Lotz - Fetishism PDF

CT&T Continental Thought & Theory
A journal of intellectual freedom
Volume 1 | Issue 2: Debt and Value

364-382 | ISSN: 2463-333X
Fiction without Fantasy:

Capital Fetishism as
Objective Forgetting
Christian Lotz
Abstract: In my paper I briefly examine three popular mystifications of the

concept of capital, before I further argue that the concept of fetishism should
be conceived of as a process of social forgetting. I argue that we are living in a
fetishistic society insofar as fetishism is not only collective but also objective.
However, I am not opening up totally new territory here, since, for example, Zizek
argued that commodity fetishism is “the unconscious of the commodity form,”
and Jameson expanded the idea of the objective quality of commodity fetishism
towards what he calls the “historical amnesia” of consumer societies. However,
I hope that my reflections can be seen as an extension of these positions in two
important respects: first, they go beyond the concept of commodity and tie the
concept of fetishism back to the concept of capital, and, second, they tie the
problem of amnesia and fetishism back to Marx’s method.
Key Words: Marx, commodity fetishism, capital, debt, abstraction
http://ctt.canterbury.ac.nz
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM
Volume 1, Issue 2: Debt and Value
Introduction
The form of revenue and the sources of revenue are the most
fetishistic expression of the relations of capitalist production. It is
their form of existence as it appears on the surface, divorced from
the hidden connections and the intermediate connecting links. Thus
the land becomes the source of rent, capital the source of profit,
and labor the source of wages. The turned-around [verdrehte] form
in which the real inversion is expressed is naturally reproduced in the
views of the agents of this mode of production. It is a kind of fiction
without fantasy, a religion of the vulgar.1
Generations of 20th Century Marxologists have worked, in the wake of Lukacs

and critical theory, through Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism. However,
despite the fact that a massive amount of critical intellectual energy has been
spent on this extraordinary concept in Marx, the concept of fetishism has been
discussed mainly in regard to Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism, as it is
presented in chapter one of Capital. Since all too many readers seem to read
only chapter one, subsection four, which is where Marx introduces commodity
fetishism, two important aspects of this concept have often been overlooked: [1]
Marx indicates that the concept of fetishism also belongs to other social-
economic categories, such as money and capital; additionally one can find him
dealing with fetishism in all three volumes of capital, up to his claim in volume
three that the concepts of interest and debt are the most abstract and emptiest
form of fetishism. Interest and debt as fetishisms are also taken up by Marx in
preparatory manuscripts between 1861 and 1863. [2] The concept of fetishism is
directly related to and interwoven with his method in Capital, insofar as at all
stages of his investigation Marx tries to reverse the process of forgetting that is
contained in each methodological step in his analyses. Accordingly, among
others one goal of Capital is to reverse the amnesia that a society determined by
capital is characterized by. This amnesia is self-related, insofar as capitalist
society forgets itself in itself. Fetishism, accordingly, is a subjective-objective
concept. What Marx has in mind with his astonishing sentence that fetishism is a
“fiction without fantasy” is a subjective relation that exists objectively.
In the following I would like to briefly consider a few popular mystifications
of the concept of capital, before I further argue that the concept of fetishism
should be conceived of as a really existing process of social forgetting. I argue
that we are living in a fetishistic society insofar as fetishism is not only collective
but also objective. However, I am not opening up totally new territory here, since,
for example, Zizek argued that commodity fetishism is “the unconscious of the
commodity form”2, and Jameson expanded the idea of the objective quality of
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Fiction without Fantasy: Capital Fetishism as Objective Forgetting
commodity fetishism towards what he calls the “historical amnesia”3 of

consumer societies.
Capital
Before I deal in more detail with the concept of fetishism in Marx, I would like to
briefly sketch three popular misunderstandings of capital, especially since these
misunderstandings can lead to fetishized conceptions of capital, which, in turn,
make it difficult to understand that capital is another term for the objective form
of capitalist social organization and the relationship to itself.
Capital and Money
The first confusion about the concept of capital stems from the problem of to
what extent capital is differentiated from money. In many popular discussions
and in the media, it is assumed that capital is identical with money invested in
the economy. Although this conception is not wrong, it is important to see that,
if we mean by capital something that is simply used for purchasing something
else, this is still money that does not (yet) function as capital, since capital is
only money that is used for purchasing something for the sake of increasing
money. Accordingly, capital is not really used for the sake of purchasing
something. Although it is true that investment money is used for purchasing
labor power, machines and technologies, land, buildings, etc., the ultimate
purpose for money in the form of investment is, of course, to accumulate the
amount of money that was invested. As long as capital is used for exchanges in
the market - for example, when it is used for purchasing labor power or
education - capital seems to function as money because it is used for buying
something (in this case labor power). However, money as capital functions
differently, insofar as capital in the form of more money is supposed to return to
its owners with a surplus. The sole purpose of investment is therefore, ultimately,
more investment.
Marx makes an important distinction in Capital, which, despite all further
complications, it is important to remember. He introduces the distinction
between what he calls “money as money” and “money as capital” as two
different forms of circulation. The latter circulation gives a society, such as ours,
that is based on money as capital a socially (and historically) specific direction,
dynamics, and purpose. With the switch towards capital as the all-encompassing
principle of social organization, it is no longer consumption that regulates
market exchanges; rather, all market exchanges that are related to consumption
(such as buying commodities) receive a new index that turns all of these market
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exchanges into exchanges that are not really exchanges based on supposed
equality and symmetry, but, instead, they are exchanges in which the purchase
and consumption of things function as a wealth creating instrument, i.e., they are
asymmetrical from the beginning on. Put differently, consumption in the form of
commodity and money exchanges becomes subsumed by surplus value, and, as
a consequence, consumption becomes dependent on capital. However, this is
not a quantitative problem. For example, one could argue that there is too much
consumption and that capitalist societies are “consumer societies.” Though this
view is not totally incorrect, it nonetheless misses the main problem, insofar as
there is too much consumption only because it becomes a function of capital.
The fact of “too much” consumption is itself not sufficient for explaining that
consumption in capitalist societies belongs to a different kind of consumption,
namely, consumption that generates wealth and therefore contributes to class
power, oppression, and inequality, as well as to the exploitation of labor power
and the earth. Every purchase that we do in the market, although it still seems to
be a purchase with the goal of consuming things, is, once it is subsumed by
capital, not really based on fulfilling needs, given that all acts of consumption are
now (necessarily) related to generating wealth and growth, i.e., for generating
surplus value. This is what Marx means when he refers to the “surface” of
commodity exchange. Commodity exchange, i.e., market relations as well as
consumption, are only, we might say, the (visible) top of the iceberg, the main
part of which lays hidden beneath the surface of exchanges. Clarifying the
distinction between money and capital is important for popular identifications of
the upper class with the rich, and of the capitalist with someone who has a lot of
money. Though, empirically, this might be correct in most cases, it confuses the
main point, since a rich person could also spend all of her money or save her
money without throwing it into circulation. For example, it could be given as a
gift or exclusively be used for consumption. In this case money would function
as money and not as capital. However, it is clear that in capitalist societies, i.e., in
societies in which the entire social organization depends upon capital, money
spent or money saved would nevertheless function as capital, insofar as the
purchases are subsumed to capital circulation and the banks would let the saved
money “work.” In capitalism all monetary relations are essentially capital
relations. The money circulation is subsumed by the capital circulation.
Is Capital a Thing?
The second confusion is closely related to the first misunderstanding. It is

common in the literature as well as in public discussions to refer to capital as
something that exists in the form of tangible things, such as assets, humans,
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money, investment, etc. I have argued elsewhere in more detail why capital
should not be conceptualized as a “thing,” as something “tangible,” or as an
“asset” that someone “has”4. Here I want to point out that the attempt to think
about capital as tangible things and possessions mystifies its nature, which, in
turn affirms capital fetishism in two major ways: first, the assumption that capital
is something that we “have” or possess overlooks that capital is a relation and
process, insofar as it can only function as capital if it is in circulation, in
movement, and in returning. When Marx first introduces capital in Capital, he
introduces it as a different type of circulation, namely, a circulation where money
is related to itself in the form of more money. Capital is this “more” in flux, but in
the form of real existing things and activities that now become part of the
circulation and return process. Second, the assumption that capital is something
that we “have” or possess equally misses the point that capital as the form of
social reality (including things and activities) belongs to a historically specific
type of social organization. It does not exist, at least not in universal form, in
other types of social organization. As Marx has it,
capital is not a thing, but rather a definite social production relation,

belonging to a definite historical formation of society, which is
manifested in a thing and lends this thing a specific social character.5
The assumption that capital is something that is tangible, that it is money as

money, or that it is something that we have and possess, tends to universalize
and naturalize capital as something that exists in all societies. This confusion
leads to a misrecognition and misunderstanding of the nature of a social
organization that is determined all the way down by capital as a relation
between money and more money, the consequence of which is that (potentially)
every-thing can take on the form of capital and therefore be turned into a use
value for capital. Put differently, everything can become part of surplus value
production and growth. Every thing counts as a social thing only because it is
related to capital and this is the reason for Marx’s claim that capital becomes
a subject. A subject not only is something that is related to itself, but also is
something that is related to itself in its other, i.e., it is related to itself through
something that is external to itself. Accordingly, capital is a subject because it
is related to itself and because it is related to itself through abstract labor, i.e.,
labor that is exchangeable and monetized, as well as thorugh the products of
abstract labor, i.e., commodities as monetized products of monetized labor. Marx
very clearly rejects the idea that capital is a thing at the end of the third volume
of Capital.
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Capital is not the sum of the material and produced means of

production. Capital is rather the means of production transformed
into capital, which in themselves are no more capital than gold or
silver in itself is money. It is the means of production monopolized
by a certain section of society, confronting living labor-power as
products and working conditions rendered independent of this very
labor-power, which are personified through this antithesis in capital.
It is not merely the products of laborers turned into independent
powers, products as rulers and buyers of their producers, but
rather also the social forces and the future form of this labor, which
confront the laborers as properties of their products. Here, then, we
have a definite and, at first glance, very mystical, social form, of one
of the factors in a historically produced social production process.6
Given this, we can see why, in “standard” conceptualizations of capital as

something that is simply “there” in the form of assets or money spent for
“investment,” capital is understood via a mystification of what capital really is. In
these conceptualizations, wealth and capital are taken as givens that are, so to
speak, introjected into society. Society, accordingly, in these conceptualizations
is understood as external to capital, and, in turn, capital is not posited as
constitutive for social reality. However, we need to understand, following Marx,
that capital is something that defines the social form of all creative capacities
and activities (labor power), as well as all natural things (resources, earth,
nature) and, also, mental reality (products of human capacities).
Is Capital Spent?
An additional misconception and mystification of capital is related to another

deep confusion, namely, the assumption that capital in the form of investments is
spent in the economy. For example, one could argue that capital is spent for it to
be used in companies, for investment, to purchase labor, etc. However, as I said
above, money as capital is not used and not consumed, since everything appears
to capital as a use value for capital. Money used for purchases is immediately
capital, which, according to Marx, can either take on a “fixed” or “variable”
form. It is indeed very difficult for us to understand that it not only is it not
the case that capital is something that someone “has,” but also is it difficult to
grasp that capital is never used for anything else than for its own accumulation.
Accordingly, capital is not spent! In fact, it is the essence of accumulation. Marx
introduces the problem of capital spending in Capital right when he introduces
his concept of capital, but it is easy to dismiss the deeper consequences of his
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claim. He writes:
In the circulation C-M-C, money is in the end converted into a

commodity, that serves as a use-value; it is spent once for all. In the
inverted form, M-C-M, on the contrary, the buyer lays out money in
order that, as a seller, he may recover money. By the purchase of his
commodity he throws money into circulation, in order to withdraw
it again by the sale of the same commodity. He lets the money go,
but only with the sly intention of getting it back again. Money (in
the form of capital 7), therefore, is not spent, it is merely advanced.8
[Italics added].
And, a bit further down, Marx goes on to say:
The exact form of this process is therefore M-C-M’, where M’ = M +

D M = the original sum advanced, plus an increment. This increment
or excess over the original value I call “surplus-value.” The value
originally advanced, therefore, not only remains intact while in
circulation, but adds to itself a surplus-value or expands itself. It is
this movement that converts it into capital.9 [Italics added]
If we think this through, then we need to come to the conclusion that, if it is

true that every return in the form of growth, profits, and interest goes back into
circulation, capital is a form of money that is actually never spent, although it is
not a form of hoarding and savings. Instead, it is something that is constantly in
movement and, as such, the essence of the social dynamics of our societies can
be spelled out in spatial and temporal terms. Money functions only as capital
as long as [1] it is in circulation and [2] it remains related to itself, which – in
principle – has no end and, accordingly, is an infinite process. The only limits that
it encounters are labor related, such as hick-ups in the markets, crises, delays,
or labor resistance.10 As soon as capital is taken out of its own processing, it
functions again as money, either in the form of hard cash or in the form of cash
savings. If it is used for land, machines, research, or buildings, it functions again
immediately as capital, since all of the used resources now go again towards
surplus value production. Important to note here is the fact that capital is not an
irrational principle simply because money functions for the sake of making more
money in the form of profit; rather, capital is in principle never spent and only
accumulates. Capital accumulation is therefore something paradoxical, insofar
as it “compounds” and needs to circulate with ever increasing speed. Capital can
only be limited through its destruction.11
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In this vein, David Harvey has given Marx’s considerations about the irrational
nature of capital a contemporary twist, which he calls the “the capital surplus
absorption problem.” In The Enigma of Capital, he writes:
In the absence of any limits or barriers, the need to reinvest in order

to remain a capitalist propels capitalism to expand at a compound
rate. This then creates a perpetual need to find new fields of
activity to absorb the reinvested capital: hence ‘the capital surplus
absorption problem’. Where are the new investment opportunities
to come from? Are there limits? Clearly, there is no inherent limit to
the monetary capacity to fuel growth (as became obvious in 2008–
9, when states conjured up, seemingly out of nowhere, trillions of
dollars to bail out a failing financial system).12
Capital as ever increasing surplus, according to Harvey, runs into ever more
crises since it becomes more difficult over time to dump all this money into the
economy again. The more hindrances emerge for capital to valorize itself in the
shortest time span possible, the more capital moves into the financial sector,
given that short term accumulations (on the basis of money as debt extensions)
are still possible in the financial system. Harvey concludes:
Financial and monetary crises have been long-standing features

of the historical geography of capitalism. But their frequency and
depth have increased markedly since 1970 or so, and we have to
grapple with why this is happening and what might be done about
it. The compounding rate of growth of global capital accumulation
has put immense pressure upon the state–finance nexus to find
new and innovative ways to assemble and distribute money capital
in quantities, forms and locations where it is best positioned
to exploit profitable opportunities. Many of the recent financial
innovations were designed to overcome the barriers posed by pre-
existing institutional and regulatory arrangements. The pressure to
deregulate seemingly became irresistible. But moves of this kind
invariably create a serious probability of unrestrained financing
going wild and generating a crisis.13
In sum, the common view of capital as something that is “used for” something
else than itself remains fetishistic, insofar as it does not understand that capital
is never spent, never consumed, and only accumulates for the sake of its own
accumulation. Consequently, capital as ever growing compound, as long as it is
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not destroyed, remains in the hands of capitalists.
Capital Fetishism as Objective Forgetting
After having clarified three of the most common fetishized conceptions of

capital, I’d like to turn my attention to the objective side of the fetishism
problem, namely, to the problem of fetishism as a process of forgetting both on
the side of social reality and on the side of Marx’s method. Frederic Jameson
was one of the first Marxists who pointed out that the centrality of the concept
of fetishism goes back to the extension of consumption culture that we
observed during the 20th Century, and although Marx already thought about the
fact that the laborer is at the same time a consumer, he could not foresee the
force with which capital transformed everyday life, including the free time of
the laboring individual, into a consumer culture. As we know, by means of the
transformation of consumption, formerly external areas of human life, such as
health, leisure, and education, have been incorporated into capitalism. Moreover,
we are currently observing the subsumption of the entire mind and the brain to
production.14 In an early interview, Jameson says:
But there is another disturbing and significant factor which must

now be introduced into the discussion: and it is the unique dynamics
of this latest moment of capital - variously called consumer society,
media society, multi-national society, post-industrial society, the
‘society of the spectacle’ and so forth – and which is characterized
by a historical amnesia -a repression both of past and of imaginable
future-far more intense than in any other social formation in human
history.15
Although Marx’s conception of fetishism is much broader than Jameson seems

to argue here, since for Marx the commodity form or value is itself fetishistic,
Jameson’s take is nevertheless of interest for us here, since he ties the problem
of fetishism not only to the problem of (historical) forgetting, but also, given
the Freudian undertone, to the problem of amnesia as a process of total
forgetting and repression. Speaking of a “historical amnesia” is based on the
idea that in the process of becoming a capitalist society and in the process of
its constitution, capitalist society loses “consciousness” of itself. Put differently,
it does not know of itself, it mis-recognizes itself and, hence, appears reified to
itself. Grasped both as a subject and as a relation, society remains unaware of its
own coming about, of its own internal workings and of its own genesis. Its own
genesis disappears, as Marx has it, in its result.16
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In any case, what Jameson has in mind is remarkable for two reasons: [1] it
reminds us of Freud’s rejection of 19th Century theories of memory constitution
that are based on the idea that consciousness and memory are constituted by
material traces, and [2] it reminds us of Marx’s language in Capital, since Marx
uses the exact same argument not only for his claim that the value form is a
form that exists in the form of a real abstraction (thereby “forgetting” its own
sociality and “relatedness”), but also for his claim that his dialectical method
and the inner relatedness of social categories, such as commodity, money and
capital, is the attempt to reverse the process of forgetting by showing that each
category is already contained and constituted by the next higher category. Let
us first briefly look at Freud.
Freud’s theory of consciousness is in large measure based on a critique of
the psychology of his time and its assumption that memory works in the form
of material “traces,” the idea of which runs through the entire history of modern
philosophy from Descartes onwards. Against this tradition, Freud argues in
Beyond the Pleasure Principle that consciousness, i.e., knowing, is not defined by
material traces that are somehow “present” or constitutive of consciousness and
mental acts, such as perception and reproductive imagination, or having access
to itself, but, instead, he claims that it is defined by the loss of knowing itself. He
writes:
Consciousness is not the only distinctive character that we ascribe

to the processes in that system. On the basis of impressions derived
from our psycho-analytic experience, we assume that all excitatory
processes that occur in the other systems leave permanent traces
behind in them, which form the foundation of memory. Such
memory-traces, then, have nothing to do with the fact of becoming
conscious; indeed they are often most powerful and most enduring
when the process which left them behind was one which never
entered consciousness.17 [Italics added]
Freud’s claim is based on a reversal of central assumptions in modern

psychology, inasmuch as as he claims that knowledge of itself and consciousness
is based on being cut off from its physiological and “material” traces. Even if in
our contemporary theories as well as in transcendental theories of knowledge
we would find Freud’s affirmation of the physiological base of consciousness
and knowledge highly dubious, his claim is nevertheless still important, insofar
as, for Freud, knowledge in general and knowledge of itself is constituted
precisely by what we could call the structural intransparence of consciousness.
Consciousness is a screen. Memory traces, if there are any, for Freud, disappear
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in the result of their constitution. In fact, memory as that which gives us access
to ourselves and that which constitutes subjectivity and self-relatedness for
Freud, is constituted by its absence.
If we now turn our attention to Marx, it is rather astonishing to see that he
uses the exact same language as Freud. In a central passage in Capital he writes:
We have already seen, from the simplest expression of value,

x commodity A = y commodity B, that the thing in which the
magnitude of the value of another thing is represented appears
to have the equivalent form independently of this relation, as a
social property inherent in its nature. We followed the process by
which this false semblance became firmly established, a process
which was completed when the universal equivalent form became
identified with the natural form of a particular commodity, and
thus crystallized into the money-form. What appears to happen
is not that a particular commodity becomes money because all
other commodities express their values in it, but, on the contrary,
that all other 20 commodities universally express their values in a
particular commodity because it is money. The movement through
which this process has been mediated vanishes in its own result,
leaving no trace behind. Without any initiative on their part, the
commodities find their own value-configuration ready to hand, in the
form of a physical commodity existing outside but also alongside
them. This physical object, gold or silver in its crude state, becomes,
immediately on its emergence from the bowels of the earth, the
direct incarnation of all human labor. Hence the magic of money.
Men are henceforth related to each other in their social process
of production in a purely atomistic way. Their own relations of
production therefore assume a material shape which is independent
of their control and their conscious individual action. This situation
is manifested first by the fact that the products of men’s labor
universally take on the form of commodities. The riddle of the money
fetish is therefore the riddle of the commodity fetish, now become
visible and dazzling to our eyes.18
This complex passage contains at least three central ideas that are of
importance for us here: [1] Marx claims that the money form genetically contains
the commodity form, leaving no trace behind; [2] Marx claims that money is
the “thing” in which all social relations disappear and, instead, that it exists in
the form of “one,” really existing, commodity that now stands in for all social
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relations; [3] Marx claims that this externalized and objectified thing appears, as
a consequence of the foregoing, as being beyond the control of those subjects
who are constituted by it.19 This process of social forgetting is a process in
which society appears to itself as thing-like and as something “natural” that is
“there” without access to itself. Fetishism occurs, we might say, when the reality
is not seen as a result of a process, but, instead, as something given, fixed,
natural, and unmovable. The entire critique of positivism in critical theory stems
from this assumption. The similarity to Freud’s position is obvious: as Freudian
psychoanalysis tries to make the process of constitution visible that is contained,
but suppressed in consciousness, Marx’s dialectics tries to render the process of
(social) constitution visible that is contained in the objectivity of society and the
knowledge of itself as something (apparently) thing-like in nature.
In addition, here Marx points to the movement through which the value-
form, as he discusses it in the first chapter of Capital, becomes invisible in the
result of its constitution, i.e., in the real existing form of value, which is money.
The steps, however, that lead to money as the universal placeholder of social
reality vanish in their result. As Marx puts it in the above quote, the intermediate
steps of the process vanish in the result and leave no trace behind. In a similar
formulation, Marx puts it this way: “The name of a thing is entirely external to its
nature. I know nothing of a man if I merely know his name is Jacob. In the same
way, every trace of the money-relation disappears in the money names pound,
thaler, franc, ducat, etc.”20 [Italics added]. When we find commodities on the
market, they already come with a price tag and the fact that commodities are
constituted by their specific social form disappears behind their appearance.
Put differently, money stands in for a complex relationship between the visible
and the invisible, and it is as if the surface in capitalism is like a symptom,
insofar as that which the symptom is a symptom of is forgotten in the symptom.
Moreover, Marx argues that this basic process of forgetting and displacement
occurs at every level of money and capital. For example, in regard to commodity
circulation, i.e., market relations, he writes the following – with explicit reference
to the process of forgetting:
In present bourgeois society as a whole, this positing of prices and

their circulation etc. appears as the surface process, beneath which,
however, in the depths, entirely different processes go on, in which
this apparent individual equality and liberty disappear. It is forgotten,
on one side, that the presupposition of exchange value, as the
objective basis of the whole of the system of production, already
in itself implies compulsion over the individual, since his immediate
product is not a product for him, but only becomes such in the social
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process, and since it must take on this general but nevertheless

external form; and that the individual has an existence only as a
producer of exchange value, hence that the whole negation of his
natural existence is already implied ; that he is therefore entirely
determined by society; that this further presupposes a division of
labor etc., in which the individual is already posited in relations other
than that of mere exchanger, etc.21
What Marx argues here is well known: at the surface of commodity circulation
and everyday market relations, such as buying and selling as well as supply
and demand, equal individuals seem to encounter each other as formally free
individuals. In fact, market relations are only apparently made of individual
transactions between individuals that are socially constituted through their
exchange relations. In truth, however, these individuals are constituted by
the relations that underlie market relations, but are forgotten and displaced
underneath the exchange relations. Individuals are already determined as
specific individuals and are constituted by the relations of production and
consumption as well as by conditions of the relations of production and
consumption. Accordingly, the fetishism and objective self-forgetting of
capitalist society can also be traced back to the specific form, in which labor
is constituted in capitalism, namely, to abstract labor and the wage form: “The
wage-form thus extinguishes every trace of the division of the working day into
necessary labor and surplus labor, into paid labor and unpaid labor. All labor
appears as paid labor”.22[Italics added]
Marx does not stop here. In fact, if we take all three volumes of Capital into
account, the fetishism does not suddenly disappear; instead, Marx analyses it in
its ever more abstract instantiations, i.e., commodity fetishism reproduces itself
objectively on each level of social constitution, which explains why Marx already
thematizes fetishism in chapter one as a, if not the, constitutive moment of the
universal form of value. Economic readings as well as cultural readings of Marx’s
Capital tend to miss the entire point, as Marx discusses the fetishism as both [1]
socially constitutive as well as [2] economically universal. As I pointed out in the
first part of this essay, capital is not some “thing” that enters the society from
the outside in the form of something tangible or as a bunch of money; rather,
capital is the real existing form and dynamics of all social relations, insofar as
capital is a specific way in which money takes on all social relations.
However, the most abstract form of capital and its “purest” expression,
according to Marx, is interest. In interest (and, hence, debt) the “absolute
knowing” in its most abstract form and identity is posited. Consequently, by
reading Capital we are asked to understand that that which appears to us in
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our everyday life as isolated and non-related “facts” or givens, such as money,
capital, wage, interest, and debt, are in truth actualizations of the same social
form, namely, the capital form as the self-relatedness of everything to itself in
the form of surplus value. Our society knows itself through these categories. In
interest and debt all other social categories are contained and the task of Marx’s
dialectics is to render the systematic internal constitution of the categories
visible in order to help us understand that capitalist social organization is a
whole with a beginning and an end. Debt, then, for Marx, is the highest form
under which objective forgetting is constituted and the most dazzling way in
which our society appears to itself as that which it is not. Accordingly, we are
asked not to look at interest and debt as separated “phenomena;” instead, we
are asked to look at them as the purest and, hence, most objective actualization
of capital. Consequently, debt (and the financialization of it) are from the
beginning on part of capital, namely, its extension into the future.
Let me now, finally, turn to this most abstract form of social forgetting
and the most objective actualization of this process of forgetting in something
natural and thing-like.
Debt as Pure Abstraction
In an extraordinary manuscript that Marx wrote in preparation of Capital

between 1861 and 1863, entitled Revenue and its Sources, Marx points to three
basic fetishisms that occur in capitalist societies, and which he calls the “religion
of the vulgar.” These basic fetishisms are based on the idea [1] that the earth is
the source of rent, [2] that labor is the source of the wage, and [3] that capital
is a “tool” for acquiring labor. What he has in mind should be clear, given what I
have discussed in the first part of this essay, insofar as even today, roughly 150
years after Marx’s Capital, we still live in a world that to a large extent follows
this threefold religion of the vulgar. For example, how many people still believe
that they receive the wage for their labor and the product of their labor, or
its “importance,” or for the “responsibility” expressed in it (and not for their
surplus value production and market mechanism of making their labor more
exchangeable and profitable)? Be that as it may, Marx’s manuscript is also
extraordinary because Marx uses terms that place the concept of fetishism in
close proximity to the concept of forgetting, insofar as he determines here not
only interest-bearing capital as the most completed form of fetishism, but also
that in interest the “recollection of the past”23is no longer present and that it no
longer shows any “scars of its origin.”24 Whereas all other social categories show
some social content in them, in interest all content seems to be eliminated, since
capital exists in the form of interest as a pure and abstract relation to itself. One
377
gives money and receives more back, which, as Marx highlights, is based on the
separation from the legal owner of interest bearing capital from the production
process. Put differently, the separation of industrial capital from interest bearing
capital and the fact that a portion of the first always goes to the latter. This also
explains why interest does not appear as profit, but, instead, as something that
people somehow “share” with whoever represents interest bearing capital, which
is, in most cases, banks and – though invisible - financialized forms of capital.
Since ultimately all labor and exchange relations in capitalist society
are driven forward by circulating capital, it is also clear that ultimately all
capitalist relations culminate and, speculatively expressed, are contained in
(compound) interest. Capital appears in interest as a source of itself - and how
many speculators will sit behind their monitors and say to themselves that they
made some money during the day! “In M-M’,” as Marx puts it, “we have the
empty [begrifflose] form of capital, the perversion [Verkehrung] and reification
[Versachlichung] of production relations”.25 The negative existence of interest
is debt, since that which someone “owes” to someone else is in the end always
the surplus to be paid on top of the return of what was given, which is ultimately
based on actually increased productivity or, as in almost all cases, on promised
productivity. As we know, not only single persons, but also households, and
even nations,26 are in debt, and the connection between these forms of debt
and capital in the form of interest disappears in debt itself. “In this way, all
connection with the actual process of capital’s valorization is lost, right down to
the last trace, confirming the notion that capital is a self-valorizing automat by
its own powers”27 [Italics added]. However, the debts of someone are in every
case the wins of someone else, at least as long as surplus value in the form of
productivity increases, expulsions, dispossessions, or extensions of markets
occur, and the entire process lays in the hands of those who legally control the
circulation of capital.
In the third volume of Capital, in a section that discusses banking capital
and interest, Marx writes the following:
Moving from the capital of the national debt, where a negative

quantity appears as capital - interest-bearing capital always being
the mother of all turned around forms [Mutter all verrückten
Formen], so that debts, for example, can appear as commodities in
the mind of the banker - we shall now consider labor-power. Here
wages are conceived as interest, and hence labor-power as capital
that yields this interest. If the wage for a year comes to ￡50, say,
and the rate of interest is 5 percent, one annual labor-power is taken
as equal to a capital of ￡1,000. Here the absurdity of the capitalist
378
way of representing things reaches its climax, in so far as instead of

deriving the valorization of capital from the exploitation of labor-
power, they explain the productivity of labor-power by declaring that
labor-power itself is this mystical thing, interest-bearing capital.28
Two things are important here: [1] insofar as the fact that interest and debt do
not appear as what they are, namely, capital, they appear to those who “deal”
with it, as something to be purchased and sold, i.e., as the beginning of the
entire reproduction process (and not, as it should be, as the result of the entire
process), and [2] labor power appears itself as a mystification in what we today
tend to call “human capital,” i.e., we tend to believe that it is not interest as
capital (and its compound rate) that circulates in the society; rather, we tend to
believe that it is the “people” who are the real “capital.” With Marx, we might say
that in those beliefs capital fetishism is at the point where it can hardly appear
in more abstract forms, given that the source of capital, which is the creative
capacities of human beings, is turned into capital itself.
Finally, the ever-increasing compound rate of interest and the increasing
debts that we observe in our world today are of course, as Marx already knew,
labor-capacities, productivity and economic growth projected into the future.
We always live ahead of ourselves, as long as we are able to extend our current
situation into the future and believe that it will go on without crises. As Marx has
it:
All these securities actually represent nothing but accumulated

claims, legal titles, to future production. Their money or capital
value either does not represent capital at all, as in the case of
national debts, or is determined independently of the real capital
value they represent. In all countries of capitalist production, there
is a tremendous amount of so-called interest-bearing capital or
‘moneyed capital’ in this form. And an accumulation of money
capital means for the most part nothing more than an accumulation
of these claims to production, and an accumulation of the market
price of these claims, of their illusory capital value.29
Conclusion
The claim that interest and debt are the most abstract forms of fetishism and
the historical amnesia of ourselves is well represented in the film The Big Short.
In this film in which Hollywood deals with the 2008 housing crises in the US,
one of the main figures is an investor named Michael Burry (played by Christian
379
Bale) who speculates against the subprime mortgage market before the 2008
financial crisis, and in the end his fund’s value increases by 489 percent. The film
displays very well that the main activity of this fund manager, with the exception
of his initial calculations and reports, consist of waiting for what will turn into the
largest crisis of our modern system after the crash of 1929. The fund manager
is displayed sitting behind his desk, making a few calls, and otherwise playing
around in his small office. The labor that goes into his eventual win shrinks to
an insignificant amount of everyday activities, and does not seem to have any
other content than the initial assumption that the market will crash. In this case,
waiting for the productivity to come equals waiting for the system to crash. The
number “489%,” displayed at the end of the movie on a traditional chalkboard,
remains as empty as Burry’s activities and the system that he represents. It is a
number, and, nevertheless, this number is real. The fetishism of our world, both
on the side of our conceptions of it and on the side of the social reality itself,
is well represented by the astonished reaction of the viewer who watches both
the downfall of a real existing world, including the suffering of the people, and
the representation of this downfall in an abstract number that stands for a real
win. What we do not realize is the fact that both represent the same process.
Winning and losing is one.
The figure of Michael Burry, we might say in conclusion, is the theatrical
incarnation of a society that has forgotten itself, namely, by replacing
nothingness with fictional projections that are caught in a mythical conception
of itself. The emptiness of capital as a social form, combined with the inspired
feeling that he made money out of this, is all that remains of ourselves. Filled
with awe, we enjoy our own downfall. In the end, the hero, capital, wins and
everyone goes down. The film is a classical Hollywood movie, after all.
1 Marx, Karl, Theories of Surplus Value, Addenda. Revenue and its Sources.
Vulgar Political Economy, Works 1861-1863, online: https://www.marxists.
org/archive/marx/works/1863/theories-surplus-value/add3.htm;
Marx, Karl, Zur Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie (Manuskript 1861-1863),
in Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich, Gesamtausgabe (MEGA), Zweite
Abteilung, Band 3, Teil 4, Berlin: Dietz Verlag 1979, II/3.4, 1450; (translation
altered)
2 Slavoj, Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, (London: Verso 2010), p.9
3 Frederic, Jameson, Conversations on Cultural Marxism, ed. Ian Buchanan

(Durham: Duke University Press 2007), p.15.
380
4 Christian Lotz, “Is Capital a Thing? Remarks on Piketty’s Concept of

Capital”, Critical Sociology, 41:2 (2015), pp.375-383.
5 Marx, Karl, Capital. Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 3, tr. David Fernbach
(London: Penguin, 1981), p.953; Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Werke,
vol.25, (Berlin: Dietz 1952-2015), p.822.
7 Brackets description added by Lotz.
8 Marx, Karl, Capital. Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1, tr. Ben Fowkes,
(London: Penguin 1976), p.249; Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Werke, vol.
23, (Berlin: Dietz 1952-2015), p.165.
23, (Berlin: Dietz 1952-2015), p.166.
10 For this process, see David Harvey, The Enigma of Capital, Oxford: Oxford
University Press 2010.
11 For this, see Marx, Karl, Grundrisse. Foundations of the Critique of Political
Economy, tr. Martin Nicolaus (London: Penguin, 1995) p.750.
12 David Harvey, The Enigma of Capital (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

2010), p.45.
13 Ibid., p.54.
14 For more on this, see Christian Lotz, The Capitalist Schema. Time, Money,
and the Culture of Abstraction, Lexington Books 2014.
15 Frederic, Jameson, Conversations on Cultural Marxism, ed. Ian Buchanan

(Durham: Duke University Press 2007),p.15.
16 As we know, this idea also undergirds Lukacs’ theory of subjectivity in

History and Class Consciousness, but for the sake of this essay I am unable
to reveal the deeper connection and systematic issues here.
17 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, tr. James Strachey (New
York: Dover, 2015), p.19.
381
23, (Berlin: Dietz 1952-2015), p.107.
19 For more on this, see Christian Lotz, The Capitalist Schema. Time, Money,
and the Culture of Abstraction, Lexington Books 2014.
23, (Berlin: Dietz 1952-2015), p.115.
21 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse. Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, tr.

Martin Nicolaus (London: Penguin, 1995), p.247.
23, (Berlin: Dietz 1952-2015), p.561.
23 Marx, Karl, Theories of Surplus Value, Addenda. Revenue and its Sources.
Vulgar Political Economy, Works 1861-1863, online: https://www.marxists.
org/archive/marx/works/1863/theories-surplus-value/add3.htm;
Marx, Karl, Zur Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie (Manuskript 1861-1863),
in Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich, Gesamtausgabe (MEGA), (Zweite
Abteilung, Band 3, Teil 4, Berlin: Dietz Verlag 1979), II/3.4, p.1454.
24 Ibid., p.1454 (translation altered).
25 Ibid., p.1460 (translation altered).
26 The question of whether it is true that nation-states can be “in debt,” I will
leave open at this point.
vol.25, (Berlin: Dietz 1952-2015), p.484 (translation altered).
(London: Penguin, 1981), p.596 (translation altered); Karl Marx and
Friedrich Engels, Werke, vol.25, (Berlin: Dietz 1952-2015), p.483.
London: Penguin 1993), p.599; Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Werke,
382

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CT&T Continental Thought & Theory

A journal of intellectual freedom

Volume 1 | Issue 2: Debt and Value

Fiction without Fantasy:

Abstract: In my paper I briefly examine three popular mystifications of the

Key Words: Marx, commodity fetishism, capital, debt, abstraction

Generations of 20th Century Marxologists have worked, in the wake of Lukacs

commodity fetishism towards what he calls the “historical amnesia”3 of

Capital and Money

The second confusion is closely related to the first misunderstanding. It is

capital is not a thing, but rather a definite social production relation,

The assumption that capital is something that is tangible, that it is money as

Capital is not the sum of the material and produced means of

Given this, we can see why, in “standard” conceptualizations of capital as

An additional misconception and mystification of capital is related to another

In the circulation C-M-C, money is in the end converted into a

And, a bit further down, Marx goes on to say:

The exact form of this process is therefore M-C-M’, where M’ = M +

If we think this through, then we need to come to the conclusion that, if it is

In the absence of any limits or barriers, the need to reinvest in order

Financial and monetary crises have been long-standing features

not destroyed, remains in the hands of capitalists.

Capital Fetishism as Objective Forgetting

After having clarified three of the most common fetishized conceptions of

But there is another disturbing and significant factor which must

Although Marx’s conception of fetishism is much broader than Jameson seems

Consciousness is not the only distinctive character that we ascribe

Freud’s claim is based on a reversal of central assumptions in modern

We have already seen, from the simplest expression of value,

In present bourgeois society as a whole, this positing of prices and

process, and since it must take on this general but nevertheless

Debt as Pure Abstraction

In an extraordinary manuscript that Marx wrote in preparation of Capital

Moving from the capital of the national debt, where a negative

way of representing things reaches its climax, in so far as instead of

All these securities actually represent nothing but accumulated

3 Frederic, Jameson, Conversations on Cultural Marxism, ed. Ian Buchanan

4 Christian Lotz, “Is Capital a Thing? Remarks on Piketty’s Concept of

7 Brackets description added by Lotz.

12 David Harvey, The Enigma of Capital (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

15 Frederic, Jameson, Conversations on Cultural Marxism, ed. Ian Buchanan

16 As we know, this idea also undergirds Lukacs’ theory of subjectivity in

21 Marx, Karl, Grundrisse. Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy, tr.

24 Ibid., p.1454 (translation altered).

25 Ibid., p.1460 (translation altered).

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