CFI of
Manila. As a result, EliodoroSandejas filed a motion for reconstitution of the
records of the case. On February 16, 1983, the lower court granted such
motion.
On April 19, 1983, an Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene and

petition-in-intervention was filed by Alex A. Lina alleging among others that
on June 7, 1982, EliodoroSandejas sold to him 4 parcels of land all located
in Makati, Province of Rizal.
On January 7, 1985 the counsel for EliodoroSandejas filed a manifestation

alleging among others that he died sometime in November 1984 in Canada
and said counsel is still waiting for official word on the fact of the death of
the administrator. The counsel also alleged thath the matter of the claim of
Alex A. Lina becomes a money claim to be filed in the estate of the late
EliodoroSandejas. On February 15, 1985, the lower court issued an order
directing that the counsel for the heirs to move for the appointment of a
new administrator within 15 days from receipt of order.
On January 1986, Alex filed a Motion for his appointment as a new

administrator of the Intestate Estate of Remedios R. Sandejas on the
following reasons: that Alex has not received any motion for the
appointment of an administrator in place of Eliodoro; that his appointment
would be beneficial to the heirs; that he is willing to give away his being an
administrator as long as the heirs has found one. The heirs chose
SixtoSandejas as new administrator. They were reasoning out that it was
only at a later date that Sixto accepted the appointment. The lower court
substituted Alex Lina with SixtoSandejas as administrator.
On November 1993, Alex filed an Omnibus Motion to approve the deed of

conditional sale executed between Alex A. Lina and Elidioro and to compel
the heirs to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of Alex. The lower
court granted Alex's motion.
54
Overturning the RTC ruling, the CA held that the contract between
EliodoroSandejas Sr. and respondent was merely a contract to sell, not a
perfected contract of sale. It ruled that the ownership of the four lots was to
remain in the intestate estate of Remedios until the approval of the sale
was obtained from the settlement court.
ISSUE:
W/N the order of conveyance of the disputed 3/5 parcel of land proper.
RULING:
YES.
A contract of sale is not invalidated by the fact that it is subject to probate

court approval. The transaction remains binding on the seller-heir, but not
on the other heirs who have not given their consent to it. In settling the
estate of the deceased, a probate court has jurisdiction over matters
incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers. Such
matters include selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty
belonging to the estate. Rule 89, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, deals
with the conveyance of real property contracted by the decedent while still
alive. In contrast with Sections 2 and 4 of the same Rule, the said
provision does not limit to the executor or administrator the right to file the
application for authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber realty
under administration. The standing to pursue such course of action before
the probate court inures to any person who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment or to be entitled to the avails of the suit.
Petitioners argue that the CA erred in ordering the conveyance of the

disputed 3/5 of the parcels of land, despite the nonfulfillment of the
suspensive condition — court approval of the sale — as contained in the
“Receipt of Earnest Money with Promise to Sell and to Buy” (also referred
to as the “Receipt”). Instead, they assert that because this condition had
not been satisfied, their obligation to deliver the disputed parcels of land
was converted into a money claim.
We disagree. Petitioners admit that the agreement between the deceased

EliodoroSandejas Sr. and respondent was a contract to sell. Not exactly.
In a contract to sell, the payment of the purchase price is a positive
55
suspensive condition. The vendor’s obligation to convey the title does not
become effective in case of failure to pay.
On the other hand, the agreement between Eliodoro Sr. and respondent is
subject to a suspensive condition — the procurement of a court approval,
not full payment. There was no reservation of ownership in the agreement.
In accordance with paragraph 1 of the Receipt, petitioners were supposed
to deed the disputed lots over to respondent. This they could do upon the
court’s approval, even before full payment. Hence, their contract was a
conditional sale, rather than a contract to sell as determined by the CA.
When a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth or effectivity

can take place only if and when the condition happens or is fulfilled. Thus,
the intestate court’s grant of the Motion for Approval of the sale filed by
respondent resulted in petitioners’ obligation to execute the Deed of Sale of
the disputed lots in his favor. The condition having been satisfied, the
contract was perfected. Henceforth, the parties were bound to fulfill what
they had expressly agreed upon.
Court approval is required in any disposition of the decedent’s estate per

Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. Reference to judicial approval, however,
cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of heirs to dispose of their
own pro indiviso shares in the co-heirship or co-ownership. In other words,
they can sell their rights, interests or participation in the property under
administration. A stipulation requiring court approval does not affect the
validity and the effectivity of the sale as regards the selling heirs. It merely
implies that the property may be taken out of custodialegis, but only with
the court’s permission. It would seem that the suspensive condition in the
present conditional sale was imposed only for this reason.
Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to the settlement of estates

(Rules 74 & 86-91) and the probate of wills (Rules 75-77) of deceased
persons, including the appointment and the removal of administrators and
executors (Rules 78-85). It also extends to matters incidental and collateral
to the exercise of a probate court’s recognized powers such as selling,
mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate.
Indeed, the rules on this point are intended to settle the estate in a speedy
manner, so that the benefits that may flow from such settlement may be
immediately enjoyed by the heirs and the beneficiaries.
56
Petitioners’ computation is correct. The CA computed Eliodoro’s share as
an heir based on one tenth of the entire disputed property. It should be
based only on the remaining half, after deducting the conjugal share.
Succession laws and jurisprudence require that when a marriage is

dissolved by the death of the husband or the wife, the decedent’s entire
estate – under the concept of conjugal properties of gains — must be
divided equally, with one half going to the surviving spouse and the other
half to the heirs of the deceased. After the settlement of the debts and
obligations, the remaining half of the estate is then distributed to the legal
heirs, legatees and devices.
57
G.R. No. 169129 March 28, 2007
SPS. VIRGILIO F. SANTOS & ESPERANZA LATI SANTOS,

SPS.VICTORINO F. SANTOS, & LAGRIMAS SANTOS, ERNESTO F.
SANTOS, and TADEO F. SANTOS, Petitioners, vs. SPS. JOSE
LUMBAO and PROSERFINA LUMBAO,
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Facts:SpousesLumbao filed an action for reconveyance with damages

against petitioners. Petitioners are survivors and legitimate heirs of Rita
Santos who allegedly sold 2 parcels of land to Sps. Lumbao when she was
alive by virtue of a document called ‘bilihannglupa’, The respondents even
claimed that the execution of the documen t was signed and witnessed by
petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo.
After having acquired the subject property,SpousesLumbao took actual

possession and built a house which they occupied as exclusive owners up
to the present. The Spouses made several verbal demands upon Rita,
during her lifetime, and thereafter upon herein petitioners, to execute the
necessary documents to effect the issuance of a separate title in their
favor. Spouses Lumbao alleged that prior to her death, Rita informed
respondent ProserfinaLumbao she could not deliver the title to the subject
property because the entire property inherited by her and her co-heirs from
Maria had not yet been partitioned.
Finally, the respondents Lumbao claimed that petitioners, acting

fraudulently and in conspiracy with one another, executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement, adjudicating and partitioning among themselves
and the other heirs, the estate left by Maria, which included the lot already
sold to them. Due to refusal of petitioners to convey the said property, the
spouses filed the action. The lower court (RTC) dismissed the complaint of
ground of lack of cause of action as the spouses allegedly did not comply
with the required barangay conciliation. The CA granted and ordered the
petitioners to convey the land to the spouses, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Are the heirs bound by the contract (BilihanngLupa)?
58
RULING: YES.
In "BilihanngLupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981, it is clear

that there was only one estate left by Maria upon her death. And this fact
was not refuted by the petitioners. Besides, the property described in Tax
Declaration No. A-018-01674 and the property mentioned in TCT No. 3216
are both located in Barrio Rosario, Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal,
and almost have the same boundaries. It is, thus, safe to state that the
property mentioned in Tax Declaration No. A-018-01674 and in TCT No.
3216 are one and the same.
In the case at bar, the right of the respondents Spouses Lumbao to seek
reconveyance does not prescribe because the latter have been and are still
in actual possession and occupation as owners of the property sought to be
reconveyed. Furthermore, SpousesLumbao cannot be held guilty of laches
because from the very start that they bought the 107-square meter lot from
the mother of the petitioners, they have constantly asked for the transfer of
the certificate of title into their names but Rita, during her lifetime, and the
petitioners, after the death of Rita, failed to do so on the flimsy excuse that
the lot had not been partitioned yet. Inexplicably, after the partition of the
entire estate of Maria, petitioners still included the 107-square meter lot in
their inheritance which they divided among themselves despite their
knowledge of the contracts of sale between their mother and the
SpousesLumbao.
It is noteworthy that at the time of the execution of the documents

denominated as "BilihanngLupa," the entire property owned by Maria, the
mother of Rita, was not yet divided among her and her co-heirs and so the
description of the entire estate is the only description that can be placed in
the "BilihanngLupa, dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981" because
the exact metes and bounds of the subject property sold to respondents
Spouses Lumbao could not be possibly determined at that time.
Nevertheless, that does not make the contract of sale between Rita and
respondents Spouses Lumbao invalid because both the law and
jurisprudence have categorically held that even while an estate remains
undivided, co-owners have each full ownership of their respective aliquots
or undivided shares and may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage them.
59
The co-owner, however, has no right to sell or alienate a specific or
determinate part of the thing owned in common, because such right over
the thing is represented by an aliquot or ideal portion without any physical
division. In any case, the mere fact that the deed purports to transfer a
concrete portion does not per se render the sale void. The sale is valid, but
only with respect to the aliquot share of the selling co-owner. Furthermore,
the sale is subject to the results of the partition upon the termination of the
co-ownership.
In the case at bar, when the estate left by Maria had been partitioned on 2
May 1986 by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, the 107- square
meter lot sold by the mother of the petitioners to respondents Spouses
Lumbao should be deducted from the total lot, inherited by them in
representation of their deceased mother, which in this case measures 467
square meters. The 107-square meter lot already sold to respondents
Spouses Lumbao can no longer be inherited by the petitioners because the
same was no longer part of their inheritance as it was already sold during
the lifetime of their mother.
Under the above premises, this Court holds that the "BilihanngLupa"
documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 are valid and
enforceable and can be made the basis of the respondents Spouses
Lumbao’s action for reconveyance. The failure of Spouses Lumbao to have
the said documents registered does not affect its validity and enforceability.
It must be remembered that registration is not a requirement for validity of
the contract as between the parties, for the effect of registration serves
chiefly to bind third persons. The principal purpose of registration is merely
to notify other persons not parties to a contract that a transaction involving
the property had been entered into. Where the party has knowledge of a
prior existing interest which is unregistered at the time he acquired a right
to the same land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the
effect of registration as to him. Hence, the "BilihanngLupa" documents
dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981, being valid and enforceable,
herein petitioners are bound to comply with their provisions. In short, such
documents are absolutely valid between and among the parties thereto.
Finally, the general rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by
their predecessors-in-interest applies in the present case. Article 1311 of
the NCC is the basis of this rule. It is clear from the said provision that
60
whatever rights and obligations the decedent have over the property were
transmitted to the heirs by way of succession, a mode of acquiring the
property, rights and obligations of the decedent to the extent of the value of
the inheritance of the heirs. Thus, the heirs cannot escape the legal
consequence of a transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-interest
because they have inherited the property subject to the liability affecting
their common ancestor. Being heirs, there is privity of interest between
them and their deceased mother. They only succeed to what rights
their mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also
valid and binding as against them. The death of a party does not excuse
nonperformance of a contract which involves a property right and the rights
and obligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the
deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the death of the
party when the other party has a property interest in the subject matter of
the contract.
In the end, despite the death of the petitioners’ mother, they are still bound
to comply with the provisions of the "BilihanngLupa," dated 17 August 1979
and 9 January 1981. Consequently, they must reconvey to herein
respondents Spouses Lumbao the 107-square meter lot which they bought
from Rita, petitioners’ mother. And as correctly ruled by the appellate court,
petitioners must pay respondents Spouses Lumbao attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses for having been compelled to litigate and incur
expenses to protect their interest. On this matter, we do not find reasons to
reverse the said findings.
61
Rodriguez v. Borja
G.R. No. L-21993, June 21, 1966 (17 SCRA 418)
FACTS:
In this case, there were 2 proceedings. First was an intestate

proceeding instituted meaning, a proceeding to settle the estate of a
deceased person who died without a will. But subsequently, a will was
found and again another proceeding was instituted, this time, testate
proceeding wherein the estate of the deceased person is settled if that
person has left a will. We are confronted here of 2 proceedings, one was
instituted ahead of the other.
Petitioners Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio, surnamed

Rodriguez, petition this Court for a writ of certiorari and prohibition to the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, for its refusal to grant their motion to
dismiss its Special Proceeding No. 1331, which said Court is alleged to
have taken cognizance of without jurisdiction.
Fr. Celistino Rodriguez died on Feb 12, 1963 in Manila. A month

later, Apolonia Pangilinan and AdelaidaJacalan delivered to the Clerk of
Court of Bulacan a last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez.Days later,
Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez, through counsel filed a petition for
leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will. Later on, before
the Court could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn. Subsequently,
Maria and Angela Rodriguez filed before the CFI of Rizal a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among other
things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Parañaque, Rizal, and died
without leaving a will and praying that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as
Special Administratrix of the estate; and that on March 12, 1963 Apolonia
Pangilinan and AdelaidaJacalan filed a petition in this Court for the probate
of the will delivered by them on March 4, 1963. They stipulated that Fr.
Rodriguez was born in Parañaque, Rizal; that he was Parish priest of the
Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan, from the year 1930 up to the time of
his death in 1963; that he was buried in Parañaque, and that he left real
properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan.
62
Rodriguez argues: that since the intestate proceedings in the CFI of
Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for
probate was filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on
the same date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition
for probate, citing OngsingcoVda. deBorja vs. Tan and De Borja.
Pangilinan and Jacalan argue: CFI of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction

over the case upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on
March 4, 1963, and that the case in this Court therefore has precedence
over the case filed in Rizal on March 12, 1963.
CFI: denied Rodriguez’ MTD, reasoning that a difference of a few

hours did not entitle one proceeding to preference over the other; that, as
early as March 7, movants were aware of the existence of the purported
will of Father Rodriguez, and that they only filed the case to prevent the
court from exercising jurisdiction over the probate proceedings
ISSUE:
Which proceeding should be preferred?
RULING:
As long as there is a will, even if that will is found later and even
if the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a person with a
will is filed later, that should be preferred. The will should be probated.
The will should be given effect as much as possible in order to give effect
to the wishes of the testator. The wishes of the testator must be given such
preference first. Probate of the will is needed in order to determine whether
or not the will was indeed valid, whether or not the will was executed in
observance with the formalities required by law and whether or not the
testator executed it with a sound mind.
63
If later on in the probate proceeding, the will is found not to have
validly executed, then you go to intestate proceeding. But first you go to
testate.
The jurisdiction of a probate court became vested upon the delivery

thereto of the will, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later,
because upon the will being deposited the court could, motuproprio, have
taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the
corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule
76, of the Revised Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 77, of the old Rules).
The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a
petition for the allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court
may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even if
no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate is
made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to
the time when the will was delivered.
The power to settle decedents' estates is conferred by law upon all

courts of first instance, and the domicile of the testator only affects the
venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court (In re Kaw Singco, 74 Phil. 239;
Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484; Bernabe vs. Vergara, 73 Phil. 676).
Where the estate proceedings were initiated in the Bulacan Court of First
Instance ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue.
(Sec.1, Rule 73, Revised Rules of Court)
Intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate since

intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will. Only
after final decision as to the nullity of testate succession could an intestate
succession be instituted. The institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal
may not thus proceed while the probate of the purported will of Father
Rodriguez is pending.
64
BALANAY V. MARTINEZ
G.R. NO. L-39247 JUNE 27, 1975
AQUINO, J.
DOCTRINE: Mixed succession is that effected partly by will and partly by

operation of law.
FACTS:
Leodegaria Julian died and survived by her husband, Felix Balanay Sr, and
6 legitimate children. She left a will which her son Felix Jr, petitioned for
probate. She stated in her will that 1. She was the owner of southern-half of
9 parcels of land, 2. She’s the absolute owner of 2 parcels of land which
she inherited, 3. That her properties should not be divided if her husband is
still alive, and 4. That the legitimes of her heirs should be satisfied by fruits
of her properties (by money).
Also, she added that upon her husband’s death, all of the conjugal assets
should be owned by her and be distributed according to the one stipulated
above. Thereafter, her daughter, Avelina and Felix Sr. opposed the probate
of the will on several grounds. Felix Jr, replied to the opposition and
attached an affidavit stating that his Father, Felix Sr, withdrew his
opposition and conform to the will left by Leodegaria. Felix Sr also
renounced his hereditary rights in favor of his 6 children.
Avelina, in her rejoinder contended that the said affidavit was void. That
Leodegaria invalidly claimed to be the owner of the southern portion of the
lots and she cannot partition the conjugal estate by allocation. Several
series of litigation happened and the RTC dismissed the petition for probate
thus it converted it to intestate proceedings.
ISSUE:
Was it proper for the RTC to declare the whole will void?
HELD:
NO. "Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the
valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without
defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the general
testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries"
The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the
conjugal lands is contrary to law because, although she was a coowner
65
thereof, her share was inchoate and pro indiviso but this illegal declaration
does not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded.
The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be
divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime but should be kept
intact and that the legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary to article
1080 of the Civil Code.
However, it should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's

conformity to his wife's will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his
one-half conjugal share became a part of his deceased wife's estate. His
conformity had the effect of validating the partition made of the will without
prejudice to the legitimes.
In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband
intended to partition the conjugal estate in the manner set forth in
paragraph V of her will. It is true that she could dispose of by will only her
half of the conjugal estate but since the husband, after the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership, had assented to her testamentary partition of the
conjugal estate, such partition has become valid, assuming that the will
may be probated.
It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the
will as contemplated in its uncancelled order of June 18, 1973. Save in an
extreme case where the will on its face is intrinsically void, it is the probate
court's duty to pass first upon the formal validity of the will. Generally, the
probate of the will is mandatory.
66
BALUS V. BALUS
G.R. NO. 168970 JANUARY 15, 2010
PERALTA, J.
DOCTRINE:The inheritance of a person includes not only the property and

the transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, but
also those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the
succession.
FACTS:
The case is between the children of spouses Rufo and Sebastiana Balus.
Sebastiana died on Sept 1978, while Rufo died on July 1984.
Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land as security for a loan he obtained from the
Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao Del Norte. Rufo failed to pay the loan and the
mortgaged property was foreclosed and subsequently sold to the Bank.
The sheriff executed a definite deed of sale in favor of the Bank after the
property was not redeemed within the period allowed by law. A new title
was issued in the name of the Bank.
In 1989, the children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate,
adjudicating each of them ⅓ portion of the property consisting of 10,246
square meters.
Three years after, Saturnino and Leonarda bought the subject property
from the Bank while Celestino continued possession of the lot.
In 1995, a complaint for recovery of possession and damages was filed by
Saturnino and Leonarda against Celestino who still refused to surrender
possession of the land even if he was already informed that the two were
the new owners of the property.
RTC ruled that Celestino had the right to purchase from Saturnino and
Leonarda his share in the disputed property as the Extrajudicial Settlement
of Estate was executed before the two bought the subject lot from the
Bank.
CA reversed the ruling and ordered Celestino to immediately surrender
possession of the subject property; declaring that the co-ownership was
extinguished when the three of them did not redeem the lot during the
redemption period and allowed the consolidation of ownership and
issuance of new title in the name of the Bank.
ISSUE:
Did the co-ownership among the siblings continue to exist even after the lot
was purchased by the Bank, the title was transferred to its name, and was
repurchased eventually by the Saturnino and Leonarda?
67
HELD: NO.
The court held that the Balus children were wrong in assuming that they
become co-owners of the property. Thus, any issue arising from the
supposed right of Celestino as co-owner of the contested parcel of land is
negated by the fact that in the eyes of the law, the disputed lot did not pass
into the hands of the children as compulsory heirs of Rufo at any given
point in time.
**On the argument that the EJS is an independent contract which
gives Celestino the right to enforce his right to claim a portion of the
disputed lot.
There is nothing in the subject Extrajudicial Settlement to indicate any
express stipulation for the Balus children to continue with their supposed
co-ownership of the contested lot.
For Celestino to claim that the Extrajudicial Settlement is an agreement
between him and his siblings to continue what they thought was their
ownership of the subject property, even after the same had been bought by
the Bank, is stretching the interpretation of the said Extrajudicial Settlement
too far.
In the first place, as earlier discussed, there is no co-ownership to talk
about and no property to partition, as the disputed lot never formed part of
the estate of their deceased father.
68
HEIRS OF LEANDRO NATIVIDAD v. MAURICIO-NATIVIDAD
G.R. NO. 198434 FEBRUARY 29, 2016
PERALTA, J.
FACTS:
Leandro and Juliana alleged that Sergio Natividad (Sergio), husband of

respondent Juana Mauricio-Natividad (Juana) and father of respondent
Jean Natividad-Cruz (Jean), obtained a loan from the Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP). As security for the loan, Sergio mortgaged two
parcels of land, one of which is co-owned and registered in his name and
that of his siblings namely, Leandro, Domingo and Adoracion. Sergio's
siblings executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing him to mortgage
the said property. The other mortgaged parcel of land, was registered in the
name of Sergio and Juana.
Subsequently, Sergio died without being able to pay his obligations with
DBP. Since the loan was nearing its maturity and the mortgaged properties
were in danger of being foreclosed, Leandro paid Sergio's loan obligations.
Considering that respondents were unable to reimburse Leandro for the
advances he made in Sergio's favor, respondents agreed that Sergio's
share in the lot which he co-owned with his siblings and the other parcel of
land in the name of Sergio and Juana, shall be assigned in favor of
Leandro and Juliana. Leandro's and Sergio's brother, Domingo, was tasked
to facilitate the transfer of ownership of the subject properties in favor of
Leandro and Juliana. However, Domingo died without being able to cause
such transfer. Subsequently, despite demands and several follow-ups
made by heirs of Leandro, respondents failed and refused to honor their
undertaking.
Respondents denied the allegations in the complaint and raising that the
complaint states no cause of action as respondents are not duty-bound to
reimburse whatever alleged payments were made by petitioners; and that
there is no contract between the parties to the effect that respondents are
under obligation to transfer ownership in petitioners' favor as
reimbursement for the alleged payments made by petitioners to DBP.
ISSUE:
Can the Heirs of Leandro demand reimbursement?
HELD: YES
The New Civil Code provides that under:

property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance,
of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by
will or by operation of law.
69
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of
a person which are not extinguished by his death.
Art. 781. The inheritance of a person includes not only the property and the
transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, but
also those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the
succession.
In the present case, respondents, being heirs of Sergio, are now liable to
settle his transmissible obligations, which include the amount due to
petitioners, prior to the distribution of the remainder of Sergio's estate to
them.Moreover, since respondents had already acknowledged that Sergio
had, in fact, incurred loan obligations with the DBP, they are liable to
reimburse the amount paid by Leandro for the payment of the said
obligation even if such payment was made without their knowledge or
consent.
Article 1236 of the Civil Code clearly provides that:
The creditor is not bound to accept payment or performance by a third

person who has no interest in the fulfillment of the obligation, unless there
is a stipulation to the contrary.
Whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has paid,
except that if he paid without the knowledge or against the will of the
debtor, he can recover only insofar as the payment has been beneficial to
the debtor.
Neither can respondents evade liability by arguing that they were not
parties to the contract between Sergio and the DBP. As earlier stated, the
fact remains that, in the Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs, respondents
clearly acknowledged Sergio's loan obligations with the DBP. Being
Sergio's heirs, they succeed not only to the rights of Sergio but also to his
obligations.
70
VITUG v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 82027 March 29, 1990
SARMIENTO, J.
DOCTRINE:A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the

formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition
of this estate, to take effect after his death.
FACTS:
Dolores Luchangco Vitug died naming Rowena Faustino-Corona as
executrix. Her husband, Romarico G. Vitug filed a motion asking for
authority from the probate court to sell certain shares of stock and real
properties belonging to the estate to cover his advances to the estate in the
sum of P667,731.66 which he claimed as personal funds.
Rowena Corona opposed on the ground that the same funds withdrawn
from savings account No. 35342-038 were conjugal partnership properties
and part of the estate, and hence, there was allegedly no ground for
reimbursement. Vitug now insists that the funds were exclusive property
having been acquired through a survivorship agreement executed with his
late wife and the bank on June 19, 1970. It provides:
We hereby agree with each other and with the BANK OF
AMERICAN NATIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS
ASSOCIATION (hereinafter referred to as the BANK), that
all money now or hereafter deposited by us or any or
either of us with the BANK in our joint savings current
account shall be the property of all or both of us and shall
be payable to and collectible or withdrawable by either or
any of us during our lifetime, and after the death of either
or any of us shall belong to and be the sole property of
the survivor or survivors, and shall be payable to and
collectible or withdrawable by such survivor or survivors.
We further agree with each other and the BANK that the
receipt or check of either, any or all of us during our
lifetime, or the receipt or check of the survivor or
survivors, for any payment or withdrawal made for our
above-mentioned account shall be valid and sufficient
release and discharge of the BANK for such payment or
withdrawal.
The RTC ruled in favor of Romarico in his motion by upholding the validity
of the agreement. However, CA reversed RTC’s ruling holding that the
survivorship agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causa which "did
not comply with the formalities of a valid will as prescribed by Article 805 of
the Civil Code," and secondly, assuming that it is a mere donation inter
71
vivos, it is a prohibited donation under the provisions of Article 133 of the
Civil Code.
ISSUE:Is the survivorship agreement considered as a will? Thus there is

need for complying with the formalities of will or donation?
HELD: NO.
The conveyance in question is not, first of all, one of mortis causa, which
should be embodied in a will. A will has been defined as "a personal,
solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person disposes of
his property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect
after his death." In other words, the bequest or device must pertain to the
testator. In this case, the monies subject of savings account No. 35342-038
were in the nature of conjugal funds and simply their joint holdings.
There is no showing that the funds exclusively belonged to one party, and
hence it must be presumed to be conjugal, having been acquired during the
existence of the marital relations.
Neither is the survivorship agreement a donation inter vivos, for obvious
reasons, because it was to take effect after the death of one party.
Secondly, it is not a donation between the spouses because it involved no
conveyance of a spouse's own properties to the other.
In the case at bar, when the spouses Vitug opened savings account No.
35342-038, they merely put what rightfully belonged to them in a money-
making venture. They did not dispose of it in favor of the other, which would
have arguably been sanctionable as a prohibited donation. And since the
funds were conjugal, it cannot be said that one spouse could have
pressured the other in placing his or her deposits in the money pool.
72
SEANGIO V. REYES
G.R. NOS. 140371-72 NOVEMBER 27, 2006
AZCUNA, J:
DOCTRINE:A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the

formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition
of this estate, to take effect after his death.
FACTS:
Alfredo Seangio and other siblings filed for the settle of the intestate estate
of their Father Segundo Seangio. Dy and Virginia Seangio opposed
because they alleged that Segundo left a holographic will disinheriting
Alfredo. Hence, the proceedings for intestate were suspended and
replaced by proceedings for probate of the will.
The holographic will quoted as follows:
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa
465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at nagtatalay ng maiwanag na
pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng
lahat at anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na
si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin at
isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga
kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob
ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon
gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa
ibabaw.
Alfredo moved for dismissal on the ground that the holographic will does
not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not
meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. That the will
only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest
son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not
named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition
which would result to intestacy.
The RTC dismissed the probate proceedings finding that it would result to
preterition.
ISSUE:Does a document containing disinheritance can also be considered

as a will?
HELD: YES
Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere
disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will
73
prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo
himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the
terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative
disposition of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo,
nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the
disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator
Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned
as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his
last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in
the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance
cannot be given effect.
With regard to the issue on preterition, the Court believes that the
compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in
the Court’s opinion, Segundo’s last expression to bequeath his estate to all
his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did
not institute an heir to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The
mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the
document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name
was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and
his son, Alfredo.
74
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS AND
MARIA MARLENA COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000.
PURISIMA, J.:
DOCTRINE:A will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a

person disposes of his property, to take effect after his death. (Article 783,
New Civil Code) Since the will expresses the manner in which a person
intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the
testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a will cannot be the subject of a
compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of
making a will.
FACTS: From the Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of
testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla who was the predecessor-in-
interest of Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511,855
square meter parcel of land at the Bacolod Cadastre.
In the fourth paragraph of the said will, it stated that: “should I die and
Jorge Rabadilla shall have already received the ownership of the said lot,
… Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give
Maria Marlina Coscuella y Belleza, 75 piculs of export sugar and 25 piculs
of domestic sugar, until Marlina dies.”
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife, Rufina, and
children Johnny, Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscuella y Belleza brought a

complaint against the heirs of Rabadilla to enforce the provisions of the
subject codicil.
The lower court dismissed the complaint finding that the action was
premature since no intestate proceeding was yet initiated to give full
meaning and semblance to the claim of Maria Marlena under the Codicil.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and established the right of
Maria Marlena to receive 100 piculs of sugar annually, which was the heirs
of Rabadilla’s obligation under Aleja Belleza’s codicil.
75
ISSUE:Does Johnny Rabadilla have an obligation to deliver to Marlena
Coscuella 100 piculs of sugar annually?
RULING: YES.
The Supreme Court held that the subject codicil provides that the instituted
heir is under obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena
Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is imposed on the instituted heir, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should
they sell, lease, mortgate or otherwise negotiate the property involved. The
Codicil further provides that in the event that the obligation to deliver the
sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall seize the property
and turn it over to the testatrix’s near descendants. The non-performance
of the said obligation is thus with the sanction of seizure of the property and
reversion thereof to the testatrix’s near descedants. Since the said
obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only on the instituted heir
but also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the testatrix
in case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to the
instituted heir and his successors-in-interest.
Suffice it to state that a will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by
which a person disposes of his property, to take effect after his death.
(Article 783, New Civil Code) Since the will expresses the manner in which
a person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of
the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a will cannot be the subject of a
compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of
making a will.
The petition is dismissed. CA decision is affirmed.
76
ANTONIO CASTANEDA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSE E. ALEMANY,
Defendant-Appellant.
[G.R. No. 1439. March 19, 1904]
WILLARD, J.:
DOCTRINE:If a will is signed by the testator or by someone else in his

presence and under his express direction, it is a matter of indifference by
whom the mechanical work of writing of the will is done.
FACTS:Jose Alemany contested the validity of the will of Dona Juana

Moreno on the ground that although the attestation caluse in the will states
that the testator signed the will in the presence of three witnesses who also
each signed in each other’s presence, the will was not actually written by
Dona Juana Moreno.
ISSUE:Should the will be written by the testator herself in order to be valid?
RULING:NO.
Section 618 of the Civil Code requires (1) that the will be in writing and (2)
either the testator sign it himself or, if he does not sign it, that it be signed
by someone in his presence and by his express direction. Who does the
mechanical work of writing th ewill is a matter of indifference. The fact,
therefore, that in this case the will was typewritten in the office of the lawyer
for the testatrix is of no consequence.
77
BUHAY DE ROMA, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and FELICIDAD CARINGAL, as Guardian of Rosalinda De
Roma, Respondents.
[G.R. No. L-46903, July 23, 1987.]
CRUZ, J.:
DOCTRINE:When there is an imperfect description, or when no person or

property exactly answers the description, mistakes and omissions must be
corrected, if the error appears from the context of the will or from extrinsic
evidence, excluding the oral declarations of the testator as to his intention;
and when an uncertainty arises upon the face of the will, as to the
application of any of its provisions, the testator’s intention is to be
ascertained from the words of the will, taking into consideration the
circumstances under which it was made, excluding such oral declarations.
(Article 789, New Civil Code)
FACTS: Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay de

Roma and Rosalinda de Roma. She died intestate on April 30, 1971.
Buhay was appointed administratrix and in due time, filed an inventory of
the estate. This was opposed by Rosalinda on the ground that certain
properties earlier donated to Buhay by Candelaria, and the fruits thereof,
had not been included.
The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land worth

P10,297.50. The parties cannot agree on whether these lands are subject
to collation. As to Felicidad (guardian of Rosalinda), it is, in accordance to
Article 1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for her part cited Article 1062,
claiming that she has no obligation to collate since the decedent prohibited
such collation and the donation was not officious.
The issue was resolved in favor of Buhay by the trial court. On appeal, the
order of the trial court was reversed, and the Court of Appeals held that the
deed of donation contained no express provision to collate. Accordingly, it
ordered collation and equally divided the net estate of the decedent,
including the fruits of the donated property, between Buhay and Rosalinda.
ISSUE:Did the will of Candelaria de Roma prohibit collation of the donated

properties?
RULING: NO.
78
The Supreme Court held that there is nothing in the provisions of the will
expressly prohibiting the collation of the donated properties. As the CA
correctly observed, the phrase “sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di
mababawing muli” merely described the donation as “irrevocable” and
should not be construed as an express prohibition against collation. The
fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject
thereof from the collation required under Article 1061.
The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and

unequivocally as an exception to the general rule announced in Article
1062. Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not the
exception but the rule, which is categorical enough.
79
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA, executrix-appellee, vs. ESTELA DIZON,
TOMAS V. DIZON, BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON,
ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA DIZON, oppositors-appellants.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
DOCTRINE:The testator’s wishes and intention constitute the first and

principal law in the matter of testatments, when expressed clearly and
precisely in his last will amount to the only law whose mandate must
imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs
and devisees and legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the
courts may substitute their own criterion for the testator’s will.
FACTS: Testatrix Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga

and was survived by seven compulsory heirs - six legitimate children and a
legitimate granddaughter Lilia Dizon. Lilia is the only legitimate child and
heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of Agripina. Six
compulsory heirs, except Marina (executrix-appellee), are the oppositors-
appellants.
Agripina left a will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the

Pampango dialect. The beneficiaries of the said will were the compulsory
heirs and seven other legitimate grandchildren.
In her will, Agripina divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties
apprised at P1,801,960.00 among the heirs. Testate proceedings were
commenced and the will was duly allowed and admitted to probate. Marina
was appointed executrix of Agripina’s estate.
The real and personal properties of Agripina at the time of her death had a
total apprised value of P1,811,695.60 and the legitime of each of the seven
compulsory heirs amounted to P129,361.11. (1/7 of the half of the estate
reserved for the legitime of legitimate children and descendants.) In her
will, Agripina commanded that her property be divided in accordance with
her testamentary disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed
specific real properties comprising practically the entire bulk of her estate
among her six children and eight grandchildren.
Marina filed her project of partition adjudicating the properties to each of

the compulsory heirs, to their legitimes to P129,254.96.
80
The oppositors also filed a counter-project of partition, proposing that the
whole estate of Agripina to be reduced into half -- one half for the heirs, and
the other half would be deemed as constituting the legitime of Marina and
the six other heirs, to be divided among them in seven equal parts of
P129,362.11 as their respective legitimes.
The lower court approved the project of partition of Marina on the ground
that Articles 906 and 907 of the New Civil Code provide that when the
legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be completed and
satisfied. While it is true that this process has been followed and adhered to
in the two projects of partition, it is observe that Marina and the oppositors
differ in respect to the source from which the portion or portions shall be
taken in order to fully restore that impaired legitime.
ISSUE:Does Marina’s project of partition give effect to what Agripina

intended in her will?
RULING: YES
The Supreme Court ruled that Agripina’s testamentary disposition was in

the nature of a partition of her estate by will, which is valid, as
contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the
Civil Code, which provides that, “Should a person make a partition of her
estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected,
insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.” This
right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right of
compulsory heirs to their legitimes. This right is safeguarded by the
provisions of the Civil Code in Articles 906 and 907.
At the same time, the right of a testator to partition his estate by will was
recognized in Article 1056, which has been reproduced as Article 1080 in
the New Civil Code, permitting that “any person (not a testator) to partition
his estate by an act inter vivos.”
Aside from the provisions of Articles 906 and 907, other codal provisions
support Marina’s project of partition as approved by the lower court rather
than the counter-project of partition proposed by the oppositors whereby
they would reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made by
Agripina to one-half and limit the same, which they would consider as mere
devisees or legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free
portion, and apply the other half of the estate to payment of the legitimes of
81
the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors’ proposal would amount
substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix’
will.
82
LEONOR VILLAFOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellantvs.
DELFIN JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the testate
estate of FAUSTA NEPOMUCENO, defendant-appellee.
[G.R. No. L-15737, February 28, 1962]
REYES, J.B.L, J.:
DOCTRINE:The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will

give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any
of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that
one is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy. (Article 791, New Civil
Code)
FACTS:Don Nicolas Villaflor, a wealthy man of Castillejos, Zambales,

executed a will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and
bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona Fausta Nepomuceno, one-half of all
his real and personal properties, giving the other half to his brother Don
Fausto Villafor.
Don Nicolas died on March 3, 1922, without begetting any child with his
wife. Fausta, already a widow, thereupon instituted a settlement of her
husband’s estate, where she was appointed judicial adminstratrix. She
submitted a project of partition, which showed that she received the
ownership and possession of a considerable amount of real and personal
estate, and the use and possession of all real and personal properties
mentioned in the 7th clause of the will.
Dona Fausta died without having contracted a second marriage, and

without having begotten any child with Don Nicolas. Her estate was settled
in the lower court, and Delfin Juico was duly appointed as judicial
administrator.
Leonor Villaflor instituted an action against Delfin Juico contending that

upon Dona Fausta’s death, she (Leonora) became vested with the
ownership of the real and personal properties bequeathed by Don Nicolas
pursuant to the 7th and 8th clause of the will.
The lower court ruled in favor of Delfin and held that the title to the
properties of Don Nicolas became absolutely vested in the widow upon her
death, on account that she never remarried.
83
ISSUE: Can Leonor validly recover the properties from her grand-uncle
Don Nicolas?
RULING: YES
The Supreme Court agreed with Leonor that the plain desire and intent of
Don Nicolas, as manifested in clause 8 or his testament, was to invest
Dona Fausta with only a usufruct or life tenure in the properties described
in the seventh clause, subject to the further condition that if the widow
remarried, her rights would thereupon cease, even during her lifetime. That
the widow was meant to have no more than a life interest in those
properties, even if she did not remarry at all, is evident from the
expressions used by Don Nicolas “uso y posesion mientras viva” (use and
possession while alive) in which the first half of the phrase “uso y posesion”
instead of “dominio” or “propriedad” reinforces the second “mientras viva.”
The testator plainly did not give his widow the full ownership of these
particular properties, but only the right to their possession and use (or
enjoyment) during her lifetime.
84
DEL ROSARIO V. DEL ROSARIO
2 PHIL 321, MAY 19, 1903
WILLARD, J
CASE DIGEST BY: MAIZ
DOCTRINE:Article 907 requires the executor to render accounts to the

heir, not to the legatee; and although by article 789 all of the provisions of
Chapter II (in which both articles are found) relating to heirs are made
applicable to legatees, we cannot hold that this requires an executor to
submit his accounts to one who has no interest in the estate except to a
money legacy when there is no suggestion that it will not be paid when the
right to it is established.
FACTS: Don Nicolas del Rosario died on July 14, 1897, leaving a last will,
the ninth, eleventh, and eighteenth clauses of which are as follows:
Ninth. The testator declares that the sum of 5,000 pesos is to be divided,
3,000 pesos for the Enrique and 2,000 pesos for the Ramon, the delivery of
the said sums to be effected by the wife of the testator, provided that these
young men behave themselves as they have done up to the present time,
and do not cease to study until taking the degree of bachelor of arts, and
then take a business course, if their health will permit, their support to be
paid out of the testamentary estate and they to live in the house of the
widow.
Eleventh. The testator declares that in a case the said young men should
be still engaged in study at the time of the death of the testator's wife, they
shall continue to be supported at the expense of the testamentary estate,
without deducting such expenses from their legacies, if they should desire
to continue the same studies.
85
Eighteenth. The testator further states that although his wife is at the
present time fifty-five years of age, and consequently is not likely to marry
again, as she herself says, nevertheless it is impossible that the opposite of
what she asserts might occur, and, if so, then it is to be regarded as
sufficient reason to authorize the young men Ramon and Enrique, so often
referred to, separate from their aunt, in which event they are to be
supported by the testamentary estate on a small allowance of twenty-five
pesos per month, provided that they continue their studies or should be in
poor health, this without in any respect reducing the amount of their shares.
Don Ramon del Rosario brought this action in 1902 against Don Clemente
del Rosario, the then executor, asking, among other things, that the said
executor pay him an allowance from the death of the widow of the testator
at the rate of 75 pesos a month, and that the executor allow him to live in
the house in which the widow was living at that time.
The widow of the testator, Doña Honorata Valdez, died on July 7, 1900.
ISSUE: Is Ramon entitled to his claim?
RULING: No.
So far as the disposition of that part of the inheritance left in the aunt's will
to Doña Luisa for life is concerned, the question is free from doubt. It is
distinctly declared that Ramon del Rosario and Enrique Gloria shall take
certain parts of it after 1,000 pesos have been deducted.
They are pointed out by name as the legatees. It is true that they are called
the natural sons of Don Clemente. But this is merely a further description of
persons already well identified, and, if false, can be rejected in accordance
86
with the provision of article 773 of the Civil Code, which by article 789 is
applicable to legatees.
As to the estate of Don Nicolas, the only thing here in question is the right
to the allowance. As we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled to it, he is not
entitled to any statement of accounts as such pretended legatee.
As to the estate of Doña Honorata, he is entitled to be paid a legacy of

1,500 pesos. Article 907 requires the executor to render accounts to the
heir, not to the legatee; and although by article 789 all of the provisions of
Chapter II (in which both articles are found) relating to heirs are made
applicable to legatees, we cannot hold that this requires an executor to
submit his accounts to one who has no interest in the estate except to a
money legacy when there is no suggestion that it will not be paid when the
right to it is established.
87
Estate of Rigor v. Rigor
89 SCRA 493
April 30, 1979
Doctrine: One canon in the interpretation of the testamentary provisions is

that "the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the will
taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was made", but
excluding the testator's oral declarations as to his intention (Art. 789, Civil
Code of the Philippines).
FACTS:Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on August

9, 1935, leaving a will executed on October 29, 1933 which was probated
by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935.
 Named as devisees in the will were the testators nearest relatives,
namely, his three sisters. The testator gave a devise to his cousin,
Fortunato Gamalinda.
 In addition, the will contained the following controversial bequest
LEGACY OF THE CHURCH
That it be adjudicated in favor of the legacy purported to be given to the

nearest male relative who shall take the priesthood, and in the interim to be
administered by the actual Catholic Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of
Victoria, Tarlac, Philippines, or his successors, the real properties.
 Judge Cruz approved the project of partition.
 Inasmuch as no nephew of the testator claimed the devise and as the
administratrix and the legal heirs believed that the parish priest of
Victoria had no right to administer the ricelands, the same were not
delivered to that ecclesiastic. The testate proceeding remained
pending.
 About thirteen years after the approval of the project of partition, the
parish priest of Victoria filed in the pending testate proceeding a
petition praying for the appointment of a new administrator, who
should deliver to the church the said ricelands, and further praying
that the possessors thereof be ordered to render an accounting of the
fruits.
 In 1957 the parish priest filed another petition for the delivery of the
ricelands to the church as trustee.
 The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered praying that the
bequest be declared inoperative and that they be adjudged as the
88
persons entitled to the said ricelands since "no nearest male relative
of" the testator "has ever studied for the priesthood".
 That petition was opposed by the parish priest of Victoria.
ISSUE: Did the testator contemplate only his nearest male relative at
the time of his death? Or did he have in mind any of his nearest male
relatives at anytime after his death?
HELD: The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of
testaments. When his intention is clearly and precisely expressed, any
interpretation must be in accord with the plain and literal meaning of his
words, except when it may certainly appear that his intention was different
from that literally expressed
The intent of the testator is the cardinal rule in the construction of wills." It is
"the life and soul of a will. It is "the first greatest rule, the sovereign guide,
the polestar, in giving effect to a will".
One canon in the interpretation of the testamentary provisions is that "the

testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words of the will taking into
consideration the circumstances under which it was made", but excluding
the testator's oral declarations as to his intention (Art. 789, Civil Code of the
Philippines).
To ascertain Father Rigor's intention, it may be useful to make the following

re-statement of the provisions of his will.
That he bequeathed the ricelands to anyone of his nearest male relatives

who would pursue an ecclesiastical career until his ordination as a priest.
That the devisee could not sell the ricelands.
That the devisee at the inception of his studies in sacred theology could
enjoy and administer the ricelands, and once ordained as a priest, he could
continue enjoying and administering the same up to the time of his death
but the devisee would cease to enjoy and administer the ricelands if he
discontinued his studies for the priesthood.
That if the devisee became a priest, he would be obligated to celebrate

every year twenty masses with prayers for the repose of the souls of Father
Rigor and his parents.
xxx
89
It may be deduced that the testator intended to devise the ricelands to his
nearest male relative who would become a priest, who was forbidden to
sell the ricelands, who would lose the devise if he discontinued his studies
for the priesthood, or having been ordained a priest, he was
excommunicated, and who would be obligated to say annually twenty
masses with prayers for the repose of the souls of the testator and his
parents.
On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would
administer the ricelands only in two situations: one, during the interval of
time that no nearest male relative of the testator was studying for the
priesthood and two, in case the testator's nephew became a priest and he
was excommunicated.
SC held that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative
living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. "In
order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living
at the moment the succession opens, except in case of representation,
when it is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code).
90
Rabadilla v. CA
G.R. No. 113725, June 29, 2000
Purisima, J:
Doctrine: In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the

face of the Will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the testator's
intention is to be ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into
consideration the circumstances under which it was made. Such
construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must be
adopted.
Facts: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix

AlejaBelleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein
petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of parcel of
land. The Codicil provides that Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation
until he dies, every year to give Maria MarlinaCoscolluela y Belleza, (75)
(sic) piculs of Export sugar and (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said
Maria MarlinaCoscolluela y Belleza dies.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died. Private respondent brought a complaint, to

enforce the provisions of subject Codicil.
Issue: Are the obligations of Jorge Rabadilla under the Codicil inherited by
his heirs?
Held: Yes.In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the

face of the Will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the testator's
intention is to be ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into
consideration the circumstances under which it was made. Such
construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must be
adopted.
91
VDA DE VILLAFLOR V. JUICO
GR NO. L-15737 FEBRUARY 28, 1962
REYES, J,B,L. J:
Doctrine: If the testator wanted to give the properties to DoňaFausta then

he should have specifically stated in his will that ownership should belong
to DoňaFausta without mentioning any condition.
Facts: Don Nicolas Villaflor executed a will in Spanish in his own

handwriting, devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona Faustina
½ of all his real and personal properties giving the other half to his brother
Don Fausto.
Petitioner filed an action against the administrator contending that upon the
widow’s death, she became vested with the ownership of the properties
bequeathed under clause 7 pursuant to its 8th clause of the will.
Issue: Is the petitioner entitled to the ownership of the properties upon the
death of Dona Faustina?
Held: No. The intention of the testator here was to merely give usufructuary
right to his wife DoňaFausta because in his will he provided that
DoňaFausta shall forfeit the properties if she fails to bear a child and
because she died without having begotten any children with the deceased
then it means that DoňaFausta never acquired ownership over the
property. Upon her death, because she never acquired ownership over the
property, the said properties are not included in her estate. Those
properties actually belong to Villaflor. That was the intention of the testator.
Otherwise, if the testator wanted to give the properties to DoňaFausta then
he should have specifically stated in his will that ownership should belong
to DoňaFausta without mentioning any condition.
92
YAMBAO V. GONZALES
G.R. NO. L-10763 (1961)
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J:
Doctrine: The words 'dapat TUNGKULIN O GANGPANAN" mean to do or

to carry out as a mandate or directive, and having reference to the word
"pahihintulutan", can convey no other meaning than to impose a duty upon
appellees. To follow an otherwise interpretation would be to devoid the
wish of the testatrix of its real and true meaning.
Facts: On August 10, 1942, Maria Gonzales executed a will bequeathing to

appellees all her properties situated in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. The will was
probated in 1948.
Immediately, thereafter, appellant went to appellees to request that he be

placed as tenant of the riceland which, by an express provision of said will,
they were directed to give to him for cultivation, as tenant, and when they
refused alleging that they had already given it to another tenant he filed the
present action.
Defendants averred that the provisions of the will relied upon by plaintiff is
not mandatory; that the determination of who should be the tenant of the
land is vested in a special court; and that the present action is not the
proper remedy.
The pertinent provisions of the will relied upon by appellant read as follows:
Dapat din namanmalaman ng dalawakong
tagapagmananasila MARIA PABLO at ANGELINA
GONZALES nasila ay may dapat TUNGKULIN O
GANGPANAN GAYA ng mgasumusunod:
x xxxxxxxx
93
Pahihintulutannilanasi Delfin Yambao ang makapagtrabajo ng
bukidhabangpanahon, at ang nasabingbukid ay isasailalim ng pamamahala
ng Albaseasamantalang ang bukid ay nasausapin at may utang pa.
Issue: How should the will be interpreted?
Held: Analyzing the wish of the testator carefully, SC finds that the same
contains a clear directive to employ appellant as may be seen from the
words preceding the word "pahihintulutan", which say: "Dapat din
namanmalaman ng dalawakongtagapagmananasila MARIA PABLO at
ANGELINA GONZALES nasila ay may dapat TUNGKULIN O
GANGPANAN GAYA ng mga sumusunod."
The words 'dapat TUNGKULIN O GANGPANAN" mean to do or to carry

out as a mandate or directive, and having reference to the word
"pahihintulutan", can convey no other meaning than to impose a duty upon
appellees. To follow an otherwise interpretation would be to devoid the
wish of the testatrix of its real and true meaning.
94
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA, BELINDA
CAPONONG-NOBLE, Petitioner, v.
ALIPIO ABAJA and NOEL ABELLAR, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 147145, January 31, 2005
CARPIO, J.:
Case Digest by: Cheryll Navarette
DOCTRINE:
The facts and circumstances of record are to be considered in the

application of any given rule. If the surrounding circumstances point to a
regular execution of the will, and the instrument appears to have been
executed substantially in accordance with the requirements of the law, the
inclination should, in the absence of any suggestion of bad faith, forgery or
fraud, lean towards its admission to probate, although the document may
suffer from some imperfection of language, or other non-essential defect.
Precision of language in the drafting of an attestation clause is

desirable. However, it is not imperative that a parrot-like copy of the words
of the statute be made. It is sufficient if from the language employed it can
reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause fulfills what the law
expects of it.
FACTS:
Abada died sometime in May 1940.His widow Paula Toray ("Toray")

died sometime in September 1943. Both died without legitimate children.
On 13 September 1968, Alipio C. Abaja ("Alipio") filed with the then

Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (now RTC-Kabankalan) a
petition for the probate of the last will and testament ("will") of Abada.
Abada allegedly named as his testamentary heirs his natural children
EulogioAbaja ("Eulogio") and Rosario Cordova. Alipio is the son of Eulogio.
NicanorCaponong ("Caponong") opposed the petition on the ground

that Abada left no will when he died in 1940. Caponong further alleged that
the will, if Abada really executed it, should be disallowed for the following
reasons: (1) it was not executed and attested as required by law; (2) it was
not intended as the last will of the testator; and (3) it was procured by
undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries.
Citing the same grounds invoked by Caponong, the alleged intestate heirs
of Abada, namely, Joel, Julian, Paz, Evangeline, Geronimo, Humberto,
Teodora and Elena Abada ("Joel Abada, et al."), and Levi, Leandro,
Antonio, Florian, Hernani and Carmela Tronco ("Levi Tronco, et al."), also
opposed the petition. The oppositors are the nephews, nieces and
grandchildren of Abada and Toray.
95
On 13 September 1968, Alipio filed another petition before the RTC-
Kabankalanfor the probate of the last will and testament of Toray.
Caponong, Joel Abada, et al., and Levi Tronco, et al. opposed the petition
on the same grounds.
On 20 September 1968, Caponong filed a petition before the RTC-

Kabankalanpraying for the issuance in his name of letters of administration
of the intestate estate of Abada and Toray.
In an Order dated 14 August 1981, the RTC-Kabankalan admitted to

probate the will of Toray. Since the oppositors did not file any motion for
reconsideration, the order allowing the probate of Toray's will became final
and executory.
In an order dated 23 November 1990, the RTC-Kabankalan

designated Belinda Caponong-Noble ("Caponong-Noble") Special
Administratrix of the estate of Abada and Toray. Caponong-Noble moved
for the dismissal of the petition for probate of the will of Abada. The RTC-
Kabankalan denied the motion in an Order dated 20 August 1991.
Sometime in 1993, during the proceedings, Presiding Judge Rodolfo

S. Layumas discovered that in an Order dated 16 March 1992, former
Presiding Judge Edgardo Catilo had already submitted the case for
decision. Thus, the RTC-Kabankalan rendered a Resolution dated 22 June
1994, as follows:
There having been sufficient notice to the heirs as required by law;

that there is substantial compliance with the formalities of a Will as the law
directs and that the petitioner through his testimony and the deposition of
Felix Gallinero was able to establish the regularity of the execution of the
said Will and further, there being no evidence of bad faith and fraud, or
substitution of the said Will, the Last Will and Testament of AlipioAbada
dated June 4, 1932 is admitted and allowed probate.
As prayed for by counsel, Noel Abbellar is appointed administrator of

the estate of Paula Toray who shall discharge his duties as such after
letters of administration shall have been issued in his favor and after taking
his oath and filing a bond in the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00)
Pesos.
Mrs. Belinda C. Noble, the present administratrix of the estate of

AlipioAbada shall continue discharging her duties as such until further
orders from this Court.
The RTC-Kabankalan ruled on the only issue raised by the oppositors

in their motions to dismiss the petition for probate, that is, whether the will
of Abada has an attestation clause as required by law. The RTC-
Kabankalan further held that the failure of the oppositors to raise any other
matter forecloses all other issues.
96
Not satisfied with the Resolution, Caponong-Noble filed a notice of
appeal.
In a Decision promulgated on 12 January 2001, the Court of Appeals

affirmed the Resolution of the RTC-Kabankalan. The appellate court found
that the RTC-Kabankalan properly admitted to probate the will of
Abada.Hence, the present recourse by Caponong-Noble.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the RTC-Kabankalan in admitting

to probate the will of Abada?
RULING:
No. The Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the RTC-
Kabankalan in admitting to probate the will of Abada.
Abada executed his will on 4 June 1932. The laws in force at that
time are the Civil Code of 1889 or the Old Civil Code, and Act No. 190 or
the Code of Civil Procedurewhich governed the execution of wills before
the enactment of the New CivilCode.
The matter in dispute in the present case is the attestation clause in

the will of Abada. Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended
by Act No. 2645, governs the form of the attestation clause of Abada's will.
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:
SEC. 618. Requisites of will. No will, except as provided in the

preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor
charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the language or dialect
known by the testator and signed by him, or by the testator's name written
by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and
attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of each other. The testator or the person
requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the
will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left
margin, and said pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on
the upper part of each sheet. The attestation shall state the number of
sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the
testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other
person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of
three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages
thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.
Caponong-Noble asserts that the will of Abada does not indicate that
it is written in a language or dialect known to the testator. Further, she
maintains that the will is not acknowledged before a notary public. She
cites in particular Articles 804 and 805 of the OldCivil Code, thus:
97
Art. 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in [a] language
or dialect known to the testator.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by
the testator and the witnesses. xxx
Caponong-Noble actually cited Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil
Code. Article 804 of the Old Civil Code is about the rights and obligations of
administrators of the property of an absentee, while Article 806 of the Old
Civil Code defines a legitime.
Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code are new provisions.
Article 804 of the New Civil Code is taken from Section 618 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. Article 806 of the New Civil Code is taken from Article 685
of the Old Civil Code which provides:
Art. 685. The notary and two of the witnesses who authenticate the
will must be acquainted with the testator, or, should they not know him, he
shall be identified by two witnesses who are acquainted with him and are
known to the notary and to the attesting witnesses. The notary and the
witnesses shall also endeavor to assure themselves that the testator has,
in their judgment, the legal capacity required to make a will.
Witnesses authenticating a will without the attendance of a notary, in

cases falling under Articles 700 and 701, are also required to know the
testator.However, the Code of Civil Procedure repealed Article 685 of the
Old Civil Code. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, the intervention of a
notary is not necessary in the execution of any will. Therefore, Abada's will
does not require acknowledgment before a notary public.
Caponong-Noble points out that nowhere in the will can one discern
that Abada knew the Spanish language. She alleges that such defect is
fatal and must result in the disallowance of the will. On this issue, the
Court of Appeals held that the matter was not raised in the motion to
dismiss, and that it is now too late to raise the issue on appeal. We agree
with Caponong-Noble that the doctrine of estoppel does not apply in
probate proceedings. In addition, the language used in the will is part of the
requisites under Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Court
deems it proper to pass upon this issue.
Nevertheless, Caponong-Noble's contention must still fail. There is

no statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the testator knew the
language or dialect used in the will. This is a matter that a party may
establish by proof aliunde. Caponong-Noble further argues that Alipio, in
his testimony, has failed, among others, to show that Abada knew or
understood the contents of the will and the Spanish language used in the
will. However, Alipio testified thatAbada used to gather Spanish-speaking
people in their place. In these gatherings, Abada and his companions
98
would talk in the Spanish language. This sufficiently proves that Abada
speaks the Spanish language.
We rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate of Abada's

will. Abada's will clearly shows four signatures: that of Abada and of three
other persons. It is reasonable to conclude that there are three witnesses
to the will. The question on the number of the witnesses is answered by an
examination of the will itself and without the need for presentation of
evidence aliunde.
99
In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO
ABADIA.
SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,
vs.
MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-7188, August 9, 1954
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
DOCTRINE:
The validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time
of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court
for probate or when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the
instrument was executed.
FACTS:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of

Talisay, Cebu, executed a document purporting to be his Last Will and
Testament now marked Exhibit "A". Resident of the City of Cebu, he died
on January 14, 1943, in the municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he
was an evacuee. He left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On
October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees in Exhibit "A",
filed a petition for its probate in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some
cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he
left no will, filed opposition.
During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being
dead, testified without contradiction that in his presence and in the
presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote out in longhand Exhibit
"A" in Spanish which the testator spoke and understood; that he (testator)
signed on he left hand margin of the front page of each of the three folios or
sheets of which the document is composed, and numbered the same with
Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of his writing at the
last page, all this, in the presence of the three attesting witnesses after
telling that it was his last will and that the said three witnesses signed their
names on the last page after the attestation clause in his presence and in
the presence of each other. The oppositors did not submit any evidence.
The learned trial court found and declared Exhibit "A" to be a

holographic will; that it was in the handwriting of the testator and that
although at the time it was executed and at the time of the testator's death,
holographic wills were not permitted by law still, because at the time of the
hearing and when the case was to be decided the new Civil Code was
already in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic wills,
under a liberal view, and to carry out the intention of the testator which
100
according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may override any
defect in form, said trial court by order dated January 24, 1952, admitted to
probate Exhibit "A", as the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho
Abadia. The oppositors are appealing from that decision; and because only
questions of law are involved in the appeal, the case was certified to us by
the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the law to apply to the probate of Exhibit “A” is the old
civil code when the will was executed?
RULING:
Yes, It should be the old Civil Code. The new Civil Code, which took
effect August 30, 1950, provides in Art. 795: “The validity of a will as to its
form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is
made.” Here, the validity of the holographic will is to be judged not by the
law enforced at the time when the petition is decided by the court but at the
time the instrument was executed. When one executes a will which is
invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal requirements at the time of
its execution, just like in this case, then upon his death he should be
regarded and declared as having died intestate. This is because the
general rule is that the Legislature cannot validate void wills.
Article 795 of this same new Civil Code expressly provides: "The
validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in
force at the time it is made." The above provision is but an expression or
statement of the weight of authority to the affect that the validity of a will is
to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the testator's death or at
the time the supposed will is presented in court for probate or when the
petition is decided by the court but at the time the instrument was executed.
One reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates
upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the
disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given
solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy
or bequest then becomes a completed act. This ruling has been laid down
by this court in the case of In re Will of Riosa, 39 Phil., 23. It is a
wholesome doctrine and should be followed.
Wherefore, the order appealed from was reversed, and Exhibit "A"
was denied probate, with costs.
101
MAGIN RIOSA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PABLO ROCHA, MARCELINA
CASAS, MARIA CORRAL and CONSOLACION R. DE
CALLEJA, Defendants-Appellees.
G.R. No. 23770. February 18, 1926
AVANCEÑA, C.J. :
DOCTRINE:
For the purposes of the reservation and the rights and obligations
created thereby, in connection with the relatives benefited, the property
must not be deemed transmitted to the heirs from the time the extrajudicial
partition was made, but from the time said partition was approved by the
court.
The reservor is bound to register the reservation within ninety days

from the date of the adjudication of the property to the heirs by the court.
After this period, the reservees have the right to enforce compliance with
said obligation.
Where a reservable property is sold by the reservor, without having

registered its reservable character, the obligation to register the same is
transferred to the purchaser, when, in making the purchase, the latter knew
the facts which give the property the reservable character.
The law does not require the reservor to secure the reservation with a
mortgage or bond as to the real property, the notation of the reservation in
the registry of property being sufficient (art. 977, Civil Code). This security
for the value of the real property, which is required by the law (art. 978,
paragraph 4, of the Civil Code), in case it is sold before acquiring the
reservable character, in a reservation by the widowed spouse (art. 968,
Civil Code), is not applicable to "reservatroncal" (reservation by ascendant)
(art. 811, Civil Code).
FACTS:
Maria Corral was united in marriage with the deceased Mariano

Riosa, it being her first and only marriage and during which time she bore
him three children named Santiago, Jose and Severina. The latter died
during infancy and the other two survived their father, Mariano Riosa.
Santiago Riosa, now deceased, married Francisca Villanueva, who bore
him two children named Magin and ConsolacionRiosa. Jose Riosa, also
deceased, married Marcelina Casas and they had one child who died
before the father, the latter therefore leaving no issue. Mariano Riosa left a
will dividing his property between his two children, Santiago and Jose
102
Riosa, giving the latter the eleven parcels of land described in the
complaint. Upon the death of Jose Riosa he left a will in which he named
his wife, Marcelina Casas, as his only heir.
On May 16, 1917, the will of Jose Riosa was filed for probate.
Notwithstanding the fact that Marcelina Casas was the only heir named in
the will, on account of the preterition of Maria Corral who, being the mother
of Jose Riosa, was his legitimate heir, I Marcelina Casas and Maria Corral,
on the same date of the filing of the will for probate, entered into a contract
by which they divided between themselves the property left by Jose Riosa,
the eleven parcels of land described in the complaint being assigned to
Maria Corral.
On October 26, 1920, Maria Corral sold parcels Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,

10 and 11 to Marcelina Casas for the sum of P20,000 in a public instrument
which was recorded in the registry of deeds on November 6, 1920. On
November 3, 1920, Marcelina Casas sold these eight parcels of land to
Pablo Rocha for the sum of P60,000 in a public document which was
recorded in the registry of deeds on November 6, 1920. On September 24,
1921, Pablo Rocha returned parcels No. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 to Maria Corral
stating in the deed executed for the purpose that these parcels of land had
been erroneously included in the sale made by Maria Corral to Marcelina
Casas.
The Court of first Instance denied the probate of the will of Jose
Riosa, but on appeal this court reversed the decision of the lower court and
allowed the will to probate. The legal proceedings for the probate of the will
and the settlement of the testate estate of Jose Riosa were followed; and,
at the time of the partition, Maria Corral and Marcelina Casas submitted to
the court the contract of extrajudicial partition which they had entered into
on May 16, 1917, and which was approved by the court, by order of
November 12, 1920, as though it had been made within the said
testamentary proceedings.
From the foregoing is appears that the eleven parcels of land

described in the complaint were acquired by Jose Riosa, by lucrative title,
from his father Mariano Riosa and that after the death of Jose Riosa, by
operation of law, they passed to his mother Maria Corral. By virtue of article
811 of the Civil Code these eleven parcels of land are reservable property.
It results, furthermore, that parcels 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 still belong in
fee simple to Maria Corral, and that parcels 10 and 11 were successively
sold by Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas and by the latter to Pablo Rocha.
Lastly, it appears that Magin and ConsolacionRiosa are the nearest
relatives within the third degree of the line from which this property came.
This action was brought by MaginRiosa, for whom the property

should have been reserved, against Maria Corral, whose duty it was to
reserve it, and against Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha as purchasers of
parcels 10 and 11. ConsolacionRiosa de Calleja who was also bound to
103
make the reservation was included as a defendant as she refused to join as
plaintiff.
The complaint prays that the property therein described be declared

reservable property and that the plaintiffs Jose and ConsolacionRiosa be
declared reservees; that this reservation be noted in the registry of deeds;
that the sale of parcels 10 and 11 to Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha be
declared valid only in so far as it saves the right of reservation in favor of
the plaintiff MaginRiosa and of the defendant ConsolacionRiosa, and that
this right of reservation be also noted on the deeds of sale executed in
favor of Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha; that Maria Corral, Marcelina
Casas and Pablo Rocha give a bond of P50,000, with good and sufficient
sureties, in favor of the reservees as surety for the conservation and
maintenance of the improvements existing on the said reservable property.
The dispositive part of the court's decision reads as follows:
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the purchaser (Pablo Rocha) can be compelled to

have the reservation noted on his title?
2. Whether or not the obligation of insuring the return of these
parcels of land, or their value, to the reservees by means of a
mortgage or a bond also applies to the purchaser (Pablo Rocha)?
RULING:
1. Yes.Where a reservable property is sold by the reservor,

without having registered its reservable character, the obligation to register
the same is transferred to the purchaser, when, in making the purchase,
the latter knew the facts which give the property the reservable
character. Marcelina Casas, as well as Pablo Rocha, Knew of the
reservable character of the property when they bought it.Wherefore, the
duty of Maria Corral of recording the reservable character of lots 10 and 11
has been transferred to Pablo Rocha and the reservees have an action
against him to compel him to comply with this obligation.
In accordance with article 977, Maria Corral, reservor, is obliged to

have the reservation noted in the registry of deeds in accordance with the
provisions of the Mortgage Law which fixes the period of ninety days for
accomplishing it (article 199, in relation with article 191, of the Mortgage
Law). According to article 203 of the General Regulation for the application
of the Mortgage Law, this time must be computed from the acceptance of
the inheritance. But as this portion of the Civil Code, regarding the
acceptance of the inheritance, has been repealed, the time, as has been
indicated, must be computed from the adjudication of the property by the
court to the heirs, in line with the decision of this court hereinabove quoted.
After the expiration of this period the reservees may demand compliance
with this obligation.
104
If Maria Corral had not transferred parcels 10 and 11 to another there
would be no doubt that she could be compelled to cause the reservable
character of this property to be noted in the registry of deeds. This
acquisition by Pablo Rocha took place when it was the duty of Maria Corral
to make the notation of the reservation in the registry and at the time when
the reservees had no right to compel Maria Corral to make such notation,
because this acquisition was made before the expiration of the period of
ninety days from November 12, 1920, the date of the adjudication by the
court, after which the right of the reservees to commence an action for the
fulfillment of the obligation arose. But the land first passed to Marcelina
Casas and later to Pablo Rocha together with the obligation that the law
imposes upon Maria Corral. They could not have acquired a better title than
that held by Maria Corral and if the latter's title was limited by the
reservation and the obligation to note it in the registry of deeds, this same
limitation is attached to the right acquired by Marcelina Casas and Pablo
Rocha.
In the transmission of reservable property the law imposes the

reservation as a resolutory condition for the benefit of the reservees (article
975, Civil Code). The fact that the resolvable character of the property was
not recorded in the registry of deed at the time that it was acquired by
Marcelina Casas and Pablo Rocha cannot affect the right of the reservees,
for the reason that the transfers were made at the time when it was the
obligation of the reservor to note only such reservation and the reservees
did not them have any right to compel her to fulfill such an obligation.
2. No. The law does not require that the reservor give this security,
the recording of the reservation in the registry of deeds being sufficient (art.
977 of the Civil Code). There is no ground for this requirement inasmuch
as, the notation once is made, the property will answer for the efficacy of
the reservation. This security for the value of the property is required by law
(art. 978, paragraph 4, of the Civil Code) in the case of a reservation by the
surviving spouse when the property has been sold before acquiring the
reservable character (art 968 of the Civil Code), but is not applicable to
reservation known as reservatroncal(art 811 of the Civil Code), or where
the property goes to the ascendant already reservable in character.
The judgment appealed from is modified and Pablo Rocha is ordered

to record in the registry of deeds the reservable character of parcels 10 11,
the subject of this complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs.
105
BIENVENIDO A. IBARLE, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT,
VS.ESPERANZA, M. PO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.
G. R. No. L-5064, February 26, 1953
TUASON, J.:
DOCTRINE:
The moment of death is the determining factor when the children of a

decedent acquire a definite right to the inheritance, whether such right be
pure or contingent. No formal or judicial declaration is needed to confirm
the children’s title. Sale made by the widow of the decedent’s property after
his death is null and void so far as it included the children’s share.
Sale made of decedent’s property with authority of the competent

court is legal and effective even if not registered.
FACTS:
Leonard J. Winstantley and Catalina Navarro were husband and wife, the
former having died on June 6, 1946 leaving as heir the surviving spouse
and some minor children.
Upon the death of L. J. Winstanley, he left a parcel of land described under

Transfer Certificate of title No. 2391 of the Registry of Deeds of the
Province of Cebu;
The above mentioned property was a conjugal property;
On April 15, 1946, the surviving spouse Catalina Navarro Vda.

deWinstanley sold the entire parcel of land to the spouses Maria Canoy
and Roberto Canoy, alleging among other things, that she needed money
for the support of her children;
On May 24, 1947, the spouses Maria Canoy and Roberto Canoy
sold the same parcel of land to the plaintiff in this case named Bienvenido
A. Ebarle;
The two deeds of sale referred to above were not registered and have
never been registered up to date;
On January 17, 1948 surviving spouse Catalina Navarro Vda.

deWinstanley, after her appointment as guardian of her children by this
court (Special Proceeding No. 212-R) sold one-half of the land mentioned
above to Esperanza M. Po, defendant in the instant case, which portion
belongs to the children of the above named spouses.
106
As stated by the trial Judge, the sole question for determination is the
validity of the sale to Esperanza M. Po, the last purchaser. This question in
turn depends upon the validity of the prior sale to Maria Canoy and Roberto
Canoy.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the first sale to Spouses Canoy was valid?
2. Whether or not the second sale to DF Esperanza of ½ of the land was

valid?
RULING:
1. No. In the sale to Spouses Canoy:
Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides:
"The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment
of his death." In a slightly different language, this article is incorporated in
the new Civil Code as article 777.
When Catalina sold the entire parcel to the Spouse Canoy, ½ of it already
belonged to Catalina’s (seller’s) children. No formal or judicial declaration is
being needed to confirm the children’s title. Thus, the first sale was null and
void because it included the children's share.
Manresa, commending on article 657 of the Civil Code of Spain, says:
"The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a
definite right to the inheritance, whether such right be pure or contingent. It
is immaterial whether a short or long period of time lapses between the
death of the predecessor and the entry into possession of the property of
the inheritance because the right is always deemed to be retroactive from
the moment of death." (5 Manresa, 317.)
2. Yes. The sale to the defendant having been made by authority of the
competent court was undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has
not been recorded is of no consequence. If registration were necessary,
still the non-registration would not avail the plaintiff because it was due to
no other cause than his own opposition.
The decision will be affirmed subject to the reservation, made in

said decision, of the right of the plaintiff and/or the Canoy spouses to bring
such action against Catalina Navarro Vda. deWinstanley as may be
appropriate for such damages as they may have incurred by reason of the
voiding of the sale in their favor.
107
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the
deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
G.R. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963
LABRADOR, J.:
DOCTRINE:
Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the

country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect

to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to
the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
where said property may be found.
FACTS:
Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to

California, where he resided and consequently was considered a California
citizen. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary
until his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this
country he had always considered himself a citizen of California.
In his will executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged

natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir, but left a legacy
of sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who was rendered to
have been declared acknowledged natural daughter. Counsel for appellant
claims that California law should be applied; that under California law, the
matter is referred back to the law of the domicile; that therefore Philippine
law is ultimately applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be
increased in view of the successional rights of illegitimate children under
Philippine law. On the other hand, counsel for the heir of Christensen
contends that inasmuch as it is clear that under Article 16 of our Civil Code,
the national law of the deceased must apply, our courts must immediately
apply the internal law of California on the matter; that under California law
there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator could dispose of
any property possessed by him in absolute dominion and that finally,
illegitimate children not being entitled to anything and his will remain
undisturbed.
108
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the

estate of Christensen?
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court grants more successional rights to Helen. It

said in effect that there are two rules in California on the matter: the internal
law which applies to California’s domiciled in California, and the conflict rule
for Californian’s domiciled out of California. Christensen, being domiciled in
the Philippines, the law of his domicile must be followed. For the
determination of the successional rights under Philippine Law, the case
was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
The Court ruled that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a

citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his
will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be
governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the
Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from was reversed and the

case returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made
as the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with
costs against appellees.
109
LOURDES L. DOROTHEO
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, VICENTE DOROTHEO
and JOSE DOROTHEO
G.R. No. 108581 DECEMBER 8, 1999
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
DOCTRINE: Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides
for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or
rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, the unlawful
provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect.
FACTS:
Vicente and Jose Dorotheo are the legitimate children of Alejandro

Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. Aniceta died in 1969 without her estate being
settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Lourdes Dorotheo, who claims to have
taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the
probate of Alejandro’s last will and testament. The children of the spouses
namely Vicente,Jose, and Nilda filed a "Motion To Declare The Will
Intrinsically Void." The trial court granted the motion and declared Lourdes
Legaspi not the wife of the late Alejandro Dorotheo; that the provisions of
the last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void; and
declaring the oppositors Vicente, Jose and Nilda as the only heirs of the
late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes.
Lourdes assails the Order of the upholding the order which declared the
intrinsic invalidity of Alejandro's will that was earlier admitted to probate.
The heirs of Alejandro opposed the motion on the ground that petitioner
has no interest in the estate since she is not the lawful wife of the late
Alejandro.
ISSUE:
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically
void in an order that has become final and executory still be given effect?
RULING:
No.A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or

reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. Moreover, it has been ruled
that a final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the
whole world
Under Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of successional rights that
testacy is preferred to intestacy. But before there could be testate
110
distribution, the will must pass the scrutinizing test and safeguards provided
by law considering that the deceased testator is no longer available to
prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside from the fact that the transfer
of the estate is usually onerous in nature and that no one is presumed to
give — Nemo praesumitur donare. No intestate distribution of the estate
can be done until and unless the will had failed to pass both its extrinsic
and intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy
apply regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is extrinsically valid, the
next test is to determine its intrinsic validity — that is whether the provisions
of the will are valid according to the laws of succession. If both test are not
satisfied the rules of intestacy will apply.
In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the will of Alejandro was
extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof are void. Alejandro
gave all the property to Lourdes, his concubine. Such is invalid because
one cannot dispose what he does not own. In this case, the whole property
is the conjugal property of Alejandro and Aniceta. Such has become final
and executory. The only instance where a party interested in probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by
reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence with circumstances do not concur
herein.
111
JULIANA BAGTAS
vs.
ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-6801 MARCH 14, 1912
TRENT, J.
DOCTRINE: Mere weakness of mind and body, induced by age and

disease do not render a person incapable of making a will. The law does
not require that a person shall continue in the full enjoyment and use of his
pristine physical and mental powers in order to execute a valid will.
FACTS:
The last will and testament executed by Pioquinto Paguio who died a year
and five months from the execution, was propounded by by the executrix,
Juliana Bagtas, widow of Paguio. However, Paguio’s son and several
grandchildren by a former marriage opposed the probate asserting that
Paguio was not in the full of enjoyment and use of his mental faculties and
was without the mental capacity necessary to execute a valid will.
According to them, Paguio suffered from a paralysis of the left side of his
body. This resulted to the impairment of his hearing, lost of the power of
speech and uncontrolled saliva discharge. Despite the paralysis, Paguio
retained the use of his right hand and was able to write fairly well. Paguio
was able to indicate his wishes to his wife and to the other members of his
family,through the medium of signs.
ISSUE:
Is paralysis a ground to establish mental incapacity that would disqualify

the testator to execute a valid will?
RULING:
No. The mere weakness of mind and body, induced by age and disease do
not render a person incapable of making a will. The law does not require
that a person shall continue in the full enjoyment and use of his pristine
physical and mental powers in order to execute a valid will.Perfect
soundness of mind is not essential to testamentary capacity. A testator may
be afflicted with a variety of mental weaknesses, disorders, or peculiarities
and still be capable in law of executing a valid will.
In the case at bar, at the time of the execution of the will, it does not appear
that Pioquinto’s conduct was irrational in any particular. He seems to have
comprehended clearly what the nature of the business was in which he was
engaged. The evidence show that the writing and execution of the will
occupied a period several hours and that the testator was present during all
this time, taking an active part in all the proceedings. Hence, the will in the
case at bar is perfectly reasonable and its dispositions are those of a
rational person.
112
ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, ET.AL.
vs.
LORENZO LAXA
G.R. No. 174489 APRIL 11, 2012
DEL CASTILLO, J.
DOCTRINE: Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind.
FACTS:
Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and
testament entitled "Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia
Regala".Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia
bequeathed all her properties to Lorenzo Laxa and his wife Corazon Laxa
and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa.More than
four years after the death of Paciencia, Lorenzo filed a for the probate of
the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his
favour.
Antonio Baltazar and the others filed an opposition contending that

Paciencia’s Will was null and void on the ground that Paciencia was
mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution. The
oppositors, through their witness Rosie, claim that Paciencia was
"magulyan" or forgetful so much so that it effectively stripped her of
testamentary capacity. They likewise claimed that Paciencia was not only
"magulyan" but was actually suffering from paranoia.
ISSUE:
Is the state of being forgetful necessarily make a person mentally unsound

so as to render him unfit to execute a will?
RULING:
No. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind.
Under Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be
in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly
unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause. It
shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to
know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his
bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.
And also under Article 800 of the New Civil Code states:
Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the
absence of proof to the contrary.
113
In this case, there was no substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that
would show that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the
execution of the Will. On the other hand, it was worthy to note as to the
soundness of mind of Paciencia when she went to Judge Limpin’s house
and voluntarily executed the Will. More importantly, a testator is presumed
to be of sound mind at the time of the execution of the Will and the burden
to prove otherwise lies on the oppositor. The burden of proof that the
testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on
the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one
month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the
person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator
made it during a lucid interval. Here, there was no showing that Paciencia
was publicly known to be insane one month or less before the making of
the Will. Clearly, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind
lies upon the shoulders of Antonio et.al however the same was not proved
and the court affirmed the probate of the will of Paciencia.
114
CATALINA BUGNAO
vs.
FRANCISCO UBAG, ET AL.
G.R. No. 4445 SEPTEMBER 18, 1909
CARSON, J.
DOCTRINE: Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the

nature of the transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time, to
recollect the property to be disposed of and the persons who would
naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend
the manner in which the instrument will distribute his property among the
objects of his bounty.
FACTS:
This is an appeal admitting to probate a document purporting to be the last

will and testament of Domingo Ubag, deceased. The instrument was
propounded by his widow, Catalina Bugnao, the sole beneficiary. The
probate was contested by brothers and sisters of the deceased. The
appellants contend that the evidence is not sufficient to establish the
execution of the alleged will in the manner and form prescribed; and that at
the time when it is alleged that the will was executed, Ubag was not of
sound mind and memory, and was physically and mentally incapable of
making a will, as he was extremely ill, in an advanced stage of tuberculosis
complicated with severe intermittent attacks of asthma; that he was too sick
to rise unaided from his bed; that he needed assistance even to rise
himself to a sitting position; and that during the paroxysms of asthma to
which he was subject he could not speak
ISSUE:
Does physical weakness of a testator establishes his mental incapacity or a

lack of testamentary capacity?
RULING:
No.Evidence of physical weakness in no wise establishes mental incapacity

or a lack of testamentary capacity.It has been held that "mere weakness of
mind, or partial imbecility from the disease of body, or from age, will not
render a person incapable of making a will, a weak or feeble minded
person may make a valid will, provided he has understanding memory
sufficient to enable him to know what he is about, and how or to whom he
is disposing of his property"; that, "To constitute a sound and disposing
mind, it is not necessary that the mind should be unbroken or unimpaired,
unshattered by disease or otherwise"; that "it has not been understood that
a testator must possess these qualities (of sound and disposing mind and
memory) in the highest degree.
115
In this case, the evidence of the subscribing witnesses as to the aid
furnished them by the testator, Ubag, in preparing the will, and his clear
recollection of the boundaries and physical description of the various
parcels of land set out therein, taken together with the fact that he was able
to give to the person who wrote the will clear and explicit instructions as to
his desires touching the disposition of his property, is strong evidence of his
testamentary capacity.
116
MANUEL TORRES and
LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO
vs.
MARGARITA LOPEZ
G.R. No. L-24569 FEBRUARY 26, 1926
MALCOLM, J.
DOCTRINE: Testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a

person shall actually be insane or of an unsound mind. Weakness of
intellect, whether it arises from extreme old age, from disease, or great
bodily infirmities of suffering, or from all these combined, may render the
testator in capable of making a valid will, providing such weakness really
disqualifies for from knowing or appreciating the nature, effects, or
consequences of the act she is engaged in.
FACTS:
On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez executed his last will and

testament. Thereafter died leaving a considerable estate. Subsequently,
Manuel Torres, one of the executors named in the will asked that the will of
Rodriguez be allowed. Opposition was entered by Margarita Lopez, the first
cousin of the deceased on the grounds: (1) That the testator lacked mental
capacity because at the time of senile dementia and was under
guardianship; (2) that undue influence had been exercised by the persons
benefited in the document in conjunction with others who acted in their
behalf; and (3) that the signature of Tomas Rodriguez to the document was
obtained through fraud and deceit.
It was presented in this case, Rodriguez had reached the advanced age of
76 years. He was suffering from anemia, hernia inguinal, chronic dypsia,
and senility. Physically he was a wreck.
As to the mental state of Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, there were

conflicting results. Doctors Calderon Domingo, and Herrera certify that the
intellectual faculties of the patient are "sound, except that his memory is
weak," and that in executing the will the testator had full understanding of
the act he was performing and full knowledge of the contents thereof.
Doctors De Los Angeles, Tietze and Burke certify that Tomas Rodriguez
was of unsound mind and that they diagnosed his case as senile dementia
of the simple type approaching the deteriorated stage.
ISSUE:
Did Tomas Rodriguez possess sufficient mentality to make a will?
RULING:
Yes. Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of

the transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the
property to be disposed of and the persons who would naturally be
117
supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner
in which the instrument will distribute his property among the objects of his
bounty. The mental capacity of the testator is determined as of the date of
the execution of his will.Of the specific tests of capacity, neither old age,
physical infirmities, feebleness of mind, weakness of the memory, the
appointment of a guardian, nor eccentricities are sufficient singly or jointly
to show testamentary incapacity. Each case rests on its own facts and
must be decided by its own facts. There is one particular test relative to the
capacity to make a will which is of some practical utility. This rule concerns
the nature and rationality of the will. Is the will simple or complicated? Is it
natural or unnatural? The mere exclusion of heirs will not, however, in itself
indicate that the will was the offspring of an unsound mind.
In the present case, the court opined thatTomas Rodriguez, comprehended

the nature of the transaction in which he was engaged. He had two
conferences with his lawyer, Judge Mina, and knew what the will was to
contain. The will was read to him by Mr. Legarda. He signed the will and its
two copies in the proper places at the bottom and on the left margin. At that
time the testator recollected the property to be disposed of and the persons
who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon him While for some
months prior to the making of the will he had not manage his property he
seem to have retained a distinct recollection of what it consisted and of his
income. Occasionally his memory failed him with reference to the names of
his relatives. Ordinarily, he knew who they were, he seemed to entertain a
prediliction towards Vicente F. Lopez as would be natural since Lopez was
nearest in which the instrument distributed the property naming the objects
of his bounty. His conversations with Judge Mina disclosed as insistence
on giving all of his property to the two persons whom he specified.
On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez may have been of advanced years,

may have been physically decrepit, may have been weak in intellect, may
have suffered a loss of memory, may have had a guardian and may have a
been extremely eccentric, but he still possessed the spark of reason and of
life, that strength of mind to form a fixed intention and to summon his
enfeebled thoughts to enforce that intention, which the law terms
"testamentary capacity." Hence, the will of Tomas Rodriguez will be
admitted to probate.
118
FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979
GUERRERO, J.:
Case Digest by: Lyndzelle Jane D. Paniza
DOCTRINE: The test of testamentary capacity is at the time of the making

of the will. Mere weakness of mind or partial imbecility from disease of body
or from age does not render a person incapable of making a will.
FACTS:
Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Doña Forentina Rella, and their four
children, Francisca Alsua-Betts, Pablo, Fernando and Amparo Alsua,
entered into a duly notarized agreement, Escritura de Particion
Extrajudicial. The said agreement specifically partitioned one-half of the
properties of the spouses to their legitimate heirs of their respective shares,
while they reserved for themselves (the spouses Don Jesus and Doña
Tinay) the other half or those not disposed of to the said legitimate heirs,
and they mutually and reciprocally bequeathed unto each other their
participation therein as well as in all properties which they might be
acquired subsequently.
In comformity and in implementation of the extrajudicial partition, spouses

Don Jesus and Doña Florentina executed their respective holographic wills
as well as codicils, separately.
Upon the death of Doña Tinay, Don Jesus cancelled his holographic will
and instructed his lawyer to draft a new will which was duly signed by him
and his attesting witnesses. The notarial will and testament had essential
features, one of them was that it instituted his children as
legatees/devisees of certain specific properties, and as to the rest of the
properties and whatever may be subsequently acquired in the future,
before his death, were to be given to Francisca and Pablo, naming
Francisca as executrix to serve without a bond.
When Don Jesus died, Fransisca, as executrix, filed a petition for the
probate of the new will of Don Jesus. Pablo, Amparo and Fernando
opposed, one of their contention was that Don Jesus was not of sound and
disposing mind at the time of the execution of the alleged will. That his
mental faculties or his possession of the same had been diminished
considering that when the will was executed, he was already 84 years of
age and in view of his weakness and advanced age, the actual
119
administration of his properties had been left to his assistant Madarieta
who, for his part received instructions from Francisca and her husband.
ISSUE: Were the weakness of mind and advanced age of Don Jesus
renders him incapable of making a will?
RULING: NO
The weakness of mind and advanced age of Don Jesus does not render
him incapable of making a will.
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full
possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly
unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to
bounty, and the character of the testamentary act,
The test of testamentary capacity is at the time of the making of the will.
Mere weakness of mind or partial imbecility from disease of body or from
age-does not render a person incapable of making a will.
Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which

unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degrees
of mental aberration generally known as insanity or Idiocy, there are
numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and while on one
hand it has been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility
from disease of body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of
making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a valid will,
provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to
know what he is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his
property. To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that
the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or
otherwise. It has been held that testamentary incapacity does not
necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of unsound
mind. (Bugnao vs. Ubag, 14 Phil. 163).
The Civil Code itself provides under Article 798 that in order to make a will,
it is essential that the testator be of sound mind at the time of its execution,
and under Article 800, the law presumes that every person is of sound
mind in the absence of proof to the contrary. In the case at bar, the
acceptance by the Court of Appeals of the findings of fact of the trial court
on the due execution of the last will and testament of Don Jesus has
foreclosed any and all claim to the contrary that the will was not executed in
accordance with the requirements of the law. But more than that, gleaned
from the quoted portions of the appealed decision, the described behavior
of Don Jesus is not that of a mentally incapacitated person nor one
120
suffering from "senile dementia" as claimed by Pablo, Amparo and
Fernando. From these accepted facts, We find that: (a) it was Don Jesus
himself who gave detailed instructions to his lawyer as to how he wanted to
divide his properties among his children by means of a list of his properties
should pertain; (b) the semi-final draft of the contested will prepared by his
lawyer was even corrected by Don Jesus; (c) on the day of the signing of
the will at his house in Ligao, "Don Jesus was in bright and lively spirits ...,
leading in the conversation which ran from problems of farming and the
merits of French-made wines"; (d) the signing of the will by Don Jesus and
his attesting witnesses was made after a statement from Don Jesus of the
purpose of their meeting or gathering. Clearly then, Don Jesus knew
exactly what his actions were and the fun implications thereof.
121
ALFONSO ALBORNOZ, vs DOLORES ALBORNOZ and JOSE
ALBORNOZ
[GR No. 47428. April 8, 1941.]
DIAZ, M.:
DOCTRINE: The fact that two days before the execution of the will, the
deceased could barely move and talk and if she spoke, her words were
incoherent and thereafter lost her speech, it was of course impossible for
her to execute her will.
FACTS:
Perpetua A. Vda. de Soriano executed a will. The will was presented by
Alfonzo and Dolores Albornoz for probate but it was rejected by the Court
of First Instance of Ilocos Norte and ruled that Perpetua A. Vda. de Soriano
had no mental capacity when she executed her will.
Perpertua died on June 25, 1936, in the municipality of Laoag of the

Province of Ilocos Norte, then she was 68 years old. She suffered from
diarrhea and enteritis with complications of myocarditis from June 3, 1936
until the time of her death. On June 22, 1936, Perpetua could barely move
and talk and if she spoke, her words were incoherent. And on June 23,
1936, she completely lost speech, and although her eyes were open, they
no longer move. In these circumstances, it was physically impossible for
her to execute her will considering that the document shows on its face that
it was executed at 6 am on June 24, 1936.
Dolorez Albornoz, for her part, stated that the late Perpetua in executing
her will, was with complete freedom, being in full enjoyment of her mental
faculties and in the presence of witnesses whose names and signatures
are mentioned and appear in the testimony clauses of her will.
ISSUE: Does Perpetua A. Vda. de Soriano have the mental capacity to

execute her will?
RULING: NO.
The deceased was not poor and did not lack the means to procure
domestic services: she did not live alone or was alone in her home since
she became ill; and in fact, the deceased had nine servants at her service.
The deceased was never without company in her room during her illness,
122
especially during her last days, because she required continuous
care. Therefore, it is incredible that Adriano Ruiz and the other instrumental
witnesses of the alleged testament of June 24, 1936 could enter inside the
room of the deceased or even inside her house, without being seen or
noticed by anyone. The granting of the will in question could not be done in
a short moment; it had to take a long time, enough time for those in the
house to realize that there were strangers in it, at a time when it is not
customary to visit.
Additionally, the calligraphy expert Arcadio Laperal, who made a thorough

study of the signatures "PERPETUA A. VDA. DE SORIANO” that appear in
the will comparing them with the authentic ones of the deceased and those
that appear in the testament and in the codicil legalized by the Court a quo,
which were not discussed, express the opinion that they could not have
been written by the same person, helped or not by another because they
differ in all respects.
We believe that the opinion of the aforementioned expert is based on the

facts, especially considering that the deceased could no longer see well, as
one of the testament witnesses said, and yet the signatures are written with
great symmetry, rightly, and keeping the letters to each other, almost the
same distance. And even if the decedent had been helped by another to
stamp these signatures, they would not have come out as well as they
appear in the expressed document.
123
TRINIDAD NEYRAVS. ENCARNACION NEYRA
C.A. No. 8075 March 25, 1946
DE JOYA, J.:
DOCTRINE:Where it appears that a few hours and also a few days after
the execution of the will, the testator intelligently and intelligibly conversed
with other persons, although lying down and unable to move or stand up
unassisted, but could still effect the sale of property belonging to him, these
circumstances show that the testator was in a perfectly sound mental
condition at the time of the execution of the will.
FACTS:
Encarnacion Neyra and her sister, Trinidad Neyra had a litigation in the
Court of First Instance regarding the properties left by their father.
During the course of the litigation, Encarnacion Neyra had been suffering
from Addison’s disease and on the day before her death, Encarnacion and
Trinidad reconciled and had a long and cordial conversation, in the course
of which they talked about the properties left by their father and their
litigations which had reached the Court of Appeals, they then agreed to
have the latter dismissed, on the condition that the property involved
therein should be given exclusively to Trinidad Neyra, that the latter should
waive her share in the rents of said property collected by Encarnacion.
On November 3, 1942, Attorney Panis prepared a document of

compromise embodying their agreement and prepared Encarnacion’s last
will and testament.
On November 4, 1942, Encarnacion unexpectedly died allegedly from heart

attack, as a consequence of Addison’s disease.
Atty. Lucio Javillonar, claiming to represent Encarnacion Neyra, and other

relatives of hers, filed a petition claiming that the alleged compromise or
agreement could not have been understood by Encarnacion Neyra, as she
was already then at the threshold of death, and that as a matter of fact she
died the following day.
ISSUE: Was Encarnacion Neyra of sound mental condition at the time of

the execution of the compromise and of her last will and testament?
RULING: YES.
Encarnacion Neyra was of sound mental condition at the time of the

execution of the compromise and of her last will and testament.
Presentacion Blanco, niece of Encarnacion, in the course of her cross-

examination, frankly admitted that, in the morning and also at about 6
124
o'clock in the afternoon of November 3, 1942, Encarnacion Neyra talked to
her that they understood each other clearly, thus showing that the testatrix
was really of sound mind, at the time of signing and execution of the
agreement and will in question.
It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that the mental faculties of

persons suffering from Addison's disease, like the testatrix in this case,
remain unimpaired, partly due to the fact that, on account of the sleep they
enjoy, they necessarily receive the benefit of physical and mental rest. And
that like patients suffering from tuberculosis, insomnia or diabetes, they
preserve their mental faculties until the moments of their death.
The logical conclusion is that Encarnacion Neyra was of sound mind and
possessed the necessary testamentary and mental capacity, at the time of
the execution of the agreement and will, dated November 3, 1942.
125
EULALIO HERNAEZVS.ROSENDO HERNAEZ
G.R. No. 857 February 10, 1903
ARELLANO, C.J.:
DOCTRINE:The fact that an old woman gives contradictory orders, that

she walks in a stooping position, that she has fainting fits, that she received
the sacraments some days before making her will, are circumstances
which even if fully demonstrated by proof could no lead the court to
establish a conclusion contrary to the mental soundness of a person who is
to be presumed to be in the full enjoyment of the mental faculties until the
contrary is conclusively proven.
FACTS:
Eulalio Hernaez, one of the sons of the testatrix Doña Juana Espinosa,
filed an action for annulment of the will executed by the latter, which will
disposes those of the third part of the hereditary estate of free disposal to
her eldest son, Rosendo, and the distribution of the remaining third in six
equal parts among her five children and two grandchildren.
One of the grounds Eulalio presented was the incapacity of the testatrix to
make a will. That on the day of the execution of her will, Doña Juana was
over 80 years of age and was so ill that three days before she had received
the sacraments and extreme unction, and that two days afterwards she
died; and that prior thereto she walked in a stooping attitude, and gave
contradictory orders, as a result of her senile debility.
ISSUE: Does the testatrix have the use of the necessary mental faculties
for the purpose of the execution of the will?
RULING: YES.
The testatrix have the use of the necessary mental faculties for the purpose
of the execution of the will.
It is sufficient to state that neither from the facts elicited by the

interrogatories nor the documents presented with the complaint can the
conclusion be reached that the testatrix was deprived of her mental
faculties.
The fact that an old woman gives contradictory orders, that she walks in a
stooping position, that she has fainting fits, that she received the
sacraments some days before making her will, are circumstances which
even if fully demonstrated by proof could no lead the court to establish a
conclusion contrary to the mental soundness of a person who is to be
presumed to be in the full enjoyment of the mental faculties until the
contrary is conclusively proven.
126
The notary certifies that in his judgment the testatrix had the necessary
legal capacity and the use of the necessary mental faculties for the
purposes of the execution of the will. "The Code might have adopted either
one of two systems [with respect to the mental capacity of the testator] —
that of establishing as a general rule the presumption of soundness of the
mental faculties until the contrary be proven, or that of presuming mental
weakness in the absence of proof that the act was performed while the
mental faculties were in their normal condition. Under the first presumption
a will made should be declared valid in all cases, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary. Under the second it would have to be considered
as void upon the presumption that it was executed by a person demented,
unless the contrary is shown. The Code has adopted the first system as
being the most rational, by accepting the principle that mental soundness is
always to be presumed with respect to a person who has not been
previously incapacitated until the contrary is demonstrated and proven by
the proper person and the correctness of this choice is beyond doubt; in the
meantime the intervention of the notary and the witnesses constitutes a
true guaranty of the capacity of the testator, by reason of their knowledge
of the matter.
127
SANTIAGO GALVEZ, V. CANUTA GALVEZ
[G.R. NO. 6650. DECEMBER 5, 1913. ]
TORRES, J.:
DOCTRINE: In order to hold that a testator, as the result of cholera, was

not of sound mind and did not have full knowledge of his acts and was
incapable of executing a valid will, it is indispensable that the proceedings
disclose conclusive proof of his mental incapacity and of his lack of reason
and judgment at the time he executed his will in due form.
FACTS:
This case deals with the probate of the second will executed by Victor
Galvez and signed in his presence by the witnesses Juan Dimanlig,
Nazaria Galvez, and J. Leoquinco, and, as the testator was no longer able
to sign on account of his sickness, Lorenzo Galvez, at his request, affixed
his own signature to the instrument, for him and below his written name.
The other will was presented during the proceedings; it was the first one
the testator executed on the same date, and, for the purpose of correcting
an error contained in this first will, he executed another will, the second,
which is the one exhibited for probate.
Canuta Galvez, the testator’s daughter, opposed on the probate of the will
alleging that her father, owing to his very serious sickness with cholera,
lacked the intellectual capacity and clear judgment requisite for making a
will.
ISSUE: Does Victor Galvez by having a very serious sickness with cholera
lacked the capacity and clear judgment for making a will?
RULING: NO.
The record sufficiently proved that the subscribing witnesses to the will
affirmed under oath that they were present when Victor Galvez, then such
in his house, stated to them that the document read before them by
Lorenzo Galvez contained his last will and testament, and that, as the
testator was no longer able to sign, he charged his nephew Lorenzo to do
so in his stead, which the latter did by affixing his own signature to the
document, after having written at the foot of the same the name and
surname of the testator, Victor Galvez, who, as these witnesses observed,
was of sound mind and in the full enjoyment of his mental faculties; he
talked intelligently and with perfect knowledge of what was taking place.
They further testified that they all, including Lorenzo Galvez, signed the will
in the presence of the testator, Victor Galvez, who was at the time lying on
his bed.
128
In order to hold that Victor Galvez, on account of serious sickness, was not
then of sound mind and did not have full knowledge of his acts and,
therefore, was incapable to execute a will, it is necessary that the
proceedings disclose conclusive proof of his mental incapacity and of his
evident lack of reason and judgment at the time he executed his will in the
presence of the witnesses whose signatures appear at the foot thereof, for
these witnesses positively affirmed that Victor Galvez, on executing his will,
showed that he was in full possession of his intellectual faculties and was
perfectly cognizant of his acts.
The physician Dr. Vicente de Jesus, in his testimony, referred to the effects
and results of cholera on a patient in ordinary cases and in the regular
course of this disease; but his statements, taken in general, cannot, in the
present suit, serve as a ground upon which to predicate incapacity, for the
reason that he did not examine Victor Galvez, nor did he even see him
between the hours during which period the testator ordered his will drawn
up and the attesting witnesses signed it.
It may be true that cholera patients do, in the majority of cases, become
incapacitated in the manner described by the witnesses; but there may be
exceptions to the general rule, and to judge from the testimony of the
witnesses who saw and communicated with the patient Victor Galvez at the
time he executed his will, his physical and mental condition must have
been an exception, since he demonstrated that he had sufficient energy
and clear intelligence to execute his last will in accordance with the
requirements of the law.
Besides the attestation of the aforesaid subscribing witnesses, the contents

of the will and the testator’s positive determination to rectify the error he
incurred in the execution of this first will, show that Victor Galvez was in his
sound mind and was perfectly aware of his duties in respect to the legal,
inviolable rights of his daughter and sole heir, Canuta Galvez.
Inasmuch as, in the drafting and execution of the second will, signed in the
name of the testator by Lorenzo Galvez and the witnesses Juan Dimanlig,
Nazaria Galvez, and J. Leoquinco, the formalities prescribed by section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure were observed, for the testator’s name
appears written at the foot of the will and under this name Lorenzo Galvez
signed by direction of the testator himself, and the instrument was also
signed by the attesting witnesses before mentioned who affirmed that they
heard and attested the dispositions made by the testator and witnessed the
reading of the will, that they were present when the said Lorenzo Galvez
signed the will in the name of the testator and that they signed it in the
presence of all the persons assembled in the latter’s house, the conclusion
is inevitable that Victor Galvez, in executing his will, did so with a sound
mind and the full use of his mental faculties; therefore, the will must be
admitted to probate.
129
JUANA CAGUIOA, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED EMIGDIO ZARATE
V.
MARIA CALDERON
G.R. No. 6625, October 24, 1911
JOHNSON, J.
CASE DIGEST BY: Jose Luis P. Pacquiao
DOCTRINE: WILLS; UNDUE INFLUENCE; MENTAL CAPACITY; LAWFUL

WILL - Under the facts stated in the opinion, that the will in question, was
duly and legally authorized by the deceased, he being of sound mind and
memory, and that the same was not executed under threats or fear.
FACTS:
Caguioa presented a petition in the CFI of the Province of

Pangasinan, praying for the probation of the last will and testament of
Emigdio Zarate, deceased, in conformity with section 630 of the Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions.
Due notice of said petition was given in accordance with law, and the
hearing for the probation of said will was fixed. Subsequently, said Maria
Calderon appeared, by her attorney, and opposed the probation of said will
upon one of the following grounds:
“That the said Emigdio Zarate was mentally incapacitated at the

time he authorized and signed his will.”
Caguioa prays the court to annul the will alleged to have been
executed by Zarate, and to order that its probate be disallowed. Thereafter,
the court overruled the opposition, sustained the petition, and held that the
same is legal in all its parts as the last will and testament of the deceased
Zarate.
ISSUE: Was Emigdio Zarate in the full possession of his mental faculties at
the time of the execution of his will?
130
RULING: YES.
After hearing the evidence, the lower court found that Emigdio Zarate,
at the time of the execution of the said will, was in the possession of his
faculties. Two of the witnesses who signed the will, as well as others who
were present in the house at the time the said will was executed, testified
that in their opinion Emigdio Zarate was of sound mind and memory at the
time he signed the said will.
The appellant attempted to show that Emigdio Zarate for some

months prior to his death had been troubled with insomnia, as well as some
other physical infirmities. The two doctors who appeared on behalf of the
opponents testified that insomnia tended to destroy the mental capacity,
but that there were times, even during the period while they were suffering
from insomnia, when they would be perfectly rational.
Even admitting that there was some foundation for the supposition
that Emigdio Zarate had suffered from the alleged infirmities, we do not
believe that the testimony was sufficiently direct and positive, based upon
the hypothetical questions, to overcome the positive and direct testimony of
the witnesses who were present at the time of the execution of the will in
question.
The evidence adduced during the trial of the case, shows a large
preponderance of proof in favor of the fact that Emigdio Zarate was in the
full possession of his mental faculties at the time he executed his last will
and testament.
131
TESTATE ESTATE OF VITO BORROMEO
JOSE H. JUNQUERA
vs.
CRISPIN BORROMEO, ET AL.,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-18498, March 30, 1967
DIZON, J.
DOCTRINE: The subscribing witnesses to a contested will are regarded as

the best witnesses in connection with its due execution. It is similarly true,
however, that to deserve full credit, their test, testimony must be
reasonable and unbiased, and that, as in the case of any other witness,
their testimony may be overcome by any competent evidence - direct or
circumstantial.
FACTS:
Vito Borromeo died on March 13, 1952, in Parañaque, Rizal, at the

age of 88 years, without forced heirs but leaving extensive properties in the
province of Cebu.
Junquera, filed with the CFI of said province a petition for the probate
of a one page document as the last will left by said deceased, devising all
his properties to Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in
equal and undivided shares, and designating Junquera as executor thereof.
Teofilo Borromeo filed an opposition to the probate of the will based

on several grounds, one of which is that the testator was mentally
incapable of making a will at the time of its execution. Subsequently, the
Court removed Junquera as special administrator and appointed Dr.
Patricio Beltran in his place.
On October 1955, the Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for

leave to intervene and join the oppositors in contesting the probate of the
will, on the ground that, should the estate be adjudicated the latter by
132
intestacy, it stood to collect a considerable amount by way of estate and
inheritance taxes.
After a prolonged trial, the Court rendered a decision denying the

probate of the will and declaring itself without jurisdiction to pass upon the
question of ownership over the thirteen lots which the Cebu Arcade etc.
claimed as its own.
The proponents of the disputed will, mainly with the testimony of the
three attesting witnesses, Cornelio Gandionco, Filiberto Leonardo and
Eusebio Cabiluna, sought to prove the following facts:
Vito Borromeo executed first, the document Exhibit "F", witnessed by

Gandionco and Cabiluna. Later, Vito Borromeo, being of sound and
disposing mind, and without pressure or influence exerted on him, dictated
the substance of his will to Tomas Borromeo, who in turn typewrote it in
proper legal language. The document was then read by Vito Borromeo,
who later signed and thumbmarked it.
The trial court refused to believe the testimony of the attesting

witnesses and, as a result, denied the petition for probate, because, in its
opinion, they appeared not to be "wholly disinterested persons" and
because of the serious discrepancies in their testimonies with respect to
the number of copies made of the disputed document.
The court also found that the physical condition of the deceased at
the time of the execution of the questioned document was such that it was
highly improbable, if not impossible, for him to have affixed his signatures
on the documents in the spontaneous and excellent manner they appear to
have been written. Thus, the court was also led to believe the testimony of
the handwriting experts for oppositors, - adverse to the genuineness of the
signatures of Vito Borromeo on the questioned document - more than that
of the handwriting expert presented by the proponents of the will.
ISSUE: Is the evidence of record sufficient to prove the due execution of

the will in question?
RULING: NO.
The subscribing witnesses to a contested will are regarded as the

best witnesses in connection with its due execution. It is similarly true,
however, that to deserve full credit, their test, testimony must be
reasonable and unbiased, and that, as in the case of any other witness,
133
their testimony may be overcome by any competent evidence — direct or
circumstantial.
We cannot see our way clear to holding that the trial court erred in
refusing to give full credit to the testimony of the three subscribing
witnesses.
It has also been held that the condition and physical appearance of a
questioned document constitute a valuable factor which, if correctly
evaluated in the light of surrounding circumstances, may help in
determining whether it is genuine or forged. Subscribing witnesses may
forget or exaggerate what they really know, saw, heard or did; they may be
biased and, therefore, tell only half truths to mislead the court or favor one
party to the prejudice of the other.
This cannot be said of the condition and physical appearance of the

questioned document itself. Both, albeit silently, will reveal the naked truth,
hiding nothing, forgetting nothing, and exaggerating nothing. For this
reason, independently of the conflicting opinions expressed by the
handwriting experts called to the witness stand by the parties, we have
carefully examined and considered the physical appearance and condition
of the original and two copies of the questioned will found in the record —
particularly the signatures attributed to the testator — and We have come
to the conclusion that the latter could not have been written by him.
134
MANUEL TORRES and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO
vs.
MARGARITA LOPEZ
GR No. 24569, February 26, 1926
MALCOLM, J.
DOCTRINE: Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the

nature of the transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time, to
recollect the property to be disposed of and the persons who would
naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend
the manner in which the instrument will distribute his property among the
objects of his bounty.
FACTS:
Tomas Rodriguez y Lopez died on February 25, 1924 leaving all his
estate to Vicente Lopez. Subsequently, Tomas Rodriguez designated
Vicente Lopez as administrator of his property due to his feeble health,
such was opposed by Margarita Lopez, CFI of Manila concluded Vicente
Lopez as Tomas Rodriguez’s guardian.
Tomas Rodriguez voiced out the need to form a will, and Vicente
Lopez has procured Judge Maximino Mina. Manuel Torres, one of the
executors named in the will, asked the will to be allowed. Such was
contested by Manuel Lopez on the grounds that the testator lacked mental
capacity because at the time of institution he was suffering “senile
dementia” and was under guardianship; that undue influence had been
exercised by the persons benefited; and that the signature of Rodriguez
was obtained through fraud and deceit.
Luz Lopez allegedly deceived Tomas Rodriguez to sign by stating

that such document he was about to sign was in connection with a
complaint against Dr. Boanan, one of the witness of the signing of the will.
The trial court denied legalization of the will on the ground of “lack of
mental capacity” at the signing of the will by the testator.
135
ISSUE: Did Tomas Rodriguez possessed the sufficient mentality to make a
will which would meet the legal test regarding testamentary capacity?
RULING: YES.
Tomas Rodriguez has testamentary capacity to constitute a will. Drs.

Calderon, Domingo, Herrera claimed that testator had full understanding of
the acts he was performing and that they were witnesses in the said
signing of the will.
Tomas Rodriguez may have been of advanced years, may have been
physically decrepit, may have been weak in intellect, may have suffered a
loss of memory, may have had a guardian and may have a been extremely
eccentric, but he still possessed the spark of reason and of life, that
strength of mind to form a fixed intention and to summon his enfeebled
thoughts to enforce that intention, which the law terms "testamentary
capacity." That in effect is the definite opinion which we reach after an
exhaustive and exhausting study of a tedious record, after weighing the
evidence for the oppositors, and after giving to the case the serious
consideration which it deserves.
The Code of Civil procedure prescribes a requisite that the testator

be of “sound mind”, a sound mind is a disposing mind. One of the grounds
of disallowing a will is if the testator is insane or otherwise incapable of the
execution.
The Court has adopted a definition of “testamentary capacity” as the

capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction in which the testator
is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the
persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator,
and to comprehend the manner in which the instrument will distribute his
property among the objects of his bounty.
The presumption is that every adult is sane. It is only when those

seeking to overthrow the will have clearly established the charge of mental
incapacity that the courts will intervene to set aside a testamentary
document.
136
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF MARIE GARNIER
GARREAU. LIRIO PFANNENSCHMIDT RAMIREZ
v.
JOSE MA. RAMIREZ
G.R. No. L-19910, May 31, 1971
MAKALINTAL, J.
DOCTRINE:Pre-senile Dementia incapacitated testator from making a will.

The evidence hereinabove discussed, cumulatively considered, leads to
the definite conclusion that Marie Garnier Garreau was indeed mentally
incapacitated to make a will, that is, "to know the nature of the estate to be
disposed of, the proper objects of (her) bounty, and the character of the
testamentary act" (Art. 799. Civil Code).
FACTS:
Maria Gamier Garreau, widow of Ramon Ramirez, was a native of

Paris, France, but a Filipino citizen residing in Madrid, Spain, where she
died childless at the age of 84 on January 11, 1959.
The will in question was an "open" one, executed before a notary

public in Madrid on May 24, 1958, and instituting her niece Lirio (Lily)
Pfannenschmidt now appellant, as sole and universal heir. Lirio is one of
the four children of Jose Ramirez, brother of the testatrix husband Ramon,
the other three being Elsa, Esperanza and Horacio.
Ramon had a half-brother, Jorge P. Ramirez, whose son, Jose Maria

Ramirez, now appellee, opposed the petition for probate filed by Urio,
alleging in his opposition, inter alia, that there was a prior will executed by
the testatrix in Manila in 1949.
Even before then, however, the testatrix' mental condition was

already the object of serious concern among her close relatives.
Depositions were taken from by Julio Escribano Langa, a resident of
Madrid who had known the spouses Ramon Ramirez and Maria Gamier
Garreau for about nine years, testified to the same mental condition of the
testatrix: her susceptibility to another person's influence; her lack of
137
memory for recent events, her lack of understanding of, or volition for
deciding, certain matters such as the making of a last will.
The most pertinent evidence in behalf of appellant is the testimony of

the notary public before whom the will in question was executed and the
testimony of two of the three instrumental witnesses. As may be noted, the
foregoing statements of the notary public are far from satisfactory. They are
vague and evasive and tend to beg the very issue.
ISSUE: Are the testimonies rendered in court sufficient to establish the

testamentary capacity?
RULING: NO.
We find no ground to disregard such evidence in favor of the vague,

inconclusive statements of the notary public who authenticated the will and
of the two instrumental witnesses, nor even of the testimony of the rebuttal
witnesses, the more categorical character of whose affirmations only serve
to weaken their credibility, conflicting as they do not only with the evidence
for appellee but also with that given by the other witnesses for appellant.
The Supreme Court did not give much credit to the testimony of the
notary public because the statements were far from satisfactory, vague,
evasive, and tend to beg the very issue. The notary public could not say
with certainty but could merely suppose that the testator possessed the
requisite qualifications that she had a recollection of her properties or the
relatives that would logically inherit from her.
As early as 1955, when she was examined by the family physician.

Dr. Romero de Arcos, and by a qualified psychiatrist. Dr. Jose Garmain she
was already suffering from pre-senile dementia, a degenerative mental
infirmity that was described by them as "a progressive and irreversible
process." The manifestations of this condition are amply illustrated in the
letters written by appellant herself as well as in the testimony of her uncle.
Jose Eugenio Ramirez: In fact, these two were convinced that the testatrix
should be placed under judicial guardianship and actually took the initial
steps towards that end.
The issue here is essentially one of fact and involves an appraisal of

the conflicting evidence presented by the parties. That issue was
addressed in the first instance to the trial Judge, and we cannot say that his
conclusion as to the testamentary incapacity of the testatrix is erroneous.
138
It is based mainly on expert medical testimony to the effect that her
mental infirmity was observed by the family physician as far back as 1953
and confirmed in 1955 by a competent psychiatrist, who described the
process of the mental degeneration as progressive and irreversible; on the
written admissions and declarations of appellant herself, who would have
no motive then to falsify the facts; and on the testimony of the testatrix'
brother-in-law, Jose Eugenio Ramirez.
139
SAMSON vs. CORRALES TAN QUINTIN
G.R. NO. L-19142, MARCH 5, 1923
OSTRAND, J.
Case Digest by: Faith Imee D. Roble
DOCTRINE: Weakness of the mind is not equivalent to an unsound mind.

Evidence on the soundness of mind must be testified by the Attending
Physician
FACTS:
A document alleged to be the last will and testament of the deceased
Mariano Corrales Tan is to be probated. This was opposed by the son of
the deceased, on the ground that the will is incomplete, fraudulent, and
does not express the true intent of the testator; that the testator acted
under duress and under undue influence, and that at the time of the
execution of the will he was not of sound and disposing mind.
The physician, Dr. Tee Han Kee, testified that the deceased was suffering
from diabetes and had been in comatose condition for several days prior to
his death. He died about eight or nine o'clock in the evening of December
26, 1921, and the will is alleged to have been executed in the forenoon of
the same day. However, all of the witnesses presented by Samson, five in
number, testify that the deceased was conscious, could hear and
understand what was said to him and was able to indicate his desires. Four
of these witnesses state that he could speak distinctly; the fifth, Velhagen,
says that the deceased only moved his head in answer to questions.
ISSUE: Was the decedent of sound mind when he executed his last will
and testament?
RULING: YES.
That the deceased was in an exceedingly feeble condition at the time the
will was executed is evident, but if the witnesses presented in support of
the petition told the truth there can be no doubt that he was of sound mind
and capable of making his will.
There is no reason to discredit any of the witnesses; the discrepancies

found between their respective versions of what took place at the execution
of the document are comparatively unimportant and so far from weakening
140
their testimony rather lend strength to it by indicating the absence of any
conspiracy among them.
As against their testimony are only the testimony of Maximina Ong and Dr.
Tee Han Kee. The former is not a disinterested witness. As to the
testimony of the latter, it is sufficient to say that mere professional
speculation of a non-attending physician cannot prevail over the positive
statements of five apparently credible witnesses whose testimony does not
in itself seem unreasonable.
141
CUYUGAN v. BARON
G.R. No. L-41947, JANUARY 16, 1936
BUTTE, J.
DOCTRINE: There is testamentary incapacity when the alleged testator

harbors the belief that she did not execute a will nor judge the propriety of
revoking such will. Testamentary Incapacity invalidates the whole will.
FACTS:
Silvestra Baron died on January 30, 1933, leaving an estate exceeding in
value the sum of P80,000 which she disposed of by will dated December
17, 1932. She died single without forced heirs. The will appointed Vivencio
Cuyugan, her nephew, as executor. The petition for probate recites that on
the date of the execution of said will on December 17, 1932, the said
testatrix was about 80 years old, more or less, and was found in disposing
mind, and not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, and
was in every respect competent to dispose of her estate by will.
Guillermo Baron, brother of the deceased, and Faustina Baron, sister of the
deceased, allege, that at the time of the execution of the alleged will,
Silvestra Baron was mentally and physically incapacitated for the execution
of a will; and, second, that her signature and alleged consent to the said
will was obtained and the attorney who prepared the document and the
witnesses who affixed their signatures thereto.
ISSUE: Did the testator possess testamentary capacity at the time of the
making of the will?
RULING: NO.
An instrument purporting to be a will executed and witnessed in

accordance with the formalities required by the statute is entitled to the
presumption of regularity. But the burden of the evidence passed to the
proponent when the oppositors submit credible evidence tending to show
that the supposed testator did not possess testamentary capacity at the
time or that the document was not the free and voluntary expression of the
alleged testator or that the will, for any other reason, is void in law.
She never saw the alleged will at any time again prior to her death which
occurred forty-four days later. It was immediately taken away by an
attorney who kept it in his possession alleging that she had instructed him
142
to keep it secret. There is, however, credible evidence in the record that
before her death she had denied to several persons that she made any will.
This belief on her part that she had not made any will explains her failure to
do any act of revocation in the forty-four days during which she lingered in
this life. The doctrine that where the testator has had an opportunity to
revoke his will subsequent to the operation of an alleged undue influence
upon him but makes no change in it, the courts will consider this fact as
weighing heavily against the testimony of undue influence, has no
application to cases in which there has been an initial lack of testamentary
capacity.
143
ORTEGA v. VALMONTE
G.R. No. 157451, DECEMBER 16, 2005
PANGANIBAN, J.
DOCTRINE: The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the
existence of fraud at the time of its execution. To constitute a sound and
disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or
unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise.
FACTS:
Placido Valmonte died on October 8, 1984. He executed a notarial last will
and testament in favor of his wife alone, named Josefina, who is thrice
lower his age. The will was written in English and consisting of two (2)
pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9,
1983. Notary Public Floro Sarmiento testified that before the testator and
his witnesses signed the prepared will, he explained to them each and
every term thereof in Ilocano, a dialect which the testator spoke and
understood. He likewise explained that though it appears that the will was
signed by the testator and his witnesses on June 15, 1983, the day when it
should have been executed had he not gone out of town, the formal
execution was actually on August 9, 1983. The attesting witnesses to the
will corroborated the testimony of the notary public.
Oppositors Leticia and Mary Jane Ortega declared that Josefina should not
inherit alone because aside from her there are other children from the
siblings of Placido who are just as entitled to inherit from him. She attacked
the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at the time of the
execution of the notarial will the testator was already 83 years old and was
no longer of sound mind.
They also contend that it was "highly dubious for a woman at the prime of
her young life to almost immediately plunge into marriage with a man who
[was] thrice her age x x x and who happened to be [a] Fil-American
pensionado,"thus casting doubt on the intention of respondent in seeking
the probate of the will. Moreover, it supposedly "defies human reason, logic
and common experience"for an old man with a severe psychological
condition to have willingly signed a last will and testament.
ISSUE: Did Placido Valmonte possess testamentary capacity at the time

he allegedly executed the subject will?
144
RULING: YES.
The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of
fraud at the time of its execution.The burden to show otherwise shifts to the
proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible evidence of
fraud.Unfortunately in this case, other than the self-serving allegations of
Leticia, no evidence of fraud was ever presented.
In determining the capacity of the testator to make a will, the Civil Code
gives the following guidelines:
"Article 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the testator be
of sound
mind at the time of its execution.
"Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator

be in full
possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly
unbroken,
unimpaired, or shattered by disease, injury or other cause.
"It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the
will to
know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of
his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.
"Article 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in
the
absence of proof to the contrary.
"The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the
time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the
probate
of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his
will was
publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of
the will
must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval."
According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the
ability to know to be considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the
nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the
testator’s bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying
145
this test to the present case, Placido had testamentary capacity at the time
of the execution of his will.
146
BALTAZAR v. LAXA
G.R. No. 174489, APRIL 11, 2012
DEL CASTILLO, J.
DOCTRINE: The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a

person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a will.
Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind.
FACTS:
testament entitled "Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia
Regala" (Will) in the Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981. The Will,
executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge Limpin),
was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will
and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said
document on page 3and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4
thereof.
The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra. Limpin),
Francisco Garcia (Francisco) and Faustino R. Mercado (Faustino). The
three attested to the Will’s due execution by affixing their signatures below
its attestation clauseand on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof,in
the presence of Paciencia and of one another and of Judge Limpin who
acted as notary public.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her
properties to respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon
F. Laxa and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa.
On September 13, 1981, Rosie claimed that she saw Faustino bring
"something" for Paciencia to sign at the latter’s house.Rosie admitted,
though, that she did not see what that "something" was as same was
placed inside an envelope.However, she remembered Paciencia instructing
Faustino to first look for money before she signs them.A few days after or
on September 16, 1981, Paciencia went to the house of Antonio’s mother
and brought with her the said envelope.Upon going home, however, the
envelope was no longer with Paciencia. Rosie further testified that
Paciencia was referred to as "magulyan" or "forgetful" because she would
sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it moments
later.On cross examination, it was established that Rosie was neither a
147
doctor nor a psychiatrist, that her conclusion that Paciencia was
"magulyan" was based on her personal assessment,and that it was Antonio
who requested her to testify in court.
ISSUE: Was the testator of sound mind when she executed her last will
and testament?
RULING: YES.
The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally
unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not
equivalent to being of unsound mind.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to
bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.
In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencia’s

forgetfulness, there is no substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that
would show that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the
execution of the Will. On the other hand, we find more worthy of credence
Dra. Limpin’s testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the
latter went to Judge Limpin’s house and voluntarily executed the Will. "The
testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the testator’s
mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and
intelligent."More importantly, a testator is presumed to be of sound mind at
the time of the execution of the Will and the burden to prove otherwise lies
on the oppositor.
The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of
making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the
will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will was
publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the
will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval.
Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be

insane one month or less before the making of the Will. Clearly, thus, the
burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind lies upon the
shoulders of petitioners. However and as earlier mentioned, no substantial
evidence was presented by them to prove the same, thereby, petitioners
failed to discharge such burden.
148
SUROZA v. HONRADO
A.M. No. 2026-CFI, DECEMBER 19, 1981
AQUINO, J.
DOCTRINE: Lack of knowledge cannot be cured by interpretation or

explanation of the contents of the will to the testator.
FACTS:
Marcelina supposedly executed a notarial will in Manila on July 23, 1973,
when she was 73 years old. That will which is in English was thumbmarked
by her. She was illiterate. Her letters in English to the Veterans
Administration were also thumbmarked by her. In that will, Marcelina
bequeathed all her estate to her supposed granddaughter Marilyn ( an
“anak-anakan” allegedly begot by the deceased Agapito from Arsenia, but
in reality, the child was the daughter of the Spouses Sy and was merely
entrusted to Arsenia when the baby was only days old).
Marina Paje, alleged to be a laundrywoman of Marcelina and the executrix

in her will (the alternate executrix was Juanita Macaraeg, mother of Oscar,
Marilyn's husband), filed with the Court a petition for the probate of
Marcelina's alleged will. The case was assigned to Judge Reynaldo P.
Honrado, who appointed Marina as administratrix.
The wife of Agapito, Nenita, filed an opposition thereto only after learning of
the existence of the testamentary proceeding (when an order for ejectment
was issued by said judge upon motion of Marina). One of the grounds for
her opposition was that the alleged will is void because Marcelina did not
appear before the notary and because it is written in English which is not
known to the deceased. However, this was denied by the judge. This
prompted Nenita to file a complaint charging Judge Honrado for having
probated the fraudulent will of Marcelina.
ISSUE: Being merely interpreted or translated to the testator, was the will
valid?
RULING: NO.
Disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judge for his

improper disposition of the testate case which might have resulted in a
miscarriage of justice because the decedent's legal heirs and not the
149
instituted heiress in the void win should have inherited the decedent's
estate.
Judge Honrado, on perusing the will and noting that it was written in
English and was thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could
have readily perceived that the will is void.
In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a
language "understood and known" to the testatrix. But in its concluding
paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the testatrix "and
translated into Filipino language". That could only mean that the will was
written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is
void because of the mandatory provision of article 804 of the Civil Code
that every will must be executed in a language or dialect known to the
testator.
The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and
notarial acknowledgment where Marcelina Salvador Suroza is repeatedly
referred to as the "testator" instead of "testatrix".
Had respondent judge been careful and observant, he could have noted
not only the anomaly as to the language of the will but also that there was
something wrong in instituting the supposed granddaughter as sole heiress
and giving nothing at all to her supposed father who was still alive.
150
IN RE WILL OF ANA ABANGAN. GERTRUDIS ABANGAN v.
ANASTACIA ABANGAN, ET AL.
G. R. NO. L-13431 NOVEMBER 12, 1919
AVANCEÑA, J.:
DOCTRINE:For the presumption that the testatrix knew of the dialect in

which the will is written, the following circumstances must appear: 1) that
the will must be in a language or dialect generally spoken in the place of
execution, and, 2) that the testator must be a native or resident of the said
locality
FACTS:On September 19, 1917, the Court of First Instance of Cebu

admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will executed July, 1916. From this
decision the opponent's appealed. Said document, duly probated as Ana
Abangan's will, consists of two sheets, the first of which contains all of the
disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban
(in the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by three
witnesses. With the said decision of the court, Anastacia Abanga et al.
appealed alleging that the records do not show that the testatrix knew the
dialect in which the dialect was written.
ISSUE:Is the will validly probated?
RULING: YES, the will is validly probated.
The circumstance appearing in the will itself that same was executed in the
city of Cebu and in the dialect of this locality where the testatrix was a
neighbor is enough, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, to presume
that she knew this dialect in which this will is written.
151
TESTACY OF SIXTO LOPEZ. JOSE S. LOPEZ v. AGUSTIN LIBORO
G.R. No. L-1787 AUGUST 27, 1948
TUASON, J.:
DOCTRINE:There is no statutory requirement that such knowledge be
expressly stated in the will itself. It is a matter that may be established by
proof aliunde.
FACTS:In the Court of First Instance (CFI), Agustin Liboro opposed the
probate of what purports to be the last will and testament of Don Sixto
Lopez, who died at the age of 83 in Balayan, Batangas, on March 3, 1947,
almost six months after the document in question was executed. Liboro
questioned the validity of the will based on five (5) grounds. One of the 5
grounds was that there was no indication in the will that the language used
therein is known by Don Sixto Lopez.
ISSUE:Is the will valid?
RULING:YES, the will is valid.
There is no statutory requirement that such knowledge be expressly stated

in the will itself. It is a matter that may be established by proof aliunde. This
Court so impliedly ruled in Gonzales vs. Laurel, 46 Phil., 781, in which the
probate of a will written in Tagalog was ordered although it did not say that
the testator knew that idiom. In fact, there was not even extraneous proof
on the subject other than the fact that the testator resided in a Tagalog
region, from which the court said "a presumption arises that said Maria
Tapia knew the Tagalog dialect.
152
IN RE ESTATE OF PIRASO. SIXTO ACOP v. SALMING PIRASO, ET AL.
G. R. NO. L-28946 JANUARY 16, 1929.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
DOCTRINE:The presumption that the testator is presumed to know the

dialect of the locality where he resides can be overcome by the
presentation of evidence and facts as in this case.
FACTS:The Court of First Instance of Benguet denied the probate of the

last will and testament of the deceased Piraso based on the ground that the
will sought to be probated was written in English which the latter did not
know.
Evidence shows that Piraso knew how to speak the Ilocano dialect,
although imperfectly, and could make himself understood in that dialect,
and the court is of the opinion that his will should have been written in that
dialect.
Sixto Acop alleged that the lower court erred in not holding that the testator
did not know the Ilocano dialect well enough to understand a will drawn up
in said dialect.
ISSUE:Can the presumption that the testator knew the language used in
the will applicable in this case?
RULING:NO, the presumption that the testator knew the language used in
the will is not applicable in this case.
"No will, except as provides in the preceding section" (as to wills executed
by a Spaniard or a resident of the Philippine Islands, before the present
Code of Civil Procedure went into effect), "shall be valid to pass any estate,
real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the
language or dialect known by the testator," etc. Nor can the presumption in
favor of the will established by this court in Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil.,
476), to the effect that the testator is presumed to know the dialect of the
locality where he resides, unless there is proof to the contrary, even he
invoked in support of the probate of said document since in the instant
case, not only is it not proven that English is the language of the City of
Baguio where the deceased Piraso lived and where the will was drawn, but
that the record contains positive proof that said Piraso knew no other
language than the Igorrote dialect, with a smattering of Ilocano hence, he
did not know the English language in which the will was written. Even if
such a presumption could have been raised in this case it would have been
wholly contradicted and destroyed.
153
TESTATE ESTATE OF MARIA ZUÑIGA VDA. DE PANDO, deceased.
JUAN REYES v. DOLORES ZUÑIGA VDA. DE VIDAL
G.R. NO. L-2862 APRIL 21, 1952
DOCTRINE:The failure of the witnesses to testify that the testatrix knew

and spoke the language used in a will does not itself alone suffice to
conclude that this requirement of law has not been complied with when
there is enough evidence of record which supplies this technical omission
FACTS:This concerns the admission to probate of a document claimed to

be the last will and testament of Maria Zuñiga Vda. de Pando who died in
the City of Manila on October 29, 1945.
On November 6, 1945, a petition for the probate of said will was filed in the
Court of First Instance of Manila. On December 21, 1945, Dolores Zuñiga
Vda. de Vidal, sister of the deceased, filed an opposition based on several
grounds. And, after several days of trial, at which both parties presented
their respective evidence, the court rendered its decision disallowing the
wil. One of the grounds that the lower court base the disallowance of the
will is the failure of the Dolores to prove that the testratrix knew and spoke
the language in which the will in question appears to have been written.
According to the lower court, the law requires that the will should be written
in the dialect or language known to the testator and this fact having been
proven, the probate of the will must fail. And the wall was disallowed.
ISSUE:Is there evidence to show that the testatrix knew the language in
which the will was written?
RULING:YES. There is indeed nothing in the testimony of the witnesses

presented by the petitioner which would indicate that the testatrix knew and
spoke the Spanish language used in the preparation of the will in question.
But, in our opinion, this failure alone does not in itself suffice to conclude
that this important requirement of the law has not been complied with, it
appearing that there is enough evidence on record which supplies this
technical omission. In the first place, we have the undisputed fact that the
deceased was a mestiza española, was married to a Spaniard, Recaredo
Pando, and made several trips to Spain. In the second place, we have the
very letters submitted as evidence by the oppositor written in Spanish by
the deceased possessed the Spanish language, oppositor cannot now be
allowed to allege the contrary. These facts give rise to the presumption that
the testatrix knew the language in which the testament has been written,
which presumption should stand unless the contrary is proven (Abangan
vs. Abangan, 40 Phil., 476; Gonzales vs. Laurel, 46 Phil. 750). And this
presumption has not been overcome. And finally, we have the very
attestation clause of the will which states that the testatrix knew and
154
possessed the Spanish language. It is true that this matter is not required
to be stated in the attestation clause, but its inclusion can only mean that
the instrumental witnesses wanted to make it of record that the deceased
knew the language in which the will was written. There is, therefore, no
valid reason why the will should be avoided on this ground.
155
IN RE: WILL OF THE DECEASED LEONICIA TOLENTINO. VICTORIO
PAYAD v. AQUILINA TOLENTINO
G.R. NO. 42258 SEPTEMBER 5, 1936
DIAZ, J,:
DOCTRINE:A statute requiring a will to be signed is satisfied if the

signature is made by the testator’s mark.
FACTS:Victorio Payad filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late
Leonicia Tolentino however, this was opposed by Aquilina Tolention on the
ground that the will in question was made after the death of Leonicia
Tolentino and that the latter was mentally and physically incapable of
executing such will.
The lower court denied the probate of the will on the ground that the
attestation clause was not in confirmity with the requirements of the law in
that it is not stated therein that the testatrix caused Attorney Almario to
write her name at her express direction.
ISSUE:Is the attestation clause in confirmity with the requirements of the

law?
RULING:YES, the attestation clause is in confirmity with the requirements

of the law.
The evidence shows that Leonicia Tolentino was assisted by Attorney

Almario in the execution of the will. The latter guided her in placing her
thumbmark on each and every page of the said will and that the latter
merely wrote her name to indicate the place where she placed said
thumbmark. The said acts are not an indication that Attorney Almario sign
for the testatrix. Hence, it is clear that it was not necessary that the
attestation clause in issue should state that the testatrix requested Attorney
Almario to sign her name inasmuch as the testatrix signed the will in
accordance with the law.
156
In re will of TAN DIUCO, deceased. MAMERTA BASE, petitioner-
appellant.
G.R. No. L-20475 March 19, 1924
ARAULLO, C.J.:
Case Digest by: Jan ione R. Salveron
DOCTRINE: it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the
exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given
assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing
but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustative
of the testator's last will, must be disregarded
FACTS:
Mamerta Base instituted the probate of the will executed, according

to her, by the Chinaman Tan Diuco. The lower court denied the probate of
the will since it was not signed by three instrumental witnesses. Mamerta
Base appealed the said decision.
The document in question, appears to have been signed by Simplicio

Sala by order of the testator, whose name is before the said signature, by
reason of the latter's incapacity on account of his weakness and the
trembling of his hand, the testator also stating that he directed said
Simplicio Sala to sign it in his name and in the presence of three witnesses
who also signed with him at the bottom of said document, and on the left
margin of each of its three pages correlatively numbered in letters by Sala
in the name of the testator Tan Diuco and by the witnesses therein
mentioned, named Pablo Maturan, Ladislao Fenomeno, and Enrique
Peñaredondo. After the signature of the testator, Tan Diuco by Simplicio
Sala.
ISSUE: Did the will comply with the three witness rule?
RULING: YES.
Among the necessary requirements before a will can be probated,

that it be attested and signed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of each other. An instrumental witness is one
who takes part in the execution of an instrument or writing.
In dealing with attestation, section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure,

as amended by Act No. 2645, does not say that said witnesses must be
different from those who signed the attestation clause. Besides, as may be
seen, the said three witnesses who signed the attestation clause, did so
also on the left margin and beside the signature of the testator or of
Simplicio Sala who signed by order of the latter, and if account is taken of
the fact that these witnesses are "instrumental" witnesses, as above
157
demonstrated, and they have made reference to their own signatures, as
well as that of the testator and of the person who signed by the latter's
order below the attestation clause, it is evident that in the instant case, it is
merely a matter of technicality devoid of any importance as to the probate
of the will that said witnesses are called instrumental witnesses, as if they
were different from those who have to sign the attestation clause.
158
AUREA MATIAS, petitioner, vs. BASILIA SALUD, respondent.
G.R. No. L-10751 June 23, 1958
CONCEPCION, J.:
DOCTRINE: the validity of a thumbprint should not be limited in cases of

illness of infirmity, it shall always be considered as a valid and sufficient
signature in complying with the requirements of Article 805 of the New Civil
Code.
FACTS:
Aurea Matias initiated a petition for the probate of a document

purporting to be the last will and testament of her aunt, Gabina Raquel,
who died single. The document consists of three(3) pages, after the
attestation clause there appears the signature of the testatrix with a
smudge of violet ink claimed as thumbprint placed by Gabina Raquel. The
same violet smudge appears on the left margin of each page accompanied
by the written words “Gabina Raquel” with “by Lourdes Samonte”
underneath it. It shall be considered that the testatrix was suffering from
herpes zoster at the time the will was executed, and had a hard time writing
her name in the instrument. Upon seeing Gabina’s struggle, Atty. Agbunag
instructed Lourdes to write the said words next to each thumbprint. The
testatrix instructed Atty. Agbunag to draft the will and was brought to her.
The will was likewise signed by the necessary witnesses on the left margin
and on the attestation clause. Basilia Salud, a niece of the decedent
opposed the probate alleging that the smudge cannot be regarded as a
valid signature as it does not show distinct identifying ridgelines and that
there must appear in the attestation clause that another person wrote the
testatrix’s name at her request.
ISSUE: Is a thumbprint a sufficient compliance with the law despite the

absence of a description of such in the attestation clause?
RULING: YES.
The Supreme Court have constantly held in a long line of cases that a
thumbprint is always a valid and sufficient signature for the purpose of
complying the requirement of Article 805 of the New Civil Code. As to the
clarity of the ridgelines, it is so dependent on the aleatory requirements as
to require dexterity that can be expected of very few people. Moreover,
absence of the description in the attestation clause that another person
wrote the testator’s name is not a fatal defect.
159
In the Matter of the will of ANTERO MERCADO, deceased. ROSARIO
GARCIA, petitioner,
vs. JULIANA LACUESTA, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-4067 November 29, 1951
PARAS, C.J.
DOCTRINE: a cross seen after the name of the testator shall not be
considered as sufficient signature if it is not the usual signature of the
testator.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals disallowing

the will of Antero Mercado. The will appears to have been signed by Atty.
Florentino Javier who wrote the name of Antero Mercado, followed below
by "A reugo del testator" and the name of Florentino Javier. Antero
Mercado is alleged to have written a cross immediately after his name. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the attestation clause failed (1) to certify that
the will was signed on all the left margins of the three pages and at the end
of the will by Atty. Florentino Javier at the express request of the testator in
the presence of the testator and each and every one of the witnesses; (2)
to certify that after the signing of the name of the testator by Atty. Javier at
the former's request said testator has written a cross at the end of his name
and on the left margin of the three pages of which the will consists and at
the end thereof; (3) to certify that the three witnesses signed the will in all
the pages thereon in the presence of the testator and of each other.
Antero Mercado argues, however, that there is no need for such

recital because the cross written by the testator after his name is a
sufficient signature and the signature of Atty. Florentino Javier is a
surplusage.
ISSUE:Should the cross after the name of the testator be considered a

sufficient signature?
RULING: NO.
The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that

Antero Mercado caused Atty. Florentino Javier to write the testator's name
under his express direction. It is not here pretended that the cross
appearing on the will is the usual signature of Antero Mercado or even one
of the ways by which he signed his name. After mature reflection, we are
not prepared to liken the mere sign of the cross to a thumbmark, and the
reason is obvious. The cross cannot and does not have the trustworthiness
of a thumbmark.
160
PEDRO BARUT, petitioner-appellant, vs. FAUSTINO CABACUNGAN,
ET AL., opponents-appellees.
G.R. No. L-6285 February 15, 1912
MORELAND, J.
DOCTRINE: It is unimportant whether the person who writes the name of

the testatrix signs his own or not for a will to be valid.
FACTS: Pedro Barut initiated the probate the last will and testament of
Maria Salomon. Severo Agayan, Timotea Inoselda, Catalino Ragasa, and
A. M. Jimenez are alleged to have been witnesses to the execution thereof.
By the terms of said will Pedro Barut received the larger part of decedent's
property. The original will appears on page 3 of the record and is in the
Ilocano dialect. Its translation into Spanish appears at page 11. After
disposing of her property the testatrix revoked all former wills by her made.
She also stated in said will that being unable to read or write, the same had
been read to her by Ciriaco Concepcion and Timotea Inoselda and that she
had instructed Severo Agayan to sign her name to it as testatrix.
The probate of the will was contested and opposed by a number of

the relatives of the deceased on various grounds. The probate court found
that the will was not entitled to probate upon the sole ground that the
handwriting of the person who it is alleged signed the name of the testatrix
to the will for and on her behalf looked more like the handwriting of one of
the other witnesses to the will than that of the person whose handwriting it
was alleged to be.
ISSUE:Was the difference in the handwriting of the person tasked to write

in behalf of the testator a sufficient ground to deny the probate of the will?
RULING: NO.
We do not believe that the mere dissimilarity in writing thus

mentioned by the court is sufficient to overcome the uncontradicted
testimony of all the witnesses to the will that the signature of the testatrix
was written by Severo Agayan at her request and in her presence and in
the presence of all the witnesses to the will. It is immaterial who writes the
name of the testatrix provided it is written at her request and in her
presence and in the presence of all the witnesses to the execution of the
will.
It is unimportant whether the person who writes the name of the

testatrix signs his own or not. The important thing is that it clearly appears
that the name of the testatrix was signed at her express direction in the
presence of three witnesses and that they attested and subscribed it in her
presence and in the presence of each other. That is all the statute requires.
161
BEATRIZ NERA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. NARCISA
RIMANDO, defendant-appellant
G.R. No. L-5971 February 27, 1911
CARSON, J.
DOCTRINE: The presence of each other does not depend upon proof of
the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon the paper at the moment of
its subscription by each of them, but that at that moment existing conditions
and their position with relation to each other were such that by merely
casting the eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each other
sign..
FACTS:
One of the subscribing witnesses was some eight or ten feet away, in a
large room connecting with the smaller room where the testator and other
subscribing witnesses were, by a doorway, across which was hung a
curtain which made it impossible for one in the outside room to see the
testator and the other subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching their
signatures to the instrument.
The trial judge does not appear to have considered the determination of
this question of fact of vital importance in the determination of this case, as
he was of opinion that under the doctrine laid down in the case of Jaboneta
vs. Gustilo the alleged fact that one of the subscribing witnesses was in the
outer room when the testator and the other describing witnesses signed the
instrument in the inner room, had it been proven, would not be sufficient in
itself to invalidate the execution of the will.
ISSUE: Should the witness who was outside the room when the testator
and other subscribing witnesses attached their signatures to the instrument
be considered as present during the said act?
RULING: NO.
Once this subscribing witness is proven to have been in the outer

room at the time when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses
attached their signatures to the instrument in the inner room, it would have
been invalid as a will, the attaching of those signatures under
circumstances not being done "in the presence" of the witness in the outer
room. This because the line of vision from this witness to the testator and
the other subscribing witnesses would necessarily have been impeded by
the curtain separating the inner from the outer one "at the moment of
inscription of each signature."
162
The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the
execution of a will is not whether they actually saw each other sign,
but whether they might have been seen each other sign, had they
chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical condition and
position with relation to each other at the moment of inscription of
each signature.
But it is especially to be noted that the position of the parties with

relation to each other at the moment of the subscription of each signature,
must be such that they may see each other sign if they choose to do so. A
witness must be able to see everything that took place by merely casting
his eyes in the proper direction and without any physical obstruction to
prevent his doing so."
163
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA
VILLACORTE.
CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO, oppositors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
DOCTRINE: The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to

penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness
over whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the law to
guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is
sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the
evidence on record attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites.
FACTS:
A petition for the allowance and admission to probate of the original, Exhibit
"A" as the alleged will of Josefa Villacorte, deceased, and for the
appointment of petitioner Celso Icasiano as executor thereof was filed.
Natividad and Enrique Icasiano, a daughter and son of the testatrix, filed
their opposition thereto.
On March 19, 1959, the petitioner proponent commenced the introduction

of his evidence; but on June 1, 1959, he filed a motion for the admission of
an amended and supplemental petition, alleging that the decedent left a will
executed in duplicate with all the legal requirements, and that he was, on
that date, submitting the signed duplicate (Exhibit "A-1"), which he allegedly
found only on or about May 26, 1959.
The records show that the original of the will, which was surrendered
simultaneously with the filing of the petition and marked as Exhibit "A"
consists of five pages, and while signed at the end and in every page, it
does not contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose
V. Natividad, on page three (3) thereof; but the duplicate copy attached to
the amended and supplemental petition and marked as Exhibit "A-1" is
signed by the testatrix and her three attesting witnesses in each and every
page.
ISSUE: Did the failure of one of the witnesses to sign a page of the will
render the will void?
164
RULING: NO
The records show that the original of the will, which was surrendered
simultaneously with the filing of the petition and marked as Exhibit "A"
consists of five pages, and while signed at the end and in every page, it
does not contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose
V. Natividad, on page three (3) thereof; but the duplicate copy attached to
the amended and supplemental petition and marked as Exhibit "A-1" is
signed by the testatrix and her three attesting witnesses in each and every
page.
Witness Natividad who testified on his failure to sign page three (3) of the
original, admits that he may have lifted two pages instead of one when he
signed the same, but affirmed that page three (3) was signed in his
presence.
We have examined the record and are satisfied, as the trial court was, that
the testatrix signed both original and duplicate copies (Exhibits "A" and "A-
1", respectively) of the will spontaneously, on the same in the presence of
the three attesting witnesses, the notary public who acknowledged the will;
and Atty. Samson, who actually prepared the documents; that the will and
its duplicate were executed in Tagalog, a language known to and spoken
by both the testator and the witnesses, and read to and by the testatrix and
Atty. Fermin Samson, together before they were actually signed; that the
attestation clause is also in a language known to and spoken by the
testatrix and the witnesses.
We hold that the inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to
one page of a testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the
course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify denial of probate.
Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the
testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its
bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom
the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law
should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix
on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she
had no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of
the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no
intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record
attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites.
That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely
through pure oversight is shown by his own testimony as well as by the
165
duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of signatures in every
page. The text of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment before the
Notary Public likewise evidence that no one was aware of the defect at the
time.
166
Testate Estate of Florencia R. Mateo. PERFECTO GABRIEL, petitioner-
appellee,
vs.
RITA R. MATEO, ET AL., opponents-appellants.
G.R. No. L-26545 December 16, 1927
AVANCEÑA, C. J.:
DOCTRINE:Over the testimony of experts, we have the categorical and

positive declaration of veracious witnesses who affirm that these signatures
were written by the testatrix herself.
FACTS:
The probate court allowed the will of Florencia Mateo composed of two
used sheets. The will appears to be signed by the testatrix and three
witnesses on the left margin of each of the sheets, by the testatrix alone at
the bottom, and by the three witnesses after the attestation clause.
The three attesting witnesses to this will, testifying in this case, declared
that the signature of the testatrix were written in their presence and that
they signed their names in the presence of the testatrix and of each other.
The testatrix from girlhood knew how to sign her name and did so with her
right hand; but as the right side of her body later became paralyzed, she
learned to sign with her left hand and for many years thereafter, up to the
time of her death, she used to sign with that hand. The opponents allege
that Florencia Mateo did not sign this will.
ISSUE:Was the signature of Florencia Mateo genuine?
RULING:Yes.
If, as the opposition alleges, the testatrix's signature is not genuine and
was placed there by another person, it is strange that the latter should have
done so in such a way as to write it above Gabriel's signature while
following the horizontal line, when this could have been avoided by simply
putting it a little higher. And this may be attributed to carelessness in the
first case, but it cannot be so explained in the second.
At all events, even admitting that there is a certain question as to whether

the attesting witnesses signed before or after the testatrix, or whether or
not they signed with the same pen and ink, these are details of such trivial
167
importance, considering that this will was signed two years before the date
on which these witnesses gave their testimony, that it is not proper to set
aside the will for this reason alone.
The attesting witnesses to this will, who testified also as witnesses at the
trial of this case, showed themselves to be intelligent and honest, one of
them being a lawyer of twelve year's practice, and there is no reason to
reject their testimony, and to suppose that they were untruthful in testifying,
and that they falsified the will in question.
The opposition presented Doctor Banks as expert. He testified that the

signatures of the testatrix in the will are not genuine. The petitioner, on the
other hand, presented another expert, Pedro Serrano Laktao, who affirmed
that these signatures are genuine. But, over the testimony of these experts,
we have the categorical and positive declaration of veracious witnesses
who affirm that these signatures were written by the testatrix herself.
168
RIZALINA GABRIEL GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUTGARDA
SANTIAGO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979
GUERRERO, J.:
DOCTRINE:
• The instrumental witnesses in Order to be competent must be shown

to have the qualifications under Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of
the disqualifications under Article 821 and for their testimony to be credible,
that is worthy of belief and entitled to credence, it is not mandatory that
evidence be first established on record that the witnesses have a good
standing in the community or that they are honest and upright or reputed to
be trustworthy and reliable, for a person is presumed to be such unless the
contrary is established otherwise.
• The attestation clause which Matilde Orobia signed is the best

evidence as to the date of signing because it preserves in permanent form
a recital of all the material facts attending the execution of the will. This is
the very purpose of the attestation clause which is made for the purpose of
preserving in permanent form a record of the facts attending the execution
of the will, so that in case of failure in the memory of the subscribing
witnesses, or other casualty they may still be proved.
FACTS:
Lutgarda Santiago filed a petition for the probate of a will of Isabel Gabriel
and designating Lutgarda as the principal beneficiary and executrix.
The will submitted for probate, Exhibit "F", which is typewritten and in
Tagalog, appears to have been executed in Manila on the 15th day of April,
1961, or barely two (2) months prior to the death of Isabel Gabriel. It
consists of five (5) pages, including the pages whereon the attestation
clause and the acknowledgment of the notary public were written. The
signatures of the deceased Isabel Gabriel appear at the end of the will on
page four and at the left margin of all the pages.
169
The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales. The Trial Court
disallowed the probate of the will. The Court of Appeals allowed the
probate of the will. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:Was the will executed and attested as required by law?
RULING:Yes
As to the credibility of the witnesses:
Rizalina argues that the requirement in Article 806, Civil Code, that the
witnesses must be credible is an absolute requirement which must be
complied with before an alleged last will and testament may be admitted to
probate and that to be a credible witness, there must be evidence on
record that the witness has a good standing in his community, or that he is
honest and upright, or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable.
In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not character

witnesses for they merely attest the execution of a will or testament and
affirm the formalities attendant to said execution.
In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three
instrumental witnesses, namely, Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria
Gimpaya, are competent and credible is satisfactorily supported by the
evidence as found by the respondent Court of Appeals.
Moreover, petitioner has not pointed to any disqualification of any of the

said witnesses, much less has it been shown that anyone of them is below
18 years of age, of unsound mind, deaf or dumb, or cannot read or write.
In fine, We state the rule that the instrumental witnesses in Order to be

competent must be shown to have the qualifications under Article 820 of
the Civil Code and none of the disqualifications under Article 821 and for
their testimony to be credible, that is worthy of belief and entitled to
credence, it is not mandatory that evidence be first established on record
that the witnesses have a good standing in the community or that they are
honest and upright or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, for a person is
presumed to be such unless the contrary is established otherwise.
As to the capacity of the testator:
We nevertheless hold that the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals

that the testatrix dictated her will without any note or memorandum appears
to be fully supported by the following facts or evidence appearing on
record. Thus, Isabel Gabriel, despite her age, was particularly active in her
business affairs as she actively managed the affairs of the movie business
ISABELITA Theater, paying the aparatistas herself until June 4, 1961, 3
170
days before her death. She was the widow of the late Eligio Naval, former
Governor of Rizal Province and acted as coadministratrix in the Intestate
Estate of her deceased husband Eligio Naval. The text of the win was in
Tagalog, a dialect known and understood by her and in the light of all the
circumstances, We agree with the respondent Court that the testatrix
dictated her will without any note or memorandum, a fact unanimously
testified to by the three attesting witnesses and the notary public himself.
In addition to the testimony of Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria

Gimpaya that Matilde was present on April 15, 1961 and that she signed
the attestation clause to the will and on the left-hand margin of each of the
pages of the will, the documentary evidence which is the will itself, the
attestation clause and the notarial acknowledgment overwhelmingly and
convincingly prove such fact that Matilde Orobia was present on that day of
April 15, 1961 and that she witnessed the will by signing her name thereon
and acknowledged the same before the notary public, Atty. Cipriano P.
Paraiso. The attestation clause which Matilde Orobia signed is the best
evidence as to the date of signing because it preserves in permanent form
a recital of all the material facts attending the execution of the will. This is
the very purpose of the attestation clause which is made for the purpose of
preserving in permanent form a record of the facts attending the execution
of the will, so that in case of failure in the memory of the subscribing
witnesses, or other casualty they may still be proved.
Petitioner's exacerbation centers on the supposed incredibility of the

testimonies of the witnesses for the proponent of the will, their alleged
evasions, inconsistencies and contradictions. But in the case at bar, the
three instrumental witnesses who constitute the best evidence of the will
making have testified in favor of the probate of the will. So has the lawyer
who prepared it, one learned in the law and long in the practice thereof,
who thereafter notarized it. All of them are disinterested witnesses who
stand to receive no benefit from the testament. The signatures of the
witnesses and the testatrix have been identified on the will and there is no
claim whatsoever and by anyone, much less the petitioner, that they were
not genuine. In the last and final analysis, the herein conflict is factual and
we go back to the rule that the Supreme Court cannot review and revise
the findings of facts of the respondent Court of Appeals.
171
In re will of Josefa Zalamea y Abella, deceased.
PEDRO UNSON, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO ABELLA, ET AL., opponents-appellants.
G.R. No. 17857 June 12, 1922
VILLAMOR, J.:
Doctrine:The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is

to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills
and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the
laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these
primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the
fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of
the right to make a will. So when an interpretation whatsoever, that adds
nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless, and
frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.
Facts:
On July 19, 1918, Doña Josefa Zalamea y Abella executed her last will and
testament with an attached inventory of her properties, Exhibits A and A-1,
in the presence of three witnesses, who signed with her all the pages of
said documents. The testatrix died on the 6th of January, 1921, and, as the
record shows, the executor appointed in the will, Pedro Unson, filed an
application for the probate of the will and the issuance of the proper letters
of administration in his favor.
To said application an opposition was presently by Antonio Abella, Ignacia

Abella, Avicencia Abella, and Santiago Vito, alleging that the supposed will
of the deceased Zalamea was not executed in conformity with the
provinces of the law, inasmuch as it was not paged correlatively in letters,
nor was there any attestation clause in it, nor was it signed by the testatrix
and the witnesses in the presence of each other.
Issue: Was the will executed with all the solemnities required by law?
Ruling: Yes.
The appellants contend that the court below erred in admitting the will to
probate notwithstanding the omission of the proponent to produce one of
the attesting witnesses. But supposing that said witness, when cited, had
172
testified adversely to the application, this would not by itself have change
the result reached by the court a quo, for section 632 of the Code of Civil
Procedure provides that a will can be admitted to probate, notwithstanding
that one or more witnesses do not remember having attested it, provided
the court is satisfied upon the evidence adduced that the will has been
executed and signed in the manner prescribed by the law.
The last error assigned by the appellants is made to consist in the probate
of the inventory, Exhibit A-1, despite the fact that this exhibit has no
attestation clause in it, and its paging is made in Arabic numerals and not in
letters.
In view of the fact that the inventory is referred to in the will as an integral
part of it, we find that the foregoing attestation clause is in compliance with
section 1 of Act No. 2645, which requires this solemnity for the validity of a
will, and makes unnecessary any other attestation clause at the end of the
inventory.
As to the paging of the will in Arabic numerals, instead of in letters, we

adhere to the doctrine announced in the case of Aldaba vs. Roque (p.
378, ante), recently decided by this court. In that case the validity of the will
was assailed on the ground that its folios were paged with the letters A, B,
C, etc., instead of with the letters "one," two," "three," etc. It was held that
this way of numbering the pages of a will is in compliance with the spirit of
the law, inasmuch as either one of these methods indicates the correlation
of the pages and serves to prevent the abstraction of any of them.
In other words the more or less degree of facility to imitate the writing of the
letters A, B, C, etc., does not make for the easiness to forge the signatures.
And as in the present case there exists the guaranty of the authenticity of
the testament, consisting in the signatures on the left margins of the
testament and the paging thereof as declared in the attestation clause, the
holding of this court in Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476), might as well
be repeated:
"The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills

is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth
and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be
interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends.
But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact
that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the
exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation
whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites
173
entirely unnecessary, useless, and frustrative of the testator's
last will, must be disregarded."
The law provides that the numbering of the pages should be in letters
placed on the upper part of the sheet, but if the paging should be placed in
the lower part, would the testament be void for this sole reason? We
believe not. The law also provides that the testator and the witnesses must
sign the left margin of each of the sheets of the testament; but if they
should sign on the right margin, would this fact also annul the testament?
Evidently not. This court has already held in Avera vs. Garcia and
Rodriguez (42 Phi., 145).
We do not desire to intimate that the numbering in letters is a requisite of

no importance. But since its principal object is to give the correlation of the
pages, we hold that his object may be attained by writing one, two, three,
etc., as well as by writing A, B, C, etc.
We see no reason why the same rule should not be applied where the
paging is in Arabic numerals, instead of in letters, as in the inventory in
question. So that, adhering to the view taken by this court in the case of
Abangan vs. Abangan, and followed in Aldava vs. Roque, with regard to
the appreciation of the solemnities of a will, we find that the judgement
appealed from should be, as is hereby, affirmed with the costs against the
appellants.
174
Probate of the late Rev. P. Eleuterio Pilapil. ADRIAN
MENDOZA,petitioner and appellee,
vs.
Pilapil CALIXTO AND OTHERS,opponents and appellants.
G. R. No. L-47931June 27, 1941
DIAZ, J.:
DOCTRINE:The paging in this case was a sufficient compliance with the

law. It is sufficient that the number of pages can be identified.
FACTS:
P. Eleuterio Pilapil was a parish priest of Mualboal, Cebu where he died.

No will was presented after his death until early February 1939 by his
brother Calixto Pilapil. March 4, 1939, the appellee prayed for the the
legalization as a testament of the late P. Eleuterio Pilapil, of Exhibit A and
its duplicate to the coal of Exhibit C.
The two documents, exhibits A and C, consist of three pages, and in the
left margin of each of the first two , are the firms that are at the end of the
main body of these documents and their attestation clause and that are,
according to the evidence, signatures of the late P. Eleuterio Pilapil, and
witnesses Wenceslas Pilapil, Marcelo Pilapil and Eugene K. Pilapil.
The probate of the will is opposed on the grounds that the said will was not
properly paged such that at the bottom of the pages (1) and (2) are
respectively the notes: "Go to 2. Pages", "go to 3. Pages".
ISSUE: Is the will valid?
RULING: Yes, the will is valid and must be admitted for probate.
The purpose of the law in establishing the formalities is undoubtedly to

ensure and guarantee their authenticity against bad faith and fraud. The
paging in this case was a sufficient compliance with the law. It is sufficient
that the number of pages can be identified. Indeed, the will in this case, as
stated in the 3rdpage, contains no more, no less than 2 articles, containing
16 dispositions and written in 3 pages.
We maintain the view that there should be required strict compliance with
the substantive requirements of the will, to ensure its authenticity, but at the
same time we should not take into account the defects that could thwart the
will of the testator. (Rodriguez against Yap, supra.)
175
Fernandez v. de Dios
46 Phil 922
DOCTRINE:
Although the numbering of the sheet containing the attestation clause does
not appear in the upper part thereof, yet if that numbering is found in its
text, the requirement prescribed by the law is substantially complied with.
FACTS:
The question in this case is as to the validity of the document Exhibit A as a
will, which was propounded by Ramon J. Fernandez for probate, and
contested by Fernando Vergel de Dios and Francisco, Ricardo and
VirgilioRustia, the court of First Instance of Manila having denied its
probate. One of the issues raised was that the will has 4 pages. However,
the 4th page has no page number.
Ramon takes this appeal, assigning error to the action of the lower court in
holding the attestation fatally defective and in not finding Act No. 2645 void.
ISSUE:
1. Will the numbering of the sheet containing the attestation clause
which does not appear in the upper part make the will defective? NO
2. Should the attestation clause state, among other things,“that the
testator signed on the margin of each sheet of the will in the presence
of the witnesses and the latter in the presence of each other; and
such a fact cannot be proven by any other proof than the attestation
clause itself”? NO
3. Are the signatures necessary in the attestation clause? NO
HELD:
1. NO. Although the numbering of the sheet containing the attestation

clause does not appear in the upper part thereof, yet if that numbering is
found in its text, as when it is said therein that the will consists of three
sheets actually used, correlatively numbered, besides this one, that is to
say, the sheet containing the attestation clause, the requirement
prescribed by the law is substantially complied with, for if the will
consists of three sheets besides the one containing the attestation
clause, it is evident that the latter is the fourth page, that is to say, that
the document consists of four sheets.
2. NO. The fact appears in any manner intelligible from the attestation
clause, the latter would be sufficient and valid. Thus the attestation
clause in question is sufficient in this respect which says: "* * * and he
(the testator) signed at the bottom of the aforesaid will in our presence,
and at his request we also signed our names as witnesses in his
presence and that of each other, and finally, the testator, as well as we,
his witnesses, signed in the same manner on the left margin of each
176
andevery one of its sheets," for the phrase, in the same manner, means
that the testator signed in the presence of the witnesses, and the latter
in his presence and that of each other.
3. NO. The last paragraph of section 618 of the Code deals with the
requirements for the attestation clause. This last paragraph reads thus:
The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon
which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will
and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his
name, under his express direction, in the presence of three
witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages
thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.
As may be seen this last paragraph, it refers to the contents of the text of
the attestation, not the requirements or signatures thereof outside of its
text. It does not require that the attestation be signed by the testator or that
the page or sheet containing it be numbered.
From this analysis of our law now in force it appears:
First. That the will must have an attestation clause as a complement,

without which it cannot be probate and with which only not aliunde
(UyCoque vs. Navas L. Sioca , supra ) may the requirements to be
stated in its text be proven. The attestation clause must be prepared
and signed, as in the instant case, on the same occasion on which
the will is prepared and signed, in such a way that the possibility of
fraud, deceit or suppression of the will or the attestation clause be
reduced to a minimum; which possibility always exists, as experience
shows, in spite of the many precautions taken by the legislator to
insure the true and free expression of one's last will.
Second. That the will is distinct and different from the attestation,
although both are necessary to the validity of the will, similar, in our
opinion, to a document which is not public so long as it is not
acknowledged before a notary, the document being a distinct and
different thing from the acknowledgment, each of which must comply
with different requisites, among which is the signature of the maker
which is necessary in the document but not in the acknowledgment
and both things being necessary to the existence of the public
document.
Third. That the will proper must meet the requirements enumerated in
the second paragraph of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Fourth. That the text of the attestation clause must express

compliance with the requirements prescribed for the will.
In the case at bar the attestation clause in question states that the
requirements prescribed for the will were complied with, and this is enough
177
for it, as such attestation clause, to be held as meeting the requirements
prescribed by the law for it.
The fact that in said clause the signature of the testator does not appear
does not affect its validity, for, as above stated, the law does not require
that it be signed by the testator.
178
Lopez v. Liboro
81 Phil 429
DOCTRINE:
The purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of wills is to guard against
fraud, and to afford means of preventing the substitution or of detecting the
loss of any of its pages. The omission to put a page number on a sheet, if
that be necessary, may be supplied by other forms of identification more
trustworthy than the conventional numeral words or characters.
FACTS:
Agustin Liboro opposed the probate of the last will and testament of Don
Sixto Lopez which was executed six months before his death, affixing his
thumbmark to the instrument instead of signing his name for the reason
that he was suffering from "partial paralysis.” However, Liboro
unsuccessfully opposed the probate. The will in question comprises two
pages, each of which is written on one side of a separate sheet. The first
sheet is not paged either in letters or in Arabic numerals. Liboro believes
that this is a fatal defect. Liboro also impugns the will for its silence on the
testator's understanding of the language used in the testament.
Liboro specified five grounds for his opposition during its opposition in the
CFI of Iloilo, to wit:
(1) that the deceased never executed the alleged will;

(2) that his signature appearing in said will was a forgery;
(3) that at the time of the execution of the will, he was wanting in
testamentary as well as mental capacity due to advanced age;
(4) that, if he did ever execute said will, it was not executed and attested
as required by law, and one of the alleged instrumental witnesses
was incapacitated to act as such; and it was procured by duress,
influence of fear and threats and undue and improper pressure and
influence of the testator's sister Clemencia Lopez and Jose S. Lopez;
and
(5) that the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick.
ISSUES:
1. Is the lack of paging either in letters or in Arabic numerals of the first
page of the will fatal to its validity? NO
2. Is it required to expressly state in the will that the testator
understands the language used in the testament? NO
HELD:
1. No. The Court held that the lack of paging either in letters or in Arabic
numerals of the first page of the will of Don Sixto Lopez is not fatal.
179
The purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of wills is guard against
fraud, and to afford means of preventing the substitution of the loss of any
of its pages.In the present case,the omission to put a page number on the
first sheet, if that be necessary, is supplied by other forms ofidentification
more trustworthy than the conventional numerical words or characters. The
unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first page by the internal
sense of its contents considered in relation to the contents of the second
page. By their meaning and coherence, the first and second lines on the
secondpage are undeniably a continuation of the last sentence of the
testament, before the attestation clause, whichstarts at the bottom of the
preceding page. Furthermore, the unnumbered page contains the
caption"TESTAMENTO," the invocation of the Almighty, and a recital that
the testator was in full use of his testamentaryfaculty, — all of which, in the
logical order of sequence, precede the direction for the disposition of the
marker'sproperty. Again, as page two contains only the two lines above
mentioned, the attestation clause, the mark ofthe testator and the
signatures of the witnesses, the other sheet cannot by any possibility be
taken for otherthan page one.
2. No. The Court held that there is no statutory requirement that such
knowledge be expressly stated in the will itself. It is a matter that may be
established by proof aliunde. The Court so impliedly ruled in Gonzales vs.
Laurel, 46 Phil., 781, in which the probate of a will written in Tagalog was
ordered although it did not say that the testator knew that idiom. In fact,
there was not even extraneous proof on the subject other than the fact that
the testator resided in a Tagalog region, from which the court said "a
presumption arises that said Maria Tapia knew the Tagalog dialect.
180
Taboada v. Rosal
G.R. No. L-36033, November 5, 1982
DOCTRINE:
While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial
departure from the usual forms should be ignored, especially where the
authenticity of the will is not assailed.
The law is to be liberally construed, “the underlying and fundamental

objective permeating the provisions on the law on wills in this project
consists in the liberalization of the manner of their ex-ecution with the end
in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes but
with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of
fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon
the testator. This objective is in accord with the modern tendency in respect
to the formalities in the execution of a will.”
FACTS:
Dorotea Perez left a will. The will has two pages. On the first page, which
contains the entire testamentary dispositions, were the signatures of the
three instrumental witnesses and that of Dorotea Perez. The signatures of
the three instrumental witnesses were on the left margin while Perez’
signature was on the bottom. On the second page, which contains the
attestation clause and the acknowledgement, were the signatures of the
three attesting witnesses and that of DoroteaPerez. The attestation clause
failed to state the number of pages used in the will.
Taboada petitioned for the admission to probate of the said will. The Judge
Pamatian denied the petition. Taboada filed a motion for reconsideration
but Pamatian was not able to act on it because he was transferred to
another jurisdiction. The case was transferred to Judge Rosal who also
denied the motion for reconsideration on the grounds that a) that the
testator and the instrumental witnesses did not all sign on the left margin of
the page as prescribed by law; that the testator and the witnesses should
have placed their signature in the same place b) that the attestation clause
failed to state the number of pages used in writing the will – this, according
to Judge Rosal violated the requirement that the attestation clause shall
state the number of pages or sheets upon which the will is written, which
requirement has been held to be mandatory as an effective safeguard
against the possibility of interpolation or omission of some of the pages of
the will to the prejudice of the heirs to whom the property is intended to be
bequeathed.
ISSUE:
Should the will be admitted to probate?
HELD:
181
Yes. The will should be admitted. The law must be interpreted liberally.
The failure to include in the attestation clause of the number of pages used
in writing the will would have been a fatal defect. But then again, the matter
should be approached liberally. There were only two pages in the will left
by Perez. The first page contains the entirety of the testamentary
dispositions and signed by the testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the
instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin. The other page which is
marked as “Pagina dos” comprises the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment. Further, the acknowledgment itself states that “This Last
Will and Testament consists of two pages including this page.
Further, there is substantial compliance with the law. It would be absurd

that the legislature intended to place so heavy an import on the space or
particular location where the signatures are to be found as long as this
space or particular location wherein the signatures are found is consistent
with good faith.
182
Caneda v. CA
222 SCRA 781
DOCTRINE:
The defects and imperfection must only be with respect to the form of the
attestation or the language employed therein. Such defects or imperfection
would not render a will invalid should it be proved that the will was really
executed and attested in compliance with Article 805. These considerations
do not apply where the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the
attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence
of the testator and of each other. In such a situation, the defect is not only
in the form or language of the attestation clause but the total absence of a
specific element required by Article 805 to be specifically stated in the
attestation clause of a will.
FACTS:
On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children,

already in the twilight years of his life executed a last will and testament
before three attesting witnesses and he was duly assisted by his lawyer
and a notary public. It was declared therein that, among other things that
the testator was leaving by way of legacies and devises his real and
personal properties to specific persons, all of whom do not appear to be
related to Mateo. Not long after, he himself filed a petition before the CFI
seeking the probate of his last will and testament but the scheduled
hearings were postponed, until the testator passed away before his petition
could finally be heard by the probate court. Benoni Cabrera, one of the
legatees named in the will, sought his appointment as special administrator
of the testator’s estate but due to his death, he was succeeded by William
Cabrera, who was appointed by RTC which is already the probate court.
The petitioners, claiming to be the nieces and nephews of the testator,

assail to the allowance of the testator’s will on the ground that it was not
executed in accordance with all the requisites of law since the testator was
already in a poor state of health such that he could not have possibly
executed the same. Petitioners likewise contend that the will is null and
void because its attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails to
specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the
testator signing the will in their presence and that they also signed the will
and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another.
The respondents, Cabrera, et al, on the other hand, argue that Mateo was
of sound and disposing mind and in good health when he executed his will.
Further, they also contend that the witnesses attested and signed the will in
the presence of the testator and of each other.
ISSUES:
183
1. Is the attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Caballero fatally
defective such that it affects the validity of the will? YES
2. Does the attestation clause comply with the substantial compliance
requirement pursuant to Article 809 of the Civil Code? NO
HELD:
1. Yes. An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby
the attesting witnesses certify that the instrument has been executed
before them and to the manner of the execution of the same. It is a
separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the conduct of
execution and once signed by the witnesses; it gives affirmation to the fact
that compliance with the essential formalities required by law has been
observed.
Under the 3rd paragraph of Article 805, such a clause, the complete lack of
which would result in the invalidity of the will, should state: 1. The number
of pages used upon which the will is written; 2. That the testator signed, or
expressly cause another to sign, the will and every page thereof in the
presence of theattesting witnesses; and 3. That the attesting witnesses
witnessed the signing by the testator of the will and all its pages, and that
the said witnesses also signed the will and every page thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another.
It will be noted that Article 805 requires that the witness should both attest
and subscribe to the will in the presence of the testator and of one another.
“Attestation” and “subscription” differ in meaning. Attestation is the act of
sense, while subscription is the act of the hand. The attestation clause
herein assailed is that while it recites that the testator indeed signed the will
and all its pages in the presence of the three attesting witnesses and states
as well the number of pages that were used, the same does not expressly
state therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their
respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each
other. What is then clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses
signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of
one another.
The absence of the statement required by law is a fatal defect or

imperfection which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will
that is here sought to be admitted to probate. Petitioners are correct in
pointing out that the defect in the attestation clause obviously cannot be
characterized as merely involving the form of the will or the language used
therein which would warrant the application of the substantial compliance
rule, as contemplated in Article 809 of the Civil Code:
2. No. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud or undue and improper
pressure and influence, defects and imperfection in the form of attestation
or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is not
proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial
compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.
184
The defects and imperfection must only be with respect to the form of the
attestation or the language employed therein. Such defects or imperfection
would not render a will invalid should it be proved that the will was really
executed and attested in compliance with Article 805. These considerations
do not apply where the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the
attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence
of the testator and of each other. In such a situation, the defect is not only
in the form or language of the attestation clause but the total absence of a
specific element required by Article 805 to be specifically stated in the
attestation clause of a will.
That is precisely the defect complained of in the present case since there is
no plausible way by which it can be read into the questioned attestation
clause statement, or an implication thereof, that the attesting witness did
actually bear witness to the signing by the testator of the will and all of its
pages and that said instrumental witnesses also signed the will and every
page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
185
Lee v.Tambago,
A.C. No. 5281, February 12, 2008
DOCTRINE:
Notaries public are required to certify that the party to every document
acknowledged before him had presented the proper residence certificate
(or exemption from the residence tax), and to enter its number, place of
issue and date as part of such certification, formalities which are mandatory
and cannot be disregarded. As the acknowledging officer of the contested
will, respondent was required to faithfully observe the formalities of a will
and those of notarization. These formalities are mandatory and cannot be
disregarded, considering the degree of importance and evidentiary weight
attached to notarized documents. A notary public, especially a lawyer, is
bound to strictly observe these elementary requirements.
A notary public, by having allowed the decedent to exhibit an expired

residence certificate, failed to comply with the requirements of both the old
Notarial Law and the Residence Tax Act.
FACTS:
Complainant Manuel Lee charged respondent Atty. ReginoTambago with

violation of the notarial law and the ethics of the legal profession for
notarizing a spurious last will and testament.
He averred that his father, Vicente lee, Sr., never executed the contested
will. The signature of the two witnesses in the will are claimed to be
spurious.In the said will, the decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire
estate to his wife Lim Hock Lee, save for a parcel of land which he devised
to Vicente Lee, Jr., and Elena Lee, half siblings of the complainant.
Complainant claimed that while the will was executed and acknowledged
on June 1965, the decedent’s residence certificate noted in the
acknowledgement of the will was dated January 1962.Complainant also
pointed out the absence of notation of the residence certificate of the two
witnesses in the will.
Respondent answered that the complaint contains false allegations. He

claimed that the will and testament was validly executed and actually
notarized by him as per affidavit of Gloria Novato, common law wife of the
decedent, and corroborated by the joint-affidavit of the children of the
decedent namely Elena Lee and Vicente Lee.
The RTC referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
 The IBP investigating commissioner found respondent guilty of
violation of the old notarial law. Also, the violation constituted an
infringement of legal ethics of the Code of Professional
186
Rexponsibility. The commissioner recommended the suspension of
the respondent for a period of 3 months.
 The IBP Board of Governors, in its resolution, adopted and approved
with modifications the recommendation of the commissioner.
Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for 1 year and
his notarial commission was revoked and disqualified from
reappointment as notary public for 2 years.
ISSUE:
Is the will valid? NO.
RULING:
No. The will is not valid. The will was attested by only 2 witnesses and
therefore, it is considered void.
A notarial will is required by law to be subscribed at the end thereof by the

testator himself. In addition, it should be attested and subscribed by 3 or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one
another.The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to
close the door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity.The Civil Code
likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public
by the testator and the witnesses.
An Acknowledgement is the act of one who has executed a deed in going

before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or
deed. An Acknowledgement in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to
safeguard the testator’s wishes long after his demise, and (2) to assure that
his estate is administered in the manner that he intends it to be done.
The acknowledgment of the will in question shows that this requirement

was neither strictly nor substantially complied with. There was an absence
of a notation of the residence certificate of the notarial witnesses in the
acknowledgement. Similarly, the notation of the testator’s old residence
certificate in the same acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law.
These omissions by respondent invalidated the will.Defects in the
observance of the solemnities prescribed by the law render the entire will
invalid.
Respondent was suspended to practice law for a period of 1 year and his
notarial commission is revoked and he is perpetually disqualified from
reappointment as a notary public.
187
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VICENTE CAGRO. JESUSA CAGRO
V.PELAGIO CAGRO, ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-5826, APRIL 29, 1953
PARAS, C. J.
Case Digest by: Nor-Aiza R. Unas
DOCTRINE: The attestation clause is a memorandum of the facts

attending the execution of the will required by law to be made by the
attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures.
FACTS:This is an appeal interposed by the oppositors from a decision of

the CFI of Samar, admitting to probate the will allegedly executed by
Vicente Cagro who died in Laoangan, Pambujan, Samar, on February 14,
1949. The main objection insisted upon by PELAGIO CAGRO in that the
will is fatally defective, because its attestation clause is not signed by the
attesting witnesses. There is no question that the signatures of the three
witnesses to the will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause,
although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the
left-hand margin.
ISSUE:Are the signatures of the witnesses necessary in the attestation

clause?
HELD: Yes. The attestation clause is a memorandum of the facts attending

the execution of the will required by law to be made by the attesting
witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned
attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since
the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their
participation. JESUSA CAGRO contends that signatures of the three
witnesses on the left-hand margin conform substantially to the law and may
be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause. This is untenable,
because said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that the
will be signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation
clause not signed by the three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted
as sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent
occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses.
188
FELIX AZUELA V.COURT OF APPEALS, GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO
substituted by ERNESTO G. CASTILLO
G.R. No. 122880, April 12, 2006
TINGA, J.
DOCTRINE: A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number
of pages on which the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose
attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally
defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an
acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these
defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects is
just aching for judicial rejection.
FACTS:The case stems from a petition for probate filed on 10 April 1984
with the RTC of Manila. The petition filed by petitioner Felix Azuela sought
to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo (decedent), which
was notarized on 10 June 1981. FELIX is the son of the cousin of the
EUGENIA. The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures
on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will, but not at the bottom of
the attestation clause.The probate petition adverted to only 2 heirs,
legatees and devisees of the decedent, namely: FELIX, and one Irene Lynn
Igsolo, who was alleged to have resided abroad. FELIX prayed that the will
be allowed, and that letters testamentary be issued to the designated
executor, Vart Prague.
It was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo (Geralda Castillo), who

represented herself as the attorney-in-fact of "the 12 legitimate heirs" of the
decedent. Geralda Castillo claimed that the will is a forgery, and that the
true purpose of its emergence was so it could be utilized as a defense in
several court cases filed by oppositor against petitioner, particularly for
forcible entry and usurpation of real property, all centering on petitioner’s
right to occupy the properties of the decedent. It also asserted that contrary
to the representations of FELIX, the decedent was actually survived by 12
legitimate heirs, namely her grandchildren, who were then residing abroad.
Per records, it was subsequently alleged that decedent was the widow of
Bonifacio Igsolo, who died in 1965, and the mother of a legitimate child,
Asuncion E. Igsolo, who predeceased her mother by three (3) months.
Geralda also argued that the will was not executed and attested to in
accordance with law. She pointed out that decedent’s signature did not
appear on the second page of the will, and the will was not properly
acknowledged. These twin arguments are among the central matters to this
petition.
RTC favorably took into account the testimony of the 3 witnesses to the
will, Quirino Agrava, Lamberto Leano, and Juanito Estrada. The RTC also
called to fore "the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the
189
execution of a will x x x with the end in view of giving the testator more
freedom in expressing his last wishes;” and from this perspective, rebutted
oppositor’s arguments that the will was not properly executed and attested
to in accordance with law. After a careful examination of the will and
consideration of the testimonies of the subscribing and attesting witnesses,
and having in mind the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the
execution of a will, i.e., the liberalization of the interpretation of the law on
the formal requirements of a will with the end in view of giving the testator
more freedom in expressing his last wishes, RTC is persuaded to rule that
the will in question is authentic and had been executed by the testatrix in
accordance with law.
On the issue of lack of acknowledgement, this RTC has noted that at the
end of the will after the signature of the testatrix, statement is made under
the sub-title, "Patunay Ng Mga Saksi" is considered substantial compliance
with the requirements of the law. RTC is of the view that the signing by the
subscribing witnesses on the left margin of the second page of the will
containing the attestation clause and acknowledgment, instead of at the
bottom thereof, substantially satisfies the purpose of identification and
attestation of the will.
With regard to the oppositor’s argument that the will was not numbered
correlatively in letters placed on upper part of each page and that the
attestation did not state the number of pages thereof, it is worthy to note
that the will is composed of only two pages. The first page contains the
entire text of the testamentary dispositions, and the second page contains
the last portion of the attestation clause and acknowledgement. Such being
so, the defects are not of a serious nature as to invalidate the will. For the
same reason, the failure of the testatrix to affix her signature on the left
margin of the second page, which contains only the last portion of the
attestation clause and acknowledgment is not a fatal defect.
CA: reversed the trial court and ordered the dismissal of the petition for
probate. It noted that the attestation clause failed to state the number of
pages used in the will, thus rendering the will void and undeserving of
probate.
ISSUE: Is a will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of
pages fatally defective?
HELD: Yes.
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the
end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by
some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and
presence of the testator and of one another.
190
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and
every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages
shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each
page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof,
or caused some other person to write his name, under his express
direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter
witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of
the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall

be interpreted to them.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain
a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.
The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which
the will was written remains a fatal flaw, despite Article 809. The purpose of
the law in requiring the clause to state the number of pages on which the
will is written is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of
one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in the
pages. The failure to state the number of pages equates with the absence
of an averment on the part of the instrumental witnesses as to how many
pages consisted the will, the execution of which they had ostensibly just
witnessed and subscribed to. In this case, there could have been no
substantial compliance with the requirements under Article 805 since there
is no statement in the attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself as to
the number of pages which comprise the will.
The Court could thus end here and affirm the Court of Appeals. However,
an examination of the will itself reveals a couple of even more critical
defects that should necessarily lead to its rejection. For one, the
attestation clause was not signed by the instrumental
witnesses. While the signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on
the left-hand margin of the will, they do not appear at the bottom of the
attestation clause which after all consists of their averments before the
notary public.
The attestation clause is "a memorandum of the facts attending the

execution of the will" required by law to be made by the attesting
witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned
attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since
the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their
participation. Thus, the subject will cannot be considered to have been
191
validly attested to by the instrumental witnesses, as they failed to sign the
attestation clause.
Yet, there is another fatal defect to the will on which the denial of this
petition should also hinge. The requirement under Article 806 that "every
will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses" has also not been complied with. The importance of this
requirement is highlighted by the fact that it had been segregated from the
other requirements under Article 805 and entrusted into a separate
provision, Article 806. The non-observance of Article 806 in this case is
equally as critical as the other cited flaws in compliance with Article 805,
and should be treated as of equivalent import.
In lieu of an acknowledgment, the notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, wrote

"Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa
Lungsod ng Maynila."By no manner of contemplation can those words be
construed as an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one
who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court
and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken
whereby the signor actually declares to the notary that the executor of a
document has attested to the notary that the same is his/her own free act
and deed.
It may not have been said before, but we can assert the rule, self-evident
as it is under Article 806. A notarial will that is not acknowledged before
a notary public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally defective,
even if it is subscribed and sworn to before a notary public.
192
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE APOLINARIA LEDESMA. FELICIDAD
JAVELLANA V.DOÑA MATEA LEDESMA
G.R. NO. L-7179, JUNE 30, 1955
REYES, J.B.L., J.
DOCTRINE: The new Civil Code does not require that the signing of the
testator, witnesses and notary should be accomplished in one single act.
FACTS:By order of July 23, 1953, the CFI of Iloilo admitted to probate the
documents in the Visayan dialect, as the testament and codicil duly
executed by the deceased Da. Apolinaria Ledesma Vda. de Javellana, on
March 30, 1950, and May 29, 1952, respectively, with Ramon Tabiana,
Gloria Montinola de Tabiana and Vicente Yap as witnesses. The
contestant, Da. Matea Ledesma, sister and nearest surviving relative of
said deceased, appealed from the decision, insisting that the said exhibits
were not executed in conformity with law.
The contestant argues that the Court erred in refusing credence to her
witnesses Maria Paderogao and Vidal Allado, cook and driver, respectively,
of the Apolinaria Ledesma. Both testified that on March 30, 1950, they saw
and heard Vicente Yap (one of the witnesses to the will) inform Apolinaria
that he had brought the "testamento" and urge her to go to attorney
Tabiana's office to sign it; that Da. Apolinaria manifested that she could not
go, because she was not feeling well; and that upon Yap's insistence that
the will had to be signed in the attorney's office and not elsewhere, the
deceased took the paper and signed it in the presence of Yap alone, and
returned it with the statement that no one would question it because the
property involved was exclusively hers.
ISSUE: Will the signing of the will by the testator in the absence of the
notary public affects the validity of the will?
RULING: No. Our examination of the testimony on record discloses no

grounds for reversing the trial Court's rejection of the improbable story of
the witnesses. It is squarely contradicted by the concordant testimony of
the instrumental witnesses, Vicente Yap, Atty. Ramon Tabiana, and his
wife Gloria Montinola, who asserted under oath that the testament was
executed by testatrix and witnesses in the presence of each other, at the
house of the decedent on General Hughes St., Iloilo City, on March 30,
1950. And it is highly unlikely, and contrary to usage, that either Tabiana or
Yap should have insisted that Da. Apolinaria, an infirm lady then over 80
years old, should leave her own house in order to execute her will, when all
three witnesses could have easily repaired thither for the purpose.
Upon the other hand, the discrepancies in the testimony of the instrumental
witnesses urged upon us by the contestant-appellant, concerning the
presence or absence of Aurelio Montinola at the signing of the testament or
193
of the codicil, and the identity of the person who inserted the date therein,
are not material and are largely imaginary, since the witness Mrs. Tabiana
confessed inability to remember all the details of the transaction. Neither
are we impressed by the argument that the use of some Spanish terms in
the codicil and testament (like legado, partes iguales, plena propiedad) is
proof that its contents were not understood by the testatrix, it appearing in
evidence that those terms are of common use even in the vernacular, and
that the deceased was a woman of wide business interests.
The most important variation noted by the contestants concerns that

signing of the certificate of acknowledgment (in Spanish) appended to the
Codicil in Visayan, Exhibit E. Unlike the testament, this codicil was
executed after the enactment of the new Civil Code, and, therefore, had to
be acknowledged before a notary public (Art. 806). Now, the instrumental
witnesses (who happen to be the same ones who attested the will of 1950)
asserted that after the codicil had been signed by the testatrix and the
witnesses at the San Pablo Hospital, the same was signed and sealed by
notary public Gimotea on the same occasion. On the other hand, Gimotea
affirmed that he did not do so, but brought the codicil to his office, and
signed and sealed it there. The variance does not necessarily imply
conscious perversion of truth on the part of the witnesses, but appears
rather due to a well-established phenomenon, the tendency of the mind, in
recalling past events, to substitute the usual and habitual for what differs
slightly from it.
At any rate, as observed by the Court below, whether or not the notary
signed the certification of acknowledgment in the presence of the testatrix
and the witnesses, does not affect the validity of the codicil. Unlike the
Code of 1889 (Art. 699), the new Civil Code does not require that the
signing of the testator, witnesses and notary should be accomplished in
one single act. A comparison of Articles 805 and 806 of the new Civil Code
reveals that while testator and witnesses sign in the presence of each
other, all that is thereafter required is that "every will must be
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses"
(Art. 806); i.e., that the latter should avow to the certifying officer the
authenticity of their signatures and the voluntariness of their actions in
executing the testamentary disposition.
194
AGAPITA N. CRUZ V.HON. JUDGE GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR,
PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH I, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
CEBU, AND MANUEL B. LUGAY
G.R. NO. L-32213, NOVEMBER 26, 1973
ESGUERRA, J.:
DOCTRINE:To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one the
attesting and acknowledging witnesses, would have the effect of having
only two attesting witnesses to the will which would be in contravention of
the provisions of Article 80 be requiring at least three credible witnesses to
act as such and of Article 806 which requires that the testator and the
required number of witnesses must appear before the notary public to
acknowledge the will.
FACTS:Petitioner-appellant Agapita N. Cruz, the surviving spouse of

VALENTE Z. CRUZ opposed the allowance of the will alleging the will was
executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and undue influence;
that the said instrument was execute without the testator having been fully
informed of the content thereof, particularly as to what properties he was
disposing and that the supposed last will and testament was not executed
in accordance with law. Notwithstanding her objection, the Court allowed
the probate of the said last will and testament Hence this appeal by
certiorari which was given due course.
Of the three instrumental witnesses, namely Deogracias T. Jamaloas Jr.,

Dr. Francisco Pañares and Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr., one of them, the last
named, is at the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was
supposed to have been acknowledged. As the third witness is the notary
public himself, petitioner argues that the result is that only two witnesses
appeared before the notary public to acknowledge the will. On the other
hand, private respondent-appellee, Manuel B. Lugay, who is the supposed
executor of the will, following the reasoning of the trial court, maintains that
there is substantial compliance with the legal requirement of having at least
three attesting witnesses even if the notary public acted as one of them.
ISSUE:Is the last will and testament of Valente Cruz executed in

accordance with Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code?
RULING:No. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged
cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot
acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. To acknowledge
before means to avow; to own as genuine, to assent, to admit; and "before"
means in front or preceding in space or ahead of. Consequently, if the third
witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow assent, or
admit his having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done
because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear
195
before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will.
To permit such a situation to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity.
Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, among others, to guard

against any illegal or immoral arrangement. That function would defeated if
the notary public were one of the attesting instrumental witnesses. For
them he would be interested sustaining the validity of the will as it directly
involves him and the validity of his own act. It would place him in
inconsistent position and the very purpose of acknowledgment, which is to
minimize would be thwarted. To allow the notary public to act as third
witness, or one the attesting and acknowledging witnesses, would have the
effect of having only two attesting witnesses to the will which would be in
contravention of the provisions of Article 805 be requiring at least three
credible witnesses to act as such and of Article 806 which requires that the
testator and the required number of witnesses must appear before the
notary public to acknowledge the will. The result would be, as has been
said, that only two witnesses appeared before the notary public for or that
purpose. In the circumstances, the law would not be duly in observed.
196
BELLA A. GUERRERO V. RESURRECCION A. BIHIS
G.R. NO. 174144, April 17, 2007
CORONA, J.
DOCTRINE: A notary public is authorized to perform notarial acts, including

the taking of acknowledgments, within that territorial jurisdiction
only. Outside the place of his commission, he is bereft of power to perform
any notarial act; he is not a notary public. Any notarial act outside the limits
of his jurisdiction has no force and effect.
FACTS:On February 19, 1994, Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of

petitioner Bella A. Guerrero and respondent Resurreccion A. Bihis, died at
the Metropolitan Hospital in Tondo, Manila.BELLA filed a petition for the
probate of the last will and testament of the decedent.The petition alleged
the following: BELLA was named as executrix in the decedent's will and
she was legally qualified to act as such; the decedent was a citizen of the
Philippines at the time of her death; at the time of the execution of the will,
the testatrix was 79 years old, of sound and disposing mind, not acting
under duress, fraud or undue influence and was capacitated to dispose of
her estate by will.BIHIS opposed her elder sister's petition on the following
grounds: the will was not executed and attested as required by law; its
attestation clause and acknowledgment did not comply with the
requirements of the law; the signature of the testatrix was procured by
fraud and petitioner and her children procured the will through undue and
improper pressure and influence.
RTC appointed BELLA as special administratrix of the decedent's estate.

BIHIS filed a demurrer alleging that BELLA’s evidence failed to establish
that the decedent's will complied with Articles 804 and 805 of the Civil
Code.
RTC denied the probate of the will ruling that Article 806 of the Civil Code
was not complied with because the will was "acknowledged" by the testatrix
and the witnesses at the testatrix's, residence at No. 40 Kanlaon Street,
Quezon City before Atty. Macario O. Directo who was a commissioned
notary public for and in Caloocan City. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
ISSUE:Did the will "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the instrumental

witnesses before a notary public acting outside the place of his commission
satisfy the requirement under Article 806 of the Civil Code?
RULING:No.Article 806 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain
a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.
197
One of the formalities required by law in connection with the execution of a
notarial will is that it must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses. This formal requirement is one of the
indispensable requisites for the validity of a will. In other words, a notarial
will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
instrumental witnesses is void and cannot be accepted for probate.
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going

before some competent officer and declaring it to be his act or deed. In the
case of a notarial will, that competent officer is the notary public.The
acknowledgment of a notarial will coerces the testator and the instrumental
witnesses to declare before an officer of the law, the notary public, that they
executed and subscribed to the will as their own free act or deed. Such
declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus paving the way for
the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of
spurious wills, or those executed without the free consent of the testator. It
also provides a further degree of assurance that the testator is of a certain
mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to the persons instituted
as heirs or designated as devisees or legatees in the will.Acknowledgment
can only be made before a competent officer, that is, a lawyer duly
commissioned as a notary public.
A notary public's commission is the grant of authority in his favor to perform

notarial acts. It is issued "within and for" a particular territorial jurisdiction
and the notary public's authority is co-extensive with it. In other words, a
notary public is authorized to perform notarial acts, including the taking of
acknowledgments, within that territorial jurisdiction only. Outside the place
of his commission, he is bereft of power to perform any notarial act; he is
not a notary public. Any notarial act outside the limits of his jurisdiction has
no force and effect.
Since Atty. Directo was not a commissioned notary public for and in
Quezon City, he lacked the authority to take the acknowledgment of the
testatrix and the instrumental witnesses. In the same vein, the testatrix and
her witnesses could not have validly acknowledged the will before him.
Thus, Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura's last will and testament was, in
effect, not acknowledged as required by law.
198
IN RE WILL OF ANA ABANGAN, GERTRUDIS ABANGAN v.
ANASTACIA ABANGAN, ETAL
G.R. No. L-13431 November 12, 1919
AVANCEÑA, J.
DOCTRINE: In a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all
the testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator
and three witnesses and the second contains only the attestation clause
and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary
that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and the
witnesses, or be paged.
FACTS: On September 19, 1917, the CFI-CEBU admitted to probate Ana

Abangan's will executed July, 1916. From this decision the opponent's
appealed. Said document, duly probated as Ana Abangan's will, consists of
two sheets, the first of which contains all of the disposition of the testatrix,
duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the
direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The following sheet
contains only the attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three
instrumental witnesses. Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin
by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters; and these
omissions, according to appellants' contention, are defects whereby the
probate of the will should have been denied.
ISSUE: Is it necessary that both pages are signed on their margins by the
testator and the witnesses?
RULING: NO. In requiring that each and every sheet of the will should also
be signed on the left margin by the testator and three witnesses in the
presence of each other, Act No. 2645 evidently has for its object (referring
to the body of the will itself) to avoid the substitution of any of said sheets,
thereby changing the testator's dispositions. But when these dispositions
are wholly written on only one sheet signed at the bottom by the testator
and three witnesses, their signatures on the left margin of said sheet would
be completely purposeless. In requiring this signature on the margin, the
statute took into consideration, undoubtedly, the case of a will written on
several sheets and must have referred to the sheets which the testator and
the witnesses do not have to sign at the bottom. A different interpretation
would assume that the statute requires that this sheet, already signed at
the bottom, be signed twice.
The Court cannot attribute to the statute such an intention. As these

signatures must be written by the testator and the witnesses in the
presence of each other, it appears that, if the signatures at the bottom of
the sheet guaranties its authenticity, another signature on its left margin
would be unnecessary; and if they do not guaranty, same signatures,
affixed on another part of same sheet, would add nothing. The Court
cannot assume that the statute regards of such importance the place where
the testator and the witnesses must sign on the sheet that it would consider
199
that their signatures written on the bottom do not guaranty the authenticity
of the sheet but, if repeated on the margin, give sufficient security.
In a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the
testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and
three witnesses and the second contains only the attestation clause and is
signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that
both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and the
witnesses, or be paged.
200
MARIANO LEANO v. ARCADIO LEAÑO
G.R. No. 9150. March 31, 1915
CARSON, J.
DOCTRINE: A cross is sufficient to be considered as signature or mark as

long as it is customary.
FACTS: Cristina Valdes, deceased, placed her cross against her name
attached by some other person to the instrument offered for probate which
purports to be her last will and testament, in the presence of the three
witnesses whose names are attached to the attesting clause, and that they
attested and subscribed the instrument in her presence and in the
presence of each other.
ISSUE: Is the cross sufficient compliance?
RULING: YES. The placing of the cross opposite her name at the
conclusion of the instrument was a sufficient compliance with the
requirements of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which
prescribes that except where wills are signed by some other person than
the testator in the manner and form therein indicated, a valid will must be
signed by the testator. The right of a testator to sign his will by mark,
executed animo testandi, has been uniformly sustained by the courts of last
resort of the United States in construing statutory provisions prescribing the
mode of execution of wills in language identical with, or substantially similar
to that found in section 618 of our code, which was taken from section 2349
of the Code of Vermont.
201
IN THE MATTER OF THE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE
OF THE DECEASED ANACLETA ABELLANA. LUCIO BALONAN V.
EUSEBIA ABELLANA, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-15153. August 31, 1960
LABRADOR, J.
DOCTRINE: A will subscribed at the end thereof by some person other

than the testator in such manner that the signature of said person appears
above the typewritten statement "Por la Testadora Anacleta Abellana . . .
Ciudad de Zamboanga," may not be admitted to probate for failure to
comply with the express requirement of the law that the testator must
himself sign the will or that his name be affixed thereto by some other
person in his presence and by his express direction.
FACTS: The last Will and Testament is written in the Spanish language
and consists of two (2) typewritten pages double space. The first page is
signed by Juan Bello and under his name appears typewritten ‘Por la
testadora Anacleta Abellana, residence Certificate A-1167629, Enero 20,
1951, Ciudad de Zamboanga’, and on the second page appears the
signature of the three (3) instrumental witnesses Blas Sebastian, Faustino
Macaso and Rafael Ignacio, at the bottom of which appears the signature
of T. de los Santos and below his signature is his official designation as the
notary public who notarized the said testament. On the first page on the left
margin of the said instrument also appear the signatures of the
instrumental witnesses. On the second page, which is the last page of the
said last Will and Testament, also appears the signature of the three (3)
instrumental witnesses and on that second page on the left margin appears
the signature of Juan Bello under whose name appears handwritten the
following phrase, ‘Por la Testadora Anacleta Abellana’. The will is duly
acknowledged before Notary Public, Attorney Timoteo de los Santos.
ISSUE: Does the signature of Dr. Juan A. Abello above the typewritten
statement "Por la Testadora Anacleta Abellana” comply with the
requirements of the law prescribing the manner in which a will shall be
executed?
RULING: NO. The present law, Article 805 of the Civil Code, in part
provides as follows: "Every will, other than a holographic will, must be
subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator’s
name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses
in the presence of the testator and of one another."
The clause "must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself
or by the testator’s name written by some other person in his presence and
by his express direction," is practically the same as the provisions of
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) which reads as
follows: "No will, except as provided in the preceding section shall be valid
to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless
202
it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by the testator’s name written
by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and
presence of the testator and of each other. . . ."
Article 618 of the Old Civil Code as well as Article 805 of the New Civil
Code require that the testator himself sign the will, or if he cannot do so,
the testator’s name must be written by some other person in his presence
and by his express direction.
Here, the name of the testatrix, Anacleta Abellana, does not appear written
under the will by said Abellana herself, or by Dr. Juan Abello. There is,
therefore, a failure to comply with the express requirement in the law that
the testator must himself sign the will, or that his name be affixed thereto by
some other person in his presence and by his express direction.
203
ROMAN ABAYA v. DONATA ZALAMERO
G.R. No. L-3907 March 12, 1908
TORRES, J.
DOCTRINE: Where it appears in a will that the testator has stated that by
reason of his inability to sign his name he requested one of the three
witnesses present to do so, and that as a matter of fact, the said witness
wrote the name and surname of the testator who, stating that the
instrument executed by him contained his last will, put the sign of the cross
between his said name and surname, all of which details are set forth in a
note which the witnesses forthwith subscribed in the presence of the
testator and of each other, said will may be probated.
FACTS: Roman Abaya filed a petition with the CFI-Laguna, for the
allowance of the will executed by Juan Zalamero, a resident of Pagsanhan,
in said province, on the 29th of October, 1905, and produced in court the
said will, which was written in Tagalog dialect. Donata Zalamero opposed
the petition, alleging that the will had been executed under pressure and
unlawful and improper influence on the part of those who were to benefit
thereby, and that it had not been executed and signed in accordance with
the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
ISSUE: Was the will executed in accordance with the law?

RULING: YES. It is true that the witness Mariano Zaguirre, who was
requested by the testator to write his name and surname at the end of his
will, did not affix his own signature immediately below the name and
surname of Juan Zalamero and below the cross placed by the latter with
the words "by request of the testator Juan Zalamero;" but in the said will
are clearly stated the reason why it was not signed by the testator himself
as also the request he made to the witness Zaguirre, and a repetition
thereof was not necessary; further, that this same witness, upon being
requested, wrote with his own hand the name and surname of the testator,
who afterwards placed the cross between them, stating that it was his
statement, all of which was written immediately after the said name and
surname of the testator and the cross made by him, and the same was
subscribed by the three witnesses in the manner provided by law.
The essential requisites prescribed by the above-mentioned section 618 of

the law have been complied with, namely, that three witnesses were
present at the execution of the will of Juan Zalamero at the date mentioned
therein; that they heard his statement that the said instrument, written and
drawn up under his direction, contained his last will; that they saw and
witnessed when, at the express request of the testator, and under his
direction, the witness, Mariano Zaguirre, wrote at the foot of the will the
name and surname of Juan Zalamero, and when the latter put the cross
between his written name and surname, each of the witnesses subscribing
it at the time and in the presence of each other.
204
GERMAN JABONETA v. RICARDO GUSTILO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 1641 January 19, 1906
CARSON, J.
DOCTRINE: The true test of vision is not whether the testator actually saw
the witness sign, but whether he might have seen him sign, considering his
mental and physical condition and position at the time of the subscription.
FACTS: The last will and testament of Macario Jaboneta, deceased, was
denied because the lower court was of the opinion from the evidence
adduced at the hearing that Julio Javellana, one of the witnesses, did not
attach his signature thereto in the presence of Isabelo Jena, another of the
witnesses, as required by the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Before Jena left, he saw that last witness Javellana, beginning
to sign the latter’s signature was not yet completed when the former turned
his back and left the room.
ISSUE: Should the will be admitted to probate?
RULING: YES. The fact that Jena was still in the room when he saw
Javellana moving his hand and pen in the act of affixing his signature to the
will, taken together with the testimony of the remaining witnesses which
shows that Javellana did in fact there and then sign his name to the will,
convinces us that the signature was affixed in the presence of Jena. The
fact that he was in the act of leaving, and that his back was turned while a
portion of the name of the witness was being written, is of no importance.
He, with the other witnesses and the testator, had assembled for the
purpose of executing the testament, and were together in the same room
for that purpose, and at the moment when the witness Javellana signed the
document he was actually and physically present and in such position with
relation to Javellana that he could see everything which took place by
merely casting his eyes in the proper direction, and without any physical
obstruction to prevent his doing so, therefore we are of opinion that the
document was in fact signed before he finally left the room.
In the matter of Bedell (2 Connoly (N.Y.), 328) it was held that it is sufficient
if the witnesses are together for the purpose of witnessing the execution of
the will, and in a position to actually see the testator write, if they choose to
do so; and there are many cases which lay down the rule that the true test
of vision is not whether the testator actually saw the witness sign, but
whether he might have seen him sign, considering his mental and physical
condition and position at the time of the subscription.
205
MARAVILLA VS. MARAVILLA
G.R. No. L-23225, FEB. 27, 1971
REYES, J.B.L., J.
DOCTRINE:
In weighing the testimony of the attesting witnesses to a will, the
statements of a competent attorney, who has been charged with the
responsibility of seeing to the proper execution of the instrument, is entitled
to greater weight than the testimony of a person casually called to
participate in the act, supposing of course that no motive is revealed that
should induce the attorney to prevaricate. The reason is that the mind of
the attorney, being conversant with the requisites of proper execution of the
instrument, is more likely to become fixed on details, and he is more likely
than other persons to retain those incidents in his memory
FACTS:
Appellant Herminio Maravilla, probate petitioner and husband of the

decedent, died on 16 July 1966, after the case was submitted for decision.
Upon motion for intervention filed by Concepcion Maravilla Kohlhaas and
Rose Mary Kohlhaas, this Supreme Court allowed their intervention on 24
July 1967, upon showing that their interest as substitute heirs was vested
definitely upon the death of Herminio Maravilla, and that said movants for
intervention merely adopt the pleadings and briefs filed in behalf of the
deceased Herminio Maravilla so that the intervention will not delay the
disposition of the case.
Herminio Maravilla’s petition for probate was opposed by the appellees

Pedro, Asuncion and Regina, all surnamed "Maravilla," who are allegedly
the brother and sisters of the deceased Digna Maravilla, in an amended
opposition filed in the course of the trial in the court. The Oppositors
alleged that the deceased the alleged testatrix and the instrumental
witnesses did not sign the alleged will, each and every page thereof, in the
presence of each other. That Digna affixed her signature on the will under
undue and improper pressure and she was not of sound mind. That the
said will had already been revoked by the deceased.
After trial, the court rendered judgment, holding as unsubstantiated the last
three (3) grounds above-enumerated, but sustaining the first, that is, that
the will was not executed in accordance with Section 618 of Act 190, and,
therefore, denied the probate of the will.The petitioner and one Adelina
206
Sajro, who was named a devisee under the questioned will, appealed the
judgment.
The late Digna Maravilla died in Manapla, Negros Occidental, on 12 August
1958, leaving an extensive estate. It is undisputed that, at the time of the
probate proceedings, only one (1) (Aquilino Mansueto) of the three (3)
attesting witnesses to the will had survived, the two (2) others (Timoteo
Hernaez and Mariano Buenaflor) having died previously.The will submitted
for probate, Exhibit "A," which is typewritten in the Spanish language,
purports to have been executed in Manila on the 7th day of October, 1944;
it consists of five (5) pages, including the page on which the attestation
clause was completed. The purported signatures of the testatrix appear at
the logical end of the will on page four and at the left margin of all the other
pages.
During the hearing, Col. Mansueto identified his own signature and those of
Dr. Timoteo Hernaez and of Digna Maravilla, and asserted that the latter
did sign in the presence of all three witnesses and Atty. Villanueva. The
witness explained that he could not remember some details because
fourteen years had elapsed, and when he signed as a witness, he did not
give it any importance and because of the time he (Col. Mansueto) was
very worried because of rumours that the Japanese Kempeitai would arrest
officers of the USAFFE who did not want to collaborate.
Atty. Manuel Villanueva, as third witness for the proponent asserted that he
had been the lawyer of the Maravillas; that 5 or 6 days before 7 October
1944 he had been summoned through Mariano Buenaflor to the house of
the Maravillas and there met Digna who requested him to draft a new will,
revoking her old one, to include as additional beneficiaries Adelina Sajo,
Concepcion Maravilla, and the latter’s youngest daughter, Rose Mary
Kohlhaas, who lived with her (Digna) and whom she considered as her real
children, having cared for them since childhood.Digna gave Villanueva
instructions concerning the will, and handed him her old will and a
handwritten list of the certificates of title of her properties, which list she
asked and obtained from her husband. Before leaving, Villanueva asked
Digna to look for three witnesses. Upon the evidence, the trial judge
concluded that Mansueto did not actually see Digna Maravilla sign the will
in question, basing such conclusion upon the fact that while Mansueto
positively identified his own signature
ISSUE:
Should the court give credit to the testimony of Atty. Manuel Villanueva?
RULING: YES
207
That Mansueto, Hernaez and Buenaflor, together with the testatrix and the
lawyer, sat next to one another around one table when the will was signed
is clearly established by the uncontradicted testimony of both attorney
Villanueva and Herminio Maravilla; and that detail proves beyond doubt
that each one of the parties concerned did sign in the presence of all the
others. It should be remembered, in this connection, that the test is not
whether a witness did see the signing of the will but whether he was in a
position to see if he chose to do so.
The trial court rejected the evidence of both Herminio Maravilla and Manuel
Villanueva, giving as a reason that they were biased and interested in
having the probate succeed. The reasoning is not warranted for Herminio
Maravilla certainly stood to gain more under the previous will of his wife
where he was made the sole beneficiary, As to attorney Villanueva, while
he had been a friend of Herminio from boyhood, he also had been the
family lawyer, and his intervention in the execution of the will of one of his
clients became inevitable, for it is not to be expected that the testatrix
should call upon a stranger for the purpose. If Villanueva wished to perjure
in favor of Herminio, all he needed was to color his testimony against the
due execution of the will (and not in favor thereof, since, as previously
observed, Digna’s first will was more advantageous to the widower.
It is hardly conceivable that any attorney of any standing would risk his
professional reputation by falsifying a will and then go before a court and
give false testimony.
"‘In weighing the testimony of the attesting witnesses to a will, the
statements of a competent attorney, who has been charged with the
responsibility of seeing to the proper execution of the instrument, is entitled
to greater weight than the testimony of a person casually called to
participate in the act, supposing of course that no motive is revealed that
should induce the attorney to prevaricate. The reason is that the mind of
the attorney, being conversant with the requisites of proper execution of the
instrument, is more likely to become fixed on details, and he is more likely
than other persons to retain those incidents in his memory.’"
The court is satisfied that the preponderance of evidence is to the effect
that the testament was duly executed by a qualified testatrix and competent
witnesses, in conformity with the statutory requirements. The decree of the
court denying probate of the 1944 will of Digna Maravilla is reversed and
the said testament is hereby ordered probated.
208
NAYVE VS. MOJAL
G.R. No. L-21755, DEC. 29, 1925
Romualdez, J.
DOCTRINE:
The act of the testator and the witnesses seeing reciprocally the signing of
the will is one which cannot be proven by the mere exhibition of the will
unless it is stated in the document. And this fact is expressly stated in the
attestation clause now before us. But the fact of the testator and the
witnesses having signed all the sheets of the will may be proven by the
mere examination of the document, although it does not say anything about
this, and if that is the fact, as it is in the instant case, the danger of fraud in
FACTS:
This is a proceeding for the probate of the will of the deceased Antonio
Mojalinstituted by his surviving spouse, Filomena Nayve. The probate is
opposed by LeonaMojal and Luciana Aguilar, sister and niece, respectively,
of the deceased.
The will in question is composed of four sheets with written matter on only
side of each, that is, four pages written on four sheets. The four sides or
pages containingwritten matter are paged “Pag. 1,” “Pag. 2,” “Pag. 3,” “Pag.
4,” successively. Each of the first two sides or pages, which was issued,
was signed by the testator and thethree witnesses on the margin, left side
of the reader. On the third page actuallyused, the signatures of the three
witnesses appear also on the margin, left side of thereader, but the
signature of the testator is not on the margin, but about the middle of the
page, at the end of the will and before the attestation clause.
On the fourth page,the signatures of the witnesses do not appear on the
margin, but at the bottom of theattestation clause, it being the signature of
the testator that is on the margin, left sideof the reader.
The defects attributed to the will are:(a)The fact of not having been signed
by the testator and the witnesses on eachand every sheet on the left
margin; (b) the fact of the sheets of the documentnot being paged with
letters; (c) the fact that the attestation clause does notstate the number of
sheets or pages actually used of the will; and (d) the factthat the testator
does not appear to have signed all the sheets in the presenceof the three
witnesses, and the latter to have attested and signed all thesheets in the
presence of the testator and of each other. Trial court admitted the will to
probate and from the judgment, the opponentsappealed.
ISSUE:
209
Can the will be admitted to probate?
RULING: YES
The court ruled in the affirmative.
As to the first defect, As each and every page used of the will bears the
signatures of the testator and the witnesses, the fact that said signatures
do not all appear on the left margin of each page does not detract from the
validity of the will. As to the second defect, the court held in Unson vs.
Abella that paging with Arabic numerals and not with letters, as in the case
before us, is within the spirit of the law and is just as valid as paging with
letters.
As to the third defect, the attestation clause must state the number of
sheets or pages composing the will; but when, as in the case before us,
such fact, while it is not stated in the attestation clause, appears at the end
of the will proper, so that no proof aliunde is necessary of the number of the
sheets of the will, then there can be no doubt that it complies with the
intention of the law that the number of sheets of which the will is composed
be shown by the document itself, to prevent the number of the sheets of the
will from being unduly increased or decreased.
It must be noted that in the attestation clause above set out it is said that
the testator signed the will “in the presence of each of the witnesses” and
the latter signed “in the presence of each other and of the testator.” So that,
as to whether the testator and the attesting witnesses saw each other sign
the will, such a requirement was clearly and sufficiently complied with.
What is not stated in this clause is whether the testator and the witnesses
signed all the sheets of the will.
The act of the testator and the witnesses seeing reciprocally the signing of
the will is one which cannot be proven by the mere exhibition of the will
unless it is stated in the document. And this fact is expressly stated in the
attestation clause now before us. But the fact of the testator and the
witnesses having signed all the sheets of thewill may be proven by the
mere examination of the document, although it does not say anything about
this, and if that is the fact, as it is in the instant case, the danger of fraud in
The fact that the testator and the witnesses signed each and every page of
the will is proven by the mere examination of the signatures in the will, the
omission toexpressly state such evident fact does not invalidate the will nor
prevent its probate.
210
IN RE: ESTATE OF SAGUINSIN
G.R. No. L-15025, MAR. 15, 1920
ARELLANO, C.J.
DOCTRINE:
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the
instrumental witnesses of the will shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and
every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet.
FACTS:
The subject of this case is the will of Remigia Saguinsin. It is a manuscript
signed by the alleged testatrix and three witnesses on October 3, 1918, the
conclusion of which says: "I, the testatrix, sign in the presence of the
witnesses this will written by D. Lino Mendoza at my request and under my
direction--Then follows a signature and then these expressions: "The
testatrix signed in our presence and each of us signed in the presence of
the others." - "Witness who wrote this will at the request and under the free
and voluntary personal direction of the testatrix herself." Then come three
signatures.
The said instrument was impugned by a sister of Remigia and after the
taking of the declaration of the authors of the signatures which appear
three times and in different parts of the manuscript, the court declared that
the document attached to the record could not be allowed as a will. Certain
person who allege themselves to be legatees appealed jointly with the
lawyer for the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Is the instrument considered a Valid Will?
RULING: NO.
Act No. 2645, Section 618 provides that "The attestation shall state the
number of sheets or pages used upon which the will is written . . . ." None
of these requirements appear in the attesting clause at the end of the
subject document presented. The second page, i.e., what is written on the
reverse side of the first, engenders the doubt whether what is written
thereon was ordered written by the alleged testatrix or was subsequently
added by the same hand that drew the first page and the date that appears
on the third. With this non-fulfillment alone of Act No. 2645 it is impossible
to allow the so-called will which violates said law.
Said Act also provides that "The testator or the person requested by him to
write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will shall also sign, as
211
aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages
shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each
sheet. The Law requires that the signature which guarantees the
genuineness of the testament shall be placed on the left hand margin of
each page and that each page should be numbered by letter in the upper
part This requirement is entirely lacking on the second page that is, on the
reverse side of the first.By the failure to comply with this requisite the law
has been obviously violated.
This is a defect so radical that there is no way by which what is written on
the reverse side of the first folio may be held valid. It is possible that this
document consists of only the two folios numbered 1 and 2, and that on the
reverse side of number 2 nothing may have been written upon the order of
the testatrix, the testament ending at the foot of the first folio.
There is nothing which guarantees all the contents of page 2. The margin
of this page is absolutely blank. There is nothing which gives the assurance
that the testatrix ordered the insertion of all the contents of page 2. It may
very well be that it was subsequently added thereby substituting the will of
the testatrix, a result for the prevention of which this manner of authenticity
by affixing the signature on each page and not merely on each folio was
provided for by law. This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament.
It is not enough that the signatures guaranteeing authenticity should appear
upon two folios or leaves; three pages having been written, the authenticity
of all three of them should be guaranteed with the signature of the alleged
testatrix and her witnesses. The English text which requires the signing of
pages and not merely leaves or folios should prevail.
212
AVERA VS. GARCIA
G.R. No. 15566, SEP. 14, 1921
Street, J.
DOCTRINE:
A will otherwise properly executed in accordance with the requirements of
existing law is not rendered invalid by the fact that the paginal signatures of
the testator and attesting witnesses appear in the right margin instead of
the left.
FACTS:
Eutiquia Avera filed a petition for the probate of the will of one Esteban
Garcia. Marino Garcia and Juan Rodriguez, the latter in the capacity of
guardian for the minors Jose Garcia and Cesar Garcia contested the
probate. One of the attesting witnesses testified that the will was executed
with all necessary external formalities, and that the testator was at the time
in full possession of disposing faculties. Upon the latter point the witness
was corroborated by the person who wrote the will at the request of the
testator. Two of the attesting witnesses were not introduced, nor was their
absence accounted for by the proponent of the will.
ISSUE:
Is the will rendered invalid by the fact that the signature of the testator and
of the three attesting witnesses are written on the right margin of each page
of the will instead of the left margin?
RULING: NO
The instrument now before us contains the necessary signatures on every
page, and the only point of deviation from the requirement of the statute is
that these signatures appear in the right margin instead of the left. By the
mode of signing adopted every page and provision of the will is
authenticated and guarded from possible alteration in exactly the same
degree that it would have been protected by being signed in the left margin;
and the resources of casuistry could be exhausted without discovering the
slightest difference between the consequences of affixing the signatures in
one margin or the other.
The controlling considerations on the point now before us were well stated
In Re will of Abangan (40 Phil., 476,479), where the court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Avanceña, in a case where the signatures were placed
at the bottom of the page and not in the margin, said:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close

the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of will and
testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws
on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these
213
primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the
fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of
the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures
such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but
demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of
the testator's last will, must be disregarded.
In the case before us, where ingenuity could not suggest any possible
prejudice to any person, as attendant upon the actual deviation from the
letter of the law, such deviation must be considered too trivial to invalidate
the instrument.
214
GARCIA VS. GATCHALIAN
G.R. No. L-20357, NOV. 25, 1967
Dizon, J.
DOCTRINE:
The requirement that a will must be acknowledged before a notary public
by the testator and also by the witnesses is indispensable for its validity.
FACTS:
On March 15, 1967, Gregorio Gatchalian, a widower of 71 years of age,
died in Pasig, Province of Rizal, leaving no forced heirs. On April 2 of the
same year, appellant Pedro Reyes Garcia filed a petition with the CFI for
the probate of said alleged will of the late Gregorio Gatchalian, wherein he
was instituted as sole heir.
Felipe Gatchalian, Aurora G. Camins, Angeles G. Cosca, Federico G.
Tubog, Virginia G. Talanay and Angeles G. Talanay, appellees herein,
opposed the petition on the ground, among others, that the will was
procured by fraud. They also alleged that the deceased did not intend the
instrument signed by him to be as his will and that the deceased was
physically and mentally incapable of making a will at the time of the alleged
execution of said will.
After due trial, the court rendered the appealed decision finding the
document to be the authentic last will of the deceased but disallowing it for
failure to comply with the mandatory requirement of Article 806 of the New
Civil Code — that the will must be acknowledged before a notary public by
the testator and the witnesses.An examination of the document shows that
the same was acknowledged before a notary public by the testator but not
by the instrumental witnesses.
ISSUE:
Can the will be admitted to probate?
RULING: NO
Article 806 of the New Civil Code reads as follows:
“ Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator

and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy
of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.”
215
The court held that compliance with the requirement contained in the above
legal provision to the effect that a will must be acknowledged before a
notary public by the testator and also by the witnesses is indispensable for
its validity (In re: Testate Estate of Alberto, G. R. No. L-11948, April 29,
1959). As the document under consideration does not comply with this
requirement, the same may not be probated.
216
LUCIO V. GARCIA v. HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ
G.R. No. L-26615 April 30 1970
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Case Digest by: Paulo Jose S. Villarin
DOCTRINE:The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the

testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself is to make the
provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they
are not in accordance with his wishes.
FACTS:
This is a petition for appeal from the CFI of Manila admitting to probate the
will of Gliceria Avelino del Rosario (“Gliceria”) executed in 1960. Likewise,
this is also an appeal to remove the current administrator, Consuelo
Gonzales-Precilla( “Consuelo”) as special administratrix of the estate on
the ground of Consuelo possesses interest adverse to the estate and to
order the RD of Manila to annotate on the registered lands a notice of Lis
Pendens.
When Gliceria died she had no descendants, ascendants. After which, her
niece, Consuelo petitioned the court to be the administratrix of the
properties. The court approved this because Consuelo was already
managing the properties of the deceased during her lifetime. What the
respondents allege is that in the last years of the deceased, Consuelo
sought the transfer of certain parcels of land valued at 300k for a sale price
of 30k to her husband Alfonso through fraud and intimidation. In addition,
the oppositors presented evidence that Consuelo asked the court to issue
new Certificates of Titles to certain parcels of land for the purpose of
preparing the inventory to be used in the probate. Also shown was that
NEW TCTs were issued by the RD for certain lands of the deceased after
Consuelo asked for the old TCTs.
At the end of the probate proceedings, the court ruled that Counsuelo
should be made the administrator, and that the will was duly executed
because of these reasons: NO EVIDENCE HAS BEEN PRESENTED to
establish that the deceased was not of sound mind, that eventough the
allegations state that the deceased prepared another will in 1956
(12pages), the latter is not prevented from executing another will in 1960
(1page), and that inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses prove
their truthfulness.
217
ISSUE:
Was the will in 1960 properly executed?
HELD:
NO. Provision of Article 808 mandatory. Therefore, For all intents and
purposes of the rules on probate, the testatrix was like a blind testator, and
the due execution of her will would have required observance of Article
808. The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator
if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate)
, is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to
object if they are not in accordance with his wishes. Likewise, the 1970 will
was done in Tagalog which the deceased is not well versed but in Spanish.
This creates doubt as to the due execution of the will and as well as the
typographical errors contain therein which show the haste in preparing the
1 page will as compared to the 12 page will created in 1956 written in
Spanish. ALSO, as to the blindness, there was proof given by the testimony
of the doctor that the deceased could not read at near distances because
of cataracts. (Testatrix’s vision was mainly for viewing distant objects and
not for reading print.) Since there is no proof that it was read to the
deceased twice, the will was NOT duly executed.
ALSO, Consuelo should be removed as administrator because she is not

expected to sue her own husband to reconvey the lands to the estate
alleged to have been transferred by the deceased to her own husband.
The notice of lis pendens is also not proper where the issue is not an action
in rem, affecting real property or the title thereto.
218
In the Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of the
Deceased Brigido Alvarado, CESAR ALVARADOv. HON. RAMON G.
GAVIOLA, JR.
G.R. No.74695 September 14,1993
Bellosillo,J.:
DOCTRINE: Article 808 not only applies to blind testators, but also to those
who, for one reason or another, are incapable of reading their wills.
FACTS:
On 5 November 1977, 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will

entitled “Huling Habilin” wherein he disinherited an illegitimate son,
petitioner Cesar Alvarado, and expressly revoked a previously executed
holographic will at the time awaiting probate before the RTC of Laguna.
According to Bayani Ma. Rino, private respondent, he was present when

the said notarial will was executed, together with three instrumental
witnesses and the notary public, where the testator did not read the will
himself, suffering as he did from glaucoma.
Rino, a lawyer, drafted the eight-page document and read the same aloud
before the testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public,
the latter four following the reading with their own respective copies
previously furnished them.
Thereafter, a codicil entitled “Kasulatan ng Pagbabago ng Ilang

Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na May Petsa Nobiembre 5,
1977 ni Brigido Alvarado” was executed changing some dispositions in the
notarial will to generate cash for the testator’s eye operation.
Said codicil was likewise not read by Brigido Alvarado and was read in the
same manner as with the previously executed will.
When the notarial will was submitted to the court for probate, Cesar
Alvarado filed his opposition as he said that the will was not executed and
attested as required by law; that the testator was insane or mentally
incapacitated due to senility and old age; that the will was executed under
duress, or influence of fear or threats; that it was procured by undue
pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary; and that the signature
of the testator was procured by fraud or trick.
ISSUE:
219
Was there substantial compliance to the reading of the will?
HELD:
Article 808 not only applies to blind testators, but also to those who, for one
reason or another, are incapable of reading their wills. Hence, the will
should have been read by the notary public and an instrumental witness.
However, the spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. In
this case, there was substantial compliance. Substantial compliance is
acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason
being that the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended to
protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never
intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary
privilege.
However, in the case at bar, there was substantial compliance where the
purpose of the law has been satisfied: that of making the provisions known
to the testator who is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when
he is illiterate) and enabling him to object if they do not accord with his
wishes.
Rino read the testator’s will and codicil aloud in the presence of the
testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public.
Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that
the contents read corresponded with his instructions.
Only then did the signing and acknowledgment take place.
There is no evidence that the contents of the will and the codicil were not
sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator.
With four persons, mostly known to the testator, following the reading word
for word with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that the testator
was reasonably assured that what was read to him were the terms actually
appearing on the typewritten documents.
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he
is blind or incapable of reading the will to himself (as when he is illiterate),
is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to
object if they are not in accordance with his wishes.
Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial

requirements of law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal
220
imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose
and which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testator’s will.
221
TEODORO CANEDA ET AL. v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. 103554 MAY 28, 1993
REGALADO, J.:
DOCTRINE:The will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the

testator and the attesting witnesses. The attestation clause need not be
written in a language known to the testator or even to the attesting
witnesses.
FACTS:
On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children

and already in the twilight years of his life, executed a last will and
testament at his residence before 3 witnesses.
He was assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad.
In the will, it was declared that the testator was leaving by way of legacies
and devises his real and personal properties to several people all of whom
do not appear to be related to the testator.
4 months later, Mateo Caballero himself filed a case seeking the probate of
his last will and testament, but numerous postponements pushed back the
initial hearing of the probate court regarding the will.
On May 29, 1980, the testator passed away before his petition could finally
be heard by the probate court.
Thereafter one of the legatees, Benoni Cabrera, sought his appointment as

special administrator of the testator’s estate.
Thereafter, the petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of the

testator, instituted a second petition for intestate proceedings. They also
opposed the probate of the testator’s will and the appointment of a special
administrator for his estate.
Benoni Cabrera died and was replaced by William Cabrera as special

administrator and gave an order that the testate proceedings for the
probate of the will had to be heard and resolved first.
In the course of the proceedings, petitioners opposed to the allowance of

the testator’s will on the ground that on the alleged date of its execution,
the testator was already in poor state of health such that he could not have
possibly executed the same. Also the genuineness of the signature of the
testator is in doubt.
222
On the other hand, one of the attesting witnesses and the notary public
testified that the testator executed the will in question in their presence
while he was of sound and disposing mind and that the testator was in
good health and was not unduly influenced in any way in the execution of
his will.
Probate court then rendered a decision declaring the will in question as the
last will and testament of the late Mateo Caballero.
CA affirmed the probate court’s decision stating that it substantially

complies with Article 805. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Is the attestation clause in the will of the testator fatally defective or can be
cured under the art. 809?
HELD:
No. It does not comply with the provisions of the law.
Ordinary or attested wills are governed by Arts. 804 to 809. The will must
be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the attesting
witnesses. The attestation clause need not be written in a language known
to the testator or even to the attesting witnesses.
It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the

conduct of execution and once signed by the witnesses it gives affirmation
to the fact that compliance with the essential formalities required by law has
been observed.
The attestation clause, therefore, provides strong legal guaranties for the
due execution of a will and to insure the authenticity thereof.
It is contended by petitioners that the attestation clause in the will failed to

specifically state the fact that the attesting witnesses witnessed the testator
sign the will and all its pages in their presence and that they, the witnesses,
likewise signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the
testator and of each other. And the Court agrees.
The attestation clause does not expressly state therein the circumstance
that said witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the
presence of the testator and of each other.
The phrase, “and he has signed the same and every page thereof, on the
space provided for his signature and on the left hand margin,” obviously
refers to the testator and not the instrumental witnesses as it is immediately
preceded by the words” as his last will and testament.”
223
Clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every
page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. That the
absence of the statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection
which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here
sought to be probated.
Also, Art. 809 does not apply to the present case because the attestation
clause totally omits the fact that the attesting witnesses signed each and
every page of the will in the presence of the testator and of each other. The
defect in this case is not only with respect to the form or the language of
the attestation clause. The defects must be remedied by intrinsic evidence
supplied by the will itself which is clearly lacking in this case.
Therefore, the probate of the will is set aside and the case for the intestate
proceedings shall be revived.
Article 809 cannot be used to cure the defects of the will when it does not
pertain to the form or language of the will. This is because there is not
substantial compliance with Article 805.
224
TESTATE ESTATE OF VICENTE CAGRO v. PELAGIO CAGRO
G.R. No. L-5826 APRIL 29,1953
PARAS, C.J.:
DOCTRINE:An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act

of the witnesses since the omission of their signatures at the bottom
negatives their participation.
FACTS:
This is an appeal interposed by the oppositors from a decision of the Court

of First Instance of Samar, admitting to probate the will allegedly executed
by Vicente Cagro who died in Laoangan, Pambujan, Samar, on February
14, 1949.
The main objection insisted upon by the appellant in that the will is fatally
defective, because its attestation clause is not signed by the attesting
witnesses.
The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses
on the left-hand margin conform substantially to the law and may be
deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause.
ISSUE:
Was the will valid?
HELD:
Will is not valid. The attestation clause is a memorandum of the facts

attending the execution of the will. It is required by law to be made by the
attesting witnesses and it must necessarily bear their signatures.
An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the

witnesses since the omission of their signatures at the bottom negatives
their participation.
Moreover, the signatures affixed on the let hand margin is not substantial
conformance to the law. The said signatures were merely in conformance
with the requirement that the will must be signed on the left-hand margin of
all its pages. If the attestation clause is unsigned by the 3 witnesses at the
bottom, it would be easier to add clauses to a will on a subsequent
occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses.
225
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE WILL
OF DOROTEA PEREZ, (deceased): APOLONIO TABOADA, v. HON.
AVELINO S. ROSAL
G.R. No. L-36033 NOVEMBER 5,1992
GUTIERREZ, JR. J.:
DOCTRINE:The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin

of the first page of the will attested not only to the genuineness of the
signature of the testatrix but also the due execution of the will as embodied
in the attestation clause.
FACTS:
Petitioner Apolonio Taboada filed a petition for probate of the will of the late
Dorotea perez. The will consisted of two pages, the first page containing all
the testamentary dispositions of the testator and was signed at the end or
bottom of the page by the testatrix alone and at the left hand margin by the
three instrumental witnesses. The second page consisted of the attestation
clause and the acknowledgment was signed at the end of the attestation
clause by the three witnesses and at the left hand margin by the testatrix.
The trial court disallowed the will for want of formality in its execution
because the will was signed at the bottom of the page solely by the
testatrix, while the three witnesses only signed at the left hand margin of
the page. The judge opined that compliance with the formalities of the law
required that the witnesses also sign at the end of the will because the
witnesses attest not only the will itself but the signature of the testatrix.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Was the object of attestation and subscription fully when the instrumental
witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which contains all the
testamentary dispositions?
HELD:
YES.
Undoubtedly, under Article 805 of the Civil Code, the will must be
subscribed or signed at its end by the testator himself or by the testator's
name written by another person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses
in the presence of the testator and of one another.
226
It must be noted that the law uses the terms attested and subscribed.
Attestation consists in witnessing the testator's execution of the will in order
to see and take note mentally that those things are done which the statute
requires for the execution of a will and that the signature of the testator
exists as a fact. On the other hand, subscription is the signing of the
witnesses' names upon the same paper for the purpose of identification of
such paper as the will which was executed by the testator. (Ragsdale v.
Hill, 269 SW 2d 911).
The signatures of the instrumental witnesses on the left margin of the first
page of the will attested not only to the genuineness of the signature of the
testatrix but also the due execution of the will as embodied in the
attestation clause.
While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable, unsubstantial

departure from the usual forms should be ignored, especially where the
authenticity of the will is not assailed. (Gonzales v. Gonzales, 90 Phil. 444,
449).
The law is to be liberally construed, "the underlying and fundamental

objective permeating the provisions on the law on wills in this project
consists in the liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in
view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes but
with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of
fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon
the testator. This objective is in accord with the modern tendency in respect
to the formalities in the execution of a will" (Report of the Code
Commission, p. 103).
The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied in
the present case when the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin
of the sole page which contains all the testamentary dispositions, especially
so when the will was properly identified by subscribing witness Vicente
Timkang to be the same will executed by the testatrix. There was no
question of fraud or substitution behind the questioned order.
227
JOSE VILLAFLOR V. DEOGRACIAS TOBIAS ET AL
GR NO. 27440, DECEMBER 24, 1927
OSTRAND, J.
DOCTRINE: In some circumstances the writing of the attestation clause on

a separate page do not invalidate the will.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a judgement denying a petition for the probate of a

will which was found out that the attestation clause of the said will was
written on a separate sheet, page 9, when said clause could have been
written totally or partially on page 8, since one-half of page 8 is blank.
ISSUE: Will a attestation clause written on a separate page make a will

false?
RULING: IN THIS CASE, NO.
That the attestation clause of the will is written on a separate page and not
on the last page of the body of the document is a matter of minor
importance and is explained by the fact that if the clause had been written
on the eighth page of the will in direct continuation of the body thereof,
there would not have been sufficient space on that page for the signatures
of the witnesses to the clause. It is also to be observed that all of the
pages, including that upon which the attestation clause is written, bear the
signatures of all of the witnesses and that there is no question whatever as
to the genuineness of said signatures.
228
FELIX AZUELA V. COURT OF APPEALS, GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO
GR NO. 122880, APRIL 12, 2006
TINGA, J.
DOCTRINE: Express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be

“acknowledged,” and not merely subscribed and sworn to.
FACTS:
It was alleged that the subject will was forged, and imbued with several
fatal defects, such that the will was not properly acknowledged. The notary
public, Petronio Y. Bautista, only wrote “Nilagdaanko at ninotariokongayong
10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 ditosaLungsodng Maynila.”
ISSUE: Was the subject will properly acknowledged?
RULING: NO.
The express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be “acknowledged,”

and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The will does not present any
textual proof, much less one under oath, that the decedent and the
instrumental witnesses executed or signed the will as their own free act or
deed. The acknowledgment made in a will provides for another all-
important legal safeguard against spurious wills or those made beyond the
free consent of the testator.
229
IN THE MATTER O THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF
MELECIA LABEADOR. SAGRADO LABRADOR, ENRICA LABRADOR
AND CRISTOBAL LABRADO V. COIRT OF APPEALS, 1 GAUDENCIO
LABRADOR AND JESUS LABRADOR
GR NO. 83843-44, APRIL 5, 1990
PARAS, J.
DOCTRINE: Date must be in the will itself and executed in the hands of the
testator.
FACTS:
The Court of Appeals denied the allowance of the probate of the subject
holographic will for being undated despite the fact that in the first paragraph
of the second page of the same will, which was written in Ilocano, the
testator mentioned a date - “month of March, 17th, 1968.
ISSUE: Was the subject will properly dated?
RULING: YES.
The will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect
compliance with Article 810. It is worthy of note to quote the first paragraph
of the second page of the holographic will, viz: "And this is the day in which
we agreed that we are making the partitioning and assigning the respective
assignment of the said fishpond, and this being in the month of March, 17th
day, in the year 1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is the
matter to be followed. And the one who made this writing is no other than
MELECIO LABRADOR, their father." The law does not specify a particular
location where the date should be placed in the will. The only requirements
are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the
testator. These requirements are present in the subject will.
230
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ANDRES G. DE
JESUS AND BIBIANA ROXAS DE JESUS, SIMEON R. ROXAS AND
PEDRO ROXAS DE JESUS V. ANDRES R. DE JESUS, JR.
GR NO. L-38338, JANUARY 28, 1985
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
DOCTRINE: Purpose of liberal trend pf the Civil Code in the manner of

execution of wills in case of doubt is to prevent intestacy.
FACTS:
The subject holographic will found in a notebook belonging to the deceased

dated “Feb./61” stated that “This is my will which I want to be respected
although it is not written by a lawyer.” The probate of such will was
opposed on the ground that it does not comply with Article 810 of the Civil
Code which provides that the date in a holographic will must signify the
year, month, and day.
ISSUE: Was the date of the subject will a valid compliance of Article 810 of
the Civil Code?
RULING: YES.
As a general rule, the “date” in a holographic Will should include the day,
month, and year of its execution. However, when as in the case at bar,
there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure
and the authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is whether
or not the date “FEB./61” appearing on the holographic Will is a valid
compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic
Will should be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.
In particular, a complete date is required to provide against such

contingencies as that of two competing Wills executed on the same day, or
of a testator becoming insane on the day on which a Will was executed
(Velasco v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720). There is no such contingency in this case.
231
JOSE RIVERA V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND
ADELAIDO J. RIVERA
GR NOS. 75005-06, FEBRUARY 15, 1990
CRUZ, J.
DOCTRINE: A stranger has no personality to contest a will.
FACTS:
The Jose Rivera who claimed to be the son of the deceased, Venancio
Rivera, opposed the probate of the holographic wills submitted by another
son Adelaido Rivera. However, it was found out that Jose is a son of
another Vinencio Rivera.
ISSUE: Was the opposition proper?
RULING: NO.
Jose Rivera is not the son of the deceased Venancio Rivera whose estate
is in question. Hence, being a mere stranger, he had no personality to
contest the wills and his opposition thereto did not have the legal effect of
requiring the three witnesses required by Article 811 of the Civil Code. The
testimony of Zenaida and Venancio Rivera, Jr., who authenticated the wills
as having been written and signed by their father, was sufficient.
232
ICASIANO vs ICASIANO
G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
DOCTRINE: The law should not be strictly and literally interpreted as to

penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness
over whose conduct she has no control of. Where the purpose of the law is
to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages, and
there is no intentional or deliberate deviation existed.
FACTS:
Celso Icasiano, filed a petition for the probate of the will of Josefa Villacorte
and for his appointment as executor thereof. It appears from the evidence
that the testatrix died on September 12, 1958. She executed a will in
Tagalog, and through the help of her lawyer, it was prepared in duplicates,
an original and a carbon copy.
On the day that it was subscribed and attested, the lawyer only brought the
original copy of the will while the carbon duplicate (unsigned) was left in
Bulacan. One of the witnesses failed to sign one of the pages in the original
copy but admitted he may have lifted 2 pages simultaneously instead when
he signed the will. Nevertheless, he affirmed that the will was signed by the
testator and other witnesses in his presence
ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure of one of the subscribing witnesses to affix his
signature to a page is sufficient to deny probate of the will.
RULING:
No, the failure to sign was entirely through pure oversight or mere
inadvertence. Since the duplicated bore the required signatures, this
proves that the omission was not intentional. Even if the original is in
existence, a duplicate may still be admitted to probate since the original is
deemed to be defective, then in law, there is no other will bu the duly
signed carbon duplicate and the same can be probated.
The law should not be strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the
testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose
conduct she has no control of. Where the purpose of the law is to
guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages, and there
is no intentional or deliberate deviation existed.
Note that this ruling should not be taken as a departure from the rules that
the will should be signed by the witnesses on every page. The carbon copy
duplicate was regular in all respects.
233
CODOY vs CALUGAY
G.R. No. 123486 August 12, 1999
PARDO, J.:
DOCTRINE: The goal to be achieved by Article 811 of the Civil Code is to

give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the
possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ
means to defeat the wishes of the testator.
FACTS:
On 6 April 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia
Patigas, devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased
Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, filed a petition for probate of the said will.
They attested to the genuineness and due execution of the will on 30
August 1978.
Eugenio Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed their opposition
claiming that the will was a forgery and that the same is even illegible. They
raised doubts as regards the repeated appearing on the will after
every disposition, calling the same out of the ordinary. If the will was in the
handwriting of the deceased, it was improperly procured.
Evangeline Calugay, etc. presented 6 witnesses and various documentary
evidence.
The first witness was the clerk of court of the probate court who produced
and identified the records of the case bearing the signature of the
deceased.
The second witness was election registrar who was made to produce and
identify the voter’s affidavit, but failed to as the same was already
destroyed and no longer available.
The third, the deceased’s niece, claimed that she had acquired familiarity
with the deceased’s signature and handwriting as she used to accompany
her in collecting rentals from her various tenants of commercial buildings
and the deceased always issued receipts. The niece also testified that the
deceased left a holographic will entirely written, dated and signed by said
deceased.
The fourth witness was a former lawyer for the deceased in the intestate
proceedings of her late husband, who said that the signature on the will
was similar to that of the deceased but that he can not be sure.
The fifth was an employee of the DENR who testified that she was familiar
with the signature of the deceased which appeared in the
latter’s application for pasture permit. The fifth, respondent Evangeline
Calugay, claimed that she had lived with the deceased since birth where
she had become familiar with her signature and that the one appearing on
the will was genuine.
234
Codoy and Ramonal’s demurrer to evidence was granted by the
lower court. It was reversed on appeal with the Court of Appeals which
granted the probate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing that at least three
witnesses explicitly declare the signature in a contested will as the genuine
signature of the testator, is mandatory or directory.
RULING:
YES, the word “shall” connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation

and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is
that the word“shall”, when used in a statute, is mandatory.
In the case at bar, the goal to be achieved by the law, is to give effect to the
wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibility that
unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat
the wishes of the testator.
The paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true
intent of the deceased.
235
AZOALA vs. SINGSON
G.R. No. L-14003 August 5, 1960
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
DOCTRINE:
Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory only for notarial wills. Witnesses
needs to be presented for probate of notarial wills. Article 811 of the Civil
Code is discretionary for holographic wills, if not contested.
FACTS:
Fortunata S. Vda. De Yance died in Quezon City on September 9, 1957.
Petitioner submitted for probate her holographic will, in which Maria Azaola
was made the sole heir as against the nephew, who is the defendant. Only
one witness, Francisoco Azaola, was presented to testify on the
handwriting of the testatrix. He testified that he had seen it one month,
more or less, before the death of the testatrix, as it was given to him and
his wife; and that it was in the testatrix’s handwriting. He presented the
mortgage, the special power of the attorney, and the general power of
attorney, and the deeds of sale including an affidavit to reinforce his
statement. Two residence certificates showing the testatrix’s signature
were also exhibited for comparison purposes.
The probate was opposed on the ground that (1) the execution of the will
was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of
the petitioner and his wife, and (2) that the testatrix did not
seriously intend the instrument to be her last will, and that the same was
actually written either on the 5th or 6th day of August 1957 and not on
November 20, 1956 as appears on the will.
The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil
Code, the proponent must present three witnesses who could declare that
the will and the signature are in the writing of the testatrix, the probate
being contested; and because the lone witness presented “did not prove
sufficiently that the body of the will was written in the handwriting of the
testatrix.”
Petitioner appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound to produce more
than one witness because the will’s authenticity was not questioned; and
second, that Article 811 does not mandatorily require the production of
three witnesses to identify the handwriting and signature of
a holographic will, even if its authenticity should be denied by
the adverse party.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory or permissive.
236
RULING:
Article 811 is merely permissive and not mandatory. Since the authenticity
of the will was not contested, petitioner was not required to produce more
than one witness; but even if the genuineness of the holographic will were
contested, Article 811 can not be interpreted to require the compulsory
presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator,
under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have
been present at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by
law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the existence of
witness possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the
control of the proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding and
producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses “who know the
handwriting and signature of the testator” and who can declare (truthfully,
of course, even if the law does not so express) “that the will and the
signature are in the handwriting of the testator”. There may be no available
witness of the testator’s hand; or even if so familiarized, the witnesses may
be unwilling to give a positive opinion. Compliance with the rule of
paragraph 1 of Article 811 may thus become an impossibility.
This is the reason why the 2nd paragraph of Article 811 allows the court to
resort to expert evidence. The law foresees the possibility that no qualified
witness may be found (or what amounts to the same thing, that no
competent witness may be willing to testify to the authenticity of the will),
and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency.
What the law deems essential is that the court should be convinced of the
will’s authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is produced
and the court is convinced by their testimony that the will is genuine, it may
consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the other hand, if no
competent witness is available, or none of those produced is convincing,
the Court may still, and in fact it should, resort to handwriting experts. The
duty of the Court, in fine, is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the
state is as much interested as the proponent that the true intention of the
testator be carried into effect.
237
FAUSTO E. GAN v. ILDEFONSO YAP
G.R. No. L-12190 August 30, 1958
BENGZON, J.:
DOCTRINE: The execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed

holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who
have seen and/or read such will.
FACTS:
On November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart failure in
the University of Santo Tomas Hospital, leaving properties in Pulilan,
Bulacan, and in the City of Manila.
On March 17, 1952, Fausto E. Gan initiated these proceedings in the

Manila court of first instance with a petition for the probate of a holographic
will allegedly executed by the deceased.
Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that
the deceased had not left any will, nor executed any testament during her
lifetime.
After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Hon. Ramon
R. San Jose, Judge, refused to probate the alleged will. A seventy-page
motion for reconsideration failed. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of
witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the
handwriting of the testator?
RULING:
NO, the court ruled that the execution and the contents of a lost or
destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of
witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.
The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof.
Even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost
holographic will, we think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so
tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to
that “clear and distinct” proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6. 11.
238
RODELAS vs. ARANZA
G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982
RELOVA, J.:
DOCTRINE: A photocopy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be

admitted because the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can
be determined by the probate court with the standard writings of the
testator.
FACTS:
The appellant filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of
Ricardo Bonilla in 1977. The petition was opposed by the appellees on the
ground that the deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise.
The lower court dismissed the petition for probate and held that since the
original will was lost, a photostatic copy cannot stand in the place of the
original.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be
proved by means of a photostatic copy.
RULING:
YES.
If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is
available, the will cannot be probated because the best and only evidence
is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a
comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the
handwritten will.
But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be

allowed because comparison can be made by the probate court with the
standard writings of the testator. The probate court would be able to
determine the authenticity of the handwriting of the testator.
In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that “the
execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not
be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read
such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no
effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of
authenticity.” But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that “Perhaps it
may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a
mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby
the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and
tested before the probate court,”
239
KALAW VS RELOVA
G.R. NO. L-40207 SEPTEMBER 28, 1984
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
DOCTRINE: Effect of erasures, corrections, and alterations in a

holographic will
FACTS:
Gregorio Kalaw, the private respondent, claiming to be the sole heir of
sister Natividad, filed a petition for probate of the latter's holographic will in
1968. The will contained 2 alterations: a) Rosa's name, designated as the
sole heir was crossed out and instead "Rosario" was written above it and
such was not initialed; b) Rosa's name was crossed out as sole executrix
and Gregorio's name was written above it. This alteration was initialed by
the testator.
Rosa contended that the will as first written should be given effect so that
she would be the sole heir. The lower court denied the probate due to the
unauthenticated alterations and additions.
ISSUE:
Is the will valid?
RULING:NO.
The will is voided or revoked since nothing remains in the will which could
remain valid as there was only one disposition in it.
Such was altered by the substitution of the original heir with another. To
rule that the first will should be given effect is to disregard the testatrix'
change of mind. However, this change of mind cannot be given effect either
as she failed to authenticate it in accordance with Art. 814, or by affixing
her full signature.
240
AJERO VS CA
G.R. No. 106720, September 15, 1994
PUNO, J.
DOCTRINE: Nature of probate proceeding
FACTS:
The holographic will of Annie San was submitted for probate.
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the
testament’s body nor the signature therein was in decedent’s handwriting; it
contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by
decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper
pressure and undue influence.
The petition was also contested by Dr. Ajero with respect to the disposition
in the will of a house and lot. He claimed that said property could not be
conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.
However, the trial court still admitted the decedent’s holographic will to
probate.The trial court held that since it must decide only the question of
the identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity of
the testatrix, it finds no reason for the disallowance of the will for its failure
to comply with the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of testamentary
capacity of the testatrix.
On appeal, the CA reversed said Decision holding that the decedent did not
comply with Articles 313 and 314 of the NCC. It found that certain
dispositions in the will were either unsigned or undated, or signed by not
dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made
had not been authenticated by decedent.
ISSUE:
Were Articles 813 and 814 of the NCC complied with?
RULING:YES.
A reading of Article 813 shows that its requirement affects the validity of the
dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the
testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that
these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not
render the whole testament void.Likewise, a holographic will can still be
admitted to probate notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of
Article 814.Unless the authenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions
were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator’s signature,
their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication
will only result in disallowance of such changes.It is also proper to note that
241
the requirements of authentication of changes and signing and dating of
dispositions appear in provisions Article 813 and 814 separate from that
which provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the
holographic will under Article 810.
In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the

requirement that they be totally authographic or handwritten by the testator
himself. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will no result in the
disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionable handwritten by the
testator.
.
242
GUEVARA VS GUEVARA
G.R. No. 48840. DECEMBER 29, 1943
OZAETA, J.
DOCTRINE: Allowance of wills
FACTS:
Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made various
bequests t his wife, stepchildren, wife in the 2nd marriage. He has a
legitimate son Ernesto and a natural daughter Rosario. Therein, he
acknowledged Rosario as his natural daughter.
In 1933, Victorino died but his last will was never presented for probate nor
was there any settlement proceeding initiated. It appeared that only his son
Ernest possessed the land which he adjudicated to himself. While Rosario
who had the will in her custody, did nothing to invoke the acknowledgment,
as well as the devise given to her.
Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her legitime from
Ernesto, a portion of a large parcel of land invoking the acknowledgment
contained in the will and based on the assumption that the decedent died
intestate because his will was not probated. She alleged that the
disposition in favor of Ernesto should be disregarded.
The lower court and the Court of Appeals sustained Rosario's theory.
ISSUE:
Can a probate of a will be dispensed with?
RULING:NO.
Rosario's contention violates procedural law and considered an attempt to

circumvent the last will and testament of the decedent. The presentation of
a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance is essential
and indispensable to its efficacy.
The Code of CivilProcedure, which was in force up to the time this case
was decided by the trial court, contains the following pertinentprovisions:
"Sec. 625.Allowance Necessary, and Conclusive as to Execution. — No will
shall pass either the real or personal estate,unless it is proved and allowed
in the Court of First Instance, or by appeal to the Supreme Court; and the
allowance bythe court of a will of real and personal estate shall be
conclusive as to its due execution.
"Sec. 626.Custodian of Will to Deliver. — The person who has the custody
of a will shall, within thirty days after heknows of the death of the testator,
deliver the will into the court which has jurisdiction, or to the executor
named in thewill.
243
"Sec. 627.Executor to Present Will and Accept or Refuse Trust. — A
person named as executor in a will, shall withinthirty days after he knows of
the death of the testator, or within thirty days after he knows that he is
named executor, ifhe obtained such knowledge after knowing of the death
of the testator, present such will to the court which hasjurisdiction, unless
the will has been otherwise returned to said court, and shall, within such
period, signify to the courthis acceptance of the trust, or make known in
writing his refusal to accept it.
"Sec. 628.Penalty. — A person who neglects any of the duties required in

the two preceding sections, unless he gives asatisfactory excuse to the
court, shall be subject to a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars.
"Sec. 629.Person Retaining Will may be Committed. — If a person having

custody of a will after the death of the testatorneglects without reasonable
cause to deliver the same to the court having jurisdiction, after notice by the
court so to do,he may be committed to the prison of the province by a
warrant issued by the court, and there kept in close confinementuntil he
delivers the will."
-The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, with notice by
publication to the whole world and with personalnotice to each of the known
heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator.
Suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy for without
probate, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be
rendered nugatory.
244
TESTATE ESTATE OF SUNTAY
G.R. NOS. L-3087 AND L- 3088, JULY 31, 1954
PADILLA, J.
DOCTRINE: Wills executed and probated in a foreign country must be

proven before the Philippine court to obtain similar validity/effectivity.
FACTS:
Sometime in 1934, Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and a resident of

the Philippines, diedin Amoy, China. He left real and personal properties in
the Philippines and a house inAmoy. During his lifetime, he married twice,
the first wife was Manuela Cruz, with whom he had several children. The
second marriage was with Maria Natividad Lim Brillian, with whom he had a
son, herein petitioner,SilvinoSuntay. An intestate proceeding was instituted
by the heirs from the first marriage. Whilethe second wife, the surviving
widow who remained in Amoy China, filed a petition forthe probate of
the last will and testament of the deceased which was claimed to havebeen
executed and signed in the Philippines on November 1929. The petition
wasdenied due to the loss of the will before the hearing thereof. After the
Pacific War,
Silvino, claimed to have found among the records of his father, a last will
and testament
in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on
January1931 and
probated in the Amoy District Court. He filed a petition in the intestate
proceedings for
the probate of the will executed in the Philippines on November 1929 or the
will
executed in Amoy China on November1931.
ISSUE:
Is the will executed in Amoy, China can still be validly probated

in the Philippines?
RUILING: NO
To have the will execute in Amoy, China be validly probated in the

Philippines, the following must be proved: (a.) the fact that
the Municipal District Court of Amoy, China is a probate court; (b.)the law
245
of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills; (c.) Established
competent evidence of the legal requirements for the execution of the will
in China in 1931. Herein case, there is no proof on these points.
Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in

the Municipal District Court of Amoywere for the purpose of taking the
testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will
and that the order of the said courtdoes not purport to probate the will.The
order of the Municipal District Court of Amoy, China does not purport
toprobate or allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings. In
view thereof, thewill and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have
been done in accordancewith the accepted basic andfundamental concepts
and principles followed in theprobate and allowance ofwills. Consequently,
the authenticated transcript ofproceedings held
inthe Municipal District Court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed
andaccepted as proceedings leading to the probate of allowance of a will.
Therefore, thewill referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded
by a competent court in the Philippines.
246
MICIANO VS. BRIMO
50 PHIL 867, NOVEMBER 1, 1927
ROMUALDEZ, J.
DOCTRINE: The national law of the testator shall govern in the disposition
of the testator’s properties; impossible conditions in the will shall be
considered as not imposed.
FACTS:
Juan Miciano was the judicial administrator of the estate of Joseph

Brimo, a Turkish citizen. Miciano filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo,
one of the brothers of the deceased (Joseph Brimo) opposed Miciano’s
participation in the inheritance and that said scheme of partition was not in
accordance in the Turkish laws. However, in the second part of the will of
Joseph Brimo, he specifically indicated that the distribution of his properties
shall be in accordance with the Philippine laws and not his national law,
which is Turkish.
ISSUE:
Is the Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution of Joseph

Brimo’s estates and not the Turkish law?
RUILING: NO.
Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said
that “it be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the
Philippine Island”, this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall
be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in
any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise
provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law
or good morals. Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in his
testamentary dispositions.
Further, Andre Brimo failed to prove that the scheme of partition

being filed violated the Turkish law. Hence, the court approved the scheme
of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such manner as to
include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.
247
DELA CERNA VS POTOT
REYES, J.B.L., J.
DOCTRINE: Joint will iscontrary to law.
FACTS:
The spouses Bernabe de la Serna and GervasiaRebaca, executed a

joint last will and testament where they willed that their two(2) parcels of
land be given to Manuela Rebaca, their niece and that while each of them
are living, he/she will continue to enjoy the fruits of the lands mentioned.
When Bernabe died,Gervasia submitted the will for probated. By order,
the Court admitted for probate of the said will but only for the part of
Bernabe in Oct. 31, 1939.
When Gervasia died, another petition for probate was instituted

by Manuela, but because she and her attorney failed to appear in court, the
petition was dismissed. When the same was heard, the CFI declared the
will void for being executed contrary to the prohibition on joint wills. But on
appeal, the order was reversed.
ISSUE:
Is the second petition for probate on the will valid?
RUILING: NO.
The court admitted that the probate of the will in 1939 was
erroneous.However, because it was probated by a court of
competent jurisdiction, it has conclusive effect and a
final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding
upon the whole world. But this is only with respect to the estate of the
husband and cannot affect the estate of the wife; considering that a joint
will is a separate will of each testator.
The joint will being prohibited by law, its validity, in so far as the
estate of the wife is concerned, must be reexamine and adjudicated
de novo. The undivided interest of the wife should pass upon her death to
her intestate heirs and not to the testamentary heir. Thus, as to
the disposition of the wife, the will cannot be given effect.
248
GONZALES VS. CA
G.R. No. L-37453, May 25, 1979
DOCTRINE: There is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify

initially or at any time during the trial as to his good standing in the
community, his reputation for trustworthiness and for being reliable, his
honesty and uprightness (such attributes are presumed of the witness
unless the contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing party) in order that
his testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial court.
FACTS: Isabel Gabriel died on June 7, 1961 without issue. Lutgarda

Santiago (respondent), niece of Isabel, filed a petition for probate of
Isabel’s will designating her as the principal beneficiary and executrix. The
will was typewritten in Tagalog and was executed 2 months prior to death
of Isabel.
The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gonzales (petitioner), also a niece of

Isabel, on the following grounds:
1. The will is not genuine;

2. The will was not executed and attested as required by law;
3. The decedent at the time of the making of the will did not have
testamentary capacity due to her age and sickness; and
4. The will was procured through undue influence.
The trial court disallowed the probate of the will but the Court of Appeals
Reversed the said decision of the trial court. The petitioner filed a petition
for review with SC claiming that the CA erred in holding that the will of the
decedent was executed and attested as required by law when there was
absolutely no proof that the 3 instrumental witnesses are credible.
ISSUE: Is it required that there must be evidence on record that the

witness to a will has good standing in his/her community or that he/she is
honest or upright?
RUILING: No. There is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify

initially or at any time during the trial as to his good standing in the
community, his reputation for trustworthiness and for being reliable, his
honesty and uprightness (such attributes are presumed of the witness
unless the contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing party) in order that
his testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough
that the qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are
complied with, such that the soundness of his mind can be shown by or
deduced from his answers to the questions propounded to him, that his age
249
(18 years or more) is shown from his appearance, testimony , or
competently provedotherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf
or dumb and that he is able to read and write to the satisfaction of the
Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications under Article 821 of the
Civil Code.
250
CRUZ V. VILLASOR
54 SCRA 31
DOCTRINE: The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged
acknowledge before himself his having signed the will.
FACTS: The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of the last will and testament
of the late Valenti Cruz. However, the petitioner opposed the allowance of
the will alleging that it was executed through fraud, deceit,
misrepresentation, and undue influence. He further alleged that the
instrument was executed without the testator having been informed of its
contents and finally, that it was not executed in accordance with law. One
of the witnesses, Angel Tevel Jr. was also the notary before whom the will
was acknowledged. Despite the objection, the lower court admitted the will
to probate on the ground that there is substantial compliance with the legal
requirements of having at least 3 witnesses even if the notary public was
one of them.
ISSUE: Can the acknowledging officer serve as witness at the same time?
RUILING: No. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged
acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. To acknowledge
before means to avow; to own as genuine, to assent, to admit, and “before”
means in front or preceding in space or ahead of. Consequently, if the third
witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow, assent or
admit his having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done
because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear
before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will.
251
CALUYA v. DOMINGO
27 Phil. 330
DOCTRINE: The fact that the testator in his will mentioned a sale of real
estate, fully consummated before his death, which he had made to one of
the witnesses to his will, does not make such person an incompetent
witness; nor does the fact that he signed the will as one of the attesting
witnesses render the will invalid under section 622 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
FACTS: This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of

the Province of Ilocos Norte denying the probate of a will.
The learned court below based its judgment upon three grounds. The first
one was that, although the testator had signed by mark, "it nowhere
appeared in the will who had written the signature or that it had been
written at his request. The second, that the witness Antonino Pandaraoan
could not really have signed the attestation clause because, at the time it
was executed, he was attending a session of the municipal council of
Piddig as a member thereof. Third: That as to the other witness, Segundino
Asis, the will mentioned and confirmed a sale of land to him by the testator,
and he being thereby an interested party his testimony could not be
believed.
ISSUE: Does the fact that the testator in his will mentioned a sale of real
estate which he had made to one of the witnesses of the will make such
person an incompetent witness?
RUILING: No. The fact that the testator in his will mentioned a sale of real
estate, fully consummated before his death, which he had made to one of
the witnesses to his will, does not make such person an incompetent
witness; nor does the fact that he signed the will as one of the attesting
witnesses render the will invalid under section 622 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
As will readily be seen on reading this section, nothing in the will before us
relative to the sale of land to Segundino Asis creates such an interest
therein as falls within the provisions thereof. Indeed, no interest of any kind
was created by the will in favor of Segundino Asis, nor did it convey or
transfer any interest to him. It simply mentioned a fact already
consummated, a sale already made. Even if, however, the will had
conveyed an interest to Segundino Asis, it would not have been for that
reason void. Only that clause of the will conveying an interest to him would
252
have been void; the remainder could have stood and would have stood as
a valid testament.
253
TESTATE ESTATE OF MALOTO v. CA
158 SCRA 451
DOCTRINE: A valid revocation must be done with animus revocandi or the

intention to revoke coupled with an overt physical act of burning, tearing,
obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another
person in his presence and under his express direction.
FACTS: Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the
petitioners Aldina Maloto- Casiano and Constancio, Maloto, and the private
respondents Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto. Believing that the deceased
did not leave behind a last will and testament, these four heirs commenced
an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunt’s estate. While the
case was still in progress, they executed an extrajudicial settlement of
Adriana’s estate dividing it into four equal parts among themselves. They
presented the same and successfully gained court approval. Three years
later, a document was discovered entitled “KATAPUSAN NGA
PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento),” purporting to be the last will and
testament of Adriana. Malotos oppposed the probate of the Will stating
among others that the said will was revoked. Two witnesses were
presented to prove that the will was burned by Adriana herself.
ISSUE: Was the will validly revoked?
RUILING: No, the will was not validly revoked. A valid revocation must be
done with animus revocandi or the intention to revoke coupled with an overt
physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried
out by the testator or by another person in his presence and under his
express direction. The document or papers burned by Adriana’s maid,
Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established–that such was the will of
Adriana Maloto. And that the burning was not proven to have been done
under the express direction of Adriana. Also the burning was not in her
presence. Both witnesses stated that they were the only ones present at
the place where papers were burned. The act done by the witnesses could
not have constituted a valid revocation of Adriana’s Will.
254
Testate Estate of the Deceased MARIANO MOLO Y LEGASPI. JUANA
JUAN VDA. DE MOLOvs.LUZ, GLICERIA and CORNELIO MOLO
G.R. No. L-2538, September 21, 1951
DOCTRINE: The failure of a new testamentary disposition upon whose

validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a
suspensive conditions, and hence prevents the revocation of the original
will. But a mere intent to make at some time a will in the place of that
destroyed will not render the destruction conditional. It must appear that the
revocation is dependent upon the valid execution of a new will
FACTS:
Mariano Molo y Legaspi executed two (2) wills, one executed on June 20,
1939 (1939 Will) and another in 1918 (1918 Will). He died. He was survived
by his wife and his nieces and nephew, Luz and Cornelio Molo. Mariano’s
wife filed a petition for the probate of the 1939 Will. In view of the
disallowance of the 1939will, the widow filed another petition for the
probate of the 1918 will. The oppositors filed an oppositionalleging that the
said will had already been revoked under the 1939 will contending that,
notwithstanding the disallowance of said will, the revocatory clause is valid
and still has the effect of nullifying the prior of 1918. The oppositors
contend that the testator, after executing the 1939 will, and with full
knowledge of the recovatory clause contained said will, himself deliberately
destroyed the original of the 1918 will, and for that reason the will submitted
by petitioner for probate in these proceedings is only a duplicate of said
original.
ISSUE:Can the 1918 Will still be valid despite the revocatory clause in the
1939 will which was disallowed for probate?
RULING: YES
255
A subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having
been disallowed, for the reason that it was not executed in conformity with
the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as to the
making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will,
inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void.
There is no evidence which may directly indicate that the testator

deliberately destroyed the original of the 1918 will because of his
knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will he executed in
1939. The only evidence we have is that when the first will was executed in
1918, Juan Salcedo, who prepared it, gave the original and copies to the
testator himself and apparently they remained in his possession until he
executed his second will in 1939. And when the 1939 will was denied
probate on November 29, 1943, and petitioner was asked by her attorney
to look for another will, she found the duplicate copy (Exhibit A) among the
papers or files of the testator. She did not find the original.
This is the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. The failure of a new

testamentary disposition upon whose validity the revocation depends, is
equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive conditions, and hence
prevents the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent to make at
some time a will in the place of that destroyed will not render the
destruction conditional. It must appear that the revocation is dependent
upon the valid execution of a new will. (1 Alexander, p. 751; Gardner, p.
253.)
We hold therefore, that even in the supposition that the destruction of the
original will by the testator could be presumed from the failure of the
petitioner to produce it in court, such destruction cannot have the effect of
defeating the prior will of 1918 because of the fact that it is founded on the
mistaken belief that the will of 1939 has been validly executed and would
be given due effect. The theory on which this principle is predicated is that
the testator did not intend to die intestate. And this intention is clearly
manifest when he executed two wills on two different occasion and
instituted his wife as his universal heir. There can therefore be no mistake
as to his intention of dying testate.
256
CRISTINA SAMSON, DELFINA NAVAL, and SOR CONSOLACION
EUGENIOvs.NAVAL ET. AL
G.R. No. L-11823 February 11, 1918
ARAULLO, J.:
DOCTRINE: A subsequent will containing a clause revoking an earlier will

must, as a general rule, be admitted to probate before the clause of
revocation can have any effect, and the same kind, quality, and method of
proof is required for the establishment of the subsequent will as was
required for the establishment of the former will.
FACTS:
Simeona Naval executed a will on February 13, 1915 where he appointed

Atty. Perfecto Gabriel as executor. She died. Atty. Gabriel filed a petition
for probation of the said will on September 20, 1915. The petition was
denied. Thereafter the nieces and legatees of the same deceased filed in
the same court for allowance as her will, another document executed by
Simeona Naval on October 31, 1914. It was opposed by Monica, Rosa and
Cristina Naval on the ground that the will, the allowance of which is asked,
could not be allowed, because of the existence of another will of
subsequent date executed during the lifetime of the deceased. Thus, said
will has been revoked by the subsequent will.
ISSUE: Did the February 1915 Will validly revoked the October 1914 Will?
RULING: NO.
Article 739 of the Civil Code provides that a former will is by operation of
law revoked by another valid subsequent will, if the testator does not state
257
in the later will his desire that the former should subsist wholly or partly. In
harmony with this provision of substantive law, we find section 623 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that no will shall be revoked,
except by implication of law, otherwise than by some will, codicil, or other
writing executed as provided in case of wills.
In order that the will of February 13, 1915, that is, the first document
presented as the will of the deceased Simeona F. Naval, could have the
effect of revoking that which was presented afterwards by the petitioners as
executed by the same deceased on October 31, 1914, that is, on a date
previous to the execution of the first, it was necessary and indispensable
that the later will, that is, that first presented for allowance, should be
perfect or valid, that it, executed as provided by lay in case of wills.
A subsequent will containing a clause revoking an earlier will must, as a

general rule, be admitted to probate before the clause of revocation can
have any effect, and the same kind, quality, and method of proof is required
for the establishment of the subsequent will as was required for the
establishment of the former will.
But admitting that the will said to have been executed by the deceased
Simeona F. Naval on February 13, 1915, notwithstanding its inefficacy to
transmit property for the reason that it has not been executed, according to
the provisions of said section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, should be
considered as executed by her in order to express her desire, appearing in
one of its clauses, to revoke and annul any previous will of hers, as stated
in clause 13, this being the argument adduced by the appellant, Monica
naval, in support of said assignment of error — neither could it be
maintained that, the allowance of said will having been denied by the court
on November 11, 1915, said revocatory clause subsists and the intention
expressed by the testratrix therein is valid and legally effective, for the
simple reason that, in order that a will may be revoked by a document, it is
necessary, according to the conclusive provisions of section 623 of said
procedural law, that such documents be executed according to the
provisions relating to will in section 618, and the will in question, or,
according to the respondent, the so-called document, was not executed
according to the provisions of said section, according to the express finding
of the trial court in its order of November 11, 1915, acquiesced in by the
opponent herself, and which is now final and executory. Therefore, the
258
disallowance of said will and the declaration that it was not executed
according to the provisions of law as to wills, produced the effect of
annulling said revocatory clause.
259
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO ET. AL
vs.COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 76464 February 29, 1988
SARMIENTO, J.:
DOCTRINE:The physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this

case, does not per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the
destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is
not imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself.
It may be performed by another person but under the express direction and
in the presence of the testator.Of course, it goes without saying that the
document destroyed must be the will itself.
FACTS:
On October 20, 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs, petitioners

Aldina Maloto-Casiano and Constancio, Maloto, and the private
respondents Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto. Believing that the deceased
died intestate, her heirs commenced on November 4, 1963 an intestate
proceeding for the settlement of their aunt's estate. While the case was still
in progress, the heir— Aldina, Constancio, Panfilo, and Felino — executed
an agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adriana's estate which provides
for the division of the estate into four equal parts among the parties. The
Malotos then presented the extrajudicial settlement agreement to the trial
court for approval which the court did on March 21, 1964.Three years later,
a document entitled "KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN
(Testamento)," dated January 3,1940 was discovered purporting to be the
last will and testament of Adriana, found inside a cabinet. Hence the
annulment of the proceedings and a probate petition was filed by the
devisees and legatees.It was however alleged that the documents or
papers burned by thehousehelp of Adriana, upon her instructions was the
subject will.
ISSUE:
260
Does the alleged act of burning the will of Adriana constitute an effective
revocation of her will?
RULING:NO.
Art. 830.No will shall be revoked except in the following cases:
1. By implication of law; or
2. By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of
wills: or
3. By burning, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the will with the
intention of revoking it, by the testator himself, or by some other
person in his presence, and by his express direction. If burned, torn
cancelled, or obliterated by some other person, without the express
direction of the testator, the will may still be established, and the
estate distributed in accordance therewith, if its contents, and due
execution, and the fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation,
or obliteration are established according to the Rules of Court.
It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this
case, does not per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the
destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is
not imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself.
It may be performed by another person but under the express direction and
in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without saying that the
document destroyed must be the will itself.
In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, may be

conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone would not
suffice. "Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the
effective revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke
must be accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing,
obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another
person in his presence and under his express direction. There is paucity of
evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the
document or papers burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not
satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana
261
Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have been done under
the express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was not in her
presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in stating that
they were the only ones present at the place where the stove (presumably
in the kitchen) was located in which the papers proffered as a will were
burned.
The respondent appellate court in assessing the evidence presented by the

private respondents as oppositors in the trial court, concluded that the
testimony of the two witnesses who testified in favor of the will's revocation
appear "inconclusive." We share the same view. Nowhere in the records
before us does it appear that the two witnesses, Guadalupe Vda. de Corral
and Eladio Itchon, both illiterates, were unequivocably positive that the
document burned was indeed Adriana's will. Guadalupe, we think, believed
that the papers she destroyed was the will only because, according to her,
Adriana told her so. Eladio, on the other hand, obtained his information that
the burned document was the will because Guadalupe told him so, thus,
his testimony on this point is double hearsay.
262
FRANCISCO GAGOvs.CORNELIO MAMUYAC ET. AL
G.R. No. L-26317 January 29, 1927
JOHNSON, J.:
DOCTRINE:Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in

the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the
absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or
destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator
had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will
not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person
without the knowledge or authority of the testator.
FACTS:
Miguel Mamuyac (Petitioner) executed a last will and testament (Exhibit A)

on July 27, 1918. He died on January 2, 1922. Francisco Gago filed a
pettion for the probation of that will. The probation was opposed by
Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina
Mamuyac (Respondents).The petition for the probation of said will was
denied upon the ground that the deceased executed a new will and
testament on April 16, 1919 (Exhibit 1).
Petitioner secured for the probation of the new will.Respondents opposed

alleging (a) that the said will is a copy of the second will and testament
executed by the said Miguel Mamuyac; (b) that the same had been
cancelled and revoked during the lifetime of Miguel Mamuyac and (c) that
the said will was not the last will and testament of the deceased Miguel
Mamuyac. The probation of the new will was denied upon the ground that
the same had been cancelled and revoked in the year 1920.
ISSUE:Was there a valid revocation of the will?
RULING:YES.
263
There was a valid revocation of the will. It may be stated that there is
positive proof, not denied, which was accepted by the lower court, that will
in question had been cancelled in 1920. The law does not require any
evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a will to be preserved. It
therefore becomes difficult at times to prove the revocation or cancellation
of wills. The fact that such cancellation or revocation has taken place must
either remain unproved of be inferred from evidence showing that after due
search the original will cannot be found. Where a will which cannot be
found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last
seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that
the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where
it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be
found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been
destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the
testator. The force of the presumption of cancellation or revocation by the
testator, while varying greatly, being weak or strong according to the
circumstances, is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the
will was not destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it.
In view of the fact that the original will of 1919 could not be found after the
death of the testator Miguel Mamuyac and in view of the positive proof that
the same had been cancelled, we are forced to the conclusion that the
conclusions of the lower court are in accordance with the weight of the
evidence. In a proceeding to probate a will the burden of proofs is upon the
proponent clearly to establish not only its execution but its existence.
Having proved its execution by the proponents, the burden is on the
contestant to show that it has been revoked. In a great majority of
instances in which wills are destroyed for the purpose of revoking them
there is no witness to the act of cancellation or destruction and all evidence
of its cancellation perishes with the testator. Copies of wills should be
admitted by the courts with great caution. When it is proven, however, by
proper testimony that a will was executed in duplicate and each copy was
executed with all the formalities and requirements of the law, then the
duplicate may be admitted in evidence when it is made to appear that the
original has been lost and was not cancelled or destroyed by the testator.
(Borromeo vs. Casquijo, G.R. No. L-26063.)
264
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED MARIANO MOLO Y
LEGASPLJUANA JUAN VDA. DE MOLO, PETITIONER AND
APPELLEE, VS. LIRA, GLICEKIA AND COENELIO MOLO,
OPPOSITORS AND APPELLANTS.
[ G. R. No. L-2538, September 21, 1951]
Case Digest by: LOURIE CALOPE
DOCTRINE: This doctrine is known as that of dependent relative

revocation, and is usually applied where the testator cancels or destroys a
will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with a present
intention to make a new testamentary disposition as a substitute... for the
old, and the new disposition is not made or, if made, fails of effect for some
reason. The doctrine is not limited to the existence of some other
document, however, and has been applied where a will was destroyed as a
consequence of a mistake of law
FACTS:
Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on January 24, 1941, in the municipality of
Pasay, province of Rizal, without leaving any forced heir either in the
descending or ascending line. He was survived, however, by his wife, the
herein petitioner Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, and by his nieces... and
nephew, the oppositors-appellants, Luz, Gliceria and Cornelio, all
surnamed Molo,who were the legitimate children of CandidoMolo y
Legaspi, deceased brother of the testator. Mariano Molo y Legaspi left two
wills, one executed on August 17, 1918, (Exhibit A) and another... executed
on June 20, 1939, (Exhibit I). The latter will contain a clause which
expressly revokes the will executed in 1918.
On February 7, 1941, Juana Juan Vda. de Molo filed in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal a petition, which was docketed as special proceeding No.
8022, seeking the probate of the will executed by the deceased on June
20, 1939.
There being no opposition, the will was probated. However, upon petition
filed by the herein oppositors, the order of the court admitting the will to
probate was set aside and the case was reopened. After hearing, at which
both parties presented their evidence, the court... rendered decision
denying the probate of said will on the ground that the petitioner failed to
prove that the same was executed in accordance with law,... In view of the
disallowance of the will executed on June 20, 1939, the widow on February
24, 1944, filed another petition for the probate of the will executed .by the
deceased on August 17, 1918, which was docketed as special proceeding
No. 56, in the same court. Again, the same... oppositors filed an opposition
265
to the petition, based on three grounds: (1) that petitioner is now estopped
from seeking the probate of the will of 1918; (2) that said will has not been
executed in the manner required by law and (3) that the will has been
subsequently revoked.
But before the second petition could be heard, the battle for liberation came
and the records of the case were destroyed. Consequently, a petition for
reconstitution was filed, but the same was found to be impossible because
neither petitioner nor oppositors could produce the... copies required for its
reconstitution. As a result, petitioner filed a new petition on September 14,
1946, similar to the one destroyed, to which the oppositors filed an
opposition based on the same grounds as those contained in their former
opposition.
ISSUES: Was the alleged will of 1918 deliberately revoked by Molo
himself?
RULING: NO
There is no evidence which may directly indicate that the testator
deliberately destroyed the original of the 1918, will because of his
knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will he executed in
1939. The only evidence we have is that when the first will was... executed
in 1918, Juan Salcedo, who prepared it, gave the original and copies to the
testator himself and apparently they remained in his possession until he
executed his second will in. 1939. And when the 1939 will was denied
probate on November 29, 1943, and petitioner was... asked by her attorney
to look for another will, she found the duplicate copy (Exhibit A) among the
papers or files of the testator. She did not find the original.
If it can be inferred that the testatordeliberately destroyed the 1918 will
because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause of the 1939 will, and it is
true that he gave a duplicate copy thereof to his wife, the herein petitioner,
the mostlogical step for the testator to take... is to recall said duplicate copy
in order that it may" likewise be destroyed. But this was not done as shown
by the fact that said duplicate copy remained in the possession of
petitioner. It is possible that because of the long lapse of twenty-one (21)
years since the first will... was executed, the original of the will had been
misplaced or lost, and forgetting that there was a copy, the testator deemed
it wise to execute another will be containing exactly the same testamentary
dispositions. Whatever may be the conclusion we may draw from this chain
of... circumstances, the stubborn fact is that there is no direct evidence of
voluntary or deliberate destruction of the first will by the testator. This
matter cannot be left to mere inference or conjecture.
Granting for the sake of argument that the earlier will was voluntarily
destroyed by the testator after the execution of the second will, which
revoked the first, could there be any doubt, under this theory, that said
earlier will was destroyed by the testator in the honest... belief that it was
no longer necessary because he had expressly revoked it in his will of
1939? In other words, can we not say that the destruction of the earlier will
was but the necessary consequence of the testator's belief that the
266
revocatory clause contained in the... subsequent will was valid and the
latter would be given effect? If such is the case, then it is our opinion that
the earlier will can still be admitted to probate under the principle of
"dependent relative revocation".
"This doctrine is known as that of dependent relative revocation, and is
usually applied where the testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an
instrument intended to revoke a will with a present intention to make a new
testamentary disposition as a substitute... for the old, and the new
disposition is not made or, if made, fails of effect for some reason. The
doctrine is not limited to the existence of some other document, however,
and has been applied where a will was destroyed as a consequence of a
mistake of law * * *." (68 C. J. p.
799).
"The rule is established that where the act of destruction is connected with
the making of another will so as fairly to raise the inference that the testator
meant the revocation of the old to depend upon the efficacy of the new
disposition intended to be substituted, the... revocation will be conditional
and dependent upon the. efficacy of the new disposition.; and if, for any
reason, the new will intended to be made as a substitute is inoperative, the
revocation fails and the original will remains in full force." (Gardner, pp.
232, 233.)
"This is the doctrine oE dependent relative revocation. The failure of the
new testamentary disposition, upon Whose validity the revocation depends,
is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition, and hence
prevents the revocation of the original will. But a mere... intent to make at
some time a will in place of that destroyed will not render the destruction
conditional. It must appear that the revocation is dependent upon the valid
execution of a new will." (1 Alexander, p. 751; Gardner, p. 233.)
We hold, therefore, that even in the supposition that the destruction of the
original will by the testator could be presumed from the failure of the
petitioner to produce it in court, such destruction cannot have the effect of
defeating the prior will of 1918 because of the... fact that it is founded on
the mistaken belief that the will of 1939 has been validly executed and
would be given due effect. The theory on which this principle is predicated
is that the testator did not intend to die intestate. And this intention is clearly
manifest when he... executed two wills on two different occasions and
instituted his wife as his universal heir. There can therefore be no mistake
as to his intention of dying testate.
267
IN MATTER OF ESTATE OF JESUS DE LEON. IGNACIA DIAZ v. ANA
DE LEON
GR No. 17714, May 31, 1922
Romualdez, J.
DOCTRINE: The destruction of a will with animo revocandi constitutes, in

itself, a sufficient revocation.
FACTS:
From the evidence submitted in this case, it appears that the testator,
shortly after the execution of the first will in question, asked that the same
be returned to him. The instrument was returned to the testator who
ordered his servant to tear the document. This was done... in his presence
and before a nurse who testified to this effect. After some time, the testator,
being asked by Dr. Cornelio Mapa about the will, said that it had been
destroyed.
ISSUES:
Was the will executed by Jesus de Leon, now deceased, was revoked by
him.
RULING: NO
We find, that the second will Exhibit 1 executed by the deceased is not
clothed with all the necessary requisites to constitute a sufficient
revocation.
But according to the statute governing the subject in this jurisdiction, the
destruction of a will with animo revocandi constitutes, in itself, a sufficient
revocation.
The intention of revoking the will is manifest from the established fact that
the testator was anxious to withdraw or change the provisions he had made
in his first will. This fact is disclosed by the testator's own statements to the
witnesses Canto and the Mother Superior of... the Hospital where he was
confined.
The original will herein presented for probate having been destroyed with
animo revocandi, cannot now be probated as the will and last testament of
Jesus de Leon. Judgment is affirmed with costs against the petitioner.
268
ERNESTO M. GUEVARA VS. ROSARIO GUEVARA and her husband
PEDRO BUISON
74 Phil 479 December 29, 1943
OZAETA, J.:
DOCTRINE: No will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is

proved and allowed in the proper court.
FACTS:
In August 26, 1931, Victorino Guevara executed a will wherein he

made various bequests to his wife, stepchildren, wife in the 2nd marriage.
He has a legitimate son Ernesto and a natural daughter Rosario. Therein,
he acknowledged Rosario as his natural daughter.In 1933, Victorino died
but his last will was never presented for probate nor was there any
settlement proceeding initiated. It appeared that only his son Ernesto
possessed the land which he adjudicated to himself. While Rosario who
had the will in her custody, did nothing to invoke the acknowledgment, as
well as the devise given to her.
Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her legitime

from Ernesto, a portion of a large parcel of land invoking the
acknowledgment contained in the will and based on the assumption that
the decedent died intestate because his will was not probated. She alleged
that the disposition in favor of Ernesto should be disregarded.
The lower court and the Court of Appeals sustained Rosario's theory.
ISSUE:
Is probate necessary for Rosario to be able to claim her legitime as

an acknowledged natural daughter?
RULING:NO
Rosario's contention violates procedural law and considered an

attempt to circumvent the last will and testament of the decedent. The
presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its
269
allowance is essential and indispensable to its efficacy.Suppression of the
will is contrary to law and public policy for without probate, the right of a
person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory.
In the instant case, there is no showing that the various legatees

other than the present litigants had received their respective legacies or
that they had knowledge of the existence and of the provisions of the will.
Their right under the will cannot be disregarded, nor may those rights be
obliterated on account of the failure or refusal of the custodian of the will to
present it to the court for probate.Even if the decedent left no debts and
nobody raises any question as to the authenticity and due execution of the
will, none of the heirs may sue for the partition of the estate in accordance
with that will without first securing its allowance or probate by the court,
first, because the law expressly provides that “no will shall pass either real
or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court” and,
second, because the probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem, cannot
be dispensed with the substituted by any other proceeding, judicial or
extrajudicial, without offending against public policy designed to effectuate
the testator’s right to dispose of his property by will in accordance with law
and to protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the will thru the
means provided by law, among which are the publication and the personal
notices to each and all of said heirs and legatees. Nor may the court
approve and allow the will presented in evidence in such an action for
partition, which is one in personam, any more than it could decree the
registration under the Torrens system of the land involved in an ordinary
action for reinvindicacion or partition.
270
DELA CERNA VS POTOT
REYES, J.B.L., J.
DOCTRINE: Will probated in a court of competent jurisdictionhas

conclusive effect and a final judgment rendered on a petition for the
probate of a will is binding upon the whole world.
FACTS:
Spouses Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint

last will and testament where they willed that their two(2) parcels of land be
given to Manuela Rebaca, their niece and that while each of them are
living, he/she will continue to enjoy the fruits of the lands mentioned. When
Bernabe died, Gervasia submitted the will for probated. By order, the Court
admitted for probate of the said will but only for the part of Bernabe in Oct.
31, 1939.
However, Gervasia died, another petition for probate was instituted

by Manuela, but because she and her attorney failed to appear in court, the
petition was dismissed. When the same was heard, the CFI declared the
will void for being executed contrary to the prohibition on joint wills. But on
appeal, the order was reversed.
ISSUE:
Is the second petition for probate on the will valid?
RUILING: NO.
The court ruled that the will probated in 1939 was

erroneous.However, because it was probated by a court of
competent jurisdiction, it has conclusive effect and a
final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding
upon the whole world. But this is only with respect to the estate of the
husband and cannot affect the estate of the wife; considering that a joint
will is a separate will of each testator.The joint will being prohibited by law,
its validity, in so far as the estate of the wife is concerned, must be
reexamine and adjudicated de novo. The undivided interest of the wife
271
should pass upon her death to her intestate heirs and not to the
testamentary heir. Thus, as to the disposition of the wife, the will cannot be
given effect.
272
GALLANOSA VS. ARCANGEL
G.R. NO. L-2930, June 21, 1978
Aquino, J:
DOCTRINE: An action for annulment of the will is not allowed. The

Supreme Court said, to contest a will, an opposition should have been filed
in the probate proceedings and to pursue this application in the appellate
court in case the will is admitted to probate. Otherwise, the decree of
probate becomes conclusive as to formal validity and due execution of the
will.
FACTS:
Florentino Hitosis executed a will in the Bicol dialect on June 19, 1938
when he was eighty years old. He died on May 26, 1939 and as a childless
widower, he was survived by his brother, Leon Hitosis.
Florentino bequeathed his one-half share in the conjugal estate to his

second wife, Tecla Dollentas, and, should Tecla predecease him, as was
the case, his one-half share would be assigned to the spouses Pedro
Gallanosa and Corazon Grecia, the reason being that Pedro, Tecla's son
by her first marriage, grew up under the care of Florentino: he had treated
Pedro as his foster child, and Pedro has rendered services to Florentino
and Tecla.
Opposition on the probate of the will was filed by the testator’s legal heirs.
However, the judged admitted the probate of the will for the failure of the
heirs to adduce evidence in support of their opposition.
As basis of their complaint, they alleged that the Gallanosa spouses,

through fraud and deceit, caused the execution and simulation of the
document purporting to be the last will and testament of Florentino Hitosis.
On 1967, or 28 years after the probate of the will, the testator’s heirs filed
an action for annulment of the will of Florentino Hitosis and for the
recovery of 61 parcels of land. They alleged that the Gallanosa spouses,
through fraud trial deceit, caused the execution trial simulation of the
document purporting to be the last will trial testament of Florentino Hitosis.
ISSUE:
Will the action for annulment of the will of Florentino prosper?
RULING: NO.
Action instituted in 1967 for the annulment of a last will and testament
duly probated way back in 1939 will not prosper.
273
What the plaintiffs seek is the “annulment” of a last will and testament duly
probated in 1939 by the lower court itself. The proceeding is coupled with
an action to recover the lands adjudicated to the defendants by the same
court in 1943 by virtue of the probated will, which action is a resuscitation of
the complaint of the same parties that the same court dismissed in 1952. It
is evident from the allegations of the complaint and from defendants’
motion to dismiss that plaintiffs’ 1967 action is barred by res judicata, a
double-barrelled defense, and by prescription, acquisitive and extinctive, or
by what are known in the jus civile and the jus gentium as usucapio, longi
temporis possesio and praescriptio.
Our procedural law does not sanction an action for the “annulment” of a
will. In order that a will may take effect, it has to be probated, legalized or
allowed in the proper testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will is
mandatory (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, formerly sec. 1, Rule 76,
Rules of Court; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479; Guevara vs. Guevara,
98 Phil. 249). The testamentary proceeding is a special proceeding for
settlement of the testators estate. A special proceeding is distinct and
different from an ordinary action (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 2 and sec. 1, Rule
72. Rules of Court).
The 1939 decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal

validity of the will (Sec. 625, Act 190, sec. 1, Rule 76, now sec. 1, Rule 75,
Rules of Court; Last par. of art. 828, Civil Code). That means that the
testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time when he executed the
will and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence;
that the will was signed by him in the presence of the required number of
witnesses, and that the will is genuine and is not a forgery. Accordingly,
these facts cannot again be questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not
even in a criminal action for the forgery of the will. After the finality of the
allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its execution cannot
be raised anymore
On the other hand, the 1943 decree of adjudication rendered by the trial
court in the testate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Florentino
Hitosis, having been rendered in a proceeding in rem, is, under the
abovequoted section 49(a), binding upon the whole world.
274
NEPOMUCENO VS. CA
G.R. NO. L-62950, October 9, 1985
Gutierrez, Jr., J:
DOCTRINE: The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its

face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations
demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it
is probated, the court should meet the issue.
FACTS:
Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974. He left a last Will and Testament duly
signed by him at the end of the Will on page three and on the left margin of
pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof in the presence of 3 witnesses (Celestina, Myrna
and Leandro), who in turn, affixed their signatures below the attestation
clause and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 of the Will in the
presence of the testator and of each other and the Notary Public. The will
was acknowledged before the Notary Public Romeo Escareal by the
testator and his 3 attesting witnesses.
The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina
Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free
portion thereof to herein petitioner. The Will reads in part:
Art. III. That I have the following legal heirs, namely: my
aforementioned legal wife, Rufina Gomez, and our son, Oscar,
and daughter Carmelita, both surnamed Jugo, whom I declare
and admit to be legally and properly entitled to inherit from
me; that while I have been estranged from my above-
named wife for so many years, I cannot deny that I was
legally married to her or that we have been separated up to the
present for reasons and justifications known fully well by them:
Art. IV. That since 1952, 1 have been living, as man and
wife with one Sofia J. Nepomuceno, whom I declare and avow
to be entitled to my love and affection, for all the things which
she has done for me, now and in the past; that while Sofia J.
Nepomuceno has with my full knowledge and consent, did
comport and represent myself as her own husband, in truth and
in fact, as well as in the eyes of the law, I could not bind her to
me in the holy bonds of matrimony because of my
aforementioned previous marriage;
Thereafter the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and
Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo. The legal wife of the testator,
Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging inter alia that
the execution of the Will was procured by undue and improper influence on
the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the execution of the Will, the
275
testator was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living
in concubinage with the testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus, letters
testamentary should not be issued to her.
The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the
testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner from December
1952 until his death on July 16, 1974, the Will's admission to probate will
be an Idle exercise because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its
intrinsic provisions is evident.
The petitioner submits that the validity of the testamentary provision

in her favor cannot be passed upon and decided in the probate
proceedings but in some other proceedings because the only purpose
of the probate of a Will is to establish conclusively as against everyone that
a Will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the
testator has the mental capacity to execute the same.
ISSUE:
Can the probate court after declaring the Will of deceased Martin validly
drawn passed upon the instrinsic validity of the testamentary provision?
RULING: YES.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry
is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the
Will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.
The fact that the probate court declared a devise made in a will null and
void will be sustained where no useful purpose will be served by requiring
the filing of a separate civil action and restricting the court only to the issue
of extrinsic validity of the will. We are of the opinion that in view of certain
unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and because of
the motion to withdraw the petition f or probate (which the lower court
assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization), the trial
court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before
its formal validity had been established.
The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it

appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations
demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be
gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that
appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will,
probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the
276
same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time,
effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations
that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of
the validity of the provisions of the will in question. After all, there exists a
justiciable controversy crying for solution.
277
BALTAZAR VS LAXA
G.R. NO. 174489, April 11, 2012
Del Castillo, J.:
DOCTRINE: It is incumbent upon those who oppose the probate of a will to

clearly establish that the decedent was not of sound and disposing mind at
the time of the execution of said will. Otherwise, the state is duty-bound to
give full effect to the wishes of the testator to distribute his estate in the
manner provided in his will so long as it is legally tenable.
FACTS:
testament entitled “Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia
Regala”(Will) in the Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981. Childless
and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her
properties to respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon
F. Laxa and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa.
More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April 27, 2000,
Lorenzo filed a petition for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the
issuance of Letters of Administration in his favour. There being no
opposition to the petition after its due publication, the RTC issued an Order
allowing Lorenzo to present evidence on June 22, 2000.
The following day or on June 23, 2000, petitioner Antonio Baltazar

(Antonio) filed an opposition to Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio averred that the
properties subject of Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda Regala
Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to
bequeath them to Lorenzo.
Petitioners filed an Amended Opposition asking the RTC to deny the

probate of Paciencia’s Will on the following grounds:
1. the Will was not executed and attested to in accordance with the
requirements of the law;
2. that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its
execution; that she was forced to execute the Will under duress or
influence of fear or threats;
3. that the execution of the Will had been procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other
persons for his benefit;
4. that the signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged;
5. that assuming the signature to be genuine, it was obtained through
fraud or trickery; and
6. that Paciencia did not intend the document to be her Will.
278
The trial court gave considerable weight to the testimony of Rosie and
concluded that at the time Paciencia signed the Will, she was no longer
possessed of sufficient reason or strength of mind to have testamentary
capacity.
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and granted the probate of
the Will of Paciencia since the oppositors in the probate proceedings were
not able to overcome the presumption that every person is of sound mind.
Further, no concrete circumstances or events were given to prove the
allegation that Paciencia was tricked or forced into signing the Will.
ISSUE:
Is the probate of the will proper?
RULING: YES.
It is worth stressing that bare arguments, no matter how forceful, if not

based on concrete and substantial evidence cannot suffice to move the
Court to uphold said allegations. Furthermore, “a purported will is not to be
denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of
testamentary succession will be shaken to its foundation, for even if a will
has been duly executed in fact, whether x x x it will be probated would have
to depend largely on the attitude of those interested in the estate of the
deceased.”
The very existence of the Will is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed
testatrix has willed that her estate be distributed in the manner therein
provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such
desire be given full effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected
thereby. This, coupled with Lorenzo’s established relationship with
Paciencia, the evidence and the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, as
opposed to the total lack of evidence presented by petitioners apart from
their self-serving testimonies, constrain us to tilt the balance in favor of the
authenticity of the Will and its allowance for probate.
279
INRE: PILAPIL
G.R. NO. L-47931, June 27, 1941
Diaz, J.:
DOCTRINE: Probate of wills is mandatory. It is not the parties interested in

one way or another in a matter, who can confer or remove jurisdiction and
authority to the Tribunals to resolve and decide what the same law wants to
be resolved and decided.
FACTS:
Father Eleuterio Pilapil, died on December 6, 1935. No testament was

submitted after his death, at least until the beginning of February 1939, his
brother Calixto Pilapil promoted to file intestacy No. 399 to request that he
be appointed administrator of the relict assets of him.
The will contains the following provisions:
I, Eleuterio Pilapil, Priest of the Roman Catholic Apostolic

Church, sixty-eight years old, a native of Liloan, currently Cura
Parroco de la Parroquia de Mualboal, Province of Cebu, IF,
enjoying health and in FULL USE OF MY MENTAL
FACULTIES, I hereby publish, declare and grant the following
as MY TESTAMENT AND LAST WILL:
ART. FIRST: I institute and appoint Mr. Adriano Mendoza, my

political nephew, married, of legal age and neighbor of the
Municipality of Liloan, Province of Cebu, IF, ALBACEA-
EXECUTOR of this My Testament and Last
Will: Understanding , That in case of impossibility, negligence
or other cause with which it is prohibited to enforce this my Will
and Last Will, by bail, I have and order that it be replaced in
the office of executor-executor of this my Will and Last Will, by
my Cousin, Jose Cabatingan, Married, of legal age, resident of
the Municipality of Mualboal, Province of Cebu, IF, who will be
in charge and will have these following provisions met:
xxx xxx xxx
2. I provide and order that this my Will and Last Will not
be aired in the Court, since this Testament and Last Will
simply confirms, affirms and assures the legitimacy of the
documents of sale of my goods;
280
xxx xxx xxx ART. SECOND: I hereby state that this My
Testament and Last Will, which corroborates, affirms and
assures the legitimacy of documents granted to me by buyers
consists of two articles; It contains sixteen provisions and is
written on three pages;
xxx xxx xxx
Cebu, Cebu, IF, today November 27, 1935.
(Signed)
ELEUTERIO Pilapil
Testador
At the end of them (exhibits A and C), there is this testimony

clause:
Who I read:
HEALTH,
We who sign below, state: That the pre-insertion Testament

and Last Will has been signed, declared and sworn by the
Testament, Rev. P. Eleuterio Pilapil in the presence of all of us
and at the request of said Testament, we sign each of us in
the presence of us, here in Cebu, Cebu, IF, today November
27, 1935.
(Signed)
WENCESLAO PILAPIL MARCELO PILAPIL EUGENIO

K. PILAPIL
Witness Witness Witness
ISSUE:
Can the probate of the will be waived by express provision of the

testator contained in his will?
RULING: NO.
The testator's disposition that his "Testament and Last Will not be aired in
the Court" cannot dispossess the Courts of his authority to determine
whether his referred testament is legalizable or not. It is not the parties
interested in one way or another in a matter, who can confer or remove
jurisdiction and authority to the Tribunals to resolve and decide what the
same law wants to be resolved and decided.
281
It should be borne in mind that the law mandates, that the wills granted by
a testator be delivered to the Court, after he dies, by the person to whom
his custody has been entrusted, in order to determine whether his
legalization and you can at the same time dispose of your assets as
mandated therein; or if by contract, he must declare himself intestate dead,
for not being able to legalize the one that would have granted. (Arts. 626 to
631, Law No. 190.) In addition, the testator being not a lawyer, it is not
surprising that he has consigned in his will the prohibition that, - using his
own words -, "vent in the Court".
282
RAFAEL E. MANINANG AND SOLEDAD L. MANINANG VS. COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. L-57848
June 19, 1982
PONENTE: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Doctrine:No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is

proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Facts:
On May 21, 1977, ClemenciaAseneta, single, died at the Manila
Sanitarium Hospital at age 81. She left a holographic will, the pertinent
portions of which are quoted hereunder:
"x xx
"It is my will that all my real properties located in Manila, Makati, Quezon
City, Albay and Legaspi City and all my personal properties shall be
inherited upon my death by Dra. Soledad L. Maninang with whose family I
have lived continuously for around the last 30 years now. Dra. Maninang
and her husband Pamping have been kind to me. x xx I have found peace
and happiness with them even during the time when my sisters were still
alive and especially now when I am now being troubled by my nephew
Bernardo and niece Salvacion. I am not incompetent as Nonoy would like
me to appear. I know what is right and wrong. I can decide for myself. I
do not consider Nonoy as my adopted son. He has made me do things
against my will."
"x xx"
On June 9, 1977, petitioner Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for

probate of the Will of the decedent. Respondent Bernardo Aseneta, who,
as the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of decedent
ClemenciaAseneta, instituted intestate proceedings. Respondent Bernardo
then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground that the
holographic will was null and void because he, as the only compulsory heir,
was preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue. In her opposition,
Soledad averred in a that the court’s area of inquiry is limited only to the
extrinsic validity of the will, and Bernardo was effectively disinherited and
not preterited. CFI Dismissed the Testate Case and appointed Bernardo as
administrator of the estate.
ISSUE:
Whether the dismissal of the testate proceeding is valid?
HELD:
No. The probate of a Will is mandatory. "No will shall pass either real
or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the
Rules of Court." The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy
requires it, because unless the Will is probated and notice thereof given to
the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by Will may
283
be rendered nugatory. Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its
intrinsic validity. Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the
provisions of the will cannot be entertained in Probate proceeding because
its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in
accordance with the requirements of the law.
The Nuguid and the Balanay cases provide the exception rather than
the rule. The intrinsic validity of the Wills in those cases was passed upon
even before probate because "practical considerations" so demanded.
Moreover, for the parties in the Nuguid case, the "meat of the controversy"
was the intrinsic validity of the Will; in fact, the parties in that case "shunted
aside the question of whether or not the Will should be allowed probate."
Not so in the case before us now where the probate of the Will is insisted
on by petitioners and a resolution on the extrinsic validity of the Will
demanded.
Moreover, in the Nuguid case, this Court ruled that the Will was
intrinsically invalid as it completely preterited the parents of the testator. In
the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under
the terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or
disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance.
Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts.
The effects of preterition and disinheritance are also totally different.

Preterition under Article 854 of the New Civil Code 'shall annul the
institution of heir.' This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in
addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In
ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such
disinheritance shall also 'annul the institution of heirs', but only 'insofar as it
may prejudice the person disinherited', which last phrase was omitted in
the case of preterition (III Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1961
Edition, p. 172). Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to
that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally
deprived."
By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination of

that controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered. We gather
from the assailed Order of the trial Court that its conclusion was that
respondent Bernardo has been preterited. We are of opinion, however,
that from the face of the Will, that conclusion is not indubitable.
As held in the case of Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso:

"x xx it is as important a matter of public interest that a purported will is not
denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of
testamentary succession will be shaken to its foundation. x xx"
Coming now to the procedural aspect, suffice it to state that in view of our
finding that Q Judge had acted in excess of his jurisdiction in dismissing the
Testate Case.
284
SPOUSES RICARDO PASCUALVS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 115925
August 15, 2003
PONENTE: CARPIO, J.
DOCTRINE:No will shall pass either real or personal property unless

probated.
FACTS:
Consolacion andRemediosare the niece and granddaughter,
respectively, of the late Canuto. CANUTO and 11 other individuals, were
co-owners of a parcel of land.
CANUTO had the lot 2 surveyed and subdivided into and were placed
under CANUTO's name.CANUTO and CONSOLACION executed a
Kasulatan ng BilihangTuluyan. Under the KASULATAN, CANUTO sold his
10/70 share in Lot 2 in favor of CONSOLACION for P2,250.00. The
KASULATAN, notarized. CONSOLACION immediately took possession.
She later declared the land for taxation purposes and paid the
corresponding real estate taxes.On 1968, the surviving children of
CANUTO, namely, Felicidad and Beatriz, executed a joint affidavit affirming
the said sale. On 1988, REMEDIOS filed a complaint against
CONSOLACION and her spouse Ricardo Pascualfor "Annulment or
Cancellation of Transfer Certificate [of Title] and Damages." REMEDIOS
claimed that she is the owner of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E because CATALINA
devised these lots to her in CATALINA's last will and testament.
ISSUE:
Whether Consolacion’s claim of ownership is valid?
HELD:
No. REMEDIOS anchored her claim over the lots on the devise of
these lots to her under CATALINA's LAST WILL. However, the court found
that the probate court did not issue any order admitting the LAST WILL to
probate. REMEDIOS does not contest this finding. Indeed, during the trial,
REMEDIOS admitted that Special Proceedings Case No. C-208 is still
pending.Article 838 of the Civil Code states that "[N]o will shall pass either
real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with
the Rules of Court." This Court has interpreted this provision to mean, "until
admitted to probate, [a will] has no effect whatever and no right can be
claimed thereunder."REMEDIOS anchors her right in filing this suit on her
being a devisee of Catalina’s last will. However, since the probate court has
not admitted CATALINA's LAST WILL, REMEDIOS has not acquired any
right under the LAST WILL. REMEDIOS is thus without any cause of action
either to seek reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E or to enforce an
implied trust over these lots.
285
ANTILANO G. MERCADO vs. ALFONSO SANTOS
G.R. No. 45629
September 22, 1938
PONENTE: LAUREL, J.:
DOCTRINE: The probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction

thereof is usually considered as conclusive as to its due execution and
validity
FACTS:
Petitioner Antilano Mercado filed a petition for the probate of the will
of his deceased wife. The will was admitted to probate. However, Rosario
Basa de Leon filed with the justice of the peace court of San Fernando,
Pampanga, a complaint against Mercado for falsification/forgery of the will
probated. Mercado was arrested. The complaint was subsequently
dismissed at the instance of de Leon herself. Same intervenor charged
Mercado with the same offense, this time in the justice of the peace court.
Mercado was arrested again. The complaint was likewise dismissed, again
at de Leon’s instance. Upon due investigation, the case was dismissed on
the ground that the will alleged to have been falsified has already been
probated and that there was no evidence that Mercado had forged the
signature of the testatrix but that, on the contrary, satisfactory evidence
was presented that established the authenticity of said signature. Rosario
Basa de Leon and other intervenors moved ex parte to reopen the probate
proceedings, alleging lack of jurisdiction to probate the will and to close the
proceedings. This motion was denied, having been filed ex parte. The
provincial fiscal moved for reinvestigation of the criminal case for forgery
before the Pampanga CFI. The motion was granted, and for the fourth time,
Mercado was arrested. The reinvestigation dragged on for almost a year.
Intervenors’ motion was appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed
the probate court’s order of denial. Mercado moved to dismiss the case,
claiming again that the will alleged to have been forged had already been
probated and, further, that the order probating the will is conclusive as to
the authenticity and due execution thereof. The CFI overruled the motion.
Mercado thus filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction with
the Court of Appeals, which promptly denied same. HENCE, THIS
PETITION.
ISSUE:
Whether the probate of the will of his deceased wife is a bar to
Mercado’s criminal prosecution for the alleged forgery of the said will?
HELD:
Yes. In view of the provisions of Secs. 306, 333 and 625 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, a criminal action will not lie against the forger of a will
which had been duly admitted to probate by a court of competent
jurisdiction. The probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction
286
thereof is usually considered as conclusive as to its due execution and
validity, and is also conclusive that the testator was of sound and disposing
mind at the time when he executed the will, and was not acting under
duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, and that the will is genuine and
not a forgery. Section 625 of our Code of Civil Procedure was taken almost
bodily from the Statutes of Vermont statute as to the conclusiveness of the
due execution of a probated which provides that no will shall pass either
real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the probate court,
or by appeal in the county or supreme court; and the probate of a will of
real or personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
The probate of a will in this jurisdiction is a proceeding in rem. The

provision of notice by Publication as a prerequisite to the allowance of a will
is constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate is granted, the
judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against the State. A
judgment admitting a will to probate cannot be attacked collaterally
although the will was forged; and a payment to the executor named therein
of a debt due the decedent will discharge the same, notwithstanding the
spurious character of the instrument probated. It has also been held that,
upon an indictment for forging a will, the probate of the paper in question is
conclusive evidence in the defendants’ favor of its genuine character.
Therefore, as the court of last resort, having in view the needed

stability of property rights and the public interest in general. The aggrieved
party may file an application for relief with the proper court within a
reasonable time, but in no case exceeding six months after said court has
rendered the judgment of probate, on the ground of mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect.
That in view of the provisions of sections 306, 333 and 625 of our
Code of Civil Procedure, criminal action will not lie in this jurisdiction
against the forger of a will which had been duly admitted to probate by a
court of competent jurisdiction.
287
RUFINA LUY LIM vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 124715
January 24, 2000
PONENTE: BUENA, J.:
DOCTRINE: A probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether

testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong
to outside parties
FACTS:
Petitioner RufinaLuy Lim is the surviving spouse of late Pastor Y. Lim
whose estate is the subject of probate proceedings in special proceedings
Q-95-23334 entitled, “In re: Intestate Estate Of Pastor Y. Lim RufinaLuy
Lim, represented by George Luy, petitioner.” Private respondents auto
truck corporation, alliance marketing corporation, speed distributing inc,
active distributing inc, and action company are corporations formed,
organized and existing under Philippine laws and which owned real
properties covered under the Torrens system. On June 11, 1994, Pastor Y.
Lim died intestate. Herein petitioner, as surviving spouse and duly
represented by her nephew, George Luy filed on March 17, 1995, a joint
petition for the administration of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Private respondents corporations
whose properties were included in the inventory of the estate of Pastor Y.
Lim, then filed a motion for the lifting of his pendens an motion for exclusion
of certain properties from the estate of the decedent. Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. 613494, 363123, 236236 and 263236 are excluded from these
proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether properties registered under the name of corporations
founded by the deceased pastor be included in the probate proceedings of
his estate?
HELD:
No. Citing CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE, an exposition on the probate
court's limited jurisdiction, it is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one
in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which
are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court
could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the
administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the
parties, the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an
ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title
because the probate court cannot do so.
288
In CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE, where similarly as in the case at bar, the
property subject of the controversy was duly registered under the Torrens
system, We categorically stated: . . . Having been apprised of the fact that
the property in question was in the possession of third parties and more
important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of
such third parties, the respondent court should have denied the motion of
the respondent administrator and excluded the property in question from
the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive
such third persons of their possession and ownership of the property.
Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate

of the Late Pastor Y. Lim are in the possession of and are registered in the
name of private respondent corporations, which under the law possess a
personality separate and distinct from their stockholders, and in the
absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the
presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of private respondents
should stand undisturbed. It is settled that a corporation is clothed with
personality separate and distinct from that of the persons composing it. It
may not generally be held liable for that of the persons composing it. It may
not be held liable for the personal indebtedness of its stockholders or those
of the entities connected with it.
289
FRANCISCA ALSUA-BETTS, JOSEPH O. BETTS, JOSE MADARETA,
ESTEBAN P. RAMIREZ, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR ALBAY
PROVINCE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO ALSUA BUENVIAJE,
FERNANDO BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO ALSUA, represented by his
guardian, CLOTILDE S. ALSUA and PABLO ALSUA
G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979
Ponente:GUERRERO, J.
Digested by: Ralph dela Cruz
DOCTRINE:
The principle of estoppel is not applicable in probate proceedings relative to

question of testamentary capacity of a person.
FACTS:
Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Dona FlorentinaRella together with all their
living children, Francisca Alsua-Betts, Pablo Alsua, FernandoAlsua and
AmparoAlsua De Buenviaje, entered into a duly notarized agreement, over
the then present and existing properties of the Spouses Don Jesus and
Dona Florentina.
In the provision of said extra judicial partition, each of the four children was
allotted with the properties considered as their share in the estate or as
inheritance left by the deceased where they will be the absolute owner of
the properties assigned in case of death of one of the spouses.
On January 5, 1955, Don Jesus and Dona Florentina also separately

executed holographic will with exactly the same terms and conditions in
conformity with the executed extra judicial partition naming each other as
an executor without having to post any bond. That in case new properties
be acquired same shall be partitioned one half to the surviving spouse and
the other half to children of equal parts.
The Souses subsequently executed separately a codicil of exactly the

same terms and conditions, amending and supplementing their holographic
wills stating that they reserved for themselves the other half not disposed of
to their legitimate heirs under the agreement of partition and mutually and
reciprocally bequeathed each other their participation as well all properties
which might be acquired subsequently.
290
Doña Florentina died in effect Don Jesus by order of the probate court was
name as executor.
Before Don Jesus died he cancelled his holographic will in the presence of
his bookkeeper and secretary and instructed his lawyer to draft a new will.
This was a notarial will and testament of 3 essential features as follows;
1. It expressly cancelled revoked and annulled all the provisions of his

holographic will and codicil.
2. It provided for the collation of all his properties donated to his four living
children by virtue of the Escritura de Partition Extra judicial”.
3. It instituted his children as legatees / devisees of specific properties, and

as to the rest of the properties and whatever may be subsequently acquired
in the future, before his death, were to be given to Francisca and Pablo,
naming Francisca as executor to serve without a bond On May 6,1964,
Don Jesus Alsua died.
On MAY 20, 1964, Francisca Alsua-Betts, as the executrix named in the

will of filed a petition for the probate of said new will of Don Jesus Alusa
before the Court of First Instance.
Oppositions thereto were filed by Pablo, Amparo and, Fernando.
ISSUE:
1. Are the oppositors to the probate of the will estopped as to the

question on the competence of the testator Don Jesus Alsua? (NO)
2. Can the testator Don Jesus revoke his previous will? (NO)
RULING: NO
1. The principle of estoppel is not applicable in probate proceedings.

Probate proceedings involve public interest, and the application therein of
the rule of estoppel, when it will block the ascertainment of the truth as to
the circumstances surrounding the execution of a testament, would seem
inimical to public policy.
291
Over and above the interest of private parties is that of the state to see that
testamentary dispositions be carried out if, and only if, executed
conformably to law.
2.
A holographic will and codicil is revocable at anytime by the testator.
Don Jesus was not forever bound of his previous holographic will and
codicil.
As such, the will would remain revokable at his discretion.
Art. 828 of the new Civil Code is clear: "A will may be revoked by the
testator at any time before his death. Any waiver or restriction of this right is
void."
There can be no restriction that may be made on his absolute freedom to

revoke his holographic will and codicil previously made.
292
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF EMIL H. JOHNSON
G.R. NO. L-12767 NOVEMBER 16, 1918
PONENTE: STREET
DOCTRINE:
The allowance by the court of a will of real or personal property shall be

FACTS:
Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United

States, died in the city of Manila, leaving a holographic will, dated
September 9, 1915.
It was written in his (the testator's) own handwriting, and is signed by

himself and two witnesses only, instead of three witnesses.
The will was not executed in conformity with the provisions of law generally
applicable to wills executed by inhabitants of the Philippines, and hence
could not have been proved under the law.
A petition was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila
for the probate of this will, on the ground that Johnson was at the time of
his death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of America; that the
will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and hence
could properly be probated here pursuant to Section 636 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
ISSUE:
May the probate be allowed?
RULING: NO
The applicable provision of law is:
Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that "the

allowance by the court of a will of real or personal property shall be
conclusive as to its due execution."
293
The proceedings for the probate of the will were regular and that the
publication was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to entertain the
proceeding and to allow the will to be probated.
As the Court of First Instance found that the testator was a citizen of the
State of Illinois and that the will was executed in conformity with the laws of
that State, the will was necessarily and properly admitted to probate.
The due execution of a will involves conditions relating to a number of

matters, such as the age and mental capacity of the testator, the signing of
the document by the testator, or by someone in his behalf, and the
acknowledgment of the instrument by him in the presence of the required
number of witnesses who affix their signatures to the will to attest the act.
The proof of all these requisites is involved in the probate; and as to each
and all of them the probate is conclusive. (Castaneda vs. Alemany)
Jurisprudence do not contain the slightest intimation that a will which has
been probated according to law, and without fraud, can be annulled, in any
other proceeding whatever, on account of any supposed irregularity or
defect in the execution of the will or on account of any error in the action of
the court upon the proof adduced before it.
This court has never been called upon to decide whether, in case the
probate of a will should be procured by fraud, relief could be granted in
some other proceeding; and no such question is now presented. But it is
readily seen that if fraud were alleged, this would introduce an entirely
different factor in the case.
In Austria vs. Ventenilla, it was suggested but not decided that relief might
be granted in case the probate of a will were procured by fraud.
The circumstance that the judgment of the trial court recites that the will
was executed in conformity with the law of Illinois and also, in effect, that
the testator was a citizen of that State places the judgment upon an
unassailable basis so far as any supposed error apparent upon the face of
the judgment is concerned. It is, however, probable that even if the
judgment had not contained these recitals, there would have been a
294
presumption from the admission of the will to probate as the will of a citizen
of Illinois that the facts were as recited in the order of probate.
295
BENEDICTO LEVISTE vs. CA, HON. JUDGE LUIS B. REYES, CFI,
ROSA DEL ROSARIO, RITA BANU, CARMEN DE GUZMANMARQUEZ,
JESUS R. DE GUZMAN, RAMON R. DE GUZMAN, JACINTO R. DE
GUZMAN and ANTONIO R. DE GUZMAN
G.R. No. L-29184 January 30, 1989
Ponente: Grino-Aquino
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
BenedictoLeviste, a practicing attorney, entered into a written agreement

with Rosa del Rosario to appear as her counsel in a petition for probate of
the holographic will of the late Maxima C. Reselva.
Under the will, a piece of real property, was bequeathed to Del Rosario. It
was agreed that petitioner's contigent fee would be 35% of the property
that Rosa may receive upon the probate of the will.
Leviste received a letter from Ms. Del Rosario, informing him that she was
terminating his services as her counsel due to "conflicting interest.".
Del Rosario waived her rights to the devise in her favor and agreed that the
De Guzman brothers and sisters who opposed her
A petition for probate, shall inherit all the properties left by the decedent.
The court disallowed the will. Upon appeal, the private respondents filed a
motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that petitioner was not a party
in interest.
Leviste opposed the motion to dismiss his appeal, claiming that he has a
direct and material interest in the decision sought to be reviewed. He also
asked that he be substituted as party-petitioner, in lieu of his former client,
Ms. Del Rosario.
The trial judge dismissed the appeal and denied petitioner's motion for
substitution.
296
Leviste filed in the CA a petition for mandamus. The CA dismissed the
petition for being insufficient in form and substance as the petitioner did not
appear to be the proper party to appeal the decision.
Leviste argues that by virtue of his contract of services with Del Rosario, he
is a creditor of the latter.
ISSUE:
Does Leviste have a standing to be a party in the case?
RULING: NO
The provision of law relevant to the case is:
ART. 1052. If the heir repudiates the inheritance to the prejudice of his own
creditors, the latter may petition the court to authorize them to accept it in
the name of the heir. xxx
Article 1052 of the Civil Code does not apply to this case. That legal
provision protects the creditor of a repudiating heir.
Leviste is not a creditor of Rosa del Rosario. The payment of his fees is
contingent and dependent upon the successful probate of the holographic
will.
Since the petition for probate was dismissed by the lower court, the
contingency did not occur. Attorney Leviste is not entitled to his fee.
Furthermore, Article 1052 presupposes that the obligor is an heir.
Rosa del Rosario is not a legal heir of the late Maxima C. Reselva. Upon
the dismissal of her petition for probate of the decedent's will, she lost her
right to inherit any part of the latter's estate. There is nothing for the
petitioner to accept in her name.
In this case, Leviste was not a party to the probate proceeding in the lower
court. He had no direct interest in the probate of the will. His only interest in
the estate is an indirect interest as former counsel for a prospective heir.
The reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting the will, is that
the litigants should not be molested by the intervention in the proceedings
of persons with no interest in the estate which would entitle them to be
heard with relation thereto.
297
It only gives him the right to collect a certain amount for his services in case
his client is awarded a certain sum by the court. (Morente vs. Firmalino)
298
LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as

Attorney-in-Fact of VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE DOROTHEO,
respondents.
G.R. No. 108581 December 8, 1999
Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Doctrine:
A final judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole

world.
Facts:
Nilda et.al.were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Ancieta

Reyes.
The latter died without her estate being settled.
Lourdes who claims to have taken Alejandro before he died, filed Special
Proceeding for the probate of the latter’s will.
The court admitted the will but the respondent filed a motion to declare the
will. The dispositive portion of the decision declared that Lourdes Legaspi
(Petitioner) was not the wife of the late Alejandro Dorotheo and declaring
the oppositors Vicente, Jose, and NildaDorotheo as the only heirs of the
decedent.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some

compensation since she took care of the decedent. Upon denial, she
appealed to the CA but it dismissed her appeal and the judgment became
final and executory.
299
A writ of execution was issued. Respondent filed motions to compel
Petitioner to surrender to them the TCT’s. When Petitioner refused, the
respondent filed motion for cancellation of titles and Petitioner opposed the
same.
An order was issued by the Judge setting aside the final and executory
order and writ of execution on the ground that they are interlocutory.
Issue:
May a last will and testament that has become final and executory be
subsequently questioned?
Ruling: NO
A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or

reopened no matter how erroneous it may be.
In setting aside the January 30, 1986 Order that has attained finality, the
trial court in effect nullified the entry of judgment made by the Court of
Appeals.
It is well settled that a lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or
orders of a superior court, for to do so would be to negate the hierarchy of
courts and nullify the essence of review. It has been ruled that a final
judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world.
It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time from a
judgment or order of the trial court, the same attains finality by mere lapse
of time.
Thus, the order allowing the will became final and the question determined
by the court in such order can no longer be raised anew, either in the same
proceedings or in a different motion.
The matters of due execution of the will and the capacity of the testator
acquired the character of res judicata and cannot again be brought into
question, all juridical questions in connection therewith being for once and
forever closed.
300
Such final order makes the will conclusive against the whole world as to its
extrinsic validity and due execution.
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether

the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution,
that he had freely executed the will and was not acting under duress, fraud,
menace or undue influence and that the will is genuine and not a forgery,
that he was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a person not
expressly prohibited by law from making a will.
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same
may still be raised even after the will has been authenticated. Thus, it does
not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is
always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator
provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their
legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, the
unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect.
This is specially so when the courts had already determined in a final and
executory decision that the will is intrinsically void. Such determination
having attained that character of finality is binding on this Court which will
no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically
valid, but that a final and executory decision of which the party had the
opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunals must stand and should
no longer be reevaluated.
Failure to avail of the remedies provided by law constitutes waiver. And if

the party does not avail of other remedies despite its belief that it was
aggrieved by a decision or court action, then it is deemed to have fully
agreed and is satisfied with the decision or order.
301
MALOLES II vs. PHILLIPS
G.R. NO. 129505, January 31, 2000
MENDOZA, J.
DOCTRINE:Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the

death of the testator. However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the
filing of a petition for probate of the will filed by the testator himself.
FACTS:
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos filed a petition for probate of
his will. He alleged that he had no compulsory heirs; that he had named in
his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.;
that he disposed by his will his properties with an approximate value of not
less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in the custody of
the named executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. The
petition was granted.
Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on February
26, 1996.
On April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for

intervention claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testator's
sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew
and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a
creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of the
order allowing the will and the issuance of letters of administration in his
name.
Private respondent was appointed as special administrator of Dr. De

Santos's estate.On July 29, 1996, petitioner sought to intervene in the
special proceeding.
Petitioner's motion for intervention was granted. The Court of Appeals

set aside the trial court's order on the ground that petitioner had not shown
any right or interest to intervene in.
ISSUE: Does petitioner Maloles have the right to intervene in the special
proceeding?
RULING: NO.
In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of

the court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e.,
whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.
Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of

the testator, so much so that, after approving and allowing the will, the
302
court proceeds to issue letters testamentary and settle the estate of the
testator. However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a
petition for probate of the will filed by the testator himself. It provides:
CIVIL CODE, ART. 838.
Xxx
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having
jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. xxx
The Regional Trial Court having begun the probate proceedings of

the estate of the deceased, it continues and shall continue to exercise said
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others. It should be noted that probate
proceedings do not cease upon the allowance or disallowance of a will but
continues up to such time that the entire estate of the testator had been
partitioned and distributed.
The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will
of the decedent Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the
latter. As the only and nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can
inherit from the latter only in case of intestacy. Since the decedent has left
a will which has already been probated and disposes of all his properties
the private respondent can inherit only if the said will is annulled. His
interest in the decedent's estate is, therefore, not direct or immediate.
303
NUGUID vs. NUGUID
G.R. No. L-23445, June 23, 1966
SANCHEZ, J.
DOCTRINE:If a will is null and void because of preterition, a probate

procedding would be useless.
FACTS:
Rosario Nuguid died on December 30, 1962, single, without

descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate
parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz SalongaNuguid, and six (6) brothers and
sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and
Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
In 1963, petitioner RemediosNuguid filed a holographic will allegedly

executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before
her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that
letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her.
Felix and Paz moved to the probate of her will on the ground that the
oppositors — who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct
ascending line — were illegally preterited and that in consequence the
institution is void.
The court's order held that "the will in question is a complete nullity
and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario
Nuguid" and dismissed the petition without costs.
ISSUE: Should the will be probated?
RULING: NO.
The court's area of inquiry is limited — to an examination of, and

resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due execution thereof,
the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites
or solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be presented,
and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court at this stage of the
proceedings — is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy
of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein.
If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be
gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted.
Reproduced hereunder is the will:
Nov. 17, 1951
I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory,

having amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and
304
bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die to my beloved
sister RemediosNuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In
witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day of November,
nineteen hundred and fifty-one.
(Sgd.) Illegible
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID
The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or

illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her
parents. And, the will completely omits both of them: They thus received
nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime;
neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition.
The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a

complete nullity". Considering, however, that the will before us solely
provides for the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more,
the result is the same. The entire will is null.
305
PASTOR, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-56340, June 24, 1983
PLANA, J.
DOCTRINE:In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by

and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the
testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with
the formalities prescribed by law.
FACTS:
Pastor, Sr., was survived by his wife Sofia Bossio (who also died),
their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. and Sofia Pastor de Midgely,
and an illegitimate child, LewellynBarlitoQuemada.
Quemada filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged

holographic will of Pastor, Sr. The will contained only one testamentary
disposition: a legacy in favor of Quemada consisting of 30% of Pastor, Sr.'s
42% share in the operation by Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development
Corporation of some mining claims.
The Probate Court appointed him special administrator of the entire,

whether or not covered or affected by the holographic will. He instituted
against Pastor, Jr. and his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged
properties of the estate, which included the properties subject of the legacy
and which were in the names of the latter.
Pastor, Jr. and Sofia filed their opposition to the petition for probate
and the order appointing Quemada as special administrator.The Probate
Courtallowed the will to probate.Quemadaasked for payment of his legacy
and seizure of the properties subject of said legacy, but this remained
unacted upon.
The Probate Court set the hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will,
but upon objection of Pastor, Jr. and Sofia on the ground of pendency of
the reconveyance suit, no hearing was held.
While the reconveyance suit was still being litigated, the Court issued
the now assailed Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving the
question of ownership of the royalties payable by Atlas Company and ruling
in effect that the legacy to Quemada was not inofficious.
ISSUE:Is the question on the finality of ownership and intrinsic validity of

the will resolved?
RULING: NO.
In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and

large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the
testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with
306
the formalities prescribed by law. As a rule, the question of ownership is an
extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality.
Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or
should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate
Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional,
not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to
resolve title.
Nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership

of specific properties. On the contrary, it is manifest therein that ownership
was not resolved.
There had been no prior definitive determination of the assets of the

estate of Pastor, Sr. There was an inventory of his properties presumably
prepared by the special administrator, but it does not appear that it was
ever the subject of a hearing or that it was judicially approved. The
reconveyance or recovery of properties allegedly owned but not in the
name of Pastor, Sr..was still being litigated in another court.
It was, therefore, an error for the assailed implementing Orders to

conclude that the Probate Order adjudged with finality the question of
ownership of the mining properties and royalties, and that, premised on this
conclusion, the dispositive portion of the said Probate Order directed the
special administrator to pay the legacy in dispute.
Without a final, authoritative adjudication of the issue as to what

properties compose the estate of Pastor, Sr. in the face of conflicting claims
made by heirs and a non-heir involving properties not in the name of the
decedent, and in the absence of a resolution on the intrinsic validity of the
will here in question, there was no basis for the Probate Court to hold that
private respondent is entitled to the payment of the questioned legacy.
Therefore, the Order of Execution and the subsequent implementing orders
for the payment of Quemada'slegacy, must fall for lack of basis.
307
CAYETANO vs. LEONIDAS
G.R. No. L-54919, May 30, 1984
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
DOCTRINE:As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to

the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities
prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after
the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated.
FACTS:
Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner

Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita C.
Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs.
As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed an
Affidavit of Adjudication whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership
of the entire estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos.
Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of the

deceased and for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the
deceased testatrix.
Nenita alleged that the testatrix made her last will and testament,
according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A. and that the executor is also
resident U.S.A.; and that therefore, there is an urgent need for the
appointment of an administratrix to administer and eventually distribute the
properties of the estate located in the Philippines.
An opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by petitioner

alleging that the will is a forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the will are
null and void; and that the American laws could not apply inasmuch as they
would work injustice and injury to him.
Petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and left a will, appointing Polly

Cayetano as the executrix of his last will and testament. Cayetano,
therefore, filed a motion to substitute herself as petitioner in the instant
case.
ISSUE: Is the reprobate proceeding valid?
RULING: YES.
As a general rule, the probate court's authority is limited only to the

extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities
prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after
the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However,
where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will
308
be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the
issue.
In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent
judge allowed the reprobate of Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos
was divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him.
This contention is without merit.
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the

petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate
outright, the private respondents have sufficiently established that
Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a
permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under
Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the law which governs
Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the
national law of the decedent.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions

of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the
national law of the decedent must apply.
309
CORONADO V. CA,
G.R. NO. 78778, DECEMBER 3, 1990 (191 SCRA 894)
CORONADO V. CA, G.R. NO. 78778, DECEMBER 3, 1990 (191 SCRA
894)
PERALTA J.:
DOCTRINE:
The title to ownership of the property does not determine nor even by
implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions of the will,
thus may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its
authentication. The question relating to these points remain entirely
unaffected and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated.
FACTS:
The property subject of this case is a parcel of land situated in

Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing 277 square meters.
Said parcel of land is being contested by Juana Albovias, herein
private respondent, on the one hand, and Leonida-Coronado, Felix Bueno,
Melania Retizos, Bernardino Buenseda and Jovita Montefalcon, herein
petitioners, on the other hand.
Juana Albovias (JUANA, for brevity) claims that the property in
question is a portion of a bigger lot referred to as Parcel G in the last will
and testament executed in 1918 by MelecioArtiaga, grandfather of JUANA.
This bigger lot was inherited under that will by JUANA, her brother
Domingo Bueno, and two other grandchildren, namely Bonifacio and
Herminigildo, both surnamed Formentera.
JUANA further claims that sometime in 1925 or 1926, C. Lirio Street
was created by the Municipality of Nagcarla traversing said Parcel G and
thus dividing it into two portions, one on the west of C. Lirio St. and the
other to the east of said street. Parcel G was divided by the heirs in the
following manner; the land was divided into two portions, the northern
portion of which was adjudicated in favor of the Formenteras and the
southern portion was given to JUANA and Doming Bueno. The southern
portion in turn was partitioned between JUANA and Domingo Bueno, the
former getting the northern part adjoining the lot of the Formenteras, and
the latter the southern part which adjoins the lot of Perfecto Nanagas (not
owned by DalmacioMonterola). The part allocated to Domingo was later
sold by him to DalmacioMonterola, owner of the adjoining property (Ibid.).:
nad
Moreover, JUANA claims that her property was included together with
the two parcels of land owned by DalmacioMonterola, which were sold by
Monterola's successor-in-interest Leonida Coronado (now married to Felix
Bueno) to Melania Retizos on April 18, 1970. Melania Retizos in turn sold
the lots, including that one being claimed by JUANA, to the spouse
310
Bernardino Buenaseda and Jovita Montefalcon, now the present
possessors thereof, sometime in 1974.
On the other hand, Leonida Coronado and her co-petitioners
(CORONADO, for brevity) claim that the property in question was
bequeathed to Leonida Coronado under a Will executed by Dr.
DalmacioMonterola, who was allegedly in possession thereof even before
the outbreak of World War II (Ibid., p. 107).
Parenthetically, said will was probated under Sp. Proc. No. SC-283,
entitled "Testate Estate of the Deceased Monterola Leonida F. Coronado,
petitioner (Ibid., p. 105). JUANA, together with her husband, opposed the
said probate. Despite their opposition, however, the Will was allowed by the
then Court of First Instance of Laguna, Sta. Cruz Branch.
ISSUE:
Can a title of ownership to a property still be impugned even after it is

transmitted through a will?
RULING:
Yes, while it is true that no will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court (Art. 838, Civil
Code), the questioned will, however, may be sustained on the basis of
Article 1056 of the Civil Code of 1899, which was in force at the time said
document was executed by MelecioArtiaga in 1918. The said article read
as follows:
"Article 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his properties
by an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it does
not prejudice the legitime of the forced heir." (Mang-Oy v. Court of Appeals,
144 SCRA 33 [1986])
It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or
efficiency of the provisions of the will, thus may be impugned as being
vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The question relating to
these points remain entirely unaffected and may be raised even after the
will has been authenticated (Maninang, et al., v. Court of Appeals, 114
SCRA 473 [1982]). Consequently, JUANA is not estopped from questioning
the ownership of the property in question, notwithstanding her having
objected to the probate of the will executed by Monterola under which
Leonida Coronado is claiming title to the said property.
Moreover, the lower court found sufficient evidence to support the
conclusion that the property in question is the same property adjudicated to
JUANA under the will of MelecioArtiaga, and that CORONADO has no right
whatsoever to said property (Ibid., p. 20). Such findings are conclusive
311
upon this Court (Reynolds Philippine Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 169
SCRA 220 [1989]).
312
SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, PETITIONERS,
VS.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. NO. 106720 SEPTEMBER 15, 1994
PUNO, J.:
DOCTRINE:
Unless the authenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were

made on the date of the holographic will or on testator’s signature, their
presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will
only result in disallowance of such changes.
FACTS:
The holographic will of Annie San was submitted for probate.

Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the
testament’s body nor the signature therein was in decedent’s handwriting; it
contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by
decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper
pressure and undue influence.
The petition was also contested by Dr. Ajero with respect to the
disposition in the will of a house and lot. He claimed that said property
could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole
owner.
However, the trial court still admitted the decedent’s holographic will
to probate.
The trial court held that since it must decide only the question of the identity
of the will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix,
it finds no reason for the disallowance of the will for its failure to comply
with the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of testamentary capacity
of the testatrix.
On appeal, the CA reversed said Decision holding that the decedent did not
comply with Articles 313 and 314 of the NCC. It found that certain
dispositions in the will were either unsigned or undated, or signed by not
dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made
had not been authenticated by decedent.
ISSUE:
Were the formalities of a holographic will under theArticles 813 and

814 of the New Civil Codecomplied with?
HELD:
Yes, reading of Article 813 shows that its requirement affects the
validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its
313
probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the
result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure,
however, does not render the whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate notwithstanding
non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814.
Unless the authenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made

on the date of the holographic will or on testator’s signature, their presence
does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result
in disallowance of such changes.
It is also proper to note that he requirements of authentication of changes

and signing and dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Article 813 and
814) separate from that which provides for the necessary conditions for the
validity of the holographic will (Article 810).
This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only
the requirements of Article 810 of the NCC – and not those found in Articles
813 and 814 – are essential to the probate of a holographic will.
Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and Article 839 of the Civil Code
enumerate the grounds for disallowance of wills. These lists are exclusive;
no other grounds can serve to disallow a will.
In a petition to admit a holographic will, the only issues to be resolved are:
1.whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent’s last will and
testament;
2.whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities

prescribed by law;
3.whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the

time the will was executed; and
4.whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of
the decedent.
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close

the door against bad faith and fraud; accordingly, laws on this subject
should be interpreted to attain these primordial ends.
In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the

requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator
himself. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the
disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionable handwritten by the
testator.
314
CELEDONIA SOLIVIO V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 83484, FEBRUARY 12, 1990
MEDIALDEA, J.:
DOCTRINE:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of
relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from
which said property came.

ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from his
descendants.
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees
(reservatarios)—relatives within the third degree counted from the
descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from which
the property came.
3. The propositus—the descendant who received by gratuitous title
and died without issue, making his other ascendant inherit by
operation of law.
FACTS:
On October 11, 1959, Esteban Javellana, Jr.’s mother Salustia died

leaving all her property, including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, to
him. Esteban Jr,” died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants,
brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his
maternal aunt, petitioner CeledoniaSolivio, the spinster half-sister of his
mother, SalustiaSolivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia
Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.
Pursuant to an agreement between Concordia and Celedonia, the

latter would take care of the proceedings leading to the formation of the
foundation. Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel,
filed for a Special Proceeding for her appointment as special administratrix
of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr., praying that letters of administration
be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the deceased; and that
after payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and
accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her.
Concordia filed a civil case in the RTC of Iloilo for partition, recovery
of possession, ownership and damages. Celedonia averred that the estate
315
of Esteban Jr. was subject to reservatroncal and thus it should redound to
her as a relative within the 3rd degree on his mother side.
ISSUE:
Whetherthe estate of the deceased was subject to reservatroncal and

that it pertains to her as his only relative within the third degree on his
mother’s side?
RULING:
No, there is no merit in the petitioner’s argument that the estate of the
deceased was subject to reservatroncal, and that it pertains to her as his
only relative within the third degree on his mother’s side. The
reservatroncal provision of the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which
reads as follows:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of
relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from

ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from his descendants.
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees
(reservatarios)—relatives within the third degree counted from the
descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from which the property
came.
3. The propositus—the descendant who received by gratuitous title and died
without issue, making his other ascendant inherit by operation of law. (p.
692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not

reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the
descendant of his mother, SalustiaSolivio, from whom he inherited the
properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to
a reservation in favor of his aunt, CeledoniaSolivio, who is his relative
within the third degree on his mother’s side. The reservatroncal applies
to properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it
from another ascendant or a brother or sister. It does not apply to property
inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation
covered by Article 891.
316
CELSA L. VDA. DE KILAYKO, ENCARNACION L. VDA. DE PANLILIO
and REMEDIOS L. VDA. DE GUINTO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ERNESTO TENGCO of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch IV and RODOLFO LIZARES
and AMELO LIZARES, as Judicial Administrators of the Estate of the
late EUSTAQUIA LIZARES, respondents.
G.R. No. 45965 March 27, 1992
ROMERO, J.:
DOCTRINE:
The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding

may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of
circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not
imputable to negligence.
FACTS:
The testator died without an issue leaving her last will and testament
to her niece ,EustaquiaLizarez. The will was probated and the project of
partition was granted. The decree of distribution became final. However,
there were errors in the distribution as alleged by Kilayko et al.
ISSUES:
Whetherthe errors in the distribution warrants the reopening of the

estate of the testator?
RULING:
No, the error will not cause the reopening of the succession.
Where the court has validly issued a decree of distribution and the
same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of partition
becomes irrelevant.
The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding

may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of
circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not
imputable to negligence.
The fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res

judicata rests is that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the
same issue more than once.
317
FELIX BALANAY, JR.,
VS.HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ
G.R. NO. L-39247, JUNE 27, 1975
AQUINO, J.:
DOCTRINE: In Probate proceeding the inquiry as a General Rule is limited

only to the EXTRINSIC VALIDITY of the will. Save in an extreme case
where the will on its face is intrinsically void, it is the probate court's duty to
pass first upon the formal validity of the will. Generally, the probate of the
will is mandatory.
FACTS: Testatrix Leodegaria Julianwas survived by her husband, Felix

Balanay, Sr., and by their six legitimate children including Felix Balanay, Jr.
Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed a petition for the probate of his mother's notarial
will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in English. In that will
Leodegaria Julian declared: xxx that it was her desire that her properties
should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and
that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties
(Par. IV).
Then, in paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband's death
her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands (which she described as
"my properties") should be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in
that part of her will. Testatrix Leodegaria devised and partitioned the
conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed of in
the will her husband's one half share of the conjugal assets
Felix, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the
grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the
husband and alleged improper partition of the conjugal estate.
Felix, Jr., in his reply to the opposition, attached thereto an affidavit of Felix,
Sr. dated April 18, 1973 wherein he withdrew his opposition to the probate
of the will and affirmed that he was interested in its probate. On the same
date Felix Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument captioned "Conformation (sic)
of Division and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights" wherein he manifested
that out of respect for his wife's will he "waived and renounced' his
hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their six children. In that same
instrument he confirmed the agreement, which he and his wife had
perfected before her death, that their conjugal properties would be
partitioned in the manner indicated in her will.
The lower court in its order of June 18, 1973 "denied" the opposition and
reset for hearing the probate of the will. It gave effect to the affidavit and
conformity of Felix Balanay, Sr.
In its order of February 28, 1974, the lower courtdismissed the petition for
the probate, declared that the will was void, converted the testate
318
proceeding into an intestate proceeding, and ordered the issuance of a
notice to creditors.
ISSUE:
1. Is the probate court correct in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the
will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity? (YES)
2. Is the probate court correct in declaring the will void, converting the
testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding and in not proceeding with
the probate of the will? (NO)
RULING:
1. YES, THE TRIAL COURT ACTED CORRECTLY IN PASSING UPON

THE WILL'S INTRINSIC VALIDITY EVEN BEFORE ITS FORMAL
VALIDITY HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED.
We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will,
which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the
petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed with
the petitioner's authorization), THE TRIAL COURT ACTED CORRECTLY
IN PASSING UPON THE WILL'S INTRINSIC VALIDITY EVEN BEFORE
ITS FORMAL VALIDITY HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. The probate of a
will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be
intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated,
the court should meet the issue.
2. NO, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE WILL VOID

AND CONVERTING THE TESTATE PROCEEDING INTO AN
INTESTATE PROCEEDING; AND IN NOT PROCEEDING WITH THE
PROBATE OF THE WILL.
The probate court erred in declaring, in its order of February 28, 1974
that the will was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an
intestate proceeding notwithstanding the fact that in its order of June
18, 1973 , it gave effect to the surviving husband's conformity to the
will and to his renunciation of his hereditary rights which presumably
included his one-half share of the conjugal estate.
The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the
conjugal lands is contrary to law because, although she was a co-
owner thereof, her share was inchoate and pro-indiviso (Art. 143, Civil
Code). But That illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It
may be disregarded.
Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-
half share of the conjugal partnership (Arts. 179[1] and 1041, Civil Code)
but insofar as said renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary
319
rights and his one-half share in the conjugal estate (Art. 1060[1] Civil
Code), it should be subject to the limitations prescribed in articles 750 and
752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the
widower for his support and maintenance. Or at least his legitime should be
respected.
Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on collation, the

will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given effect if
it does not prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. The
distribution and partition would become effective upon the death of Felix
Balanay, Sr. In the meantime, the net income should be equitably divided
among the children and the surviving spouse.
It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity

to his wife's will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half
conjugal share became a part of his deceased wife's estate. His conformity
had the effect of validating the partition made in paragraph V of the will
without prejudice, of course, to the rights of the creditors and the legitimes
of the compulsory heirs.
Article 793 of the Civil Code provides that "property acquired after the
making of a will shall only pass thereby, as if the testator had it at the time
of making the will, should it expressly appear by the will that such was his
intention". Under article 930 of the Civil Code "the legacy or devise of a
thing belonging to another person is void, if the testator erroneously
believed that the thing pertained to him. But if the thing bequeathed, though
not belonging to the testator when he made the will, afterwards becomes
his, by whatever title, the disposition shall take effect."
In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her
husband intended to partition the conjugal estate in the manner set
forth in paragraph V of her will. It is true that she could dispose of by
will only her half of the conjugal estate (Art. 170, Civil Code) but since
the husband, after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had
assented to her testamentary partition of the conjugal estate, such
partition has become valid, assuming that the will may be probated.
In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His
preterition did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his
conformity to his wife's will and renounced his hereditary rights.
IT RESULTS THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT PROCEEDING

WITH THE PROBATE OF THE WILL AS CONTEMPLATED IN ITS
UNCANCELLED ORDER OF JUNE 18, 1973. SAVE IN AN EXTREME
CASE WHERE THE WILL ON ITS FACE IS INTRINSICALLY VOID, IT IS
THE PROBATE COURT'S DUTY TO PASS FIRST UPON THE FORMAL
VALIDITY OF THE WILL. GENERALLY, THE PROBATE OF THE WILL
IS MANDATORY.(Art. 838, Civil Code).
320
PATRICIA NATCHER
VS.COURT OFAPPEALS AND
THE HEIRS OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO
G.R. NO. 133000, OCTOBER 2, 2001
BUENA, J.:
DOCTRINE: Matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate

of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the
exercise of its limited jurisdiction. The Regional Trial Court, acting in its
general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render an adjudication and
resolve the issue of advancement of the real property.
FACTS:
Spouses Del Rosario were registered owners of the subject property. In

1951, the wife died.In 1954, Graciano (surviving spouse), together with his
six children, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate.
Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six children received 1/14
share.The heirs subdivided among themselves the subject property.
Graciano then donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion of
his interest in the land leaving only 447.60 sqms. registered under his
name. Subsequently, the remaining portion was further subdivided into two
separate lots (Lot 1 and Lot 2). Eventually, Graciano sold the first lotto a
third person but retained ownership over the second lot.
In 1980, Graciano married herein Patricia Natcher. During their marriage,

Graciano sold the Lot 2 to Natcher. In 1985,Graciano died leaving his
second wife Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.
An action for reconveyance annulment of title with damages was filed by

the children by the first marriage against Natcher in the RTC alleging that
as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been
impaired.
Natcher averred that during Graciano's lifetime, Graciano already

distributed, in advance, properties to his children, hence, herein private
respondents may not anymore claim against Graciano's estate or against
herein petitioner's property.
RTC: declared that the deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del
Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is prohibited by law and thus a
complete nullity. There being no evidence that a separation of property was
agreed upon in the marriage settlements or that there has been decreed a
judicial separation of property between them, the spouses are prohibited
from entering (into) a contract of sale.
Court of Appeals: reversed and set aside the RTC's decision ratiocinating,
inter alia:"It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a
just and legal distribution of the estate. The court a quo, trying an ordinary
action for reconveyance / annulment of title, went beyond its jurisdiction
321
when it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the
settlement of estate of a deceased person. XXXThus the court a quo erred
in regarding the subject property as advance inheritance. What the court
should have done was merely to rule on the validity of (the) sale and leave
the issue on advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding
instituted for that purpose. XXX"
ISSUE: May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction

in an action for reconveyance annulment of title with damages, adjudicate
matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person
particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by the
decedent to any of the heirs?
RULING: NO.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN THE INSTANT CASE, ACTING IN ITS

GENERAL JURISDICTION, IS DEVOID OF AUTHORITY TO RENDER
AN ADJUDICATION AND RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF ADVANCEMENT
OF THE REAL PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF HEREIN PETITIONER
NATCHER.
There lies a marked distinction between an action and a special

proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice
in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of
applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The term
"special proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to
establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in
special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute
expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted
generally upon an application or motion."
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a

civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a
deceased person such as advancement of property made by the
decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which
concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided
for in the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the

estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate
court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to

advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any
heir may be heard and determined by thecourt having jurisdiction of the
estate proceedings;and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding
on the person raising the questions and on the heir.
322
While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless
clear that the same provision11 contemplates a probate court when it
speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings".
COROLLARILY, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN THE INSTANT

CASE, ACTING IN ITS GENERAL JURISDICTION, IS DEVOID OF
AUTHORITY TO RENDER AN ADJUDICATION AND RESOLVE THE
ISSUE OF ADVANCEMENT OF THE REAL PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF
HEREIN PETITIONER NATCHER, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075
for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is not, to our
mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under
the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not
properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the
question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario
to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.
Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated

the long standing principle that although generally, a probate court may
not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties
are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the
parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court
and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court
is competent to decide the question of ownership.
323
CAROLINA CAMAYA, ET.AL.
VS.BERNARDO PATULANDONG
G.R. NO. 144915, FEBRUARY 23, 2004
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
DOCTRINE: A probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether

testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong
to outside parties.
FACTS:
In 1972, Rufina Reyes (testatrix) executed a notarized will wherein she

devised, among others, Lot No. 288-A to her grandson Anselmo
Mangulabnan. The testatrix’s son Bernardo Patulandong (Patulandong),
was in the will appointed as the executor.During her lifetime, the testatrix
herself filed a petition for the probate of her will which the court admitted.
In 1973, the testatrix executed a codicil modifying paragraph five of her will,
where she decided to instead devise the subject property to her 4 children
and grandson Anselmo Mangulabnan, equally.
In 1988, the testatrix Rufina died.Mangulabnan later sought the delivery to

him by executor Patulandong of the title to Lot 288-A. Patulandong refused
to heed the request, however, in view of the codicil which modified the
testator’s will.
Mangulabnan thus filed an "action for partition" docketed as Civil Case No.
552 (the partition case) in the RTC against Patulandong where the lower
court ordered the partitioning of the properties without prejudice to the
probate of the codicil.
Patulandong filed before the (probate court) RTC a petitionfor probate of

the codicil of the testatrix.
In 1991, by virtue of the decision in the partition case, Mangulabnan

caused the title over the subject proper to be issued in his
name.Mangulabnan later sold to petitioners Camayas the subject property
by a Deed of Sale.
The probate court admitted the codicil to probate, and declared null and
void the TCT’s and the Deed of Sale in favor of the Camayas.
ISSUE: Did the probate court exceed its jurisdiction when it declared null
and void and ordered the cancellation of the TCTs of petitioners Camaya
and the deed of sale?
RULING: YES.
324
THE PROBATE COURT EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT
FURTHER DECLARED THE DEED OF SALE AND THE TITLES OF
PETITIONERS NULL AND VOID, IT HAVING HAD THE EFFECT OF
DEPRIVING THEM POSSESSION AND OWNERSHIP OF THE
PROPERTY.
In Cuizon v. Ramolete, this Court elucidated on the limited jurisdiction of a

probate court, to wit:
It is well-settled rule thata probate court or one in charge of

proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and
which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that said
court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they
should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but
if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties
have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.
xxx
Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the
possession of third parties and more important, covered by a transfer
certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent
court should have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and
excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of the
estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their possession
and ownership of the property. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
FOLLOWING CUIZON, THE PROBATE COURT EXCEEDED ITS

JURISDICTION WHEN IT FURTHER DECLARED THE DEED OF SALE
AND THE TITLES OF PETITIONERS NULL AND VOID, IT HAVING HAD
THE EFFECT OF DEPRIVING THEM POSSESSION AND OWNERSHIP
OF THE PROPERTY.
Moreover, following Section 48 of the Property Registry Decree which

reads:
SECTION 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. - A certificate of

title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified,
or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law,
petitioners’ titles cannot, under probate proceedings, be declared null

and void.
325
HEIRS OF ROSENDO LASAM
VS.VICENTA UMENGAN
G.R. NO. 168156, DECEMBER 6, 2006
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
DOCTRINE:Before any will can have force or validity it must be probated.
FACTS:
Isabel Cuntapay had 4 children by her first husband, Domingo Turingan,

namely: Abdon, Sado (deceased), Rufo and Maria. When Domingo
Turingan passed away, Isabel Cuntapay remarried Mariano Lasam, whom
she had 2 other children, namely: Trinidad and Rosendo.
The heirs of Rosendo Lasam (son of Isabel Cuntapay by her second

husband) filed with the MTCC a complaint for unlawful detainer against
Vicenta Umengan, who was then occupying the subject lot. Vicenta
Umengan is the daughter of Abdon Turingan (son of Isabel Cuntapay by
her first husband).
The MTCC rendered judgment in favor of the heirs of Rosendo Lasam and
directed the ejectment of Vicenta Umengan. In so ruling, the MTCC gave
credence to the newly discovered last will and testament (entitled
Testamento Abierto) purportedly executed by Isabel Cuntapay where she
bequeathed the subject lot to her son, Rosendo Lasam.
The heirs of Lasam base their claim of right to possession on the theory
that their father, Rosendo Lasam, was the sole owner of the subject lot by
virtue of the newly discovered last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay
bequeathing the same to him. ThatVicenta Umengan is allegedly holding
the subject lot by mere tolerance of Rosendo Lasam and, upon the
petitioner heirs' formal demand on her to vacate the same, Umengan's right
to possess it has expired.
On the other hand, Vicenta Umengan hinges her claim of possession on

the legal conveyances made to her by the children of Isabel Cuntapay by
her first husband, namely, Maria, Rufo, Sado and Abdon. These
conveyances were made through the sale and donation by the said siblings
of their respective portions in the subject lot to respondent as evidenced by
the pertinent deeds.
ISSUE: Who has the better right to possess the subject property?
RULING:
VICENTA UMANGAN HAS A BETTER RIGHT TO POSSESS THE

SUBJECT LOT.THE PURPORTED LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF
ISABEL CUNTAPAY COULD NOT PROPERLY BE RELIED UPON TO
ESTABLISH THE PETITIONER HEIRS' RIGHT TO POSSESS THE
SUBJECT LOT BECAUSE, WITHOUT HAVING BEEN PROBATED, THE
326
SAID LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT COULD NOT BE THE SOURCE OF
ANY RIGHT.
It is well settled that in ejectment suits, the only issue for resolution is the
physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of
any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. However, the issue of
ownership may be provisionally ruled upon for the sole purpose of
determining who is entitled to possession de facto.
The CA correctly held that, as between the respective claims of

petitioners and respondentVICENTA UMANGAN, the latter has a
better right to possess the subject lot.
As earlier stated, petitioners rely on the last will and testament of Isabel
Cuntapay that they had allegedly newly discovered. On the basis of this
instrument, the MTCC and RTC ruled that petitioners have a better right to
the possession of the subject lot because, following the law on succession,
it should be respected and should prevail over intestate succession.
However, contrary to the ruling of the MTCC and RTC, the purported
last will and testament of Isabel Cuntapay could not properly be relied
upon to establish the petitioner heirs' right to possess the subject lot
because, without having been probated, the said last will and
testament could not be the source of any right.
Article 838 of the Civil Code is instructive:
Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property

unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of
Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court
having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case, the
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of
wills after the testator's death shall govern.
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of

Court as may be necessary for the allowance of wills on petition
of the testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either

during the lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be
In Cañiza v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that: "[a] will is essentially
ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may be changed or
revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no
right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: 'No will shall
pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court.' "
327
Dr. Tolentino, an eminent authority on civil law, also explained that "[b]efore
any will can have force or validity it must be probated. To probate a will
means to prove before some officer or tribunal, vested by law with authority
for that purpose, that the instrument offered to be proved is the last will and
testament of the deceased person whose testamentary act it is alleged to
be, and that it has been executed, attested and published as required by
law, and that the testator was of sound and disposing mind. It is a
proceeding to establish the validity of the will."Moreover, the presentation
of the will for probate is mandatory and is a matter of public policy.
Following the above truisms, the MTCC and RTC, therefore,

erroneously ruled that petitioners have a better right to possess the
subject lot on the basis of the purported last will and testament of
Isabel Cuntapay, which, to date, has not been probated. Stated in
another manner, ISABEL CUNTAPAY'S LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT,
WHICH HAS NOT BEEN PROBATED, HAS NO EFFECT WHATEVER
AND PETITIONERS CANNOT CLAIM ANY RIGHT THEREUNDER.
Hence, the CA correctly held that, as against petitioners' claim, respondent

has shown a better right of possession over the subject lot as evidenced by
the deeds of conveyances executed in her favor by the children of Isabel
Cuntapay by her first marriage.
Contrary to the assertion of petitioners, therefore, the conveyances made

by the children of Isabel Cuntapay by her first marriage to respondent are
valid insofar as their pro indiviso shares are concerned. Moreover, the CA
justifiably held that these conveyances, as evidenced by the deed of
donation and deed of sale presented by respondent, coupled with the fact
that she has been in possession of the subject lot since 1955, establish that
respondent has a better right to possess the same as against petitioners
whose claim is largely based on Isabel Cuntapay's last will and testament
which, to date, has not been probated; hence, has no force and effect and
under which no right can be claimed by petitioners.
328
IRIS MORALES, Petitioners, v. ANA MARIA OLONDRIZ, ALFONSO
JUAN OLONDRIZ, JR., ALEJANDRO MORENO OLONDRIZ, ISABEL
ROSA OLONDRIZ AND FRANCISCO JAVIER MARIA
OLONDRIZ, Respondent
G.R. No. 198994, February 03, 2016
BRION, J.
DOCTRINE: Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from

the will, either because he is not named or, although he is named as a
father, son, etc., he is neither instituted as an heir nor assigned any part of
the estate without expressly being disinherited - tacitly depriving the heir of
his legitime. Preterition requires that the omission is total, meaning the heir
did not also receive any legacies, devises, or advances on his legitime.
FACTS:
Alfonso Juan P. Olondriz, Sr. (the decedent) died on June 9, 2003.

He was survived by his widow, Ana Maria Ortigas de Olondriz, and his
children: Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz, Jr., Alejandro Marino O. Olondriz,
Isabel Rosa O. Olondriz, Angelo Jose O. Olondriz, and Francisco Javier
Maria Bautista Olondriz. His widow and children are collectively referred to
as the respondent heirs.
The pertinent portions of the decedent's will

reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Upon my death, IRIS MORALES OLONDRIZ shall be the executor

hereof and administrator of my estate until its distribution in
accordance herewith, x xx
2. My entire estate shall be divided into six (6) parts to be distributed
equally among and between (1) IRIS MORALES OLONDRIZ, my
children (2) ALFONSO JUAN OLONDRIZ, JR., (3) ALEJANDRO
OLONDRIZ, (4) ISABEL OLONDRIZ, (5) ANGELO OLONDRIZ, and
their mother (6) MARIA ORTEGAS OLONDRIZ, SR.3
Notably, the will omitted Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz, an
illegitimate son of the decedent.
On January 6, 2004, the respondent heirs moved to dismiss the

probate proceedings because Francisco was preterited from the will.
ISSUE:
Is Francisco preterited from the will?
RULING:
329
Yes. Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from
the will, either because he is not named or, although he is named as a
father, son, etc., he is neither instituted as an heir nor assigned any part of
the estate without expressly being disinherited - tacitly depriving the heir of
his legitime. Preterition requires that the omission is total, meaning the heir
did not also receive any legacies, devises, or advances on his legitime.
In other words, preterition is the complete and total omission of a

compulsory heir from the testator's inheritance without the heir's express
disinheritance.
Article 854 of the Civil Code states the legal effects of preterition:
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of

the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as
they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution
shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation,
(emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the

direct line shall annul the institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies
shall remain valid insofar as the legitimes are not impaired. Consequently,
if a will does not institute any devisees or legatees, the preterition of a
compulsory heir in the direct line will result in total intestacy.7
In the present case, the decedent's will evidently omitted Francisco

Olondriz as an heir, legatee, or devisee. As the decedent's illegitimate son,
Francisco is a compulsory heir in the direct line. Unless Morales could
show otherwise, Francisco's omission from the will leads to the conclusion
of his preterition.
330
THELMA M. ARANAS, petitioner, vs. TERESITA V. MERCADO,
FELIMON V. MERCADO, CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V.
MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M. ANDERSON, and FRANKLIN L.
MERCADO, respondents.
G.R. No. 156407. January 15, 2014
BERSAMIN, J.
DOCTRINE: The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of

ownership of properties for purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the
inventory to be submitted by the administrator, but its determination shall
only be provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the
decedent, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights
of third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters
incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such
as the determination of the status of each heir and whether property
included in the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property of the
deceased spouse.
FACTS:
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991,

survived by his second wife, Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita), and their five
children, namely: Allan V. Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M.
Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his
two children by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin L. Mercado
and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He

owned corporate shares in Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and
Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned
his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and
sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353 covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty.
Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a petition for
the appointment of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio's estate. The
RTC granted the petition considering that there was no opposition. The
letters of administration in favor of Teresita.
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of

Emigdio for the consideration and approval by the RTC. She indicated in
the inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had "left no real
properties but only personal properties" worth P6,675,435.25 in all,
consisting of cash of P32,141.20; furniture and fixtures worth P20,000.00;
pieces of jewelry valued at P15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir
331
Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson
worth P22,708.25.
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded
from the inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend
the inventory, and to be examined regarding it. Teresita filed a compliance
with the order of January 8, 1993, 3 supporting her inventory with copies of
three certificates of stocks covering the 44,806 Mervir Realty shares of
stock; 4 the deed of assignment executed by Emigdio on January 10, 1991
involving real properties with the market value of P4,440,651.10 in
exchange for 44,407 Mervir Realty shares of stock with total par value of
P4,440,700.00; 5 and the certificate of stock issued on January 30, 1979
for 300 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth P30,000.00.
Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath

on the inventory. The RTC issued an order expressing the need for the
parties to present evidence and for Teresita to be examined to enable the
court to resolve the motion for approval of the inventory. Thelma opposed
the approval of the inventory, and asked leave of court to examine Teresita
on the inventory.
The RTC issued on March 14, 2001 an order finding and holding that
the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be
included. The RTC denied the administratrix's motion for approval of
inventory and orders the said administratrix to re-do the inventory of
properties which are supposed to constitute as the estate of the late
Emigdio S. Mercado. The RTC also directed the administratrix to render an
account of her administration of the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado
which had come to her possession.
Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought the

reconsideration of the order of March 14, 2001 on the ground that one of
the real properties affected, Lot No. 3353 located in Badian, Cebu, had
already been sold to Mervir Realty,
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision insofar as the inclusion

of the inclusion of parcels of land known as Lot No. 3353 located at Badian,
Cebu with an area of 53,301 square meters subject matter of the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated November 9, 1989 and the various parcels of land
subject matter of the Deeds of Assignment dated February 17, 1989 and
January 10, 1991 in the revised inventory to be submitted by the
administratrix is concerned.
ISSUE:
Did the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack

or excess ofjurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the
inventorynotwithstanding that such properties had been either transferred
by sale or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent
during his lifetime?
332
RULING:
No. The CA's conclusion of grave abuse of discretion on the part of

the RTC was unwarrantedand erroneous.
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of

properties for purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to
be submitted by the administrator, but its determination shall only be
provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the decedent, or the
question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties
are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to
the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of
the status of each heir and whether property included in the inventory is the
conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a
probate court or an intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with
the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons,
but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that
arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such
court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several
cases, a probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether
testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to
outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased
but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said
court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not
they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by
the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there
is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to
resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for
a final determination of the conflicting claims of title.
333
IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF
RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and
BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS, Petitioners,
vs.
ERNESTO PALAGANAS, Respondent
G.R. No. 169144 January 26, 2011
ABAD, J.
DOCTRINE: Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by

foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and
allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal
effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of
an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he
resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.
FACTS:
RupertaPalaganas, a Filipino who became a naturalized U.S. citizen,

died single and childless. In the last will and testament she executed in
California, she designated her brother, Sergio, as the executor of her will
for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.
Ernesto, another brother of Ruperta, filed with the RTC of Malolos,

Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment
as special administrator of her estate.
Manuel and Benjamin, nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the

ground that Ruperta’s will should not be probated in the Philippines but in
the U.S. where she executed it. They added that, assuming Ruperta’s will
could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having
been executed under duress and without the testator’s full understanding of
the consequences of such act. They also claimed that Ernesto is not
qualified to act as administrator of the estate.
The RTC admitted to probate Ruperta’s last will and appointed Ernesto as
special administrator at the request of Sergio. The Letters of Special
Administration was issued to Ernesto.
Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the CA.
The CA affirmed the RTC Decision.
ISSUE:
334
Can aunprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S. be
probated for the first time in the Philippines?
RULING:
Yes. Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by

foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and
allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal
effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of
an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he
resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.
Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that

if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the
province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of
such estate.
Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will
must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b)
the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of
the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the
property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are
prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of
the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death
of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province
where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the estate he left in such province. The rules do not require proof
that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country
of its execution.
335
RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC., Petitioners,
v. HON. JANSEN R. RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6, JOSEPH CHENG,
JAIME CHENG, MERCEDES IGNE AND LUCINA SANTOS, substituted
by her son, EDUARDO S. BALAJADIA, Respondents
G.R. No. 192828 : November 28, 2011
REYES, J.
DOCTRINE: Disinheritance can be effected only through a will wherein the

legal cause therefor shall be specified.
FACTS:
FACTS:
The respondents filed a Complaint against the petitioners and

Stroghold Insurance Company, Global Business Bank, Inc. (formerly
PhilBank), Elena Tiu Del Pilar, Asia Atlantic Resources Ventures, Inc.,
Registers of Deeds of Manila and Malabon, and all persons claiming rights
or titles from Ramon Ching (Ramon).
The Complaint was captioned as one for "Disinheritance, Declaration

of Nullity of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement,
Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for [the]
Issuance of [a] Temporary Restraining Order and [a] Writ of Preliminary
Injunction." In the complaint, the respondents alleged that (1) they are the
heirs of Antonio Ching and that Ramon misrepresented himself as Antonios
son when he was, in fact, adopted and his birth certificated merely
simulated; (2) Antonio was killed with Ramon as the prime suspect and
prior to the conclusion of the investigations, Ramon made an inventory of
the formers estate and illegally transferred to his name the titles to Antonios
properties; (3) Ramon sweet-talked respondent Mercedes into surrendering
to him a Certificate of Time Deposit of P4,000,000.00 in the name of
Antonio and the TCTs of two condo units registered under Ramons name;
(4) Ramon illegally transferred to his own name through a forged document
40,000 shares in Po Wing Corporation; (5) Ramon executed an Affidavit of
Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating solely to himself Antonio's
entire estate to the prejudice of the respondents; and (6) Ramon sold
Antonio's two parcels of land in Navotas to co-defendant Asia Atlantic
Business Ventures, Inc. Another parcel of land, which was part of Antonio's
estate, was sold by Ramon to co-defendant Elena Tiu Del Pilar at an
unreasonably low price.
The respondents thus prayed for the (1) issuance of a TRO to

restrain Ramon or his representatives from disposing or selling any
property that belongs to the estate of Antonio; (2) that Ramon be declared
336
as disqualified from inheriting from Antonio Ching; and (3) declaring null the
unauthorized transfers made by Ramon.
The RTC denied the petitioners Motion to Dismiss and subsequent

Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Can there be disinheritance in intestate succession?
RULING:
No.Under Article 916 of the NCC, disinheritance can be effected only

through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. This
Court agrees with the RTC and the CA that while the respondents in their
Complaint and Amended Complaint sought the disinheritance of Ramon,
no will or any instrument supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's
estate was ever mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for Ramon's
disinheritance, the case filed does not partake of the nature of a special
proceeding and does not call for the probate court's exercise of its limited
jurisdiction.
337
ROBERTS V. LEONIDAS
G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984
Aquino, J.:
Case Digest by: Nhassie John G. Gonzaga
DOCTRINE: The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the

estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate
proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the
testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should
FACTS:
Grimm, an American resident of Manila, died in 1977. He was survived by

his second wife (Maxine), their two children (Pete and Linda), and by his
two children by a first marriage (Juanita and Ethel) which ended by divorce.
Grimm executed two wills in San Francisco, California on January 23,

1959. One will disposed of his Philippine estate described as conjugal
property of himself and his second wife. The second will disposed of his
estate outside the Philippines. The two wills and a codicil were presented
for probate in Utah by Maxine on March 1978. Maxine admitted that she
received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel in January
1978. The Utah Court admitted the two wills and codicil to probate on April
1978 and was issued upon consideration of the stipulation between the
attorneys for Maxine and Ethel.
Also in April 1978, Maxine and Ethel, with knowledge of the intestate
proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in Utah
regarding the estate.
As mentioned, in January 1978, an intestate proceeding was instituted by

Ethel. On March 1978, Maxine filed an opposition and motion to dismiss
the intestate proceeding on the ground of pendency of the Utah probate
proceedings. She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm’s will. However,
pursuant to the compromise agreement, Maxine withdrew the opposition
and the motion to dismiss. The court ignored the will found in the record.
The estate was partitioned.
In 1980, Maxine filed a petition praying for the probate of the two wills
(already probated in Utah), that the partition approved by the intestate court
be set aside and the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine be
338
appointed executrix and Ethel be ordered to account for the properties
received by them and return the same to Maxine. Maxine alleged that they
were defrauded due to the machinations of Ethel that the compromise
agreement was illegal and the intestate proceeding was void because
Grimm died testate so partition was contrary to the decedent’s wills.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition which was denied by Judge
Leonidas for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Did the judge commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in denying Ethel’s motion to dismiss?
HELD: NO
We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel’s motion to
dismiss.
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two
wills and “no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed” (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).
The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a

person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding.
Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate
proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should
339
THE INCOMPETENT, CARMEN CANIZA, REPRESENTED BY HER
LEGAL GUARDIAN, AMPARO EVANGELISTA V. COURT OF APPEALS
(SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO ESTRADA AND HIS WIFE,
LEONORA ESTRADA
G.R. NO. 110427. FEBRUARY 24, 1997
NARVASA, C.J.
DOCTRINE: A Will has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed

thereunder until it is admitted to Probate
FACTS:
Being then ninety-four (94) years of age, Carmen Caniza was declared
incompetent by judgment in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her
niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. Caniza was the owner of a house and lot.
Her guardian Amparo Evangelista commenced a suit to eject the spouses
Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises.
The complaint was later amended to identify the incompetent Caniza as

plaintiff, suing through her legal guardian, Amparo Evangelista. The
amended Complaint pertinently alleged that plaintiff Caniza was the
absolute owner of the property in question; that out of kindness, she had
allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children, grandchildren, and sons-in-law
to temporarily reside in her house, rent-free; that Caniza already had urgent
need of the house on account of her advanced age and failing health, “so
funds could be raised to meet her expenses for support, maintenance and
medical treatment;” among others.
The defendants declared that they had been living in Caniza’s house since
the 1960’s; that in consideration of their faithful service they had been
considered by Caniza as her own family, and the latter had in fact executed
a holographic will by which she “bequeathed” to the Estradas the house
and lot in question. The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them
by Caiza clearly denotes her intention that they remain in possession
thereof, and legally incapacitated her judicial guardian, Amparo
Evangelista, from evicting them therefrom, since their ouster would be
inconsistent with the ward’s will. Such will has not been submitted for
probate.
340
ISSUE:
Was the will effective even such was not submitted for probate?
HELD: NO
A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator’s death, it
may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect
whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite
explicit: “No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court” An owner’s
intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his
tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former’s taking back possession in
the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient. And that, in this case,
there was sufficient cause for the owner’s resumption of possession is
apparent: she needed to generate income from the house on account of
the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.
341
ASUNCION NABLE JOSE, ET AL. vs.
MARIA IGNACIA USON, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-8927, March 10, 1914
MORELAND, J.:
DOCTRINE: The court below based its construction upon the theory that
the other construction would be "an admission that the testatrix desired to
favor her deceased sister Eufemia Uson, who left three children, more than
her other deceased sister Antonia Uson, who left two children, and
moreover both would be more favored than any of the other four surviving
sisters, one of whom was married at the time of the execution of the said
codicil and without doubt had children."
FACTS:
The question involved in this appeal arises from the interpretation of the
first and second clauses of a codicil to the will of Filomena Uson. They read
as follows:
First. I declare that all the property which belongs to me as conjugal

property, referred to in my said testament, shall be the property of my
aforesaid husband, Don Rafael Sison; in case all or part of said
property exists at my husband's death, it is my will that at his death
my sisters and nieces hereinafter named succeed him as heirs.
Second. I declare to be my sisters in lawful wedlock the persons

named Doña Antonia Uson, now deceased, who has left tow
daughters called Maria Rosario, widow, and Maria Paz, unmarried;
Maria Romualda Uson, widow of Estanislao Lengson; Ignacia Uson,
married to Don Vicente Puson; Eufemia Uson, now deceased, who is
survived by three daughters called Maria Salud, Maria Amparo, and
Maria Asuncion; and Maria Pilar Uson; Maria Manaoag Uson,
unmarried, issued had by our deceased after Don Daniel Uson with
one Leonarda Fernandez, alias Andao de Lingayen, so that they may
have and enjoy it in equal parts as good sisters and relatives.
The court below found that the children of the deceased sisters should take
only that portion which their respective mothers would have taken if they
been alive at the time the will was made; that the property should be
divided into six equal parts corresponding to the number of sisters; that
each living sister should take one-sixth, and the children of each deceased
sister should also take one-sixth, each one- sixth to be divided among said
children equally.
ISSUE: In interpreting the codicil to the will of Filomena Uson, was it her
intention to equally divide among her heirs the property?
342
HELD: YES
We are of the opinion that the appellants' contention is well founded. We

see no words appellants in the clauses quoted which lead necessarily to
the construction placed upon those paragraphs by the learned court below.
On the other hand, we find expressions which seem to indicate with fair
clearness that it was the intention of the testatrix to divide her property
equally between her sisters and nieces. The court below based its
construction upon the theory that the other construction would be "an
admission that the testatrix desired to favor her deceased sister Eufemia
Uson, who left three children, more than her other deceased sister Antonia
Uson, who left two children, and moreover both would be more favored
than any of the other four surviving sisters, one of whom was married at the
time of the execution of the said codicil and without doubt had children."
As we look at the codicil we observe, first, that the testatrix, in the first
paragraph thereof, declares that after her husband's death she desires that
"my sisters and nieces, as hereinafter named, shall succeed him as heirs."
We note, in the second place, that the testatrix, in the second paragraph of
the codicil, names and identifies each one of her heirs then living, in each
one of the persons whom she desires shall succeed her husband in the
property. Among those mentioned specially are the nieces as well as the
sisters. The nieces are referred to in no way different from the sisters. Each
one stands out in the second paragraph of the codicil as clearly as the
other and under exactly the same conditions.
In the third place, we note, with interest, the last clause of the second
paragraph of the codicil which, it seems to us, taken together with the last
clause of the first paragraph of the codicil, is decisive of the intention of the
testatrix. In the last clause she says that she names all of the persons
whom she desires to take under her will be name "so that they must take
and enjoy the property in equal parts as good sisters and relatives."
We have then in the first paragraph a declaration as to who the testatrix

desires shall become the owners of her property on the death of her
husband. Among them we find the names of the nieces as well as of the
sisters. We have also the final declaration of the testatrix that she desires
that the sisters and the nieces shall take and enjoy the property in equal
parts. That being so, it appears to us that the testatrix's intention is fairly
clear, so clear in fact that it is unnecessary to bring in extraneous
arguments to reach a conclusion as to what she intended.
343
RUBEN AUSTRIA v. ANDRES REYES,
GR No. L-23079, FEBRUARY 27, 1970
CASTRO, J.:
DOCTRINE: Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side,

especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to
dispose of practically his whole estate
FACTS:
On July 7, 1956 Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Special Proceedings 2457) a petition for probate, ante
mortem, of her last will and testament. The probate... was opposed by the
present petitioners Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro
Austria Mozo, and still others who, like the petitioners, are nephews and
nieces of Basilia. This opposition was,... however, dismissed and the
probate of the will allowed after due hearing.
The bulk of the estate of Basilia, admittedly, was destined, under the will to
pass on to the respondents Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meñez, Isagani
Cruz, Alberto Cruz, and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom had been assumed
and... declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted children.
On April 23, 1959, more than two years after her will was allowed to
probate, Basilia died. The respondent Perfecto Cruz was appointed
executor without bond by the same court in accordance with the provisions
of the decedent's will, notwithstanding the blocking attempt pursued by the
petitioner Ruben Austria.
Finally, on November 5, 1959, the present petitioners filed in the same
proceedings a petition in intervention for partition alleging in substance that
they are the nearest of kin of Basilia, and that the five respondents Perfecto
Cruz,... et al., had not in fact been adopted by the decedent in accordance
with law, in effect rendering these respondents mere strangers to the
decedent and without any right to succeed as heirs.
ISSUES:
May the institution of heirs retains its efficacy in the event there exists proof
that the adoption of the same heirs by the decedent is false?
HELD: NO
The decedent's will, which alone should provide the answer, is mute on this
point or at best is vague and uncertain. The phrases, "mga sapilitang
tagapagmana" and"sapilitangmana," were borrowed from the language of
the law on succession and were used, respectively, to describe the class of
344
heirs instituted and the abstract object of the inheritance. They offer no...
absolute indication that the decedent would have willed her estate other
than the way she did if she had known that she was not bound by law to
make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of her
estate(libre disposicion) which largely favored the respondent Perfecto
Cruz, the latter's children, and the children of the respondent Benita Cruz,
shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give to the... respondents
more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Compare
this with the relatively small devise of land which the decedent had left for
her blood relatives, including the petitioners Consuelo Austria-Benta
andLauro Mozo and the children of the petitioner Ruben Austria. Were we
to exclude the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. from the inheritance, then
the petitioners and the other nephews and nieces would succeed to the
bulk of the estate... by intestacy -- a result which would subvert the clear
wishes of the decedent.
Whatever doubts one entertains in his mind should be swept away by these
explicit injunctions in the Civil Code: "The words of a will are to receive an
interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than
one which will render any of the expressions... inoperative; and of two
modes of interpreting a will that is to be preferred which will prevent
intestacy."
Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where
the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of
practically his whole estate,[2] as was done in this... case. Moreover, so
compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes
of the testator allowed to prevail, that we could even vary the language of
the will for the purpose of giving it... effect. A probate court has found, by
final judgment, that the late Basilia Austria Vda. de Cruz was possessed of
testamentary capacity and her last will executed free... from falsification,
fraud, trickery or undue influence. In this situation, it becomes our duty to
give full expression to her will.
At all events, the legality of the adoption of the respondents by the testatrix
can be assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose, and
cannot be the subject of a collateral attack.
345
ACAIN V. IAC
G.R. NO. 72706, OCTOBER 27, 1987
PARAS, J.
DOCTRINE:Article 854 – the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of

institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they
are not inofficious.
shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.
FACTS:
Constantino Acain filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late
NemesioAcain and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters
testamentary on the premise that NemesioAcain died leaving a will in which
petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and his sisters Anita,
Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly
execute was written in Bisaya with a translation in English The will
contained provisions on burial rites, payment of debts, and the appointment
of a certain Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of the testament.
On the disposition of the testator's property, the will provided that all his
shares that he may receive from properties. house, lands and money which
he earned jointly with his wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given to his
brother Segundo Acain. In case Segundo pre-deceased him, his share
shall be given to Segundo’s children.
Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus, it is the children of Segundo who

are claiming to be heirs. Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter
of tile deceased and the latter's widow Rosa DiongsonVda. de Acain
opposed because the children of Segundo were merely universal heirs and
the widow and the adopted daughter have been pretirited.
ISSUE:
Do legally adopted daughter and the widow of the deceased have been
pretirited?
346
RULING: YES.The legally adopted daughter has been pretirited but not the
widow of the deceased.
Preterition mentioned in article 854 consists in the omission in the testator's

will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not
mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as
heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
Adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he
were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a
legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that Virginia A. Fernandez
was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both
adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime.
Insofar as the widow is concerned, she does not ascend or descend from
the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if
the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she
is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line.
Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
347
MALOLES V. PHILIPS, 324 SCRA 172
G.R. NO. 129505, JANUARY 31, 2000
MENDOZA, J.

FACTS:
Dr. Arturo de Santos filed a petition for probate of his will. He alleged that
he had no compulsory heirs. He had named in his will as sole legatee and
devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.Copies of said will were in
the custody of the named executrix, Pacita de los Reyes Phillips.
It appears from the evidence adduced that Dr. de Santos in his lifetime,
executed his Last Will and Testament. The Last Will and Testament having
been executed and attested as required by law. He, at the time of the
execution of the will, was of sane mind and/or not mentally incapable to
make a Will nor was it executed under duress or under the influence of fear
or threats.It was in writing and executed in the language known and
understood by the testator. Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De
Santos died.
Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming that, as the

only child of Alicia de Santos (testator's sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr.,
he was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos.
He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus
prayed for the reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the
issuance of letters of administration in his name.He further sought to
intervene in the appointment of Phillips as special administrator.
ISSUE:
DoesOctavio S. Maloles IIhave a right to intervene and oppose the petition

for issuance of letters testamentary to Phillips?
RULING: NO.
348
It is a fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who has no
compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will.
Even if Maloles is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be

considered an "heir" of the testator. He is not an heir or legatee under the
will of the decedent Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of
the latter. As the only and nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he
can inherit from the latter only in case of intestacy. Since the decedent has
left a will which has already been probated and disposes of all his
properties the private respondent can inherit only if the said will is annulled.
His interest in the decedent's estate is, therefore, not direct or
immediate.Nor does he have any right to intervene in the settlement
proceedings based on his allegation that he is a creditor of the deceased.
Since the testator instituted or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent
upon the Court to respect the desires of the testator.
349
MORALES V. OLONDRIZ
G.R. NO. 198994, FEBRUARY 3, 2016
BRION, J.

FACTS:
Alfonso Juan P. Olondriz, Sr.died and was survived by his widow, Ana
Maria Ortigas de Olondriz, and his children. Believing that the decedent
died intestate, the respondent heirs filed a petitionfor the partition of the
decedent's estate and the appointment of a special administrator.
However, Iris Morales filed a separate petitionalleging that the decedent left
a will where she was appointed as special administratrix. Portions of the
decedent's will states that Iris Morales is one of the heirs and that the
illegitimate child in the name of Francisco was omitted.
ISSUE:
Was the illegitimate child of the decedent omitted from the will preterited?
RULING: YES.
The preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line shall annul the
institution of heirs, but the devises and legacies shall remain valid insofar
as the legitimes are not impaired. Consequently, if a will does not institute
any devisees or legatees, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct
line will result in total intestacy.
The decedent's will evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz as an heir,

legatee, or devisee. As the decedent's illegitimate son, Francisco is a
compulsory heir in the direct line. Unless Morales could show otherwise,
Francisco's omission from the will leads to the conclusion of his preterition.
The decedent's will does not contain specific legacies or devices and
Francisco's preterition annulled the institution of heirs. The annulment
effectively caused the total abrogation of the will, resulting in total intestacy
of the inheritance.
350
JLT AGRO V. BALANSAG
G.R. NO. 141882, MARCH 11, 2005
TINGA, J.
DOCTRINE: Article 854 – the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of

FACTS:
Don Julian L. Teves contracted two marriages, first with Antonia Baena,
and after her death, with Milagros DonioTeves. Don Julian had two children
with Antonia and four (4) children with Milagros Donio.
A Compromise Agreement was executed that lays down the effect of the
eventual death of Don Julian vis-à-vis his heirs. The propertiesadjudicated
to the children in the first marriage shall be understood as including not
only their one-half share which they inherited from their mother but also the
legitimes and other successional rights which would correspond to them of
the other half belonging to their father, Julian L. Teves. In other words, the
properties now selected and adjudicated to Julian L. Tevesshall exclusively
be adjudicated to the wife in second marriage of Julian L. Teves and his
four minor children.
Subsequently, Supplemental Deed was initiated in favor of J.L.T. Agro,

Inc.transferring ownership over Lot No. 63 to the latter.
Meanwhile, Milagros Donio and her children had immediately taken

possession over Lot No. 63 after the execution of the Compromise
Agreement. they entered into a yearly lease agreement with spouses
Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday. Unaware that the subject lot was
already registered in the name ofJ.L.T. Agro, Inc., Balansag and
Cadayday bought Lot No. 63 from Milagros Donio.
ISSUE:
Will the Supplemental Deed tantamount to a preterition of the decedent’s

heirs from the second marriage?
RULING: NO.
351
Article 854 provides that the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of
are not inofficious. Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir
in the will, either by not naming him at all or, while mentioning him as
father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him
expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the properties. It is the total
omission of a compulsory heir in the direct line from inheritance. It consists
in the silence of the testator with regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him
in the testament, either by not mentioning him at all, or by not giving him
anything in the hereditary property but without expressly disinheriting him,
even if he is mentioned in the will in the latter case. But there is no
preterition where the testator allotted to a descendant a share less than the
legitime, since there was no total omission of a forced heir.
Don Julian did not execute a will since what he resorted to was a
partition inter vivos of his properties, as evidenced by the court
approved Compromise Agreement. Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant to
speak of preterition prior to the death of Don Julian in the absence of a will
depriving a legal heir of his legitime. Besides, there are other properties
which the heirs from the second marriage could inherit from Don Julian
upon his death. A couple of provisions in the Compromise Agreement are
indicative of Don Julian’s desire along this line.Hence, the total omission
from inheritance of Don Julian’s heirs from the second marriage, a
requirement for preterition to exist, is hardly imaginable as it is unfounded.
352
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED. ADOLFO C. AZNAR, v. MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DUNCAN
G. R. No. L-24365, June 30, 1966
Case Digest by: Ernie Gultiano
DOCTRINE: When a testator leaves to a forced heir a legacy worth less

than the legitime, but without referring to the legatee as an heir or even as
a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other persons, the heir could
not ask that the institution of the heirs be annulled entirely, but only that the
legitime be completed.
FACTS:
Christensen died testate. The will was admitted to probate. The court
declared that Helen Garcia was a natural child of the deceased. The Court
of First Instance equally divided the properties of the estate of Christensen
between Lucy Duncan (whom testator expressly recognized in his will as
his daughter) and Helen Garcia. In the order, the CFI held that Helen
Garcia was preterited in the will thus, the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir
was annulled and the properties passed to both of them as if the deceased
died intestate.
ISSUE:
Should the estate, after deducting the legacies, be equally divided or the
inheritance of Lucy as instituted heir be merely reduced to the extent
necessary to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent to ¼ of the
entire estate?
RULING:
The inheritance of Lucy should be merely reduced to cover the legitime of

Helen Garcia.
Christensen refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter

and limited her share to a legacy of P3,600.00. When a testator leaves to a
forced heir a legacy worth less than the legitime, but without referring to the
legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to
other persons, the heir could not ask that the institution of the heirs be
annulled entirely, but only that the legitime be completed.
353
DY YIENG SEANGIO v. AMOR A. REYES
G.R. Nos. 140371-72, Nov 27, 2006
DOCTRINE: A holographic will must be written, dated and signed by the

testator himself.
FACTS:
On September 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement

of the intestate estate of the late Segundo. Petitioners opposed assailing
among others that Segundo left a holographic will which is entirely a
declaration of disinheritance affecting Alfredo, one of the private
respondents. Private respondents opposed the probate on the ground that
the holographic will did not contain any disposition of the estate of the
deceased. RTC dismissed the petition for probate easoning that the
holographic will clearly shows preterition.
ISSUE:
Can the document executed by Segundo be considered as a holographic

will?
RULING:
A holographic will must be written, dated and signed by the testator himself.
An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deducted from the terms of
the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative deposition of the
latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, is an act of disposition in
itself. The disinheritance results in the disposition of the property in favor of
those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
With regard to the issue on preterition, the court believes that the
compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was
Segundo’s last expression bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs,
with the sole exception of Alfredo.
354
HEIRS OF POLICRONIO M. URETA v. HEIRS OF LIBERATO M. URETA
G.R. No. 165748, 14 September 2011
DOCTRINE: Article 1390 is not applicable in this case. Article 1390 (1)
contemplates the incapacity of a party to give consent to a contract
Facts:
Alfonso Ureta was financially well-off and owned several properties. He

begot fourteen children, including herein petitioners and Policronio, father
of respondents. For taxation purposes, Alfonso sold, without monetary
consideration, several parcels of land to four of his children, including
Policronio. Alfonso continued to own, possess and enjoy the lands and
their produce. Upon his death, Liberato acted as the administrator. The
Fernandez Family rented the portion transferred to Policronio. But even
after the fact, the tenants never turned over the produce of the lands to
Policronio or any of this heirs, but to Alfonso and, later, to the
administrators of his estate. When Policronio died, except for a portion of
one of the parcels of land, neither Policronio nor his heirs ever took
possession of the subject lands. Alfonso’s heirs executed a Deed of Extra-
Judicial Partition,8 which included all the lands that were covered by the
four (4) deeds of sale that were previously executed by Alfonso for taxation
purposes. Conrado, Policronio’s eldest son, representing the Heirs of
Policronio, signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in behalf of his co-
heirs. Heirs of Policronio allegedly learned about the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition involving Alfonso’s estate when it was published in the July 19,
1995 issue of the Aklan Reporter. The Heirs of Policronio averred that the
extra-judicial partition is void because Conrado signed the same without
written authority form his siblings.
Issue:
Did ConradoUreta’s lack of capacity to give his co-heirs’ consent to the

Extra-Judicial Partition render the same voidable?
Ruling:
No. Article 1390 is not applicable in this case. Article 1390 (1) contemplates
the incapacity of a party to give consent to a contract. What is involved in
the case at bench though is not Conrado’s incapacity to give consent to the
contract, but rather his lack of authority to do so. Instead, Articles 1403 (1),
1404, and 1317 of the Civil Code find application to the circumstances
prevailing in this case. The Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale is not a
voidable or an annullable contract under Article 1390 of the New Civil
Code. Article 1390 renders a contract voidable if one of the parties is
355
incapable of giving consent to the contract or if the contracting party’s
consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or
fraud. Therefore, Conrado’s failure to obtain authority from his co-heirs to
sign the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in their behalf did not result in his
incapacity to give consent so as to render the contract voidable, but rather,
it rendered the contract valid but unenforceable against Conrado’s co-heirs
for having been entered into without their authority.
356
REYES Y BARRETTO v. LUCIA MILAGROS BARRETTO-DATU
GR No. L-17818, Jan 25, 1967
DOCTRINE: It is that judicial decree of distribution, once final, that vests

title in the distributees. Where a court has validly issued a decree of
distribution of the estate, and the same has become final, the validity or
invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant.
Facts:
BibianoBarretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime, they

acquired vast estate (real property in Manila, Pampanga and Bulacan).
When Bibiano died (Feb. 18, 1936), he left his share in a will to
SaludBarretto (mother of the minors) and Lucia Milagros Barretto; and a
small portion as legacies to his sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto
and his nephew and nieces. The usufruct of a fishpond was reserved for
Maria (the widow). As appointed administratrix, Maria prepared a project of
partition, signed by her in her own behalf and as guardian of the minor
Milagros. It was approved, and the estate was distributed and the shares
delivered. Salud took immediate possession of her share and secured the
cancellation of OCTs and issuance of new titles in her name.
Upon Maria’s death (Mar. 5, 1948), it was discovered that she executed
two wills: in the first, she instituted Salud and Milagros as her heirs; in the
second, she revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of
Milagros alone. The later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting
the first will presented by Tirso Reyes (as guardian of the children of
SaludBarretto), the RTC held that Salud was not the daughter of the
decedent Maria by her husband Bibiano. The SC affirmed the same.
Having lost the fight for a share in the estate of Maria as her legitimate heir,
Tirso now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of Bibiano (the
fishpond), which was given in usufruct to Maria. Hence, this action for the
recovery of the one-half portion thereof. This action afforded Milagros an
opportunity to set up her right of ownership; not only of the fishpond under
litigation, but of all the other properties willed and delivered to Salud, for
being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the estate of Bibiano,
thereby directly attacking the validity, not only of the project of partition, but
of the decision of the court based thereon as well.
Issue:
Is the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond in question void ab
initio and Salud did not acquire valid title to it?
357
Ruling:
Salud admittedly had been instituted heir in Bibiano’s last will and
testament together with Milagros. Hence, the partition had between them
could not be one such had with a party who was believed to be an heir
without really being one, and was not null and void under Art. 1081. The
legal precept of Art. 1081 does not speak of children, or descendants, but
of heirs (without distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate ones),
and the fact that Salud did not happen to be a daughter of the testator does
not preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament;
for Bibiano was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to
whomsoever he chose. While the share (½) assigned to Salud impinged on
the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a
testamentary heir of Bibiano. Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in
her father’s will a share smaller than her legitime invalidate the institution of
Salud as heir, since there was no preterition or total omission of a forced
heir here.
The view that the partition in question is void for being a compromise on
the civil status of Salud, in violation of Art. 1814 (OCC) is erroneous. A
compromise presupposes the settlement of a controversy through mutual
concessions of the parties; and the condition of Salud as daughter of the
testator Bibiano, while untrue, was at no time disputed during the
settlement of the estate of testator. There can be no compromise over
issues not in dispute. While a compromise over civil status is prohibited, the
law nowhere forbids a settlement by the parties over the share that should
correspond to a claimant to the estate.
At any rate, independently of the project of partition (a mere proposal for

distribution of estate), it is the court alone that makes the distribution of the
estate and determines the persons entitled thereto and the parts to which
each is entitled. It is that judicial decree of distribution, once final, that vests
title in the distributees. Where a court has validly issued a decree of
distribution of the estate, and the same has become final, the validity or
invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant.
358
NUGUID VS. NUGUID, ET AL.
No. L-23445. June 23, 1966.
DOCTRINE: Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or

illegitimate, but she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line·her
parents, and her holographic will does not explicitly disinherit them but
simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of preterition of the
parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance.
FACTS:
Rosario died single, without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate.

Surviving were her legitimate parents, Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and
sisters. One of the siblings filed a holographic will allegedly executed by
Rosario 11 years before her death and prayed that she be admitted to the
probate and be appointed administrator. The parents opposed saying that
they are the compulsory heirs of the decedent in the direct ascending line
and that the will should be void on the ground of absolute preterition.
Below is the will:
Nov. 17, 1951
I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory,

having amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and
bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die to my beloved
sister RemediosNuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In
witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day of November,
nineteen hundred and fifty- one.
ISSUE:
Is the will made by Rosario void?
359
RULING: YES
Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate,

but she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line·her parents, and her
holographic will does not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their
names altogether, the case is one of preterition of the parents, not a case
of ineffective disinheritance.
The effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of
disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the New Civil Code „shall
annul the institution of heir‰. This annulment is in toto, unless in the will
there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or
legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code,
such disinheritance shall also „annul the institution of heirs‰, but only
„insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited‰, which last phrase
was omitted in the case of preterition (III Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Philippines, 1961 Edition, p. 172). Better stated yet, in disinheritance the
nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs
have been illegally deprived.
Where the onesentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole,

universal heir and preterits the parents of the testatrix, and it contains no
specific legacies or bequests, such universal institution of petitioner, by
itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.
360
PCIB VS. ESCOLIN
No. L-27860 & L-27896. MARCH 29, 1974
DOCTRINE: Substitution occurs only when another heir is appointed

in a will „so that he may enter into inheritance in default of the heir originally
instituted.
FACTS:
Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas, made a will in

1952.
Unfortunately, she passed away in 1957 while she was domiciled in Iloilo
City.
In her will, she left all her estate in favor of her husband, Charles Newton
Hodges. Linnie, however, also stated in her will that should her husband
later die, said estate shall be turned over to her brother and sister.
In 1962, Charles died (it appears he was also domiciled in the

Philippines).
While the probate proceeding on the will of Linnie was pending, Atty. Leon
Gellada, the lawyer of Charles, filed a motion before the probate court so
that a certain AvelinaMagno may be appointed as the administratrix of the
estate. The latter was the trusted employee of the Hodges when they were
alive.
Atty. Gellada manifested that Charles himself left a will but the same
was in an iron trunk in Charles’ office. Hence, in the meantime, he would
like to have Magno appointed as administratrix. The said motion was
approved by Judge VenicioEscolin.
Later, Charles’ will was found and so a new petition for probate was
filed for the said will. Since said will basically covers the same estate,
Magno, as admininistratrix of Linnie’s estate opposed the said petition.
361
Eventually, the probate of Charles’ will was granted. Eventually still,
the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank was appointed as
administrator. But Magno refused to turn over the estate.
Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted Charles to turn over the
property to Linnie’s brother and sister and since that is her will, the same
must be respected.
Magno also contended that Linnie was a Texan at the time of her
death (an alien testator); that under Article 16 of the Civil Code,
successional rights are governed by Linnie’s national law; that under Texas
law, Linnie’s will shall be respected regardless of the presence of legitimes
(Charles’ share in the estate).
PCIB argued that the law of Texas refers the matter back to
Philippine laws because Linnie was domiciled outside Texas at the time of
her death (applying the renvoi doctrine).
ISSUE:
Is there a substitution under Article 857 and 859?
RULING: NO
Legally speaking, Mrs. HodgesÊ will provide neither for a simple or

vulgar substitution under article 859 of the Civil Code nor for a
fideicommissary substitution under article 863 thereof. There is no vulgar
substitution therein because there is no provision for either (1) predecease
of the testator by the designated heir or (2) refusal or (3) incapacity of the
latter to accept the inheritance, as required by article 859; and neither is
there a fideicommissary substitution therein because no obligation is
imposed thereby upon Hodges to preserve the estate or any part thereof
for anyone else.
Substitution occurs only when another heir is appointed in a will „so

that he may enter into inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted.
362
The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are also heirs instituted
simultaneously with Hodges, subject, however, to certain conditions,
partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was concerned and correspondingly
suspensive with reference to his brothers and sisters-in-law. It is partially
resolutory, since it bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her estate to be
owned and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with absolute
dominion over them only during his lifetime, which means that while he
could completely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter rivos to
anyone other than himself, he was not free to do so mortis causa, and all
his right to what might remain upon his death would cease entirely upon the
occurrence of that contingency, inasmuch as the right of his brothers and
sisters-in- law to the inheritance, although vested already upon the death of
Mrs. Hodges, would automatically become operative upon the occurrence
of the death of Hodges in the event of actual existence of any remainder of
her estate then.
363
RABADILLA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 113725. JUNE 29, 2000
DOCTRINE: In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly

mandated to preserve the property and to transmit the same later to the
second heir. In the case under consideration, the instituted heir is in fact
allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation
is with the near descendants or the sister of the testatrix
FACTS:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix

AlejaBelleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein
petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511, 855
square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of
theBacolodCadastre. The said Codicil, which was duly probated and
admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046 before the then Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental.
“That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned

property and the rights which I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited
and acknowledged by the children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla”
a)….It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I

die and Jorge Rabadilla shall have already received the ownership of the
said Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and also at the time that the lease of
Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have
the obligation until he dies, every year to give to Maria MarlinaCoscolluela y
Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and TwentyFive (25)
piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria MarlinaCoscolluela y Belleza
dies.
Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No.
1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
RT-4002 (10492), shall have the obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as
364
specified in the Fourth paragraph of his testament, to Maria
MarlinaCoscolluela y Belleza on the month of December of each year.
If Dr. Rabadilla or his heirs decide to sell, lease or transfer, the buyer,
lessee or transferee shall also have the same obligation to the testator’s
sister. Failure to do so will forfeit the property to the sister and nearest
relatives.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina
and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed
Rabadilla.
ISSUE:
Is there a substitution under Article 859?
RULING: NO
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons

to take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in
general, the testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another
heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die
before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as
in a simple substitution, or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the
express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or others, as
in a fideicommissary substitution.
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in

default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation.
In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not
provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease,
incapacity or renunciation, the testatrixÊs near descendants would
substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
365
or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property
referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrixÊs near
descendants.
In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to

preserve the property and to transmit the same later to the second heir. In
the case under consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the
Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the near
descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of
a fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly imposing
upon the first heir the preservation of the property and its transmission to
the second heir. „Without this obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the
testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary substitution. Also, the near
descendantsE right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property
will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the
obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to private respondent.
Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also

missing here. Under Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to
whom the property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the
first heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if
the first heir is not related by first degree to the second heir. In the case
under scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to the instituted
heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
366
RAMIREZ VS VDA DE RAMIREZ
No. L-27952. FEBRUARY 15, 1982
DOCTRINE: But dying before the testator is not the only case for
vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal or incapacity to accept the
inheritance as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra. Hence, the
vulgar substitution is valid.
FACTS:
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on

December 11, 1964, with only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was
admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on
July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the
estate.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition

as follows: the property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One
part shall go to the widow “en plenodominio” in satisfaction of her legitime;
the other part or “free portion” shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez “en
nudapropriedad.” Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged
with the widow‟s usufruct and the remaining two-third (2/3) with a usufruct
in favor of Wanda.
-APPEAL for the partitioning of testate estate of Jose Eugenio

Ramirez (a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964) among
principal beneficiaries:
MarcelleDemoron de Ramirez
-widow
-French who lives in Paris
367
-received ½ (as spouse) and usufructuary rights over 1/3 of the free
portion
Roberto and Jorge Ramirez
-two grandnephews
-lives in Malate
-received the ½ (free portion)
Wanda de Wrobleski
-companion
-Austrian who lives in Spain
-receivedusufructuary rights of 2/3 of the free portion
-vulgar substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and

Horacio Ramirez
-Maria Luisa Palacios -administratix
-Jorge and Roberto Ramirez opposed because
a. vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda wrt widow’s usufruct and in

favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez, wrt to Wanda’s
368
usufruct is INVALID because first heirs (Marcelle and Wanda) survived the
testator
b. fideicommissary substitutions are INVALID because first heirs not

related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree as provided
in Art 863 CC
c. grant of usufruct of real property in favor of an alien, Wanda,

violated Art XIII Sec 5
d. proposed partition of the testator’’s interest in the Santa Cruz

Building between widow and appellants violates testators express will to
give this property to them
ISSUE:
Is the vulgar substitution under Article 859 valid?
RULING: YES
They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect is void because
Wanda survived the testator or stated differently because she did not
predecease the testator. But dying before the testator is not the only case
for vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal or incapacity to accept the
inheritance as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra. Hence, the
vulgar substitution is valid.
As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the

appellants are correct in their claim that it is void for the following reasons:
The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not
related to Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art 863 of the Civil Code
validates a fideicommissary substitution „provided such substitution does
not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted.‰
369
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZvs.MARCELLE D.
VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-27952, February 15, 1982
ABAD SANTOS, J.
DOCTRINE:Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary

substitution "provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree
from the heir originally instituted."
FACTS:
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11,
1964, with only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to
probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila on July 27, 1965. Maria
Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as

follows: the property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One
part shall go to the widow (Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez) in satisfaction of
her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto
Ramirez (grandnephews). Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is
charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a
usufruct in favor of Wandade Wrobleski (his companion).
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition among other grounds:
(b) that the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid
because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes
within the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Was the fideicommissary substitution valid?
RULING:
No, the fideicommissary substitution was not valid.
ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or

first heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to
transmit to a second heir the whole or part of inheritance, shall be valid and
shall take effect, provided such substitution does not go beyond one
degree from the heir originally instituted, and provided further that the
fiduciary or first heir and the second heir are living at time of the death of
the testator.
It was void due to the following reasons:

(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not
related to Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code
validates a fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does
not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted."
370
What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino
as follows:
Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation,
substitution, or transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain has
decidedly adopted this construction. From this point of view, there
can be only one tranmission or substitution, and the substitute need
not be related to the first heir. Manresa, Morell and Sanchez Roman,
however, construe the word "degree" as generation, and the present
Code has obviously followed this interpretation by providing that the
substitution shall not go beyond one degree "from the heir originally
instituted." The Code thus clearly indicates that the second heir must
be related to and be one generation from the first heir.
From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a

child or a parent of the first heir. These are the only relatives who are
one generation or degree from the fiduciary.
(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to

the substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact,
the appellee admits "that the testator contradicts the establishment of a
fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties subject of the
usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the
naked owners."
371
JOHNNY S. RABADILLAvs.COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 113725, June 29, 2000
PURISIMA, J.
DOCTRINE: Under Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to

whom the property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the
first heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if
the first heir is not related by first degree to the second heir.
FACTS:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja
Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein
petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of 511,855
square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the
Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was duly probated and admitted
in Special Proceeding before the then Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, contained the following provisions:
SIXTH
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event
that the one to whom I have left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later
sell, lease, mortgage this said Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have
also the obligation to respect and deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100)
piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, on each month of
December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export and TWENTY FIVE (25)
piculs of Domestic, until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer,
lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my command in this
my addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall
immediately seize this Lot No. 1392 from my heir and the latter's heirs, and
shall turn it over to my near descendants, (sic) and the latter shall then
have the obligation to give the ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until
Maria Marlina shall die. I further command in this my addition (Codicil) that
my heir and his heirs of this Lot No. 1392, that they will obey and follow that
should they decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with
others than my near descendants and my sister."
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the
deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498
thereto issued in his name.
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and
children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed
Rabadilla.
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos

brought a complaint against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Codicil. The plaintiff then
prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to
372
reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja
Belleza, the cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased,
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the
names of the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.
The parties admitted that:
On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain Alan
Azurin, son-in-law of the herein petitioner who was lessee of the property
and acting as attorney-in-fact of defendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable
settlement and entered into a Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation
to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar, to the following effect:
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No. 49074 of
TCT No. 44489 will be delivered not later than January of 1989, more
specifically, to wit:
75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then existing in any of
our names, Mary Rose Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan Azurin, during December
of each sugar crop year, in Azucar Sugar Central; and, this is considered
compliance of the annuity as mentioned, and in the same manner will
compliance of the annuity be in the next succeeding crop years.
However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of

Agreement except for a partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar
corresponding to sugar crop year 1988 -1989.
RTC- Dismissed the complaint.

CA- Reversed the decision of the trial court.
Ordered defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey

title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of
Aleja Belleza.
ISSUE:
Should the lot be reverted to the estate of the testatrix Aleja Belleza?
HELD:(Only few discussion regarding Article 863.)

Yes, the lot should be reverted to the estate of testatrix Belleza as Dr.
Rabadilla is not related to the testatrix.
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedentand compulsory heirs
are called to succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and
descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or
widower, are compulsory heirs.Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters,
as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded
the latter by operation of law, without need of further proceedings, and the
373
successional rights were transmitted to them from the moment of death of
the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be
delivered to the herein private respondent every year. Upon the death of
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title
over the said property, and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation
to deliver the fruits of the lot involved to herein private respondent. Such
obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of
private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of
which is now being demanded by the latter through the institution of the
case at bar.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to

take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in
general, the testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another
heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die
before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as
in a simple substitution,or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the
express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or others, as
in a fideicommissary substitution.The Codicil sued upon contemplates
neither of the two.
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of

the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation.In the
case under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide
that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or
renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What
the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill
the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be
seized and turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point,

petitioner is correct. In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly
mandated to preserve the property and to transmit the same later to the
second heir.In the case under consideration, the instituted heir is in fact
allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation
is with the near descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very
important element of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the
obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the
property and its transmission to the second heir. "Without this obligation to
preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will, there is no
fideicommissary substitution."Also, the near descendants' right to inherit
from the testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass to them should
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of the
usufruct to private respondent.
374
Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also
missing here. Under Article 863, the second heir or the
fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not be
beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A
fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not
related by first degree to the second heir.In the case under scrutiny,
the near descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla.
375
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK vs.THE
HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the CFI of Iloilo,
Branch II
and
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES vs.LORENZO
CARLES ET AL.
G.R. Nos. L-27860, L-27896, L-27936 & L-27937, March 29, 1974
BARREDO, J.
DOCTRINE: There are generally only two kinds of substitution provided for
and authorized by our Civil Code (Articles 857-870), namely, (1) simple or
common substitution, sometimes referred to asvulgar substitution (Article
859), and (2) fideicommissary substitution (Article 863).
FACTS:
Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges were originally from
Texas, USA. During their marriage, they had acquired and accumulated
considerable assets and properties in the Philippines and in Oklahoma and
Texas in the US. They both lived, worked and were domiciled in Iloilo City
for around 50 years. Before her death, Linnie Jane executed a will leaving
her estate, less her debts and funeral expenses, to her husband Charles.
Should Charles die, the will provided that the remainder of her estate go to
her brothers and sisters, share and share alike. Should any of the brothers
and sisters die before the husband, Linnie willed that the heirs of the said
sibling be substituted in the deceased’s sibling’s place.
When Linnie died, Charles took the will to probate court, and was
appointed Executor, then later, Special Administrator. He moved to be
allowed to continue administering the family business, as per Linnie Jane’s
wishes, and to engage in sales, conveyances, leases, mortgages and other
necessary transactions. He also filed the necessary and appurtenant
administration/accounting records, and income tax returns for the estate.
Charles named seven brothers and sisters of Linnie Jane as her heirs
(Esta, Emma, Leonard, Aline, David, Sadie, Era and Nimroy), but the order
admitting the will to probate unfortunately omitted one of the heirs, Roy
(Nimroy) Higdon, so Charles filed a verified motion to have Roy’s name
included.
As an executor, he was bound to file tax returns for the estate he was
administering under American law. He did file such as estate tax return on
August 8, 1958. In Schedule "M" of such return, he answered "Yes" to the
question as to whether he was contemplating "renouncing the will". On the
question as to what property interests passed to him as the surviving
spouse, he answered:
“None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying debts,
taxes and other legal charges. It is the intention of the surviving
husband of deceased to distribute the remaining property and
376
interests of the deceased in their Community estate to the devisees
and legatees named in the will when the debts, liabilities, taxes and
expenses of administration are finally determined and paid.”
Charles died in Iloilo in December 1962 without having liquidated Linnie’s

estate, which includes her share in the conjugal partnership. A longtime
employee of the Hodges, Avelina Magno, was appointed Administratrix (for
Linnie’s estate) and a Special Administratrix (for Charles’). Magno was
appointed, but later Harold Davies (representative of Charles’ heirs in the
US) was designated Co-Special Administrator, who was then replaced by
one Joe Hodges, Charles’ nephew. One Atty. Mirasol was also appointed
as co-administrator, and an order of probate and letters of administration
were issued to Hodges and Mirasol.
PCIB’s Claims
Linnie Jane’s will should be governed by Philippine Law, with respect to the
order of succession, the amount of successional rights, and the intrinsic
validity of its testamentary provisions.
 Linnie intended Philippine laws to govern her Will.
 Article 16, CC, provides that "the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be
found", shall prevail. However, the Conflict of Law of Texas, which is
the "national law" of the testatrix, Linnie Jane Hodges, provide that
the domiciliary law (Philippine law) should govern the testamentary
dispositions and successional rights over movables, and the law of
the situs of the property (also Philippine law as to properties located
in the Philippines) as regards immovables.
 Thus applying the "Renvoi Doctrine", as approved and applied in the
Christensen case (1963), Philippine law should apply.
 Under Philippine and Texas law, the conjugal or community estate of
spouses shall, upon dissolution, be divided equally between them.
Thus, upon Linnie’s death, ½ of the entirety of the assets of the
Hodges spouses constituting their conjugal estate pertained
automatically to Charles, not by way of inheritance, but in his own
right as partner in the conjugal partnership.
 The other one-half (1/2) portion forming part of Linnie’s estate,
cannot, under a clear and specific provision of her Will, be enhanced
or increased by income, earnings, rents, or emoluments accruing
after her death. “All rents, emoluments and income from said estate
shall belong to him (C. N. Hodges) and he is further authorized to use
any part of the principal of said estate as he may need or desire."
 Articles 900, 995 and 1001 provide that the surviving spouse of a
deceased leaving no ascendants or descendants is entitled, as a
matter of right and by way of irrevocable legitime, to at least one-half
(1/2) of the estate of the deceased, and no testamentary disposition
by the deceased can legally and validly affect this right of the
377
surviving spouse. In fact, her husband is entitled to said one-half (1/2)
portion of her estate by way of legitime. (Article 886)
 Clearly, therefore, immediately upon the death of Linnie Jane
Hodges, C. N. Hodges was the owner of at least 3/4 or 75% percent
of all of the conjugal assets of the spouses, 50% by way of conjugal
partnership share and 1/4 or 25% by way of inheritance and legitime)
plus all "rents, emoluments and income" accruing to said conjugal
estate from the moment of Linnie Jane Hodges' death.
 In his capacity as sole heir and successor to Linnie’s estate, Charles
appropriated to himself the entirety of her estate. He operated all the
assets, engaged in business and performed all acts in connection
with the entirety of the conjugal estate, in his own name alone, just as
he had been operating, engaging and doing while the late Linnie
Jane Hodges was still alive. Upon his death on December 25, 1962,
therefore, all said conjugal assets were in his sole possession and
control, and registered in his name alone, not as executor, but as
exclusive owner of all said assets.
 As the sole and exclusive heir, Charles did not need to liquidate the
estate. Neither was there any asset left to Linnie’s estate at the time
of Charles’ death, though Linnie’s estate may have referred to “all of
the rest, residue and remainder of my estate” which would go to her
siblings in the event of Charles death. The provision is thus void and
invalid at least as to Philippine assets.
 There are generally only two kinds of substitution provided for and
authorized by our Civil Code (Articles 857-870), namely, (1) simple or
common substitution, sometimes referred to asvulgarsubstitution
(Article 859), and (2) fideicommissary substitution (Article 863). All
other substitutions are merely variations of these. The substitution
provided for by paragraph four of the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges is
not fideicommissary substitution, because there is clearly no
obligation on the part of C. N. Hodges as the first heir designated, to
preserve the properties for the substitute heirs. At most, it is
avulgarorsimplesubstitution. However, in order that
a vulgar orsimple substitution can be valid, three alternative
conditions must be present, namely, that the first designated heir (1)
should die before the testator; or (2) should not wish to accept the
inheritance; or (3) should be incapacitated to do so. None of these
conditions apply to C. N. Hodges, and, therefore, the substitution
provided for by the above-quoted provision of the Will is not
authorized by the Code, and, therefore, it is void. Manresa even said,
“when another heir is designated to inherit upon the death of a first
heir, the second designation can have effect only in case the first
instituted heir dies before the testator, whether or not that was the
true intention of said testator.”
 The remedy of the Higdons, then, who are claiming dubious rights to
¼ of the conjugal estate of the Hodges, is to file a claim against the
estate of Charles.
378
 It also follows that the conveyances executed by Avelina, claiming to
be merely in continuation of the Hodges’ businesses, and which
corresponding deeds of sale were confirmed by the probate court, are
null and void and should be subject to reconveyance.
Avelina’s Claims
(At one point, even Linnie’s heirs wanted to have Avelina removed from her
capacity as administrator, but the lower court reversed its earlier grant of
the motion, on account of a previous injunction it issued.)
 Linnie Jane merely gave Charles a life-estate or a usufruct over all
her estate, and gave a vested remainder-estate or the naked title
over the same estate, to her relatives.
 After Linnie’s death, Charles, as administrator and executor of the
will, unequivocably and clearly through oral and written declarations
and sworn public statements, renounced, disclaimed and repudiated
his life-estate and usufruct.
 Since there was no separation or segregation of the interests of
Linnie and Charles in the combined conjugal estate, as there has
been no such separation or segregation, and because of Charles’
repudiation, both interests have continually earned exactly the same
amount of rents, emoluments and income.
ISSUE:
Is Linnie’s disposition in favor of her siblings void?
RULING:(There is no much discussion on Article 863).
No, the disposition is not void.
To a certain extent, PCIB’s contention that Linnie’s testamentary

substitution, when viewed as a substitution, may not be given effect, is
correct. Indeed, legally speaking, Linnie’s will provides neither for a simple
or vulgar substitution under Article 859 of the Civil Code nor for a
fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 thereof. There is no vulgar
substitution because there is no provision for either (1) predecease of the
testator by the designated heir or (2) refusal or (3) incapacity of the latter to
accept the inheritance, as required by Article 859; and neither is there a
fideicommissary substitution therein because no obligation is imposed
thereby upon Hodges to preserve the estate or any part thereof for anyone
else. But from these premises, it is not correct to jump to the conclusion, as
PCIB does, that the testamentary dispositions in question are therefore
inoperative and invalid.
The error in PCIB's position lies simply in the fact that it views the said
disposition exclusively in the light of substitutions covered by the Civil Code
section on that subject, (Section 3, Chapter 2, Title IV, Book III) when it is
obvious that substitution occurs only when another heir is appointed in a
will "so that he may enter into inheritance in default of the heir originally
379
instituted," (Article 857) and, in the present case, no such possible default
is contemplated. The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not
substitutes for Hodges because, under her will, they are not to inherit what
Hodges cannot, would not or may not inherit, but what he would not
dispose of from his inheritance; rather, therefore, they are also heirs
instituted simultaneously with Hodges, subject, however, to certain
conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was concerned and
correspondingly suspensive with reference to his brothers and sisters-in-
law. It is partially resolutory, since it bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of
her estate to be owned and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with
absolute dominion over them only during his lifetime, which means that
while he could completely and absolutely dispose of any portion
thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he was not free to do
so mortis causa, and all his rights to what might remain upon his death
would cease entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency, inasmuch as
the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although
vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would automatically
become operative upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event
of actual existence of any remainder of her estate then.
Contrary to Avelina’s view, however, it was not the usufruct alone of

Linnie’s estate, as contemplated in Article 869, that she bequeathed to
Charles during his lifetime, but the full ownership thereof, although the
same was to last also during his lifetime only, even as there was no
restriction whatsoever against his disposing or conveying the whole or any
portion thereof to anybody other than himself. The Court saw no legal
impediment to this kind of institution, except that it cannot apply to the
legitime of Charles as the surviving spouse, consisting of one-half of the
estate, considering that Linnie had no surviving ascendants nor
descendants. (Arts. 872, 900, and 904.)
Hodges’ acts of administration and accounting strongly negate PCIB’s

claims that he had adjudicated to himself all of Linnie’s estate. While he
may have used language like “herein executor (being) the only devisee or
legatee of the deceased, in accordance with the last will and testament
already probated… there is no other person interested in the Philippines of
the time and place of examining herein account to be given notice,” he
would’ve known that doing so would impute bad faith unto him. Also, in his
very motions, Hodges asserted the rights of Linnie’s named heirs. He even
moved to include Roy’s name included in the probate court’s order, lest
Roy’s heirs think that they had been omitted.
Thus, he recognized, in his own way, the separate identity of his wife’s
estate from his own share of the conjugal partnership up to the time of his
death, more than 5 years after that of his wife. He never considered the
whole estate as a single one belonging exclusively to himself. The only
conclusion one can gather from this is that he could have been preparing
the basis for the eventual transmission of his wife's estate, or, at least, so
380
much thereof as he would not have been able to dispose of during his
lifetime, to her brothers and sisters in accordance with her expressed
desire, as intimated in his tax return in the US. And assuming that he did
pay the corresponding estate and inheritance taxes in the Philippines on
the basis of his being sole heir, such payment is not necessarily
inconsistent with his recognition of the rights of his co-heirs. The Court thus
viewed that under the peculiar provisions of his wife's will, and for purposes
of the applicable inheritance tax laws, Hodges had to be considered as her
sole heir, pending the actual transmission of the remaining portion of her
estate to her other heirs, upon the eventuality of his death, and whatever
adjustment might be warranted should there be any such remainder then is
a matter that could well be taken care of by the internal revenue authorities
in due time. The Court also considered as basis of Charles’ intentions
several questionnaires in solemn forms in filing estate taxes abroad, though
they have not been introduced in evidence, only referred to several times
by the parties.
It is obvious, though, that Charles’ procrastinating in settling Linnie’s estate,

and his sole administration of it, commingled his and his co-heirs interests,
making it difficult to properly make an accounting of their shares. PCIB,
then, cannot administer the properties on its own. What would be just and
proper is for both administrators of the two estates to act conjointly until
after said estates have been segregated from each other.
381
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZvs.MARCELLE D.
VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-27952, February 15, 1982
ABAD SANTOS, J.
(The case Palacios vs Ramirez cannot be found, instead this case was
found when typing the Palacios vs Ramirez).
DOCTRINE: Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary

substitution "provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree
from the heir originally instituted."
FACTS:
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11,
1964, with only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to
probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila on July 27, 1965. Maria
Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as

follows: the property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One
part shall go to the widow (Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez) in satisfaction of
her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto
Ramirez (grandnephews). Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is
charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a
usufruct in favor of Wandade Wrobleski (his companion).
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition among other grounds:
(b) that the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid
because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes
within the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Was the fideicommissary substitution valid?
RULING:
No, the fideicommissary substitution was not valid.
ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or

first heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to
transmit to a second heir the whole or part of inheritance, shall be valid and
shall take effect, provided such substitution does not go beyond one
degree from the heir originally instituted, and provided further that the
fiduciary or first heir and the second heir are living at time of the death of
the testator.
It was void due to the following reasons:

(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not
related to Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code
382
validates a fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does
not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted."
What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino
as follows:
Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation,
substitution, or transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain has
decidedly adopted this construction. From this point of view, there
can be only one tranmission or substitution, and the substitute need
not be related to the first heir. Manresa, Morell and Sanchez Roman,
however, construe the word "degree" as generation, and the present
Code has obviously followed this interpretation by providing that the
substitution shall not go beyond one degree "from the heir originally
instituted." The Code thus clearly indicates that the second heir must
be related to and be one generation from the first heir.
From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a

child or a parent of the first heir. These are the only relatives who are
one generation or degree from the fiduciary.
(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to

the substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact,
the appellee admits "that the testator contradicts the establishment of a
fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties subject of the
usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the
naked owners."
383
RABADILLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 113725 JUNE 29, 2000
PURISIMA, J.:
DOCTRINE: Testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality an

obligation imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition
unless it clearly appears from the will itself that such was the intention of
the testator.
FACTS:
In the Codicil of Testatrix, Dr. Rabadilla (predecessor in interest of
herein petitioner) instituted as a devisee of Lot No. 1392 contained the
following provisions among others:
1. Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give to
Belleza 100 piculs of sugar until Belleza dies;
2. Should Rabadilla die his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392
shall have the obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as specified to
Belleza;
3. In the event that the Lot is sold, leased, or mortgaged, the buyer,
lessee, mortgagee shall also have the obligation to respect and
deliver yearly sugar to Belleza. Should the command be not
respected Belleza shall immediately seize that lot and turn it over to
the testatrix near descendents.
ISSUE:
1. Is this a simple substitution?
2. Does it involve fideicommissary substitution?
3. Is the institution conditional?
RULING:
1. NO, it is not a simple substitution. In simple substitutions, the second

heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heirs by reason of
incapacity, predecease or renunciation. The codicil does not provide
that should Dr. Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or
renunciation, the testatatrix’s near descendants would substitute him.
What the codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his
heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property
referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix’s near
descendants.
2. NO, there is no fideicommissary substitution. In a fideicommissary

substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property
and to transmit the same later to the second heir.
Here, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to

alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the near
descendants or sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element
384
of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking, the obligation clearly
imposing upon the first heir, the preservation of the property and its
transmission to the second heir. Also, the near descedants’ right to
inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass to
them should Dr. Rabadilla of his heirs not fulfill the obligation to
deliver part of the usufruct to private respondent.
Moreover, it is void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the
second heir. Here, the near descendants are not at all related to the
instituted heir, Dr. Rabadilla.
3. NO, it is not a conditional institution. It is clear that the testatrix

intended that the lot be inherited by Dr. Rabadilla. It is likewise clear
that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and
his successors in interest to deliver sugar to Belleza, during the
lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr.
Rabadilla’s inheritance and effectively of his institution as a devisee,
dependent on the performance of the said obligation.
It is clear though that should the obligation be not complied with the
shall be turned over to the testatrix near descendants. Since
testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality an obligation
imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it
clearly appears from the will itself that such was the intention of the
testator.
In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal not
conditional. The manner of institution of Dr. Rabadilla’s is modal in
nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without
however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.
A modal imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does

not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. On the other
hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must
happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the
testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate; and the mode
obligates but does not suspend.
385
CARMEN LAPUZ SY vs. EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY
G.R. No. L-30977 JANUARY 31, 1972
REYES J.B.L., J.:
DOCTRINE: An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the

plaintiff, even if property rights are involved. These rights are mere effects
of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the
decree such rights do not come into existence
FACTS:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio
Eufemio on August 1953. They were married civilly on September 21,
1934 and canonically after nine days. They had lived together as husband
and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her husband
abandoned her. They acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner
then discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named
Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of
legal separation, which among others, would order that the defendant
Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership
profits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage

with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go
Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence.
However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already
scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular
accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the court of her death.
Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on
the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period
provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen
abated the action for legal separation. Petitioner’s counsel moved to
substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.
ISSUE:
Is the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal
separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved
property rights?
RULING:
YES. An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the

plaintiff, even if property rights are involved. These rights are mere effects
of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the
decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of
a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death
supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be
forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and
386
the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain
unborn.
Here, the petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and

academic and there could be no further interest in continuing the same
after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any
property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper
action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
387
JOSE BARITUA and EDGAR BITANCOR, vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NICOLAS NACARIO and
VICTORIA RONDA NACARIO
G.R. No. 82233 MARCH 22, 1990
SARMIENTO, J.:
DOCTRINE: The parents of the deceased succeed only when the latter
dies without a legitimate descendant.
FACTS:
Bienvenido Nacario was driving a tricycle with a passenger when he
was hit with a bus driven by Edgar Bitancor and owned by Jose Baritua.
Bienvenido and his passenger died and the tricycle was damaged.
There was an extrajudicial settlement negotiation wherein
Beienvenido’s estranged wife, Alicia, with whom he has a child, received
P18, 500. With that, she executed a “Release of Claim” discharging
Bitancor, Baritua, and the bus insurer from all actions, claims, and
demands arising from the accident. She also executed an affidavit of
desistance manifesting her lack of interest in instituting any case, civil or
criminal against them.
After a year and ten months from the date of accident, the parents
of Bienvenidofiled a complaint for damages against Bitancor and Baritua.
They alleged that they were the ones who spent for their son’s funeral and
loaned to him the purchase price of the damaged tricycle. Claiming that it is
them who suffered damages, they shall be indemnified for their son’s
death.
ISSUE: Was the spouse entitled to receive the petitioner’s payment
RULING:
YES. Under Article 1240 of the Civil Code, payment shall be made to
the person in whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or his
successor in interest, or any person authorized to receive it. Here, Alicia
and her son with the deceased are the successors in interest referred to by
law as the persons authorized to receive payment.
Further, Articles 887 and 985 of the Civil Code provide that the
parents of the deceased succeed only when the person dies without a
legitimate descendant. Since it has been established that Bienvenido was
married to Alicia and that they begot a child, the parents are not
successors-in-interest of Bienvenido; they are not compulsory heirs. Even if
Alicia had been estranged from Bienvenido, mere estrangement is not a
388
legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the
deceased spouse.
Neither could the parents, as alleged creditors of Bienvenido, seek

relief and compensation from the petitioners. Such are mere money claims
against the estate of their deceased son, which had been released by the
agreement of the extra-judicial settlement concluded with Alicia, the victim's
widow and heir, as well as the natural guardian of their child, her co-heir.
389
SPOUSES NICANOR TUMBOKON (deceased), substituted by:
ROSARIO SESPEÑE and their Children vs. APOLONIA G. LEGASPI,
and PAULINA S. DE MAGTANUM
G.R. No. 153736 August 12, 2010
BERSAMIN, J.:
DOCTRINE: Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of

which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person
represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if she
were living or if she could have inherited.
FACTS:
The parcel of land subject in this case was originally owned by
the late Alejandra Sespeñe, who had had two marriages. The first
marriage was with Gaudencio Franco, by whom she bore Ciriaca Franco,
whose husband was Victor Miralles. The second marriage was with Jose
Garcia, by whom she bore respondent Apolonia Garcia, who married Primo
Legaspi. Alejandra died without a will in 1935, and was survived
by Apolonia and Crisanto Miralles, the son of Ciriaca (who had
predeceased Alejandra in 1924) and Victor Miralles.
A case was filed by the petitioners for the recovery of ownership and
possession of real property with damages against the respondents. The
former alleged that petitioner Rosario SespeñeTumbokon purchased the
land in question from Cresenciana Inog. Cresenciana Inog, in turn,
acquired the land by purchase from Victor Miralles, son-in-law of
decedent Alejandra, who had represented that he inherited the land from
his mother-in-law. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners,
holding that the spouses were able to establish the purchase of the land.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and dismissed the
complaint
ISSUE: Was the sale made by Victor Miralles valid?
HELD:
NO. The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals
that Victor’s claim of being the sole heir was false and erroneous
for Alejandra had more than one intestate heir, and Victor Miralles as a
mere son-in-law could not be one of them. A decedent’s compulsory heirs
in whose favor the law reserves a part of the decedent’s estate are
exclusively the persons enumerated in Article 887 of the Civil Code.
Here, only two forced heirs survived Alejandra upon her

death, namely: respondent Apolonia, her daughter, and Crisanto Miralles,
her grandson. The latter succeeded Alejandra by right of representation
because his mother, Ciriaca, had predeceased Alejandra.
390
REGINA FRANCISCO AND ZENAIDA PASCUALvs.AIDA FRANCISCO-
ALFONSO
G.R. No. 138774 March 8, 2001
DOCTRINE:
The sale which transferred the property of the father to the illegitimate
children would deprive the legitimate child of her share in her father's
estate. By law, she is entitled to half of the estate of her father as his only
legitimate child. The legal heirs must be determined in proper testate or
intestate proceedings for settlement of the estate. Compulsory heir cannot
be deprived of her share in the estate save by disinheritance as prescribed
by law.
FACTS:
Aida, respondent, is the only daughter of spouses Gregorio Francisco and
Cirila de la Cruz, who are now both deceased.
Regina and Zenaida, the petitioners, are the illegitimate daughters of

Gregorio who have the possession of the certificates of title of Gregorio’s
property.
After Gregorio died, Aida inquired about the certificates of title from her half
sisters and was told that their father had sold the land to them. After
verification, Aida learned that there was indeed a deed of absolute sale. By
virtue of the sale, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued TCTs
Aida filed with the RTC a complaint for annulment of sale with
damages.She alleged that the signature of her late father was a forged.In
their joint answer to the complaint, petitioners denied the alleged forgery or
simulation of the deed of sale.
RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint and sustaining the

validity of the “KasulatanSaGanap Na Bilihan".
CA reversed the trial court’s decision declaring the kasulatan as null and
void and ordered the cancellartion of the transfer certificates of title. The
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
May a legitimate daughter be deprived of her share in the estate of her
deceased father by a simulated contract transferring the property of her
father to his illegitimate children?
RULING:
No, the legitimate daughter as the compulsory heir, cannot be deprived of
her share in the estate save by disinheritance as prescribed by
law.Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If indeed the
391
parcels of land involved were the only property left by their father, the sale
in fact would deprive respondent of her share in her father's estate. By law,
she is entitled to half of the estate of her father as his only legitimate child.
According to Article 888, Civil Code:

"The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of
the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.
"The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half subject to the rights of
illegitimate children and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided."
The kasulatan was also simulated hence, null and void, as there was no
consideration for the contract of sale. A friend testified that respondents did
not have any source of incomewhen they bought the property. Though they
may have been earning, the Court find it incredible that engaging in buy
and sell could raise the amount of P10,000.00, or that earnings in selling
goto could save enough to pay P15,000.00, in cash for the land.
But even if the even if the kasulatan was not simulated, it still violated the
Civil Code provisions insofar as the transaction affected respondent's
legitime. The sale was executed in 1983, when the applicable law was the
Civil Code, not the Family Code.
Obviously, the sale was Gregorio's way to transfer the property to his
illegitimate daughters at the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale
was executed to prevent respondent Alfonso from claiming her legitime and
rightful share in said property. Before his death, Gregorio had a change of
heart and informed his daughter about the titles to the property.
392
IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA, DOMINADOR CHUA and REMEDIOS CHUA
vs.THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,
BRANCH V and SUSANA DE LA TORRE, in her capacity as
Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre
DOCTRINE:
Pursuant to Article 891 of the Civil Code, in order that a property may be
impressed with a reservable character the following requisites must exist,
to wit: (1) that the property was acquired by a descendant from an
asscendant or from a brother or sister by gratuitous title; (2) that said
descendant died without an issue; (3) that the property is inherited by
another ascendant by operation of law; and (4) that there are relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came.
FACTS:
In the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias SyQuio
he sired three children, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel. When
Patricia died, Jose contracted a second marriage with Consolacion de la
Torre with whom he had a child by the name of Juanita Frias.
Josedied intestate. In the Intestate Proceeding, lower court issued an

orderadjudicating, among others, the½ portion of Lot No. 399 and the sum
of P8,000.00 to Consolacion as the widow, the other half of Lotin favor of
Juanitoson in the second marriage; P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenzo; and
P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio.
Juanitoof the second marriage died intestate without any issue.his mother
Consolacionsucceeded to his pro-indivisio share of Lot No.
399.Consolacion later executed a declaration of heirship adjudicating in her
favor the pro-indiviso share of her son but then she died intestate leaving
no direct heir except her brothers & sisters.
The petitioners, as heirs of the Gregorio on the first marriage, filed the
complaintpraying that the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 399 which
formerly belonged to Juanitobut which passed to Consolacionbe
declaredas a reservable property for the reason that the lot in question was
subject to reservaltroncal pursuant to Article 981 of the New Civil Code.
CFI dismissed the complaint of the petitioners.
ISSUE:
Was the property in question acquired by Juanito from his father Jose
gratuitously in order to subject it to a reservatroncal?
RULING:
Yes, the lot in question is subject to reservatroncal under Art, 891 of the
New Civil Code.It is evident from the record that the transmission of the
property in question to Juanito upon the death of his father was by means
of a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous.
393
After his death his mother Consolation succeeded to his one-half pro-
indiviso share of Lot 399. This was, however, subject to the condition that
the property was reservable in character under Art. 891 of the Civil Code in
favor of relatives within the third degree of Jose from whom the property
came. These relatives are the petitioners herein.
The pertinent provision of reservatroncal under the New Civil Code
provides:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inheritts from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendat, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he
may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree and belong to the line from which said property
came.
Pursuant to the foregoing provision, in order that a property may be
impressed with a reservable character the following requisites must exist,
to wit:
(1) that the property was acquired by a descendant from an asscendant or
from a brother or sister by gratuitous title;
(2) that said descendant died without an issue;
(3) that the property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law;
and
(4) that there are relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
In this case, all of the foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as borne out
by the records, Juanito of the second marriage died intestate without
leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399 was acquired
by his mother, Consolacionwho later died.Juanito had relatives within the
third degree. These relatives are Ignacio,Dominador and Remidios, the
suppose legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo, who are the
petitioners herein. They are declared owners of 1/2 undivided portion of Lot
399;and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental is hereby ordered to
cancel. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering Lot No. 399 issued
in the name of Consolacion de la Torre and to issue a new Certificate of
Title in the names of Consolacion de la Torre, 1/2 undivided portion;
Ignacio Frias Chua, 1/4 undivided portion; and Dominador Chua and
Remedios Chua, 1/4 undivided portion, of said lot.
394
MARIA MENDOZA et.al.vs. JULIA POLl CARPIO DELOS SANTOS,
substituted by her heirsCARMEN P. DELOS SANTOS et. al.
G.R. No. 176422 March 20, 2013
DOCTRINE:
Reservatroncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a
reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from
which the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and
by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant.
FACTS:
The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of land.Two of
the said lots are in the name of respondent Julia Delos Santos. The other
lot is also in the name of Julia but co-owned by Victoria Pantaleon, who
bought 1/2 of the property from petitioner Maria Mendoza and her siblings.
Petitioners alleged that the properties were part of their grandparent’s

properties that were subject of an oral partition and subsequently
adjudicated to Exequiel, one of the children.After Exequiel’s death, it
passed on to his spouse Leonor and daughter, Gregoria. Gregoria later
died intestate and without issue. After Gregoria’s death, respondent, who is
Leonor’s sister,adjudicated unto herself all these properties as the sole
surviving heir of Leonor and Gregoria.
Petitioners claim that the properties should have been reserved by

respondent in their behalf and must now revert back to them, applying
Article 891 of the Civil Code on reservatroncal.
Respondent, however, denies any obligation to reserve the properties as

these did not originate from petitioners’ familial line and were not originally
owned by Placido and Dominga. According to respondent, the properties
were bought by Exequiel and Antonio from a certain Alfonso Ramos in
1931. It appears, however, that it was only Exequiel who was in possession
of the properties.
RTC granted theaction for Recovery of Possession by ReservaTroncal of

petitioners. CA reversed and set aside the decision stating that petitioners
failed to establish that Placido and Dominga owned the properties in
dispute.10 The CA also ruled that even assuming that Placido and
Dominga previously owned the properties, it still cannot be subject to
reservatroncal as neither Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga nor
did Gregoria predecease Exequiel.
ISSUE:
Are the petitioners Mendozashave the right to the properties by virtue of the
law on reserve troncal?
RULING:
NO, Article 891 on reservatroncal is not applicable.
395
Petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they are not
relatives within the 3rd degree of Gregoria from whom the properties came.
The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the
descendant/prepositus―the one at the end of the line from which the
property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. It is
Gregoria in this case.
Petitioners are Gregoria’s fourth degree relatives, being her first cousins.
First cousins of the prepositus are fourth degree relatives and are not
reservees or reservatarios.While it may appear that the properties are
reservable in character, petitioners cannot benefit from reservatroncal.
First, because Julia, who now holds the properties in dispute, is not the
other ascendant within the purview of Article 891 of the Civil Code and
second, because petitioners are not Gregoria’s relatives within the third
degree.
Assuming for argument’s sake that reservatroncal is applicable, is have the

reservable nature of the property registered on respondent’s titles. In fact,
respondent, as reservista, has the duty to reserve and to annotate the
reservable character of the property on the title. In reservatroncal, the
reservista who inherits from a prepositus, whether by the latter’s wish or by
operation of law, acquires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly
transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of ownership belong to
him exclusively.A reservista acquires ownership ofthe reservable property
until thereservation takes place or isextinguished.
3 lines of transmission in reservatroncal.

The first transmission is by gratuitous title, whether by inheritance or
donation, from an ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant called the
prepositus. The second transmission is by operation of law from the
prepositus to the other ascendant or reservor, also called the reservista.
The third and last transmission is from the reservista to the reservees or
reservatarios who must be relatives within the third degree from which the
property came.
The lineal character of thereservable property is reckonedfrom the

ascendant from whom theprepositus received the property bygratuitous
title.
The fallacy in the CA’s resolution is that it proceeded from the erroneous
premise that Placido is the ascendant contemplated in Article 891 of the
Civil Code. From thence, it sought to trace the origin of the subject
properties back to Placido and Dominga, determine whether Exequiel
predeceased Placido and whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel.

(1) that the property was acquired by a descendant from an asscendant or
from a brother or sister by gratuitous title;
396
(2) that said descendant died without an issue;
(3) that the property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law;
and
(4) that there are relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been acquired by
the descendant or prepositus from an ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative
title. A transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient
does not give anything in return. That the person obliged to reserve the
property should be an ascendant (also known as the reservor/reservista) of
the descendant/prepositus. Julia, however, is not Gregoria’s ascendant;
rather, she isGregoria’s collateral relative under Article 964.
Gregoria’s ascendants are her parents, Exequiel and Leonor, her

grandparents, great-grandparents and so on. On the other hand, Gregoria’s
descendants, if she had one, would be her children, grandchildren and
great-grandchildren. Not being Gregoria’s ascendants, both petitioners and
Julia, therefore, are her collateral relatives. In determining the collateral line
of relationship, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent
to the relative from whom the computation is made. In the case of Julia’s
collateral relationship with Gregoria, ascent is to be made from Gregoria to
her mother Leonor (one line/degree), then to the common ancestor, that is,
Julia and Leonor’s parents (second line/degree), and then descent to Julia,
her aunt (third line/degree). Thus, Julia is Gregoria’s collateral relative
within the third degree and not her ascendant.
397
BEATRIZ L. GONZALESvsCOURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA
(BRANCH V), BENITO F. LEGARDA et.al
G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981
DOCTRINE:
If there are only two transmissions there is no reserve.
Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of

ascendant (reservista) together with his own property in favor of another of
his descendants as forced heir, forms no part of the latter's lawful
inheritance nor of the legitime, for the reason that, as said property
continued to be reservable, the heir receiving the same as an inheritance
from his ascendant has the strict obligation of its delivery to the relatives,
within the third degree, of the predecessor in interest (prepositus), without
prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot part of the property, if he has at
the same time the right of a reservatario (reserves).
FACTS:
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died and
was survived by his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: 3
sons and four daughters including petitioner.
The real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in

three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of
his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by
Benito F. Legarda.
FilomenaLegarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19,

1943. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Races Vda. deLegarda.
Mrs.Legarda executedan affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the

properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter,
FilomenaLegarda.As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena
Races succeeded her deceased daughter FilomenaLegarda as co-owner of
the properties held proindiviso by her other six children.
Later, Mrs Legardaexecuted two handwritten Identical documents wherein

she disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in
favor of the children of her sons and partitioned the properties consisting of
the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which the
children inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la
Paz.
Mrs.Legarda died and her will was admitted to probate as a holographic

will. In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda, a daughter of the testatrix
filed a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother’s estate the
properties, which she inherited from her deceased daughter on the ground
that said properties are reservable properties, which should be inherited by
FilomenaLegarda.
398
Without awaiting the resolution on the motion, Beatriz filed an ordinary civil
action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother’s
estate for the purpose of serving a declaration that said properties are
reservable properties which Mrs.Legarda could not bequeath in her will to
her grandchildren to the exclusion of her sons and daughters.
ISSUE:
Are the properties in question be subjected to reservatroncal?
RULING:
Yes, the properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the
hands of Mrs.Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation
became a certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or relatives
within the third degree of the prepositusFilomenaLegarda were living or
they survived Mrs.Legarda.
So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs.Legarda, as reservor,

could convey the reservable properties by will or mortis causa to the
reservees within the third degree (her sixteen grandchildren) to the
exclusion of the reservees in the second degree, her three daughters and
three sons. As indicated at the outset, that issue is already res judicata or
cosajuzgada.
We hold that Mrs.Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her
sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited
from her daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did not form
part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor
cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as
long as the reservees survived the reservor.
Thereservees inherit the reservable properties from the prepositus, not

from the reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be

inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third degree from the
prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs.Legarda. She could
not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be given
and deprive the other reservees of their share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the

reservable properties in favor of the reservees in the third degree and,
consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second degree would be a
399
glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary disposition cannot be
allowed.
Court held that the reservable property bequeathed by the reservor to her
daughter does not form part of the reservor's estate nor of the daughter's
estate but should be given to all the seven reservees or nearest relatives of
the prepositus within the third degree.
This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property
to only one reserves it did not pass into the hands of strangers,
nevertheless, it is likewise true that the heiress of the reservor was only
one of the reservees and there is no reason founded upon law and justice
why the other reservees should be deprived of their shares in the
reservable property
Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs.Legarda could not
dispose of in her will the properties in question even if the disposition is in
favor of the relatives within the third degree from FilomenaLegarda. The
said properties, by operation of Article 891, should go to Mrs.Legarda's six
children as reservees within the second degree from FilomenaLegarda.
It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but
from the reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the reservees are the
heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that they must survive the
reservor (Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil.
1065).
The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable
character due to the non-existence of third-degree relatives of
FilomenaLegarda at the time of the death of the reservor, Mrs.Legarda,
belonging to the Legarda family, "except third-degree relatives who pertain
to both" the Legarda and Races lines.
That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been extinguished

only by the absence of reservees at the time of Mrs.Legarda's death. Since
at the time of her death, there were (and still are) reservees belonging to
the second and third degrees, the disputed properties did not lose their
reservable character. The disposition of the said properties should be made
in accordance with article 891 or the rule on reservatroncal and not in
accordance with the reservor's holographic will. The said properties did not
form part of Mrs.Legarda's estate.
400
DE PAPA, ET AL. VS. CAMACHO, ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-28032, SEPTEMBER 24, 1986
NARVASA, J.
DOCTRINE: In reserva troncal, the successional rights of the relatives of

the praepositus within the 3rd degree are determined by, and subject to,
the rules of intestate succession; so as to exclude uncles and aunts of the
descendant from the reservable property by his niece or nephew.
FACTS:
Romana donated four parcels of land to Toribia. When Toribia died in 1915,
she left the said property to Faustino and Trinidad, her children. When
Balbino died in 1928, three parcels of land were adjudicated to Toribia and
since she predeceased her father, the same was given to her children
Faustino and Trinidad. Faustino died in 1937 and left his ½ pro-indiviso
share in the seven lands to his father Eustacio Dizon, subject to reserve
troncal. When Trinidad died in 1939, all her ½ pro-indiviso share were
inherited by Dalisay, subject to usufruct of Primo Tongko. Eustacio died in
1965, survived by his only granddaughter Dalisay. Dalisay claims the ½ by
virtue of the reserva troncal implied by law upon the death of Faustino.
Plaintiffs, as uncles and aunts, also claim ¾ of the ½ pro-indiviso share,
being a third relative of Faustino.
The lower court ruled that both plaintiffs and defendants are all entitled as
reservatarios.
ISSUE:
Are all relatives of the prepositus within the third degree in the appropriate
line succeed without distinction to the reservable property upon the death
of the reservista?
HELD:
No. Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when

there are relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the
nearest relative, called reservatario, over the property which the reservista
(person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that
of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged
when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is
not among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code
in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit
of designated persons who are within the third degree of the person from
whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and
the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since
the law does not recognize them as such.
401
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the
part of one alleging his rights as reservatario who is not within the third
degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the
part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as
in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable
property came. x x x
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of

ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and
nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of
half blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity
of degree and the right of representation of nephews are made to apply,
the rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should
likewise be operative.
In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives
(reservatarios) to whom the property should be returned; but within that
group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the
applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not
specify otherwise. x x x
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on

intestate succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right
thereto because, as aunts and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the
prepositus), they are excluded from the succession by his niece, the
defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within the same
degree as the latter. x x x
Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the
defendant-appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of
the reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower court is reversed

and set aside, and the complaint is dismissed with costs against plaintiffs-
appellees.
402
SIENES, ET AL. VS. ESPARCIA, ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-12957, MARCH 24, 1961
DIZON, J.
DOCTRINE: In reserva troncal the reservor has the legal title and dominion
over the reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition. He may
alienate the same but subject to the reservation, i.e., the rights acquired by
the transferee are revoked upon the survival of reservees at the time of
death of the reservor.
FACTS:
Saturnino Yaeso originally owes Lot 3368. With his first wife, Teresa
Ruales, he had four children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and
Cipriana, while with his second wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son
named Francisco. Lot 3368 was issued in the name of Francisco. When
Francisco died, without any descendant, his mother, as his sole heir,
executed the public instrument entitled extra-judicial settlement and sale
whereby, among other things, for and in consideration of the sum of
P800.00, she sold the property in question to Sienes. Thereafter, Cipriana
and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving half-sisters of Francisco, and who as
such had declared the property in their name executed a deed of sale in
favor of the spouses Esparcia. Andrea Gutang died later with Cipriana
Yaeso (child from the first wife) surviving her.
Sienes then filed an action asking for the nullification of the sale executed
by Paulina and Cipriana, the reconveyance of the lot and damages and
cost of suit.
Fidel Esparcia countered that they did not know any information regarding
the sale by Andrea Gutang in favor of the Sps. Sienes, and that if such sale
was made, the same was void since Andrea had no right to dispose of the
property.
The lower court declared that both the sale made by Andrea Gutang to
Sps. Sienes was and that of Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso to the Sps.
Esparcia were void. The land in question was reservable property and
therefore, the reservista Andrea Gutang, was under obligation to reserve it
for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
which said property came, if any, survived her.
Record shows that lone reserve surviving was Cipriana Yaeso.
ISSUE:
● Was the subject lot is a reservable property?

● If yes, can the reservoir or the reserve alienate the subject lot?
403 | P a g e
HELD:
Yes. The lot is a reservable property, and the reservoir may alienate the
property subject to a resolutory condition.
In reserva troncal the reservor has the legal title and dominion over the
reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition. He may alienate
the same but subject to the reservation, i.e., the rights acquired by the
transferee are revoked upon the survival of reservees at the time of death
of the reservor.
The reserva instituted by law in favor of the heirs within the third degree
belonging to the line from which the reservable property came constitutes a
real right which the reservee may alienate and dispose of, although
conditionally, the condition being that the alienation would transfer
ownership to the vendee only if and when the reservee survives the
reservor.
Upon the death of the reservor, there being a surviving reservee, the
reservable property passes in exclusive ownership to the latter.
In the present case, inasmuch as when the reservista, Andrea Gutang died,
CiprianaYaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the
previous sale made by the former in favor of appellants became of no legal
effect and the reservable property passed in exclusive ownership to
Cipriana.
On the other hand, the sale executed by the sisters, Paulina and
CiprianaYaeso, in favor of the Sps. Esparcia was subject to a similar
resolutory condition. While it may be true that the sale was made by
Cipriana and her sister prior to the death of Andrea, it became effective
because of the occurrence of the resolutory condition.
404 | P a g e
PADURA, ET AL. VS. BALDOVINO, ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-11960, DECEMBER 27, 1958
REYES, J.B.L., J
FACTS:
Agustin Padura contracted two marriages during his lifetime: his first wife,
Gervacia Landig, where he had one child named Manuel Padura; and his
second wife, Benita Garing, having two children named Fortunato and
Candelaria.
Agustin Padura died leaving a last will and testament bequeathing his
properties among his three children (Manuel, Fortunato and Cadelaria),
and his surviving spouse, Benita. Fortunato was adjudicated 4 parcels of
land. Fortunato died unmarried without a will. Hence, the said parcels of
land were inherited by her mother, Benita Garing. She was issued with a
Torrens Title, subject to a condition that the properties were reservable in
favor of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which
said property came.
Candelaria died leaving as her only heirs, her four legitimate children, the
appellants herein, Cristeta, Melania, Anicia and Pablo, all surnamed
Baldovino. Manuel Padura also died. Surviving him are his legitimate
children, Dionisia, Felisa, Flora, Gornelio, Francisco, Juana, and Severino,
all surnamed Padura, the appellees herein.
Upon the death of Benita Garing (the reservista), appellants and appellees
took possession of the reservable properties. The legitimate children of the
deceased Manuel Padura and Candelaria Baldovino were declared to be
the rightful reservees, and as such, entitled to the reservable properties
(the original reservees Candelaria Padura and Manuel Padura, having
predeceased the reservista).
Appellants Baldovino seeks to have these properties partitioned, such that

one-half of the same be adjudicated to them, and the other half to the
appellees, allegedly on the basis that they inherit by right of representation
from their respective parents, the original reservees. To this petition,
appellees filed their opposition, maintaining that they should all (the eleven
reservees) be deemed as inheriting in their own right, under which, they
claim, each should have an equal share.
The appellants further contend that notwithstanding the reservable

character of the property under Art, 891 of the new Civil Code (Art. 811 of
the Code of 1889) the reservatarios nephews of the whole blood are
entitled to a share twice as large as that of the others, in conformity with
Arts, 1006, 1008 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Arts. 949 and 951 of
the Code of 1889) on intestate succession.
405 | P a g e
ISSUE:
In a case of reserva troncal, where the only reservatarios (reservees)

surviving the reservista, and belonging to the line of origin, are nephews of
the descendant (prepositus), but some are nephews of the half blood and
the others are nephews of the whole blood, should the reserved properties
be apportioned among them equally, or should the nephews of the whole
blood take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half-
blood?
HELD:
Yes. The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the
return of the reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to
the line from which the property originally came, and avoid its being
dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant (reservista).
To this end, the Article 891 of the Civil Code provides that the ascendant
who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is
obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of
law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who
belong to the line from which said property came.
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of

ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers
and nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and
nephews of half-blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios
inter se, proximity of degree and the right of representation of nephews are
made to apply, the rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the
whole blood should be likewise operative.
In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives
(reservatarios) to whom the property should be returned; but within that
group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the
applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not
specify otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance that
the reserva being an exceptional case, its application should be limited to
what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the law.
406 | P a g e
SOLIVIO VS. C.A.
G.R. NO. 83484, FEBRUARY 12, 1990
MEDIALDEA, J.
DOCTRINE: RESERVA TRONCAL; DOES NOT APPLY TO PROPERTY

INHERITED BY A DESCENDANT FROM ITS ASCENDANT.
FACTS:
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr.
who died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters,
nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt,
petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia
Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva,
sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.
After the death of Esteban, Jr., Concordia and Celedonia talked about what
to do with Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's
desire to place his estate in a foundation to be named after his mother,
from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent
students in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the
deceased.
Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the

proceedings leading to the formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good
faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed a petition, praying that she
be declared sole heir of the deceased; and that after payment of all claims
and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her.
She later sold the property and put up a foundation named after Javellana.
Later, the court declared her as the sole heir of Esteban Jr.
Concordia filed for motion for reconsideration to declare her also an heir to
the deceased’s properties.
Celedonia averred that the properties of the deceased had already been
transferred to, and were in the possession of, the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de
Javellana Foundation.
ISSUE:
Can Reserva Troncal be applied to properties inherited by a descendant

from his ascendant?
HELD:
No. Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not
reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the
descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the
properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to
407 | P a g e
a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative
within the third degree on his mother’s side. The reserva troncal applies to
properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it
from another ascendant or a brother or sister. It does not apply to property
inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation
covered by Article 891.
ARTICLE 891
408 | P a g e
FLORENTINO V. FLORENTINO
G.R. No. L-14856 November 15, 1919
TORRES, J.:
DOCTRINE: Reserva Troncal
FACTS:Apolonio Florentino II was first married to Antonio where they

begot 9 children. After Antonia’s death, he married Severina with whom he
had 2 children. Apolonio died on February 13,1890 wherein he was
survived by his second wife, Severina and his 10 children. The 11th child,
Apolinio III was born the following on March 4, 1890. Apolonio II executed a
will instituting as his universal heirs his ten children, the posthumos
Apolonio III and his widow Severina Faz de Leon; that he declared, in one
of the paragraphs of said will, all his property should be divided among all
of his children of both marriages. The posthumous son was given
properties marked A,B,C,D,E, and F, a gold rosary, pieces of gold and
silver, livestock, palay and other personal properties. However, the
posthumous son died in 1891 and her mother Severina, succeeded all his
inheritance. When Severina died, her daughter Mercedes succeeded all
property left of Severina including those of the posthumous sonas
reservable property; that, as a reservist, said Mercedes Florentino had
been gathering for herself alone the fruits of lands described in the
complaint even though each and every one of the parties mentioned in said
complaint is entitled to one-seventh of the fruits of the reservable property
described therein.
The plaintiffs, who are the relatives of Apolonio III within the third degree,
asked defendants to deliver their part of the reservable property but the
defendants refused.
ISSUE:Was the property left by Apolonio III invested with the character of
reservable property when it was received by his mother, Severina Faz de
Leon?
RULING:Yes.
Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the absolute

dominion of the ascendant who inherits and receives same from his
descendant, therefore it does not form part of his own property nor become
the legitimate of his forced heirs. It becomes his own property only in case
that all the relatives of his descendant shall have died (reservista) in which
case said reservable property losses such character. As these relatives are
at present living, claiming for it with an indisputable right, we cannot find
any reasonable and lawful motive why their rights should not be upheld and
409 | P a g e
why they should not be granted equal participation with the defendant in
the litigated property.
If said property did not come to be the legitimate and exclusive property of
Severina Faz de Leon, her only legitimate and forced heiress, the
defendant Mercedes, could not inherit all by operation of law and in
accordance with the order of legitimate succession, because the other
relatives of the deceased Apolonio III, within the third degree, as well as
herself are entitled to such reservable property.
410 | P a g e
EDROSO V. SABLAN
G.R. No. 6878 September 13, 1913
ARELLANO, C.J.:
DOCTRINE:Reserva Troncal
FACTS: Marcelina Edroso married Victoriano Sablan wherein they had

a son named Pedro. Pedro (unmarried) inherited the two parcels of
land which eventually was passed through inheritance to her mother,
Marcelina upon Pedro’s death. When Marcelina applied for the
registration of the two parcels of land, the two brothers of Victoriano
opposed its registration claiming one of two things: Either that the
registration be denied, "or that if granted to her the right reserved by law to
the opponents be recorded in the registration of each parcel."
Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land
in question partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved
and that in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the
names of the mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.
Appellant denies that the lands which are the subject matter of the
application are required by law to be reserved.
ISSUE: Is Marcelina Edroso invested with the absolute title of the property
to cause its registration?
RULING: Yes.
The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve

the right has, beyond any doubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He
has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal title and dominion,
although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express
provision of the law, the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to
dispose of is to alienate, although under a condition. He has the right to
recover it, because he is the one who possesses or should possess it and
have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal
title and dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him while he
lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been assured, he
can do anything that a genuine owner can do.
On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of
the right is reserved cannot dispose of the property, first because it is no
way, either actually, constructively or formally, in their possession; and,
moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of the fee simple
which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the
person who must reserve the right should die before them will they acquire
it, thus creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their place in the
succession of the descendants of whom they are relatives within the third
degree.
411 | P a g e
CANO V. DIRECTOR
G.R. No. L-10701 January 16, 1959
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
DOCTRINE:Reserva Troncal
FACTS: Lots Nos. 1798 and 1799 were registered in the name of Maria
Cano with the understanding that Lot No. 1799 shall be subject to the right
of reservation in favor of Eustaquia Guerrero pursuant to Article 891 of the
Civil code. In October 1955, Guerrero prayed for the cancellation of the
TCT alleging the death of the original registered owner and reservista,
Maria Cano, on September 8, 1955 and a new one be issued in favour of
her.
The lower court granted the petition for the issuance of a new certificate, for
the reason that the death of the reservistavested the ownership of the
property in the petitioner as the sole reservatorio troncal.The oppositors,
heirs of the reservista Maria Cano, duly appealed from the order, insisting
that the ownership of the reservatorio can not be decreed in a mere
proceeding under sec. 112 of Act 496, but requires a judicial administration
proceedings, wherein the rights of appellee, as the reservatorio entitled to
the reservable property, are to be declared.
ISSUE: Is an intestacy proceeding still necessary?
RULING:No.
The reservatario is not the reservista's successor mortis causa nor is

the reservable property part of the reservista's estate;
the reservatarioreceives the property as a conditional heir of the
descendant ( prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line of origin
from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during
the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there
being reservatarios that survive the reservista, the latter must be deemed
to have enjoined no more than a life interest in the reservable property.
Hence, its acquisition by the reservatario may be entered in the property

records without necessity of estate proceedings, since the basic requisites
therefor appear of record. It is equally well settled that the reservable
property can not be transmitted by a reservista to her or his own
successors mortis causa,(like appellants herein) so long as
a reservatario within the third degree from the prepositus and belonging to
the line whence the property came, is in existence when
the reservista dies.
412 | P a g e
ARTICLE 898
DEL ROSARIO V. CONANAN

G.R. No. L-37903 March 30, 1977
MAKASIAR, J.
DOCTRINE: Where the nearest surviving relatives of the deceased are his
parents, spouse and an adopted child, Article 343 of the Civil Code in
relation to Article 1000 should apply in resolving their hereditary rights.
FACTS: On November 13, 1972, petitioner, legitimate mother of the

deceased, filed for the settlement and partition of her late son Felix del
Rosario who died on a plane crash. While oppositor Dorotea del Rosario is
the legitimate surviving wife of Felix. Dorotea and Felix had a legally
adopted child named Marilou del Rosario. The court dismissed the
petitioner’s petition based on the law on intestate succession that an
adopted child concurring with the surviving spouse of the adopter excludes
the legitimate ascendants from succession, ...therefore, the petitioner not
being included as intestate heir of the deceased cannot be considered as a
co-owner of or have any right over the properties sought to be partitioned.
ISSUE: Is petitioner, as the legitimate mother of the deceased, entitled toan

inheritance?
RULING: Yes.
The court opined that the governing provision is article 343 of the
New Civil Code. Under Article 343, an adopted child surviving with
legitimate parents of the deceased adopter, has the same successional
rights as an acknowledged natural child, which is comprehended in the
term "illegitimate children". Consequently, the respective shares of the
surviving spouse, ascendant and adopted child should be determined by
Article 1000 of the New Civil Code. It is most unfair to accord more
successional rights to the adopted, who is only related artificially by fiction
of law to the deceased, than those who are naturally related to him by
blood in the direct ascending line.
The applicability of Article 343 does not exclude the surviving parent of the
deceased adopter, not only because a contrary view would defeat the
intent of the framers of the law, but also because in intestate succession,
where legitimate parents or ascendants concur with the surviving spouse of
the deceased, the latter does not necessarily exclude the former from the
inheritance.
413 | P a g e
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA v. ESTELA DIZON
G.R. NO. L-24561
JUNE 30, 1970
TEEHANKEE, J.
DOCTRINE: The testamentary dispositions of the testatrix in favor of

compulsory heirs do not have to be taken only from the free portion of the
estate.
FACTS: Testatrix Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died and was survived by

seven compulsory heirs named Estela, Tomas, Bernardita, Marina,
Angelina and Josefina Dizon. Thereafter, the last will and testament of the
decedent was probated wherein appellee Marina Dizon-Rivera was
appointed executrix of the testatrix' estate. In her will, the testatrix
"commanded that her property be divided" in accordance with her
testamentary disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specific
real properties among her six children and eight grandchildren.
The lower court, sustained and approved the executrix' project of

partition, ruling that "Articles 906 and 907 of the New Civil Code specifically
provide that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall be
completed and satisfied”. While it is true that this process has been
followed and adhered to in the two projects of partition, it is observed that
the executrix and the oppositors differ in respect to the source from which
the portion shall be taken in order to fully restore the impaired legitime. The
proposition of the oppositors, if upheld, will substantially result in a
distribution of intestacy, which is in controversion of Article 791 of the New
Civil Code.
ISSUE: Is the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix' will are in

the nature of devises imputable to the free portion of her estate, and
therefore subject to reduction?
RULING: Yes, the testatrix' testamentary disposition was in the nature of

a partition of her estate by will. In the third paragraph of her will, in
accordance with the dispositions, she specified each real property in her
estate and designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory
heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same.
This right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right of
compulsory heirs to their legitime as provided under Article 906 and Article
The second paragraph of Article 912 Civil Code covers precisely the
case of the executrix-appellee, who admittedly was favored by the testatrix
with the large bulk of her estate in providing that "The devisee who is
entitled to a legitime may retain the entire property, provided its value does
not exceed that of the disposable portion and of the share pertaining to him
as legitime."
414 | P a g e
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL
RIGOR. THE PARISH PRIEST OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH
OF VICTORIA, TARLAC v. BELINA RIGOR
G.R. NO. L-22036
APRIL 30, 1979
AQUINO, J.
DOCTRINE: Legal succession takes place when the will "does not
dispose of all that belongs to the testator”.
FACTS: This case is about the efficaciousness or enforceability of a

devise of ricelands. That devise was made in the will of the late Father
Pascual Rigor, in favor of his nearest male relative who would study for the
priesthood. The record discloses that Father Rigor, the parish priest of
Pulilan, Bulacan, died leaving a will which was probated wherein the
testator gave a devise to his cousin, FortunatoGamalinda.
The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to be a trustee of the said lands,
appealed alleging that the said devise was inoperative. The intestate heirs
of Father Rigor countered a petition praying that they be adjudged as the
persons entitled to the said ricelands since, as admitted by the parish priest
of Victoria, "no nearest male relative of the testator has ever studied for the
priesthood". That petition was opposed by the parish priest of Victoria.
ISSUE: Is the bequest in question inoperative?
HELD: Yes, inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew
who became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in
question was ineffectual or inoperative. It should be understood that the
parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee only when the testator's
nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to become a priest, had
not yet entered the seminary or, having been ordained a priest, he was
excommunicated. Those two contingencies did not arise, and could not
have arisen in this case because no nephew of the testator manifested any
intention to enter the seminary or ever became a priest.
There being no substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands the

same should be distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The Civil Code
recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate, or that
there may be mixed succession. The old rule as to the indivisibility of the
testator's will is no longer valid. Thus, if a conditional legacy does not take
effect, there will be intestate succession as to the property recovered by the
said legacy.
415 | P a g e
G.R. NO. 140975
DECEMBER 8, 2000
VITUG, J.
DOCTRINE: Collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews

and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of
proximity, expressed in Article 962 of the Civil Code is an absolute rule.
FACTS: Petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in the

intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H. Piedad asserting
entitlement to a share of the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad.
Petitioner assailed the finality of the order of the trial court awarding the
entire estate to respondent PastoraPiedad contending that the proceedings
were tainted with procedural infirmities. The trial court denied the motion,
prompting petitioner to raise her case to the Court of Appeals. Respondent
sought the dismissal of the appeal on the thesis that the issues brought up
on appeal only involved pure questions of law.
ISSUE: Can petitioner, a collateral relative of the fifth civil degree,

inherit alongside respondent, a collateral relative of the third civil degree?
RULING: No, Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or

ascendants. Respondent is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a third-
degree relative of the decedent, while petitioner is the daughter of a first
cousin of the deceased, or a fifth-degree relative of the decedent. The rule
on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the
decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the
extent that the right of representation can apply as provided on Article 962
of the Civil.Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the
late Augusto H. Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree,
from succeeding abintestato to the estate of the decedent.
416 | P a g e
G.R. NO. 140975
DECEMBER 8, 2000
VITUG, J.
DOCTRINE: Right of representation is proper only in the descending

never in the ascending line.
FACTS: Petitioner Ofelia Hernando Bagunu moved to intervene in the

intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H. Piedad asserting
entitlement to a share of the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad.
Petitioner assailed the finality of the order of the trial court awarding the
entire estate to respondent PastoraPiedad contending that the proceedings
were tainted with procedural infirmities. The trial court denied the motion,
prompting petitioner to raise her case to the Court of Appeals. Respondent
sought the dismissal of the appeal on the thesis that the issues brought up
on appeal only involved pure questions of law.
ISSUE: Will the rule on proximity in intestate succession find application

among collateral relatives?
RULING: By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a

decedent is, by operation of law, "raised to the same place and degree" of
relationship as that of a closer blood relative of the same decedent. The
representative thereby steps into the shoes of the person he represents
and succeeds, not from the latter, but from the person to whose estate the
person represented would have succeeded.
In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the

descending, never in the ascending, line. In the collateral line, the right of
representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or
sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or
aunts.
The right of representation does not apply to "other collateral relatives

within the fifth civil degree" (to which group both petitioner and respondent
belong) who are sixth in the order of preference following, firstly, the
legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and
ascendants, thirdly, the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the
surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and sisters/nephews and nieces,
of the decedent.
417 | P a g e
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA
VS
ROSALES
G.R. NO. L-40789, FEBRUARY 27, 1987
GANCAYCO, J.:
DOCTRINE:
Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person
represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were
living or if he could have inherited. (Civil Code Art. 970)
FACTS:
On February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra Rosales died intestate. She was
survived by her husband Fortunato Rosales and their two children Magna
Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales,
predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his
widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. Magna Rosales Acebes
instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
The trial court ordered that Fortunato, Magna, Macikequerox and Antonio
be entitled each to ¼ share in the estate of decedent. Irenea, on the other
hand, insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the
surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased,
claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law.
ISSUE: Is Macikequerox the rightful representative of Carterio Rosales?
RULING: YES.
Under the law, intestate or legal heirs are classified into two groups,
namely, those who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the
right of representation. The essence and nature of the right of
representation is explained by Articles 970 and 971 of the Civil Code. In
Article 970 it states that representation is a right created by fiction of law,
by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree
of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would
have if he were living or if he could have inherited.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving
spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The right of representation
is provided for in Article 981 of the same law. Indeed, the surviving spouse
is considered a third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law.
418 | P a g e
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA
VS
ROSALES
G.R. NO. L-40789, FEBRUARY 27, 1987
GANCAYCO, J.:
DOCTRINE:
The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the
person represented. The representative does not succeed the person
represented but the one whom the person represented would have
succeeded. (Civil Code Art. 971)
FACTS:
On February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra Rosales died intestate. She was
survived by her husband Fortunato Rosales and their two children Magna
Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales,
predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his
widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. Magna Rosales Acebes
instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
The trial court ordered that Fortunato, Magna, Macikequerox and Antonio
be entitled each to ¼ share in the estate of decedent. Irenea, on the other
hand, insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the
surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased,
claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law.
ISSUE: Is Irenea entitled to inherit from her mother-in-law?
RULING: NO.
Irenea misinterpreted the provision of Article 887 of the Civil Code because
the provision refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the
surviving spouse is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a
parent-in-law.
Article 971 of the same code states that the representative is called to the
succession by the law and not by the person represented. The
representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom
the person represented would have succeeded. Macikequerox Rosales is
called to succession by law because of his blood relationship. He does not
succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the person represented) who
predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his
father would have succeeded. Irenea cannot assert the same right of
representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.
419 | P a g e
BICOMONG VS ALMANZA
G.R. NO. L-37365 NOVEMBER 29, 1977
GUERRERO, J.:
DOCTRINE:
Nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in their own right and they alone
do not inherit by right of representation (that is per stirpes) unless
concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased.
FACTS:
Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas with three children
namely: Perpetua, Igmedia, and Ignacio. Sisenanda Barcenas died ahead
of her husband Simeon Bagsic. Simeon Bagsic remarried Silvestra
Glorioso. Of this second marriage were born two children, Felipa and
Maura. Simeon Bagsic and Silvestra Glorioso died. Ignacio Bagsic died
leaving the plaintiff Francisca Bagsic as his only heir. Igmedia Bagsic also
died survived by the plaintiffs Dionisio Tolentino, Maria Tolentino and Petra
Tolentino. Perpetua Bagsic died and was survived by her heirs, the
plaintiffs Gaudencio Bicomong, Felicidad Bicomong, Salome Bicomong,
and Gervacio Bicomong.
Of the children of the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died leaving no heir.
Felipa Bagsic also died leaving her husband Geronimo Almanza and
Engracio Manese the husband of her daughter Cristeta Almanza who died
five (5) months before the present suit was filed. The case concerns the
one-half undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the five (5) parcels of land
which she inherited from her deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso. Three
sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint on December 1, 1959, namely: (a) the
Bicomongs, children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the Tolentinos, children of
Igmedia Bagsic; and (c) Francisco Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic,
against the defendants Geronimo Almanza and Engracio Menese for the
recovery of their lawful shares in the properties left by Maura Bagsic.
ISSUE: Is the plaintiffs entitled to inherit in their own right?
RULING: YES.
They inherit in their own right and not by right of representation. The
contention that Maura Bagsic should be succeeded by Felipa Bagsic, her
sister of full blood, to the exclusion of the nephews and nieces of half blood
citing Art. 1004, NCC is invalid for it is based on an erroneous factual
assumption, that is, that Felipa Bagsic died in 1955, which is not true as
she died on May 9, 1945, thus she predeceased her sister Maura Bagsic.
Article 975 of the New Civil Code states that when children of one or more
brothers or sisters of tile deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter
by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they
alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions. This provision makes no
420 | P a g e
qualification as to whether the nephews or nieces are on the maternal or
paternal line and without preference as to whether their relationship to the
deceased is by whole or half blood, the sole niece of whole blood of the
deceased does not exclude the ten nephews and niece of half blood.
421 | P a g e
TEOTICO VS. DEL VAL
G.R. NO. L-18753, MARCH 26, 1965
DOCTRINE:
Relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and
adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents
except only as expressly provided by law.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the
same manner as a legitimate child. (Civil Code Art. 979)
FACTS:
Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties worth P600,000. She
executed a will written in Spanish, affixed her signature and acknowledged
before Notary Public by her and the witnesses. Among the legacies made
in the will was the P20,000 for Rene Teotico who was married to the
testatrix’s niece, Josefina Mortera. The usufruct of Maria’s interest in the
Calvo Building were left to the said spouses and the ownership thereof was
left in equal parts to her grandchildren, the legitimate children of said
spouses. Josefina was likewise instituted, as sole and universal heir to all
the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed by will. Vicente
Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will but was opposed by Ana
del Val Chan, claiming that she was an adopted child of Francisca
(deceased sister of Maria) and an acknowledged natural child of Jose
(deceased brother of Maria), that said will was not executed as required by
law and that Maria as physically and mentally incapable to execute the will
at the time of its execution and was executed under duress, threat, or
influence of fear.
ISSUE: Has Ana del Val Chan have the right to intervene in this proceeding
as an heir?
RULING: NO.
She would not acquire any interest in any portion of the estate left by the
testatrix. She would acquire such right only if she was a legal heir of the
deceased.
Under Art. 979 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, an adopted child succeeds to
the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate
child. Relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter
and adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents
except only as expressly provided by law. As a consequence, she is an heir
of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
422 | P a g e
In Article 992 of our Civil Code it states that an illegitimate child has no right
to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father
or mother.
It is true that she claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Jose and
also an adopted daughter of Francisca. But the law does not give her any
right to succeed to the estate of Maria because being an illegitimate child
she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her
natural father.
423 | P a g e
Sayson v. CA
GR 892224-25, January 23, 1992
DOCTRINE: Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the

parents…An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting
parents in the same manner as a legitimate child
FACTS:
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot 5 children: Mauricio, Rosario,

Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Teodoro married Isabela. Upon the death
of Teodoro and Isabela, their properties were in the possession of Delia,
Edmundo and Doribel, their children. The plaintiffs filed for partition of the
intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabela. It was opposed by Delia, Edmundo
and Doribel alleging their successional rights to the estate as the
lawful descendants. Subsequently, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed
for partition of intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela as they are entitled to
inherit Teodoro’s share in his parents’ estate by right of representation
because Delia and Edmundo are adopted children and Doribel was
legitimate daughter.
The RTC found the defendants qualified to inherit from Eleno and
Rafaela by right of representation. However, the Court of Appeals found
Delia and Edmundo disqualified from inheriting from the decedent.
ISSUE:
May Delia, Edmundo and Doribel inherit from the estate of Eleno
and Rafaela by right of representation?
RULING:
As to Doribel, YES, for she was a legitimate daughter of Teodoro and

thus granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela. But as to Delia and Edmundo, it
is NO. The Court cited Art. 979 of the New Civil Code which expressly
provides that “Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the
parents…An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting
parents in the same manner as a legitimate child”.
Here Doribel has right to represent her deceased father in

the distribution of intestate estate of her grandparents. She is entitled to the
share her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall
be equal to the shares of her grandparents’ other children. But for
Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were total
strangers, cannot inherit by representation. While it is true that the adopted
child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as
424 | P a g e
the latter, these rights do not include right of representation. The
relationship created by the adoption is between the adopting parents and
the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relative of either party.
425 | P a g e
HEIRS OF JOAQUIN TEVES VS CA
GR No. 109963, October 13, 1999
DOCTRINE: An extrajudicial settlement is a contract and it is a well-

entrenched doctrine that the law does not relieve a party from the effects of
a contract, entered into with all the required formalities and with full
awareness of what he was doing, simply because the contract turned out to
be a foolish or unwise investment
FACTS:
Spouses Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves died intestate and
without debts in 1943 and 1953, respectively. During their lifetime, the
spouses own two parcels of land registered in the name of Marcelina and
another lot registered in the name of Joaquin and his two sisters. However,
Joaquin’s sisters died without issue, causing the entire property to pass to
him. After Marcelina and Joaquin died, their children executed extrajudicial
settlements purporting to adjudicate unto themselves the ownership over
the two parcels of land and to alienate their shares thereto in favor of their
sister Asuncion Teves for a consideration. The division of the subject lot
was embodied in two deeds. The first Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and
Sale was entered into on June 13, 1956 while the second deed was
executed on April 21, 1959. The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and sale
was executed on December 14, 1971. After the death of Asuncion Teves,
her children, private respondents, extrajudicially settled
her property, adjudicating unto themselves said lots.
However, Cresenciano Teves, one of the heirs was not a signatory to the
two alleged Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, and thru his son Ricardo
contended that they should not be affected by the sale to Asuncion Teves,
and hence, be given back their share in the inheritance.
ISSUE: Should the extrajudicial settlements be upheld?
HELD: Yes. An extrajudicial settlement is a contract and it is a well-

entrenched doctrine that the law does not relieve a party from the effects of
a contract, entered into with all the required formalities and with full
awareness of what he was doing, simply because the contract turned out to
be a foolish or unwise investment. Therefore, although plaintiffs-appellants
may regret having alienated heir hereditary shares in favor of their sister
Asuncion, they must now be considered bound by their own contractual
acts.
But in the part of Cresenciano represented by his son Ricardo Teves, he is

given 1/8 part of Lot 769-A because according to Art. 980 of the New Civil
Code “ The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their
426 | P a g e
own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares”. Since they are all 8 in
the family, the inheritance must be divided in equal shares, thus
Cresenciano thru his predescessor-in-interest must be him his share and
not to be subjected to the conveyance to Asuncion Teves and her children.
427 | P a g e
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF SUNTAY VS
SUNTAY
GR.NO. 183053
DOCTRINE: Article 99216 of the Civil Code bars the illegitimate child from
inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father
or mother.
FACTS:
On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina),

married to Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate. In 1979, their
only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina
and Federico. At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her
husband, Federico, and several grandchildren, including herein petitioner
Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay.
During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they
begot three children, namely: herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and
Emilio II, all surnamed Cojuangco-Suntay. Emilio I's marriage to Isabel
Cojuangco was subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two
children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay Tañedo (Nenita), by
two different women, Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos,
respectively.
Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever since he was
a mere baby, nine months old, by the spouses Federico and Cristina and
was an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I. Nenita is an acknowledged
natural child of Emilio I and was likewise brought up by the spouses
Federico and Cristina. Significantly, Federico, after the death of his spouse,
Cristina, or on September 27, 1993, adopted their illegitimate
grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
ISSUE:
Is Emilio III deemed exlcluded from the administration of the

decedent’s estate?
HELD:
No. the Court ruled that jurisprudence has consistently held that Article
99216 of the Civil Code bars the illegitimate child from inheriting ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother.
Thus, Emilio III, who is barred from inheriting from his grandmother, cannot
be preferred over respondent in the administration of the estate of their
grandmother, the decedent;
428 | P a g e
From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding Emilio
III from the administration of the decedent's estate. As Federico's adopted
son, Emilio III's interest in the estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this
Court as the interest therein of respondent, considering that the CA even
declared that "under the law, [Federico], being the surviving spouse, would
have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the
decedent, aside from his share in the conjugal partnership."
429 | P a g e
DIAZ VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. NO. 66574, FEBRUARY 21, 1990
DOCTRINE: The term relatives in “Article 992 of New Civil Code” in more
restrictive sense than it is used and intended; is not warranted by any rule
of interpretation. Besides, when the law intends to use the term in a more
restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in Articles
1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.
FACTS:
It is undisputed that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda.

de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only
legitimate child of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; that
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the
mother of Pablo Santero; that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of
his parents;that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and
Simona Santero in 1976; that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was
survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor natural children
to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with
Felixberta Pacursa.
ISSUE:
Who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero — her niece
Felisa Pamuti-Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo
Santero)?
HELD:
Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the
respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in
holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate
estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
The term relatives in “Article 992 of New Civil Code” in more restrictive
sense than it is used and intended; is not warranted by any rule of
interpretation. Besides, when the law intends to use the term in a more
restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in Articles
1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.
430 | P a g e
OLIVIA PASCUAL v. ESPERANZA PASCUAL- BAUTISTA
G.R NO. 84240
MARCH 25, 1992
PARAS, J.
DOCTRINE: The right of representation is not available to illegitimate

descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate
grandparent.
FACTS: Don Andres Pascual died intestate. Petitioners Olivia and

Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural children of
the late EligioPascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent
Don Andres Pascual. The heirs entered into a compromise agreement,
over the vehement objections of the herein petitioners. The said
Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the Manifestation of
the petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, alleging their hereditary
rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual, their uncle. Petitioners
contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article 992 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines.
ISSUE: Can Article 992 of the Civil Code be interpreted to exclude

recognized natural children from the inheritance of the deceased?
RULING: No.Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron

curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession abintestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or
mother of said legitimate child. Between the legitimate family and
illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and
incompatibility.Finally, under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate
children are generally placed under one category, which undoubtedly
settles the issue as to whether or not acknowledged natural children should
be treated differently, in the negative.It may be said that the law may be
harsh but that is the law.
431 | P a g e
TOMAS CORPUS v. ESTATE OF TEODORO R. YANGCO
G.R. NO. L – 22469
OCTOBER 23, 1978
AQUINO, J.
DOCTRINE: Legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her

illegitimate child.
FACTS: Teodoro R. Yangco died without forced heirs. At the time of his
death, his nearest relatives were: (1)his half brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2)his
half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Ossorio (3)Amalia Corpus, Jose
A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo
Corpus, and (4)Juanita Corpus, the daughter of his half brother Jose
Corpus. Thereafter, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita corpus, filed
an action to recover her supposed share in Yangco intestate estate. He
alleged in his complaint that the dispositions in Yangco’s will has perpetual
prohibitions upon alienation which rendered it void under article 785 of the
old Civil Code and that the 1949 partition is invalid therefore, the
decedent's estate should be distributed according to the rules on intestacy.
ISSUE: Can Tomas Corpus recover his mother's supposed intestate

share in Yangco's estate?
HELD: Article 992 of the Civil Code provides that "an illegitimate child
has no right to inherit abintestato from the legitimate children and relatives
of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the
same manner from the illegitimate child".That rule is based on the theory
that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate
family while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate
child.Following the rule in article 992, formerly article 943, it was held that
the legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child.
432 | P a g e
CRESENCIANO LEORNARDO v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. L-51263
FEBRUARY 28, 1983
DE CASTRO, J.
DOCTRINE: The right of representation cannot be applied to those

children born outside wedlock or when the putative father and mother’s
previous marriage is subsisting.
FACTS: Francisca Reyes who died intestate on July 12, 1942 was
survived by two (2) daughters, Maria and SilvestraCailles and a grandson,
Sotero Leonardo, the son of her daughter, PascualaCailles who
predeceased her. Petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son
of the late Sotero Leonardo, filed a complaint for ownership of properties
praying to be declared one of the lawful heirs of the deceased Francisca
Reyes and to have an accounting of all the income derived from said
properties from the time defendants took possession thereof until said
accounting shall have been made, delivering to him his share therein with
legal interest. In her answer, private respondent Maria Cailles asserted
exclusive ownership over the subject properties and alleged that petitioner
is an illegitimate child who cannot succeed by right of representation.
ISSUE: As the great grandson of Francisca Reyes, can petitioner inherit

by representation?
HELD: No.Even if it is true that petitioner is the child of Sotero

Leonardo, still he cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the
estate left by the deceased Francisca Reyes considering that, as found by
the Court of Appeals, he was born outside wedlock as shown by the fact
that when he was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged putative father
and mother were not yet married, and his alleged father's first marriage
was still subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who
has no right to inherit abintestato from the legitimate children and relatives
of his father, like the deceased Francisca Reyes as provided under Article
433 | P a g e
HEIRS OF SANDEJAS v. ALEX A. LINA
G.R. NO. 141634
FEBRUARY 5, 2001
PANGANIBAN, J.
DOCTRINE: A contract of sale is not invalidated by the fact that it is

subject to probate court approval. The transaction remains binding on the
seller-heir, but not on the other heirs who have not given their consent to it.
In settling the estate of the deceased, a probate court has jurisdiction over
matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers.
FACTS: EliodoroSandejas, Sr. filed a petition praying that letters of

administration be issued in his favor for the settlement of the estate of his
wife, Remedios R. Sandejas.A petition-in-intervention was filed by Alex A.
Lina alleging that administrator Eliodoro P. Sandejas sold the subject lands
which formed part of the estate of the late Remedios R. Sandejas.
Thereafter, intervenor filed an Omnibus Motion to approve the deed of
conditional sale executed between Plaintiff-in-lntervention Alex A. Lina and
ElidioroSandejas.
Petitioners aver that the Court of Appeal's computation of Eliodoro

Sr.'s share in the disputed parcels of land was erroneous because, as the
conjugal partner of Remedios, he owned one half of these lots plus a
further one tenth of the remaining half, in his capacity as a one of her legal
heirs. Hence, Eliodoro's share should be 11/20 of the entire property. On
the other hand, the CA held that, the conditional sale should cover the one
half (1/2) pro indiviso conjugal share of Eliodoro plus his one tenth (1/10)
hereditary share as one of the ten legal heirs of the decedent, or a total of
three fifths (3/5) of the lots in administration.
ISSUE: Is the share of Eliodorobe 3/5 as held by the Court of Appeals?
HELD: No, the share of Eliodoro should be 11/20 of the entire property
based on the remaining half, after deducting the conjugal share.
Succession laws and jurisprudence require that when a marriage is
dissolved by the death of the husband or the wife, the decedent's entire
estate under the concept of conjugal properties of gains must be divided
equally, with one half going to the surviving spouse and the other half to the
heirs of the deceased. After the settlement of the debts and obligations, the
remaining half of the estate is then distributed to the legal heirs, legatees
and devices.
In this case, however, a preliminary determination of the decedent's

estate has already been taken into account by the parties, since the only
issue raised in this case is whether Eliodoro's share is 11/20 or 3/5 of the
disputed lots.
434 | P a g e
G.R. No. 136467 April 6, 2000
ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner,
vs.
MARIETTA CALISTERIO, respondent.
VITUG, J.
DOCTRINE A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not

necessaryas long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally
noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit
mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a
competent court." It follows that the burden of proof would be, in these
cases, on the party assailing the second marriage.
FACTS: Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had

previously been married to James William Bounds on 13 January 1946 at
Caloocan City. James Bounds disappeared without a trace on 11 February
1947. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years later, or on 08
May 1958, without Marietta having priorly secured a court declaration that
James was presumptively dead.
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a

surviving sister of Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of
Quezon City, Branch 104, a petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate
Estate of the Deceased TeodoricoCalisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas,
Petitioner," claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving heir of
TeodoricoCalisterio, the marriage between the latter and respondent
Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and
void.
ISSUE: is the marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent

Marietta valid ?
RULING:
435 | P a g e
No. The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent
Marietta was solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law in force at that time was
the Civil Code, not the Family Code which took effect only on 03 August
1988. Article 256 of the Family Code 5 itself limited its retroactive
governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws.Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during
the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than
such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at
the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having
news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as
dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is
presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so
contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null
and void by a competent court.
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not

necessaryas long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally
noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit
mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a
competent court." It follows that the burden of proof would be, in these
cases, on the party assailing the second marriage.
SUCCESSIONAL RIGHTS
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having

been adduced to indicate another property regime between the spouses,
pertains to them in common. Upon its dissolution with the death of
Teodorico, the property should rightly be divided in two equal portions —
one portion going to the surviving spouse and the other portion to the
estate of the deceased spouse. The successional right in intestacy of a
surviving spouse over the net estate of the deceased, concurring with
legitimate brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces (the latter by right of
436 | P a g e
representation), is one-half of the inheritance, the brothers and sisters or
nephews and nieces, being entitled to the other half. Nephews and nieces,
however, can only succeed by right of representation in the presence of
uncles and aunts; alone, upon the other hand, nephews and nieces can
succeed in their own right which is to say that brothers or sisters exclude
nephews and nieces except only in representation by the latter of their
parents who predecease or are incapacitated to succeed. The appellate
court has thus erred in granting, in paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion
of its judgment, successional rights, to petitioner's children, along with their
own mother Antonia who herself is invoking successional rights over the
estate of her deceased brother.
437 | P a g e
G.R. No. L-19281 June 30, 1965
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO

SANTILLON, CLARO SANTILLON, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO U. MIRANDA and ROSARIO

CORRALES, oppositors-appellees.
BENGZON, C.J.:
DOCTRINEIf a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants

are left, the surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that
of each of the children.
TOPIC : ARTICLE 996
FACTS:On November 21, 1953, Santillon died without testament in Tayug,

Pangasinan, his residence, leaving one son, Claro, and his wife, Perfecta
Miranda. During his marriage, Pedro acquired several parcels of land
located in that province.
On April 25, 1961, Claro filed a "Motion to Declare Share of Heirs"

and to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties with respect to their
respective rights in the estate. Invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil Code, he
insisted that after deducting 1/2 from the conjugal properties is the conjugal
share of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2 must be divided as follows: 1/4 for her
and 3/4 for him. Oppositor Perfecta, on the other hand, claimed that
besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of the New Civil
Code to another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words, Claro claimed 3/4
of Pedro's inheritance, while Perfecta claimed 1/2.
ISSUE: is Perfecta entitled to ½ or ¼ of the ½ of the conjugal estate? In

alternative, is article 892 or 996 applicable in this case ?
HELD:
Perfecta is entitled to ½ of the ½ of the conjugal estate or the estate

of Pedro.
438 | P a g e
Art. 996 provides that If a widow or widower and legitimate children or
descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the succession the same
share as that of each of the children.
Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the chapter on
Testamentary Succession; whereas Art. 996 comes under the chapter on
Legal or Intestate Succession. Such being the case, it is obvious that Claro
cannot rely on Art. 892 to support his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate. Art
892 merely fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse and Art. 888 thereof,
the legitime of children in testate succession. While it may indicate the
intent of the law with respect to the ideal shares that a child and a spouse
should get when they concur with each other, it does not fix the amount of
shares that such child and spouse are entitled to when intestacy occurs.
Because if the latter happens, the pertinent provision on intestate
succession shall apply, i.e., Art. 996.
439 | P a g e
G.R. No. L-37903 March 30, 1977
GERTRUDES L. DEL ROSARIO, petitioner,
vs.
DOROTEA O. CONANAN and MARILOU DEL ROSARIO, respondents.\
MAKASIAR, J.
DOCTRINE: If legitimate ascendants, the surviving spouse and illegitimate

children are left, the ascendants shall be entitled to one half of the
inheritance, and the other half shall be divided between the surviving
spouse and the illegitimate children so that such widow or widower shall
have one-fourth of the estate, the illegitimate children the other fourth
TOPIC : ARTICLE 1000
FACTS:On November 13, 1972, petitioner filed with the court below the
petition for settlement and partition of estate, subject of which is the estate
left by her late son, Felix L. del Rosario, who died in a plane crash on
September 12, 1969 at Antipolo, Rizal. Felix was survived by his adopted
child MARILOU DEL ROSARIO, wife DOROTEA DEL ROSARIO
CONANAN and his mother petitioner GERTRUDES L. DEL ROSARIO.
ISSUE: is petitioner as legitimate ascendant excluded from the inheritance

of FELIX DEL ROSARIO? Considering that FELIX is survived by and
adopted child and his spouse.
RULING: No. The petitioner is not excluded.The lower court found the
following the new provisions of the New Civil Code gername to the instant
case:
Art. 341. The adoption shall:
(1) Give to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he
were a legitimate child of the adopted;
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the parents by nature;
(3) Make the adopted person a legal heir of the adopted;
440 | P a g e
(4) Entitle the adopted person to use the adopter's surname."
Art. 978. Succession pertains, in the first place, to the decending

direct line.
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their decendantssuceed the parents

and the other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if
they should come from different marriages.
WE opine that the governing provision is the hereinafter quoted article 343
of the New Civil Code, in relation to Articles 893 and 1000 of said law,
which directs that:
Art. 343. If the adopter is survived by legitimate parents or ascendants

and by an adopted person. the latter shall not have more successional
rights than an acknowledged natural child.
Article 343 of the New Civil Code is qualification to Article 341 which gives
an adopted child the same rights and duties as though he were a legitimate
child. The reason for this is that:
(I)t is unjust to exclude the adopter's parents from the inheritance in facor
of an adopted person (Report of the Code Commission, p. 92).
It is most unfair to accord more successional rights to the adopted, who is

only related artificially by fiction of law to the deceased, than those who are
naturally related to him by blood in the direct ascending line.
The applicability of Article 343 does not exclude the surviving parent of the
deceased adopter, not only because a contrary view would defeat the
intent of the framers of the law, but also because in intestate succession,
where legitimate parents or ascendants concur with the surviving spouse of
the deceased, the latter does not necessarily exclude the former from the
inheritance. This is affirmed by Article 893 of the New Civil Code which
states:
If the testator leaves no legitimate descendants, but leaves legitimate

ascendants, the surviving spouse shall have a right to onefourth (only) of
the hereditary estate.
441 | P a g e
This fourth shall be taken from the free portion.
Article 343 does not require that the concurring heirs should be the aodpted
child and the legitimate parents or ascendants only. The language of the
law is clear, and a contrary view cannot be presumed.
It is, thus, OUR view that Article 343 should be made to apply, consonant
with the cardinal rule in statutory construction that all the provisions of the
New Civil Code must be reconciled and given effect.
Under Article 343, an adopted child surviving with legitimate parents of the
deceased adopter, has the same successional rights as an acknowledged
natural child, which is comprehended in the term "illegitimate children".
Consequently , the respective shares of the surviving spouse, ascendant
and adopted child should be determined by Article 1000 of the New Civil
Code, which reads:
Art. 1000. If legitimate ascendants, the surviving spouse and

illegitimate children are left, the ascendants shall be entitled to one half of
the inheritance, and the other half shall be divided between the surviving
spouse and the illegitimate children so that such widow or widower shall
have one-fourth of the estate, the illegitimate children the other fourth.
442 | P a g e
G.R. No. 73275 May 20, 1987
FLOCERFINA BARANDA, Assisted by Husband, ELIAS FABON,

HERMINIA BARANDA RECATO represented by LILIA R. TORRENTE,
as Attorney-in-Fact, TEODORO BARANDA represented by JUANITA
VICTORIA as Attorney-in-Fact, ALIPIO VILLARTA and SALVACION
BARANDA, petitioners,
vs.
EVANGELINA G. BARANDA, ELISA G. BARANDA, and THE

HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
DOCTRINE Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and
nieces, who are the children of the descendant's brothers and sisters of the
full blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stirpes
FACTS:
[FAMILY TREE] Paulina Baranda died intestate without leaving any

direct descendants or ascendants, or compulsory heirs. She was survived,
however, by two brothers, namely, Pedro and Teodoro, and several
nephews and nieces, including the private respondents, as well as
petitioners FlocerfinaBaranda, SalvacionBaranda, and
AlipioBarandaVillarte, children of two deceased brothers and a sister. The
above- named persons, together with Pedro Baranda, who was not joined
as a petitioner because he is the father of the private respondents, and the
children of another deceased sister, are the legitimate intestate heirs of
Paulina Baranda.
The case involves reconveyance of 5 parcel of lands which were

simulatedly sold by deceased PAULIANA BARANDA to her nieces
EVANGELINA BARANDA AND ELISA BARANDA. On August 1, 1977, in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in which she alleged that she had
signed the said deeds of sale without knowing their contents and prayed
that Evangelina and Elisa be ordered to reconvey the lands subject thereof
to her. This complaint was later withdrawn pursuant to an agreement dated
August 2, 1977, under which the defendants, in exchange for such
443 | P a g e
withdrawal, obligated themselves to "execute absolute deeds of sale
covering the above-mentioned properties in favor of the First Party,"
meaning the plaintiff.
As it turned out, only Elisa reconveyed the lot deeded to her;

Evangelina never complied with the agreement; and when Paulina died in
1982, the certificate of title over the lots in question were still in the names
of Evangelina and Elisa Baranda.
April 26, 1982, the herein petitioners, claiming to be the legitimate

heirs of the late Paulina Baranda, filed a complaint against Evangelina and
Elisa Baranda in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the annulment of
the sale and the reconveyance of the lots, with damages. Judgment was
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. On appeal the judgment was reversed.
ISSUE: are petitioners the proper parties to question the validity of the
deed of sale.
RULING
Yes. The petitioners have legal standing to assail the validity of the
contract.
The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are the following:
Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate

children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed
to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles.
Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews
and nieces, who are the children of the descendant's brothers and
sisters of the full blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the
latter per stirpes
444 | P a g e
Art. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct
descending line, but never in the ascending.
In the collateral line it takes place only in favor of the children or

brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood.
As heirs, the petitioners have legal standing to challenge the deeds of

sale purportedly signed by Paulina Baranda for otherwise property claimed
to belong to her estate will be excluded therefrom to their prejudice. Their
claims are not merely contingent or expectant, as argued by the private
respondents, but are deemed to have vested in them upon Paulina
Baranda's death in 1982, as, under Article 777 of the Civil Code, "the rights
to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent." While they are not compulsory heirs, they are nonetheless
legitimate heirs and so, since they "stand to be benefited or injured by the
judgment or suit," are entitled to protect their share of successional rights.
This Court has repeatedly held that "the legal heirs of a decedent are
the parties in interest to commence ordinary actions arising out of the rights
belonging to the deceased, without separate judicial declaration as to their
being heirs of said decedent, provided that there is no pending special
proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate."
There being no pending special proceeding for the settlement of

Paulina Baranda's estate, the petitioners, as her intestate heirs, had the
right to sue for the reconveyance of the disputed properties, not to them,
but to the estate itself of the decedent, for distribution later in accordance
with law. Otherwise, no one else could question the simulated sales and
the subjects thereof would remain in the name of the alleged vendees, who
would thus have been permitted to benefit from their deception, In fact,
even if it were assumed that those suing through attorneys-in-fact were not
properly represented, the remaining petitioners would still have sufficed to
impugn the validity of the deeds of sale.
445 | P a g e
BICOMONG VS ALMANZA
G.R. NO. L-37365 NOVEMBER 29, 1977
GUERRERO, J.:
DOCTRINE: The application of the only difference in the right of

succession provided in Art. 1008, NCC in relation to Article 1006 of the
New Civil Code, in effect, entitle the sole niece of full blood to a share
double that of the nephews and nieces of half- blood
FACTS:
Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas and were born

three children namely: Perpetua, Igmedia, and Ignacio.
Sisenanda Barcenas predeceased Simeon Bagsic and remarried Silvestra
Glorioso. With the second marriage were born two children, Felipa
and Maura. Simeon Bagsic and Silvestra Glorioso later died.
Of the children on the first marriage, Ignacio Bagsic died leaving the
Francisca Bagsic as his only heir. Igmedia Bagsic also died survived by the
Dionisio Tolentino, Maria Tolentino and Petra Tolentino. Perpetua Bagsic
died and was survived by her heirs, the Gaudencio
Bicomong, Felicidad Bicomong, Salome Bicomong, and Gervacio
Bicomong. The surviving heirs of the first marriage were the plaintiff in this
case.
Of the children of the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died also

leaving no heir. Felipa Bagsic’s surviving heirs were Geronimo Almanza
and her daughter Cristeta Almanza. But five (5) months before the present
suit was filed or on July 23, 1959, Cristeta Almanza died leaving behind
her husband, the defendant herein Engracio Manese and her father
Geronimo Almanza.
The subject matter concerns the one-half undivided share of Maura

Bagsic in the following described five (5) parcels of land which she
inherited from her deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso. There were three
sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint on December 1, 1959, namely: (a) the
Bicomongs, children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the Tolentinos, children of
Igmedia Bagsic; and (c) Francisco Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in
the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City against
the defendants Geronimo Almanza and Engracio Menese for the recovery
of their lawful shares in the properties left by Maura Bagsic.
ISSUE:
Are the nephews and nieces, both full blood and half-blood, are
entitled to inherit in their own right?
RULING: YES
446 | P a g e
In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, Article 1003 of the New Civil Code provides that
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. It
appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue, and her
husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded
by the surviving collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full
blood and the ten (10) children of her brother and two (2) sisters of half
blood in accordance with the provision of Art. 975 of the New Civil Code.
By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces

are entitled to inherit in their own right. In Abellana-Bacayo vs. Ferraris-
Borromeo, L-19382, August 31, I965, 14 SCRA 986, this Court held that
"nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (that is
per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased."
Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as

to whether the nephews or nieces are on the maternal or paternal line and
without preference as to whether their relationship to the deceased is by
whole or half blood, the sole niece of whole blood of the deceased does not
exclude the ten nephews and of half-blood. The only difference in their right
of succession is provided in Art. 1008, NCC in relation to Article 1006 of the
New Civil Code (supra), which provisions, in effect, entitle the sole niece of
full blood to a share double that of the nephews and nieces of half- blood.
Such distinction between whole and half- blood relationships with the
deceased has been recognized in Dionisia Padura, et al. vs. Melanie
Baldovino, et al., No. L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065
(unreported) and in Alviar vs. Alviar, No. L-22402, June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA
610).
Thus, the contention of the appellant that Maura Bagsic should be

succeeded by Felipa Bagsic, her sister of full blood, to the exclusion of the
nephews and nieces of half- blood citing Art. 1004, NCC is unmeritorious
and erroneous for it is based on an erroneous factual assumption, that is,
that Felipa Bagsic died in 1955, which as indicated here before, is not true
as she died on May 9, 1945, thus she predeceased her sister Maura
Bagsic.
447 | P a g e
GAUDENCIO BICOMONG vs. GERONIMO ALMANZA
L-37365. November 29, 1977
GUERRERO, J.:
DOCTRINE: In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate

children, or a surviving spouse, the New Civil Code provides that collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
FACTS:
Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas and were born
three children namely: Perpetua Bagsic, Igmedia Bagsic, and Ignacio
Bagsic. Sisenanda Barcenas died ahead of her husband Simeon Bagsic.
Simeon Bagsic remarried Silvestra Glorioso. Of this second marriage were
born two children, Felipa Bagsic and Maura Bagsic. Simeon Bagsic and
Silvestra Glorioso died. Ignacio Bagsic died leaving the plaintiff Francisca
Bagsic as his only heir. Igmedia Bagsic also died survived by the plaintiffs
Dionisio Tolentino, Maria Tolentino and Petra Tolentino. Perpetua Bagsic
died and was survived by her heirs, the plaintiffs Gaudencio Bicomong,
Felicidad Bicomong, Salome Bicomong, and Gervacio Bicomong.
Of the children of the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died also leaving no
heir as her husband died ahead of her. Felipa Bagsic, the other daughter of
the second Geronimo Almanza and her daughter Cristeta Almanza. But five
(5) months before the present suit was filed or on July 23, 1959, Cristeta
Almanza died leaving behind her husband, the defendant herein Engracio
Manese and her father Geronimo Almanza. The subject matter concerns
the one-half undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the following described
five (5) parcels of land which she inherited from her deceased mother,
Silvestra Glorioso. Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint on December
1, 1959, namely: (a) the Bicomongs, children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the
Tolentinos, children of Igmedia Bagsic; and (c) Francisco Bagsic, daughter
of Ignacio Bagsic, in the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo
City against the defendants Geronimo Almanza and Engracio Menese for
the recovery of their lawful shares in the properties left by Maura Bagsic.
ISSUE:
Are the nephews and nieces entitled to inherit in their own righ?.
RULING:
Yes. In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children,
or a surviving spouse, Article 1003 of the New Civil Code provides that
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. It
appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue, and her
husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded
by the surviving collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full
blood and the ten (10) children of her brother and two (2) sisters of half-
blood in accordance with the provision of Art. 975 of the New Civil Code.
448 | P a g e
By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are
entitled to inherit in their own right.
Under the same provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as
to whether the nephews or nieces are on the maternal or paternal line and
without preference as to whether their relationship to the deceased is by
whole or half blood, the sole niece of whole blood of the deceased does not
exclude the ten nephews and n of half-blood. The only difference in their
right of succession is provided in Art. 1008, NCC in relation to Article 1006
of the New Civil Code (supra), which provisions, in effect, entitle the sole
niece of full blood to a share double that of the nephews and nieces of half
blood.
449 | P a g e
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL
RIGOR. THE PARISH PRIEST OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH
OF VICTORIA, TARLAC, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. BELINA
RIGOR, NESTORA RIGOR, FRANCISCA ESCOBAR DE RIGOR AND
JOVITA ESCOBAR DE FAUSTO, RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.
[ G.R. No. L-22036, April 30, 1979 ]
Aquino J.:
Doctrine:
This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now
article 960(2), which provides that legal succession takes place when the
will "does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator". There being no
substitution nor accretion as... to the said rice lands, the same should be
distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator
had made no disposition as to the said rice lands.
Facts:
FatherPascual Rigor owned rice lands located at Guimba, Nueva

Ecija, with a total area of around forty-four hectares. That devise was
made in the will of... the late Father Pascual Rigor, a native of Victoria,
Tarlac, in favor of his nearest male relative who would study for the
priesthood.
Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on August 9,

1935, leaving a will executed on October 29, 1933.
Named as devises in the will were the testator's nearest relatives,

namely, his three sisters: Florencia Rigor-Escobar, Belina Rigor-Manaloto
and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The testator gave a devise to his cousin,
Fortunato Gamalinda.
About thirteen years after the approval of the project of partition, or on

February 19, 1954, the parish priest of Victoria filed in the pending testate
proceeding a petition praying for the appointment of a new administrator
The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered with a petition dated

March 25, 1957 praying that the bequest be declared inoperative and that
they be adjudged as the persons entitled to the said rice lands.
Issues:
Is the devise of the rice lands efficacious or enforceable?
450 | P a g e
Ruling:
From thetestamentary provisions, it may be deduced that the testator

intended to devise the rice lands to his nearest male relative who would
become a priest, who was forbidden to sell the rice lands, who would lose
the devise if he... discontinued his studies for the priesthood, or having
been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated, and who would be
obligated to say annually twenty masses with prayers for the repose of the
souls of the testator and his parents.
On the other hand, it is clear that the parish priest of Victoria would
administer the rice lands only in two situations: one, during the interval of
time that no nearest male relative of the testator was studying... for the
priesthood and two, in case the testator's nephew became a priest and he
was excommunicated.
We hold that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male
relative living at the time of his death and not to any indefinite time
thereafter.
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who

became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question
was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the rice
lands by the parish priestof Victoria, as envisaged in the will, was likewise
inoperative.
451 | P a g e
POLLY CAYETANO v. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS,
GR No. L-54919, 1984-05-30
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Digested by: NHASSIE JOHN G. GONZAGA
DOCTRINE: If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of

his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance
in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in
which he had estate.
FACTS:
On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father,
petitioner Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita
C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving
heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he
executed... an Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of the
Rules of Court whereby he adjudicated unto himself the ownership of the
entire estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos.
Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a

petition for the reprobate of a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos,
which was allegedly executed in the United States and for her appointment
as administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.
In her petition Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at
the time of her death and was a permanent resident of 4633 Ditman Street,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila on
January 31, 1977 while temporarily residing with her... sister at 2167
Leveriza, Malate, Manila; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last
will and testament on July 10, 1975, according to the laws of Pennsylvania,
U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of New Jersey as executor; that after
the testatrix' death, her last... will and testament was presented, probated,
allowed, and registered with the Registry of Wills at the County of
Philadelphia, U.S.A., that Clement L. McLaughlin, the administrator who
was appointed after Dr. Barzaga had declined and waived his appointment
as executor in favor of... the former, is also a resident of Philadelphia,
U.S.A., and that therefore, there is an urgent need for the appointment of
an administratrix to administer and eventually distribute the properties of
the estate located in the Philippines.
ISSUES: Will the national law of the decedent also apply as to the intrinsic
validity of the will?
RULING: YES
452 | P a g e
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and
thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the
private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the
time of her death, an American citizen and a... permanent resident of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and
1039 of the Civil which respectively provide:
Art. 16 par. (2).
xxx xxx xxx

"However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under... consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found."'
Art. 1039.
"Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the
decedent."...
the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania,
U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties
admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all
the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a... complete stranger, the
petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be
contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter
to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of

the will, as provided for by Article 16 (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the
national law of the decedent must apply, This was squarely applied in the
case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRN
358. wherein we ruled:

"It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be
involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend
the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically
chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of... successional rights, to the
decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general
ones.
xxx xxx xxx
"The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the
State of Texas, U.S.A. and under the law of Texas; there are no forced
heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of
the will and the amount of successional rights... are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine Law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy
of Amos G. Bellis."
453 | P a g e
Intestate Estate of the Late Vito Borromeo v. Borromeo,
G.R. No. L-55000, July 23, 1987.
Doctrine: The will of man is changeable. Even just before the moment of
his death he may change his mind. A person who accepts from a living
person an inheritance accepts or repudiates nothing at all. If a person is
uncertain of his right to inherit then his acceptance or repudiation is
ineffective
FACTS
Fortunato claimed a portion of the legitime being an illegitimate son of the

deceased, by incorporating a Waiver of Hereditary Rights supposedly
signed by the rest of the Borromeo’s. In the waiver, of the 9 heirs
relinquished to Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate. The
petitioners opposed this Waiver for reason that this is without force and
effect because there can be no effective waiver of hereditary rights before
there has been a valid acceptance of the inheritance from the heirs who
intend to transfer the same.
ISSUE: Was there a valid repudiation inheritance?
RULING
Pursuant to Article 1043 of the Civil Code, to make acceptance or

repudiation of inheritance valid, the person must be certain of the death of
the one from whom he is to inherit and of his right to the inheritance. Since
the petitioner and her co-heirs were not certain of their right to the
inheritance until they were declared heirs, their rights were, therefore,
uncertain.
The purported "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" cannot be considered to be

effective. For a waiver to exist, three elements are essential: (1) the
existence of a right; (2) the knowledge of the existence thereof; and (3) an
intention to relinquish such right. (People v. Salvador, (CA) 53 O.G. No. 22,
p. 8116, 8120). The intention to waive a right or advantage must be shown
clearly and convincingly, and when the only proof of intention rests in what
a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative
454 | P a g e
of an intent to, voluntarily relinquish the particular right or advantage that no
other reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible.
455 | P a g e
Imperial v. CA
G.R. No. 112483, October 8, 1999
DOCTRINE: The repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a public

or authentic instrument, or by petition presented to the court having
jurisdiction over the testamentary or intestate proceedings
FACTS:
Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a parcel of land. On July 7,

1951, Leoncio sold the said lot for P1.00 to his acknowledged natural son,
petitioner Eloy Imperial, who then acquired title over the land and
proceeded to subdivide it into several lots. Petitioner and respondents
admit that despite the contract’s designation as one of “Absolute Sale”, the
transaction was in fact a donation.
On January 8, 1962, Leoncio died, leaving only two heirs —petitioner, who
was his acknowledged natural son, and an adopted son, Victor Imperial.
On March 8, 1962, Victor was substituted in place of Leoncio in the case.
Fifteen years after, Victor died, single and without issue, survived only by
his natural father, Ricardo Villalon, who was a lessee of a portion of the
disputed land. Four years hence, or on September 25, 1981, Ricardo died,
leaving as his only heirs his two children, Cesar and Teresa Villalon.
Five years thereafter, or sometime in 1986, Cesar and Teresa filed a
complaint for annulment of the donation.
ISSUE:
May a renunciation of legitime that be presumed?
RULING:
No. There was no renunciation of legitime which may be presumed from

the foregoing acts. Our law on succession does not countenance tacit
repudiation of inheritance. Rather, it requires an express act on the part of
the heir. Thus, under Article 1051 of Civil Code: The repudiation of an
inheritance shall be made in a public or authentic instrument, or by petition
presented to the court having jurisdiction over the testamentary or intestate
proceedings. Thus, when Victor substituted Leoncio in Civil Case No. 1177
upon the latter’s death, his act of moving for execution of the compromise
judgment cannot be considered an act of renunciation of his legitime.
He was, therefore, not precluded or estopped from subsequently seeking
the reduction of the donation, under Article 772. Nor are Victor’s heirs,
upon his death, precluded from doing so, as their right to do so is expressly
recognized under Article 772, and also in Article 1053. If the heir should die
without having accepted or repudiated the inheritance, his right shall be
transmitted to his heirs.
456 | P a g e
Imperial v. CA
G.R. No. 112483, October 8, 1999
DOCTRINE: If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated

the inheritance, his right shall be transmitted to his heirs.
FACTS:
Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a parcel of land. On July 7,

1951, Leoncio sold the said lot for P1.00 to his acknowledged natural son,
petitioner Eloy Imperial, who then acquired title over the land and
proceeded to subdivide it into several lots. Petitioner and respondents
admit that despite the contract’s designation as one of “Absolute Sale”, the
transaction was in fact a donation.
On January 8, 1962, Leoncio died, leaving only two heirs —petitioner, who
was his acknowledged natural son, and an adopted son, Victor Imperial.
On March 8, 1962, Victor was substituted in place of Leoncio in the case.
Fifteen years after, Victor died, single and without issue, survived only by
his natural father, Ricardo Villalon, who was a lessee of a portion of the
disputed land. Four years hence, or on September 25, 1981, Ricardo died,
leaving as his only heirs his two children, Cesar and Teresa Villalon.
Five years thereafter, or sometime in 1986, Cesar and Teresa filed a
complaint for annulment of the donation.
Issue: Was the right of Victor transmitted to his heirs upon his death?
Held: Yes.
When Victor substituted Leoncio in Civil Case No. 1177 upon the latter's
death, his act of moving for execution of the compromise judgment cannot
be considered an act of renunciation of his legitime. He was, therefore, not
precluded or estopped from subsequently seeking the reduction of the
donation, under Article 772. Nor are Victor's heirs, upon his death,
precluded from doing so, as their right to do so is expressly recognized
under Article 772, and also in Article 1053:
If the heir should die without having accepted or repudiated the inheritance,
his right shall be transmitted to his heirs.
457 | P a g e
Octavio Maloles II vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 133359, January 31, 2000
DOCTRINE: One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all
his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed
FACTS:36
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati
City, filed a petition for probate of his will 1 in the Regional Trial Court. He
alleged that he had no compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as
sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he
disposed by his will his properties with an approximate value of not less
than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in the custody of the
named executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips.
Petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming that,

as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testator’s sister) and Octavio L.
Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin of Dr.
De Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator.
Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of the order allowing the will
and the issuance of letters of administration in his name.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de
Santos, has a right to intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of
letters testamentary filed by the respondent
RULING:
No. The petitioner in this case avers that, as the nearest next of kin
and creditor of the testator, his interest in the matter is material and direct.
Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be
considered an “heir” of the testator. It is a fundamental rule of testamentary
succession that one who has no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of
his entire estate by will. Thus, Article 842 of the Civil Code provides:
“One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or
any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.”
“One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he
does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the
legitimate of said heirs.”
Compulsory heirs are limited to the testator’s —
458 | P a g e
1. Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate
parents and ascendants;
2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect
to their legitimate children and descendants;
3. The widow or widower;
4. Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
5. Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir who may

have been preterited in the testator’s will. Nor does he have any right to
intervene in the settlement proceedings based on his allegation that he is
a creditor of the deceased. Since the testator instituted or named
an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the Court to respect the desires
of the testator. Only if the appointed executor is incompetent, refuses the
trust, or fails to give bond may the court appoint other persons to
administer the estate. None of these circumstances is present in this case.
459 | P a g e
ROWENA F. CORONA, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
DOCTRINE:
— The executrix’s choice of Special Administrator, considering her own

inability to serve and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the
testratix in her will, is entitled to the highest consideration. Objection to
Nenita Alonte’s appointment on grounds of impracticality and lack of
kinship are overshadowed by the fact that justice and equality demand that
the side of the deceased wife and the faction of the surviving husband be
represented in the management of the decedent’s estate.
FACTS:
On November 10, 1980, Dolores Luchangco Vitug died in New York,
U.S.A., leaving two Wills: one, a holographic Will dated October 3, 1980,
which excluded her husband, respondent Romarico G. Vitug, as one of her
heirs, and the other, a formal Will sworn to on October 24, 1980, or about
three weeks thereafter, which expressly disinherited her husband Romarico
"for reason of his improper and immoral conduct amounting to
concubinage, which is a ground for legal separation under Philippine Law" ;
bequeathed her properties in equal shares to her sisters Exaltacion L.
Allarde, Vicenta L. Faustino and Gloria L. Teoxon, and her nieces Rowena
F. Corona and Jennifer F. Way; and appointed Rowena F. Corona, herein
petitioner, as her Executrix.
On November 21, 1980, Rowena filed a petition for the probate of the Wills
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI (Spec. Procs. No.
9398), and for the appointment of Nenita P. Alonte as Administrator
because she (Rowena) is presently employed in the United Nations in New
York City.
On December 2, 1980, upon Rowena’s urgent Motion, the Probate Court

appointed Nenita P. Alonte as Special Administratrix, upon a P100,000.00
bond.
On December 12, 1980, the surviving husband, Romarico Vitug, filed an

"Opposition and Motion" and prayed that the Petition for Probate be denied
and that the two Wills be disallowed on the ground that they were procured
through undue and improper pressure and influence, having been executed
at a time when the decedent was seriously ill and under the medical care of
Dr. Antonio P. Corona; petitioner’s husband, and that the holographic Will
impaired his legitime. Romarico further prayed for his appointment as
Special Administrator because the Special Administratrix appointed is not
460 | P a g e
related to the heirs and has no interest to be protected, besides, the
surviving spouse is qualified to administer.
Oppositions to probate with almost identical arguments and prayers were

also filed by respondent (1) Avelino L. Castillo and Nicanor Castillo,
legitimate children of Constancia Luchangco, full blood sister of the
decedent; (2) Guillermo Luchangco, full blood brother of the decedent; (3)
Rodolfo Torres, Reynaldo Torres, and Purisima Torres Polintan, all
legitimate children of the deceased Lourdes Luchangco Torres, full blood
sister of the decedent.
On December 18, 1980, Nenita P. Alonte posted her bond and took her
oath of office before a Notary Public.
On February 6, 1981, the Probate Court set aside its Order of December 2,
1980 appointing Nenita as Special Administratrix, and appointed instead
the surviving husband, Romarico, as Special Administrator with a bond of
P200,000.00, essentially for the reasons that under Section 6, Rule 78, of
the Rules of Court, the surviving spouse is first in the order of preference
for appointment as Administrator as he has an interest in the estate; that
the disinheritance of the surviving spouse is not among the grounds of
disqualification for appointment as Administrator; that the next of kin is
appointed only where the surviving spouse is not competent or is unwilling
to serve besides the fact that the Executrix appointed, is not the next of kin
but merely a niece, and that the decedent’s estate is nothing more than half
of the unliquidated conjugal partnership property.
ISSUE: In case of appointment of administrator for the administration the

properties of a deceased person what rule shall govern?
Ruling:
Petitioner stresses that the order of preference laid down in the Rules
should not be followed where the surviving spouse is expressly
disinherited, opposes probate, and clearly possesses an adverse interest to
the estate which would disqualify him from the trust.
This Court, in resolving to give due course to the Petition taking into
account the allegations, arguments and issues raised by the parties, is of
the considered opinion that petitioner’s nominee, Nenita F. Alonte, should
be appointed as co-Special Administrator. The executrix’s choice of Special
Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude of
discretion given her by the testatrix in her Will (Annex "A-1), is entitled to
461 | P a g e
the highest consideration. Objections to Nenita’s appointment on grounds
of impracticality and lack of kinship are overshadowed by the fact that
justice and equity demand that the side of the deceased wife and the
faction of the surviving husband be represented in the management of the
decedent’s estate. 2
En passant, it is apropos to remind the Special Administrators that while

they may have respective interests to protect, they are officers of the Court
subject to the supervision and control of the Probate Court and are
expected to work for the best interests of the entire estate, its smooth
administration, and its earliest settlement.
462 | P a g e
G.R. No. 189776 December 15, 2010
AMELIA P. ARELLANO, represented by her duly appointed guardians,
AGNES P. ARELLANO and NONA P. ARELLANO,Petitioner,
vs.
FRANCISCO PASCUAL and MIGUEL PASCUAL, Respondents.
Doctrine:
The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any
legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was
left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner,
assuming that it was valid,18 is deemed as donation made to a "stranger,"
chargeable against the free portion of the estate.19 There being no
compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject to collation.
Facts:
Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his
siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her
daughters1 Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and
respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual.2
In a petition for "Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of
Letters of Administration," filed by respondents on April 28, 2000 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, respondents alleged, inter alia, that a
parcel of land (the donated property) located in Teresa Village, Makati,
which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent to petitioner
the validity of which donation respondents assailed, "may be considered as
an advance legitime" of petitioner.
Provisionally passing, however, upon the question of title to the donated
property only for the purpose of determining whether it formed part of the
decedent’s estate,4 the probate court found the Deed of Donation valid in
light of the presumption of validity of notarized documents. It thus went on
to hold that it is subject to collation following Article 1061 of the New Civil
Code which reads:5
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must
bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have
received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in
the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition.
Issue: Is the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation? NO
Ruling:
The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is a mere mathematical
operation by the addition of the value of donations made by the testator to
463 | P a g e
the value of the hereditary estate; and second, it is the return to the
hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative title by the testator
during his lifetime.13
The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory
heirs in so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding
the legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced.14
Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes
being to determine the legitime and the free portion. If there is no
compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded.15
The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or
concurring compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are
his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime – that
part of the testator’s property which he cannot dispose of because the law
has reserved it for compulsory heirs.16
The compulsory heirs may be classified into (1) primary, (2) secondary, and
(3) concurring. The primary compulsory heirs are those who have
precedence over and exclude other compulsory heirs; legitimate children
and descendants are primary compulsory heirs. The secondary compulsory
heirs are those who succeed only in the absence of the primary heirs; the
legitimate parents and ascendants are secondary compulsory heirs. The
concurring compulsory heirs are those who succeed together with the
primary or the secondary compulsory heirs; the illegitimate children, and
the surviving spouse are concurring compulsory heirs.17
The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any
legitime, he was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was
left for his siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner,
assuming that it was valid,18 is deemed as donation made to a "stranger,"
chargeable against the free portion of the estate.19 There being no
compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject to collation.
464 | P a g e
SPOUSES FLORENTINO ZARAGOZA and ERLINDA ENRIQUEZ-
ZARAGOZA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALBERTA ZARAGOZA
MORGAN, respondents.
Doctrine: It is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may
be done for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced. Art. 1080 of the Civil
Code is clear on this.13 The legitime of compulsory heirs is determined
after collation.
Facts:
Flavio Zaragoza Cano was the registered owner of certain parcels of land
situated at the Municipalities of Cabatuan, New Lucena and Sta. Barbara,
Province of Iloilo. He had four children: Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentino and
Alberta, all surnamed Zaragoza. On December 9, 1964, he died without a
will and was survived by his four children.
On December 28, 1981, private respondent Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan filed
a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo against Spouses
Florentino and Erlinda, herein petitioners, for delivery of her inheritance
share, consisting of Lots 943 and 871, and for payment of damages. She
claims that she is a natural born Filipino citizen and the youngest child of
the late Flavio. She further alleged that her father, in his lifetime, partitioned
the aforecited properties among his four children. The shares of her
brothers and sister were given to them in advance by way of deed of sale,
but without valid consideration, while her share, which consists of lots no.
871 and 943, was not conveyed by way of deed of sale then. She averred
that because of her marriage, she became an American citizen and was
prohibited to acquire lands in the Philippines except by hereditary
succession. For this reason, no formal deed of conveyance was executed
in her favor covering these lots during her father's lifetime.
Petitioners, in their Answer, admitted their affinity with private respondent
and the allegations on the properties of their father. They, however, denied
knowledge of an alleged distribution by way of deeds of sale to them by
their father. They said that lot 871 is still registered in their father's name,
while lot 943 was sold by him to them for a valuable consideration. They
denied knowledge of the alleged intention of their father to convey the cited
lots to Alberta, much more, the reason for his failure to do so because she
became an American citizen. They denied that there was partitioning of the
estate of their father during his lifetime.
The RTC decided adjudicating lot 871 to Alberta.
Issue: Should the properties Transferred inter vivos be collated to the
mass of the estate of the decedent? No
Both the trial court and the public respondent found that during the lifetime
of Flavio, he already partitioned and distributed his properties among his
three children, excepting private respondent, through deeds of sale. A deed
465 | P a g e
of sale was not executed in favor of private respondent because she had
become an American citizen and the Constitution prohibited a sale in her
favor. Petitioner admitted Lots 871 and 943 were inheritance shares of the
private respondent. These are factual determinations of the Court of
Appeals, based on documentary and testimonial evidence. As a rule, we
are bound by findings of facts of the Court of Appeals.12 Was the partition
done during the lifetime of Flavio Zaragoza Cano valid? We think so. It is
basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done for as
long as legitimes are not prejudiced. Art. 1080 of the Civil Code is clear on
this.13 The legitime of compulsory heirs is determined after collation, as
provided for in Article 1061:
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must
bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have
received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title in order that it may be computed in
the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition.
Unfortunately, collation can not be done in this case where the original
petition for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the other
compulsory heirs. The petition must therefore be dismissed without
prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable
parties are present for the rightful determination of their respective legitime
and if the legitimes were prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos.
466 | P a g e
G.R. No. L-65800 October 3, 1986
PARTENZA LUCERNA VDA. DE TUPAS, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
BRANCH XLIII of the HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS
OCCIDENTAL, respondent, and TUPAS FOUNDATION, INC.,
private respondent-appellee.
Doctrine: collation contemplates and particularly applies to gifts inter

vivos. 6 The further fact that the lots donated were admittedly capital or
separate property of the donor is of no moment, because a claim of
inofficiousness does not assert that the donor gave what was not his, but
that he gave more than what was within his power to give.
Facts:
Involved in this appeal is the question of whether or not a donationinter

vivos by a donor now deceased is inofficious and should be reduced at the
instance of the donor's widow.
Epifanio R. Tupas died on August 20, 1978 in Bacolod City, childless,

leaving his widow, Partenza Lucerna, as his only surviving compulsory heir.
He also left a win dated May 18, 1976, which was admitted to probate on
September 30, 1980 in Special Proceedings No. 13994 of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental. Among the assets listed in his will were lots
Nos. 837, 838 and 839 of the Sagay Cadastre, admittedly his private
capital. However, at the time of his death, these lots were no longer owned
by him, he having donated them the year before (on August 2, 1977) to the
Tupas Foundation, Inc., which had thereafter obtained title to said lots.
Claiming that said donation had left her practically destitute of any
inheritance, Tupas' widow brought suit against Tupas Foundation, Inc. in
the same Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (docketed as Civil
Case No. 16089) to have the donation declared inofficious insofar as it
prejudiced her legitime, therefore reducible " ... by one-half or such
proportion as ... (might be deemed) justified ... and " ... the resulting
deduction ... " restored and conveyed or delivered to her. The complaint
also prayed for attorney's fees and such other relief as might be proper.
RTC- dismissed the petition.
Issue: Should the properties donated be collated? Yes
Ruling:
467 | P a g e
A person's prerogative to make donations is subject to certain limitations,
one of which is that he cannot give by donation more than he can give by
will (Art. 752, Civil Code). 3 If he does, so much of what is donated as
exceeds what he can give by will is deemed inofficious and the donation is
reducible to the extent of such excess, though without prejudice to its
taking effect in the donor's lifetime or the donee's appropriating the fruits of
the thing donated (Art. 771, Civil Code). Such a donation is, moreover,
collationable that is, its value is imputable into the hereditary estate of the
donor at the tune of his death for the purpose of determining the legitime of
the forced or compulsory heirs and the freely disposable portion of the
estate. This is true as well of donations to strangers as of gifts to
compulsory heirs, although the language of Article 1061 of the Civil Code
would seem to limit collation to the latter class of donations. And this has
been held to be a long-established rule in Liguez vs. Honorable Court of
Appeals, et al., 4 where this Court said:
... Hence, the forced heirs are entitled to have the donation set
aside in so far as inofficious: i.e., in excess of the portion of free
disposal (Civil Code of 1889, Articles 636, 645), computed as
provided in Articles 818 and 819, and bearing in mind that
collationable gifts' under Article 818 should include gifts made
not only in favor of the forced heirs, but even those made in
favor of strangers, as decided by the Supreme Court of Spain in
its decision of 4 May 1899 and 16 June 1902. So that in
computing the legitimes, the value of the property donated to
herein appellant, Conchita Liguez, should be considered part of
the donor's estate. Once again, only the court of origin has the
requisite data to determine whether the donation is inofficious
or not. 5
The fact, therefore, that the donated property no longer actually formed part
of the estate of the donor at the time of his death cannot be asserted to
prevent its being brought to collation. Indeed, it is an obvious proposition
that collation contemplates and particularly applies to gifts inter vivos. 6 The
further fact that the lots donated were admittedly capital or separate
property of the donor is of no moment, because a claim of inofficiousness
does not assert that the donor gave what was not his, but that he gave
more than what was within his power to give.
468 | P a g e
BUHAY DE ROMA VS CA,
G.R. NO. L-46903, JULY 23, 1987
CRUZ, J;
DOCTRINE:The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed

plainly and unequivocally as an exception to the general rule announced in
Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not
the exception but the rule, which is categorical enough.
FACTS:
Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters, Buhay and

Rosalinda de Roma. She died intestate on 1971, and administration
proceedings were instituted in the Court by the private respondent as
guardian of Rosalinda. Buhay was appointed administratrix. This was
opposed by Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties earlier donated
by Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had not been included
The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of coconut land.

What the parties cannot agree upon is whether these lands are subject to
collation. The private respondent argues that it should conform to Article
1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062, claims she
has no obligation to collate because the decedent prohibited such collation
and the donation was not officious.
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory
heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he
may have received from the decedent during the lifetime of the latter, by
way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be
computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir,
and in the account of the partition.”
library
"Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the
donor should have so expressly provided, or if the donee should repudiate
the inheritance, unless the donation should be reduced as
inofficious."cralaa1aw library
The trial court ruled in favour of Buhay De Roma, which held that the
decedent, when she made the donation in favor of Buhay, expressly
prohibited collation. On appeal, the order of the trial court was reversed, the
respondent court held that the deed of donation contained no express
469 | P a g e
prohibition to collate as an exception to Article 1062. Accordingly, it ordered
collation and equally divided the net estate of the decedent, including the
fruits of the donated property, between Buhay and Rosalinda. Hence, this
appeal
ISSUE:Was there an express prohibition to collate stated in the deed of

donation?
RULING: NONE.
The court held that there is nothingexpressly prohibiting the collation of the
donated properties. The phrase "sapamamagitanngpagbibigayna di
namababawingmuli" merely described the donation as "irrevocable" and
should not be construed as an express prohibition against collation. The
fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject
thereof from the collation required under Article 1061.
Anything less than such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear
language of Article 1062. The suggestion that there was an implied
prohibition because the properties donated were imputable to the free
portion of the decedent’s estate merits little consideration. Imputation is not
the question here, nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is officious.
The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and

unequivocally as an exception to the general rule announced in Article
1062. Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not the
exception but the rule, which is categorical enough.
470 | P a g e
NOCEDA VS. CA,
313 SCRA 505, SEPTEMBER 2, 1999
GONZAGA-REYES,J:
DOCTRINE: There is no co-ownership where portion owned is concretely

determined and identifiable, though not technically described, or that said
portions are still embraced in one and the same certificate of title does not
make said portions less determinable or identifiable, or distinguishable, one
from the other, nor that dominion over each portion less exclusive, in their
respective owners. A partition legally made confers upon each heir the
exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him
FACTS:
"On June 1, 1981, plaintiff Aurora Directo, defendant Rodolfo Noceda, and
Maria Arbizo, the daughter, grandson, and widow, respectively, of the late
CelestinoArbizo, extrajudicially settled a parcel of land, which was said to
have an area of 66,530 square meters. Plaintiff Directo’s share was 11,426
square meters, defendant Noceda got 13,294 square meters, and the
remaining 41,810 square meters went to Maria Arbizo
On the same date, plaintiff Directo donated 625 square meters of her share
to defendant Noceda. However, on August 17, 1981, another extrajudicial
settlement-partition of Lot 1121 was executed by plaintiff Directo, defendant
Noceda, and Maria Arbizo. Three fifths of the said land went to Maria
Arbizo while plaintiff Directo and defendant Noceda got only one-fifth each.
In said extrajudicial settlement-partition as well as in the Tax Declaration
over Lot 1121 in the name of the late CelestinoArbizo, the said parcel of
land was said to have an area of only 29,845 square meters
Sometime in 1981, defendant Noceda constructed his house on the land

donated to him by plaintiff Directo. Plaintiff Directo fenced the portion
allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement, excluding the donated portion,
and constructed thereon three huts. But in 1985, defendant Noceda
removed the fence earlier constructed by plaintiff Directo, occupied the
three huts (3) and fenced the entire land of plaintiff Directo without her
consent. Plaintiff Directo demanded from defendant Noceda to vacate her
land, but the latter refused. Hence, plaintiff Directo filed the present suit, a
complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership and
471 | P a g e
rescission/annulment of donation, against defendant Noceda before the
lower court.
During the trial, the lower court ordered that a relocation survey of Lot 1121
be conducted by Engr. EdilbertoQuejada of the Bureau of Lands. After the
survey of Lot 1121 in the presence of both parties, Engr. EdilbertoQuejada
reported that the area of Lot 1121 stated in the extrajudicial settlement-
partition of August 17, 1981 was smaller than the actual area of Lot 1121
which is 127,298 square meters.
The RTC rendered ruled in favour of private respondent. On appeal, The

CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that he did not usurp the property of respondent Directo
since, to date, the metes and bounds of the parcel of land left by their
predecessor in interest, CelestinoArbizo, are still undetermined since no
final determination as to the exact areas properly pertaining to the parties
herein; hence they are still considered as co-owners thereof.
ISSUE: Was the August 17, 1981 extrajudicial settlement a partition under
the law?
RULING:YES.
The source of co-ownership among the heirs was intestate succession.

Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is,
before its partition, owned in common by such heirs subject to the payment
of debts of the deceased.
Partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing

held in common among those to whom it may belong. The purpose of
partition is to put an end to co-ownership. It seeks a severance of the
individual interest of each co-owner, vesting in each a sole estate in
specific property and giving to each one a right to enjoy his estate without
supervision or interference from the other. And one way of effecting a
partition of the decedent’s estate is by the heirs themselves extrajudicially.
The heirs of the late CelestinoArbizo namely Maria Arbizo, Aurora A.

Directo (private respondent) and Rodolfo Noceda (petitioner) entered into
an extrajudicial settlement of the estate on August 17, 1981 and agreed to
adjudicate among themselves the property left by their predecessor-in-
interest in the following manner: virtual 1aw library
472 | P a g e
To Rodolfo Noceda goes the northern one-fifth (1/5) portion containing an
area of 5,989 sq. meters;
To Maria Arbizo goes the middle three-fifths (3/5) portion;
and . . . To Aurora Arbizo goes the southern one-fifth (1/5) portion.
Thus, the areas allotted to each heir are now specifically delineated in the
survey plan. There is no co-ownership where portion owned is concretely
determined and identifiable, though not technically described, or that said
portions are still embraced in one and the same certificate of title does not
make said portions less determinable or identifiable, or distinguishable, one
from the other, nor that dominion over each portion less exclusive, in their
respective owners. A partition legally made confers upon each heir the
exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him.
473 | P a g e
HEIRS of JOAQUIN TEVES VS CA
316 SCRA 632, OCTOBER 13, 1999
GONZAGA-REYES,J;
DOCTRINE: For a partition pursuant to section 1 of Rule 74 to be valid, the

following conditions must concur: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the
decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all had been paid; (3) the
heirs are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are represented by their
judicial guardian or legal representatives; (4) the partition was made by
means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with the Register of
Deeds.
FACTS:
MarcelinaCimafranca and Joaquin Teves had nine children. After

MarcelinaCimafranca and Joaquin Teves died, intestate and without debts
their children executed extrajudicial settlements purporting to adjudicate
unto themselves the ownership over two parcels of land belonging to their
deceased parents and to alienate their shares thereto in favor of their sister
Asuncion Teves.
On May 9, 1984, plaintiffs-appellants Ricardo (son of one heirs) and

Arcadia Teves filed a complaint with the RTC for the partition and
reconveyance of two parcels of land against the heirs of Asuncion Teves.
Plaintiffs-appellants alleged that defendants-appellees, without any
justifiable reason, refused to partition the said parcels of land and to convey
to plaintiffs their rightful shares.
The children claimed that extrajudicial settlement executed by them in

favour of Asuncion were invalid since their signatures were forged. On the
other hand, defendants claimed that the assailed documents were
executed with all the formalities required by law and are therefore binding
and legally effective as bases for acquiring ownership or legal title over the
lots in question.
ISSUE:Was the extrajudicial settlement and sale executed between the

plaintiffs and Asuncion valid?
RULING: YES.
474 | P a g e
The Court held that the extrajudicial settlements executed by the heirs of
Joaquin Teves and MarcelinaCimafranca are legally valid and binding.
The extrajudicial settlement of a decedent’s estate is authorized by section

1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, which provides in pertinent part that if
the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the
minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly
authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by
means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds.
Thus, for a partition pursuant to section 1 of Rule 74 to be valid, the

following conditions must concur: (1) the decedent left no will; (2) the
decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all had been paid; (3) the
heirs are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are represented by their
judicial guardian or legal representatives; (4) the partition was made by
means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with theRegister of
Deeds.
Here, there is no cogent reason to reverse, the trial and appellate courts’
factual finding that the evidence presented by plaintiffs-appellants is
insufficient to overcome the evidentiary value of the extrajudicial
settlements. The deeds are public documents and it has been held by this
Court that a public document executed with all the legal formalities is
entitled to a presumption of truth as to the recitals contained therein. In
order to overthrow a certificate of a notary public to the effect that the
grantor executed a certain document and acknowledged the fact of its
execution before him, mere preponderance of evidence will not suffice.
Rather, the evidence must be so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude
all reasonable dispute as to the falsity of the certificate. When the evidence
is conflicting, the certificate will be upheld. The appellate court’s ruling that
the evidence presented by plaintiffs-appellants does not constitute the
clear, strong, and convincing evidence necessary to overcome the positive
value of the extrajudicial settlements executed by the parties, all of which
are public documents, being essentially a finding of fact, is entitled to great
respect by the appellate court and should not be disturbed on appeal.
475 | P a g e
HEIRS OF QUIRICO SERASPI v. CA
G.R. NO.. 135602, APRIL 28, 2000
MENDOZA, J:
DOCTRINE:Co-ownership rights are effectively dissolved by partition.
FACTS:
MarcelinoRecasa was the owner of two parcels of land. During his lifetime,
Marcelino contracted three (3) marriages. At the time of his death in 1943,
he had fifteen (15) children from his three marriages. In 1948, his intestate
estate was partitioned into three parts by his heirs, each part corresponding
to the share of the heirs in each marriage.
In the same year, PatronicioRecasa, representing the heirs of the first

marriage, sold the share of the heirs in the estate to DominadorRecasa, an
heir of the second marriage. Thereafter, Dominador, representing the heirs
of the second marriage, in turn sold the share of the heirs to Quirico and
PurificacionSeraspi whose heirs are the present petitioners.
In 1958, the Seraspis obtained a loan from the Kalibo Rural Bank, Inc.
(KRBI) on the security of the lands in question to finance improvements on
the lands. However, they failed to pay the loan for which reason the
mortgage was foreclosed and the lands were sold to KRBI as the highest
bidder. Subsequently, the lands were sold by KRBI to Manuel Rata,
brother-in-law of QuiricoSeraspi. It appears that Rata, as owner of the
property, allowed QuiricoSeraspi to administer the property.
In 1974, private respondent Simeon Recasa, Marcelino’s child by his third

wife, taking advantage of the illness of QuiricoSeraspi, who had been
paralyzed due to a stroke, forcibly entered the lands in question and took
possession thereof.
In 1983, the Seraspis purchased the lands from Manuel Rata and
afterwards filed a complaint against Simeon Recasa for recovery of
possession of the lands.
ISSUE:Who is the owner of the land?
476 | P a g e
RULING:Petitioners heirs of QuiricoSeraspi.
The court held that private respondent could not have acquired ownership
over the property through succession for the property was not part of those
distributed to the heirs of the third marriage, to which private respondent
belongs. It must be remembered that in the partition of the intestate estate
of MarcelinoRecasa, the properties were divided into three parts, each part
being reserved for each group of heirs belonging to one of the three
marriages Marcelino entered into. Since the contested parcels of land were
adjudicated to the heirs of the first and second marriages, it follows that
private respondent, as heir of the third marriage, has no right over the
parcels of land. While, as heir to the intestate estate of his father, private
respondent was co-owner of all of his father’s properties, such co-
ownership rights were effectively dissolved by the partition
agreed upon by the heirs of MarcelinoRecasa.
477 | P a g e
CASILANG, SR. VS. CASILANG-DIZON,
691 SCRA 385, G.R. NO. 180269, FEBRUARY 20, 2013
REYES, J.
DOCTRINE:
An agreement of partition may be made orally or in writing. Thus,an oral
agreement for the partition of the property owned in common is valid and
enforceable upon the parties.
FACTS:
The late spouses Liborio Casilang (Liborio) and Francisca Zacarias

(Francisca) had eight (8) children, among these 8 is Jose Casilang and
Ireneo Casilang. Liborio died intestate on October 11, 1982 at the age of
83, followed not long after by his wife Francisca on December 25, 1982.
Their Ireneo died on June 11, 1992, survived by his four (4) children,
namely: Mario Casilang (Mario), Angelo Casilang (Angelo), Rosario
Casilang-Dizon (Rosario) and Rodolfo Casilang (Rodolfo), herein
respondents.
The estate of Liborio, which left no debts, consisted of three (3) parcels of
land located in Barangay Talibaew, Calasiao, Pangasinan, namely: (1) Lot
No. 4676, with an area of 4,164 square meters; (2) Lot No. 4704,
containing 1,164 sq m; and (3) Lot No. 4618, with 897 sq m.
Respondent Rosario Casilang-Dizon filed an unlawful detainer against her

uncle Jose Casilang on Lot No. 4618. She claimed that it was her late
father Ireneo who owns the lot as evidenced by the tax declaration.
Meanwhile, Jose Casilang contends that all eight (8) children of Liborio
entered into a verbal partition of his estate, pursuant to which Jose was
allotted Lot No. 4618 as his share; that Ireneo never claimed ownership of
Lot No. 4618, nor took possession of it, because his share was the
southwestern 1/5 portion of Lot No. 4676, containing an area of 1,308 sq
m, of which he took exclusive possession during his lifetime; that Jose has
always resided in Lot No. 4618 since childhood, where he built his family’s
semi-concrete house just a few steps away from his parents’ old bamboo
hut; that he took in and cared for his aged parents in his house until their
deaths in 1982; that one of his children has also built a house on the lot.
ISSUE:
Is the oral partition among the children of Liborio valid?
RULING: YES.
An agreement of partition may be made orally or in writing. An oral
agreement for the partition of the property owned in common is valid and
enforceable upon the parties.—the validity of an oral partition is well-settled
in our jurisdiction. In Vda. de Espina v. Abaya, 196 SCRA 312 (1991), this
Court declared that an oral partition is valid: Anent the issue of oral
partition, We sustain the validity of said partition. “An agreement of partition
478 | P a g e
may be made orally or in writing. An oral agreement for the partition of the
property owned in common is valid and enforceable upon the parties. The
Statute of Frauds has no operation in this kind of agreements, for partition
is not a conveyance of property but simply a segregation and designation
of the part of the property which belong to the co-owners.”
479 | P a g e
ZARAGOZA VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
341 SCRA 309, G.R. NO. 106401, SEPTEMBER 29, 2000
QUISUMBING, J.
DOCTRINE:
It is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done
for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced.
FACTS:
On December 9, 1964, Flavio Zaragoza Cano died without a will and was
survived by his four children: Gloria, Zacariaz, Florentino and Alberta, all
surnamed
Zaragoza.
On December 28, 1981, private respondent Alberta Zaragoza-Morgan filed

a complaint with CFI against Spouses Florentino and Erlinda, herein
petitioners, for delivery of her inheritance share, consisting of Lots 871 and
943, and for payment of damages. She alleged that her father, in his
lifetime, partitioned the aforecited properties among his four children. The
shares of her brothers and sister were given to them in advance by way
of deed of sale, but without valid consideration, while her share, which
consists of lots no. 871 and 943, was not conveyed by way of deed of
sale then. She averred that because of her marriage, she became
an American citizen and was prohibited to acquire lands in the Philippines
except by hereditary succession. For this reason, no formal deed
of conveyance was executed in her favor covering these lots during her
father’s lifetime
ISSUE:
Whether the partition inter vivos by Flavio Zaragoza Cano of his properties,
which include Lots 871 and 943, is valid?
RULING: YES.
It is basic in the law of succession that a partition inter vivos may be done
for as long as legitimes are not prejudiced. Art. 1080 of the Civil Code is
clear on this.The legitime of compulsory heirs is determined after collation,
as provided for in Article 1061:
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory

heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or
right which he may have received from the decedent, during the
lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous
title in order that it may be computed in the determination of the
legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
480 | P a g e
Unfortunately, collation cannot be done in this case where the original
petition for delivery of inheritance share only impleaded one of the other
compulsory heirs. The petition must therefore be dismissed without
prejudice to the institution of a new proceeding where all the indispensable
parties are present for the rightful determination of their respective legitime
and if the legitimes were prejudiced by the partitioning inter vivos.
481 | P a g e
J.L.T. AGRO, INC. VS. BALANSAG,
453 SCRA 211, G.R. NO. 141882 MARCH 11, 2005
TINGA, J:
DOCTRINE:
All things, even future ones which are not outside the commerce of man
may be the object of a contract, except that no contract may be entered
into with respect to future inheritance, and the exception to the exception is
the partition inter vivos referred to in Article 1080.
FACTS
Don Julian Teves contracted two marriages, first with Antonia Baena and
had two kids namely Josefa and Emilio. After her death, he married
Milagros Teves and they had four children namely: Maria Teves, Jose
Teves, Milagros Teves and Pedro Teves. Thereafter, the parties to the
case entered into a Compromise Agreement.
When Antonia died an action for partition was instituted where the parties
entered into a Compromise Agreement which embodied the partition of all
the properties of Don Julian. On the basis of the compromise agreement,
the CFI declared a tract of land known as Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa as
property owned in common by Don Julian and his two children of the first
marriage. The property was to remain undivided during the lifetime of Don
Julian. Josefa and Emilio likewise were given other properties at Bais,
including the electric plant, the “movie property,” the commercial areas, and
the house where Don Julian was living. The remainder of the properties
was retained by Don Julian.
On 16 November 1972, Don Julian, Emilio and Josefa executed a Deed of

Assignment of Assets with Assumption of Liabilities in favor of J.L.T. Agro,
Inc. (petitioner). Later, Don Julian, Josefa and Emilio also executed an
instrument entitled Supplemental to the Deed of Assignment of Assets with
the Assumption of Liabilities (Supplemental Deed) dated 31 July 1973. This
instrument transferred ownership over Lot No. 63, among other properties,
in favor of petitioner. The appellate court ruled that the supplemental deed,
conveying ownership to JLT agro is not valid because the Compromise
Agreement reserved the properties to Don Julian’s two sets of heirs their
future legitimes. The two sets of heirs acquired full ownership and
possession of the properties respectively adjudicated to them and Don
Julian himself could no longer dispose of the same. The appellate court in
holding that the Supplemental Deed is not valid, added that it contained a
prohibited preterition of Don Julian’s heirs from the second marriage.
482 | P a g e
ISSUE:
Can a future legtime be determined, adjudicated and reserved prior to the
death of Don Julian?
RULING: YES.
As a general rule, No. Well-entrenched is the rule that all things, even
future ones, which are not outside the commerce of man may be the object
of a contract. The exception is that no contract may be entered into with
respect to future inheritance, and the exception to the exception is
partition inter vivos referred to in Article 1080.
The partition inter vivos of the properties of Don Julian is undoubtedly valid
pursuant to Article 1347. However, considering that it would become legally
operative only upon the death of Don Julian, the right of his heirs form the
second marriage to the properties adjudicated to him under the
compromise agreement was but a mere expectancy. It was a bare hope of
succession to the property of their father. Being the prospect of a future
acquisition, the interest by its nature was inchoate. It had no attribute of
property, and the interest to which it related was at the time nonexistent
and might never exist.
Evidently, at the time of the execution of deed of assignment cover Lot No.
63 in favor of petitioner, Don Julian remained the owner of the property
since ownership over the subject lot would only pass to his heirs from the
second marriage at the time of his death. Thus, as the owner of the subject
lot, Don Julian retained the absolute right to dispose of it during his lifetime.
His right cannot be challenged by Milagros Donio and her children on the
ground that it had already been adjudicated to them by virtue of the
compromise agreement.
483 | P a g e
LEGASTO VS. VERZOSA,
54 PHIL. 766, NO. 32344 MARCH 31, 1930
VILLA-REAL, J:
DOCTRINE: The partition made by a testator inter vivos in pursuance of a

will which has been disallowed is null and void.
FACTS:
On May 13, 1925, Sabina Almadin executed a will, devising certain parcels
of land belonging to her, to her four nieces, Maria Verzosa, Oliva Verzosa,
Toribia Verzosa, and Ruperta Palma, daughters of her sister Catalina
Almadin, designating the parcels to be given to each.
She partitioned her property among her aforesaid sister and nieces,
executing a deed to her niece, Maria Verzosa, assigning and making over
to her three parcels of her land therein described. On September 23, 1925,
Maria Verzosa and Sabina Almadin appeared before the deputy provincial
assessor and municipal secretary of Biñan, Laguna, and made two sworn
statements, wherein the former stated that she had purchased the parcels
of land described in the assignment, from Sabina Almadin, and the latter in
turn declared that she had sold them to Maria Verzosa, and that said
vendee had already claimed them as her property for the payment of the
land tax.
ISSUE:
Is the partition made by Sabina Almadin of her property among her nieces,
the defendants and appellants herein, was valid and enforceable?
RULING: NO.
The gift of realty made in a public instrument is null and void when the deed
fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance,
made in a separate instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not
noted in the deed of gift and in the separate acceptance.
It is thus seen that both the Spanish Supreme Court and the learned and
authoritative commentator, Manresa, are of opinion that a testator may, by
an act inter vivos, partition his property, but he must first make a will with all
the formalities provided for by law. And it could not be otherwise, for
without a will there can be no testator; when the law, therefore, speaks of
the partition inter vivos made by a testator of his property, it necessarily
refers to that property which he has devised to his heirs. A person who
disposes of his property gratis inter vivos is not called a testator, but a
donor. In employing the word "testator," the law evidently desired to
distinguish between one who freely donates his property in life and one
who disposes of it by will to take effect after his death.
Sabina Almadin must have been aware of the necessity of a prior will, since
before making the partition of her property among her nieces, the
484 | P a g e
defendants herein, she executed a will giving to each of them the same
parcels of land which she later transferred to them gratuitously. Since
Sabina Almadin's will is null and void for lack of the legal requisites,
consequently, the partition which she made of her estate among her nieces
the defendants appellants herein, during her lifetime is likewise null and
void.
485 | P a g e
HEIRS OF JOAQUIN TEVES vs. CA
G.R. No. 109963, October 13, 1999
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
DOCTRINE:For the purpose of partition of a real property, the non-

registration of an extrajudicial settlement does not affect its intrinsic validity.
FACTS: Spouses MarcelinaCimafranca and Joaquin Teves died intestate

and without debtsin 1943 and 1953, respectively. During their lifetime, the
spouses own two parcels of land registered in the name of Marcelina and
another lot registered in the name of Joaquin and his two sisters. However,
Joaquin’s sisters died without issue, causing the entire property to pass to
him. After Marcelina and Joaquin died, their children executed extrajudicial
settlements purporting to adjudicate unto themselves the ownership over
the two parcels of land and to alienate their shares thereto in favor of their
sister Asuncion Teves for a consideration. The division of the subject lot
was embodied in two deeds. The first Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and
Sale was entered into on June 13, 1956 while the second deed was
executed on April 21, 1959. The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and sale
was executed on December 14, 1971. After the death of Asuncion Teves,
her children, private respondents, extrajudicially settled
On May 9, 1984, herein petitioners, heirs of Marcelina and Joaquin, filed a

complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental against
private respondents for the partition and reconveyance of the aforesaid
parcels of land, alleging that the extrajudicial settlements were spurious.
ISSUE: Should the extrajudicial settlements be upheld?
RULING:Yes, a public document executed with all the legal formalities is

entitled to a presumption of truth as to the recitals contained therein.
Article 1082 of the Civil Code provides that, “Every act which is intended to
put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is
deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an
exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction”.
The court said, that for a partition pursuant to section 1 of Rule 74 to be

valid, the following conditions must concur:
486 | P a g e
(1) the decedent left no will;
(2) the decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all had been
paid;
(3) the heirs are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are
represented by their judicial guardian or legal representatives;
(4) the partition was made by means of a public instrument or
affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds.
Citing the case of Vda. de Reyes vs. CA, the Court held that the
requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has
for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the
protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of
registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. Thus, despite its
non-registration, the extrajudicial settlements are legally effective and
binding among the heirs of MarcelinaCimafranca since their mother had no
creditors at the time of her death.
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UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs SANTIBAÑEZ G.R. No. 149926,
February 23, 2005
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
DOCTRINE: In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among

the heirs until after the will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate
of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is probated and
notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of
his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will
decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the
testator and the compliance with those requirements or solemnities which
the law prescribes for the validity of a will.
FACTS:Efraim M. Santibañez died, leaving a holographic will.

Subsequently, testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo
City. Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the special
administrator of the estate of the decedent.Edmund, as one of the heirs,
was appointed as the special administrator of the estate of the decedent,
wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of
the three (3) tractors and each of them was to assume the indebtedness of
their late father to FCCC (which assigned all its assets and liabilities to
Union Savings and Mortgage Bank) corresponding to the tractor
respectively taken by them.
Consequently, the heirs sold the three tractors.
ISSUE:Without approval by the probate court, without having found the will
to be valid first, was it proper for the heirs to sell the three tractors pending
probate proceedings?
RULING: NO.There can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the
will has been probated.
Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine
all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered. The said court is primarily concerned with the administration,
liquidation and distribution of the estate.
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the
heirs until after the will has been probated. It must be stressed that the
probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over all the properties
488 | P a g e
of the deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in any
way without the probate court’s approval is tantamount to divesting it with
jurisdiction which the Court cannot allow. Every act intended to put an end
to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a
partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a
compromise, or any other transaction.
Thus, in executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of

an extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is
imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over
that part of the estate. Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of the probate
court to determine the identity of the heirs of the decedent.
In the instant case, there is no showing that the signatories in the joint
agreement were the only heirs of the decedent. When it was executed, the
probate of the will was still pending before the court and the latter had yet
to determine who the heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and
respondent Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto themselves the three (3)
tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the other possible heirs and
creditors who may have a valid claim against the estate of the deceased.
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CARLOMAGNO A. CRUCILLO, et al vs IAC
G.R. No. 65416, October 26, 1999
PURISIMA, J.:
DOCTRINE:After exercising acts of ownership over their respective

portions of the contested estate, the heirs are estopped from denying or
contesting the existence of an oral partition. The oral agreement for the
partition of the property owned in common is valid, binding and enforceable
on the parties.
FACTS:Balbino A. Crucillo was married to Juana Aure. They had eight (8)
children, namely, Elena, Maximino, Perpetua, Santiago, Adelaida, Miguel,
Rafael, and Vicente, all surnamed Crucillo. Balbino A. Crucillo died
intestate in 1909. Juana Aure died on November 19, 1949. Balbino A.
Crucillo left, among other things, two(2) parcels of unregistered land
situated at General Luna Street, Mendez-Nunez,Cavite. He was survived
by his heirs, who became co-owners of the aforesaid lots and thereafter,
entered into the possession thereof with each one of them possessing their
respective shares and exercising acts of ownership.
Rafael had soldtwo other lots belonging to the estate. Nicasio Sarmiento
(son of Perpetua Crucillo) has caused a residential lot situated at Gen.
Trias St., Mendez, Cavite tobe registered in his name alone, Miguel Crucillo
is in exclusive possession ofa residential lot located at General Trias St.,
Mendez, Cavite. An agriculturalland located at Sitio Niko, Mendez, Cavite,
covered by Tax Declaration No. 1179is owned in common by Vicente
Crucillo, Buenaventurada Sarmiento (daughter of the deceased Perpetua
Crucillo), AdelaidaCrucillo, and Atty. ConradoCrucillo (son of the deceased
Santiago Crucillo). Another agricultural land situated at PulongMunti, is
owned in common by the Heirs of Elena Crucillo,
AdelaidaCrucillo,andNicasio Sarmiento. Still another property covered by
Tax Declaration No. 653is owned in common by Buenaventurada
Sarmiento and Vicente Crucillo, whose share was acquired by Miguel
Crucillo. Additionally, Primitiva Mendoza is in possession of an agricultural
land in PulongMunti and also in Niko, Mendez, Cavite, while
CarlomagnoCrucillo possesses an agricultural land at SitioMaykiling,
Mendez, Cavite, Miguel Crucillo is exclusively occupying an agricultural
land at PulongMunti and Ulo ng Bukal, and the remaining portion another
agricultural land after the other portion thereof had been sold by Rafael
Crucillo.
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ISSUE:Was there partition effected in this case?
RULING:YES, the oral agreement for the partition of the property owned in
common is valid, binding and enforceable on the parties.
It has been shown that upon the death of Juana Aure, the petitioners and
the respondent Rafael Crucillo partitioned the estate among themselves,
with each one of them possessing their respective shares and exercising
acts of ownership.
Their possession of the inherited premises, their construction of

improvements thereon, and their having declared in their names for
taxation purposes their respective shares. These are indications that the
heirs of Balbino A. Crucillo agreed to divide subject estate among
themselves, for why should they construct improvements thereon, pay the
taxes therefor, and exercise other acts of ownership, if they did not firmly
believe that the property was theirs. It is certainly foolhardy for petitioners
to claim that no oral partition was made when their acts showed otherwise.
Moreover, it is unbelievable that the possession of the heirs was by mere
tolerance, judging from the introduction of improvements thereon and the
length of time that such improvements have been in existence. Then too,
after exercising acts of ownership over their respective portions of the
contested estate, petitioners are estopped from denying or contesting the
existence of an oral partition.
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REBECCA VIADO NON, et al. vs CA
G.R. No. 65416, October 26, 1999
PURISIMA, J.:
DOCTRINE:Article 1104 of the Civil Code provides that when the

preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be
rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share
pertaining to her.
FACTS: Spouses Julian and Virginia Viado owned several pieces of

property, among them was the disputed property. Virginia died on 20
October 1982. Julian C. Viado died three years later on 15 November
1985.
Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977, a common residence at

the Isarog property. However, tension would appear to have escalated
between petitioner Rebecca Viado and respondent Alicia Viado (wife of
NiloViado) after the former had asked that the property be equally divided
between the two families.
Respondents forthwith, claimed absolute ownership over the entire
property and demanded that petitioners vacate the portion occupied by the
latter. Hence, petitioners, asserting co-ownership over the property in
question, filed a case for partition before the RTC.
Respondents predicated their claim of absolute ownership over the subject

property on two documents — a deed of donation executed by the late
Julian covering his one-half conjugal share of the Isarog property in favor of
Nilo and a deed of extrajudicial settlement in which Julian Viado, Leah
Viado Jacobs and petitioner Rebecca waived in favor of Nilo their rights
and interests over their share of the property inherited from Virginia.
ISSUE:Should the partition be rescinded due to the preterition of Delia as

an heir.
RULING:No, there was no showing of fraud or bad faith.
The inheritance, which vested from the moment of death of the decedent,
remained under a co-ownership regime among the heirs until
partition. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and
legatees or devisees would be a partition although it would purport to be a
492 | P a g e
sale, an exchange, a compromise, a donation or an extrajudicial
settlement.
In debunking the continued existence of a co-ownership among the parties

hereto, respondents rely on the deed of donation and deed of extrajudicial
settlement which consolidated the title solely to NiloViado.
The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the

deed of extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition.
Under Article 1104 of the Civil Code tif the preterition is not attended by
bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited
heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her.
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PADA-KILARIO VS CA
G.G.R. NO. 134329, JANUARY 19, 2000
DE LEON, JR., J.
Digested by: Al Ammen Silo
DOCTRINE: Any act intended to end any indivision among co-heirs,

devisees and legatees be it in any form is a valid partition.
FACTS:
Respondent Silverio Pada filed an ejectment case against sps. Kilario. The
latter
occupies a portion of the intestate estate of Jacinto Pada, Grandfather of
Silverio. The Kilario’s have been living therein since 1960 by sheer
tolerance. When Jacinto Pada dies, his heirs entered into extrajudicial
partition of his estate in 1951. As a result hereof, lot 5581 was allocated to
Ananias and Marciano who became co-owners of said lot.
Ananias died and his daughter succeeded in his right as co-owner.

Eventually, Juanita sold her right in the co-ownership to Engr. Paderes.
Mariaon the other hand,heir of Marciano, sold her share to her cousin
respondent Silverio Pada. The latter demanded sps. Kilario to vacate but
the sps. refused.On June 1995, a complaint forejectment was filed against
sps. Kilario. On July 1995 a deed of donation in their favorwas executed by
heirs of Amador Pada.
ISSUE: Is the partition valid?
HELD:
The extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada among his heirs
made in
1951 is valid, albeit executed in an unregistered private document. No law
require partition among heirs to be in writing and be registered in order to
be valid. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to
others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with
the prescribed formalities is not undermined when no creditors are
involved. Without creditors to take into consideration, it is competent for the
heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution thereof in a
manner and upon a plan different from those provided by the rules from
494 | P a g e
which, in the first place, nothing can be inferred that a writing or other
formality is essential for the partition to be valid. The partition of inherited
property need not be embodied in a public document so as to be effective
as regards the heirs that participated therein. The extrajudicial partition
which the heirs of Jacinto Pada executed voluntarily and spontaneously in
1951 has produced a legal status. When they discussed and agreed on the
division of the estate of Jacinto Pada, it is presumed that they did so in
furtherance of their mutual interests. As such, their division is conclusive,
unless and until it is shown that there were debts existing against the estate
which had not been paid. No showing, however, has been made of any
unpaid charges against the estate of Jacinto Pada. Thus, there is no
reason why the heirs should not be bound by their voluntary acts.
The belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, who are the heirs of
Amador Pada, of donating the subject property to petitioners after forty four
(44) years of never having disputed the validity of the 1951 extrajudicial
partition that allocated the subject property to Marciano and Ananias,
produced no legal effect.
The donation made by his heirs to petitioners of the subject property, thus,
is void for they were not the owners thereof. At any rate it is too late in the
day for the heirs of Amador Pada to repudiate the legal effects of the 1951
extrajudicial partition as prescription and laches have equally set
in.Petitioners are estopped from impugning the extrajudicial partition
executed by the heirs of Jacinto Pada after explicitly admitting in their
Answer that they had been occupying the subject property since 1960
without ever paying any rental as they only relied on the liberality and
tolerance of the Pada family. Their admissions are evidence of a high order
and bind them insofar as the character of their possession of the subject
property is concerned.
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ANGELA I. TUASON v. ANTONIO TUASON,
GR No. L-3404, 1951-04-02
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
DOCTRINE: Art. 1082. Every act which is intended to put an end to

indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a
partition, although it should purport to be a sale, and exchange, a
compromise, or any other transaction. (n)
FACTS:
In 1941 the sisters Angela I. Tuason and Nieves Tuason de Barreto and
their brother Antonio Tuason Jr., held a parcel of land with an area of
64,928.6 sq. m. covered byCertificate of Title No. 60911 in Sampaloc,
Manila, in common, each owning an undivided
1/3 portion. Nieves wanted and asked for a partition of the common
property, but failing in this, she offered to sell her 1/3 portion. It seems that
the objection to dividing the property was that it would lose in value by the
proposed partition. The share of Nieves was offered... for sale to her sister
and her brother but iboth declined to buy it. The offer was later made to
their mother but the old lady also declined to buy, saying that if the property
later increased in value, she might be suspected of having taken advantage
of her daughter. Finally,... the share of Nieves was sold to Gregorio
Araneta Inc., a domestic corporation, and a new Certificate of Title No.
61721 was issued in lieu of the old title No. 60911 covering the same
property. The three co-owners agreed to have the whole parcel subdivided
into small lots and... then sold, the proceeds of the sale to be later divided
among them. This agreement is embodied in a document (Exh. 6) entitled
"Memorandum of Agreement" consisting of ten pages, dated June 30,
1941.
The pertinent terms of the contract (Exh. 6) may be briefly stated as
follows: The three co-owners agreed to improve the property by filling" it
and constructing roads and curbs on the same and then subdivide it into
small lots for sale. Araneta Inc. was to finance the whole... development
and subdivision; it was to prepare a schedule of prices and conditions of
sale, subject to the approval of the two other co-owners; it was invested
with authority to sell the lots into which the property was to be subdivided,
and execute the corresponding contracts... and deeds of sale; it was also to
pay the real estate taxes due on the property or of any portion thereof that
remained unsold, the expenses of surveying, improvements, etc., all
advertising expenses, salaries of personnel, commissions, office and legal
expenses, including... expenses in instituting all actions to eject all tenants
or occupants on the property; and it undertook the duty to furnish each of
the two co-owners, Angela and Antonio Tuason, copies of the subdivision
plans and the monthly sales and rents and collections made thereon. In...
return for all this undertaking and obligation assumed by Araneta Inc.,
particularly the financial burden, it was to receive 50 per cent of the gross
496 | P a g e
selling price of the lots, and any rents that may be collected from the
property, while in the process of sale, the remaining 50... per cent to be
divided in equal portions among the three co-owners so that each will
receive 16.33 per cent of the gross receipts.
Because of the importance of paragraphs 9, 11 and 15 of the contract (Exh.
6), for purposes of reference we are reproducing them below:
"(9) This contract shall remain in full force and effect during all the time that
it may be necessary for the Party op the Second Part to fully sell the said
property in small and subdivided lots and to fully collect the purchase prices
due thereon; it being... understood and agreed that said lots may be rented
while there are no purchasers thereof;
"(11) The Party of the Second Part (meaning Araneta Inc.) is hereby given
full power and authority to sign for and in behalf of all the said co-owners of
said property all contracts of sale and deeds of sale of the lots into which
this property might be subdivided; the powers... herein vested to the Party
of the Second Past may not be revoked until the purposes of this contract
have been fulfilled and carried out, and the Party of the Second Part may,
under its own responsibility and risk, delegate any of its powers under this
contract to any of its... officers, employees or to third persons;
"(15) No co-owner of the property subject-natter of this contract shall sell,
alienate or dispose of his ownership, interest or participation tiierein without
first giving preference to the other co-owners to purchase and acquire the
same under the same terms and conditions as... those offered by any other
prospective purchaser. Should none of the co-owners of the property
subject-matter of this contract exercise the said preference to acquire or
purchase the same, then such sale to a third party shall be made subject to
all the conditions, terms, and... dispositions of this contract; provided, the
Parties of the First Part (meaning Angela and Antonio) shall be bound by
this contract as long as the Party of the Second Part, namely, the Gregorio
Araneta, Inc. is controlled by the members of the Araneta family, who are...
stockholders of the said corporation at the time of the signing of this
contract and/or their lawful heirs;"
ISSUES: Was the acts of the petitioner an indication that she intended to
put and end to indivision among co-heirs?
RULING:
We have examined Exh. "L" and compared the same with the contract
(Exh. 6) and we agree with the trial court that in the main the terms of both
contracts are similar and practically the same. Moreover, as correctly found
by the trial court, the copies of both contracts were... shown to the plaintiff
Angela and her husband, a broker, and both had every opportunity to go
over and compare them and decide on the advisability of or disadvantage
in entering into the contract (Exh. 6); that although Atty. Antonio Araneta
was an official of the Araneta Inc.;... being a member of the Board of
Directors of the Company at the time that Exhibit "6" was executed, he was
497 | P a g e
not the party with which Angela contracted, and that he committed no
breach of trust. According to the evidence Araneta, Inc. showed to her the
plans of the subdivision and... all the pertinent papers, and sent to her
checks covering her share of the proceeds of the sale but that she refused
to receive the same; and that as a matter of fact, at the time of the trial,
Araneta Inc., had spent about P117,000 in improvement and had received
as proceeds on... the sale of the lots the respectable sum of Pl,265,538.48.
We quote with approval that portion of the decision appealed from on these
points:
"The evidence in this case points to the fact that the actuations of J.
Antonio Araneta in connection with the execution of exhibit 6 by the parties,
are above board. He committed nothing that is violative of the fiduciary
relationship existing between him and the... plaintiff. The act of J. Antonio
Araneta in giving the plaintiff a copy of exhibit 6 before the same was
executed, constitutes a full disclosure of the facts, for said copy contains all
that appears now in exhibit 6.
"Plaintiff charges the defendant Gregorio Aran«ta, Inc. with infringing the
terms of the contract in that the defendant corporation has failed (1) to
make the necessary improvements on the property as required by
paragraphs 1 and 3 of the contract; (2) to submit to the plaintiff... from time
to time schedule of prices and conditions under which the subdivided lots
are to be sold; and to furnish the plaintiff a copy of the subdivision plans, a
copy of the monthly statement of the sales and rents of the subdivided lots,
and a statement of the monthly gross... collections from the sale of the
property.
"The Court finds from the evidence that the defendant Gregorio Araneta,
Incorporated has substantially complied with the obligation imposed by the
contract exhibit 6 in its paragraph 1, and that for improvements alone, it has
disbursed the amount of P117,167.09. It has likewise... paid taxes,
commissions and other expenses incidental to its obligations as defined in
the agreement.
"With respect to the charge that Gregorio Araneta, Incorporated has failed
to submit to plaintiff a copy of the subdivision plans, list of prices and the
conditions governing the sale of subdivided lots, and monthly statement of
collections from the sale of tie lots, the Court... is of the opinion that it has
no basis. The evidence shows that the defendant corporation submitted to
the plaintiff periodically all the data relative to prices and conditions of the
sale of the subdivided lots, together with the amount corresponding to her.
But without any... justifiable reason, she refused to accept them. With the
indifferent attitude adopted by the plaintiff, it was thought useless for
Gregorio Araneta, Incorporated to continue sending her statement of
accounts, checks and other things. She had shown on various occasions
that she... did not want to have any further dealings with the said
corporation. So, if the defendant corporation proceeded with the sale of the
subdivided lots without the approval of the plaintiff, it was because it was
498 | P a g e
under the correct impression that under the contract exhibit 6 the... decision
of the majority co-owners is binding upon all the three.
"The Court feels that rescission of the contract exhibit 6 is not in order.
Even granting that the defendant corporation committed minor violations of
the terms of the agreement, the general rule is that 'rescission will not be
permitted for a slight or casual breach of the... contract, but only for such
breaches as are so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of
the parties in making the agreement' (Song Fo & Co. vs. Hawaiian-
Philippine Co., 47 Phil. 821)."
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HEIRS OF ECARMA VS CA
G.R. NO. 193374, JUNE 8, 2016
PEREZ, J.
DOCTRINE: Every co-heir has the right to demand the partition of the
estate except when non-partition is specifically required by the testator.
Partition may take place even in contrary to the testator's instructions when
any of the causes for a partnership dissolution takes place.
FACTS:
Spouses Natalio and Arminda owned 4 properties designated as Kitanlad,

Cuyapo and Lala consisting of 2 lots. They have 7 children among them
were Gerry Ecarma and private respondent Renato Ecarma. Natalio
predeceased Arminda, and therefater their children executed Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate. No physical division of properties was effected
and they remained in co-ownership even after the death of Arminda.
Renato Ecarma as the Special Administrator in the intestate proceedings
filed a Project of Partition because of the conflict between Gerry and the
other heirs over actual division of their inherited properties. The legal heirs
except Gerry expressed their desire to have the property partitioned.
Gerry objected because the proposed partition is not feasible, impractical

and detrimental. The planned partition is not accordance with the wishes of
decedents, but however, it was denied by the lower court. He brought up
the case to the CA but before the controversy has been settled, he died.
Therefore, the heirs of Gerry Ecarma filed their Appellant’s Brief in
substitution of the deceased.
ISSUE:
Is the Order of Partition proper where one of the co - owners refuse to

accede to such proposed partition on the ground that it is not feasible,
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impractical and detrimental?
HELD: YES.
Upon Arminda's death, her heirs' rights to the succession (covering

Arminda's share in the subject properties) vested and their co-ownership
over the subject properties has consolidated by operation of law.
Effectively, without a valid will of Arminda, and as Arminda's compulsory
heirs, herein parties (specifically Gerry Ecarma prior to his death and
substitution by herein petitioners) all ipso facto co-owned the subject
properties in equal proportion being compulsory heirs of the deceased
spouses Natalio and Arminda
501 | P a g e
SANTOS VS SANTOS
G.R. NO. 139524, OCTOBER 12, 2000
GONZAGA-REYES, J.,
DOCTRINE: A partition may be demanded by any of the co-heirs provided

such is made with the consent of the other heirs.
FACTS:
The controversy involves a 391 square meter parcel of land situated in San
Mateo, Rizal, owned by Isidra Santos, a sI 3pinster who died intestate and
without issue in 1967. She was survived by her two brothers, Ladislao and
Eliseo. Sometime in 1993, Ladislao through his attorney-in-fact Noe M.
Santos filed an action for judicial partition of the Isidra property against his
brother Eliseo and the latter’s son Philip. While admitting that Ladislao and
Eliseo inherited the subject Isidra property, Eliseo and Philip submitted that
"Eliseo Santos and wife and Ladsilao and wife signed a document wherein
Eliseo acquired the subject lot from the combined partition of the estate of
their father Bonifacio Santos and their sister Isidra Santos. Bonifacio’s
estate was composed of 6,387 square meters while that of Isidra Santos is
the subject property with an area of 391 square meters. Out of this
combined parcels of land, respondent got 3,387 square meters while Eliseo
got 3,000 square meters and the subject Isidra property with an area of 391
square meters. Eliseo, in turn, donated the subject Isidra property to his
son, Virgilio Santos.
ISSUE:
Is the deed of partition in the case valid?
HELD: NO
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The deed of partition contended to by Eliseo Santos may be valid provided
the document alleged to be made by the two parties be presented.
It is undosputed that the property passed on to Eliseo and Ladislao after

their sister's death. However, Eliseo failed to show the deed he had
contended to exist. Thus, the partition cannot be considered valid.
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IN RE: PETITION FOR PROBATE OF LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF
BASILIO SANTIAGO,
MA. PILAR SANTIAGO and CLEMENTE SANTIAGO, Petitioners,
vs.
ZOILO S. SANTIAGO, FELICIDAD SANTIAGO-RIVERA, HEIRS OF

RICARDO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF CIPRIANO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF
TOMAS SANTIAGO, Respondents.
FILEMON SOCO, LEONILA SOCO, ANANIAS SOCO, URBANO SOCO,

GERTRUDES SOCO AND HEIRS OF CONSOLACION SOCO,
Oppositors.
G.R. No. 179859 August 9, 2010
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Doctrine: The prohibition to divide a property in a co-ownership can only

last for twenty (20) years.
Facts:
Basilio Santiago (Basilio) contracted three marriages—the first to Bibiana

Lopez, the second to Irene Santiago, and the third to Cecilia Lomotan.
Basilio and his first wife bore two offsprings, Irene and Marta, the mother of
herein oppositors Felimon, Leonila, Consolacion, Ananias, Urbano, and
Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco.
Basilio and his second wife had six offsprings, Tomas, Cipriano, Ricardo,
respondents Zoilo and Felicidad, and petitioner Ma. Pilar, all surnamed
Santiago.
504 | P a g e
Basilio and his third wife bore three children, Eugenia herein petitioner
Clemente, and Cleotilde, all surnamed Santiago.
After Basilio died testate on September 16, 1973, his daughter by the
second marriage petitioner Ma. Pilar filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bulacan a petition for the probate of Basilio’s will, docketed as SP
No. 1549-M. The will was admitted to probate by Branch 10 of the RTC and
Ma. Pilar was appointed executrix.
The will contained the following provisions, among others:
e) Ang lupa’t bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na

2(c) ay ililipat at ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente hindi
bilang pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang pamahalaan at pangalagaan
lamang nila at nang ang sinoman sa aking mga anak sampu ng apo
at kaapuapuhan ko sa habang panahon ay may tutuluyan kung
magnanais na mag-aral sa Maynila o kalapit na mga lunsod x x x.
f) Ang bigasan, mga makina at pagawaan ng pagkain ng hayop ay

ipinamamana ko sa aking asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga anak na
Zoilo, Ma. Pilar, Ricardo, Cipriano, Felicidad, Eugenia, Clemente, at
Cleotilde nang pare-pareho. Ngunit, sa loob ng dalawampong (20)
taon mula sa araw ng aking kamatayan, hindi nila papartihin ito at
pamamahalaan ito ni Clemente at ang maghahawak ng salaping
kikitain ay si Ma. Pilar na siyang magpaparte. Ang papartihin lamang
ay ang kita ng mga iyon matapos na ang gugol na kakailanganin
niyon, bilang reparacion, pagpapalit o pagpapalaki ay maawas na.
Ninais ko ang ganito sa aking pagmamahal sa kanila at pagaaring
ibinubuhay ko sa kanila lahat, bukod sa yaon ay sa kanila ding
kapakinabangan at kabutihan.
g) Ang lahat ng lupa, liban sa lupa’t bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila, ay

ipinapamana ko sa aking nasabing asawa, Cecilia Lomotan, at mga
anak na Tomas, Zoilo, Ma. Pilar, Ricardo, Cipriano, Felicidad,
Eugenia, Clemente at Cleotilde nang pare-pareho. Datapwa’t, gaya
din ng mga bigasan, makina at gawaan ng pagkain ng hayop, ito ay
hindi papartihin sa loob ng dalawampong (20) taon mula sa aking
505 | P a g e
pagpanaw, at pamamahalaan din nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente. Ang
mapaparte lamang ay ang kita o ani ng nasabing mga pag-aari
matapos bayaran ang buwis at/o patubig at iba pang mga gugol na
kailangan. Si Ma. Pilar din ang hahawak ng ani o salaping
manggagaling dito. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
After the executrix-petitioner Ma. Pilar filed a "Final Accounting, Partition

and Distribution in Accordance with the Will," the probate court approved
the will by Order of August 14, 1978 and directed the registers of deeds of
Bulacan and Manila to register the certificates of title indicated therein.
Accordingly, the titles to Lot Nos. 786, 837, 7922, 836 and 838 in Malolos,
Bulacan and Lot No. 8-C in Manila were transferred in the name of
petitioners Ma. Pilar and Clemente.
The oppositors thereafter filed a Complaint-in-Intervention with the probate

court, alleging that Basilio’s second wife was not Irene but a certain Maria
Arellano with whom he had no child; and that Basilio’s will violates Articles
979-981 of the Civil Code.
Respondent-heirs of the second marriage filed before the probate court

(RTC-Branch 10) a Motion for Termination of Administration, for
Accounting, and for Transfer of Titles in the Names of the Legatees. Citing
the earlier quoted portions of Basilio’s will, they alleged that:
x x x x the twenty (20) year period within which subject properties should
be under administration of [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago
expired on September 16, 1993.
Consequently, [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago should have

ceased as such administrator[s] way back on September 16, 1993 and they
should have transferred the above said titles to the named legatees in the
Last Will and Testament of the testator by then. Said named legatees in the
Last Will and Testament are no[ne] other than the following:
xxxx
506 | P a g e
Said [Ma.] Pilar Santiago and Clemente Santiago should have also
rendered an accounting of their administration from such death of the
testator up to the present or until transfer of said properties and its
administration to the said legatees.
The probate court, finding that the properties in question would be

transferred to petitioners Ma. Pilar and Clemente for purposes of
administration only.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the probate court, hence, the
petition.
Issue:
1. Is the transfer of the properties to petitioners Ma. Pilar and Clemente for
purposes of administration only?
2. Can the properties be divided?
Ruling:
1. Yes
It is clear from Basilio’s will that he intended the house and lot in Manila to
be transferred in petitioners’ names for administration purposes only, and
that the property be owned by the heirs in common, thus:
e) Ang lupa’t bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c)

ay ililipat at ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at Clemente hindi bilang
pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang pamahalaan at pangalagaan lamang nila
507 | P a g e
at nang ang sinoman sa aking mga anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan ko
sa habang panahon ay may tutuluyan kung magnanais na mag-aral sa
Maynila o kalapit na mga lunsod sa medaling salita, ang bahay at lupang
ito’y walang magmamay-ari bagkus ay gagamitin habang panahon ng
sinomang magnanais sa aking kaapuapuhan na tumuklas ng karunungan
sa paaralan sa Maynila at katabing mga lunsod x x x x (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
2. Yes
But the condition set by the decedent on the property’s indivisibility is

subject to a statutory limitation. On this point, the Court agrees with the
ruling of the appellate court, viz:
For this Court to sustain without qualification, [petitioners]’s contention, is to

go against the provisions of law, particularly Articles 494, 870, and 1083 of
the Civil Code, which provide that the prohibition to divide a property in a
co-ownership can only last for twenty (20) years x x x x
xxxx
x x x x Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the indivision of a

property for more than twenty years, it would be contrary to public policy to
sanction co-ownership beyond the period expressly mandated by the Civil
Code x x x x
508 | P a g e
BAYLON vs. AMADOR
G.R. No. 160701. February 9, 2004
THIRD DIVISION
Doctrine: The requirement of a written notice is mandatory. It is a long

established the rule that, notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner,
the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the selling co-owner in order
to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions as well
as its efficacy and status.
Facts:
Private respondent filed an ejectment case against petitioner at the

Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bacon, Sorsogon, alleging that the latter
defaulted in payment of rentals and refused to vacate the subject property
owned by private respondent despite repeated demands.
In retaliation, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 91-5663 before the Sorsogon
RTC for specific performance alleging that their contract of lease also
contained an option to buy through which private respondent gave
petitioner the preferential right to purchase the subject property in the event
the same was put on sale.
Meanwhile, without notice to private respondent, petitioner acquired a "3/9

portion" of the subject property from one of the co-owners.
Thereafter the Sorsogon RTC, Branch 52 rendered the January 22, 1996
decision. The dispositive portion stated:
509 | P a g e
3. Declaring plaintiff to be co-owner of the house and lot in question
for having acquired by purchase at least 3/9 portion of the questioned
property.
The appellate court modified the decision of the Sorsogon RTC.
Petitioner argues that the appellate court committed reversible error when it
declared him to have lost his preferential right to buy the subject property
and gave private respondent 30 days from finality of judgment to redeem
the "3/9 portion" of the disputed property acquired by petitioner from private
respondent's co-owner.
Issue:
Does private respondent have the right to redeem the property?
Ruling:
Yes.
Article 1088 of the New Civil Code explicitly states that, should any of the
heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of
the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by
reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the
period of one month from the time they were notified in writing by the
vendor.
The requirement of a written notice is mandatory. This Court has long

established the rule that, notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner,
the latter is still entitled to a written notice from the selling co-owner in order
to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and conditions as well
as its efficacy and status.
510 | P a g e
Private respondent was never given such written notice. He thus still has
the right to redeem said one-third portion of the subject property. On
account of the lack of written notice of the sale by the other co-heirs, the
30-day period never commenced.
511 | P a g e
FRANCISCO GARCIA, PAZ GARCIA, and MARIA GARCIA, petitioners,
vs.
JOSE CALALIMAN, PACIENCIA TRABADILLO & HON. COURT OF

APPEALS, Third Division, respondents.
G.R. No. L-26855 April 17, 1989
PARAS, J.:
Doctrine: Written notice is indispensable, actual knowledge of the sale

acquired in some other manners by the redemptioner, notwithstanding. He
or she is still entitled to written notice, as exacted by the Code, to remove
all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet any
doubt that the alienation is not definitive. The law not having provided for
any alternative, the method of notifications remains exclusive, though the
Code does not prescribe any particular form of written notice nor any
distinctive method for written notification of redemption.
Facts:
Gelacio Garcia died intestate, leaving a parcel of unregistered land about

372 sq. meters, situated in the Municipality of Tubungan, Province of Iloilo.
On his death the property was inherited by his nephews, nieces,
grandnephews who are the descendants of his late brothers, Pedro,
Simeon, Buenaventura and Marcos
On December 3, 1954, the heirs, Juanita Bertomo, Joaquin Garcia, Porfirio

Garcia, Dioscoro Garcia, Flora Garcia, Consolacion Garcia, Remedios
Garcia, Trinidad Garcia, Baltazar Garcia signed a document entitled,
"Extra-judicial Partition and Deed of Sale".
Another group of heirs, Rosario Garcia, Margarita Garcia, Dolores Rufino,

Resurreccion Tagarao, Serafin Tagarao, Buenaventura Tagarao, Fortunata
Garcia and Simeon Garcia, all residents of Isabela, Negros Occidental,
512 | P a g e
also sold to the spouses Jose Calaliman and Paciencia Trabadillo through
their attorney-in-fact, Juanito Bertomo, their shares, rights, interest and
participation in the same parcel of land.
The heirs Francisco Garcia, Paz Garcia, and Maria Garcia, petitioners
herein, filed against the spouses Jose Calaliman and Paciencia Trabadillo,
private respondents herein, Civil Case No. 3489 with the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, for legal redemption of the 3/4 portion of the parcel of
land inherited by the heirs from the late Gelacio Garcia, which portion was
sold by their co-heirs to the defendants. In the complaint plaintiffs alleged,
among others:
5. That, plaintiffs' co-owners had never offered for sale their interest
and shares over the said land to the plaintiffs prior to the sale in favor
of the defendants, nor given notice of such intention on their part; and
that, no notice in writing has been given by said co-owners to the
plaintiffs of the said sale, such that, plaintiffs came to learn of it only
from other source;
6. That, plaintiffs would have purchased the interest and shares of

their co-owners had the latter offered the same to them prior to the
sale thereof to the defendants; and that, within 30 days after learning
of the sale made to the defendants under annexes 'A', 'B' and 'B-l',
plaintiffs made repeated offer to the defendants to allow them to
redeem said interest and shares acquired by the defendants in
accordance with the right granted to the plaintiffs by law in such a
case, offering a reasonable price thereof of P300 taking into
consideration the fact that the defendants had acquired only 3/4 of
the land of 372 square meters more or less, in area with assessed
value of P110 and a fair market value of 372 at Pl per square meter,
the price actually obtaining in the locality at the time of the sale
thereof under Annexes 'A', 'B' and 'B-l'; however, the defendants
refused and have until the present refused to grant redemption
thereof giving no reason why other than challenging the plaintiffs to
bring their case in court:
Issue:
513 | P a g e
Did the petitioners take all the necessary steps to effectuate their exercise
of the right of legal redemption within the period fixed by Art. 1088 of the
Civil Code?
Ruling:
Yes.
It is undisputed that no notification in writing was ever received by

petitioners about the sale of the hereditary interest of some of their co-heirs
in the parcel of land they inherited from the late Gelacio Garcia, although in
a letter dated June 23, 1953 petitioner Francisco Garcia wrote one of his
co- heirs, Joaquin Garcia, who is an uncle of petitioners, proposing to buy
the hereditary interests of his co-heirs in their unpartitioned inheritance.
Although said petitioner asked that his letter be answered "in order that I
will know the results of what I have requested you," there is no proof that
he was favored with one.
Petitioners came to know that their co-heirs were selling the property on
December 3, 1954 when one of the heirs, Juanito Bertomo, asked
Petitioner Paz Garcia to sign a document prepared in the Municipality of
Tubungan because the land they inherited was going to be sold to private
respondent, Jose Calaliman. The document mentioned by petitioner Paz
Garcia could be no other than the one entitled "Extra-Judicial Partition and
Deed of Sale" dated December 3, 1954 as it is in this document that the
name of Paz Garcia, Maria Garcia and Amado Garcia appear unsigned by
them.
It is not known whether the other heirs whose names appear in the
document had already signed the document at the time Paz Garcia was
approached by Juanito Bertomo. Paz Garcia, however, testified that she
immediately informed her brother Francisco that Juanita Bertomo wanted to
sell the land to Jose Calaliman. On December 26, 1954 he wrote
respondents giving them notice of his desire to exercise the right of legal
redemption and that he will resort to court action if denied the right. The
respondents received the letter on January 13, 1955 but petitioner
Francisco Garcia did not get any answer from them. Neither did
respondents show him a copy of the document of sale nor inform him about
the price they paid for the sale when he went home to Tubungan from
514 | P a g e
Manila sometime in March 1955 and went to see the respondent spouse
about the matter on March 24,1955.
Because of the refusal of respondent Jose Calaliman to show him the

document of sale or reveal to him the price paid for the parcel of land,
petitioner Francisco Garcia went to the Office of the Register of Deeds on
the same date, March 24,1955 and there found two documents of sale
regarding the same parcel of land.
Petitioners filed the case for legal redemption with the trial court on May 7,
1955. Respondents claim that the 30-day period prescribed in Article 1088
of the New Civil Code for petitioners to exercise the right to legal
redemption had already elapsed at that time and that the requirement of
Article 1088 of the New Civil Code that notice would be in writing is
deemed satisfied because written notice would be superfluous, the purpose
of the law having been fully served when petitioner Francisco Garcia went
to the Office of the Register of Deeds and saw for himself, read and
understood the contents of the deeds of sale.
The issue has been squarely settled in the case of Castillo v. Samonte,
where this Court observed:
Both the letter and spirit of the new Civil Code argue against any
attempt to widen the scope of the notice specified in Article 1088 by
including therein any other kind of notice, such as verbal or by
registration. If the intention of the law had been to include verbal
notice or any other means of information as sufficient to give the
effect of this notice, then there would have been no necessity or
reasons to specify in Article 1088 of the New Civil Code that the said
notice be made in writing for, under the old law, a verbal notice or
information was sufficient.
In the above-quoted decision the Court did not consider the registration of
the deed of sale with the Register of Deeds sufficient notice, most specially
because the property involved was unregistered land, as in the instant
case. The Court took note of the fact that the registration of the deed of
sale as sufficient notice of a sale under the provision of Section 51 of Act
515 | P a g e
No. 496 applies only to registered lands and has no application whatsoever
to a case where the property involved is, admittedly, unregistered land.
Consistent with aforesaid ruling, in the interpretation of a related provision

(Article 1623 of the New Civil Code) this Court had stressed that written
notice is indispensable, actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some
other manners by the redemptioner, notwithstanding. He or she is still
entitled to written notice, as exacted by the Code, to remove all uncertainty
as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to quiet any doubt that the
alienation is not definitive. The law not having provided for any alternative,
the method of notifications remains exclusive, though the Code does not
prescribe any particular form of written notice nor any distinctive method for
written notification of redemption.
516 | P a g e
CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA,

respondents.
G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987
CRUZ, J.:
Doctrine:While the general rule is that to charge a party with laches in the
assertion of an alleged right it is essential that he should have knowledge
of the facts upon which he bases his claim, yet if the circumstances were
such as should have induced inquiry, and the means of ascertaining the
truth were readily available upon inquiry, but the party neglects to make it,
he will be chargeable with laches, the same as if he had known the facts.
Facts:
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of
land registered in the name of their deceased parents.
On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his

undivided share of the herein petitioners for the sum of P550.00 by way of
absolute sale. One year later, on April 22, 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his
sister, sold her own share to the same vendees, in an instrument
denominated "Con Pacto de Retro Sale," for the sum of P 440.00.
By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales,
an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions
sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence.
In 1975, with their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a
semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.
517 | P a g e
Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs, sought to redeem the area sold to
the spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was dismissed when it appeared
that he was an American citizen. Tecla Padua, another co-heir, filed her
own complaint invoking the same right of redemption claimed by her
brother.
The trial court also dismiss this complaint, now on the ground that the right
had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from notice of the
sales in 1963 and 1964. Although there was no written notice, it was held
that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement
of the law.
Such actual notice as acquired by the co-heirs cannot be plausibly denied.

The other co-heirs, including Tecla Padua, lived on the same lot, which
consisted of only 604 square meters, including the portions sold to the
petitioners . Eustaquia herself, who had sold her portion, was staying in the
same house with her sister Tecla, who later claimed redemption petition.
It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs were unaware of the sales
and that they thought, as they alleged, that the area occupied by the
petitioners had merely been mortgaged by Celestino and Eustaquia. In the
circumstances just narrated, it was impossible for Tecla not to know that
the area occupied by the petitioners had been purchased by them from the
other. co-heirs. Especially significant was the erection thereon of the
permanent semi-concrete structure by the petitioners' son, which was done
without objection on her part or of any of the other co-heirs.
The only real question in this case, therefore, is the correct interpretation
and application of the pertinent law as invoked, interestingly enough, by
both the petitioners and private respondents. This is Article 1088 of the
Civil Code, providing as follows:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a
stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the
price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month
from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
518 | P a g e
Issue:
Granting that the law requires the notice to be written, would such notice be
necessary in this case?
Ruling:
No.
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that the

redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such
notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of redemption. Considering
the shortness of the period, it is really necessary, as a general rule, to
pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to begin, to obviate any problem of
alleged delays, sometimes consisting of only a day or two.
The instant case presents no such problem because the right of

redemption was invoked not days but years after the sales were made in
1963 and 1964. The complaint was filed by Tecla Padua in 1977, thirteen
years after the first sale and fourteen years after the second sale. The
delay invoked by the petitioners extends to more than a decade, assuming
of course that there was a valid notice that tolled the running of the period
of redemption.
Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice to be
written, would such notice be necessary in this case? Assuming there was
a valid notice although it was not in writing, would there be any question
that the 30-day period for redemption had expired long before the
complaint was filed in 1977?
In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private

respondents' pretense that they were unaware of the sales made by their
brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof of such
notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their
palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law over its
purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that the
519 | P a g e
redemptioners are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this case the other
brothers and sisters were actually informed, although not in writing, of the
sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice was sufficient.
Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?
While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of such
sales in 1963 and 1964, we do say that sometime between those years and
1976, when the first complaint for redemption was filed, the other co-heirs
were actually informed of the sale and that thereafter the 30-day period
started running and ultimately expired. This could have happened any time
during the interval of thirteen years, when none of the co-heirs made a
move to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in other words, when Tecla
Padua filed her complaint, the right of redemption had already been
extinguished because the period for its exercise had already expired.
The following doctrine is also worth noting:
While the general rule is that to charge a party with laches in the
assertion of an alleged right it is essential that he should have
knowledge of the facts upon which he bases his claim, yet if the
circumstances were such as should have induced inquiry, and the
means of ascertaining the truth were readily available upon inquiry,
but the party neglects to make it, he will be chargeable with laches,
the same as if he had known the facts.
It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the
spouses Alonzo, who were not among them, should enclose a portion of
the inherited lot and build thereon a house of strong materials. This
definitely was not the act of a temporary possessor or a mere mortgagee.
This certainly looked like an act of ownership. Yet, given this unseemly
situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to object or at least inquire, to
ascertain the facts, which were readily available. It took all of thirteen years
before one of them chose to claim the right of redemption, but then it was
already too late.
520 | P a g e
We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from
the strict letter of the law, which the respondent court understandably
applied pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as
it had no competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by this Court in the
above-cited cases. In fact, and this should be clearly stressed, we
ourselves are not abandoning the De Conejero and Buttle doctrines. What
we are doing is simply adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of
the peculiar circumstances of this case.
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although
no notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the
30-day period began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in
question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the
co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are the justifications for
this exception.
521 | P a g e
CUIZON VS.REMOTO
G.R. NO. 143027, OCTOBER 11, 2005
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Case Digest by: Jose Darwin Trinidad
DOCTRINE: One can only sell what he has-Nemo dat quod non-habet
FACTS:
A case for ownership of 4,300 sqmtrs land. In 1968, sold by Placida to
respondents,through a public document,however,unregistered.
In 1983, sold by the heirs of Placida, through extrajudicial settlement

with sale to co heir, Encarnacion,registered,covered by a torrens title.
ISSUE:
Who has a better right to the property?
HELD:
The 1968 sale by Placida in favor of the respondent should prevail over
the 1983 extra judicial partition with sale,made by the petitioners.
When Placida sold her 1/4 portion of the property,the 1983 extra judicial
settlement with sale was inexistent,and more importantly,such portion has
yet to be transferred by succession to Placida’s heirs.At the time this
document was entered into by heirs of Placida,the latter was no longer the
owner of the property.One can only sell what he does have,or he owns,or is
authorized to sell,and the buyer can acquire no-better no more than what
the seller can transfer legally.Such being the case,the heirs of Placida did
not acquire any right to adjudicate the property unto them,and sell to
Encarnacion.
522 | P a g e
NELSON CABALES and RITO CABALES vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JESUS FELIANO and ANUNCIACION FELIANO
G.R. No. 162421, AUGUST 31, 2007
PUNO, C.J.:
DOCTRINE: Legal guardian has only plenary power of administration of

minor’s property. It does not include the power to alienate.
FACTS:
In 1964,Rufino died ,leaving his wife,Saturnina,6 children and a 5,714

square meters of land.
In 1971,brothers and co-owners,Bonifacio, Alberto and Albino sold the

lot with right of repurchase within 8 years.
Alberto died in 1972,prior to expiration of redemption period,leaving his

son,Nelson and wife.
Saturnina and other co-owners redeemed the lot in lieu of

Alberto.Subsequently,Saturnina and his other children sold the lot to
Spouses Feliano,the shares of Nelson and Rito,who were minors that time
were held in trust by the vendee and will be paid upon reaching the age of
majority.
ISSUE: Was the sale of Saturnina,a legal guardian of the property on

behalf of her minor children valid?
HELD: NO
The legal guardian has only plenary power of administration of the

minors property.It does not includes the power of alienation,which needs
judicial authority.Thus,when Saturnina, as legal guardian of the petitioner
Rito sold the latter’s pro indiviso share in the subject land,she dd not have
the authority to do so.
Art.1403 of the Civil Code states:
-The following contract are unenforceable unless ratified:
1.Those entered into in the name of another person by one who

has been given no authority xxxxxxx,or has acted beyond his power.
523 | P a g e
Accordingly,the contract of sale made as to the pro indiviso share of Rito
was unenforceable.However,when he acknowledged receipt of proceeds
from the sale,petitioner effectively ratified it.The act of ratification rendered
the sale valid,and binding him.
524 | P a g e
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and
FLORENCE SANTIBAÑEZ ARIOLA
G.R. No. 149926, February 23, 2005
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
DOCTRINE: In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among

heirs until after the will had been probated. The law enjoins the probate of
the will and the public requires it,because unless the will is probated, and
notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of
his property by will may be rendered nugatory.
FACTS:
On August 31,1980, First Credit Corp.(FCC) and Efraim Santibanez

entered into a loan agreement for the purchase of agricultural
tractors,worth 128,000.
On December 13,1980,FCC and Efraim entered into second loan

agreement for the purchase of additional agricultural tractors.This was
signed by Edmund ,one of the heir as co-maker.
Efraim died in 1981,leaving a holographic will.On March 1981,testate

proceeding commenced.During its pendency,heirs executed a joint
agreement to divide among themselves and take possession of 3
tractors,each to assume the indebtedness of his father to FCC.
On August 1981,FCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union

Bank.Demand letters for settlement were sent to the respondents,but
failed.Union Bank filed a complaint for sum of money against herein
respondent,but the latter claimed not bound by the loan agreement as
being not a party to the loan agreement,and the joint agreement she
entered to,being not approved by the probate court is void,hence,she is not
liable to petitioner under it.
ISSUE(S):
1. Was the partition agreement executed by the heirs valid?
2.Was the assumption of indebtedness of the deceased by the heirs

valid?
3.Can the petitioner be held liable for the obligation of the deceased?
Held:
525 | P a g e
1. NO. There can be valid partition among heirs until after the will had
been probated. The law enjoins the probate of the will and the public
requires it, because, unless a will is probated, and notice thereof is
given to the world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will
maybe rendered nugatory.
2. NO. The assumption of liability is conditioned upon the happening of an

event that is that each shall take possession and use of each respective
share under the agreement. The partition being invalid, it follows that
the assumption of liability can’t be given force and effect.
3. NO. As the petitioner failed to file its money with the probate court, the
respondent, being not a party to the loan agreement cannot be
accountable to any liability incurred by his father. The most, the
petitioner could go after Edmund, as co-maker under the said
promissory note. This is in accordance to Sec.5,Rule 86,of the Revised
Rule of Court, and the petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the decedent,
should had filed its money claim with the probate court.
526 | P a g e
JOSEPH CUA,
vs.
GLORIA A. VARGAS, AURORA VARGAS, RAMON VARGAS, MARITES
VARGAS, EDELINA VARGAS AND GEMMA VARGAS,
G.R. No. 156536 October 31, 2006
AZCUNA, J.:
Doctrine:
Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the
purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so
within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of
the sale by the vendor.
Facts:
A parcel of residential land was left behind by the late Paulina Vargas. A
notarized Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was executed by and
among the heirs, partitioning and adjudicating unto themselves the lot in
question and was published for 3 weeks.
An Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale was again executed by
and among the same heirs over the same property and also with the same
sharings. Only 5 of the 9 heirs signed the document and their respective
shares were sold to Joseph Cua, petitioner herein.
After knowing of such sale to petitioner, Gloria Vargas tried to redeem the
property.
527 | P a g e
When the offer to redeem was refused, Gloria Vargas and her children filed
a case for annulment of Extra Judicial Settlement and Legal Redemption of
the lot with the MTC.
The MTC dismissed the complaint, declaring the Deed of Extra Judicial
Settlement Among Heirs with Sale valid and binding.
The RTC affirmed the MTC decision.
The CA reversed the ruling of both lower courts, declaring that the Extra
Judicial Settlement Among Heirs and the Extra Judicial Settlement Among
Heirs with Sale were void and without any legal effect.
The CA held that, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the
extrajudicial settlement made by the other co-heirs is not binding upon
respondents considering the latter never participated in it nor did they ever
signify their consent to the same.
Petitioner argued among others, that the acquisition by petitioner of the
subject property subsequent to the extrajudicial partition was valid because
the partition was duly published. The publication of the same constitutes
due notice to respondents and signifies their implied acquiescence thereon.
Respondents are therefore estopped from denying the validity of the
partition and sale at this late stage. Considering that the partition was valid,
respondents no longer have the right to redeem the property.
Issue:
Did the respondents lose their right to redeem the property? (NO)
Held:
No. The right to redeem was never lost because respondents were never
notified in writing of the actual sale by their co-heirs.
528 | P a g e
Based on the provision, there is a need for written notice to start the period
of redemption, thus:
Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the
purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so
within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of
the sale by the vendor. (Emphasis supplied.)
It bears emphasis that the period of one month shall be reckoned from the
time that a co-heir is notified in writing by the vendor of the actual sale.
Written notice is indispensable and mandatory, actual knowledge of the
sale acquired in some other manner by the redemptioner notwithstanding.
It cannot be counted from the time advance notice is given of an impending
or contemplated sale. The law gives the co-heir thirty days from the time
written notice of the actual sale within which to make up his or her mind
and decide to repurchase or effect the redemption.
Though the Code does not prescribe any particular form of written notice
nor any distinctive method for written notification of redemption, the method
of notification remains exclusive, there being no alternative provided by
law.
This proceeds from the very purpose of Article 1088, which is to keep
strangers to the family out of a joint ownership, if, as is often the case, the
presence of outsiders be undesirable and the other heir or heirs be willing
and in a position to repurchase the share sold.
It should be kept in mind that the obligation to serve written notice devolves
upon the vendor co-heirs because the latter are in the best position to know
the other co-owners who, under the law, must be notified of the sale. This
will remove all uncertainty as to the fact of the sale, its terms and its
perfection and validity, and quiet any doubt that the alienation is not
definitive. As a result, the party notified need not entertain doubt that the
seller may still contest the alienation.
Considering, therefore, that respondents' co-heirs failed to comply with this

requirement, there is no legal impediment to allowing respondents to
529 | P a g e
redeem the shares sold to petitioner given the former's obvious willingness
and capacity to do so.
530 | P a g e
HEIRS OF JOAQUIN TEVES: RICARDO TEVES v. CA
375 Phil. 96
[ GR No. 109963, Oct 13, 1999 ]
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Doctrine:
The requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered

has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the
protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of
registration is to serve as constructive notice to others.
Facts:
Spouses Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves died intestate and

without debts
in 1943 and 1953, respectively. During their lifetime, the spouses own two
parcels of
land registered in the name of Marcelina and another lot registered in the
name of
Joaquin and his two sisters.
However, Joaquin’s sisters died without issue, causing the entire property
to pass to him. After Marcelina and Joaquin died, their children executed
extrajudicial settlements purporting to adjudicate unto themselves the
ownership over the two parcels of land and to alienate their shares thereto
in favor of their sister Asuncion Teves for a consideration.
531 | P a g e
The division of the subject lot was embodied in two deeds. The first Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale was entered into on June 13, 1956
while the second deed was executed on April 21, 1959.
The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and sale was executed on December

14, 1971. After
the death of Asuncion Teves, her children, private respondents,
extrajudicially settled
On May 9, 1984, herein petitioners, heirs of Marcelina and Joaquin, filed a

complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental against
private
respondents for the partition and reconveyance of the aforesaid parcels of
land, alleging that the extrajudicial settlements were spurious.
Issue:
Should the extrajudicial settlements be upheld?
Held:
Yes. The extra-judicial settlements should be upheld
An extrajudicial settlement is a contract and it is a well-entrenched doctrine

that the law does not relieve a party from the effects of a contract, entered
into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of what he was
doing, simply because the contract turned out to be a foolish or unwise
investment.
Therefore, although plaintiffs-appellants may regret having alienated their

hereditary shares in favor of their sister Asuncion, they must now be
532 | P a g e
considered bound by their own contractual acts. The subject extrajudicial
settlements were never registered.
However, in the case of Vda. de Reyes vs. CA, the Court, interpreting
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court, upheld the validity of an oral partition of the decedent’s estate and
declared that
the non-registration of an extrajudicial settlement does not affect its intrinsic
validity.
It was held in this case that the requirement that a partition be put in a
public document and registered has for its purpose the protection of
creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves
against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive
notice to others. Thus, despite its non-registration, the extrajudicial
settlements are legally effective and binding among the heirs of Marcelina
Cimafranca since their mother had no creditors at the time of her death.
Thus, despite its non-registration, the extrajudicial settlements involving Lot

769-A are legally effective and binding among the heirs of Marcelina
Cimafranca since their mother had no creditors at the time of her death.
Except for the portion of Lot 769-A occupied by Ricardo Teves, both
parcels of land have been and continue to be in the possession of
Asuncion Teves and her successors-in-interest.
Despite this, no explanation was offered by plaintiffs-appellants as to why

they instituted the present action questioning the extrajudicial settlements
only in 1984, which is more than 25 years after the assailed conveyance of
Lot 769-A and more than 10 years after the issuance of a transfer
certificate of title over Lot 6409, both in favor of Asuncion Teves. Such
tardiness indubitably constitutes laches, which is the negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.
Thus, even assuming that plaintiffs-appellants had a defensible cause of

action, they are barred from pursuing the same by reason of their long and
inexcusable inaction.
533 | P a g e
CRISTINA F. REILLO, LEONOR F. PUSO, ADELIA F. ROCAMORA,
SOFRONIO S.J. FERNANDO, EFREN S.J. FERNANDO, ZOSIMO S.J.
FERNANDO, JR., and MA. TERESA F. PIÑON,
v.
GALICANO E.S. SAN JOSE, represented by his Attorneys-in-Fact,

ANNALISA S.J. RUIZ and RODELIO S. SAN JOSE, VICTORIA S.J.
REDONGO, CATALINA S.J. DEL ROSARIO and MARIBETH S.J.
CORTEZ, collectively known as the HEIRS OF QUITERIO SAN JOSE
and ANTONINA ESPIRITU SANTO,
[G.R. NO. 166393 : June 18, 2009]
PERALTA, J
Doctrine:
When the subject document and the corresponding title were canceled, the
logical consequence is that the property in dispute, which was the subject
of the extrajudicial settlement, reverted back to the estate of its original
owners. It is a basic rule that any act which is intended to put an end to
indivision among co-heirs or co-owners is deemed to be a partition.
Facts:
Spouses Quiterio San Jose (Quiterio) and Antonina Espiritu Santo

(Antonina) were the original registered owners of a parcel of land located in
E. Rodriguez Sr. Avenue, Teresa, Rizal covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 458396 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. The said parcel of
land is now registered in the name of Ma. Teresa F. Piñon (Teresa) under
TCT No. M-94400.
534 | P a g e
Quiterio and Antonina had five children, namely, Virginia, Virgilio, Galicano,
Victoria and Catalina. Antonina died on July 1, 1970, while Quiterio died on
October 19, 1976.
Virginia and Virgilio are also now deceased. Virginia was survived by her
husband Zosimo Fernando, Sr. (Zosimo Sr.) and their seven children, while
Virgilio was survived by his wife Julita Gonzales and children, among whom
is Maribeth S.J. Cortez (Maribeth).
On October 26, 1999, Galicano, represented by his children and attorneys-

in-fact, Annalisa S.J. Ruiz and Rodegelio San Jose, Victoria, Catalina, and
Maribeth (respondents) filed with the RTC a Complaint for annulment of
title, annulment of deed of extra-judicial settlement, partition and damages.
Petitioners filed an answer denying that the Deed of Extrajudicial

Settlement of Estate Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights which was the
basis of the issuance of TCT No. M-94400, was falsified and that the
settlement was made and implemented in accordance with law. They
admitted that the deceased spouses Quiterio and Antonina had five
children; that the subject property was not the only property of spouses
Quiterio and Antonina and submitted in their counter-petition for partition
the list of the other 12 parcels of land of the deceased spouses Quiterio
and Antonina that petitioners alleged are in respondents' possession and
control.
Issue:
Did the subject property of the extrajudicial settlement revert back to the
estate of the original owners? (YES)
Held:
Yes. Considering that the subject document and the corresponding title
were canceled, the logical consequence is that the property in dispute,
which was the subject of the extrajudicial settlement, reverted back to the
535 | P a g e
estate of its original owners, the deceased spouses Quiterio and Antonina
San Jose.
Since, it was admitted that all the parties to the instant suit are legal heirs of
the deceased spouses, they owned the subject property in common.
It is a basic rule that any act which is intended to put an end to indivision
among co-heirs or co-owners is deemed to be a partition.
Therefore, there was no reversible error committed by the trial court in

ordering the partition of the subject property.
The court finds nothing wrong with such ruling considering that the trial
court ordered the partition of the subject property in accordance with the
rules on intestate succession.
The trial court found the property to be originally owned by the deceased
spouses Quiterio and Antonina San Jose and, in the absence of a will left
by the deceased spouses, it must be partitioned in accordance with the
rules on intestate succession.
536 | P a g e
REBECCA VIADO NON, JOSE A. NON and DELIA VIADO,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ALICIA N. VIADO, CHERRI
VIADO and FE FIDES VIADO,
G.R. No. 137287 February 15, 2000
VITUG, J.:
Doctrine:
Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees
or devisees would be a partition although it would purport to be a sale, an
exchange, a compromise, a donation or an extrajudicial settlement.
Facts:
Spouses Julian and Virginia Viado owned several pieces of property,

among them was the disputed property. Virginia died on 20 October 1982.
Julian C. Viado died three years later on 15 November 1985.
Petitioners and respondents shared, since 1977, a common residence at

the Isarog property. However, tension would appear to have escalated
between petitioner Rebecca Viado and respondent Alicia Viado (wife of
Nilo Viado) after the former had asked that the property be equally divided
between the two families.
Respondents, forthwith, claimed absolute ownership over the entire

property and demanded that petitioners vacate the portion occupied by the
latter. Hence, petitioners, asserting co-ownership over the property in
question, filed a case for partition before the RTC.
Respondents predicated their claim of absolute ownership over the subject

property on two documents — a deed of donation executed by the late
537 | P a g e
Julian covering his one-half conjugal share of the Isarog property in favor of
Nilo and a deed of extrajudicial settlement in which Julian Viado, Leah
Viado Jacobs and petitioner Rebecca waived in favor of Nilo their rights
and interests over their share of the property inherited from Virginia.
Both instruments were executed on 26 August 1983 and registered on 07

January 1988 by virtue of which TCT No.373646 was issued to the heirs of
Nilo Viado.
Petitioners, in their action for partition, attacked the validity of the foregoing
instruments, contending that the late Nilo employed forgery and undue
influence to coerce Julian to execute the deed of donation.
Petitioner Rebecca, in her particular case, averred that her brother Nilo
employed fraud to procure her signature to the deed of extrajudicial
settlement. She added that the exclusion of her retardate sister, Delia, in
the extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the latter’s preterition that should
warrant its annulment. Finally, petitioners asseverated that the assailed
instruments, although executed on 23 August 1983, were registered only
five years later, on 07 January 1988, when the three parties thereto,
namely, Julian, Nilo and Leah had already died.
The RTC then found for respondents and adjudged Alicia Viado and her
children as being the true owners of the disputed property.
The CA affirmed with modification by ordering the remand of the records of

the case to the court a quo for further proceedings to determine the value
of the property and the amount respondents should pay to petitioner Delia
for having been preterited in the deed of extrajudicial settlement.
Issue:
Should the partition be rescinded due to the preterition of Delia as an heir?

(NO)
Held:
538 | P a g e
NO. The exclusion of petitioner Delia, alleged to be a retardate, from the
deed of extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition.
In debunking the continued existence of a co-ownership among the parties

hereto, respondents rely on the deed of donation and deed of extrajudicial
settlement which consolidated the title solely to Nilo Viado. Petitioners
assail the due execution of the documents on the grounds heretofore
expressed.
Unfortunately for petitioners, the issues they have raised boil down to the
appreciation of the evidence, a matter that has been resolved by both the
trial court and the appellate court. The Court of Appeals, in sustaining the
court a quo, has found the evidence submitted by petitioners to be utterly
wanting, consisting of, by and large, self-serving testimonies.
While asserting that Nilo Viado employed fraud, forgery and undue
influence in procuring the signatures of the parties to the deeds of donation
and of extrajudicial settlement, petitioners are vague, however, on how and
in what manner those supposed vices occurred. Neither have petitioners
shown proof why Julian Viado should be held incapable of exercising
sufficient judgment in ceding his rights and interest over the property to Nilo
Viado.
The asseveration of petitioner Rebecca Viado that she has signed the deed
of extrajudicial settlement on the mistaken belief that the instrument merely
pertained to the administration of the property is too tenuous to accept. It is
also quite difficult to believe that Rebecca Viado, a teacher by profession,
could have misunderstood the tenor of the assailed document.
The fact alone that the two deeds were registered five years after the date
of their execution did not adversely affect their validity nor would such
circumstance alone be indicative of fraud. The registration of the
documents was a ministerial actand merely created a constructive notice of
its contents against all third persons.6 Among the parties, the instruments
remained completely valid and binding.
The exclusion of petitioner Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the

deed of extrajudicial settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This
539 | P a g e
kind of preterition, however, in the absence of proof of fraud and bad faith,
does not justify a collateral attack on Transfer Certificate of Title No.
373646. The relief, as so correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals,
instead rests on Article 1104 of the Civil Code to the effect that where the
preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be
rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share
pertaining to her.
540 | P a g e
FERNANDEZ VS FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 143256, 363 SCRA 811, August 28, 2001
GONZAGA-REYES, J.
DOCTRINE: Intrusion of a Stranger in the Partition.
FACTS:
In this case, the late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and Generosa
A. de Venecia were the registered owners of the subject land in question.
The late Spouses being childless by the death of their son, purchased a
one (1) month baby boy. The boy being referred to was later on identified
as Rodolfo Fernandez, the herein appellant. Appellant was taken care of by
the couple and was sent to school and became a dental technician. He
lived with the couple until they became old and disabled.
The issue arose when Jose Fernandez died leaving an estate which
was divided by Generosa and Rodolfo through an extra-judicial partition
among themselves. The heirs of Jose Fernandez constituting his nephews,
nieces, and siblings filed a complaint for declaring the extra-judicial partition
void by alleging that without basis of heirship or any iota of rights to
succession or inheritance had caused an extra-judicial partition and were
able to secure new land titles to their disadvantage.
ISSUE:
Whether the extra-judicial partition executed by Generosa A. de
Venecia and Rodolfo V. Fernandez were valid and binding?
RULING:
The extra-judicial partition was valid but was null and void as to
Rodolfo.
Art. 1105 of the New Civil Code provides, a partition which includes a
person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with
respect to such person.
In this case, petitioner Rodolfo is not a child by nature of the spouses

Fernandez and not a legal heir of Dr. Jose Fernandez. Also, various
supporting documents presented by Rodolfo did not suffice to prove its
filiation to the spouses Fernandez.
Therefore, the subject deed of extra-judicial settlement of the estate

of Dr. Jose Fernandez between Generosavda.de Fernandez and Rodolfo is
null and void insofar as Rodolfo is concerned.
541 | P a g e
AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY VS COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 128102, March 7, 2000
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Aznar Brothers Realty Co. (hereafter AZNAR) in this case
allegedly purchased the subject lot in this case from the heirs of
CrisantaMaloloy-on by virtue of an Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with
Deed of Absolute Sale.
On the other hand, the private respondents alleged that they are the
successors and descendants of the eight children of the late
CrisantaMaloloy-on, whose names appear as the registered owners in the
Original Certificate of Title.
The MTC ruled in favor of AZNAR on the ground that, private

respondents' allegation that two of the signatories were not heirs of the
registered owners; that some of the signatories were already dead at the
date of the execution of the deed; and that many heirs were not parties to
the extrajudicial partition is a form of a negative pregnant, which had the
effect of admitting that the vendors, except those mentioned in the specific
denial, were heirs and had the legal right to sell the subject land to
petitioner. This decision was affirmed by the RTC.
CA however reversed the decision as there was no evidence that

petitioner was ever in possession of the property. Its claim of ownership
was based only on an Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale,
which private respondents, however, claimed to be null and void for being
simulated and fraudulently obtained.
ISSUE:
Whether the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale was
null and void
RULING:
No, the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale was valid.
Article 1105 is in point; it provides: A partition which includes a

person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with
respect to such person. In other words, the participation of non-heirs does
not render the partition void in its entirety but only to the extent
corresponding to them.
In this case, among the allegations of the private respondents was

that two persons who participated in the extrajudicial partition and were
542 | P a g e
made parties thereto were not heirs of Crisanta. This claim, even if true,
would not warrant rescission of the deed.
Therefore, the extrajudicial partition remains valid.
543 | P a g e
MENDOZA VS INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT
G.R. No. L-63132, July 30, 1987
FERNAN, J.
FACTS:
In this case, Buenaventura, Nicolasa and Teresa, all surnamed
Gabuya, are the legitimate children of the spouses EvaristoGabuya and
Susana Sabandija, who died intestate many years ago, that both Nicolasa
and Teresa died single, and that ModestaGabuya was the illegitimate
daughter of Nicolasa.
That there was a chance thatModestaGabuya and Elias S. Mendoza

together with Buenaventura went to the Cebu Capitol Building andsigned a
document, acknowledged before Atty. Salvador B. Mendoza for a
supposed to be reconstitution of title but it turned out to be an Extra-judicial
settlement of the Estate of EvaristoGabuya whereby Buenaventura and
Modesta appear to have divided and partitioned between themselves pro
indiviso and share and share alike [1/2 each].
Prior to the institution of the extra-judicial settlement, a Deed of

Absolute Sale was executed by ModestaGabuya in favor of the spouses
Atty. and Mrs. Elias S. Mendoza covering her alleged one-half [1/2]
undivided share. That when Atty. Elias S. Mendoza and ModestaGabuya
have respectively asked from Buenaventura Gabuya the partition of the lots
which they are co-owners of the undivided one-half [1/2] portions,
Buenaventura refused to do so claiming that ModestaGabuya is not entitled
to inherit from the estate of his late father EvaristoGabuya.
ISSUE:
Whether ModestaGabuya is entitled to the undivided one-half [1/2]
portions of the estate of EvarustoGabuya
RULING:
That this petition must fail is a foregone conclusion. ModestaGabuya,
not having been acknowledged in the manner provided by law by her
mother, Nicolasa, was not entitled to succeed the latter. The extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of EvaristoGabuya is, therefore, null and void
insofar as ModestaGabuya is concerned per Article 1105 of the New Civil
Code which states: "A partition which includes a person believed to be an
heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such person." Since
the ownership of the one-half [1/2] pro indiviso portion of Lot No. 3597
never passed on to ModestaGabuya, it follows that the sale thereof to
petitioners-spouses Elias and Eustiquia Mendoza is likewise null and void.
544 | P a g e
In the case at bar, the only document presented by ModestaGabuya
to prove that she was recognized by her mother was the certificate of birth
and baptism signed by Rev. Fr. FilomenoSingson, Assistant Parish Priest
of Pardo, Cebu City, stating therein that ModestaGabuya is an illegitimate
daughter of NicolasaGabuya. 10 However, Philippine jurisprudence is
consistent and uniform in ruling that the canonical certificate of baptism is
not sufficient to prove recognition.
545 | P a g e
LANDAYAN VS BACANI
G.R. No. L-30455, September 30, 1982
VASQUEZ, J.
FACTS:
TeodoroAbenojar died intestate, leaving parcels of land. Maxima
Andrada, the surviving spouse of TeodoroAbenojar, and SeverinoAbenojar,
executed a public document, entitled “Extra-Judicial Agreement of Partition”
whereby they adjudicated between themselves the properties left by
TeodoroAbenojar. SeverinoAbenojar represented himself in said document
as “the only forced heir and descendant” of the late TeodoroAbenojar.
Petitioners herein filed a complaint in the CFI of Pangasinan presided

over by the respondent Judge seeking a judicial declaration that they are
legal heirs of the deceased TeodoroAbenojar. They alleged that they are
the legitimate children of GuillermaAbenojar, then already deceased, who
was the only child of Teodoro Abenojar with his first wife named Florencia
Bautista; and that while TeodoroAbenojar contracted a second marriage
with AnteraMandap and a third with private respondent Maxima Andrada,
he did not have any offspring in any of the said second and third marriages.
They aver that private respondent SeverinoAbenojar is an illegitimate son
of GuillermaAbenojar. They accordingly pray that they be declared as
among the legal heirs of the deceased TeodoroAbenojar entitled to share in
his estate.
Private respondents, on the other hand, have alleged in their

pleadings that TeodoroAbenojar married only once, and that was with
private respondent Maxima Andrada. They claimed that private respondent
SeverinoAbenojar is an acknowledged natural child of TeodoroAbenojar
with Florencia Bautista. They disclaimed the allegation of the petitioners
that their mother GuillermaAbenojar was a legitimate daughter of
TeodoroAbenojar and Florencia Bautista, the truth being allegedly that
GuillermaAbenojar, the mother of the Landayans, was TeodoroAbenojar's
spurious child with AnteraMandap who was then married to another man.
ISSUE:
Whetherthe extra judicial partition executed by TeodoroAbenojar and
SeverinoAbenojar is valid
RULING:
Art. 1105 of the New Civil Code provides that, a partition which
includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only
with respect to such person.
Applying the rule in this case, the right of SeverinoAbenojar to be

considered a legal heir of TeodoroAbenojar depends on the truth of his
546 | P a g e
allegations that he is not an illegitimate child of GuillermaAbenojar, but an
acknowledged natural child of TeodoroAbenojar. On this assumption, his
right to inherit from TeodoroAbenojar is recognized by law. He even claims
that he is the sole legal heir of TeodoroAbenojar inasmuch as the
petitioners Landayans, who are admittedly the children of the deceased
GuillermaAbenojar, have no legal successional rights from
TeodoroAbenojar, their mother being a spurious child of TeodoroAbenojar.
Should the petitioners be able to substantiate their contention that

Severino Abenojar is an illegitimate son of GuillermaAbenojar, he is not a
legal heir of Teodoro Abenojar. The right of representation is denied by law
to an illegitimate child who is disqualified to inherit abintestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of Msfather. On this supposition, the
subject deed of extrajudicial partition is one that included a person who is
not an heir of the descendant whose estate is being partitioned.
Therefore, the respondent Judge is ordered to try the case on the

merits and render the corresponding judgment thereon.
547 | P a g e

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ROMULO A. CORONEL, ET. AL., V. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

Digested by: Terry Louise P. Boligor 27

DOCTRINE:Hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the

Digested by: Terry Louise P. Boligor 30

Digested by: Terry Louise P. Boligor

G. R. No. 126334. November 23, 2001 48

PUNO V. PUNO ENTERPRISES

VITUG v. COURT OF APPEALS

DIGESTED BY: MAIZ

DIGESTED BY: MAIZ 92

DIGESTED BY: MAIZ

Digested by: Cheryll Navarette

Precision of language in the drafting of an attestation clause is desirable. However, it is not

Digested by: Cheryll Navarette

Digested by: Cheryll Navarette

Digested by: Cheryll Navarette

Digested by: Cheryll Navarette 108

DOCTRINE: Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind.

Digested by: Lyndzelle Jane D. Paniza 119

Digested by: Lyndzelle Jane D. Paniza 122

Digested by: Lyndzelle Jane D. Paniza

Digested by: Lyndzelle Jane D. Paniza

IN RE WILL OF ANA ABANGAN. GERTRUDIS ABANGAN v. ANASTACIA ABANGAN, ET AL.

TESTACY OF SIXTO LOPEZ. JOSE S. LOPEZ v. AGUSTIN LIBORO

Digested by: Jan ione R. Salveron

Digested by: Jan ione R. Salveron 159

Digested by: Jan ione R. Salveron

Digested by: Nor-Aiza R. Unas

Digested by: Nor-Aiza R. Unas

Digested by: Nor-Aiza R. Unas

DOCTRINE: A cross is sufficient to be considered as signature or mark as long as it is customary.

AVERA VS. GARCIA

LUCIO V. GARCIA v. HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ

Digested by: Paulo Jose S. Villarin 222

Digested by: ALILIAN, ENNA

DOCTRINE: A stranger has no personality to contest a will.

Digested by: AMORIO, VIKKI MAE 234

Digested by: AMORIO, VIKKI MAE

Digested by: AMORIO, VIKKI MAE 238

Digested by: ARANCES, JAVY ANN 239

DOCTRINE: Effect of erasures, corrections, and alterations in a holographic will

DOCTRINE: Nature of probate proceeding

DOCTRINE: Allowance of wills

DOCTRINE: Joint will is contrary to law.

Digested by: CAGATIN, KRISTELLE

Digested by: CAGATIN, KRISTELLE 251

Digested by: CAGATIN, KRISTELLE

Digested by: CAGATIN, KRISTELLE

Digested by: CAGAMPANG, VINA

Digested by: CAGAMPANG, VINA

Digested by: CAGAMPANG, VINA

Digested by:CALOPE, LOURIE

Digested by: CALOPE, LOURIE 269

Digestedby: CASTOR, JESSETTE

Digestedby: CASTOR, JESSETTE 275

Digestedby: CASTOR, JESSETTE

Digestedby: CASTOR, JESSETTE 280

Digested by: DELA CRUZ, RALPH 293