10/22/2017 G.R. No.

196877

Today is Sunday, October 22, 2017

Custom Search

Republic of the Philippines

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 196877 November 21, 2012

ELOISA R. NARCISO, Petitioner,

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the propriety of declaring a defendant in default when the time for filing the answer has not yet
elapsed.

The Facts and the Case

Plaintiff Estelita P. Garcia (respondent in this case) filed a complaint for damages against defendant Eloisa R.
Narciso (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga. Narciso filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint, alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint since it
averred facts constitutive of forcible entry. Narciso also assailed the venue as improperly laid since the acts Garcia
complained of were committed in Angeles City.

Plaintiff Garcia opposed the motion to dismiss and at the same time sought to have defendant Narciso declared in
default. Garcia cited the Supreme Court’s administrative circular that discouraged the filing of a motion to dismiss in
lieu of answer. Since the time to file an answer had already elapsed, said Garcia, she was entitled to have Narciso
declared in default.

The RTC set the two motions for hearing on November 5, 2004 at which hearing it deemed the incidents submitted
for resolution. On November 30, 2004, the RTC denied Narciso’s motion to dismiss and, as a consequence,
declared her in default for failing to file an answer.

On December 22, 2004 defendant Narciso filed a motion for reconsideration of the orders denying her motion to
dismiss and declaring her in default for failing to file an answer, which motion Garcia opposed. In her opposition, the
latter also sought to present her evidence ex parte. Meantime, the presiding judge, Pedro M. Sunga, retired and
Judge Divina Luz Aquino-Simbulan replaced him as acting judge of the concerned RTC branch.

Judge Simbulan referred the case for mediation on June 23, 2005. When mediation failed, on August 1, 2005 the
trial court set the case for judicial dispute resolution (JDR) as component of pre-trial, presided over by Judge Maria
Amifaith S. Fider-Reyes. Since the JDR also failed, the case was re-raffled for pre-trial proper and trial to Branch 44,
presided over by Judge Esperanza Paglinawan-Rozario.

On March 26, 2007, having noted that the court had not yet acted on Narciso’s motion for reconsideration of the
orders denying her motion to dismiss and declaring her in default, the trial court set the case for hearing and
required the parties to submit their respective written manifestations to the court.

On August 24, 2007 the trial court denied Narciso’s motion for reconsideration. It ruled that since she had already
been declared in default as early as November 30, 2004 and since she had not filed any motion to lift the order of
default within the allowable time, Narciso could no longer assail such default order.

On September 3, 2007 Narciso filed a motion to lift the order of default against her. She claimed that the protracted
resolution of her motion for reconsideration and the referral of the case for mediation prevented her from filing an
answer. She also pointed out that she filed a case for ejectment against Garcia and succeeded in obtaining a
decision against the latter.

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/nov2012/gr_196877_2012.html 1/3
10/22/2017 G.R. No. 196877

On April 8, 2008 the trial court denied Narciso’s motion. She filed a motion for reconsideration of this order but the
court also denied the same on October 13, 2008, prompting Narciso to file a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals (CA). On December 8, 20101 the CA denied her petition and affirmed the RTC’s order. The CA held that,
while a motion to lift order of default may be filed at any time after notice and before judgment, Narciso needed to
allege facts constituting fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence that prevented her from answering the
complaint. She also needed to show a meritorious defense or that something would be gained by having the order
of default set aside.2 For the CA, petitioner failed to do these things. It denied Narciso’s motion for reconsideration of
its decision on April 11, 2011.3

Claiming that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, Narciso filed
the present petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and injunction.
In a Resolution dated June 8, 2011 the Court issued a TRO in the case, enjoining the RTC from proceeding with its
hearing until further orders.4

The Issue Presented

The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in affirming the order of
default that the RTC issued against petitioner Narciso.

The Court’s Ruling

Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides that a defending party may be declared in default upon motion of
the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of failure to file an answer within the time allowed for
it. Thus:

SEC. 3. Default; declaration of. — If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court
shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the
defending party in default. x x x

Here, however, defendant Narciso filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff Garcia’s complaint against her before filing an
answer. Section 1, Rule 16 allows her this remedy. Thus:

SEC. 1. Grounds. — Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a
motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds: x x x.

As a consequence of the motion to dismiss that defendant Narciso filed, the running of the period during which the
rules required her to file her answer was deemed suspended. When the trial court denied her motion to dismiss,
therefore, she had the balance of her period for filing an answer under Section 4, Rule 16 within which to file the
same but in no case less than five days, computed from her receipt of the notice of denial of her motion to dismiss.
Thus:

SEC. 4. Time to plead. — If the motion is denied, the movant shall file his answer within the balance of the period
prescribed by Rule 11 to which he was entitled at the time of serving his motion, but not less than five (5) days in
any event, computed from his receipt of the notice of the denial. If the pleading is ordered to be amended, he shall
file his answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11 counted from service of the amended pleading, unless the
court provides a longer period.

But apart from opposing defendant’s motion to dismiss, plaintiff Garcia asked the trial court to declare Narciso in
default for not filing an answer, altogether disregarding the suspension of the running of the period for filing such an
answer during the pendency of the motion to dismiss that she filed in the case. Consequently, when the trial court
granted Garcia’s prayer and simultaneously denied Narciso’s motion to dismiss and declared her in default, it
committed serious error. Narciso was not yet in default when the trial court denied her motion to dismiss. She still
1âwphi1

had at least five days within which to file her answer to the complaint.

What is more, Narciso had the right to file a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s order denying her motion to
dismiss. No rule prohibits the filing of such a motion for reconsideration. Only after the trial court shall have denied it
does Narciso become bound to file her answer to Garcia’s complaint. And only if she did not do so was Garcia
entitled to have her declared in default. Unfortunately, the CA failed to see this point.

WHEREFORE, the Court ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 8, 2010
and Resolution dated April 11, 2011 in CA-G.R. SP 106425, LIFTS the order of default that the Regional Trial Court
of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 44, · entered against petitioner Eloisa Narciso, and DIRECTS that court to
allow her to file her answer to the complaint and proceed to hear the case with dispatch. The court DISSOLVES the
temporary restraining order that it issued on June 8, 2011 to enable the trial court to resume proceedings in the
case.

SO ORDERED.

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/nov2012/gr_196877_2012.html 2/3
10/22/2017 G.R. No. 196877

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO* JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ**

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had bee n reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Footnotes
*
Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta, per Special Order 1352dated
November 7, 2012.
**
Designated Acting Member, per Special Order 1299 dated August 28, 2012.
1
Penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. with the concurrence of Justices Antonio L. Villamor
andSamuel H. Gaerlan, rollo, pp. 20-28.
2
RULES OF COURT, Rule 9, Section 3(b).
3
Rollo, p. 29.
4
Id. at 762.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/nov2012/gr_196877_2012.html 3/3