CALTEX FILIPINO MANAGERS V CIR

FACTS:

After registration, Caltex Filman sent a letter to the company as a labor org informing the latter of the registration. Caltex reply to org inquiring
on the position titles they wish to represent. Org sent a proposal to Caltex wherein one of the demands was to be recognized as the official
bargaining agency for the managers and sups of the company. Caltex replied that their opinion is that managers are not qualified for
membership in a labor org. Org initiated a certification proceeding because of this.

Almost a month after filing for the certification proceeding, the association filed notice to strike for union busting, refusal to act on good faith
and act on demands, and discrimination and intimidation of the members.

During the hearing for the certification, the judge warned the parties to maintain the status quo specifically advising not to go on strike.

After the efforts of the Bureau of Labor Relations to settle their differences failed, the association went on strike. Because of this, the
company thru an urgent petition and as an incident of the certification proceeding, the company prayed that the strike be declared illegal and
that those who participated be punished for contempt and an injunction be issued pending hearing. MTD was filed by the association
concerning this petition but was denied by the court. MR en banc was requested by the association.

A return to work agreement was executed following settlement. It was declared by the court the it was expressly reserved in the agreement
by the company to prosecute the already instituted case.

ISSUE:

WON the strike staged was illegal and WON the court correctly terminated and admonished the officers of the Association

WON court correctly absolved the company for unfair labor practices

RULING:

To begin with, we view the return-to-work agreement of May 30, 1965 as in the nature of a partial compromise between the parties and, more
important, a labor contract; consequently, in the latter aspect the same "must yield to the common good" (Art. 1700, Civil Code of the
Philippines) and "(I)n case of doubt ... shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer" (Art. 1702, ibid). To our mind
when the Company unqualifiedly bound itself in the return-to-work agreement that all employees will be taken back "with the same employee
status prior to April 22, 1965," the Company thereby made manifest its intention and conformity not to proceed with Case No. 1484-MC, (c)
relating the illegality of the strike incident. For while it is true that there is a reservation in the return-to-work agreement as follows:

6. The parties agree that all Court cases now pending shall continue, including CIR Case No. 1484-MC.

we think the same is to be construed bearing in mind the conduct and intention of the parties. The failure to mention Case No. 1484-MC(1)
while specifically mentioning Case No. 1484-MC, in our opinion, bars the Company from proceeding with the former especially in the light of
the additional specific stipulation that the strikers would be taken back with the same employee status prior to the strike on April 22, 1965.
The records disclose further that, according to Atty. Domingo E. de Lara when he testified on October 9, 1965, and this is not seriously
disputed by private respondents, the purpose of Paragraph 10 of the return-to-work agreement was, to quote in part from this witness, "to
secure the tenure of employees after the return-to-work agreement considering that as I understand there were demotions and suspensions
of one or two employees during the strike and, moreover, there was this incident Case No. 1484-MC(1)" (see Brief for the Petition pp. 41-42).
To borrow the language of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Citizens Labor Union Pandacan Chapter vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Company (G.R. No. L-
7478, May 6, 1955), in so far as the illegality of the strike is concerned in this proceeding and in the light of the records.

Conceding arguendo that the illegality incident had not become moot and academic, we find ourselves unable to agree with respondent court
to the effect that the strike staged by the Association on April 22, 1965 was unjustified, unreasonable and unwarranted that it was declared in
open defiance of an order in Case No. 1484-MC not to strike; and that the Association resorted to means beyond the pale of the law in the
prosecution of the strike. As adverted to above, the Association filed its notice to strike on March 8, 1965, giving reasons therefor any one of
which is a valid ground for a strike.

In addition, from the voluminous evidence presented by the Association, it is clear that the strike of the Association was declared not just for
the purpose of gaining recognition as concluded by respondent court, but also for bargaining in bad faith on the part of the Company and by
reason of unfair labor practices committed by its officials.

t is likewise not disputed that on March 4, 1965, the Company issued its statement of policy (Exh. B). At that time the Association was
seeking recognition as bargaining agent and has presented economic demands for the improvement of the terms and conditions of
employment of supervisors. The statement of policy conveyed in unequivocal terms to all employees the following message:

We sincerely believe that good employee relations can be maintained and essential employee needs fulfilled through
sound management administration without the necessity of employee organization and representations. We respect an
 employee's right to present his grievances, regardless of whether or not he is represented by a labor organization.
(Emphasis supplied)

An employee reading the foregoing would at once gain impression that there was no need to join the Association. For he is free to present
his grievances regardless of whether or not he is represented by a labor organization.

The guilty conduct of the Company before, during after the strike of April 22, 1965 cannot escape the Court's attention. It will suffice to
mention typical instances by way of illustration. Long prior to the strike, the Company had interferred with the Cebu Supervisors' Union by
enticing Mapa into leaving the Union under the guise of promotion in Manila; shortly before the strike, B.R. Edwards, Manager-Operations,
had inquired into the formation and organization of the petitioner Association in this case. During the strike, in addition to the culpable acts of
the Company already narrated above, due significance must be given to the inclusion initially of J.J. Mapa and A. Buenaventura, the
Association's President and Vice-President respectively, in 1965, in two coercion cases filed at that time and their subsequent elimination
from the charges the initiative of the Company after the settlement of strike; the cutting off of telephone facilities extended Association
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members in the refinery; and the use of a member of the Association to spy for the company. The discriminatory acts practiced by the
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Company against active unionists after the strike furnish further evidence that Company committed unfair labor practices as
charged. Victims of discrimination are J.J. Mapa, A.E. Buenaventura, E.F. Grey, Eulogio Manaay, Pete Beltran, Jose Dizon, Cipriano
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Cruz, F.S. Miranda and many others. The discrimination consisted in the Company's preferring non-members of the Association in
promotions to higher positions and humiliating active unionists by either promoting junior supervisors over them or by reduction of their
authority compared to that assigned to them before the strike, or otherwise downgrading their positions. 15

Then, effective July 1, 1969, the Company terminated the employment of J.J. Mapa and Dominador Mangalino, President and Vice-
President, respectively, of the Association at that time. And this the Company did not hesitate to do notwithstanding the Association's
seasonable appeal from respondent court's decision. We perceive in this particular action of the Company its anti-union posture and attitude.
In this connection, we find merit in the claim of petitioner that the dismissal of Mapa and Mangalino was premature considering that
respondent court did not expressly provide that such dismissal might be effected immediately despite the pendency of the appeal timely
taken by the Association. The situation would have been different had respondent court ordered the dismissal of Mapa and Mangalino
immediately. As the decision is silent on this matter the dismissal of said officers of the Association ought to have been done only upon the
finality of the judgment. Because appeal was timely taken, the Company's action is patently premature and is furthermore evidence of its
desire to punish said active unionists.

Verily, substantial, credible and convincing evidence appear on record establishing beyond doubt the charge of unfair labor practices in
violation of Sec. 4 (a), Nos. (1), (3), (4), (5) and (6), of Republic Act No. 875. And pursuant to the mandate of Art. 24 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines that courts must be vigilant for the protection of one at a disadvantage — and here the Association appears to be at a
disadvantage in its relations with the Company as the records show — adequate affirmative relief, including backwages, must be awarded to
the strikers. It is high-time and imperative that in order to attain the laudable objectives of Republic Act 875 calculated to safeguard the rights
of employees, the provisions thereof should be liberally construed in favor of employees and strictly against employer, unless otherwise
intended by or patent from language of the statute itself.