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240 Supreme Court Reports Annotated: de La Merced vs. Court of Appeals

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9/19/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 005

240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


De la Merced vs. Court of Appeals

No. L-17757. May 30, 1962.

MAMERTA DE LA MERCED, petitioner, vs. COURT OF


APPEALS, EZEQUIELM. SANTOS,and AMPARO
MACAPAGAL, respondents.

Land Titles, Registration of; Voluntary registration under Act 496;


What decree quiets title to and binds the land. —In voluntary registration
under Act 496, it is the decree of registration to be issued by the Land
Registration Commissioner, which shall be the basis of the certificate of title
to be issued subsequently by the corresponding register of deeds, that quiets
title to, and binds the land.
Same; Public Lands; Entry in registration book necessary to effect
registration.—Incase of public land, the property is not considered
registered, until the final act or the entry in the registration book of the
registry of deeds has been accomplished.

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VOL. 5, MAY 30, 1962 241

De la Merced vs. Court of Appeals

Same; Same; Cadastral proceedings; When title becomes vested once


registered, land not lost by adverse possession.—In the absence of fraud,
title to land in a cadastral proceeding is vested on the owner, upon the
expiration of the period to appeal from the decision or adjudication by the
cadastral court, without such appeal being perfected; and from that time the
land becomes registered property which cannot be lost by adverse
possession.

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.


     Meliton Pajarillaga for petitioner.
     Esteban C. Manuel for respondents.

BARRERA, J.:
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This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals,


affirming the original decision of the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija (in Civil Case No. 946), upholding the right of
ownership of Ezequiel Santos over Lot No. 395 of the Rizal (Nueva
Ecija) Cadastre.
As may be gathered from the extant records, the facts of the case
are:
In a complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
dated May 3, 1952, which was later amended, Ezequiel Santos (and
his wife) claiming ownership of Lot No. 395 of the Rizal Cadastre
by virtue of an adjudication of the cadastral court dated December
26, 1923, in favor of his father, sought recovery of ownership and
possession thereof from the named defendant, and of the landlord's
share in the harvests for the agricultural years 1950-1956.
Defendants, in their answer, resisted plaintiffs' claim and asserted
their ownership over said property as evidenced by Original
Certificate of Title No. 3462 issued to their predecessor Juan de la
Merced on October 10, 1931 and their continuous possession of the
land for more than 30 years.
In the course of the proceedings, Mamerta de la Merced, a
legitimate daughter of Juan de la Merced, was allowed to intervene
and make common cause with the defendants.
On January 16, 1957, the court rendered a decision for

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242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


De la Merced vs. Court of Appeals

the plaintiffs after making a finding that Lot No. 395 was part of the
Original Certificate of Title No. 425 issued on May 30, 1916 in the
name of the spouses Inocencio de los Santos and Victorina
Macapagal, parents of plaintiff Ezequiel Santos; that in a decision
rendered by the cadastral court on December 26, 1923 (Cad. Case
No. 14, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 281), the said lot was also adjudicated in
favor of the conjugal partnership of Inocencio de los Santos and
Victorina Macapagal; that pursuant to said decision, the cadastral
court issued on December 17, 1925 an order for the issuance of a
certificate of title for the said property; that on December 8, 1926,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1971 was issued in the name of
Ezequiel Santos in lieu of Original Certificate of Title No. 425 which
was cancelled; that on December 28, 1926, the cadastral court
declared lot 395 public land, as a consequence of which Juan de la
Merced, after filing a homestead application therefor, was able to
obtain Original Certificate of Title No. 3462 on October 10, 1931.
Holding that the cadastral court had no jurisdiction to issue the order
declaring the lot public land, and, therefore, the same as well as the
certificate of title issued thereafter was null and void, the court
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ordered the cancellation of OCT No. 3462 in the name of Juan de la


Merced; directed defendants to vacate Lot No. 395 of the Rizal
Cadastre and surrender possession thereof to plaintiffs; and to pay
the latter as the landlord's share, 50 cavans of palay yearly for the
agricultural years 1950 to 1956 or their equivalent, and costs of the
suit; and the receiver to deliver to plaintiffs the palay in his custody
representing the harvest for the agricultural years 1953-1955.
Upon defendants' motion for reconsideration, however, the
promulgation of the decision was ordered suspended and the case
was reset for hearing for reception of additional evidence.
On August 6, 1957, the court amended its original decision, thus:

"The plaintiffs now admit that the litigated 'Lot No. 395 of the Rizal
Cadastre, Nueva Ecija, is outside the parcel of land described in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 1971 and Original Certificate of Title No. 425, both
of which cover Lot

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VOL. 5, MAY 30, 1962 243


De la Merced vs. Court of Appeals

3-6'. They, however, claim ownership over said Lot 395 by virtue of the
decision rendered on December 26, 1923 in Cadastral Case No. 14,
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 21, entitled 'Government of the Philippines versus Justo
Abacan, et al.,' (Exh. A-1), and the other dated December 17, 1926 directing
the issuance of a decree pursuant to said decision (Exh. V-2, p. 10, Rec. of
exhibits).
"No decree has yet been issued pursuant to the said order, Exhibit B-2,
much less was there a title issued in the name of the plaintiffs over the said
lot.
"The defendants, on the other hand, predicate their claim of ownership
over the said lot on Original Certificate of Title No. 3462 issued on October
10, 1931 in favor of Juan de la Merced, their predecessor-in-interest,
pursuant to a homestead patent issued on September 15, 1931 (Exh. 1, for
the defendants and intervenor), contending that the decision of December
26, 1923, adjudicating the lot to the plaintiffs, was still subject to review
since there was no decree issued pursuant thereto.
"The position of the defendants and intervenor would have been correct
if there was actually a petition for review of the decision of December 26,
1923, or a new trial or a reopening of the case concerning Lot No. 395, The
fact of the matter is that Original Certificate of Title No. 3462 was issued
pursuant to a homestead patent long after Lot No. 395 was declared a public
land in a decision dated March 29, 1926 at Rizal, Nueva Ecija, and
December 28, 1926 at Rizal, Nueva Ecija, and December 28, 1926 at
Manila for Cabanatuan City (Exh. 4) states that Lot No. 395, together with
Lots Nos. 394 and 2044, was declared a public land and was the object of a

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homestead application by the respective concessionaries (p. 21, rec. of


exhibits). xxx.
"It would seem that the cadastral court in the same cadastral case No. 14,
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 281, entitled Government of the Philippines vs. Justo
Abacan, et al., erroneously re-opened the hearing of Lot 395 which was
already adjudicated in favor of the plaintiff by the decision dated December
26, 1923 (Exhs. A-1, and A-2, pp. 2 and 5, rec. of exhibits) and decreed that
Lot 395 is public land. The same cadastral court should have taken judicial
notice of the said decision and the other promulgated therein for the
issuance of a decree in favor of the plaintiffs over lot 395 (Exh. B-2)."

While the court held that the land having ceased to be part of the
public domain, the Director of Lands no longer had authority to
grant the homestead patent over the same to Juan de la Merced, it
declared nevertheless that, inasmuch as no title was actually issued
therefor, the said lot may be acquired by adverse possession. And, as
de-

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De la Merced vs. Court of Appeals

fendants had been in possession of the property for over 20 years,


they were declared to have acquired the right over the same by
prescription. The complaint was consequently ordered dismissed;
OCT No. 3462 cancelled and a new one issued to defendants in lieu
thereof; and plaintiffs were directed to vacate the one-third portion
of Lot No. 395 occupied by them, and to pay the costs.
Plaintiffs interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court, in its decision of July 20, 1960, sustained the
contention of appellants on the basis of the doctrine laid down by
this Court in the case of Government of the Philippine Islands v.
Abural (39 Phil. 997), that upon the finality of the decree by the
cadastral court, adjudicating ownership of the land, the title thereto
becomes incontrovertible and may no longer be acquired by
prescription. And, as the land was no longer part of the public
domain when the homestead patent was obtained by Juan de la
Merced, the same can not prevail over the cadastral court's decree of
registration of lot No. 395 in favor of appellant Santos' predecessor.
Hence, the filing of the instant petition for review of the aforesaid
decision of the Court of Appeals.
The questions actually raised, by the present appeal are: What is
the effect of the order of the cadastral court of December 26, 1923
adjudicating the lot in favor of Santos, and the subsequent order
dated December 17, 1925, directing the issuance of a certificate of
title to Inocencio Santos? Did those orders constitute registration
under the law even though the corresponding certificate of title has
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not been issued? In the affirmative, could the property thereby


affected still be lost by adverse possession?
For purposes of resolving the above questions, these salient facts
must be considered:
By virtue of the final decision rendered in Cadastral Case No. 14,
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 21, dated December 26, 1923, Santos' title to Lot
No. 395 was definitely confirmed as against the whole world,
including the Government;
That the same cadastral court issued a decree dated December 19,
1925 declaring its decision of December 26, 1923 final and directing
the Chief of the General Land

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VOL. 5, MAY 30, 1962 245


De la Merced vs. Court of Appeals

Registration Office to issue the certificate of title to Inocencio de los


Santos, although no such certificate was actually issued;
That under date of December 28, 1926, the cadastral court,
without reopening the case, declared the same Lot 395 public land as
a result of which Juan de la Merced, after due application, was able
to obtain therefor a homestead patent and OCT No. 3462 on October
10, 1931;
That as found by the Court of Appeals, Juan de la Merced, until
his death in 1931, was the overseer of Inocencio de los Santos for a
big portion of land which included Lot 395 in question and was,
therefore, a trustee for said lot at the time he applied for it as a
homestead;
That the complaint for recovery of ownership andpossession was
filed in 1952.
There is no doubt that had the land involved herein been public,
by specific provision of Act 496, the act of registration shall be the
operative act to convey and affect the same, and such registration
shall be made in the office of the register of deeds for the province
where the land lies. (Sec. 122, Act 496). In other words, in cases of
public lands, the property is not considered registered until the final
act or the entry in the registration book of the registry of deeds had
been accomplished.
With respect to private lands, however, the pertinent provisions
of Act 496 are:

"SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse
claimant has title as stated in his application or adverse claim and proper for
registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered.
Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto,
subject only to the exception stated in the following section. It shall be
conclusive upon and against all persons including the Insular Government

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and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application,
notice or citation, or included in the general description 'To all whom it may
concern'. Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy,
or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in
any court for reversing judgment or decrees; subject, however, to the right
of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree
of registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First
Instance a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree
povid-

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246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


De la Merced vs. Court of Appeals

ed no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Upon the


expiration of said term of one year, every decree or certificate of title issued
in accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible. xxx" (Italics
supplied.)
"SEC. 40. Every decree of registration shall bear the day of the year,
hour, and minute of its entry, and shall be signed by the Chief of the General
Land Registration Office (now Land Registration Commissioner). xxx. The
decree shall be stated in a convenient form for transcription upon the
certificates of titles hereinafter mentioned." (Italics supplied.)

It is apparent from the foregoing provisions that a decree of


registration and a certificate of title, under Act 496, are two different
things. And it is the decree of registration, to be issued by the Land
Registration Commissioner, which shall be the basis of the
certificate of title to be issued subsequently by the corresponding
register of deeds, that quiets title to and binds the land.
But, it must be remembered that the abovementioned provisions
apply only to voluntary registration under the Land Registration Act.
With respect to lands titled through compulsory proceedings, the
Cadastral Act prescribes:

"SEC. 11. The trial of the case may occur at any convenient place within the
province in which the lands are situated or at such other place as the court,
for reasons stated in writing and filed with the record of the case, may
designate, and shall be conducted in the same manner as ordinary trials and
proceedings in the Court of First Instance and shall be governed by the same
rules. Orders of default and confession shall also be entered in the same
manner as in ordinary cases in the same court and shall have the same
effect. All conflicting interests shall be adjudicated by the court and decrees
awarded in favor of the persons entitled to the lands or the various parts
thereof, and such decrees, when final, shall be the basis for original
certificates of title in favor of said persons which shall have the same effect

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as certificates of title granted on application for registration of land under


the Land Registration Act. xxx." (Italics supplied.)

Confronted with the question of when title to the land in a cadastral


proceeding is vested, this Court,
1
in the case of Government of the
Philippine Islands v. Abural, said:

"After trial in a cadastral case, three actions are taken. The

________________

1 39 Phil. 997.

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VOL. 5, MAY 30, 1962 247


De la Merced vs. Court of Appeals

first adjudicates ownership in favor of one of the claimants. This constitutes


the decision—the judgment—the decree of the court, and speaks in a
judicial manner. The second action is the declaration by the court that the
decree is final and its order for the issuance of the certificates of title by the
Chief of the Land Registration Office. Such order is made if within thirty
days from the date of receipt of a copy of the decision no appeal is taken
from the decision. This again is judicial action, although to a less degree
than the first.
"The third and last action devolves upon the General Land Registration
Office. This office has been instituted 'for the due effectuation and
accomplishment of the laws relative to the registration of land.'
(Administrative Code of 1917, sec. 174.) XXX.
"The judgment in a cadastral survey, including the rendition of the
decree, is a judicial act. As the law says, the judicial decree when final is the
base of the certificate of title. The issuance of the decree by the Land
Registration Office is a ministerial act. The date of the title prepared by the
Chief Surveyor is unimportant, for the adjudication has taken place and all
that is left to be performed is the mere formulation of technical description.
xxx.
"As a general rule, registration of title under the cadastral system is final,
conclusive, and indisputable, after the passage of the thirty-day period
allowed for an appeal from the date of receipt by the party of a copy of the
judgment of the court adjudicating ownership without any step having been
taken to perfect an appeal. The prevailing party may then have execution of
the judgment as of right and is entitled to the certificate of title issued by the
Chief of the Land Registration Office. The exception is the special provision
providing for fraud."

Under the foregoing pronouncement, the title of ownership on the


land is vested upon the owner upon the expiration of the period to
appeal from the decision or adjudication by the cadastral court,
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without such an appeal having been perfected. The certificate of title


would then be necessary for purposes of effecting registration of
subsequent disposition of the land where court proceedings would
no longer be necessary.
As we have here a decree issued by the cadastral court, ordering
the issuance to Inocencio de los Santos of the certificate of title over
Lot No. 395 after the decision adjudicating ownership to him of the
said property had already become final, and there being no
imputation of irregularity in the said cadastral proceedings, title of
own-

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248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Fernando vs. Angat Labor Union

ership on the said adjudicates was vested as of the date of the


issuance of such judicial decree. The land, for all intents and
purposes, had become, from that time, registered property which
could not be acquired by adverse possession.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
affirmed, with costs against petitioner Mamerta de la Merced. So
ordered.

          Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,


Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Decision affirmed.

_____________

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