Constitutional Law 1 Case Digests

Constitutional Law 1 - Case Digests (2 September 2019)
(compiled and lifted off random online sources)
#1 Gamboa
vs. Teves Wilson P. Gamboa v. Finance Secretary Margarito Teves, et al.,
G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011
CARPIO, J.:
THE FACTS
This is a petition to nullify the sale of shares of stock of Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC) by the government
of the Republic of the Philippines, acting through the Inter-Agency Privatization Council (IPC), to Metro Pacific Assets Holdings, Inc. (MPAH), an
affiliate of First Pacific Company Limited (First Pacific), a Hong Kong-based investment management and holding company and a shareholder of
the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT).

The petitioner questioned the sale on the ground that it also involved an indirect sale of 12 million shares (or about 6.3 percent of the
outstanding common shares) of PLDT owned by PTIC to First Pacific. With the this sale, First Pacific’s common shareholdings in PLDT increased
from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the total common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%. This, according to the
petitioner, violates Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a public utility to not
more than 40%, thus:
Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except
to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens; nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period
than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or
repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public.
The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital,
and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
THE ISSUE
Does the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refer to the total common shares only, or to the total outstanding
capital stock (combined total of common and non-voting preferred shares) of PLDT, a public utility?
THE RULING
[The Court partly granted the petition and held that the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of
stock entitled to vote in the election of directors of a public utility, i.e., to the total common shares in PLDT.]
Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as opposed to preferred shares which usually have no
voting rights, the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if the preferred shares also
have the right to vote in the election of directors, then the term “capital” shall include such preferred shares because the right to participate in the
control or management of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the election of directors. In short, the term “capital” in Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors.
To construe broadly the term “capital” as the total outstanding capital stock, including both common and non-voting preferred shares,
grossly contravenes the intent and letter of the Constitution that the “State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.” A broad definition unjustifiably disregards who owns the all-important voting stock, which necessarily
equates to control of the public utility.
Holders of PLDT preferred shares are explicitly denied of the right to vote in the election of directors. PLDT’s Articles of Incorporation
expressly state that “the holders of Serial Preferred Stock shall not be entitled to vote at any meeting of the stockholders for the election
of directors or for any other purpose or otherwise participate in any action taken by the corporation or its stockholders, or to receive notice of

any meeting of stockholders.” On the other hand, holders of common shares are granted the exclusive right to vote in the election of directors.

PLDT’s Articles of Incorporation state that “each holder of Common Capital Stock shall have one vote in respect of each share of such stock held
by him on all matters voted upon by the stockholders, and the holders of Common Capital Stock shall have the exclusive right to vote for
the election of directors and for all other purposes.”
It must be stressed, and respondents do not dispute, that foreigners hold a majority of the common shares of PLDT. In fact, based on

PLDT’s 2010 General Information Sheet (GIS), which is a document required to be submitted annually to the Securities and Exchange

Commission, foreigners hold 120,046,690 common shares of PLDT whereas Filipinos hold only 66,750,622 common shares. In other words,
foreigners hold 64.27% of the total number of PLDT’s common shares, while Filipinos hold only 35.73%. Since holding a majority of the common
shares equates to control, it is clear that foreigners exercise control over PLDT. Such amount of control unmistakably exceeds the allowable 40
percent limit on foreign ownership of public utilities expressly mandated in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.
shown in PLDT’s 2010 GIS, as submitted to the SEC, the par value of PLDT common shares is P5.00 per share, whereas the par
As
value of preferred shares is P10.00 per share. In other words, preferred shares have twice the par value of common shares but cannot elect
directors and have only 1/70 of the dividends of common shares. Moreover, 99.44% of the preferred shares are owned by Filipinos while

foreigners own only a minuscule 0.56% of the preferred shares. Worse, preferred shares constitute 77.85% of the authorized capital stock of

PLDT while common shares constitute only 22.15%. This undeniably shows that beneficial interest in PLDT is not with the non-voting preferred
shares but with the common shares, blatantly violating the constitutional requirement of 60 percent Filipino control and Filipino beneficial
ownership in a public utility.
In short, Filipinos hold less than 60 percent of the voting stock, and earn less than 60 percent of the dividends, of PLDT. This directly
contravenes the express command in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution that “[n]o franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization
for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to x x x corporations x x x organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens x x x.”
To repeat, (1) foreigners own 64.27% of the common shares of PLDT, which class of shares exercises the sole right to vote in the election
of directors, and thus exercise control over PLDT; (2) Filipinos own only 35.73% of PLDT’s common shares, constituting a minority of the voting
stock, and thus do not exercise control over PLDT; (3) preferred shares, 99.44% owned by Filipinos, have no voting rights; (4) preferred shares

earn only 1/70 of the dividends that common shares earn; (5) preferred shares have twice the par value of common shares; and (6) preferred
shares constitute 77.85% of the authorized capital stock of PLDT and common shares only 22.15%. This kind of ownership and control of a public
utility is a mockery of the Constitution.
[Thus, the Respondent Chairperson of the Securities and Exchange Commission was DIRECTED by the Court to apply the foregoing
definition of the term “capital” in determining the extent of allowable foreign ownership in respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company, and if there is a violation of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, to impose the appropriate sanctions under the law.]
reas of investment,
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, like other provisions of the Constitution expressly reserving to Filipinos specific a
such as the development of natural resources and ownership of land, educational institutions and advertising business, is self-executing. There
is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions of the Constitution.
Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would
give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective.
Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as self-executing, rather than as requiring future legislation for their enforcement. The
reason is not difficult to discern. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law ratified by the sovereign
people can be easily ignored and nullified by Congress. Suffused with wisdom of the ages is the unyielding rule that legislative actions
may give breath to constitutional rights but congressional inaction should not suffocate them.
Thus, we have treated as self-executing the provisions in the Bill of Rights on arrests, searches and seizures, the rights of a person under
custodial investigation, the rights of an accused, and the privilege against self-incrimination. It is recognized that legislation is unnecessary to
enable courts to effectuate constitutional provisions guaranteeing the fundamental rights of life, liberty and the protection of property. The same
treatment is accorded to constitutional provisions forbidding the taking or damaging of property for public use without just compensation.
#2 Martinez MARTINEZ vs LIM

vs. Lim AM No. P-0401795
FACTS:
RTC Romblon Branch 81 Sheriff Norvel R. Lim, on March 11,2002, sent a letter to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor Arsenio Almaddin
informing them that the OPP did not attend the flag ceremony despite of them assigned to spearhead the mentioned flag ceremony. It contained a
reminder for the office to attend the fag ceremony on Monday and Friday in the Hall of Justice of Romblon.
Because of this letters, employees of the OPP filed an administrative complaint for grave misconduct against the sheriff since they felt that the
letter portrayed them as unpatriotic Filipinos, tarnished their reputation as public officers, and cast dishonor on their persons.
The Sheriff explained that as the admin OIC, it is his duty to require the OPP to attend the flag ceremony. He denied any ill will against the OPP.
The Office of the Court Administrator, upon referral of the case by the Ombudsman to their office, said that the letter did not contain any
suggestion of bad faith or lack of patriotism. The letter only expressed concern so that it would not happen again.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the admin OIC acted with grave misconduct by writing the letter of notice against the OPP
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the admin OIC acted within his duty to remind the OPP to attend the flag ceremony. Section 18 of the R.A. 8491
requires all government offices and educational institutions to observe flag-raising ceremony every Monday morning and flag lowering every
Friday afternoon. Furthermore, SC Circular 62-2001 provides for the same flag ceremonies in hall of justices. It further noted that the admin OIC’s
letter was courteously written. The use of offensive language or the suggestion of unpratriotism on the part of the complainants are not found in
the letter.
#3 Magdalo
vs. MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 190793, 19 June 2012, EN BANC ( Sereno, J.)
COMELEC
Public knowledge of facts pertaining to employment of violence and unlawful means to achieve one’s goals is within the determination of
the COMELEC, and such fact is sufficient to deny a party registration and accreditation.
Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking
its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for participation in the 2010 National
and Local Elections. It was represented by its Chairperson, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV (Trillanes), and its Secretary General, Francisco
Ashley L. Acedillo (Acedillo).
Taking cognizance of the Oakwood incident, the COMELEC denied the Petition, claiming that MAGDALO’s purpose was to employ
violence and unlawful means to achieve their goals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied
the Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to
achieve its goals through violent or unlawful means
HELD:MAGDALO contends that it was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC
to have denied the Petition for Registration not on the basis of facts or evidence on
record, but on mere speculation and conjectures. This argument cannot be given any merit. Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may be taken
of matters that are of “public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration.” Further, Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as
the Revised Administrative Code, specifically empowers administrative agencies to admit and give probative value to evidence commonly
acceptable by reasonably prudent men, and to take notice of judicially cognizable facts.
That the Oakwood incident was widely known and extensively covered by the media made it a proper subject of judicial notice. Thus, the
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it treated these facts as public knowledge, and took cognizance thereof without
requiring the introduction and jurisprudence reception of evidence thereon. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that
MAGDALO uses violence or unlawful means to achieve its goals. Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations
and coalitions that “seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means” shall be denied registration. This disqualification is reiterated
in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that “no political party which seeks to achieve its goal through violence shall be entitled to accreditation.”
In the present case, the Oakwood incident was one that was attended with violence. As publicly announced by the leaders of MAGDALO during
the siege, their objectives were to express their dissatisfaction with the administration of former President Arroyo and to divulge the alleged
corruption in the military and the supposed sale of arms to enemies of the state. Ultimately, they wanted the President, her cabinet members, and
the top officials of the AFP and the PNP to resign. To achieve these goals, MAGDALO opted to seize a hotel occupied by civilians, march in the
premises in full battle gear with ammunitions, and plant explosives in the building. These brash methods by which MAGDALO opted to ventilate
the grievances of its members and withdraw its support from the government constituted clear acts of violence. The COMELEC did not, therefore,
commit grave abuse of discretion when it treated the Oakwood standoff as a manifestation of the predilection of MAGDALO for resorting to
violence or threats thereof in order to achieve its objectives.
The finding that MAGDALO seeks to achieve its goals through violence or unlawful means did not operate as a prejudgment of Criminal Case No.
03- 2784. The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of BP 881 in the COMELEC to register political parties
and ascertain the eligibility of groups to participate in the elections is purely administrative in character. In exercising this authority, the COMELEC
only has to assess whether the party or organization seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goals by employing acts considered as
violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature.
In finding that MAGDALO resorts to violence or unlawful acts to fulfill its organizational objectives, the COMELEC did not render an assessment
as to whether the members of MAGDALO committed crimes, as COMELEC was not required to make that determination in the first place. Its
evaluation was limited only to examining whether MAGDALO possessed all the necessary qualifications and none of disqualifications for
registration as a political party. Accreditation as a political party is not a right but only a privilege given to groups who have qualified and met the
requirements provided by law.
Noteworthily, however, in view of the subsequent amnesty granted in favor of the members of MAGDALO, the events that transpired
during the Oakwood incident can no longer be interpreted as acts of violence in the context of the disqualifications from party registration.
#4 Kulayan JAMAR KULAYAN, et al. v. GOV. ABDUSAKUR TAN, in his capacity as Governor of Sulu, et al. G.R. No. 187298, 03 July 2012, EN
vs. Tan BANC (Sereno, J.)
The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another of cial, even if he is the local
chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justi ed by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.
Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in
Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba, were purportedly inspecting a water sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial
Jail when they were seized by three armed men who were later confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). A Local Crisis
Committee, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee (Committee) was then formed to investigate the kidnapping incident. The
Committee convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu.
Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. The Proclamation cited
the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also
invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out
emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies
to suppress disorder and lawless violence. In the Proclamation, Tan called upon the PNP and the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) to set up
checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety.
Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et al. claimed that Proclamation No. 1-09 was issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections
1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the
chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
ISSUE: Can a governor exercise the calling-out powers of a President?
RULING: NO.
It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means that
when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else. Corollarily, it is only the
President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as
what became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof.
Springing from the well-entrenched constitutional precept of One President is the notion that there are certain acts which, by their very
nature, may only be performed by the president as the Head of the State. One of these acts or prerogatives is the bundle of Commander-in-Chief
powers to which the “calling-out” powers constitutes a portion.
The power to declare a state of martial law is subject to the Supreme Court’s authority to review the factual basis thereof. By constitutional
fiat, the calling-out powers, which is of lesser gravity than the power to declare martial law, is bestowed upon the President alone.
While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over
the military, making the civilian president the nation’s supreme military leader. The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII,
Section 18, is that a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution does not
require that the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military
operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual command of the armed forces to military
experts; but the ultimate power is his.
In the case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, the Court had occasion to rule that the calling-out powers belong solely to the
President as commander-in-chief:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily
exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom.
Regarding the country’s police force, Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution states that: “The State shall establish and maintain one
police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The
authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.”
A local chief executive, such as the provincial governor, exercises operational supervision over the police, and may exercise control only
in day-to-day operations.
Furthermore according to the framers, it is still the President who is authorized to exercise supervision and control over the police, through
the National Police Commission.
In the discussions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the above provision it is clear that the framers never intended for
local chief executives to exercise unbridled control over the police in emergency situations. This is without prejudice to their authority over
police units in their jurisdiction as provided by law, and their prerogative to seek assistance from the police in day to day situations, as
contemplated by the Constitutional Commission. But as a civilian agency of the government, the police, through the NAPOLCOM, properly comes
within, and is subject to, the exercise by the President of the power of executive control.
Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the
assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces,
the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the
President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of
Section 465 of the Local Government Code.
Respondents, however, justify this stance by stating that nowhere in the seminal case of David v. Arroyo, which dealt squarely with the
issue of the declaration of a state of emergency, does it limit the said authority to the President alone. Respondents contend that the ruling in
David expressly limits the authority to declare a national emergency, a condition which covers the entire country, and does not include emergency
situations in local government units. This claim is belied by the clear intent of the framers that in all situations involving threats to security,
such as lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, even in localized areas, it is still the President who possesses the sole authority to
exercise calling-out powers.
#5 Gamboa Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, 24 July 2012

vs. Chan
FACTS
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations against her
and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a Private Army Group (PAG). Purportedly without the benefit of data verification,
PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s
enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs. Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed,
Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper when the right to privacy is invoked as opposed to the state’s interest
in preserving the right to life, liberty or security.
RULING
NO.
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s
right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order
to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right
to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining
PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently
explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they
enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome. [T]he state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on
the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate.
Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.
#6 Isidro vs. Animos vs. PVAO G.R. No. 79156, June 22, 1989
PVAO
FACTS: Isidro Animos is a World War II veteran, having been a member of the USAFFE and the guerilla forces thereafter. Originally, the case
was a suit for mandamus by the petitioners against PVAO, for the payment of full pension benefits, retroactive to 1947, under Republic Act No. 65,
as amended. However, the petitioner’s claim was denied on the basis that Animos’ disability was only considered partial, rather than total,
according to the “Rules on Disability Ratings”, thus precluding the maximum payment of his pension benefits. The petitioner submits that the
rating system adopted by PVAO is null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint against PVAO can be considered a suit against the state.
HELD: No. The doctrine of immunity from the suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and
personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. When officers and agents of the government are sued in their individual capacity, the cloak of protection
from the government is removed. According to the doctrine in Ruiz vs. Cabahug: “We hold that under the facts and circumstances alleged in the
amended complaint, which should be taken on its face value, the suit is not one against the Government, or a claim against it, but one against the
officials to compel them to act in accordance with the rights to be established by the contending architects, or to prevent them from making
payment and recognition until the contending architects have established their respective rights and interests in the funds retained and in the
credit for the work done”. Hence, the complaint cannot be considered a suit against the state because it is a well-settled principle of law that we
may consider a public official liable in his personal private capacity for the damage caused by his acts when done with malice and in bad faith, or
beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction.
#7 Chavez
vs. Francisco Chavez v. Raul M. Gonzales and National Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008
Gonzales DECISION
(En Banc)
PUNO, J.:
I. THE FACTS
As a consequence of the public release of copies of the “Hello Garci” compact disc audiotapes involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation
between then-President Gloria Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that
those who had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also
stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated that he
had ordered the National Bureau of Investigation to go after media organizations “found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of
the contents of a tape. ”
Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned in a press release all radio stations and TV network owners/operators that the conditions of the authorization
and permits issued to them by government like the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority explicitly provides that they shall not use
their stations for the broadcasting or telecasting of false information or willful misrepresentation. The NTC stated that the continuous airing or
broadcast of the “Hello Garci” taped conversations by radio and TV stations is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the
conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority. It warned that their broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful
misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said
media establishments.
Subsequently, a dialogue was held between the NTC and the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) which resulted in the issuance of
a Joint Press Statement which stated, among others, that the supposed wiretapped tapes should be treated with sensitivity and handled
responsibly.
Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC directly with the Supreme Court.
II. THE ISSUES
1. Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press?
2. Did the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constitute a form of content-based prior restraint that has
transgressed the Constitution?
III. THE RULING
[The Court voted 10-5 (CJ Puno, joined by JJ. Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales,
Azcuna, Reyes and Tinga in the majority, as against JJ. Corona, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro and Velasco in the minority) in
granting the petition insofar as respondent Secretary Gonzalez’s press statement was concerned. Likewise, it voted 10-5 (CJ Puno, joined by JJ.
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Reyes and Velasco in the majority, as
against JJ. Corona, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro and Tinga in the minority) in granting the same insofar as NTC’s press
statement was concerned.]
1. NO, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will NOT justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech
and of the press.
A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government
having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of
media, including broadcast media.
Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and
present danger test. [T]he great evil which government wants to prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the
anti-wiretapping law. The records of the case at bar however are confused and confusing, and respondents’ evidence falls short of satisfying the
clear and present danger test. Firstly, the various statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape recording.
Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public two versions, one supposed to be a
“complete” version and the other, an “altered” version. Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the who’s and the how’s of the wiretapping act
is ambivalent, especially considering the tape’s different versions. The identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of its commission and other related
and relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its
airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law.
We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. Our laws are of
different kinds and doubtless, some of them provide norms of conduct which[,] even if violated[,] have only an adverse effect on a person’s
private comfort but does not endanger national security. There are laws of great significance but their violation, by itself and without more,
cannot support suppression of free speech and free press. In fine, violation of law is just a factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be
weighed in adjudging whether to restrain freedom of speech and of the press. The totality of the injurious effects of the violation to private and
public interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded by the Constitution and by related international covenants protecting
freedom of speech and of the press. In calling for a careful and calibrated measurement of the circumference of all these factors to determine
compliance with the clear and present danger test, the Court should not be misinterpreted as devaluing violations of law. By all means,
violations of law should be vigorously prosecuted by the State for they breed their own evil consequence. But to repeat, the need to prevent
their violation cannot per se trump the exercise of free speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils.
For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the
exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national
security of the State.
2. YES, the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constituted a form of content-based prior restraint that
has transgressed the Constitution.
[I]t is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars.
It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their official functions. Undoubtedly,
respondent Gonzales made his statements as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its statement as the regulatory body of media. Any act
done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The
concept of an “act” does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non formalization
of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint. The press statements
at bar are acts that should be struck down as they constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and press.
#8 Letter to In Re: Letter Of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno

Assoc
Justice Facts:
Puno - The petitioner, Reynato S. Puno, was first appointed as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals on 1980.
- On 1983, the Court of Appeals was reorganized and became the Intermediate Appellate Court pursuant to BP Blg. 129.
- On 1984, petitioner was appointed to be Deputy Minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice. Thus, he ceased to be a member of the Judiciary.
- After February 1986 EDSA Revolution, there was a reorganization of the entire government, including the Judiciary.
- A Screening Committee for the reorganization of the Intermediate Appelate Court and lower courts recommended the return of petitioner as
Associate Justice of the new court of Appeals and assigned him the rank of number 11 in the roster of appellate court justices.
- When the appointments were signed by Pres. Aquino, petitioner's seniority ranking changes from number 11 to 26.
- Then, petitioner alleged that the change in seniority ranking was due to "inadvertence" of the President, otherwise, it would run counter to the
provisions of Section 2 of E.O. No. 33.
- Petitioner Justice Reynato S. Puno wrote a letter to the Court seeking the correction of his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals.
- The Court en banc granted Justice Puno's request.
- A motion for reconsideration was later filed by Associate Justices Campos Jr. and Javellana who are affected by the ordered correction.
- They alleged that petitioner could not claim reappointment because the courts where he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the
date of his last appointment.
Issue: WON the present Court of Appeals is merely a continuation of the old Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing before
the promulgation of E.O. No. 33.
Held:
The Court held that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to E.O. No. 33 phased out as part of the legal system
abolished by the 1987 Revolution. The Court of Appeals that was established under E.O. No. 33 is considered as an entirely new court.
The present Court of Appeals is a new entity, different and distinct from the courts existing before E.O. No. 33. It was created in the wake of the
massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino in the aftermath of the people power in 1986.
Revolution is defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to
it." or "as sudden. radical and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually effected with violence or at least some acts of
violence."
#9 Estrada Estrada v. Desierto

vs. Desierto
JOSEPH ESTRADA v. ANIANO DESIERTO (D)
G.R. No. 146710, Mar. 2, 2001
FACTS:
● Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and
friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.
● House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the
House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused political convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by
Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative Fuentebella.
● Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. 21 senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.
● When by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the 2nd envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing
that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and private prosecutors walked out in
protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate President. By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA
Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the 11 senators.
● January 18, 2001 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's resignation. A 10-km line of people holding lighted candles
formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's
solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation.
● January 19, 2001, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. Petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for
President where he would not be a candidate. Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together with the
chiefs of all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine. General Angelo Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your Armed Forces, the
130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing our support to this government.” A little
later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson and the major service commanders gave a similar stunning announcement.
● January 20, 2001 Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Petitioner and his
family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace.
● January 22, 2001, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers the duties of the Presidency.
● February 5, 2001, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin
the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting any further proceedings in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until
after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted."
● February 6, 2001, Thru another counsel, petitioner filed for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the lawful
and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring
respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of
the Constitution."
ISSUES:
● Whether or not the petitioner resigned as president.
● Whether or not petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
HELD:
● Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to
resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal requirement
as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal
effect.
● In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacañang Palace in
the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be
determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
● Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
● An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
○ Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration
to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President xxx.
● What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President.
Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly
rejected petitioner's claim of inability.
● In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the
ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent
Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
#10 Manila Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS G.R. No. 122156 Bellosillo, J. Group 7
Prince Hotel
vs. GSIS
PETITIONER: Manila Prince Hotel RESPONDENTS: Government Service Insurance System, Manila Hotel Corporation, Committee on
Privatization and Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
DOCTRINES: Constitutional Supremacy: if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution, it is null and void and without any force and
effect.
LAWS/PROVISIONS: Filipino First Policy: preference should be given to Filipinos in terms of rights, privileges and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony
> Paragraph 2, Section 10 Article XII of 1987 Constitution: The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency,
when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas
of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned
by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals
and priorities.
CASE SUMMARY:
Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is mandatory. The Manila Prince Hotel, a Filipino corporation, should be preferred over a
Malaysian firm pursuant to the Constitutional provision on national patrimony. FACTS: The controversy arose when respondent Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC.
The winning bidder, or the eventual strategic partner, is to provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system,
and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila
Hotel. In a close bidding only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, and Renong Berhad,
a Malaysian firm, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration
of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner matched the bid price of P44.00 per share.
Respondent GSIS refused to accept. On October 1995, petitioner came to the Supreme Court on prohibition and mandamus.
Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino
nation and it has become a part of the national patrimony. Petitioner also argues that the hotel business, being a part of the tourism industry, is
unquestionably a part of the national economy. Since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of
the national economy, petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if
for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly
submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.
ISSUE:
● W/N the Manila Prince Hotel should be preferred over the Renong Berhad pursuant to Sec. 10, Art. XII of the Constitution.
RULING:
● Yes. Respondents, GSIS et al., directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% shares to Renong Berhad + ACCEPT the matching bid of
Manila Prince Hotel Corp. to purchase shares at P44 each.
RATIO:
● The second paragraph of Sec 10 Art XII is self-executing. “In the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national patrimony the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos”
● The Manila Hotel has been part of national patrimony, heritage and therefore, with the aforementioned mandate deserves constitutional
protection.
● The constitutional “preference” should be able to allow the Filipino company to match the bid of the non-Filipino entity.
DISSENTING OPINION:
● Dissent (Puno) Premise of the 2nd par. of Sec 10, Art XII of the Consti: > “Constitution is pro-Filipino but not anti-alien per se” > In the absence
of qualified Filipinos, t he State is not prohibited from granting the rights to foreigners... if the act will promote the weal of the nation > What the
rules (of the bidding procedure) did not grant, the petitioner can’t demand. > At the end of the day, Renong Berhad still had a higher bid than
MPC.
● Dissent (Panganiban) > “no statute empowers a losing Filipino bidder to increase his bid and equal that of the winning foreigner” > The
constitution only mandates a victory for the qualified Filipino only when the scores are tied.
#11 Francisco, Jr. vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc GR No 160261 November 10, 2003
Francisco Jr
vs.
Nagmamala ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. petitioner v s. NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO,
sakit INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER
JOSE G. DE VENCIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C.
TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents, JAMIE N. SORIANO,
respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention
PONENTE Justice Carpio-Morales
FACTS June 2, 2003 - first impeachment complaint filed by former President Joseph E. Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. and 7
Associate Justices for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes endorsed by Representatives Rolex
T. Suplico, Ronald B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen. October 13, 2003 - first impeachment complaint was sufficient in form but voted to
dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. October 23, 2003 - second impeachment complaint was filed with
Secretary General of the House b y Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella a gainst Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This impeachment complaint
was accompanied by at least 1⁄3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives. October 28 - November 5, 2003 - instant petitions (18
petitions total) against House Representatives, et al., c ontend that filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the
provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year”. November 5-6, 2003 - Court heard the views of the amici curiae a nd the arguments of petitioners, intervenors Sen.
Pimentel and Atty. Makalintal, and Solicitor Gen. Alfredo Benipayo.
ISSUES Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to exercise judicial review on impeachment proceedings?
Whether or not the impeachment complaint filed against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. is valid?
Whether the cetriorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and what time; and whether it should
be exercised by this Court at this time (p119).
a. locus standi of petitioners b. ripeness (prematurity; mootness) c. political question/justiciability d. House’s “exclusive” power to initiate all
cases of impeachment e. Senate’s “sole” power to try and decide all cases of impeachment f. constitutionality of the House Rules on
Impeachment vis-a-vis S ection 3(5) of Article XI
of the Constitution g. judicial restraint
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments and opinions
presented for and against the grant reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them to be as follows (p129):
(1) threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those
arising from impeachment proceedings Judicial review : Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by the law. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and t o
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government. (2) whether or not the essential prerequisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review
have been fulfilled Requisites of Judicial Review:
a. Actual case or controversy b. Locus standi of petitioners c. Question on constitutionality should be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity d. The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis moto of the case ( 3) substantive issues yet remaining
Arguments:
1. Judicial Review
○ Speaker De Venecia, et. al, and Senator Pimentel raised the argument that the Constitution has excluded impeachment
proceedings from the coverage of judicial review.
i. Speaker De Venecia, et. al - impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial character hence, beyond reach
of judicial review ii. Senator Pimentel - Senate’s “sole power to try” impeachment cases
● Entirely excludes application of judicial review over it
● Includes Senate’s power to determine constitutional questions relative to impeachment proceedings (e.g. Nixon v.
United States)
○ Essential Requisites for Judicial Review (Limitations)
i. An actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power ii. Person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge (he has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result or its enforcement) iii. Question of Constitutionality iv. Issue of constitutionality must
be the very lis mota of the case 2. Legal Standing (locus standi)
○ Personal and substantial interest in case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged
i. Intervenor Soriano (amicus curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza) - petitioners do not have
P
standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury ii. Solicitor General (amicus curiae U
College of Law Dean Raul Pangalangan) - petitioners have standing since this Court had accorded standing to taxpayers,
voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public interest and transcendental importance
nd the rule on standing
○ Difference between rule on real party-in-interest a
i. Real party-in-interest - concept of civil procedure; whether he is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgement,
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit ii. Standing - has constitutional underpinnings
● Specific requirements to obtain standing when suing as a:
a. Citizen - interest must be direct and personal; must be able to show not only that law/government act is invalid but also that he sustained or
is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury b. Taxpayer - claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is
being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds; interest in preventing illegal expenditure of money from
taxation and would sustain a direct injury c. Legislator - questions the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives
as a legislator 3. Ripeness and Prematurity - something had by then been accomplished or performed by
either branch
○ In the present case, the 2001 House impeachment rules were already promulgated
○ A second impeachment case was also filed
○ Amicus curiae former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga said there may be no urgent need for this court to render a decision at
this time. He recommends that all remedies in the Congress first be exhausted.
- However, neither the House of Representatives or Senate has the power
to rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality Hence, the present case satisfies this requisite for judicial review
4. Justiciability
○ Political question - questions under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government (concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not the legality) 5. Lis Mota
○ An issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided whenever possible
○ Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux o
f the controversy 6. Judicial
Restraint
○ Senator Pimentel urges Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate has the sole power to try and decide all
cases of impeachment. Court reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in
impeachment proceedings.
○ The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an potion before the Court.
RULING The Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of
Congress - it provided for certain well-defined limits, or “judicially discoverable
standards” for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. The exercise of judicial restraint over
justiciable issues is not an option before the Supreme Court, otherwise the Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VII, Sec 1(2) of
the Constitution.
The court has the power to exercise judical review over impeachment proceedings. Intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the
Senate’s sole power to try impeachment cases citing Nixon v United States as an example where they contend that the exercise of judical review
over impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the framer’s decision to allocate to different fora the power to try
impeachments and crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and balances under which impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary.
The PH Constitution however though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides
several limitations to the exercise of such power which includes manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the
impeachment of one and the same official.
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
DISSENTING OPINIONS
Puno, J. The issue of justiciability is different from the issue of jurisdiction - the former refers to the suitability of a dispute for judicial resolution
while the latter refers to the suitability of a dispute for judicial resolution while the latter refers to the power of a court to entertain, try and decide.
Whether or not the issues at bar are justiciable?

● Concur with the majority that the issues posed by the petitions at bar are justiciable - that the alleged violation of Article XI, Section 3 (5) of the
Constitution which provides that “no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year”, and this Court has jurisdiction over them. Whether or not the Court should exercise its jurisdiction?
● Hold that the coordinacy theory of constitutional interpretation and prudential considerations demand that this Court defer the exercise of its
cetriorari jurisdiction on the issue of alleged violation of Article XI, Section 3 (5) of the Constitution until after the remedies against
impeachment still available in both the House of Representatives and the Senate shall have been exhausted.
he common law principle of judicial restraint serves the public interest by allowing the political process to operate without
Ynares-Santiago, J. T
undue interference
Whether or not the Supreme Court, under its power of judicial review enshrined in the Constitution, review the acts of a co-equal body? Whether
or not the issues at bar are justiciable?
● Concur that the petitioners, except Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, Jr. in GR No. 160397 have satisfactorily established l ocus standi t o file the
instant petitions and the constitutionality of the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William B. Fuentebella is a justiciable issue which this Court may take cognizance of.
● Concur that the Court has the power of judicial review. Whether or not the Court should exercise
its jurisdiction?
● Court must observe judicial self-restraint at this time and dismiss the instant petitions.
#12 Chavez Francisco I. Chavez v Judicial and Bar Council, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Rep. Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (2014)
vs. JBC
Resolution
Ponente: Mendoza
The issue stems from the sudden impeachment of former CJ Corona on May 29, 2012. Petitioner (Chavez) was nominated and is a potential
successor.
The Court ruled as follows: “WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. THE JBC is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one member of the Congress will sit as a
representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Sec 8 (1) Art VIII of the 1987 Consti.
This disposition is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED”
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. Court set the subject motion for oral arguments and agreed to suspend the effects of the second
paragraph (“immediately executory”) of the dispositive portion of the Decision. Petitioner and respondents filed their respective memoranda.
Sec 8 (1), Art VIII of the 1987 Constitution “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the SC composed of the CJ as
the ex officio Chariman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court , and a representative of the private sector.”
The JBC was thought of by the framers as prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of political
pressure and partisan activities. It is supposedly a separate , competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President.
In 1994, the 7-member composition of the JBC was altered. An eighth member was added. 2 representatives from Congress began sitting
simultaneously in the JBC with each having ½ vote each.
In 2001, JBC en banc allowed the representatives of the Senate and HR 1 full vote each. This has been the situation since then.
Issue:
(1) WON the first paragraph of Sec 8, Art VIII of the 1987 Consti allows more than 1 member of Congress to sit in the JBC – NO - In terms of
Constitutional construction, the Court firmly relies on the basic postulate that the Framers mean what they say. The languages used in the Consti
must be taken to have been deliberately chosen for a definite purpose. Court thus cannot accede to the argument of plain oversight. The “a” to
describe “representative of Congress”, the Filipino people through the Framers intended that Congress be entitled only one seat in the
JBC.
>weak argument: to say that the Framers failed to adjust Sec 8 Art VIII by sheer inadvertence to their shift to a bicameral form of the
legislature. JBC was created to support the executive power to appoint, and Congress as one whole body, was merely assigned a contributory
non-legislative function.
(2)[answered jointly with first issue] if the practice of having 2 representatives from each House of Congress with one vote each is sanctioned by
the Constitution. – YES
In the exercise of legislative or non-legislative powers such as inter alia, the power of appropriation, the declaration of an existence of a
state of war, canvassing of electoral returns for Pres and VP, and impeachment, the dichotomy of each House must be acknowledged. In these
instances, each House is constitutionally granted with powers and functions peculiar to its nature with keen consideration to: 1) its relationship
with the other chamber and 2) in consonance with the principle of separation of powers.
>In interaction between 2 Houses in participation in JBC, no such mechanism is required. Instead, in the creation of the JBC, the
Framers added 4 regular members and 3 representatives from the major branches of government. The total is 7. NOT 8
Counter arguments :
Argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of Representatives in the JBC and vice versa is misplaced. Any member of
Congress, whether from Senate or HoR is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress.
Argument that current irregular compostition of the JBC should be accepted because it was only wquestioned for the first time through the present
action, deserves scant consideration is misplaced because acts done in violation of the Constituion no matter how frequent, usual or notorious
cannot develop or gain acceptance under the doctrine o f estoppels or laches b
ecause once an act is considered as an infringement of the
Consti, it is void from the very beginning and cannot bethe source of any power or authority.
Casus omissus- a case omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted. Court cannot simply supply what it thinks the legislature would have supplied
as that would be judicial legislation.
Dispositive portion: Wherefore the MR filed by respondents is hereby DENIED.
The suspension of the effects of the 2nd paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July 17 2012 Decision of the Court which reads “This
disposition is immediately executory” is hereby LIFTED.
#13 Aglipay FACTS:
vs. Ruiz The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of
prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International
Eucharistic Congress.
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of postage stamps commemorating the
celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty- third International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. In spite of the
protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage for printing
ISSUE: Is there a violation of principle of separation of church and state?
HELD:
In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the provisions of Act. No. 4052 of
the Philippine Legislature.
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine when the
issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does
not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use,
benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of
Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or
religious denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived
from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the letter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936,
incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and
attract more tourists to this country." The officials concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give
publicity to the Philippines and its people". It is significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and printed, instead of showing a Catholic
Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat
XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the
Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably
linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and
purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion that the Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental
results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The
main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not contemplated.
There is no violation of the principle of separation of church and state. The issuance and sale of the stamps in question maybe said to
separably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Catholic Church, was not the aim a
purpose of the government (to promote tourism).
#14 Marbury v. Madison

Marbury vs.
Madison
Citation. 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803)
Brief Fact Summary. William Marbury (Marbury), an end-of-term appointee of President John Adams (President Adams) to a justice of the peace
position in the District of Columbia, brought suit against President Thomas Jefferson’s (President Jefferson) Secretary of State, James Madison,
seeking delivery of his commission.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) has constitutional authority to review executive actions and
legislative acts. The Supreme Court has limited jurisdiction, the bounds of which are set by the United States Constitution (Constitution), which
may not be enlarged by the Congress.
Facts. Before the inauguration of President Jefferson, outgoing President Adams attempted to secure Federalist control of the judiciary by creating
new judgeships and filling them with Federalist appointees. Included in these efforts was the nomination by President Adams, under the Organic
Act of the District of Columbia (the District), of 42 new justices of the peace for the District, which were confirmed by the Senate the day before
President Jefferson’s inauguration. A few of the commissions, including Marbury’s, were undelivered when President Jefferson took office. The
new president instructed Secretary of State James Madison to withhold delivery of the commissions. Marbury sought mandamus in the Supreme
Court, requiring James Madison to deliver his commission.
Issue. Is Marbury entitled to mandamus from the Supreme Court?
Held. No. Case dismissed for want of jurisdiction. As the President signed Marbury’s commission after his confirmation, the appointment has been
made, and Marbury has a right to the commission. Given that the law imposed a duty on the office of the president to deliver Marbury’s
commission, that the Supreme Court has the power to review executive actions when the executive acts as an officer of the law and the nature of
the writ of mandamus to direct an officer of the government “to do a particular thing therein specified,” mandamus is the appropriate remedy, if
available to the Supreme Court. To issue mandamus to the Secretary of State really is to sustain an original action, which is (in this case) outside
the constitutional limits of jurisdiction imposed on the Supreme Court.
Discussion. The importance of Marbury v. Madison is both political and legal. Although the case establishes the traditions of judicial review and a
litigable constitution on which the remainder of constitutional law rests, it also transformed the Supreme Court from an incongruous institution to an
equipotent head of a branch of the federal government.
#15 Angara Angara vs. Electoral Commission

vs. Electoral
Commissio Laurel, J.:
n
This is an original action for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission from taking further cognizance of
the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua against the election of Jose Angara as a member of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of the
Province of Tayabas.
Facts:
September 17, 1935 – Angara, Ynsua, Castillo, and Mayor were candidates for the position of member of the National Assembly, 1st district of
Tayabas.
October 7 – Angara proclaimed as winner.

November 15 – Angara took oath of office.
December 3 – National Assembly passed Resolution no. 8 (confirms the election of National Assembly members against whom no protests had
thus far been filed.
December 8 – Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a Motion of Protest against Angara, praying: that he be declared winner, or the
election of the position be nullified.
December 9 – EC passed a resolution (Par. 6: The last day of the filing of protests against National Assembly members is today, which is
December 9, 1935)
December 20 – Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss the Protest, stating that: Reso. 8 was adopted in legitimate exercise of Constitutional prerogative
to prescribe a period during which protests may be filed.
December 27 – Ynsua filed an Answer to the Motion of Dismissal alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring protests after the
confirmation of election.
December 31 – Angara filed a Reply to the Answer to the Motion of dismissal.
January 23, 1936 – EC denied Angara’s Motion to Dismiss the Protest.
Issues:
WON the Supreme Court has Jurisdiction over the Case.
WON EC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take cognizance of Ynsua’s protest (protest against an elected member
despite National Assembly’s confirmation).
Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court has Jurisdiction.

- Doctrines of Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances dictates the specific powers of each branch of government. The
Judiciary hold the power to review acts committed by the other branches whether they conform with the Constitution or not. This
includes the obligation to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution.
- In this case, the National Assembly has already confirmed the election of its members with Reso. 8 (Dec. 3), while the EC had fixed
the date for the filing of protests (Dec. 9)
- This case involves the issue of whose Constitutional power prevails over the other.
- The court is in the opinion that they have Jurisdiction over this case for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of
the Constitutional grant to the EC as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of Members of
the National Assembly.
2. EC did not act without or in excess of its Jurisdiction.
- The EC was made to remedy certain evils of which the framers of the Constitution were cognizant.
- EC, with powers pertaining to contested elections of its members previously held by the legislature, was made as an independent and
impartial tribunal
- The EC is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performance and execution of the limited and specific
function assigned to it by the Constitution.
- Grant of power to EC is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature.
- If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the NA, the grant of power to the EC would be ineffective.
Merits of the Case:
- The NA issued Reso. 8 on December 3, even before the time the EC organized to deliberate on the mode and method they would
follow regarding protests. (The EC organized after the said date, so they were barred from exercising their powers even before
they’ve met formally).
- Given everything stated here, since Ynsua filed his protest around December 9, 1935, the same date prescribed by Par. 6 of the EC
Resolution. The resolution of the NA on December 3 on the confirmation of the election of its members, cannot limit the EC
Resolution, the one vested with the power to handle all cases of contested elections.
Conclusion: The EC was acting within the legitimate exercise of its Constitutional prerogative.
#16 Tanada Tañada and Macapagal v. Cuenco, et al., G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1957
vs. Cuenco En Banc
[CONCEPCION, J.]
FACTS: Petitioners pray that a writ of preliminary injunction be immediately issued directed to respondents Mariano J. Cuenco, Francisco A.
Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, restraining them from continuing to usurp, intrude into and/ or hold
or exercise the said public offices respectively being occupied by them in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and to respondent Fernando Hipolito
restraining him from paying the salaries of respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, pending this action.
Petitioners likewise prayed that judgment be rendered ousting respondents from the aforementioned public offices in the Senate Electoral Tribunal
and that they be altogether excluded therefrom and making the preliminary injunction permanent.
Respondents have admitted the main allegations of fact in the petition, except insofar as it questions the legality, and validity of the election of
respondents Senators Cuenco and Delgado, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and of the appointment of respondent Alfredo Cruz,
Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes as technical assistants and private secretaries to said respondents Senators.
Respondents, likewise, allege, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that: (a) this Court is without power, authority of jurisdiction to direct or
control the action of the Senate in choosing the members of the Electoral Tribunal
ISSUE: Was the dispute regarding the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal in the nature of a
political question that will divest the Court of jurisdiction?
HELD: NO.
[T]he term “political question” connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the
language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government.” It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called upon to decide whether the election of Senators
Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and
spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional
mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen “upon nomination .. of the party having the second largest number of
votes” in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with “full discretionary authority” in the
choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to
be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection
therewith.
“.. whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative department has by
statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with
such statute, and, particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional or statutory rights ..” (16
C.J.S., 439).
It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue raised by the
parties herein.
#17 Certiorari and prohibition

Gutierrez
vs. House Date of Promulgation: February 15, 2011
of Ponente: Carpio-Morales, J.
Representat QuickGuide: Petitioner-Ombudsman challenges House Resolutions of Sept. 1 and 7, 2010 finding two impeachment complaints against the
ives petitioner, simultaneously referred to the House Committee on Justice, sufficient in form and substance on grounds that she was denied due
process and that the said resolutions violated the one-year bar rule on initiating impeachment proceedings for impeachable officers. Court
dismissed the petition.
Facts:
– 22July2010: 4 days before the 15th Congress opened its first session, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo Lim and
spouses Pestaño (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint against Gutierrez upon endorsement of Party-List Representatives Walden
Bello and Arlene Bag-ao
– 27July2010: HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the complaint to House Speaker Belmonte who then, on August 2, directed the Committee on
Rules to include it in the Order of Business
– 3Aug2010: private respondents Renato Reyes Jr., Mother Mary John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James
Terry Ridon (Reyes group) filed an impeachment complaint againsta herein petitioner endorsed by Representatives Colmenares, Casiño,
Mariano, Ilagan, Tinio and De Jesus
– HOR provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure on Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress and HOR Sec-Gen transmitted the
complaint to House Speaker Belmonte who then, on August 9, directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business
– 11Aug2010: HOR simultaneously referred the two complaints to the House Committee on Justice (HCOJ for brevity)
– After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient in form
– 2Sept2010: The Rules of Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress was published
– After hearing, HCOJ by Resolution of September 7, 2010 found the two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution
and betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance
– Petitioner filed petitions for certiorari and prohibition challenging Resolutions of September 1 and 7 alleging that she was denied due
process and that these violated the one-year bar rule on initiating impeachment proceedings
Issue/s:
Whether the case presents a justiciable controversy

Whether the belated publication of the Rules of Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th Congress denied due process to the
Petitioner
Whether the simultaneous referral of the two complaints violated the Constitution
Ruling: Petition DISMISSED.
Ratio:
1. NOT A POLITICAL QUESTION

– Francisco Jr. vs HOR: Judicial review is not only a power but a duty of the judiciary
– the 1987 Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several
limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of
filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
-the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined
limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr, “judicially discoverable standards” for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through
the power of judicial review
2. DUE PROCESS: Is there a need to publish as a mode of promulgation the Rules of Procedure of Impeachment Proceedings?
– (P) alleges that the finding of sufficiency in form and substance of the impeachment complaints is tainted with bias as the Chairman of the
HCOJ’s, Rep. Tupas, father has a pending case with her at the Sandiganbayan
– Presumption of regularity
– The determination of sufficiency of form and exponent of the express grant of rule-making power in the HOR
– the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that there must be a “verified complaint or
resolution”, and that the substance requirement is met if there is “a recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the committee”
– The Constitution itself did not provide for a specific method of promulgating the Rules.
– impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and not for the punishment of the offender
3. THE ONE-YEAR BAR RULE
– (P): start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the
opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be
accepted and referred to public respondent.
– INITIATIVE: Filing of impeachment complaint coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint (referral of the complaint to the
Committee on Justice)
– IMPEACH: to file the case before the Senate
– Rationale of the one-year bar: “that the purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold: 1)”to prevent undue or too frequent harassment; and 2) to
allow the legislature to do its principal task [of] legislation,”
“…that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no
longer rekindle the candle.” (Gutierrez vs. HOR, 2011)
#18 Belgica Belgica v. Executive Secretary (G.R. Nos. 208566, 208493 and 209251, 2013)
vs.
Executive . SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF THE 2013 PDAF ARTICLE
Secretary
2. Project Identification. Identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared
by each implementing agency: PROVIDED, That preference shall be given to projects located in the 4th to 6th class municipalities or indigents
identified under the MHTS-PR by the DSWD. For this purpose, the implementing agency shall submit to Congress said priority list, standard or
design within ninety (90) days from effectivity of this Act.
All programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and scholarships, identified by a member of the House of Representatives outside
of his/her legislative district shall have the written concurrence of the member of the House of Representatives of the recipient or beneficiary
legislative district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
3. Legislator’s Allocation. The Total amount of projects to be identified by legislators shall be as follows:
a. For Congressional District or Party-List Representative: Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000) for soft programs and projects listed under Item A
and Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000) for infrastructure projects listed under Item B, the purposes of which are in the project menu of Special
Provision No. 1; and
b. For Senators: One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for soft programs and projects listed under Item A and One Hundred Million Pesos
(P100,000,000) for infrastructure projects listed under Item B, the purposes of which are in the project menu of Special Provision No. 1.
Subject to the approved fiscal program for the year and applicable Special Provisions on the use and release of fund, only fifty percent (50%) of
the foregoing amounts may be released in the first semester and the remaining fifty percent (50%) may be released in the second semester.
4. Realignment of Funds. Realignment under this Fund may only be allowed once. The Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and
Local Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade and Industry are also
authorized to approve realignment from one project/scope to another within the allotment received from this Fund, subject to the following: (i) for
infrastructure projects, realignment is within the same implementing unit and same project category as the original project; (ii) allotment released
has not yet been obligated for the original project/scope of work; and (iii) request is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned. The DBM
must be informed in writing of any realignment within five (5) calendar days from approval thereof: PROVIDED, That any realignment under this
Fund shall be limited within the same classification of soft or hard programs/projects listed under Special Provision 1 hereof: PROVIDED,
FURTHER, That in case of realignments, modifications and revisions of projects to be implemented by LGUs, the LGU concerned shall certify that
the cash has not yet been disbursed and the funds have been deposited back to the BTr.
Any realignment, modification and revision of the project identification shall be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the
Senate Committee on Finance, for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be.
5. Release of Funds. All request for release of funds shall be supported by the documents prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably
endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be. Funds shall be released to the
implementing agencies subject to the conditions under Special Provision No. 1 and the limits prescribed under Special Provision No. 3.
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES, HELD AND RATIO
A. Congressional Pork Barrel
WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar to it are unconstitutional considering that they violate the
principles of/constitutional provisions on…
1.) …separation of powers
YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority (a) to identify the projects they desire to be funded through
various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations; (b) and in the areas of fund release and realignment. Thus, legislators have been, in one form or
another, authorized to participate in “the various operational aspects of budgeting,” violating the separation of powers principle. That the said
authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law. Informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget
execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same
unconstitutional treatment.
2.) …non-delegability of legislative power
YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of
appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged in Congress.
3.) …checks and balances
YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit. Legislators make intermediate
appropriations of the PDAF only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law. Thus, actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have
been written into the General Appropriations Bill and are thus put into effect without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment
legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a “budget within a budget” which subverts the prescribed procedure of
presentment and consequently impairs the President’s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the President is forced to decide between
(a) accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be
consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.
Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum
amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending (i.e. scholarships, medical
missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc). This setup connotes that the
appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a
discernible item which may be subject to the President’s power of item veto.
4.) …accountability
YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in
effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of
Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: “…[A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives] shall not intervene
in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.”
Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own
office.
However, the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual legislator’s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetrate himself in
office. This is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.
Also, while it is possible that the close operational proximity between legislators and the Executive department, through the former’s
post-enactment participation, may affect the process of impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly
concern the Pork Barrel System’s intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.
5.) …political dynasties
NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase “as may be defined by law.”
Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from
ruling on this issue. In any event, the above-stated argument on this score is largely speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how
the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.
6.) …local autonomy
YES. The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed intention of “making equal the unequal.” The
gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities
of the district the legislator represents. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a
district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively “underdeveloped” compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver
scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in some years, even the Vice-President – who do not represent any locality,
receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local
Development Councils (LDCs), instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs. The programs, policies
and resolutions of LDCs should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making
authority except only when acting as a body.
B. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”
WON the following phrases are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power:
(a) “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and
YES. Regarding the Malampaya Fund: T he phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8
of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of
the President’s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the
President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate
public funds beyond the purview of the law.
(b) “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities,
as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
relating to the Presidential Social Fund
Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be
used “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects”. This gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any
infrastructure project he may so determine as a “priority”. The law does not supply a definition of “priority infrastructure development projects” and
hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of “infrastructure” is too
broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility. Thus, the phrase “to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects” must be stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient
standard of the delegating law.
#19 ACTS:
Ocampo vs.
Enriquez Public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to the public respondent Chief of Staff of the AFP,
General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the interment of Marcos at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB) in reference to the Verbal Order of
President Duterte.
Respondent AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued directives to the Philippine Army (PA) Commanding General for the Funeral Honors
and Service to former President Marcos.
Dissatisfied with the said issuance, the following were filed by petitioners:
1. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Saturnino Ocampo and several others, in their capacities as human rights advocates or human
rights violations victims as defined under Section 3 (c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of
2013).
2. Petition for Certiorari-in-Intervention filed by Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr. and his son, as members of the Bar and human rights lawyers, and his
grandchild.
3. Petition for Prohibition filed by Representative Edcel C. Lagman, in his personal capacity, as member of the House of Representatives and as
Honorary Chairperson of Families of Victims of Involuntary Disappearance (FIND), a duly-registered corporation and organization of victims and
families of enforced disappearance, mostly during the martial law regime of the former President Marcos, and several others, in their official
capacities as duly-elected Congressmen of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.
4. Petition for Prohibition filed by Loretta Ann Pargas-Rosales, former Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights, and several others, suing
as victims of State-sanctioned human rights violations during the martial law regime of Marcos.
5. Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition filed by Heherson T. Alvarez, former Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, who fought to oust the
dictatorship of Marcos, and several others, as concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.
6. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Zaira Patricia B. Baniaga and several others, as concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.
7. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Algamar A. Latiph, former Chairperson of the Regional Human Rights Commission, Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, by himself and on behalf of the Moro who are victims of human rights during the martial law regime of Marcos.
8. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Leila M. De Lima as member of the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines, public official and
concerned citizen.
ISSUES:
1. Whether President Duterte’s determination to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB poses a justiciable controversy.
2. Whether petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petitions.
3. Whether petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts.
4. Whether the Issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive violate the Constitution, domestic and international laws.
RULING:
Justiciable controversy
It is well settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court
unless the following requisites for judicial inquiry are present:
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
this case, the absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous.
In
An “actual case or controversy” is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial
resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.
Moreover, the limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies carries the assurance that the courts will not intrude into
areas committed to the other branches of government. Those areas pertain to questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government.cralawred As they are concerned with questions of policy and issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular
measure, political questions used to be beyond the ambit of judicial review.
The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte’s decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political question
that is not a justiciable controversy.
In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and E.O. No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) to allow the interment of Marcos at the
LNMB, which is a land of the public domain devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided a
question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness.
Locus standi
Locus standi, a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question, requires that a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions.
Unless a person has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of an act complained of, such proper party has no
standing.
Petitioners, who filed their respective petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in their capacities as citizens, human rights violations
victims, legislators, members of the Bar and taxpayers, have no legal standing to file such petitions because they failed to show that they have
suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury as a result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.
Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. In this case, what is essentially
being assailed is the wisdom behind the decision of the President to proceed with the interment of Marcos at the LNMB. As taxpayers, petitioners
merely claim illegal disbursement of public funds, without showing that Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the LNMB by either express or
implied provision of the Constitution, the laws or jurisprudence.
As concerned citizens, petitioners are also required to substantiate that the issues raised are of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, one should have
availed first of all the means of administrative processes available. If resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by
giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be
exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought.
For reasons of comity and convenience, courts of justice shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed
and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.
While there are exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners failed to prove the presence of any of those
exceptions.
Hierarchy of Courts
In the same vein, while direct resort to the Court through petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are allowed
under exceptional cases, which are lacking in this case, petitioners cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts that requires such
petitions to be filed first with the proper RTC. The RTC is not just a trier of facts, but can also resolve questions of law in the exercise of its original
and concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and has the power to issue restraining order and injunction
when proven necessary.
Constitutionality
The President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence.
Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB should not be allowed because it has the effect of not just rewriting history as to the
Filipino people’s act of revolting against an authoritarian ruler but also condoning the abuses committed during the Martial Law, thereby violating
the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution, which is a “post-dictatorship charter” and a “human rights constitution.” For them, the ratification of the
Constitution serves as a clear condemnation of Marcos’ alleged “heroism.” To support their case, petitioners invoke Sections 2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27
and 28 of Article II, Sec. 17 of Art. VII, Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV, Sec. 1 of Art. XI, and Sec. 26 of Art. XVII of the Constitution.
There is no merit to the contention.
As the OSG logically reasoned out, while the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a people, its entirety should not be interpreted as
providing guiding principles to just about anything remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB.
Tañada v. Angara already ruled that the provisions in Article II of the Constitution are not self-executing. Thus:
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a “declaration of principles and state policies.” The counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution
is called the “basic political creed of the nation” by Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing
principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial
review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.
As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II x x x are not
“self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.”
xxx
The petitions must be dismissed.
Note:
DISSENTING OPINION
SERENO, C.J.:
The 1987 Constitution is the embodiment of the Filipino nations’ enduring values, which this Court must zealously protect.
Countless times, this Court has said in so many words that the 1987 Constitution embodies the Filipinos’ enduring values. The protection of those
values has consequently become the duty of the Court. That this is the legal standard by which to measure whether it has properly comported
itself in its constitutional role has been declared in various fashions by the Court itself.
See, for example, how this Court articulated its duty to protect the environment, women, children, labor, the indigenous people, and consistently,
those who have been or are in danger of being deprived of their human rights.
Note the power that the Constitution vests in the Court to actively promulgate rules for the protection of human rights, and how the Court in turn
described this duty when it promulgated the writs of kalikasan, habeas data, and amparo.
Any conclusion in this case that betrays a lack of enthusiasm on the part of this Court to protect the cherished values of the Constitution would be
a judicial calamity. That the Judiciary is designed to be passive relative to the “active” nature of the political departments is a given. But when
called upon to discharge its relatively passive role, the post-1986 Supreme Court has shown zealousness in the protection of constitutional rights,
a zealousness that has been its hallmark from then up to now. It cannot, in the year 2016, be reticent in asserting this brand of protective activism.
#20 IBAAEU v. Inciong

IBAAEU vs.
Inciong G.R. No. L-52415 October 23, 1984, Makasiar, J.
(Labor Standards: Proper Construction and Interpretation of Labor Laws)
FACTS
The Secretary of Labor, issued Policy no. 9 interpreting article 94 of Labor Code as regards Right to Holiday pay, stated among others, that PD
850 principally intended to benefit daily-paid workers. Those who are paid by the month, i.e., he is paid uniformly from January to December is
presumed to have been paid with legal holidays, unless his salary is deducted for the month the holiday occurs. Invoking this Policy, the Bank
stopped paying its employees for the legal holidays.
ISSUE
Whether or not, PD 850 was intended only for daily wage workers.
RULING
“It is elementary in the rules of statutory construction that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean
exactly what it says. In the case at bar, the provisions of the Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay are clear and explicit - it
provides for both the coverage of and exclusion from the benefits. In Policy Instruction No. 9, the then Secretary of Labor went as far as to
categorically state that the benefit is principally intended for daily paid employees, when the law clearly states that every worker shall be paid their
regular holiday pay. This is a flagrant violation of the mandatory directive of Article 4 of the Labor Code, which states that "All doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of
labor." Moreover, it shall always be presumed that the legislature intended to enact a valid and permanent statute which would have the most
beneficial effect that its language permits (Orlosky vs. Haskell, 155 A. 112.)
#21 Capuno EN BANC

vs. [ AM No. RTJ-93-944, Jul 20, 1994 ]
Jaramillo RIZALIA CAPUNO v. JUDGE AUSBERTO B. JARAMILLO +
DECISION
A.M. No. RTJ-93-944
PER CURIAM:
In these two (2) administrative complaints, respondent Judge Ausberto B. Jaramillo, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 30, San Pablo City, is
charged with various corrupt practices detrimental to the administration of justice.
Per resolutions of the Court, Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-944 was referred to Mme. Justice Corona Ibay-Somera of the Court of Appeals,[1] and
Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-959 to Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez,[2] for investigation, report and recommendation. In the
meantime, we directed respondent judge to go on leave.[3] On 27 October 1993, we ordered the consolidation of the complaints.[4]
Thereafter, in compliance with our directives, Justice Corona Ibay-Somera and Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez submitted their
reports. We shall deal with respondent's administrative liability on the basis of the investigators' findings and recommendations.[5]
I. Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-944
The complaint in this case was initiated by a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" dated 28 August 1992 of complainants Rizalia Capuno and Thelma
Villanueva, mother and daughter, respectively, thus -
(1) Na si Pedro Calara Jr. ay nagdemanda ng 'writ of possession' laban kay Rizalia Capuno sa sala ni Judge Ausberto Jaramillo ng RTC-San
Pablo City.
(2) Na pagkatapos ng makapagbigay ng 'writ of possession' si Judge Jaramillo laban kay Rizalia Capuno sa nasabing kaso, ay nagpunta si
Sheriff Leonardo Ho sa bahay ni Rizalia Capuno at sinabi kay Rizalia na gusto siyang makausap ni Judge Jaramillo.
(3) Na nagpunta si Rizalia, na kasama ng kanyang anak na si Thelma, at ni Gregorio Capistrano, sa sala ni Judge Jaramillo, mga alas 10:00 ng
umaga at pinapasok sila sa kuwarto ni Judge Jaramillo.
(4) Sinabi sa kanila ni Judge Jaramillo na kung gustong hindi mapaalis sa bahay si Rizalia, ay magbigay ng halagang P200,000 cash na kung
maa-ari ay puro dadaanin, at saka isang tsekeng P150,000 na postdated 30 days.
(5) Na sinabi ni Thelma na wala silang maibibigay na ganoong halaga, at ang sabi ni Judge Jaramillo kay Thelma na subukan na maghanap ng
nasabing halaga at bumalik sa loob ng dalawang araw.
(6) Nang mga alas 11:00 ng umaga, bumalik si Thelma at si Gregorio Capistrano sa kuwarto ni Judge Jaramillo pagkatapos ng dalawang araw,
at sinabi ni Thelma kay Judge Jaramillo na wala silang maibibigay na halagang takda ni Judge. Sabi ni Judge na kung hindi kaya ni Thelma ang
P200,000 cash ay kahit na P150,000 na cash na lang, puera doon sa tsekeng P150,000 na postdated 60 days, pero dapat ang mga ito ay
maibigay ni Thelma sa kanya ng alas 2:00 ng hapon noong araw na iyon din.
(7) Na sinabi ni Thelma kay Judge Jaramillo na wala silang maibibigay na ganoong halaga. Ang sabi ni Judge Jaramillo na kung ganoon ay wala
na siyang magagawa.
(8) Na ang demanda ni Rizalia Capuno laban kay Pedro Calara, Jr. na pa walang bisa ang pagkabenta at pagka-ilit ng kanyang lupa ay
bumagsak din sa sala ni Judge Jaramillo, kaya siya ay nakikiusap kay Judge Jaramillo na ilipat ang nasabing kaso sa ibang hukuman.[6]
Required to comment, respondent judge denies the charges against him. He maintains that this complaint was filed out of pure harassment.[7]
On 19 November 1993, after due investigation of the case, Justice Ibay-Somera submitted her report the pertinent portions of which follow -
During the testimony of complainant Thelma Villanueva, she only identified the Sinumpaang Salaysay she executed with her mother Rizalia
Capuno, and affirmed the truth of the contents thereof.
xxxx
On cross-examination, complainant Thelma Villanueva admitted that her mother, complainant Rizalia Capuno borrowed the amount of P15,000.00
sometime in 1987 from one Pedro Calara, Jr., for which the questioned property consisting of 85 sq. m. and originally covered by Tax Declaration
No. 34-1260, was mortgaged as a security thereof (pp. 9 & 12, tsn, July 28, 1993). It was also shown that despite partial payments on said loan
(Exhs. B, B-1 to B-6), the mortgaged property was extrajudicially foreclosed on August 21, 1990 and a certificate of sale was issued by the
respondent judge on the same date of August 21, 1990, and registered with the office of the Register of Deeds on October 12, 1990 (Tsn p. 16,
July 28, 1993; Exh. 6), and that the buyer of said property was Pedro Calara, Jr., in the amount of P47,021.00 (Exh. 2-A, p. 17, tsn, July 28,
1993). Subsequently, an affidavit of consolidation of ownership and deed of sale were made and executed by Pedro Calara, Jr., and were
registered with the Register of Deeds on December 9, 1991, which caused the cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 541260 and a new one was
issued, Tax Declaration No. 34-2753, in the name of Pedro Calara, Jr. (Exh. 6). A petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by said
Pedro Calara, Jr., on February 24, 1992 was assigned to the Branch of respondent Judge (p. 25, tsn, July 28, 1993), who issued the
corresponding Decision on May 15, 1992 granting the said petition (Exh. 11), and ordering the issuance of the corresponding writ of possession
and was implemented by Sheriff Aranguren (Exh. "15"). Said complainant met the respondent Judge for the first time sometime in March 1992, 'to
know how much more' the complainants were to pay Pedro Calara, Jr. (TSN, July 29, 1993, pp. 2 & 15), upon advice of the Sheriff Ho (tsn, p. 9,
July 29, 1993). Complainants, together with one Gregorio Capistrano, went to see the respondent Judge sometime in May or June 1992 for the
second time, who, in one of those meetings, asked whether said complainants 'could pay P350,000.00', P200,000.00 of which should be in cash,
all in P100-bills, to be displayed on his table "so that Pedro Calara's eyes will bulge and I will take care of everything', and P150,000.00 in
postdated check (pp. 16-17, tsn, July 29, 1993). Complainant Thelma Villanueva informed the Judge that she could not afford the amount, thus
the Judge reduced the proposal to P150,000.00 in postdated check, which amount should be brought to him at 2:00 p.m., and that they
(complainants) 'should not talk to anybody' (p. 20, tsn, July 29, 1993). Because the complainant failed to comply with the demand, complainant
Rizalia Capuno was evicted from the questioned premises and her house was demolished. The testimony of the other witness for the
complainants, Gregorio Capistrano, was just corroborative of the testimony of Thelma Villanueva, that he met the respondent Judge on those two
(2) occasions when Thelma Villanueva went to see the respondent.
xxxx
Respondent Judge Ausberto B. Jaramillo, Jr., testified that he has been the Presiding Judge of Branch 30, Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City,
since January 30, 1987; that he came to know Thelma Villanueva when she testified in Sp. Proc. Case No. 852 in a prayer for issuance of a writ of
possession over a parcel of land filed by one Pedro Calara, Jr.; that he issued the writ prayed for. Respondent Judge further testified that he, in
his effort to settle the parties' differences, as per request of Deputy Sheriff Leonardo Ho, tried to mediate in order to help them settle for the
purchase price (tsn, p. 5, Aug. 30, 1993). He likewise testified that it was complainant Thelma Villanueva who voluntarily offered to pay Pedro
Calara the amount of P200,000.00 cash and to pay the balance in P150,000.00 in postdated checks (tsn, p. 6, Aug. 30, 1993). Another case was
filed by the complainant against Pedro Calara, Jr., before the Branch of respondent Judge, where the complainant moved for respondent's
inhibition, which motion he granted. Respondent Judge vehemently denied that he demanded money from the complainants.
xxxx
From the testimonies and documentary evidence adduced by both parties, and considering their (sic) demeanor of the parties during the hearings,
this Court concludes that there was indeed a color of truth in the complaint. The complainants are simple and ordinary people, who prefer to live a
simple life than engage themselves in complicated and perplexed lives. And should they become part of complexed court battles, it is not of their
own choosing but because of circumstances. It may not be amiss to stress that 'the courts exist to promote justice; and thus to aid in securing the
contentment and happiness of the people. Their administration should be speedy and careful. Every judge should at all times be alert in his rulings
and in the conduct of the business of his court so far as he can, to make it useful to litigants and to the community. He should avoid unconsciously
falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts instead of the courts for the litigants.' (Adm. Order No. 162, Canons of
Judicial Ethics). The complainants failed to get the justice they are requesting from the respondent Judge for their failure to deliver the amount
asked of them.
Hence, the complainants' allegation that the respondent Judge demanded from them money when they were trying to seek his assistance in
amicably settling their case and which demand, when not met by them resulted to their eviction from the premises, is meritorious and credible. It is
well-settled rule that 'acts of the respondent judge of demanding x x x money from a party-litigant before his court constitute serious misconduct in
office' (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Gaticales, 208 SCRA 508). Likewise, under the Canons of Judicial Ethics, 'a judge's official conduct
should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties,
but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.'
Finding respondent judge guilty of the charge, the Investigating Justice recommended his suspension for one (1) month without pay with
admonition and reprimand.[8]
The Investigating Justice is correct in finding respondent judge guilty of the charge. As judge, respondent knows fully well that he should avoid
such actions as would subject him to suspicion of interest in a case in his court. Yet, he threw all caution to the winds, so to speak, and left nothing
but telltale evidence of his guilt.
The active mediation of respondent judge in Sp. Proc. No. 852 allegedly to settle the differences between complainants and Pedro Calara, Jr.,
was highly questionable. Firstly, the mediation was initiated not by the parties themselves nor their lawyers but by respondent's sheriffs, Leonardo
Ho and Regalado Aranguren, whose words were heavily relied upon by respondent.[9] Secondly, the meetings were unrecorded and unattended
by counsel of the parties.[10] Respondent's excuse that "in the (p)rovince, we mediate the differences of the parties, especially at that particular
time the parties have (sic) no counsel," is faulty and unacceptable practice. Unless a judge is conducting a pre-trial under Rules 20 and 118, his
role in the administration of justice is to decide contentious cases with finality. In the absence of their lawyers, a judge ought not to meddle in
issues confronting the parties even on the pretext of settling their cases. For to do so would compromise the integrity of his office which he is
mandated to uphold.[11] Once more, judges are strongly reminded that the office of a judge is a public office and, as such, it is a public trust.[12] A
judicial office demands that the incumbent should conduct himself in such a manner as to merit the respect, reverence and confidence of the
people.[13]
Respondent's defense that the parties have no lawyers fails to convince us. We gather from his testimonies that he intended to see the parties,
alone, thus -
Justice Somera:
Q During the first meeting you said the parties were not represented by counsel then there was a request for a first meeting with you by the
parties.
A They have no more lawyers at that time, Your Honor.
Q But they were represented by a lawyer during the hearing?
A During the hearing.
Q Why did you not require Calara to bring with him his counsel?
A Because I do not have time to talk to Calara, Your Honor.
Q When Villanueva and Capuno appeared before you during the hearing of the petition for issuance of the writ of possession, were they also
represented by counsel?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q During this first meeting, why did you not require the lawyers to appear before you for the arrangement?
A The lawyer of the Capunos withdrew as counsel, Your Honor.
Q Why did you not advise them to get another counsel?
A According to my Sheriff, I told my sheriff 'I want their counsels to be present' my lawyer (sheriff) told me 'ayaw na ho wala na raw silang
abogado dahil wala na daw silang pambayad.'"
Q Who was always in contact with Capuno and Villanueva?
A My Sheriff, Your Honor.[14]
Yet, respondent in his earlier testimony revealed that complainant had a lawyer -
Justice Somera:
Q After they (complainants) left, did you have any occasion to meet them either Calara or Rizalia Capuno and her daughter, Thelma Villanueva,
altogether?
A There was a hearing of a motion to dismiss that is the time I realized a new case was filed by the complainants mother and daughter. In that
hearing, the Calaras were absent, Rizalia Capuno was absent but Thelma Villanueva was present.
Q Before whom?
A Before me, Your Honor. I talk(ed) to Thelma asking her was it not that you are the same person who failed to meet the other party? She
answered in the affirmative, I ask(ed) her what is your pleasure now? Shall we wait for the Calaras because she has a motion to dismiss and to
talk it over with the spouses and she reply (sic) that she will just consult her lawyer and ask for time to file opposition.[15]
Significantly, the rendezvous between respondent and complainants took place in his chambers without the attendance of his staff. Considering
that there was still the question as to whether complainants could come up with the repurchase price of the lot, the meetings conducted inside the
chambers of respondent were uncalled for. We have cautioned judges to avoid in-chambers sessions without the other party and his counsel
present, and to observe prudence at all times in their conduct to the end that they not only act impartially and with propriety but are also perceived
to be impartial and proper.[16]
Further, respondent judge insists on his good intention to help the parties agree on the repurchase price of the lot. But, we find that his meetings
were always with complainants and not once did Pedro Calara, Jr., participate therein. Such situation gives us the impression that Pedro Calara,
Jr., did not have any notion at all of these conferences. This suspicion is bolstered by (a) respondent's testimony[17] that "x x x I likewise told them
(complainants) that according to my sheriff they have been promising cash to Calara and further told them that if they have cash they have to
bring it during an arranged meeting to Calara and show the money to Calara so that they will know they are negotiating in good faith." His
statement clearly signified that he had not as yet set up an appointment with Calara, Jr., and, (b) the contradictory stand among respondent judge
and his witnesses regarding the presence of Pedro Calara, Jr., in the alleged conferences of the parties.
In his "Sinumpaang Salaysay" dated 16 February 1993, Sheriff Regalado M. Aranguren confirmed the presence of Calara, Jr., in all the
conferences.[18] He stated that "(n)a sa lahat ng beses ng conferencia ay palaging dumarating si Pedro Calara, Jr., at laging naghihintay kay
Thelma Capuno." For his part, Sheriff Leonardo L. Ho, in his "Sinumpaang Salaysay" dated 15 February 1993,[19] declared that "(a)t nang
malaman ng mga naghabla ang kahilingan ng mga Capunos tungkol sa pagbaba ng presyo ng bilihan, ako ay pinakiusapan ng mga naghahabla
na sabihin sa mga Capunos na sila ay magkita sa hukuman para sa isang conferencia upang mapagusapan ang tungkol sa presyo ng bilihang
mabibiling muli; (n)a, hindi nakatupad ang mga Capunos sa una nilang tipanan kung kaya ang conferencia ay nakansela," thus implying that
Calara, Jr., was present during the first meeting. However, respondent judge rebutted these statements when he testified that nobody appeared in
both meetings except complainants who came two days after the appointed date of the second meeting.[20]
Admittedly, the amount of P350,000.00 was the subject of conversation between respondent judge and the complainant Thelma Villanueva.
Respondent judge denies that he demanded such sum but that complainant volunteered the information that she had a checking account and that
she was ready to pay P200,000.00 in cash and the balance of P150,000.00 in postdated checks.[21] He asserts that he could not have demanded
money from complainants as they did not strike him as moneyed.[22]
We note with interest that respondent then had a contrary opinion about the economic condition of complainants. He unwittingly disclosed in his
comment that "[f]or whatever it is worth, according to reliable sources, Thelma Villanueva was given by her sister abroad to pay the repurchase
price of the Calaras; that Thelma Villanueva used the money instead in constructing her own house x x x x"[23] The reliable sources referred to
were none other than his sheriff and the latter's wife. According to Sheriff Aranguren, "[h]abang ang kaso ay nabibinbin pa sa hukuman hanggang
sa ito ay natapos na, si Thelma Capuno (Villanueva) ay palagi pa ring pumupunta sa aking upisina upang siya ay bigyan pa ng kaunting panahon
dahilan sa iniintay pa lanq niya ang peranq padala ng kanyang kapatid na nasa America. Sinabi pa rin niya na may hinihintay pa ring pera siya
galing sa kanyang asawa na sabi niya ay hindi nagtatrabaho sa San Pablo."[24] Concepcion L. Aranguren, utility worker assigned to respondent's
court, supported her husband's statement by saying that "x x x Siya (Thelma Villanueva) ay umiiyak habang nakikipagusap na kung maari daw ay
bigyan siya ng palugit dahil may dadatinq daw siyang pera galing sa kanyang kapatid sa Amerika."[25] With such information, it is not farfetched
for respondent judge to demand money from complainant. Evidently, he was led by his sources to believe that complainant had the money to buy
back the property from the Calaras.
Verily, the act of respondent in meeting with complainants without the presence of counsel and warning them not to tell anyone, and demanding
money under the guise of forging peace between her and Pedro Calara, Jr., constitutes grave misconduct. Additionally, his failure to uphold the
integrity of the judiciary has undoubtedly diminished the faith of our people in the administration of justice. Given these serious indiscretions, a
more severe penalty than one (1) month suspension without pay should be imposed. A judge who established a common fund purportedly for his
low income employees and who himself together with his employees solicited contributions from litigants and visitors for such fund was dismissed
from the service.[26] We can do no less in this case.
II. Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-959
This administrative complaint seeks to subject respondent judge to disciplinary action or to dismissal from office for violation of: (1) Sec. 3, pars.
(b), (c) and (j) of R.A. No. 3019, (2) Sec. 7, pars. (a) and (d) of R.A. No. 6713, and, (3) Arts. 206 and 210 of The Revised Penal Code.
Complainant Celia E. Pampolina, President of PSM Development Corporation and the duly designated and appointed Executrix of the Last Will
and Testament of Pastor S. Marino, alleges that on 6 April 1992, a decision was rendered by respondent judge dismissing Sp. Proc. No. 849(92),
"IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF PASTOR S. MARINO," for lack of merit; that during the pendency of the case, respondent
ordered Jesus Azores, nephew of Pastor S. Marino, to surrender, among other properties, a Mitsubishi Galant Super Saloon car to the court; that
after the car had been surrendered to the court, respondent requested complainant and the Board of the PSM Corporation to issue a resolution to
have the luxury car at his disposal during weekends and to use it as he pleased; that the corporation appropriated the sum of P10,000.00 to pay
for the reconditioning, adjustment and tune-up of the engine of the car; that respondent had the custody of the car from April 1992 to 5 May 1993;
that he also demanded and received food, money, valuable properties (jewelries) from complainant and her grandfather, the late Pastor S. Marino;
that further, respondent judge requested favors from complainant in securing an exemption from the Gun Ban during the election period; that, in
this regard, respondent called up complainant using the name "E. Pilapil" and further extorted money; that, upon the death of Pastor S. Marino,
complainant filed a "Petition for the Probate of the Will of the Late Pastor S. Marino," docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 859 (92); that the petition was
raffled to the respondent's sala; that one of the basic issues raised in the petition was the mental capacity and the sound disposition of the
testator; that this issue was already passed upon by respondent judge in Sp. Proc. No. 849 (92); that during the pendency of the probate
proceeding, respondent judge called the parties to a conference at Roño's Place, a public restaurant in San Pablo City; that the meeting started at
eight o'clock in the evening and lasted until midnight; that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss possible settlement of the probate case; that
shares and other properties were discussed except the car; that respondent intentionally omitted to include the car in the list of properties which
he himself prepared so he could still make use of the car; that despite the fact that complainant was named executrix in the will, respondent
appointed Rosevelinda Calingasan and Antonio Azcarate as joint special administrators; that such order was issued without notice and hearing;
that her motion for reconsideration on this ground was denied; that, shortly after, respondent judge ordered complainant to produce stock
certificates in the name of the late Pastor S. Marino, the books of the corporation, and other papers; that she moved for reconsideration of this
order but the same was denied; that the joint special administrators filed a motion to cite complainant in contempt for her refusal to obey the order
of respondent; that in view of the insistence of the respondent to continue hearing the probate proceedings, complainant moved for the inhibition
of respondent judge; that respondent threatened to cite complainant in contempt because of her statement that respondent had custody,
possession and enjoyment of the luxury car of the corporation; that he set the hearing for the contempt proceeding on 29 January 1993 at
eight-thirty in the morning; and, that as a result, complainant filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari.
In his answer, respondent submits that complainant has no valid cause of action against him. He explains that the car was in the possession of
the court, although on few occasions, he drove it merely to inflate the tires or to recharge the battery. The car also needed minor repairs and the
expenses were paid for by the corporation which appropriated P10,000.00 for the purpose. However, he insists, there was no instance that he
demanded money, food or valuables from complainant.
With regard to the telephone call using the name "E. Pilapil," respondent claims that he wanted to be discreet with his calls.[27] He only wanted to
get the names of the two (2) persons whom complainant mentioned earlier who could help him secure exemption from the Gun Ban. He never
called up complainant to extort money. He got the exemption on his own efforts. Besides, complainant also used "E. Pilapil" when she called him
up at his residence.
Lastly, respondent contends that his orders in the probate proceedings were just and properly issued without bias. He admits that he set the
pre-trial conference of the probate proceedings at Roño's Place because it was the site selected by the parties.
On 8 July 1993, after due investigation, Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez submitted his report -
The complaint is an aftermath of the adverse Orders dated November 27, 1992, December 22, 1992 and January 25, 1993 issued by respondent
Judge against Celia Pampolina relative to SP 859(92) In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Pastor S. Marino, appointing Antonio
Azcarate and Rosevelinda Calingasan as Joint Special Administrators instead of the named executrix in the will which (sic) is the complainant
herein.
Most of the issues raised by complainant in this administrative complaint are the very errors assigned by complainant in her petition filed before
the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 30073 entitled 'PSM Corporation and Celia Pampolina vs. Hon. Judge Ausberto Jaramillo (in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, San Pablo City). (Rollo, pp. 35-57) Thus, the undersigned cannot properly rule on complainant's assertions
that respondent herein knowingly rendered an unjust interlocutory order because of the case being sub judice on appeal.
xxxx
However, in A.M. No. RTJ-92-859 (Natividad Calauan Uy, et al. vs. Judge Florentino M. Alumbre, Assisting Judge, RTC, Las Piñas, Metro
Manila), respondent Judge Alumbre was imposed a FINE of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for appointing a special administrator without a
hearing.
Admittedly, however, there were mistakes or omissions in the acts of respondent Judge in his handling of some incidents in the case. One mistake
he made was conducting a pre-trial conference of SP 859 (92) at the Roño's place, a public place (Restaurant), rather than inside his chambers
and/or the Courtroom. While the Rules of Court does not specifically provide for the venue of pre-trial conferences, propriety demands that it
should be confined within the four (4) walls of his sala to avoid impropriety and appearance of impropriety in all his activities (Iglesia ni Kristo vs.
Judge Geronilla, July 25, 1981 and Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Code of Judicial Conduct).
Strangely, likewise, is (sic) the actuations of respondent in the matter of the custody of the Super Saloon Car. He has demeaned himself and
compromised his position as a Judge when he obligated upon himself the recharging of its batteries and the inflating of its tires.
Thus, it is difficult to conceive how a Judge would willingly go out of his way to recharge the batteries and inflate the tires of a vehicle in custodia
legis by driving the car himself to the battery shop unless there is that intent on his part to use the car.
Against the testimonies of his witnesses, there is no doubt that indeed he used the car if not on all occasions that he went home to Parañaque
where he resides coming from his Court in San Pablo but at least on some occasions.
The appearance in the glove compartment of the car receipt of a beauty parlor located within the vicinity of their house admittedly patronized by
the wife of the respondent is a glaring proof that the car must have been used and operated by the respondent.
Regardless of whether the same was used in his official capacity, his motive could still be misinterpreted; and, in the course of events, his
actuations would come in conflict with the impartial performance of his official duties. In Adm. Matter No. 690-CFI entitled 'Benito B. Nate vs. Hon.
Enrique A. Agana, Sr., et. al.' (91 SCRA 1) the Honorable Court there ruled that it is misconduct for a judge to use a car that it levied in execution
by virtue of an order issued by him and was censured and admonished. In his separate opinion, however, then Justice Claudio Teehankee
recommended that the commensurate penalty should be six (6) months suspension considering the great responsibility and trust vested in
respondent. Justice Herrera, on her part, recommended three months suspension. However, in the case of Nate, the judge intended to acquire
ownership of the car. This does not appear to be the case here.
Likewise, another aspect which is highly questionable is the use of respondent Judge of an alias 'E. Pilapil'. If indeed there were no shady
deals/transactions between complainant and respondent, why was there a necessity to use an alias in their telephone conversations and/or why
would there be a need for a Judge to talk over the phone to a party who had a pending case before him.
The charges of bribery, violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, despite the vehemence of complainant's language, have not been
proven satisfactorily, there is no clear showing and/or proof that indeed respondent Judge demanded and/or received money, jewelries and food
from the complainant.
The claim of complainant that respondent Judge demanded and received money and jewelries from her is not supported by independent
testimonies and documents. In an apparent effort to mislead this Office into believing her theory, complainant resorted to annexing various
documents, which if taken separately will definitely lead into a different conclusion. One concrete example is her diary in which she allegedly
recorded all her transactions such as appointments, telephone calls, withdrawals from the bank, collections and every minute details that
transpired in her life, yet the demand for Two Million Pesos (P2,000.000.00) was never recorded nor was the delivery of the advance two hundred
fifty thousand pesos (P250,000.00) likewise recorded. When confronted on the matter, she merely gave the excuse that the demand was almost
everyday, hence, there was no need to record the same. Likewise, the alleged delivery of the jewelries was made on April 26, 1992 but the
unofficial receipt x x x was issued only on July 20, 1992 or only after three (3) months.
Administrative charge against a judge is highly penal in nature. Such charge must therefore be proved beyond reasonable doubt, otherwise, the
charge will be dismissed (Adm. Case No. 270-J, Enriquez vs. Araulla, in re: Horellano, 43 Phil. 212).[28]
On the basis of his foregoing findings, Deputy Court Administrator Suarez recommends that: (1) the charge for knowingly rendering an unjust
order/decision be DISMISSED for having been prematurely filed; (2) the charge for bribery, violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices act be
likewise DISMISSED for lack of factual evidence; and, (3) respondent judge be found guilty for the use of the car while in custodia legis and for the
issuance of an order appointing Special Administrators without notice to the parties, submitting the appropriate penalty however to the discretion
of the Court.
We do not fully subscribe to the foregoing recommendations. Respondent judge cannot be made administratively liable for issuing the order
appointing the special administrators. On 13 July 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing complainant's petition for certiorari
but at the same time granting her plea for the inhibition of respondent judge from hearing the probate case. We agree that while there was no
notice of the hearing for the appointment of the special administrators, petitioner (complainant) was nevertheless heard on her motion for
reconsideration of the appointment of the special administrators; and, that what the law prohibits is not the absence of notice but absolute
absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard. However, the Court of Appeals ruled that considering that respondent judge admitted using
the car, he should have immediately inhibited himself once his objectivity and impartiality were put in question by petitioner (complainant) in line
with Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.[29]
While respondent judge may not necessarily be held administratively liable for issuing the orders complained of, he certainly is accountable for
violating Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and of committing a corrupt practice under Sec. 7, par. (d), of R.A. No. 6713.
The records sufficiently establish that during the guardianship proceedings, respondent judge had no qualms in taking advantage of the authority
granted by complainant and the Board of Directors of PSM Development Corporation for him to use the Mitsubishi Galant Super Saloon on
weekends or as he pleased.[30] This fact alone would have already raised valid speculations about his objectivity in acting on the guardianship
proceedings. Yet, he did nothing to apprise complainant and the Board about the impropriety of accepting the favor.[31] Nor did he require them to
forthwith withdraw the authority granted him.[32] Undeniably, his free use of the car during and after the pendency of the guardianship
proceedings for over a year constituted a corrupt practice under Sec 7, par. (d), of R.A. 6713,[33] i.e., acceptance by a public officer of a favor
from any person in the course of his official duty.
Respondent judge did not only exhibit a personal interest in the vehicle but also accepted the offer to use it. In fact, by his own admission, he
drove it several times. In the conference held at Roño's Place, respondent judge purposely omitted the car in the list of properties belonging to the
estate of Pastor S. Marino. We are not persuaded by his argument that the car was not part of the decedent's estate. His later testimony revealed
that the parties then desired to include all properties even those which supposedly belonged to the deceased but deeded to the corporation.[34]
The car was one such property, but respondent never volunteered its inclusion. He justified his omission by saying that the car was not mentioned
in the discussion. Understandably, no one dared to do so as they were fully aware that respondent was in possession and enjoying the use of the
car. Besides, he should have been the one to call the attention of the parties about the existence of the vehicle as belonging to the estate.
Obviously, he did not want to part with the vehicle.
Respondent judge even personally supervised the maintenance of the car beyond what the duties of his office would call for. He had the scratches
of the car repainted, the tires inflated and the battery recharged six (6) times. All the expenses for the reconditioning, adjustment and tune-up,
repainting and battery recharging were charged against the P10,000.00 appropriated by the Board of Directors of PSM Development
Corporation.[35] The records do not however disclose who kept the P10,000.00. Neither was there any accounting of the expenses nor any
statement made on the amount left of the P10,000.00. Considering the extra pains taken by respondent in the upkeep of the car, the possibility
that the P10,000.00 was in his possession is not remote. Respondent's conduct in this regard cannot be any different from that of a judge who
was removed from office because of manifest interest in a vehicle in custodia legis by spending for its repairs and thereafter using it for her benefit
and convenience.[36]
Another reprehensible conduct of respondent which distresses us was his availment of the battery recharging service of Cortes Battery Shop free
of charge.[37] In so doing, respondent compromised his exalted position as a judge. It bears repeating that integrity in a judicial office is more than
a virtue; it is a necessity. We dismissed a judge who not only had the seats of his "Lite Ace" van repaired but also received new seat covers both
for free from a litigant.[38] Likewise, we terminated the services of a judge upon finding that he accepted the benefit of riding regularly in Sarkies
Tour Buses free of charge.[39]
Hence, the role of the judiciary in bringing justice to conflicting interests in society cannot be overemphasized. As the visible representation of law
and justice, judges are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would enhance the respect and confidence of our people in the judicial
system. They are particularly mandated not only to uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary but also to avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in their actions.[40] For judges sit as the embodiment of the people's sense of justice, their last recourse where all other
institutions have failed.[41] Sadly, respondent judge carelessly disregarded these stringent judicial norms. Worse, his acceptance of the Galant
Super Saloon for his personal use and convenience as well as his evident personal interest in it have defiled the "public trust" character of the
judicial office. These serious transgressions cannot be countenanced. By his actions, respondent has clearly demonstrated his difficulty and
inability to keep up with the conduct required of judges. Consequently, he should not be permitted to stay a minute longer in office. We have
repeatedly held that there is no place in the judiciary for those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity.[42]
WHEREFORE, for his gross misconduct and violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct in A.M. No. RTJ-93-944, and his violation of
Sec. 7, par. (d), of R.A. 6713, and Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct in A.M. No. RTJ-93-959, respondent JUDGE AUSBERTO
JARAMILLO, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, San Pablo City, is DISMISSED from the service with prejudice to reinstatement or appointment
to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and privileges, if any. This
dismissal shall be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.Lozano vs. Nograles G.R. No. 187883 June 16, 2009 Judiciary, Locus Standi, Judicial Review
NOVEMBER 10, 2017
FACTS:
The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House
Resolution No. 1109 entitled “A Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to
Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress.” In essence, both petitions seek to trigger a
justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation by this Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for
amending or revising the Constitution.
ISSUE: Do petitioners have legal standing?
RULING:
No.
In the present case, the fitness of petitioners’ case for the exercise of judicial review is grossly lacking. In the first place, petitioners have not
sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. In the second place, House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that
the House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual
convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. More importantly, no proposal has yet been made, and hence,
no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In short, House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of
an uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive
act that would warrant an intervention from this Court.
Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim of petitioners that they are instituting the cases at bar as taxpayers and concerned
citizens. A taxpayer’s suit requires that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. It is
undisputed that there has been no allocation or disbursement of public funds in this case as of yet.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, and Kapunan JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J., no part.
#22 Lozano 607 Phil. 334

vs.
Nograles PUNO, C.J.:
This Court, so long as the fundamentals of republicanism continue to guide it, shall not shirk its bounden duty to wield its judicial power to settle
"actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government."[1] Be that as it
may, no amount of exigency can make this Court exercise a power where it is not proper.
The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House
Resolution No. 1109 entitled "A Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to
Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress." In essence, both petitions seek to trigger a
justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation by this Court of Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for
amending or revising the Constitution. Unfortunately, this Court cannot indulge petitioners' supplications. While some may interpret petitioners'
moves as vigilance in preserving the rule of law, a careful perusal of their petitions would reveal that they cannot hurdle the bar of justiciability set
by this Court before it will assume jurisdiction over cases involving constitutional disputes.
It is well settled that it is the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is.[2] The determination of the nature, scope and extent of the powers of
government is the exclusive province of the judiciary, such that any mediation on the part of the latter for the allocation of constitutional boundaries
would amount, not to its supremacy, but to its mere fulfillment of its "solemn and sacred obligation" under the Constitution.[3] This Court's power of
review may be awesome, but it is limited to actual cases and controversies dealing with parties having adversely legal claims, to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented.[4] The
"case-or-controversy" requirement bans this court from deciding "abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions,"[5] lest the court give
opinions in the nature of advice concerning legislative or executive action.[6] In the illuminating words of the learned Justice Laurel in
Angara v. Electoral Commission[7]:
Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as
its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts
accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed
through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.
An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite of "ripeness." In the United States, courts are centrally concerned with
whether a case involves uncertain contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.[8] Another approach
is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties
entailed by withholding court consideration.[9] In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff.
Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.[10] An
alternative road to review similarly taken would be to determine whether an action has already been accomplished or performed by a branch of
government before the courts may step in.[11]
In the present case, the fitness of petitioners' case for the exercise of judicial review is grossly lacking. In the first place, petitioners have
not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. In the second place, House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved
that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No
actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been adopted. More importantly, no proposal has yet been made, and
hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In short, House Resolution No. 1109 involves a
quintessential example of an uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The
House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this Court.
Tan v. Macapagal presents a similar factual milieu. In said case, petitioners filed a petition assailing the validity of the Laurel-Langley resolution,
which dealt with the range of authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. The court resolved the issue thus:
More specifically, as long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no room for the interposition of judicial oversight. Only
after it has made concrete what it intends to submit for ratification may the appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid of
jurisdiction. That is the command of the Constitution as interpreted by this Court. Unless and until such a doctrine loses force by being overruled
or a new precedent being announced, it is controlling. It is implicit in the rule of law.[12]
Yet another requisite rooted in the very nature of judicial power is locus standi or standing to sue. Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate
only when he can demonstrate that (1) he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought.[13] In
the cases at bar, petitioners have not shown the elemental injury in fact that would endow them with the standing to sue. Locus standi requires a
personal stake in the outcome of a controversy for significant reasons. It assures adverseness and sharpens the presentation of issues for
the illumination of the Court in resolving difficult constitutional questions.[14] The lack of petitioners' personal stake in this case is no more
evident than in Lozano's three-page petition that is devoid of any legal or jurisprudential basis.
Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the claim of petitioners that they are instituting the cases at bar as taxpayers and
concerned citizens. A taxpayer's suit requires that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from
taxation.[15] It is undisputed that there has been no allocation or disbursement of public funds in this case as of yet. To be sure, standing
as a citizen has been upheld by this Court in cases where a petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance or when paramount
public interest is involved.[16] While the Court recognizes the potential far-reaching implications of the issue at hand, the possible consequence of
House Resolution No. 1109 is yet unrealized and does not infuse petitioners with locus standi under the "transcendental importance" doctrine.
The rule on locus standi is not a plain procedural rule but a constitutional requirement derived from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which
mandates courts of justice to settle only "actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As stated in
Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr.,[17] viz. :
x x x [C]ourts are neither free to decide all kinds of cases dumped into their laps nor are they free to open their doors to all parties or entities
claiming a grievance. The rationale for this constitutional requirement of locus standi is by no means trifle. It is intended "to assure a vigorous
adversary presentation of the case, and, perhaps more importantly to warrant the judiciary's overruling the determination of a coordinate,
democratically elected organ of government." It thus goes to the very essence of representative democracies.
xxxx
A lesser but not insignificant reason for screening the standing of persons who desire to litigate constitutional issues is economic in character.
Given the sparseness of our resources, the capacity of courts to render efficient judicial service to our people is severely limited. For courts to
indiscriminately open their doors to all types of suits and suitors is for them to unduly overburden their dockets, and ultimately render themselves
ineffective dispensers of justice. To be sure, this is an evil that clearly confronts our judiciary today.
Moreover, while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of locus standi, evolving from the stringent
requirements of "personal injury" to the broader "transcendental importance" doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused. It is not an
open invitation for the ignorant and the ignoble to file petitions that prove nothing but their cerebral deficit.
In the final scheme, judicial review is effective largely because it is not available simply at the behest of a partisan faction, but is exercised only to
remedy a particular, concrete injury.[18] When warranted by the presence of indispensible minimums for judicial review, this Court shall not shun
the duty to resolve the constitutional challenge that may confront it.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Corona, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, and Bersamin, JJ., concur.
Carpio Morales, J., on official leave.
Chico-Nazario, J., no part.

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Constitutional Law 1 - Case Digests (2 September 2019)

(compiled and lifted off random online sources)

G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011

#2 Martinez MARTINEZ vs LIM

ISSUE: Can a governor exercise the calling-out powers of a President?

#5 Gamboa Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, 24 July 2012

I.​ ​THE FACTS

II.​ ​THE ISSUES

#8 Letter to In Re: Letter Of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno

#9 Estrada Estrada v. Desierto

JOSEPH ESTRADA v. ANIANO DESIERTO (D)

G.R. No. 146710, Mar. 2, 2001

● Whether or not the petitioner resigned as president.

● Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.

● An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:

PONENTE ​Justice Carpio-Morales

Whether or not the issues at bar are justiciable?

This disposition is immediately executory.

Dispositive portion: Wherefore the MR filed by respondents is hereby DENIED.

#14 Marbury v. Madison

Issue.​ Is Marbury entitled to mandamus from the Supreme Court?

#15 Angara Angara vs. Electoral Commission

October 7 – Angara proclaimed as winner.

December 31 – Angara filed a Reply to the Answer to the Motion of dismissal.

January 23, 1936 – EC denied Angara’s Motion to Dismiss the Protest.

WON the Supreme Court has Jurisdiction over the Case.

1. The Supreme Court has Jurisdiction.

#17 Certiorari and prohibition

Whether the case presents a justiciable controversy

1. NOT A POLITICAL QUESTION

3. THE ONE-YEAR BAR RULE

– IMPEACH: to file the case before the Senate

II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES, HELD AND RATIO

A. Congressional Pork Barrel

1.) …separation of powers

2.) …non-delegability of legislative power

3.) …checks and balances

5.) …political dynasties

6.) …local autonomy

B. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”

2. Whether petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petitions.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The petitions must be dismissed.

#20 IBAAEU v. Inciong

(Labor Standards: Proper Construction and Interpretation of Labor Laws)

#21 Capuno EN BANC

I. Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-944

II. Adm. Matter No. RTJ-93-959

ISSUE: Do petitioners have legal standing?

#22 Lozano 607 Phil. 334

IN VIEW WHEREOF​, the petitions are dismissed.

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I. THE FACTS

II. THE ISSUES

PONENTE Justice Carpio-Morales

Issue. Is Marbury entitled to mandamus from the Supreme Court?

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed.