TOPIC: ARTICLE 12

CASE 12

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs

FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES, CUSTODIO GONZALES,
SR., CUSTODIO GONZALES, JR., NERIO GONZALES and ROGELIO
LANIDA, accused, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., accused-appellant.

G.R. No. 80762, March 19, 1990

FACTS:

In a decision by RTC of Iloilo Branch 38 dated October 31, 1984, Fausta Gonzales, et al. except
Rogelio Lanida, who eluded arrest and remained at large and yet to be arraigned, all found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the murder of Lloyd Peñacerrada. They were all sentenced to
imprisonment of reclusion temporal, indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim plus moral
damages in and to pay the costs.

The trial court based its decision on the testimony of Jose Huntoria, the alleged eyewitness, who
claimed that he saw all the accused circling and ganging up on the deceased victim.

They filed an appeal to Court of Appeals but withdrew the same during its pendency, except
Custodio Gonzales, Sr.

The appellant claimed that he was asleep in his house, located some one kilometer away from
the scene of the crime when the incident happened. He asserted that he only came to know of it
after his grandchildren by Augusto and Fausta Gonzales went to his house to inform him.

The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Likewise, it modified the appellant’s
sentence to reclusion perpetua and its indemnity.

The case is certified for review of the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant is criminally liable, as affirmed by the appellate court.

RULING:

The lower courts portrayed the alleged witness, Jose Huntoria, as a credible and disinterested
one. They relied solely on his testimony and without giving credence on the appellant’s defense
of alibi. However, it took eight months for him to testify since the killing and has not explained
convincingly the long delay of his action. In light of this, his credibility as a witness is doubtful.
Likewise, he admitted that he was a tenant of the deceased victim and was also his landlord,
hence, making him an interested witness.These are in stark contrast of what the lower courts
portrayed him.

It is worth noting that during the cross examination, he admitted candidly that he did not saw
exactly the appellant as among the assailants. Further, he could not specify the act performed,
the weapon used and the extent of participation by the appellant.
As stated in Articles 3 and 4 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be an act of felony to be
criminally liable. In general, the elements of felonies are: (1) there must be an act or omission;
(2) the act or omission must be punishable under the Revised Penal Code; and (3) the act is
performed or the omission incurred by means of deceit or fault. In this regard, the appellant did
not satisfy all the elements to be criminally liable.

Hence, the Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the appellate court and
acquitted the appellant.

CASE 13

The United States, plaintiff-appellee vs. Ah Chong, defendant-appellant

G.R. No. L-5272; March 19, 1910

Carson, J.:
FACTS:
Ah Chong and Pascual Gualberto both employed at Fort Mckinley shareda small room in the rear
building of the mess hall where they worked. The building is about 40 meters away from the
closest building and has no permanent lock or bolt which they remedied by attaching a small
hook inside and propping a chair against it. They agreed that if one of them will enter the room
they’ll have their name unknown when asked. Ah Chong have also discretely hide a knife under
his pillow as precaution due to several burglaries at the fort where the said room was also
recently robbed. The two of them was said to be of amicable and agreeable terms
At around 10 pm on August 14, 1908, Ah Chong was awakened by noises of someone trying to
break into the room. He can’t see anything because it was dark inside due to the heavy vines. He
called out twice asking the identity of the intruder which the latter didn’t answer. Fearing it was a
robber, he called out that he will kill him if he enters the room. At that moment the unknown
person was able to open the door and hit Ah Chong with the chair in which Ah Chong responded
by stabbing the intruder. Running outside and with the moonlight, Ah Chong followed the
intruder and recognizing it as Pascual, called his employers for help. Pascual died the next day in
the hospital and Ah Chong was found guilty of simple homicide.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the defendant is criminally liable.

RULING:
No. The accused acted in good faith, without malice, and in the absence of negligence or
imprudence. He acted in the belief that he exercised his legitimate right of self- defense because
of the circumstances as they appear to him which threatens his life and property. If he was misled
concerning of the facts of the circumstance, it is without his fault and carelessness. He is not then
criminally liable since he acted according and justifiably had the situation given is what he
believed them to be.

The conviction was reversed, and the defendant was acquitted of the crime and his bailed bond
exonerated, with the cost of both instance de oficio.
Case 15

People of the Philippines vs. Donato Bindoy

GR No. 34665, August 28, 1931
Facts:
Afternoon of May 6, 1930, a disturbance aroused in a tuba wine shop among some of the tuba
drinkers in the barrio market of Calunod, Municipality of Baliangao, Provice of Occidental
Misamis. The tuba drinkers were Faustino Pacas (alias Agaton), his wife Tibay, and Donato
Bindoy (the appellant). Bindoy offered Tibay tuba, but she refused to drink for she had already
done so. Bindoy, who had his bolo at that time, threatened to injure Tibay if she did not accept.
The two had exchange of words, which resulted for Pacas to step in to defend his wife,
attempting to take the bolo from Bindoy. The skirmish attracted the attention of Emigdio
Omamdam, who was living near the market. Out of curiosity, Emigdio went to see what was
happening and saw Bindoy and Pacas struggling for the possession of the bolo. Bindoy then,
managed to disengage himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the latter’s hand towards the
left behind the appellant. The point of the bolo hit Emigdio Omamdam’s chest, who was then
behind Bindoy which caused his death.
The appellant was charged with homicide in violation of Article 404 of the old Penal Code and
was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Occidental Misamis to the penalty of twelve
years and one day of reclusion temporal and indemnify the heirs of the deceased Php. 1000 to
pay the costs.
The defense appealed from the judgment of the trial court, contending that the said court erred in
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, saying that it was an
accident and done without malicious intent.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant can be acquitted in the grounds that the act was an accident and
without malicious intent.
Ruling:
Yes.
There was no evidence that Emigdio took part in the fight between Bindoy and Pacas, nor was
the accused aware of Emigdio’s presence in the place. There is also no evidence to show that the
accused deliberately injured the deceased and with the intention of committing a crime. There
was no ill feeling between Bindoy and Omamdam. In fact, they were nephew and uncle and were
on good terms with each other. Bindoy was only defending his possession of the bolo, which
Pacas was trying to take away from him. The law allows a person to use the necessary force to
retain what belongs to him, making the accused’s conduct perfectly legal.
The judgment appealed is reversed, and the accused Donato Bindoy is hereby acquitted
according to Article 8, No. 8 of the old Penal Code.
TOPIC: INTENT AND DISCERNMENT

Case 17

G.R. No. L-6486, March 2, 1911

The United States, plaintiff-appellee vs. Rafael B. Catolico, defendant-appellant

FACTS:

On October 2, 1909, Catolico, as justice of the peace of Baggao, Province of Cagayan, had
before him sixteen separate civil cases filed by the plaintiff, Juan Canillas against sixteen distinct
individuals, each one for damages resulting from a breach of contract. All sixteen cases were
decided in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants in said cases appealed from the decision of the
justice of the peace and deposited P16 as required by law, at the same time giving a bond of P50,
which was approved by the court. On the 12th day of said month, Canillas presented a writing to
the appellant as said justice of the peace, alleging that the sureties on the said bonds were
insolvent and later demonstrated this to the satisfaction of the appellant. The latter ordered the
cancellation of the said bonds and, in the same order, required each of the appellants to file
another bond within fifteen days, that, if none of the appellants in said cases presented new
bonds within the time fixed, the plaintiff in said cases applied to the appellant, for an order
declaring final the judgment entered in each of the said sixteen cases and commanding the
execution of the same. None of the appellants was able to file another bond within the time fixed,
resulting in the declaration of the final judgment and ordering the sums attached and delivered
the same to the plaintiff. The attorney for the defendants in the said sixteen cases presented a
complaint against the appellant to the Court of First Instance. The appellant was prosecuted with
the crime of malversation of funds.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the act committed by the appellant, in the performance of his duty, is considered
a crime of malversation of funds.

HELD:

No. The judgment of conviction is reversed and the defendant was ordered discharge from
custody. The case made against the appellant lacks many of the essential elements required by
law to be present in the crime of malversation of public funds. The accused did not convert the
money to his own use or to the use of any other person; neither did he feloniously permit
anybody else to convert it. Everything he did was done in good faith under the belief that as
presiding officer of the court of justice of the peace, he had a perfect right under the law for his
order with regard to the bonds, and such cannot be considered an appropriation or a taking of
said sums within the meaning of Act No. 1740. To constitute a crime, the act must, except in
certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such negligence
or indifference to duty or to consequences, as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim
is, actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea — a crime is not committed if the mind of the person
performing the act complained of be innocent. In the case at bar, the prosecution demonstrated,
both by the allegations in its information filed against the accused and by its proofs on the trial,
that the absence of the funds in question was not due to the personal use thereof by the accused,
thus affirmatively and completely negativing the presumption. Conversion must be affirmatively
proved, either by direct evidence or by the production of facts from which conversion necessarily
follows. (U. S. vs. Morales, 15 Phil. Rep., 236; U. S. vs. Dominguez, 2 Phil. Rep., 580.)

CASE 19

People vs. Oanis

G.R. No. L-47722
July 27, 1943
Plaintiff-Appellee: The People of the Philippines
Defendants-Appellants: Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta

FACTS:

On December 24, 1938, Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at

Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received a telegram from Major Guido ordering the arrest of wanted
criminal- Anselmo Balagtas. He asked that he be given four men, one of whom who reported
was defendant Alberto Galanta. The same instruction was given to defendant Antonio Oanis,
chief of police of Cabanatuan, who was likewise called by the Provincial Inspector. The
Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups. Oanis and Galanta took the route leading
to the house of a bailarina named Irene Requinea, where Balagtas was believed to be staying.
They then asked a resident of that area- Brigida Mallare, where the room of Irene was.
Defendants then went to Irene’s room and on seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the
door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber
revolvers. It turned out later that the person shot and killed was not Balagtas but an innocent
citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene’s paramour. Galanta and Oanis had their own versions but
was rejected. It contradicted the evidence of Irene. It was contended that Defendants made an
innocent mistake in the performance of their duties. The lower court declared them guilty of
homicide through reckless imprudence.

ISSUE:

1) Whether or not the defendants are criminally liable for the death of Serapio Tecson.
2) Whether or not the defendants are entitled to a privileged mitigating circumstance in case they
are found criminally liable.

HELD:

1) Yes. The maxim ignorantia facti excusat, applies only when the mistake is committed without
fault or carelessness. In the instant case, the defendants found no circumstances whatsoever
which would press them to immediate action, as the person in the room being then asleep would
give them ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity. Moreover, they were instructed
not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance or
aggression is offered by him. Thus, the crime committed by defendants was not merely criminal
negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental.
2) Yes. As Balagtas was killed while asleep, the crime committed was murder with the
qualifying circumstance of alevosia. However, the defendants may be entitled to an incomplete
justifying circumstance as provided in Article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. There are
two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that the
offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the
injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty
or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In the instant case, only the first requisite is present.
Thus, Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code was imposed, entitling the defendants to a privileged
mitigating circumstance of penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law.
CASE 20

The People of the Philippine Islands, plaintiff-appellee vs. Fernando de Fernando,

defendant-appellant
G.R. No. L-24978; March 27, 1926
Villa-Real, J. :

FACTS:
Before the day of the crime, several Moro prisoners had escaped the penal colony of San Ramon,
Zamboanga. The residents of Municahan of the municipality of Zamboanga, as a result, was
alarmed by three suspicious looking persons who were prowling around the place. The accused
who was then a municipal policeman was told by Pasencia Delgado that her father wants to see
him. When the policeman came up the house, Remigio Delgado informed him of an unknown
person dressed in blue, prowling around his house. After some time, the accused was left
conversing with Pasencia on a bench near the window when, at about 7 o’clock he saw a person
dressed in dark clothes calling “Nong Miong” at about 4 meters from the stairs. When Pasencia
did not recognized the person, the accused ask the unknown person of what he wanted. The
unknown person did not answer and continued to ascend the stairs when the policeman fired a
shot at the unknown person who turn out to be the nephew of Remedio Delgado. The nephew ran
into the house of Leon Torres where he later died. The accused went into the house of the
teniente and telephone the Chief of the Police about what happened. The accused was charged
and found guilty of murder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is criminally liable.

RULING:
Yes. The accused neglect to take the necessary precaution before taking such fatal action. He
could have asked Pasencia Delgado who’s the person calling his father “Nong Miong” intimately
which indicates that the person is closed to the latter. Since the accused did the act without
malicious intent and believing he’s only doing his duty to defend the owners is found guilty of
failing to exercise reasonable diligence had therefore committed homicide through reckless
negligence and will not count as murder.
TOPIC: CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Case#22
People of the Philippines vs. Ballesteros
GR. No. 120921, January 29, 1998
Facts:
In the summer evening of May 28, 1991, Carmelo Agliam, his half-brother Eduardo Tolentino,
Ronnel Tolentino, Vidal Agliam, his brother Jerry Agliam, Robert Cacal, Raymundo Bangi and
Marcial Barid went to the barangay hall at Carusipan to attend a dance. The group did not tarry
for long at the dance because they sensed some hostility from Cesar Galo and his companions
who were giving them dagger looks. In order to avoid trouble, especially during the festivity,
they decided to head for home instead of reacting to the perceived provocation of Galo and his
companions.
The group had barely left when, within fifty meters from the dance hall, their owner jeep was
fired upon from the rear. Vidal Agliam was able to jump out from the eastern side of the
"topdown" jeep and scurried to the side of the road, hiding in the ricefield. His younger brother
Jerry also managed to jump out, but was shot in the stomach and died. Carmelo Agliam, Robert
Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino sustained injuries in the right foot, back of the right thigh, and legs
and thighs, respectively. The stunned Eduardo Tolentino was not even able to move from his seat
and was hit with a bullet which punctured his right kidney. He did not survive. The precipitate
attack upon the jeep left two people dead and four others injured.
Based upon the affidavits of Carmelo and Vidal Agliam, warrants for the arrest of Ballesteros,
Galo and Bulusan were issued. All of the accused, FELIPE BALLESTEROS, CESAR GALO
and ALVIN BULUSAN, pleaded not guilty. Paraffin tests conducted on Galo and Ballesteros
produced positive results. Bulusan was not tested for nitrates. The trial commenced, and the
Regional Trial Court of Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch 19, found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery, as charged under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The accused came to the High Court on appeal, hoping that the decision of the trial court be
reversed and that a new one be entered, acquitting them of the charges.
Issue:
Whether or not it is correct in finding the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder?
Ruling:
Yes. Accused-appellants insist that the trial court erred in finding that Carmelo and Vidal Agliam
recognized them as the assailants, which was not at all the case. In their testimonies, Carmelo
and Vidal Agliam both described the place being well lit by moonlight. It was also a summer
evening, which meant no fog could’ve becloud the vision of the victims, preventing them from
clearly seeing their assailants. They pinpointed the location of the attackers to be approximately
three meters from where they stood. Considering the moonlight and the proximity between them,
the victims could distinctly identify their assailants. They were also acquaintances. Carmelo
knew Galo and his brother, a butcher, since he used to deal with them in his business of buying
and selling cattle. Bulusan was a classmate of Vidal at Cadaratan School. The constant
interaction between them would lead to familiarity with each other such that, at the very least,
one would have been able to recognize the other easily.
That accused-appellants had no motive in perpetrating the offense is irrelevant. Motive alone is
not proof of a crime. Intent and not motive must be established by the prosecution. Motive is
hardly ever an essential element of a crime. A man driven by extreme moral perversion may be
led to commit a crime, without a real motive but a just for the sake of committing it.
Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by law to convict a person of a criminal charge. The
doubt to the benefit of which an accused is entitled in a criminal trial is a reasonable doubt, not a
whimsical or fanciful doubt based on imagined but wholly improbable possibilities and
unsupported by evidence.
The defense of alibi must be established by positive, clear and satisfactorily evidence, the reason
being that it is easily manufactured and usually so unreliable that it can rarely be given credence.
This is especially true in case of positive identification of the culprit by reliable witnesses, which
renders their alibis worthless. Positive identification prevails over denials and alibis.
With the review of the case at an end, the appellate court found the three accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery, as charged, defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and applying Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code hereby sentences them to reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties
provided by law.

Case 23

G.R.No.L-30801 March 27,1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DOMINGO URAL, accused-
appellant

Facts:

Brigido Alberio, twenty-six years old, former detainee in Buug, Zamboanga del Sur, was
accused of murder and then set at liberty on June 9, 1966 after posting bail. On July 31, 1966, he
intended to go home at Barrio Upper Lamari, Buug but night overtook him, so he decided to
sleep in the Buug Municipal Building for his security. He arrived at 8:00 PM and saw an
extraordinary occurrence. He saw Policeman Ural (with whom he was already acquainted)
boxing the detainee, Felix Napola. Ural stepped into the body of Napola who collapsed on the
floor after the fistic blows. Ural went outside, he came back and ignited a match after pouring the
contents of a bottle to Napola’s body. Ural left the cell and Napola shouted in agony, but nobody
came despite the call for help. Alberio, left after witnessing the barbaric act but Ural threatened
him: “You better keep quiet of what I have done”. Teofilo Matugas, a Policeman declared that he
was relieved by Ural at 8:30 PM and that he has not seen Alberio in the building. Domingo Ural
stated that around 9:00 PM of July 31,1966 he was the jail guard on duty when he heard the
scream of Napola asking for help. He entered the cell, saw Napola’s shirt in flames and removed
it with the assistance of Ernesto Ogoc and Anecio Siton. He did not summon a doctor because
the wounds were minor as Napola said and that he was the only one on duty.

The trial court deplored the prosecution’s failure to present as witnesses Juanito de la Serna
and Ernesto Ogoc, the prisoners who saw the burning of Napola. Their affidavit declared was
consistent with Alberio, Domingo Ural threatened them not to talk about the burning of Felix
Napola to anybody or else he will burn them also. Mrs. Napola testified that her husband told her
that policeman Ural burned him and that she was allowed by Ural to bring her husband to the
dispensary for treatment.

Doctor Luzonia R. Bakil, the municipal health officer, certified that the thirty-year old victim,
whom she treated twice, sustained second-degree burns on the arms, neck, left side of the face
and one-half of the body including the back. "Without any medical intervention", the burns
would cause death", she said. Napola died on August 25, 1966. The sanitary inspector issued a
certificate of death indicating "burn" as the cause of death.
CFI in Zamboanga del Sur, convicted him of murder, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and
ordering him to indemnify the heirs of Felix Napola in the sum of twelve thousand pesos and to
pay the costs. Ural appealed that the prosecution did not presented sufficient evidence and
contested the credibility of the witness, Alberio.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt

Held:

Finding no error in the trial court's judgment, the same is affirmed with costs against the
appellant.
The crime committed by appellant Ural was murder by means of fire (incendio). The court, after
scrutiny of the whole record, does not find any justification for disbelieving Alberio.
The trial court correctly held that the accused took advantage of his public position. The prisoner
was under his custody. The policeman, who taking advantage of his public position maltreats a
private citizen, merits no judicial leniency.
But the trial court failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance "that the offender had no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed" It is manifest from the proven facts that
appellant Ural had no intent to kill Napola. His design was only to maltreat him may be because
in his drunken condition he was making a nuisance of himself inside the detention cell. When
Ural realized the fearful consequences of his felonious act, he allowed Napola to secure medical
treatment at the municipal dispensary. Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong offsets the
generic aggravating, circumstance of abuse of his official position.
The trial court properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua which is the medium period of
the penalty for murder.

Case 24

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee vs. RAMON MABUG-

AT, defendant-appelllant

G.R. No. L-25459

August 10, 1926

ROMUALDEZ, J.

Facts:

The defendant-appellant, Ramon Mabug-at was found by the Court of First Instance of Oriental
Negros as guilty for the crime of frustrated murder and was imposed with penalty of twelve years
and one day cadena temporal, with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the offended party in
the sum of P700 and to pay the costs.

The appellant appealed from this judgment citing two errors committed by the trial court, to wit:
1) In holding that the crime committed is frustrated murder, and 2) In not giving any credit to the
evidence presented by the defense, finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The evidence of the prosecution shows that the accused and Juana Buralo were sweethearts.
Juana had been jealous of the accused on the account of the latter having frequently visited the
house of one Carmen. The accused invited Juana to take a walk on the afternoon of August 9,
1925. Juana refused him, later sending him a note of excuse. On the third day, the accused went
to the threshold of Cirilo Banyan’s house where Juana Buralo had gone to take part in some
devotion. There the accused, revolver in hand, requested Francisco Abellon to ask Juana to come
downstairs and as Abellon refused to do so, the accused said, “If you do not want to go upstairs, I
will get Juana and if anyone tries to defend her I will kill him.”

The accused waited until Juana and her niece Perfecta Buralo came downstairs when they went
in the direction of their house. The accused, who was seen by the two, followed them without
saying a word. The houses were just adjacent. As the two girls were going upstairs, the accused,
while standing at the foot of the stairway, fired a shot from his revolver which wounded Perfecta
Buralo, the bullet passing through a part of her neck, and coming out through the left eye, which
was completely destroyed. Due to proper medical attention, Perfecta Buralo did not die and is
one of the witnesses who testified at the trial of this case.

The defense, without abandoning its allegation that the accused is not responsible for the crime,
contends that the crime proven is not frustrated murder but the discharge of a firearm, with
injuries, it not having been proven that it was the accused’s intention to kill.

Issue:

1. Whether or not there was an intention to kill on the part of the accused.
2. Whether or not the trial court committed an error in holding that the crime committed
was frustrated murder

Held:

1. Yes. There was an intention to kill on the part of the accused. The court ruled that the
relations existing between the accused and Juana Buralo, his disappointment at her not
accepting his invitation to take a walk, the fact that the accused, revolver in hand, went to
look for Juana Buralo at the house where the devotion was being held, later following her
to her house, and especially having aimed at her person--the head--are facts which, in
their opinion, permit of no other conclusion than that, in firing the shot, it was the
accused's intention to kill. Moreover, the fact that a person received the shot which was
intended for another, does not alter his criminal liability. (Art. 1, par. 3, Penal Code.
2. No. The trial court did not commit an error in holding that crime committed was
frustrated murder. The Supreme Court cited treachery as the qualifying circumstance.
Further it was ruled that the treachery was proven and must be taken into consideration in
this case, because the accused fired at Perfecta Buralo, employing means which tended to
insure the execution of the crime without running any risk himself from anyone who
might attempt to defend the said offended party. The treachery which, according to the
evidence, would have attended the crime had the bullet hit Juana Buralo was present in
this case because the offended party Perfecta Buralo and Juana were going upstairs with
their backs towards the accused when he fired his revolver. Finally, the Supreme Court
ruled that the crime committed was frustrated murder, the accused having intended to kill
and performed all the acts of execution, which would have produced the crime of murder
but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will.
(Art. 3, Penal Code.) Therefore, the Supreme Court has this to say regarding the
judgement being appealed, “The judgment appealed from being in accordance with the
law and the facts proven, the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts costs against the
appellant. So ordered.”

Case 26

People vs. Reyes

G. R. No. 42117 (29 March 1935)

Facts:

Fausta Tavera had been living with Gregorio Reyes for a couple of weeks. Her parents,
however, persuaded her to return home and demanded that Reyes pay a dowry of 30.00
Php before the date of the celebration of the marriage could be fixed.
On the evening of April 30, 1934, following a barrio procession, an impromptu dance
took place and Reyes and Tavera had been talking in the yard of the house where the dance is
being held. Tavera told Reyes that she could not return to him and that she was going with her
parents to Catanduanes. Reyes then dragged Tavera towards the street and stabbed her in the
chest with a fan knife. Tavera ran to the house of the barrio lieutenant, a short distance away,
falling dead, though the wound is only slight on account of not having penetrated the thoracic
cavity.
Relatives of the deceased attempted to seize Reyes, but with the aid of his knife, escaped.
Issue:
Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of provocation may be appreciated.
Held:
No, it cannot be appreciated.
The trial court considered provocation as mitigating circumstance based on the testimony
of appellant that he had been attacked overlooking the fact that the law requires that the
provocation come from the offended party. Certainly, Tavera did not attack Reyes and
her refusal to renew her illicit relationship with him can hardly be construed as a legal
provocation.
On a review of the evidence, the court is convinced that Reyes is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.

Case 27

Leonile C. Donato, petitioner vs.

Hon. Artemon D. Luna, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila Branch XXXII,
Hon. Jose Flaminiano, City Fiscal of Manila; Paz B. Abayan, respondents.
G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988
Gancayco, J. :

FACTS:
Paz B. Abayan, the private respondent, filed a case of bigamy against herein petitioner Leonilo
C. Donato on January 23, 1979 and subsequently filed a civil action for declaration of nullity of
her marriage with the petitioner on September 26, 1978 on the ground that the private respondent
is not aware that the petitioner was already married to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping. The
petitioner states that the second marriage is void since it was solemnized without a marriage
license and that he was forced into the marriage. The petitioner by then filed a motion to suspend
the proceedings of the criminal case since the civil case raises a prejudicial question which must
be determined before the criminal case can proceed. Hon. Luna, the presiding Judge, denied the
motion to suspend the criminal proceedings.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a criminal case pending should be suspended since the civil case raises
prejudicial question.
RULING:
The petitioner cannot apply the rule on prejudicial question since a case for annulment of
marriage can be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case only if it is proved that the
petitioner’s consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress in order to establish that
his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the
basis of conviction. Moreover, the petitioner’s claim that he was forced into marriage by means
of duress was belied by the fact that they’ve been living for five years prior with the marriage
and with the fact that it is the private respondent who filed a case to annul the marriage.
TOPIC: STAGES OF EXECUTION

Case 29
People vs. Oco
GR. Nos. 137370-71, September 29, 2003
Facts:
On or about 9:30pm of November 24,1997, HerminigildoDamuag was driving his motorcycle
along V. Rama Avenue, Cebu City with Alden Abiabi riding with him at the back. When they
reached the vicinity of Pica Lumber, a white Tamaraw FX AUV overtook their motorcycle and
blocked their path, forcing Damuag to slow down. Another motorcycle, with two riders on it,
appeared behind the first motorcycle. From a distance of about two to three meters, one of the
riders of the second motorcycle suddenly fired two shots in close succession. Damuag attempted
to look at the tires of his motorcycle, thinking that they have exploded. Suddenly, Abiabi pushed
him with his body. Abiabi fell from the first motorcycle and slumped on the pavement face
down. As Damuag was trying to control his motorcycle, he noticed another motorcycle passed by
from behind him. His motorcycle zigzagged towards the gutter. Damuag was thrown off and hit
the ground. He stood up and realized that he was hit at the right side of his body. He then heard a
burst of gunfire from behind. Damuag saw the third motorcycle at about nearby. It was on a stop.
Raul “Boy Usher” Oco was at the back of the third motorcycle, holding a short firearm in his
right hand. The alleged Raul Oco fired his gun at Damuag but missed. Although wounded,
Damuagwas able to run. However, the third motorcycle chased him. Upon reaching the vicinity
of Five Brothers restaurant, Damuag stopped because he could not pass anymore. From a
distance, the appellant again fired two more shots at Damuag. The third motorcycle sped away
towards B. Rodriguez Street. Damuag was rushed to the nearest hospital. He survived the attack
due to the timely medical attention given to him at the latter hospital. Alden Abiabi did not
survive the ambush.
The trial court issued a warrant for the arrest of the appellant and his co-accused, Armando
“Amid” Lozano, Dave Samson and Eutiquiano “Toking” Pacaa, Jr. Upon learning of the warrant,
accused Oco, Lozano, and Pacaa surrendered voluntarily to the police. Samson was arrested the
same day. Court trial ensued.
After the trial, the trial court found the appellant guilty of murder and frustrated murder. But due
to the credibility of the witnesses, the appellant’s co-accused were acquitted.
The appellant then, appealed to the appellate court, insisting that he had nothing to do with the
incident. He insisted that he had no motive to kill Damuag or Abiabi, and that his identification
at the crime was incredulous. Thus, the charges of murder and frustrated murder against him
should be reversed and he be acquitted.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant is guilty of murder and frustrated murder based on the stages of
execution.
Ruling:
Yes. According to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, a felony is consummated when all the
elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present, and it is frustrated when
the performer performs all the acts of execution but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
In the case at bar, the act done by the appellant has the all the necessary elements for the
execution and accomplishment of the crime Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code. The trial court also stated that treachery attended the killing of Abiabi and the wounding
of Damuag (Paragraph 1, Article 248, R.P.C.). There is treachery when the offender commits any
of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might take. For treachery to exist, two conditions must be
found: (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and
(2) the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by
him. In this case, without any warning, the backrider of the second motorcycle, coming from
behind, suddenly fired successive shots at Damuag and Abiabi. While Abiabi was helplessly laid
at the pavement face down due to the wounds he sustained, appellant mercilessly shot at him. On
the other hand, Damuag, already wounded, tried to escape but appellant pursued him and shot at
him three more times. The unexpected and sudden attack on the victims, rendering them unable
and unprepared to defend themselves, such suddenness having been meant to ensure the safety of
the gunman as well as the success of the attack made it clear that treachery is involved. For the
serious wounding of Damuag, the appellant committed frustrated murder, the same having been
committed with intent to kill and with treachery, as afore explained. The means and method
employed by the appellant clearly show intent to kill. Indeed, Damuag could have died as a result
of the gunshot wounds he sustained if it were not for thRuling: Yes. According to Article 6 of the
Revised Penal Code, a felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution
and accomplishment are present, and it is frustrated when the performer performs all the acts of
execution but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will
of the perpetrator.
In the case at bar, the act done by the appellant has the all the necessary elements for the
execution and accomplishment of the crime Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code. The trial court also stated that treachery attended the killing of Abiabi and the wounding
of Damuag (Paragraph 1, Article 248, R.P.C.). There is treachery when the offender commits any
of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might take. For treachery to exist, two conditions must be
found: (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and
(2) the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by
him. In this case, without any warning, the backrider of the second motorcycle, coming from
behind, suddenly fired successive shots at Damuag and Abiabi. While Abiabi was helplessly laid
at the pavement face down due to the wounds he sustained, appellant mercilessly shot at him. On
the other hand, Damuag, already wounded, tried to escape but appellant pursued him and shot at
him three more times. The unexpected and sudden attack on the victims, rendering them unable
and unprepared to defend themselves, such suddenness having been meant to ensure the safety of
the gunman as well as the success of the attack made it clear that treachery is involved. For the
serious wounding of Damuag, the appellant committed frustrated murder, the same having been
committed with intent to kill and with treachery, as afore explained. The means and method
employed by the appellant clearly show intent to kill. Indeed, Damuag could have died as a result
of the gunshot wounds he sustained if it were not for the timely operation performed on him.

Case 31

Siton vs CA

CASE: Robert Siton y Ensalada vs Court-of-Appeals,

FACTS:
At around 11:00 pm, 9-Feb-1985, Norberto Notar was outside the Hair Works Salon in Sta. Ana,
Manila. Also in the vicinity were accused-appellant Roberto Siton and three other men. A group
of seven to eight men, including Roylan Holgado passed by.
A brief exchange of words occurred between Notar and Holgado. A free-for-all ensued between
the groups. Holgado, suffered two stab wounds, one of which was fatal. Notar suffered a stab
wound and was released after recovery.
The RTC-Manila, Branch II found the accused guilty of homicide after giving credence to the
positive identification made by Ferrer. The alibi of Siton was disregarded. The sentence was for
12 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal less preventive period
of confinement, and to indemnify the heirs of Holgado for 30,000.00.
The case was raised to the Court of Appeals by Siton. The appellate court affirmed the decision
of the RTC in all aspects upholding the angle of conspiracy.
Thus, the case was brought to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
W/N there can be conspiracy in a free-for-all fight

HELD:
No. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons cme to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It was not proved that there was previous
agreement relating to the commission of the crime. Conspiracy was not established since the
attack on Holgado was not agreed upon beforehand.
The decision was modified, finding the accused guilty of less serious physical injury since it was
proved that the stab wound inflicted by Siton upon the victim was non-fatal. Siton was penalized
for 4 months arresto mayor with accessory penalties.
Note: As per testimony of Ferrer, the fatal wound (slashing the right lobe of the liver, piercing
the right kidney and grazing the 1st lumbar vertebra) was inflicted by Joey Calip.

Case 33
MANALO,” REYNALDO YAMBOT, and JUN NOTARTE (at large)
G.R. Nos. 134823-25
January 14, 2003
Facts:
Arthur Pangilinan, Arnold Lopez and Reynaldo Yambot guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of kidnapping for ransom and illegal possession of firearms and imposing upon each of
them the supreme penalty of death and a prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8)
years.
“Teofilo Garcia, and his wife, Leonida, were the sole distributors of the Singer Sewing Machines
under the business name ‘Gamier Industrial Sewing Machines’. On March 8, 1994, around
eleven o’clock in the morning, two armed men, later identified as Jun Notarte and Reynaldo
Yambot, entered the Garcias’ office and showroom at 322 Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong City
and announced a hold-up. After emptying Teofilo’s drawer of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00)
in cash, they took him with them outside to a waiting light gray Mitsubishi Lancer. Inside the car
were two other men, later identified as herein appellant Arnold Lopez and Arthur Pangilinan.
Teofilo was shoved into the backseat of the car and blindfolded with black sunglasses covered
with adhesive tapes.
“On March 10, 1994, around eleven o’clock in the morning, appellant, who identified himself as
‘Adan Manalo,’ called up Leonida, telling her to prepare the amount of 10 million pesos as
ransom money for her husband’s release. Adan Manalo calls Leonida every 2 days asking if she
already raised the money.
On March 17, 1994 Leonida informed that she now had One Million Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P1,200,000.00), appellant seemed finally satisfied. He then gave Leonida instructions for
the pay-off. At a little before four o'clock that afternoon, she should be at the Magallanes flyover
and open the hood of her car to make it appear that it developed engine trouble. Appellant would
then drive by and stop his car beside hers. After he identifies himself as "Adan", Leonida should
immediately hand over the ransom money to him.
All this time, Leonida had been coordinating with the Task Force Habagat of the Presidential
Anti-Crime Commission (PACC). Eight teams were formed to monitor the pay-off and conduct
rescue operations. The ransom money was placed in a light blue Dunlop bag (Exhibit G) and
Leonida was instructed to wear a green dress for easy identification at the pay-off site.
“About 3:45 in the afternoon of the same day, Leonida, accompanied by her driver, arrived at the
pay-off site on board her Pajero. A red Toyota Corolla then approached and stopped just beside
the Pajero. Leonida saw her husband seated between two men at the back of the red car.
Meanwhile, appellant, who was seated in front at the passenger side, got down from the car.
After identifying himself as "Adan‟, Leonida gave the Dunlop bag containing the ransom money
to him. The Toyota Corolla then sped away.
Before they could do so, however, they noticed a speeding white Nissan Sentra behind them.
There is an exchange of gunfire, Jun Notarte managed to escape. However, his companions,
namely appellant, Arthur Pangilinan, and Reynaldo Yambot, were not as lucky. After about ten
minutes of intermittent firing, they were finally subdued and taken into custody. Teofilo was
successfully rescued, shaken but unharmed.
Separately apprehended in connection with his kidnapping incident was Antonio Hamton.
Having somehow learned about Teofilo’s abduction, Antonio, at the same time that appellant
was negotiating with [Leonida] for the ransom money, was also calling up Leonida, pretending
to be her husband’s kidnapper. Antonio’s ruse was eventually discovered, but not before he was
already able to extort Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) from Leonida.

Issues:
1. Whether or not there has been a conspiracy to commit kidnapping for ransom?
2. Whether or not the appellants can be convicted of illegal possession of fire arms?

Held:

1. Yes. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The agreement need not be proven by
direct evidence; it may be inferred from the conduct of the parties before, during and after
the commission of the offense, pointing to a joint purpose and design, concerted action,
and community of interest. Indeed, jurisprudence consistently tells us that conspiracy
may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated.

In the case at bar, as the trial court correctly held, conspiracy may be deduced from the
appellants’ acts that show concerted action and community of interest. If it can be proven
that two (2) or more persons aimed their acts toward the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object - so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact
connected and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association and concurrence
of sentiment - then conspiracy may be inferred, even though no actual meeting among
them to concert means can be shown. Consequently, the conspirators shall be held
equally liable for the crime, because in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all.

Undoubtedly, in perpetrating the kidnapping for ransom, conspiracy existed among

herein accused-appellants. Viewed in its totality, the individual participation of each of
them pointed to a joint purpose and criminal design.

2. No. They cannot be held liable for such offense, since there was another crime --
kidnapping for ransom -- which they were committing at the same time.

The law governing illegal possession of firearms provides that the penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be
imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with
bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45
and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and
caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic
and by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by
the person arrested.

Interpreting this law, the Court has consistently ruled that if an unlicensed firearm is used
in the commission of any other crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal
possession of firearms.