CHAVEZ v. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY 5.

Whether the constitutional right to information includes

G.R. No. 133250 official information on on-going negotiations before a final
July 9, 2002 agreement.
6. Whether the stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer of
FACTS: reclaimed and “still to be reclaimed” lands to AMARI violate the
On November 20, 1973, the government signed a contract with the Constitution.
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to
reclaim certain areas of Manila Bay. On February 4, 1977, then Pres. HELD:
Ferdinand Marcos issued P.D. No. 1084 which created the Public Estates 1. NO.
Authority (PEA). On January 19, 1988, then Pres. Corazon Aquino issued PEA and AMARI’s claim that the signing of the Amended JVA has
Special Patent No. 3517, which granted land reclaimed under the Manila- mooted the petition is erroneous not only because the said JVA has not
Cavite Coastal Road Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) to PEA. PEA then been implemented, but because it is a potential violation of Sec. 3, Art.
entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Amari Coastal Bay and XII of the Constitution. In addition, the case is one of first impression,
Development Corporation (AMARI) to develop the Freedom Islands, since it is the first the Court has faced that deals with the sale of non-
which are located along the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, on April 25, 1995. agricultural lands to private corporations.

Following then Senate Pres. Ernesto Maceda’s speech criticizing the JVA, 2. NO.
the Senate conducted an investigation which resulted in Senate The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases
Committee Report No. 560, dated September 16, 1997. Among the involving factual questions. In contrast, the instant case raises
conclusions of the report are that the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to constitutional questions of transcendental importance. Also, the case
transfer to AMARI under the JVA are inalienable, and that the JVA itself is is a petition for mandamus which is within the Court’s jurisdiction
illegal. However, a Legal Task Force commissioned by then Pres. Fidel under Sec. 5, Art. VIII of the Constitution.
Ramos upheld the JVA’s legality. On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine
Daily Inquirer and Today reported that there were ongoing renegotiations 3. NO.
between PEA and AMARI. PEA claims that, unlike in Tanada v. Tuvera, it has no affirmative
statutory duty to publicly disclose information about the JVA
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank Chavez filed a petition for mandamus renegotiation. This is erroneous since under Sec. 79 of the
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary Government Auditing Code, PEA is obligated to disclose to the public
restraining order.Despite this, on March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. More significantly,
the Amended JVA, which then Pres. Joseph Estrada approved on May 28 the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply
that same year. to a purely legal or constitutional issue.

ISSUES: 4. YES.
1. Whether the petition is moot and academic due to subsequent Petitioners’ standing is based on two constitutional issues: a) the right
events. of citizens to information on matters of public concern; and b) the
2. Whether the petition merits dismissal for failing to observe the application of a constitutional provision regarding the distribution of
principle governing the hierarchy of courts. alienable lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens. Furthermore,
3. Whether the petitioner merits dismissal for non-exhaustion of the petition raises matters of transcendental importance.
administrative remedies.
4. Whether petitioner has locus standi. 5. YES.
Sec. 7, Art. III and Sec. 28, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution respectively
define the right to information and the State policy of full
 transparency in all transactions involving public interest. PEA cites
Chavez v. PCGG to argue that, in ongoing negotiations, the right to
information is limited to definite government propositions. AMARI
also holds that the said right cannot be invoked before the transaction
is completed.

Contrary to AMARI’s argument, the members of the 1986

Constitutional Commission understood that the right to information
covers negotiations leading to a transaction’s completion. This right
affects three types of information: a) official records; b) documents
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions; and c)
government research. Matters recognized as privileged information
are not covered by the right. However, PEA does not claim that the
information demanded by petitioner is privileged information.

6. YES.
Under P.D. No. 1085 and Special Patent No. 3517, and pursuant to Sec.
2, Art. XII of the Constitution, the Freedom Islands are alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. However, the Amended JVA
also includes an additional 592.15 hectares of submerged land, which
remain inalienable and outside the commerce of man.

PEA also argues that P.D. No. 1085 and E.O. No. 525 authorize it to sell
reclaimed lands. On the contrary, there no such express authority in
both laws. In addition, the provision in P.D. No. 1085 regarding the
transfer of reclaimed lands applies only to private individuals, not to
corporations.Furthermore, under R.A. No. 6957 (BOT Law) and the
Local Government Code, a contractor, if a corporate entity, can only be
paid via leaseholds on reclaimed land. This is to comply with Sec. 3,
Art. XII of the Constitution, which prohibits private corporations from
holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease.

Despite this, PEA and AMARI assert that due to Special Patent No.
3517, the Freedom Islands have become private lands of the former. It
must be noted, however, that Special Patent No. 3517 was made
subject to C.A. No. 141, Sec. 60 of which bans the sale of alienable
lands of the public domain.

RESULT:
Petition is granted.
Akbayan vs Aquino negotiations has been categorically invoked and clearly explained by
G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008 respondents particularly respondent DTI Senior Undersecretary.

Facts: The documents on the proposed JPEPA as well as the text which is
The Petitioners (non-government organizations, Congresspersons, subject to negotiations and legal review by the parties fall under the
citizens and taxpayers) demanded the full text of the Japan-Philippines exceptions to the right of access to information on matters of public
Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine and concern and policy of public disclosure. They come within the coverage
Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process. of executive privilege. At the time when the Committee was requesting
The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free trade agreement for copies of such documents, the negotiations were ongoing as they
to be entered into by the Philippines with another country in the event are still now and the text of the proposed JPEPA is still uncertain and
the Senate grants its consent to it, covers a broad range of topics as subject to change. This is in reference to PMPF v. Manglapus .
follows: trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures, paperless
trading, trade in services, investment, intellectual property rights, The petitioner argue that PMPF v. Manglapus does not apply in the
government procurement, movement of natural persons, cooperation, present case. They stress that PMPF v. Manglapus involved the Military
competition policy, mutual recognition, dispute avoidance and Bases Agreement which necessarily pertained to matters affecting
settlement, improvement of the business environment, and general and national security; whereas the present case involves an economic
final provisions . treaty that seeks to regulate trade and commerce between the
Philippines and Japan.
(While the final text of the JPEPA has now been made
accessible to the public since September 11, 2006,6respondents do not Issue:
dispute that, at the time the petition was filed up to the filing of WON the full text/content/negotiation of the JPEPA is under the
petitioners’ Reply – when the JPEPA was still being negotiated – the executive privileged and thus must be confidential?
initial drafts thereof were kept from public view.
Ruling:
With the Senate deliberations on the JPEPA still pending, the Respondents’ claim of executive privilege being valid.
agreement as it now stands cannot yet be considered as final and
binding between the two States. Article 164 of the JPEPA itself In PMPF v. Manglapus -"the [public’s] right to information . . . does not
provides that the agreement does not take effect immediately upon the extend to matters recognized as privileged information under the
signing thereof. For it must still go through the procedures required by separation of powers." What counts as privileged information in an
the laws of each country for its entry into force) – BASIN MAG-ASK SI executive-legislative conflict is thus also recognized as such in cases
SIR… the petitioners file this case in the 3rd year of negotiation. involving the public’s right to information.

The respondent alleged that the request of the Petitioners must The court held that when the Executive has already shown that an
be denied on the ground that the issue is under the executive privileged information is covered by executive privilege, the party demanding the
and is due confidential. The petitioners argue that the contents of the information must present a "strong showing of need," whether that party
JPEPA are matter of public interest, and thus it covers by their right to is Congress or a private citizen.
information. Whether a claim of executive privilege is valid depends on
the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made.21 In However, when the Executive has – as in this case – invoked
the present case, the ground for respondents’ claim of privilege is set the privilege, and it has been established that the subject information is
forth in their indeed covered by the privilege being claimed, can a party overcome
x x x The categories of information that may be considered privileged the same by merely asserting that the information being demanded is a
includes matters of diplomatic character and under negotiation and matter of public concern, without any further showing required?
review. In this case, the privileged character of the diplomatic Certainly not, for that would render the doctrine of executive privilege of
no force and effect whatsoever as a limitation on the right to
information, because then the sole test in such controversies would be
whether an information is a matter of public concern.

By disclosing the documents of the JPEPA negotiations, the

Philippine government runs the grave risk of betraying the trust reposed
in it by the Japanese representatives, indeed, by the Japanese
government itself. How would the Philippine government then explain
itself when that happens? Surely, it cannot bear to say that it
just had to release the information because certain persons simply
wanted to know it "because it interests them."

Thus, the Court holds that, in determining whether an

information is covered by the right to information, a specific "showing of
need" for such information is not a relevant consideration, but only
whether the same is a matter of public concern. When, however, the
government has claimed executive privilege, and it has established that
the information is indeed covered by the same, then the party
demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege, must show that that the
information is vital, not simply for the satisfaction of its curiosity, but for
its ability to effectively and reasonably participate in social, political, and
economic decision-making.79

Diplomatic negotiations have, since the Court promulgated its

Resolution in PMPF v. Manglapus on September 13, 1988, been
recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction and the reasons proffered by
petitioners against the application of the ruling therein to the present
case have not persuaded the Court. Moreover, petitioners – both
private citizens and members of the House of Representatives – have
failed to present a "sufficient showing of need" to overcome the claim of
privilege in this case.

That the privilege was asserted for the first time in respondents’
Comment to the present petition, and not during the hearings of the
House Special Committee on Globalization, is of no moment, since it
cannot be interpreted as a waiver of the privilege on the part of the
Executive branch.

For reasons already explained, this Decision shall not be interpreted as

departing from the ruling in Senate v. Ermita that executive privilege
should be invoked by the President or through the Executive Secretary
"by order of the President."