January 11, 2016

G.R. No. 212623

ENRIQUE G. DE LEON, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPO3 PEDRITO L. LEONARDO,
Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the November
14, 2013 Decision1 and the May 20, 2014 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR No. 35390, which affirmed the September 28, 2012 Decision3 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 27, Manila (RTC), sustaining the conviction of accused Enrique De
Leon (De Leon) for Grave Oral Defamation by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 6,
Manila (MeTC).

Records show that De Leon was charged with Grave Oral Defamation in the Information
filed before the MeTC, docketed as Criminal Case No. 453376-CR, the accusatory portion
of which reads:

That, on or about April 17, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with
the deliberate intent to besmirch the honor and reputation of one SPO3 PEDRITO L.
LEONARDO, did and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously publicly proffer against the
latter slanderous words and expressions such as "WALANGHIYA KANG
MANGONGOTONG NA PULIS KA, ANG YABANG YABANG MO NOON. PATAY
KA SA AKIN MAMAYA [,]" and other words and expressions of similar import, thereby
bringing the said SPO3 PEDRITO L. LEONARDO into public contempt, discredit and
ridicule.

Contrary to law.4

Upon arraignment, De Leon entered a plea of not guilty. Pursuant to the Supreme Court
Circular No. 20-2002, De Leon and private respondent SPO3 Pedrito Leonardo (SPO3
Leonardo) appeared before the Philippine Mediation Center to settle the civil aspect of the
case. The conciliation meeting, however, bogged down. Hence, the proceedings before the
lower court continued. During the pre-trial, the parties pre-marked their respective exhibits
and moved for the trial to commence.

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: private respondent SPO3 Leonardo,
Carlito Principe (Principe) and Jennifer Malupeng (Malupeng). Their combined
testimonies narrated that De Leon and his son, John Christopher De Leon (John), filed a
complaint for Grave Misconduct against SPO3 Leonardo before the People’s Law
Enforcement Board (PLEB), docketed as Administrative Case Nos. 06-02-060 (291) II and
06-02-061 (292) II.

The first hearing was scheduled on April 17, 2006 at the PLEB office on the 5th Floor of
the Manila City Hall; At around 1:30 o’clock in the afternoon, while waiting outside the
PLEB office on the 5th floor of the Manila City Hall, SPO3 Leonardo noticed De Leon and
several of his companions approaching. Before entering the PLEB office, De Leon uttered
these words to SPO3 Leonardo, "Walanghiya kang mangongotong na pulis ka, ang yabang
yabang mo noon. Patay ka sa akin ngayon."

The words uttered by De Leon caused SPO3 Leonardo embarrassment because there were
several persons present at the PLEB premises. He could have arrested De Leon but he did
not want to make a scene. Afterwards, De Leon’s wife, Concepcion, emerged from the said
office and apologized to Leonardo for her husband’s actuations. SPO3 Leonardo calmly
proceeded to the Special Operations Group of the Philippine National Police (PNP) located
at the Manila City Hall to have the incident entered in its blotter. On the same day, SPO3
Leonardo filed his complaint at the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) together with
Principe.5

Version of the Defense

The defense presented Fernando Manalo (Manalo), Ruperto Molera (Molera), Concepcion
De Leon (Concepcion) and the accused himself as witnesses.

From their testimonies, the defense claimed that there was a prior incident that took place
on the morning of February 27, 2006 when De Leon, with his son John, while having
breakfast with their fellow joggers at the Philippine National Railroad-Tutuban Station,
were approached by SPO3 Leonardo who arrived on his scooter. With his gun drawn, SPO3
Leonardo walked fast towards the group and at a distance of two meters, more or less, he
said, "Putang ina mo, tapos ka na Ricky Boy, referring to De Leon." He pressed the trigger
but the gun did not fire, when he was to strike again, De Leon was able to escape with the
help of John.6

Consequently, De Leon and John filed an administrative complaint for grave misconduct
against SPO3 Leonardo before the PLEB and the first hearing was set on April 17, 2006.
In his Sinumpaang Salaysay sa Paghahabla filed before the PLEB, De Leon narrated that
he and SPO3 Leonardo were former jogging buddies and that the latter wanted to borrow
money from the former in the amount of P150,000.00, but he declined. SPO3 Leonardo
became upset with him, culminating in the gun-pointing incident.7

On April 17, 2006, at around 1:30 o’clock in the afternoon, De Leon, in the company of
his wife Concepcion, Manalo, Molera, and several others went to the PLEB office to attend
the hearing. When De Leon and his companions arrived at the PLEB, they saw SPO3
Leonardo seated on the bench alone; that they were about to pass when SPO3 Leonardo
stood up, badmouthed and threatened De Leon by uttering the words, "Putang-ina mong
mayabang ka, pag di mo inurong demanda mo sa akin, papatayin kita."

Moments later, they caused the incident to be entered in the police blotter. From there, they
returned to the PLEB office where they were advised to file charges against SPO3
Leonardo in Camp Crame. Malupeng and Principe were not seen at the PLEB office
premises. Molera even tried to pacify SPO3 Leonardo by saying, "Itok (referring to SPO3
Leonardo), ano ka ba naman andito na tayo sa husgado, ayaw mo pang tigilan ang
kamumura kay Ricky, referring to De Leon." De Leon did not do anything, he simply
entered the PLEB office and sat down there because he got nervous. He also denied
apologizing to SPO3 Leonardo.

Also on April 17, 2006, De Leon utilized the police blotter to file a case against SPO3
Leonardo in Camp Crame. He filed the said case only after he received the subpoena from
the OCP for the case filed against him by SPO3 Leonardo. Although he was with his lawyer
when he went to Camp Crame, the latter did not advise him to file a complaint in the OCP
right away. According to De Leon, he also saw SPO3 Leonardo deposit his service firearm
while at the PLEB office.8
The Ruling of the MeTC

In its Decision,9 dated April 15, 2011, the MeTC found De Leon guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Grave Oral Defamation. The trial court considered SPO3 Leonardo’s police
blotter as prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. His actuations on the day of
the incident were spontaneous. As borne by the records, he immediately reported the
incident and filed his complaint on that very same day. Considering the animosity between
him and De Leon, it was contrary to human experience to expect the him to arrest the latter
right there and then when his motives would necessarily be met with doubt later on. Neither
was there any ill-motive on the part of witness Principe whose testimony was given great
probative consequence.10 The MeTC found De Leon’s defense as only an afterthought and
self-serving as he merely filed the counter-charges against Leonardo after he had received
the subpoena from the OCP. The dispositive portion of the MeTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, with the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Enrique De Leon y Garcia
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and is hereby SENTENCED to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor, as minimum
penalty, to 1 year, 1 month and 11 days of prision correccional in its minimum period, as
maximum penalty.

On the civil aspect ex delicto, the accused is ORDERED to pay the private complainant
P10,000 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.11

The verdict being unacceptable to him, De Leon filed his Notice of Appeal,12 dated April
18, 2011.

On May 4, 2011, the RTC issued the Order13 directing De Leon to file his appeal
memorandum. De Leon, however, failed to comply. For his failure to file the same, the
RTC issued another Order,14 dated December 28, 2011, dismissing his appeal. De Leon
then filed a motion for reconsideration15 on January 30, 2012, which was granted by the
RTC in its Order,16 dated May 22, 2012.

On June 15, 2012, De Leon filed his appeal memorandum17 and argued, among others,
that the MeTC decision lacked the necessary constitutional and procedural requirements of
a valid decision.

The Ruling of the RTC

On September 28, 2012, the RTC rendered its decision affirming in toto the ruling of the
MeTC. It opined that where the issue was the extent of credence properly given to the
declarations made by witnesses, the findings of the trial court were accorded great weight
and respect. In appreciating the evidence of the prosecution, the RTC observed that the
MeTC properly discussed in seriatim how it arrived at De Leon’s conviction. Thus,
contrary to his contentions, the findings of the MeTC were clearly elucidated.18

On October 30, 2012, De Leon filed his motion for reconsideration,19 but it was denied by
the RTC in its November 27, 2012 Order.

Aggrieved, De Leon filed a petition for review under Rule 42 before the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

The CA affirmed the RTC decision with modification as to the imposed penalty. The CA
stated that the issue of credibility was already raised with the RTC and was resolved against
De Leon. The CA found that he had not shown any sufficient reason to justify a departure
from the factual findings of the MeTC, which were affirmed by the RTC.20

According to the CA, to call SPO3 Leonardo a "walanghiya," "mayabang" and

"mangongotong" in public unquestionably constituted grave oral defamation. These words
seriously attacked SPO3 Leonardo’s character. The term "mangongotong" actually
imputed a crime that was dishonorable to him as a police authority. There having been no
provocation on the part of SPO3 Leonardo and that the utterances complained of were not
made in the heat of unrestrained anger or obfuscation, the RTC did not err in upholding the
judgment against De Leon for the crime of grave oral defamation.21 The decretal portion
of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the RTC is
AFFIRMED except that the minimum sentence of imprisonment is modified to the extent
that the penalty to be served shall be: four (4) months as minimum [minus the one (1) day]
to a maximum of one (1) year, one (1) month and eleven (11) days, (as imposed by the trial
court).

IT IS SO ORDERED.22

De Leon moved for partial reconsideration of the CA decision but to no avail.

Hence, this petition, where De Leon raises matters in question that can be summarized as
follows:

ISSUES

I. WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE MeTC FAILED TO INCLUDE THE

FACTS AND THE LAW UPON WHICH THE DECISION WAS BASED

II. WHETHER DE LEON’S GUILT HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT.

In his Petition for Review,23 De Leon again argues that the MeTC decision suffers from
constitutional infirmity. The lower court should have decided the case on the basis of the
testimonies of the witnesses for the defense. Also, the conviction was based simply on De
Leon’s conduct during trial and not on the merits of the case.24

In its Comment,25 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that the testimonies
of SPO3 Leonardo and Principe were credible and competent. Further, in the absence of
clear and convincing extrinsic evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality on the
part of MeTC Judge Teresa Soriaso (Judge Soriaso), the presumption of regularity in the
performance of the judge’s function will stand.26

In his Reply,27 however, De Leon insisted that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The intent on his part to diminish the esteem, goodwill or
confidence of SPO3 Leonardo or to excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or
opinion of others against him was lacking as his testimony was made in good faith, without
malice. He also reiterated his stand that there was no finding of clear and distinct facts and
law to serve as a basis for its conclusion of convicting him for the crime charged and that
the MeTC decision was not based on the merits, rather on the personal sentiments harbored
by Judge Soriaso against him.28

The Court’s Ruling

The MeTC Decision clearly stated the facts and the law on which it was based
Under Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, no decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based. Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment or final order
determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by
the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed
by him and filed with the clerk of the court.

Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is
indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. A decision that does not
clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in
the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is
unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More
than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in arriving at a judgment, the
judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the
impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit.29

The standard "expected of the judiciary" is that the decision rendered makes clear why
either party prevailed under the applicable law to the facts as established.1âwphi1 Nor is
there any rigid formula as to the language to be employed to satisfy the requirement of
clarity and distinctness. The discretion of the particular judge in this respect, while not
unlimited, is necessarily broad. There is no sacramental form of words which he must use
upon pain of being considered as having failed to abide by what the Constitution directs.30

It is understandable that courts, with heavy dockets and time constraints, often find
themselves with little to spare in the preparation of decisions to the extent most desirable.
Judges might learn to synthesize and to simplify their pronouncements. Nevertheless,
concisely written such as they may be, decisions must still distinctly and clearly express,
at least in minimum essence, its factual and legal bases.31

In this case, there was no breach of the constitutional mandate that decisions must express
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based. The CA correctly stated
that the MeTC clearly emphasized in its decision, the factual findings, as well as the
credibility and the probative weight of the evidence for the defense vis-à-vis the evidence
of the prosecution. The MeTC presented both the version of the prosecution and that of the
defense. De Leon was not left in the dark. He was fully aware of the alleged errors of the
MeTC. The RTC, as an appellate court, found no reason to reverse the decision of the
MeTC.|

Likewise, when it comes to credibility of witnesses, this Court accords the highest respect,
even finality, to the evaluation by the lower court of the testimonies of the witnesses
presented before it.32

Although De Leon claims that the testimony of Principe is incredible, the MeTC, the RTC
and the CA perceived it otherwise. First, there was no ill motive on the part of Principe for
him to weave a tale of lies against De Leon. Second, Judge Soriaso was able to observe
Principe’s demeanor during trial. He was observed to be candid and composed and his
conduct on the witness stand did not mirror that of an insincere or false witness.

No bias and partiality on the part of Judge Soriaso

Unless there is concrete proof that a judge has a personal interest in the proceedings and
that his bias stems from an extra-judicial source, this Court shall always presume that a
magistrate shall decide on the merits of a case with an unclouded vision of its facts.33 Bias
and prejudice cannot be presumed, in light especially of a judge's sacred obligation under
his oath of office to administer justice with impartiality. There should be clear and
convincing evidence to prove the charge; mere suspicion of partiality is not enough.34
De Leon posits that Judge Soriaso harbored ill feelings towards him which eventually
resulted in his conviction. No evidence, however, was ever adduced to justify such
allegation.1awp++i1 Thus, such argument must also fail.

The crime committed is only Slight Oral Defamation

Oral Defamation or Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in

writing. It is defined as "the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice
another in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood."35 The elements
of oral defamation are: (1) there must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect,
real or imaginary, or any act, omission, status or circumstances; (2) made orally; (3)
publicly; (4) and maliciously; (5) directed to a natural or juridical person, or one who is
dead; (6) which tends to cause dishonour, discredit or contempt of the person defamed.
Oral defamation may either be simple or grave. It becomes grave when it is of a serious
and insulting nature.

An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime,

the possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status
or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt or which tends
to blacken the memory of one who is dead. To determine whether a statement is
defamatory, the words used in the statement must be construed in their entirety and should
be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood
by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another
sense.36|It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting are not actionable as
libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured,
or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for
defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that the language
is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.37

In this case, the Court agrees that the words uttered by De Leon were defamatory in nature.
It is, however, of the view that the same only constituted simple oral defamation.

Whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation, depends not only upon
the sense and grammatical meaning of the utterances but also upon the special
circumstances of the case, like the social standing or the advanced age of the offended
party.38 "The gravity depends upon: (1) the expressions used; (2) the personal relations of
the accused and the offended party; and (3) the special circumstances of the case, the
antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which may tend
to prove the intention of the offender at the time. In particular, it is a rule that uttering
defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended
party constitutes only a light felony."39

There are cases where the Court considered the circumstances of the concerned parties and
held that the defamation was grave serious in nature.

In U.S. v. Tolosa,40 where a woman of violent temper hurled offensive and scurrilous
epithets including words imputing unchastity against a respectable married lady and
tending to injure the character of her young daughters, the Court ruled that the crime
committed was grave slander. In Balite v. People,41 the accused was found guilty of grave
oral defamation as the scurrilous words he imputed to the offended party constituted the
crime of estafa.

In some cases, the Court has declared that the defamatory utterances were not grave on the
basis of the peculiar situations obtaining.
In the case of People v. Arcand,42 a priest called the offended party a gangster in the middle
of the sermon. The Court affirmed the conviction of the accused for slight slander as there
was no imputation of a crime, a vice or immorality. In Pader v. People,43 the Court ruled
that the crime committed was only slight oral defamation as it considered the expression,
"putang ina mo," as expression to convey anger or displeasure. Such utterance was found
not seriously insulting considering that he was drunk when he uttered those words and his
anger was instigated by what the private complainant did when the former’s father died.
Also in Jamilano v. Court of Appeals,44 where calling someone "yabang" (boastful or
arrogant) was found not defamatory, the complainant’s subsequent recourse to the law on
oral defamation was not sustained by the Court.

Considering the factual backdrop of this case, the Court is convinced that the crime
committed by De Leon was only slight oral defamation for the following reasons:

First, as to the relationship of the parties, they were obviously acquainted with each other
as they were former jogging buddies. Prior to the purported gun-pointing incident, there
was no reason for De Leon to harbor ill feelings towards SPO3 Leonardo.

Second, as to the timing of the utterance, this was made during the first hearing on the
administrative case, shortly after the alleged gun-pointing incident. The gap between the
gun-pointing incident and the first hearing was relatively short, a span of time within which
the wounded feelings could not have been healed. The utterance made by De Leon was but
a mere product of emotional outburst, kept inside his system and unleashed during their
encounter.

Third, such words taken as a whole were not uttered with evident intent to strike deep into
the character of SPO3 Leonardo as the animosity between the parties should have been
considered. It was because of the purported gun-pointing incident that De Leon hurled
those words. There was no intention to ridicule or humiliate SPO3 Leonardo because De
Leon’s utterance could simply be construed as his expression of dismay towards his actions
as his friend and member of the community.

The defamatory remarks were not in connection with the public officer’s duty

Finally, the Court finds that even though SPO3 Leonardo was a police officer by
profession, his complaint against De Leon for oral defamation must still prosper. It has
been held that a public officer should not be too onion-skinned and should be tolerant of
criticism. The doctrine, nevertheless, would only apply if the defamatory statement was
uttered in connection with the public officer’s duty. The following cases are illustrative:

In the case of Evangelista v. Sepulveda,45 petitioner lawyer made the following statements
in his appeal brief:

THIS BLUNDER of the TRIAL COURT, AT ONCE SHOCKING AND

UNPARDONABLE, BETRAYS BOTTOMLESS IGNORANCE OF LEGAL
FUNDAMENTALS AND IS A BLACK REFLECTION ON THE COMPETENCE OF
ITS INCUMBENT. IT COULD BE A GROUND FOR PROSECUTION AND
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION.

This shocking, colossal blunder deserves condemnation no end and cries for immediate
relief in order to avoid repetitions of miscarriages of justice.

Appalled by the contents of the brief, the trial court judge charged the petitioner for indirect
contempt. In absolving the latter, this Court recognized that lawyers sometimes get carried
away and forget themselves especially if they act as their own counsel. Hence, if the judge
had felt insulted, he should have sought redress by other means as it was not seemly for
him to be a judge of his own cause.

In Yabut v. Ombudsman,46 petitioner vice mayor was directing traffic as he was

concurrently the commander of the Traffic Management Division at that time. On board
his vehicle was private respondent Doran, who was impatient about the traffic. Angry
words turned into an exchange of punches and Doran stuck a dirty finger at petitioner.
Charged with an administrative case before the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner vice
mayor was suspended. The attendant circumstances served no excuse for the mauling
incidents that followed. Though the acts of Doran were no less than "an act of spite,
degradation and mockery," it did not justify an equally abhorrent reaction from petitioner.
This Court wrote that public officers, especially those who were elected, should not be too
onion-skinned as they are always looked upon to set the example how public officials
should correctly conduct themselves even in the face of extreme provocation.

In both cases, the criticisms directed towards the public officer were made in connection
with the dissatisfaction of the performance of their respective duties. Here, however, the
malicious imputations were directed towards the public officer with respect to their past
strained personal relationship. To note, De Leon’s displeasure towards SPO3 Leonardo
could be traced to a gun-pointing incident where the latter was angered when the former
failed to grant him a private loan transaction in the amount of Pl50,000.00.

One of man's most prized possessions is his integrity. There lies a thin line between
criticism and outright defamation. When one makes commentaries about the other's
performance of official duties, the criticism is considered constructive, then aimed for the
betterment of his or her service to the public. It is thus, a continuing duty on the part of the
public officer to make room for improvement on the basis of this constructive criticism in
as much as it is imperative on the part of the general public to make the necessary
commentaries should they see any lapses on the part of the public officer. In this case,
however, the criticism was more destructive than constructive and, worse, it was directed
towards the personal relations of the parties.

To reiterate, their altercation and De Leon's subsequent defamation were not in connection
with SPO3 Leonardo's public duties. Taking into account the circumstances of the incident,
calling him "walanghiya" and "mangongotong na pulis" was evidently geared towards his
reputation as a private individual of the community. Thus, the defamation committed by
De Leon, while only slight in character, must not go unpunished.

Accordingly, De Leon should be meted out only the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine not
exceeding P200.00 pesos, for committing slight oral defamation as prescribed under Article
358 of the Revised Penal Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The April 15, 2011 Decision
of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 6, Manila, is hereby MODIFIED to read as
follows:

WHEREFORE, finding Enrique De Leon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Slight Oral Defamation, the Court hereby sentences him to pay a fine of P200.00, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolven