Energies: Dynamic Power Flow Cascading Failure Analysis of Wind Power Integration With Complex Network Theory
Energies: Dynamic Power Flow Cascading Failure Analysis of Wind Power Integration With Complex Network Theory
Energies: Dynamic Power Flow Cascading Failure Analysis of Wind Power Integration With Complex Network Theory
Article
Dynamic Power Flow Cascading Failure Analysis of
Wind Power Integration with Complex
Network Theory
Yushu Sun 1 ID
, Xisheng Tang 1, *, Guowei Zhang 1 , Fufeng Miao 2 and Ping Wang 3
1 Institute of Electrical Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Haidian District, Beijing 100190, China;
yushusun@mail.iee.ac.cn (Y.S.); zhangguowei@mail.iee.ac.cn (G.Z.)
2 State Grid Henan Power Company Economic and Technological Research Institute, Zhengzhou 450052,
China; miaoff@vip.126.com
3 Jiangsu Province Electrochemical Energy Storage Technology Key Laboratory, Taizhou 225500, China;
wangping@shuangdeng.com.cn
* Correspondence: tang@mail.iee.ac.cn; Tel.: +86-10-82547108; Fax: +86-10-82547103
Abstract: The impact of the rapid development of large-scale centralized wind power farms on
the power system is drawing more and more attention. Some topics about grid-connected wind
power are discussed from the view of complex network theory in this paper. Firstly, a complex
network cascading failure model is established, combined with dynamic AC power flow (DACPF).
Then, the IEEE 30 bus system is used to analyze its validity using the simulations of nodes removal,
wind power integration, as well as the change of current and voltage boundaries. Furthermore,
the influences of wind power before and after smoothing are investigated. Also, different wind
power coupling locations are studied. Finally, some significant conclusions are obtained to provide
references for large-scale wind power integration.
Keywords: wind power; complex network theory; cascading failure; dynamic AC power flow
1. Introduction
With the rapid development of the larger-scale interconnected power systems, the complexity
of sizes and operations in power systems is increasing. This means that the stability, security and
reliability of power system are facing an enormous challenge. Large blackouts have attracted more
and more attention due to power systems suffering from declining stability, and even cascading failure
events. The 2003 “8·14” blackout in North America, a load loss up to 61.8 GW, led to a huge economic
loss of 30 billion dollars [1]. In the same year, the “8·28” blackout in London brought about a load
loss of 724 MW and resulted in 500,000 passengers being trapped in the subway [2]. These large
blackouts are triggered by the successive malfunction of plenty of elements, that is, cascading failure,
always induced by an initial disturbance or event, for example, component failure, ground fault,
protection malfunctioning, or a hostile environment.
Recently, large-scale and long-distance grid-connected wind power have brought a more
prominent impact on the stable operation of power system owing to its intermittent and randomness.
The probability of cascading failure is then increased. As we know, the power system is a typical
complex network, which has plenty of nodes and lines, as well as complicated topology structure
and operating characteristics. Therefore, cascading failure in grid-connected wind power system is
analyzed based on complex network theory in this paper.
So far, complex network theory has been widely applied in power system stability analysis.
Chowdhury et al. [3] use topological indices to analyze power system vulnerability with renewable
energy sources. Wang et al. [4] present complex network theory to identify the vulnerable lines of
power system with a vulnerability index. Luo et al. [5] can identify transmission sections from three
levels of transmission lines, key transmission links and partition sections automatically. Chu et al. [6]
illustrate how complex network theory can be applied to modern smart grids in structural vulnerability
assessment, cascading blackouts, network reconfigurations, and so on. Correa et al. [7] obtain a similar
conclusion from the graph theory on electric network vulnerability by comparisons of physical power
flow models and scale-free graph statistic indexes. Fan et al. [8] propose a cascading failure model
based on complex network theory by combining the node overload failures and hidden failures of
transmission lines in blackouts together. The simulation results are very useful for cascading failure
propagation mechanism analysis and the protection strategy development against cascading failures
in power grids.
A lot of research on cascading failures in power system has been done, and the most important
relates to how to define the load in the established model. Yin et al. [9] define a function of node degree
β
kj , Fj = k j , j = 1, 2, . . . , N, as initial load of each node j in the power grid. Here, the cascading failure
of complex power networks is analyzed with the local preferential redistribution rule of the load of
failure node. Zhang et al. [10] adopt Li = k i ∑m∈Γi k m as an initial load of node i, where ki is the
α
degree of node i and Γi denotes the neighborhood of node i. Liu et al. [11] use L j = k j ∑m∈Γ j k m as
the load of a node j, where α is a tunable parameter. Zhang et al. [12] establish a similar model with
complex network theory, where the initial load of node i is described as Li = αk i + (1 − α)∑ j∈Γi k j .
Wang et al. [13] apply a cascading model using a local load redistribution rule. The initial load of edge ij
α
is Li = k i k j , where ki and kj are the degrees of the nodes connected by the edge. Wang et al. [14] use
h iα
Lij = k i ∑ a∈Γi k a k j ∑b∈Γ j k b as the initial load of edge ij, and analyze the cascading phenomenon
of uncorrelated scale-free networks with two different attack strategies on edges.
In power system, some nodes or edges have smaller degree, but play an important role in
power transmission. Therefore, the concept of betweenness is introduced to reveal the propagation
mechanism of network failure. Peng et al. [15] establish a network cascading failure model, where the
number of shortest paths passing through a node (i.e., node betweenness) are defined as its load.
Nicholson [16] uses betweenness as edge load to sort the critical edges for the implementation of
preparedness options.
In the analysis of betweenness, power transmission between two nodes is supposed to pass
the shortest path, which is far from Kirchhoff’s law. Power transmission from a generator node
to a load node will be undertaken by all possible lines. Bompard et al. [17] define an extended
betweenness centrality considering the complex characteristics of power system. The local importance
of the components in power system can also be measured. Bompard [18] and Yan [19] et al.
propose a joint method of extended betweenness to define electric power load considering network
structure and electrical characteristics. By using this power transfer distribution factor-based model
(i.e., extended betweenness), the most critical lines and buses in an electrical power grid can be
evaluated. Lin et al. [20] propose a self-healing transmission network reconfiguration algorithm based
on the complex network theory to analyze the capacities of generators and the amounts of high priority
loads, as well as the distribution and importance of each transmission line.
However, the extended or electrical betweenness identifies the critical nodes or lines from the
perspective of topological structure without considering the operational states of power system.
Yan et al. [21] discuss the validity of a typical DC power flow-based cascading failure simulator in
cascading failure analysis using the critical moment. Qi et al. [22] use the probabilistic power flow
combined with DC power flow model to analyze single line failure probability. Chen et al. [23] embed a
DC power flow model with hidden failures into the traditional error and attack tolerance methodology
to develop a new approach for power system vulnerability modeling and assessment.
DC power flow model is modeled with linear equations, so it does not accurately reflect the
nonlinear characteristics of the power system. Dwivedi et al. [24] explore a new centrality index with
Energies 2018, 11, 63 3 of 15
the maximum AC power flow to analyze the 118 bus systems. The capacity of the connecting links is
defined, and the maximum flow from the source to the sink is calculated. Dey et al [25] investigate the
relationship between the topological parameter variation and failure propagation rate in the cascading
mechanism through various test beds based on AC power flow equations. Sun et al. [26] propose
a cascading failure AC power flow model to discuss the impact of wind power on power systems,
and some interesting conclusions are obtained.
AC power flow (ACPF) is employed to analyze power system performance characteristics,
where the unbalanced power occurred in the system is completely compensated by a slack node.
However, the unbalanced power is usually processed by coordinated dispatching and control of
multiple adjustable generating sets in the actual operation. Therefore, a dynamic AC power flow
(DACPF) model combined with complex network theory is proposed to discuss power system
cascading failure, and then the impact of wind power integration on the power grid is studied
more accurately.
This paper is organized as follows. The introduction is displayed in Section 1. Section 2 describes
complex network theory in details. Section 3 establishes the DACPF model with complex network
theory. Different simulation scenarios are developed in Section 4. Section 5 gives the conclusions.
3.1. DACPF
There is only a slack node in the calculation of ACPF, that is, all the unbalanced power of the
system is compensated by the slack node. For online applications, power imbalance and frequency
change in the system are usually caused by line outage, generator failure, load change, and so on.
A part of the unbalanced power is adjusted by the load, and most of those are undertaken by the
generators. This process is implemented by the coordinated control of multiple generators, not a
balancing machine. Therefore, the DACPF is adopted to meet practical needs.
For a given system, the active power flow equation is calculated as follows.
where PGi , PDi , Pi (x) are generation, load and power loss of node i, respectively.
If the unbalanced power occurs in power system
N N
∆P∑ = ∑ PGi − ∑ PDi − Ploss (x) (2)
i =1 i =1
where Ploss is the total transmission loss of power system, which is compensated by all generators.
Then, Equation (1) can be displayed as follows.
Then, the active equation mismatch of the generator in step i can be obtained.
0
∆PGi = ∆PGi − αi ∆Ploss ( xi−1 ) (5)
Uc = (1 + βU ) · Ur (6)
Energies 2018, 11, 63 5 of 15
Ic = (1 + β I ) · Ir (7)
where Ur , Ir are rated voltage and current; Uc , Ic are the boundaries of voltage and current; β is the
tolerance factor, which reveals the ability of the power network to compensate the extra load; 1 + βU is
the voltage setting coefficient, and 1 + β I is the current setting coefficient.
N0
g= (8)
N
where g expresses connectivity; N and N 0 indicate the number of nodes in maximum power supply
radius before and after failure.
B. Global effective performance
Global effective performance describes the power transmission efficiency.
1 1
NG NL ∑ i∈G,j∈ L dij
E= (9)
where E expresses global effective performance; subscript G and L represent the sets of generation and
load nodes; NG and NL display the total number of generation and load nodes; dij present the shortest
electrical distance from generation node i to load node j.
4. Case Study
According to topology principles and methods of complex network [26], the IEEE 30 bus system
is modeled as a directed, weighted and sparse connected map including 30 nodes and 41 edges,
as demonstrated in Figure 1. The advantage of DACPF in cascading failure analysis is discussed in the
following applications.
Energies 2018, 11, 63 6 of 15
Energies 2018, 11, 63 6 of 15
Energies 2018, 11, 63 6 of 15
Figure 1.
Figure 1. IEEE
IEEE30
30bus
bussystem.
system.
Figure 1. IEEE 30 bus system.
4.1.
4.1. ImpactofofRemoving
Impact RemovingNodesNodeson on Power
Power System
System
4.1. Impact of Removing Nodes on Power System
The impacts of ACPF and DACPF model on power system are analyzed by nodes removal
The impacts of ACPF and DACPF model on power system are analyzed by nodes removal
The impacts
randomly under of theACPF and DACPF
same boundary modelThe
condition. on simulation
power system are
results of analyzed
removing by nodes
node removal
1, 3, 10, 13,
randomly under the same boundary condition. The simulation results of removing node 1, 3, 10, 13,
randomly under
28 are shown in the
Figuresame boundary condition.
2. Connectivity, The
that is, g, of simulation
ACPF and DACPF results of removing
model node
are identical when1, 3,node
10, 13,
28 are shown in Figure 2. Connectivity, that is, g, of ACPF and DACPF model are identical when node
2813
areis shown
removed,in Figure
while the 2. Connectivity,
former is less that theg,latter
than is, of ACPF and DACPF
by removing othermodel
nodes.are identical
Global when
effective
13 is removed, while the former is less than the latter by removing other nodes. Global effective
node 13 is removed,
performance, while
that is, E, ofthe former
ACPF andisDACPF
less thanmodel
the latter by removing
are both other nodes.
0 by removing node 1Global
and nodeeffective
3.
performance,
However, global that is, E, of ACPF and DACPF model are both 0 by removing node 1 and node 3.
performance, that effective
is, E, of performance
ACPF and DACPF of DACPF model
model areisboth
larger than
0 by that of ACPF
removing nodemodel
1 andwhennode 3.
However,
other nodesglobal effective performance
are removed. of DACPF model isDACPF
larger than that of ACPF model when
However, global effective Therefore,
performanceit is of
more reasonable
DACPF model foris larger model to analyze
than that power
of ACPF modelsystem
when
other nodes
cascading are removed. Therefore, it is more reasonable for DACPF model to analyze power system
other nodes failure triggered
are removed. by nodesitremoval.
Therefore, is more reasonable for DACPF model to analyze power system
cascading failure triggered by nodes removal.
cascading failure triggered by nodes removal.
ACPF model
DACPF
ACPF model
model
DACPF model
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.5
0.4
g
0.4
0.3
g
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.0
1 3 10 13 28
0.0 node number
1 3 10 13 28
node
(a)number
(a)
Figure 2. Cont.
Energies 2018, 11, 63 7 of 15
Energies 2018, 11, 63 7 of 15
Energies 2018, 11, 63 7 of 15
ACPF model
ACPF model
DACPF model
DACPF model
1.1
1.1
1.0
1.0
0.9
0.9
0.8
0.8
0.7
0.7
0.6
EE
0.6
0.5
0.5
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.0
0.0
1 3 10 13 28
1 3 node10number 13 28
node number
(b)
(b)
Figure 2. Contrastive analysis of the impacts of removing nodes, (a) Connectivity; (b) Global effective
Figure 2. Contrastive
2. Contrastive analysis
analysis of the
of the impacts
impacts of removing
of removing nodes,nodes, (a) Connectivity;
(a) Connectivity; (b)effective
(b) Global Global
performance.
effective performance.
performance.
0.30
0.30
0.25
0.25
(p.u.)
power(p.u.)
0.20
0.20
Windpower
0.15
0.15
Wind
0.10
0.10
0.05
0.05
0.00
0.00
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
t (h)
t (h)
Figure 3. Wind
Figure 3. Wind power
powerover
overthe
thecourse
courseof
ofaaday.
day.
Figure 3. Wind power over the course of a day.
Energies 2018, 11, 63 8 of 15
before smoothing
after smoothing
Energies 2018, 11, 63 8 of 15
0.30
Energies 2018, 11, 63 8 of 15
0.25
0.15
Wind power (p.u.)
0.20
0.10
0.15
0.05
0.10
0.00
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
0.05
t (min)
In addition, Figure 5 indicates that the tmax (min)30-min wind power fluctuation rate before
smoothing is 25.79%, while the one after smoothing is less than 7%. Therefore, wind power has been
Figure 4.Wind
Windpower
power before
before and
andafter
aftersmoothing.
smoothing.
smoothed effectively. WindFigure
power4.fluctuation rate is calculated as follows.
max(the k ) − min( P1,2 k )
P1,2max
In addition, Figure 5 indicates that 30-min wind power fluctuation rate before
In addition,
smoothing is Figure
25.79%,5while
indicates that
the one =thesmoothing
fafter max 30-min wind
is less power
than fluctuation
7%. Therefore, rate
wind before
power (10)
hassmoothing
been
Prated
is 25.79%, while the one after smoothing is less than 7%. Therefore,
smoothed effectively. Wind power fluctuation rate is calculated as follows. wind power has been smoothed
where P1,2Wind
effectively. power
k is wind fluctuation
power at timerate
k; Pis calculated
r a tmax(
ed
as follows.
isPthe installed
) − min( P
capacity
)
of wind power.
1,2 k 1,2 k
f = (10) 30
In the following analysis, wind power is used to represent the generator node 13 in the IEEE
max( P1,2···k P − min( P1,2···k )
)rated
bus system. Then, the rationality and f =validity of DACPF model are analyzed compared with ACPF(10)
where
model from P1,2section
k is wind
A topower
C. In at time k; some
addition, Pr a t e d is thePrated
installed
significant capacity
analysis of wind power.based on DACPF
is implemented
modelP inInsection
where theis following
D and
wind analysis,
E. at time
power wind
k; power
P isis the
used to represent
installed the generator
capacity of windnode 13 in the IEEE 30
power.
1,2···k rated
bus system. Then, the rationality and validity of DACPF model are analyzed compared with ACPF
model from section A to C. In addition, some significant analysis is implemented based on DACPF
before smoothing
model in section D and E.
after smoothing
0.30
before smoothing
after smoothing
0.25
Wind power (p.u.)
0.30
0.20
0.25
Wind power (p.u.)
0.15
0.20
0.10
0.15
0.05
0.10
0.00
0.05
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
0.00
t (min)
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
Figure 5. Wind power fluctuations before and after smoothing.
t (min)before and after smoothing.
Figure 5. Wind power fluctuations
ACPF model
DACPF model
1.0
0.8
g
0.6
0.4
0.2
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
t (h)
(a)
ACPF model
DACPF model
2.0
1.8
1.6
1.4
1.2
E
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
t (h)
(b)
Figure 6. Comparative analysis of the impacts of wind power, (a) Connectivity; (b) Global effective
Figure 6. Comparative analysis of the impacts of wind power, (a) Connectivity; (b) Global
performance.
effective performance.
ACPF model
DACPF model
0.30
0.25
0.20
g
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
ACPF model
0.7 DACPF model
0.6
0.5
0.4
E
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
-0.1
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
Figure 7. Comparative analysis of the impact of grid current tolerance capability, (a) Connectivity; (b)
Figure 7. Comparative analysis of the impact of grid current tolerance capability, (a) Connectivity;
Global effective performance.
(b) Global effective performance.
ACPF model
DACPF model
1.2
0.8
g
0.4
0.0
1.05 1.10 1.15 1.20
ACPF model
DACPF model
2.0
1.5
E
1.0
0.5
0.0
1.05 1.10 1.15 1.20
Figure 8. Comparative analysis of the impact of grid voltage tolerance capability, (a) Connectivity; (b)
Figure 8. Comparative
Global analysis of the impact of grid voltage tolerance capability, (a) Connectivity;
effective performance.
(b) Global effective performance.
D. Contrastive analysis of the impact of wind power before and after smoothing
Based on the DACPF model, the generator node 13 is represented by wind power before and
after smoothing in Figure 4, respectively. The connectivity and global effective performance of wind
power after smoothing are greater than the ones before smoothing. In other words, wind power after
smoothing has less effect on power system, which can be obtained from Figure 9. So it is necessary to
smooth the wind power fluctuation from the view of complex network theory.
Energies 2018, 11, 63 12 of 15
D. Contrastive analysis of the impact of wind power before and after smoothing
Based on the DACPF model, the generator node 13 is represented by wind power before and
after smoothing in Figure 4, respectively. The connectivity and global effective performance of wind
power after smoothing are greater than the ones before smoothing. In other words, wind power after
smoothing
Energies 2018, has
11, 63less effect on power system, which can be obtained from Figure 9. So it is necessary
12 of to
15
smooth the wind power fluctuation from the view of complex network theory.
before smoothing
after smoothing
1.0
0.9
0.8
g
0.7
0.6
0.5
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
t (h)
(a)
before smoothing
after smoothing
2.0
1.8
1.6
1.4
E
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
t (h)
(b)
Figure 9. Comparative analysis of the impacts of wind power before and after smoothing, (a)
Figure 9. Comparative analysis of the impacts of wind power before and after smoothing,
Connectivity; (b) Global effective performance.
(a) Connectivity; (b) Global effective performance.
node 6
node 29
1.00
0.95
0.90
g
0.85
0.80
0.75
0.70
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
t (h)
(a)
node 6
node 29
1.8
1.7
1.6
1.5
E
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1
0 4 8 12 16 20 24
t (h)
(b)
Figure 10. Comparative analysis of the impacts of different wind power coupling locations, (a)
Figure 10. Comparative analysis of the impacts of different wind power coupling locations,
Connectivity; (b) Global effective performance.
(a) Connectivity; (b) Global effective performance.
5. Conclusions
The impact of wind power on power grid is discussed with complex network theory in this
paper. Firstly, a DACPF cascading failure model is established on the basis of the IEEE 30 bus system.
Then, comparative analysis of the ACPF and DACPF models is implemented by nodes removal, wind
Energies 2018, 11, 63 14 of 15
5. Conclusions
The impact of wind power on power grid is discussed with complex network theory in this
paper. Firstly, a DACPF cascading failure model is established on the basis of the IEEE 30 bus system.
Then, comparative analysis of the ACPF and DACPF models is implemented by nodes removal,
wind power integration and the change of current and voltage boundaries. The validity of the
DACPF model based complex network theory is verified. In addition, wind power after smoothing
has less impact on power system compared with wind power before smoothing. The reason why
grid-connected wind power should be mitigated is interpreted based on complex network theory.
Finally, selecting larger degree and electric betweenness node as wind power coupling point can
reduce the impact on power systems.
Acknowledgments: This work was financially supported by a grant from the National Key Research and
Development Program of China (No. 2016YFB0900400) and Foundation of Director of Institute of Electrical
Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences (No. Y760141CSA) and Jiangsu Province 2016 Innovation Ability
Construction Special Funds (No. BM2016027).
Author Contributions: Yushu Sun and Xisheng Tang conceived and designed the simulation and experiment.
Guowei Zhang provided the simulation and experimental platform. Fufeng Miao worked on the simulation and
the writing of paper. Ping Wang analyzed the data.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
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