VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967 383: Stonehill vs. Diokno

VOL.
20, JUNE 19, 1967 383

Stonehill vs. Diokno
No. L-19550. June 19, 1967.
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS
and KARL BECK, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his
capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his
capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation;
SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I.
PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR., and ASST. FISCAL
MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of
Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila;
JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-
Quezon City Branch and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal
Court of Quezon City, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Search warrants;Corporations; Only party affected
may contest legality of seizure effected by search warrants.—Officers of
certain corporations, from which documents, papers and things were seized
by means of search warrants, have no cause of action to assail the legality
of the seizures because said corporations have personalities distinct and
separate from those of said officers. The legality of a seizure can be contested
only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby. The objection
to an unlawful search is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties.
Same; Evidence: When illegally seized evidence is admissible.—Officers
of certain corporations cannot validly object to the use in evidence against
them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and
premises of the corporations since the right to object to their admission in
evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to which the seized effects
384
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings
against them in their individual capacity.
Same; Requisites for issuing search warrants.—The Constitution
provides that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge, and that the warrant shall particularly describe
the things to be seized.
Same; General search warrants.—Search warrants, issued upon
applications stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named
had committed a violation of Central Bank laws, tariff and customs laws,
Tax Code and Revised Penal Code do not satisfy the constitutional
requirements because no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. It was impossible for the judges, who issued the warrants, to
have found the existence of probable cause, which presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought
has performed particular acts or committed specific omissions in violation
of a specific penal provision.
Same; Why general warrants are outlawed.—General search warrants
are outlawed because they place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy
of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or
passion of peace officers.
Same; Provision of Revised Rules of Court.—To prevent the issuance of
general warrants, the Supreme Court amended the Old Rules of Court by
providing in the Revised Rules of Court that "no search warrant shall issue
for more than one specific offense".
Same; Warrants not describing particularly the things to be seized.—
Search warrants authorizing the seizure of books of accounts and records
"showing all the business transactions" of certain persons, regardless of
whether the transactions were legal or illegal, contravene the explicit
command of the Bill of Rights that the things to be seized should be
particularly described and defeat its major objective of eliminating general
warrants.
Same; Evidence; Abandonment of Moncado ruling; Illegally seized
documents are not admissible in evidence.—The Moncado ruling, that
illegally seized documents, papers and things are admissible in evidence,
must be abandoned. The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter
and spirit of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. If
there is competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission
of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then
there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the
constitutional requirements If he has no such evidence, then it is not
possible for the judge to find that there is a probable cause, and, hence, no
justifica-
385
VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967 385
tion for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation for
the issuance in that case is the necessity of fishing for evidence of the
commission of a crime. Such a fishing expedition is indicative of the absence
of evidence to establish a probable cause.
CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:

Constitutional Law; Search and Seizure; Lack of standard of petitioners
cannot affect illegality of search and seizure.— That the petitioners have no
legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers, things, and effects
seized from places other than their residences, cannot in any manner affect,
alter, or otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and
the intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures made thereunder.
Whether or not petitioners possess legal standing, the said warrants are
void and remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and remain
illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that
"legal standing", or the lack of it, is a determinant of the nullity or validity
of a Search warrant or of the lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.
Same; Provision on search and seizure is derived from Federal
Constitution.—Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was
derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and interpretation
of the said constitutional provision, our courts have invariably regarded as
doctrinal the pronouncements made on the Fourth Amendment by federal
courts, especially the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit
Courts of Appeals. The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to
move for the suppression or return of documents, papers and effects, which
are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be summarized as
follows: (a) ownership of documents, papers, and effects gives "standing"; (b)
ownership and/or control or possession—actual or constructive—of premises
searched gives "standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the
search warrant and the sworn application for search warrant are
"primarily" directed solely and exclusively 'against the "aggrieved person",
gives "standing". An examination of the search warrants in this case will
readily show that, excepting three, all were directed against the petitioners
personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named personally,
followed by the designation, "The President and/or General Manager" of the
particular corporation. The three warrants excepted named three corporate
defendants. But the "office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the
said three warrants were also the same "office/house/warehouse/premises"
declared to be owned by or under the control of the petitioners in all the
other search
386

warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the President and/or
General Manager" of the particular corporation. The searches and seizures
were to be made, and were actually made, in the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the
petitioners.
Same; Ownership of properties seized entitles petitioners to bring motion
to return and suppress and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by
unlawful search and seizure.— Ownership of the properties seized alone
entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and suppress, and gives
them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure
regardless of their location at the time of seizure. Under the constitutional
provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person places himself
or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or
his office, his hotel room or his automobile.
Same; Control of premises searched gives "standing".— Independent of
ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized,
the petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue
of their proprietary or leasehold interest in many of the premises searched.
These proprietary and leasehold interests have been sufficiently set forth in
their motion for reconsideration and need not be recounted here. It has
never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises
searched must own the property seized in order to have standing in a motion
to return and suppress.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme

Court. Certiorari, prohibition. mandamus and injunction.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz & Nazareno and Meer, Meer &
Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General
Pacifico P. de Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero,
Solicitor Camilo D, Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the

margin —hereinafter referred to as Respondents-
1
_______________
1 Hon. Jose W. Diokno, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, Jose Lukban, in his capacity as Acting
Director, National Bureau of Investigation, Special Prosecutors Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and Manuel
Villareal, Jr., and Assistant Fiscal Maneses G. Reyes. City of Manila.
387
VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967 387
Prosecutors—several judges —hereinafter 2referred to as
Respondents-Judges—issued, on different dates, a total of 42 search 3
warrants against petitioners herein and/or the corporations of

4
which they were officers, directed to any peace officer, to search the
5
persons above-named and/ or the premises of their offices,

warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of
the following personal property to wit:
"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)."
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or

fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means
of committing the offense," which is described in the applications
adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal
Code." Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null
and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court—
because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the
documents, books and things
________________
2 Hon. Amado Roan, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Roman Cansino, Judge of
the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Hermogenes Caluag, Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, Hon. Eulogio Mencias, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig
Branch, and Hon, Damian Jimenez, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Quezon City.
3 Covering the period from March 3 to March 9, 1962.
4 Harry S, Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck.
5 U.S. Tobacco Corporation, Atlas Cement Corporation, Atlas Development Corporation, Far East
Publishing Corporation (Evening News), Investment Inc., Industrial Business Management Corporation,
General Agricultural Corporation, American Asiatic Oil Corporation, Investment Management Corporation,
Holiday Hills, Inc., Republic Glass Corporation, Industrial and Business Management Corporation, United
Housing Corporation, The Philippine Tobacco-Flue-Curing and Redrying Corporation, Republic Real Estate
Corporation and Merconsel Corporation.
388
to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were
actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against
the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against
them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner;
and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not
delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in
accordance with law—on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with
the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final
disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued restraining RespondentsProsecutors, their agents and/or
representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned, or
any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and
that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the
contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and
commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to
return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67,
of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash
moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged (1) that the 6
contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in

accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any,
were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the
effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners,
regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches
and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution dated
June 29, 1962. the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as
the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the
corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was
maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and
seized in the residences of petitioners herein. 7
_______________
6Inter alia,.
7"Without prejudice to explaining the reasons for this order in the decision to be rendered in the case,
the writ of
389
VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967 389
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged
authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major
groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the off ices of the
aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the
residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein
have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested
warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the
simple reason that said corporations have
________________
preliminary injunction issued by us in this case against the use of the papers, documents and things
from the following premises: (1) The office of the U.S. Tobacco Corp. at the Ledesma Bldg., Arzobispo St.,
Manila; (2) 932 Gonzales, Ermita, Manila; (3) office at Atlanta St. bounded by Chicago, 15th & 14th Sts.,
Port Area, Manila; (4) 527 Rosario St, Mla.; (5) Atlas Cement Corp. and/or Atlas Development Corp.,
Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Ermita, Mla.; (6) 205 13th St., Port Area, Mla.; (7) No. 224 San Vicente St, Mla.;
(8) Warehouse No. 2 at Chicago & 23rd Sts., Mla.; (9) Warehouse at 23rd St., between Muelle de San
Francisco & Boston, Port Area, Mla.; (10) Investment Inc., 24th St. & Boston; (11) IBMC, Magsaysay Bldg.,
San Luis, Mla.; (12) General Agricultural Corp., Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (13) American Asiatic
Oil Corp., Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (14) Room 91, Carmen Apts. , Dewey Blvd., Manila; (15)
Warehouse Railroad St. between 17 & 12 Sts., Port Area, Manila; (16) Rm. 304, Army & Navy Club, Manila,
South Blvd.; (17) Warehouse Annex Bldg., 18th St., Port Area, Manila; (18) Rm. 81 Carmen Apts., Dewey
Blvd., Manila; (19) Holiday Hills, Inc., Trinity Bldg,, San Luis, Manila; (20) No. 2008 Dewey Blvd.; (21)
Premises of 24th St. & Boston, Port Area, Manila; (22) Republic Glass Corp., Trinity Bldg., San Luis. Manila;
(23) IBMC, 2nd Floor, Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (24) IBMC, 2nd Flr., Gochangco Blg., 610 San Luis,
Manila; (25) United Housing Corp., Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (26) Republic Real Estate Corp., Trinity
Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (27) 1437 Colorado St., Malate, Manila; (28) Phil. Tobacco Flue-Curing, Magsaysay
Bldg., San Luis, Manila and (29) 14 Baldwin St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, in the hearing of Deportation Cases
Nos. R-953 and 955 against petitioners, before the Deportation Board, is hereby lifted. The preliminary
injunction shall continue as to the papers, documents and things found in the other premises namely: in
those of the residences of petitioners, as follows: (1) 13 Narra Road, Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal; (2) 15 Narra
Road, Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal; and (3) 8 Urdaneta Avenue, Urdaneta Village, Makati, Rizal."
390
their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares
of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and
whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well 8
settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the

party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the 9
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personaland

cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners 10
herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of
the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and
premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to
object to the admission of said papers in evidence
belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects
belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity. Indeed, it 11
has been held:

"x x x that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to
the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personaldefendants. If these papers were
unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were
the rights of the corporationand not the rights of the other defendants, Next, it is clear that a
question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been
invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of
defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been
disturbed; nor could they claim for them-selves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when
its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.) 291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of
the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the personal
defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. x x x." (A.
Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs United. States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Italics supplied.)
________________
8 Newingham, et al. vs. United States, 4 F. 2d. 490.

9 Lesis vs. U.S., 6 F. 2d. 22.
10 In re Dooley (1931) 48 F 2d. 121; Rouda vs. U.S., 10 F. 2d 916; Lusco vs. U.S. 287 F. 69; Ganci vs. U.S.,
287 F 60 Moris vs. U.S., 26 F. 2d 444.

11 U.S. vs. Gass, 17 F. 2d. 997; People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384, 394.
391
VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967 391
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the
residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of
June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously
issued by this Court, thereby, in effect, restraining herein
12
Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against

petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2)
important questions need be settled, namely: (1) whether the search
warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the
authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the
preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents,
papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners
herein.
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants
are in the nature of general warrants and that, accordingly, the
seizures effected upon the authority thereof are null and void. In this
connection, the Constitution provides:13
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional

mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause,to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the
things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the
contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications
stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named had
committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other
words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed
were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the
________________
12 On March 22, 1962.

13 Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III thereof.
392
judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of
probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of
competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions,
violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact,
the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts
performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the
highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code,"—as alleged in the aforementioned
applications—without reference to any determinate provision of said
laws or codes.
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to
wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed
in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile
and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy
of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely
the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above
quoted—to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult
to imagine ,what would happen, in times of keen political strife,
when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it,
even though by legal means,
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in
connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court
deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of
Court by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of
14
Court that "a search warrant

15
________________
14 Reading: x x x A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge
or justice of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
15 x x x A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense
to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
persons or things to be seized.
393
VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967 393
shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court
added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall
issue for more than onespecific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for
the contested search warrants was compounded by the description
therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized to wit:
"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and
loss statements."
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records
pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein,
regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of allrecords of the petitioners and
the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus
openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights—that
the things to be seized be particularly described—as well as tending
to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1),
Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and
seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents,
papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against
petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are
unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado
case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the
American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed
to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," upon the 16
theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable

searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion
of evidence unlawfully obtained, such as the 17
_______________
No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. (Sec. 3, Rule 126.)
16 People vs. Defore, 140 NE 585.
17 Wolf vs. Colorado, 93 L. ed. 1782.
394
common-law action for damages against the searching officer,
against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant
and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search,
their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an
unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided
by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up
this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule,
realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
"As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has
been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official
may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution
which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will that
wrong be repressed." 18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had
already declared:
"If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be
secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value,and, so far as those thus placed are
concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their
officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have
resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land." 19
This view was, not only reiterated, but. also, broadened in

subsequent decisions of the same Federal Court. After 20
_______________
18 Pugliese (1945) 133 F. 2d. 497.

19Weeks vs. United States (1914) 232 U.S. 383, 58 L. ed. 652, 34 S. Ct. 341; italics supplied.
20Gouled vs. United States (1921) 255 US 298, 65 L. ed. 647, 41 S. Ct. 261; Olmstead vs. United
States (1928) 277 US 438, 72 L. ed. 944, 48 S. Ct. 564, Wolf vs. Colorado, 338 US 25, 93 L. ed. 1782, 69 S.
Ct. 1359; Elkins vs. United States, 364 US 206, 4 L. ed. 2d. 1669, 80 S. Ct. 1437 (1960) ; Mapp vs.
Ohio (1961), 367 US 643, 6 L, ed. 2d, 1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684.
395
VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967 395
reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs.
Ohio (supra.) :
"x x x Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of
privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are
led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official
lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific
guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible
in a State court.
"Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by
the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise,
then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and
seizures would be 'a form of words,' valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual
charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state
invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus
with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high
regard as a freedom 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' At the time that the Court held
in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause,
the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the
Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions.
Even Wolf 'stoutly adhered' to that proposition. The right to privacy, when conceded
operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of
the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent
under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive
protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches—state or federal—it
was logically and constitutionally necessary that the exclusion doctrine—an essential part of
the right to privacy—be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly
recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf
could not consistently tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely,
the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the
unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege
and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary
rule 'is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty
396
in the only effectively available way—by removing the incen-tive to disregard it' x x x.
"The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system
of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized
that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the
States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is,
therefore constitutional in origin. we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty
promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights
secured by its Due Process Clause', we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of
any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment.
Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which
the Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no less than that to which honest law
enforce-ment is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true
administration of justice." (italics ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter,

but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for
a search warrant has com-petent 'evidence to establish probable
cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against 'whom
the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant
should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law.
Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it
is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and,
hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only
possible explanation (not 'justification) for its issuance is the
necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then,
this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to
establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who
secure an illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches
or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee
under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are,
in general, committed by agents of the party in power, for, certainly,
those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power
they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the
minority usually—but, understandably—finds itself
397
VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967 397
in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the
fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility of 21
securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power
of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the
Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that
Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008,
Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No.
304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises
considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners,
Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck,
respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other
effects seized in the offices of the corporations above referred to
include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects
under their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of
which they have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal
courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged

possession of and control over the aforementioned records, papers
and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has been
advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in
the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of
June 29, 1962. In other words. said theory would appear to be a
readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach
intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended.
Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits
attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support
thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations
inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of
said petitions and motion for reconsideration, and
________________
21Even if remote.
22Particularly, Jones vs. U.S. 362 U.S. 257; Alioto vs. U.S., 216 Fed. Supp. 48; U.S. vs. Jeffries, 72 S. Ct.
93; Villano vs. U.S., 300 Fed. 2d 680; and Henzel vs. U.S., 296 Fed. 2d 650.
398
the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers
submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently established
the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the
petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed,
should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to
express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open
for determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case
must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search
of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the
Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and
seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents,
papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein
petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are
granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized
in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should
be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed
and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers
and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and
other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ.,concur.
Castro, .J., concurring and dissenting:
From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto

Concepcion and from the import of the deliberations of the Court on
this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:
1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of
Investigation in this case are general warrants and are therefore
proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of section 1 of Article
III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;
399
VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967 399
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of
the said search warrants were consequently illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs.
People, 80 Phil. 1, should be, and is declared, abandoned;
4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the
petitioners are expresslydeclared null and void: the searches and
seizures therein made are expressly declared illegal; and the writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued against the use of the
documents, papers and effects seized in the said residences is made
permanent; and
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings
satisfactorily demonstrated that they have legal standing to move
for the suppression of the documents, papers and effects seized in
the places other than the three residences adverted to above, the
opinion written by the Chief
Justice refrains from expressly declaring as null and void the such
warrants- served at such other places and as illegal the searches and
seizures made therein, and leaves "the matter open for
determination in appropriate cases in the future."
It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized
in the immediately preceding paragraph (numbered 5) with which I
am not in accord.
I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare,
at this time, the nullity of the search warrants served at places other
than the three residences, and the illegality of the searches and
seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In my view even the
exacerbating passions and prejudices inordinately generated by the
environmental political and moral developments of this case should
not deter this Court from forthrightly laying down the law not only
for this case but as well for future cases and future
generations. All the search warrants, without exception, in this case
are admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are
therefore admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the Constitution;
and the searches and seizures made were therefore unlawful. That
the peti-
400
tioners, let us assume in gratia argumente,have no legal standing to
ask for the suppression of the papers, things and effects seized from
places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in any
manner affect, alter or otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the
search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and
seizures made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess
legal standing the said warrants are void and remain void, and the
searches and seizures were illegal and remain illegal. No inference
can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that "legal
standing" or the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity
of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or illegality of a search or
seizure.
On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon
the pleadings submitted to this Court the petitioners have the
requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and return of
the documents, papers and effects that were seized from places other
than their family residences.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived
almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and
interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts have
invariably regarded as doctrinal the pronouncement made on the
Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the Federal
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for
the suppression or return of documents, papers and effects which
are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be summarized
as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives
"standing;" (b) ownership and/or control or possession—actual or
constructive—of premises searched gives "standing"; and (c) the
"aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn
application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and
exclusively against the "aggrieved person," gives "standing."
401
VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967 401
An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show
that, excepting three, all were directed against the petitioners
followed by the designation, "the President and/or General
Manager" of the particular corporation. The three warrants
excepted named three corporate defendants. But the "office/house/
warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were
also the same "office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be
owned by or under the control of the petitioners in all the other
search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the
President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation.
(see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of April 2, 1962). The searches
and seizures were to be made, and were actually made, in the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of
the petitioners.
Ownership of matters seized gives "standing"
Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners
to bring a motion to return and suppress, and gives them standing
as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure regardless
of their location at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362
U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (narcotics stored In the apartment of a friend
of the defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d. 650, 652-53
(5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of corporation of
which the defendant was president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342
U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in an apartment not belonging to the
defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925)
(books seized from the defendant's sister but belonging to the
defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United States,310 F. 2d 680, 683 (10th
Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in exclusive
possession of the def endant).
In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on
December 12, 1966), it was held that under the constitutional
provision against unlawful searches and seizures. a person places
himself or his property within a
402
constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel
room or his automobile:
"Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and scope of
Fourth Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a man
relies upon when he places himself or his property with-in a constitutionally protected area,
be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile. There he is protected from
unwarranted governmental intrusion. And when he puts something in his filing cabinet, in
his desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be secure from an
unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth Amendment could
not tolerate the warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the purloining of the
petitioner's private papers in Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic surveilance
in Silverman. Countless other cases which have come to this Court over the years have
involved a myriad of differing factual contexts in which the protections of the Fourth
Amendment have been appropriately invoked. No doubt, the future will bring countless
others. By nothing we say here do we either foresee or foreclose factual situations to which
the Fourth Amendment may be applicable." (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct. 408 (December 12,
1966). See also U.S, vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951). (Italics
supplied).
Control of premises searched gives "standing."

Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records
and documents seized, the petitioners have standing to move for
return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or leasehold
interest in many of the premises searched. These proprietary and
leasehold interests have been sufficiently set forth in their motion
for reconsideration and need not be recounted here, except to
emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or in-directly, for
practically all the premises searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts.;
Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises 2008, Dewey Boulevard;
1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the
corporate offices (IBMC, USTC); had made improvements or
furnished such offices; or had paid for the filing cabinets in which
the papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club) ; and
individually, or through their respective spouses, owned the
controlling stock of the corporations involved. The petitioners'
proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the premises searched
therefore independently gives
403
VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967 403
them standing to move for the return and suppression of the books,
papers and effects seized therefrom.
In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court
delineated the nature and extent of the interest in the searched
premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After
reviewing what it considered to be the unduly technical standard of
the then prevailing circuit court decisions, the Supreme Court said
(362 U.S. 266) :
"We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are persuaded,
however, that it is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions,
developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of private property law which,
more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is
largely historical. Even in the area from which they derive, due consideration has led to the
discarding of those distinctions in the homeland of the common law. See Occupiers' Liability
Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c, 31, carrying out Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd.
9305. Distinctions such as those between 'lessee,' 'licensee,' 'invitee, ''guest,' often only of
gossamer strength, ought not be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable
to constitutional safeguards. See also Chapman vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17
(1961).
It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the
premises searched must own the property seized in order to have
standing in a motion to return and suppress, In Alioto vs. United
States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a bookkeeper for several corporations
from whose apartment the corporate records were seized
successfully moved for their return. In United States vs. Antonelli,
Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W. D. N. Y. 1943), the
corporation's president successfully moved for the return and
suppression as to him of both personal and corporate documents
seized from his home during the course of an illegal search:
"The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property," either his own or the
corporation'swas entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Under the
circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure were unreasonable and unlawful.
The motion for the return of seized articles and the suppression of the evidence so obtained
should be granted." (Italics supplied).
404
Time was when only a person who had property interest in either
the place searched or the articles seized had the necessary standing
to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But in MacDonald
vs. United States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson,
joined by Justice Felix Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a
guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree he is under against
criminal intrusion." This view finally became the official view of the
U.S. Supreme Court and was articulated in United States vs.
Jeffers, 432 U.S. 48 (1951). Nine years later, in 1960, in Jones vs.
United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a
step further. Jones was a mere guest in the apartment unlawfully
searched, but the Court nonetheless declared that the exclusionary
rule protected him as well. The concept of "person aggrieved by an
unlawful search and' seizure" was enlarged to include "anyone
legitimately on premises where the search occurs."
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant
organizer, sole stockholder and president of a corporation had
standing in a mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the
return and suppression of corporate property. Henzel vs. United
States, 296 F. 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The court
concluded that the defendant had standing on two independent
grounds: First—he had a suff icient interest in the property seized,
and second—he had an adequate interest in the premises searched
(just like in the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully
searched the corporation's premises and had seized most of the
corporation's books and records. Looking to Jones, the court
observed:
"Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required to qualify one as a 'person aggrieved
by an unlawful search and seizure.' It tells us that appellant should not have been precluded
from objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and seizure of the corporation's books and
records merely because the appellant did not show ownership or possession of the books and
records or a substantial possessory interest in the invaded premises xxx." (Henzel vs. United
States, 296 F. 2d at 651).
Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d

680. 683, (10th Cir. 1962). In Villano,
405
VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967 405
police officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's
place of employment; the defendant did not claim ownership of
either; he asserted that several employees (including himself) used
the notebooks. The Court held that the employee had a protected
interest and that there also was an invasion of privacy.
Both Henzel and Villano considered also the fact that the search
and seizure were "directed at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs.
United States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d
at 683.
In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files
in storage and went to Puerto Rico, the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to quash as
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution a grand jury subpoena duces tecum directed to
the custodian of his files. The Government contended that the
petitioner had no standing because the books and papers were
physically in the possession of the custodian, and because the
subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court rejected the
contention, holding that
"Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in the
books and papers as not to enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure to be
escaped through the mere procedural device of compelling a third-party naked possessor to
produce and deliver them." Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).
Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant is primarily

directed against said person gives "standing."
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United
States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191 (1965, U.S.D.C., S.D.N.Y.). The
defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and papers,'
which attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the
seizing of the records, Birrell's attorney. Dunn,, in turn, had stored
*
most of the records at his home in the country and on a farm which,
according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and
management." The papers
________________
* Attorney-client relationship played no part in the decision of the case.
406
turned out to be private, personal and business papers together with
corporate books and records of certain unnamed corporations in
which Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of these type
records were seized in the case at bar), Nevertheless, the search in
Birrell was held invalid by the court which held that even though
Birrell did not own the premises where the records were stored, he
had "standing" to move for the return of all the papers and
properties seized. The court, relying on Jones vs. U. S., supra; U.S.
vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d
631: Henzel vs. U.S. supra; and Schwimmer vs. U.S., supra, pointed
out that
"It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed solely and
exclusively against Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as having violated the
law was Birrell. The first search warrant described the records as having been used 'in
committing a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the mails
by one Lowell M. Birrell, x x x.' The second search warrant was captioned: 'United States of
America vs. Lowell M, Birrell." (p. 198)
"Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to
suppress. Such was the rule even before Jones." (p, 199)
"If, as thus indicated, Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored
with Dunn, it matters not whether he had any interest in the premises searched." See
also Jeffers v, United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S.
48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).
The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for

reargument; the United States did not appeal from this decision.
The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the
present petitioners; as in Birrell,many personal and corporate
papers were seized from premises not petitioners' family residences;
as in Birrell, the searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLELY
AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of
documents were suppressed in Birrell because of the illegal search.
In the case at bar, the petitioners connection with the premises
raided is much closer than in Birrell.
Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing
of all the warrants regardless whether these
407
VOL 20, JUNE 19, 1907 407
were directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as
long as the documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to
the extent that they were corporate papers) were held by them in a
personal capacity or under their personal control.
Prescinding from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should
order the return to the petitioners all personal and private papers
and effects seized, no matter where these were seized, whether from
their residences or corporate offices or any other place or places.
The uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in their
various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show that
amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and other
places were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the
petitioners.
If there should be any categorization of the documents, "papers
and things which where the objects of the unlawful searches and
seizures, I submit that the grouping should be:
(a) personal or private papers of the petitioners wherever they were
unlawfully seized, be it their family residences, offices, warehouses
and/or premises owned and/or controlled and/or possessed (actually
or constructively) by them as shown in all the search warrants and
in the sworn applications filed in securing the void search warrants,
and (b) purely corporatepapers belonging to corporations. Under
such categorization or grouping, the determination of which
unlawfully seized papers, documents and things
are personal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate
papers will have to be left to the lower courts which issued the void
search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression and/or
return of the said documents.
'And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the
petitioners likewise have clear legal standing to move for the
suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or General
Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically mentioned in
the void search warrants.
Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases
cited in my disquisition were criminal prosecutions, the great
clauses of the constitutional proscription
408
on illegal searches and seizures do not withhold the mantle of their
protection from cases not criminal in origin or nature.
Writs granted in part and denied in part; motion for
reconsideration denied.
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS
and KARL BECK, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his
capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his
capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation;
SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I.
PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR., and ASST. FISCAL
MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of
Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila;
JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-
Quezon City Branch and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal
Court of Quezon City, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Search warrants;Corporations; Only party affected
may contest legality of seizure effected by search warrants.—Officers of
certain corporations, from which documents, papers and things were seized
by means of search warrants, have no cause of action to assail the legality
of the seizures because said corporations have personalities distinct and
separate from those of said officers. The legality of a seizure can be contested
only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby. The objection
to an unlawful search is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties.
Same; Evidence: When illegally seized evidence is admissible.—Officers
of certain corporations cannot validly object to the use in evidence against
them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and
premises of the corporations since the right to object to their admission in
evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to which the seized effects
384

belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings
against them in their individual capacity.
Same; Requisites for issuing search warrants.—The Constitution
provides that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge, and that the warrant shall particularly describe
the things to be seized.
Same; General search warrants.—Search warrants, issued upon
applications stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named
had committed a violation of Central Bank laws, tariff and customs laws,
Tax Code and Revised Penal Code do not satisfy the constitutional
requirements because no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. It was impossible for the judges, who issued the warrants, to
have found the existence of probable cause, which presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought
has performed particular acts or committed specific omissions in violation
of a specific penal provision.
Same; Why general warrants are outlawed.—General search warrants
are outlawed because they place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy
of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or
passion of peace officers.
Same; Provision of Revised Rules of Court.—To prevent the issuance of
general warrants, the Supreme Court amended the Old Rules of Court by
providing in the Revised Rules of Court that "no search warrant shall issue
for more than one specific offense".
Same; Warrants not describing particularly the things to be seized.—
Search warrants authorizing the seizure of books of accounts and records
"showing all the business transactions" of certain persons, regardless of
whether the transactions were legal or illegal, contravene the explicit
command of the Bill of Rights that the things to be seized should be
particularly described and defeat its major objective of eliminating general
warrants.
Same; Evidence; Abandonment of Moncado ruling; Illegally seized
documents are not admissible in evidence.—The Moncado ruling, that
illegally seized documents, papers and things are admissible in evidence,
must be abandoned. The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter
and spirit of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. If
there is competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission
of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then
there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the
constitutional requirements If he has no such evidence, then it is not
possible for the judge to find that there is a probable cause, and, hence, no
justifica-
385
VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967 385

tion for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation for
the issuance in that case is the necessity of fishing for evidence of the
commission of a crime. Such a fishing expedition is indicative of the absence
of evidence to establish a probable cause.
CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:

Constitutional Law; Search and Seizure; Lack of standard of petitioners
cannot affect illegality of search and seizure.— That the petitioners have no
legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers, things, and effects
seized from places other than their residences, cannot in any manner affect,
alter, or otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and
the intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures made thereunder.
Whether or not petitioners possess legal standing, the said warrants are
void and remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and remain
illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that
"legal standing", or the lack of it, is a determinant of the nullity or validity
of a Search warrant or of the lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.
Same; Provision on search and seizure is derived from Federal
Constitution.—Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was
derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and interpretation
of the said constitutional provision, our courts have invariably regarded as
doctrinal the pronouncements made on the Fourth Amendment by federal
courts, especially the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit
Courts of Appeals. The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to
move for the suppression or return of documents, papers and effects, which
are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be summarized as
follows: (a) ownership of documents, papers, and effects gives "standing"; (b)
ownership and/or control or possession—actual or constructive—of premises
searched gives "standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the
search warrant and the sworn application for search warrant are
"primarily" directed solely and exclusively 'against the "aggrieved person",
gives "standing". An examination of the search warrants in this case will
readily show that, excepting three, all were directed against the petitioners
followed by the designation, "The President and/or General Manager" of the
particular corporation. The three warrants excepted named three corporate
defendants. But the "office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the
said three warrants were also the same "office/house/warehouse/premises"
declared to be owned by or under the control of the petitioners in all the
other search
386

warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the President and/or
General Manager" of the particular corporation. The searches and seizures
were to be made, and were actually made, in the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the
petitioners.
Same; Ownership of properties seized entitles petitioners to bring motion
to return and suppress and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by
unlawful search and seizure.— Ownership of the properties seized alone
entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and suppress, and gives
them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure
regardless of their location at the time of seizure. Under the constitutional
provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person places himself
or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or
his office, his hotel room or his automobile.
Same; Control of premises searched gives "standing".— Independent of
ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized,
the petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue
of their proprietary or leasehold interest in many of the premises searched.
These proprietary and leasehold interests have been sufficiently set forth in
their motion for reconsideration and need not be recounted here. It has
never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises
searched must own the property seized in order to have standing in a motion
to return and suppress.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme

Court. Certiorari, prohibition. mandamus and injunction.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz & Nazareno and Meer, Meer &
Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General
Pacifico P. de Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero,
Solicitor Camilo D, Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the

margin —hereinafter referred to as Respondents-
1
_______________
1 Hon. Jose W. Diokno, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, Jose Lukban, in his capacity as Acting
Director, National Bureau of Investigation, Special Prosecutors Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and Manuel
Villareal, Jr., and Assistant Fiscal Maneses G. Reyes. City of Manila.
387
VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967 387
Prosecutors—several judges —hereinafter 2referred to as
Respondents-Judges—issued, on different dates, a total of 42 search 3
warrants against petitioners herein and/or the corporations of

4
which they were officers, directed to any peace officer, to search the
5
persons above-named and/ or the premises of their offices,

warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of
the following personal property to wit:
"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)."
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or
fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means
of committing the offense," which is described in the applications
adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal
Code." Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null
and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court—
because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the
documents, books and things
________________
2 Hon. Amado Roan, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Roman Cansino, Judge of
the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Hermogenes Caluag, Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, Hon. Eulogio Mencias, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig
Branch, and Hon, Damian Jimenez, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Quezon City.
3 Covering the period from March 3 to March 9, 1962.
4 Harry S, Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck.
5 U.S. Tobacco Corporation, Atlas Cement Corporation, Atlas Development Corporation, Far East
Publishing Corporation (Evening News), Investment Inc., Industrial Business Management Corporation,
General Agricultural Corporation, American Asiatic Oil Corporation, Investment Management Corporation,
Holiday Hills, Inc., Republic Glass Corporation, Industrial and Business Management Corporation, United
Housing Corporation, The Philippine Tobacco-Flue-Curing and Redrying Corporation, Republic Real Estate
Corporation and Merconsel Corporation.
388
to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were
actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against
the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against
them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner;
and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not
delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in
accordance with law—on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with
the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final
disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued restraining RespondentsProsecutors, their agents and/or
representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned, or
any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and
that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the
contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and
commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to
return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67,
of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash
moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged (1) that the 6
contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in

accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any,
were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the
effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners,
regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches
and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution dated
June 29, 1962. the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as
the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the
corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was
maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and
seized in the residences of petitioners herein. 7
_______________
6Inter alia,.
7"Without prejudice to explaining the reasons for this order in the decision to be rendered in the case,
the writ of
389
VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967 389
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged
authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major
groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the off ices of the
aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the
residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein
have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested
warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the
simple reason that said corporations have
________________
preliminary injunction issued by us in this case against the use of the papers, documents and things
from the following premises: (1) The office of the U.S. Tobacco Corp. at the Ledesma Bldg., Arzobispo St.,
Manila; (2) 932 Gonzales, Ermita, Manila; (3) office at Atlanta St. bounded by Chicago, 15th & 14th Sts.,
Port Area, Manila; (4) 527 Rosario St, Mla.; (5) Atlas Cement Corp. and/or Atlas Development Corp.,
Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Ermita, Mla.; (6) 205 13th St., Port Area, Mla.; (7) No. 224 San Vicente St, Mla.;
(8) Warehouse No. 2 at Chicago & 23rd Sts., Mla.; (9) Warehouse at 23rd St., between Muelle de San
Francisco & Boston, Port Area, Mla.; (10) Investment Inc., 24th St. & Boston; (11) IBMC, Magsaysay Bldg.,
San Luis, Mla.; (12) General Agricultural Corp., Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (13) American Asiatic
Oil Corp., Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (14) Room 91, Carmen Apts. , Dewey Blvd., Manila; (15)
Warehouse Railroad St. between 17 & 12 Sts., Port Area, Manila; (16) Rm. 304, Army & Navy Club, Manila,
South Blvd.; (17) Warehouse Annex Bldg., 18th St., Port Area, Manila; (18) Rm. 81 Carmen Apts., Dewey
Blvd., Manila; (19) Holiday Hills, Inc., Trinity Bldg,, San Luis, Manila; (20) No. 2008 Dewey Blvd.; (21)
Premises of 24th St. & Boston, Port Area, Manila; (22) Republic Glass Corp., Trinity Bldg., San Luis. Manila;
(23) IBMC, 2nd Floor, Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (24) IBMC, 2nd Flr., Gochangco Blg., 610 San Luis,
Manila; (25) United Housing Corp., Trinity Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (26) Republic Real Estate Corp., Trinity
Bldg., San Luis, Manila; (27) 1437 Colorado St., Malate, Manila; (28) Phil. Tobacco Flue-Curing, Magsaysay
Bldg., San Luis, Manila and (29) 14 Baldwin St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, in the hearing of Deportation Cases
Nos. R-953 and 955 against petitioners, before the Deportation Board, is hereby lifted. The preliminary
injunction shall continue as to the papers, documents and things found in the other premises namely: in
those of the residences of petitioners, as follows: (1) 13 Narra Road, Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal; (2) 15 Narra
Road, Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal; and (3) 8 Urdaneta Avenue, Urdaneta Village, Makati, Rizal."
390
their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares
of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and
whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well 8
settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the

party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the 9
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personaland

cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners 10
herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of
the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and
premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to
object to the admission of said papers in evidence
belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects
belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity. Indeed, it 11
has been held:

"x x x that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to
the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personaldefendants. If these papers were
unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were
the rights of the corporationand not the rights of the other defendants, Next, it is clear that a
question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been
invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of
defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been
disturbed; nor could they claim for them-selves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when
its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.) 291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of
the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the personal
defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. x x x." (A.
Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs United. States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Italics supplied.)
________________
8 Newingham, et al. vs. United States, 4 F. 2d. 490.

9 Lesis vs. U.S., 6 F. 2d. 22.
10 In re Dooley (1931) 48 F 2d. 121; Rouda vs. U.S., 10 F. 2d 916; Lusco vs. U.S. 287 F. 69; Ganci vs. U.S.,
287 F 60 Moris vs. U.S., 26 F. 2d 444.

11 U.S. vs. Gass, 17 F. 2d. 997; People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384, 394.
391
VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967 391
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the
residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of
June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously
issued by this Court, thereby, in effect, restraining herein
12
Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against

petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2)
important questions need be settled, namely: (1) whether the search
warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the
authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the
preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents,
papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners
herein.
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants
are in the nature of general warrants and that, accordingly, the
seizures effected upon the authority thereof are null and void. In this
connection, the Constitution provides: 13
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional
mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause,to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the
things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the
contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications
stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named had
committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other
words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed
were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the
________________
12 On March 22, 1962.

13 Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III thereof.
392
judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of
probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of
competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions,
violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact,
the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts
performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the
highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code,"—as alleged in the aforementioned
applications—without reference to any determinate provision of said
laws or codes.
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to
wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed
in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile
and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy
of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely
the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above
quoted—to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult
to imagine ,what would happen, in times of keen political strife,
when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it,
even though by legal means,
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in
connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court
deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of
Court by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of
14
Court that "a search warrant

15
________________
14 Reading: x x x A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge
or justice of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
15 x x x A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense
to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
persons or things to be seized.
393
VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967 393
shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court
added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall
issue for more than onespecific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for
the contested search warrants was compounded by the description
therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized to wit:
"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and
loss statements."
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records
pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein,
regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of allrecords of the petitioners and
the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus
openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights—that
the things to be seized be particularly described—as well as tending
to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1),
Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and
seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents,
papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against
petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are
unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado
case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the
American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed
to go free merely "because the constable has blundered," upon the 16
theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable

searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion
of evidence unlawfully obtained, such as the 17
_______________
No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. (Sec. 3, Rule 126.)
16 People vs. Defore, 140 NE 585.
17 Wolf vs. Colorado, 93 L. ed. 1782.
394
common-law action for damages against the searching officer,
against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant
and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search,
their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an
unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided
by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up
this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule,
realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
"As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has
been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official
may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution
which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will that
wrong be repressed." 18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had
already declared:
"If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be
secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value,and, so far as those thus placed are
concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their
officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have
resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land." 19
This view was, not only reiterated, but. also, broadened in

subsequent decisions of the same Federal Court. After 20
_______________
18 Pugliese (1945) 133 F. 2d. 497.

19 Weeks vs. United States (1914) 232 U.S. 383, 58 L. ed. 652, 34 S. Ct. 341; italics supplied.
20 Gouled vs. United States (1921) 255 US 298, 65 L. ed. 647, 41 S. Ct. 261; Olmstead vs. United
States (1928) 277 US 438, 72 L. ed. 944, 48 S. Ct. 564, Wolf vs. Colorado, 338 US 25, 93 L. ed. 1782, 69 S.
Ct. 1359; Elkins vs. United States, 364 US 206, 4 L. ed. 2d. 1669, 80 S. Ct. 1437 (1960) ; Mapp vs.
Ohio (1961), 367 US 643, 6 L, ed. 2d, 1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684.
395
VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967 395
reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs.
Ohio (supra.) :
"x x x Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of
privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are
led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official
lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific
guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible
in a State court.
"Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by
the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise,
then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and
seizures would be 'a form of words,' valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual
charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state
invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus
with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high
regard as a freedom 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' At the time that the Court held
in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause,
the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the
Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions.
Even Wolf 'stoutly adhered' to that proposition. The right to privacy, when conceded
operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of
the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent
under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive
protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches—state or federal—it
was logically and constitutionally necessary that the exclusion doctrine—an essential part of
the right to privacy—be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly
recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf
could not consistently tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely,
the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the
unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege
and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary
rule 'is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty
396
in the only effectively available way—by removing the incen-tive to disregard it' x x x.
"The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system
of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized
that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the
States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is,
therefore constitutional in origin. we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty
promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights
secured by its Due Process Clause', we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of
any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment.
Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which
the Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no less than that to which honest law
enforce-ment is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true
administration of justice." (italics ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter,

but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for
a search warrant has com-petent 'evidence to establish probable
cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against 'whom
the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant
should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law.
Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it
is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and,
hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only
possible explanation (not 'justification) for its issuance is the
necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then,
this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to
establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who
secure an illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches
or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee
under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are,
in general, committed by agents of the party in power, for, certainly,
those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power
they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the
minority usually—but, understandably—finds itself
397
VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967 397
in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the
fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility of21
securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power

of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the
Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that
Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008,
Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No.
304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises
considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners,
Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck,
respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other
effects seized in the offices of the corporations above referred to
include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects
under their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of
which they have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal
courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged

possession of and control over the aforementioned records, papers
and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has been
advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in
the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of
June 29, 1962. In other words. said theory would appear to be a
readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach
intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended.
Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits
attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support
thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations
inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of
said petitions and motion for reconsideration, and
________________
21Even if remote.
22Particularly, Jones vs. U.S. 362 U.S. 257; Alioto vs. U.S., 216 Fed. Supp. 48; U.S. vs. Jeffries, 72 S. Ct.
93; Villano vs. U.S., 300 Fed. 2d 680; and Henzel vs. U.S., 296 Fed. 2d 650.
398
the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers
submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently established
the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the
petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed,
should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to
express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open
for determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case
must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search
of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the
Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and
seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents,
papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein
petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are
granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized
in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should
be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed
and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers
and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and
other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ.,concur.
Castro, .J., concurring and dissenting:
From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto

Concepcion and from the import of the deliberations of the Court on
this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:
1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of
Investigation in this case are general warrants and are therefore
proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of section 1 of Article
III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;
399
VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967 399
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of
the said search warrants were consequently illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs.
People, 80 Phil. 1, should be, and is declared, abandoned;
4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the
petitioners are expresslydeclared null and void: the searches and
seizures therein made are expressly declared illegal; and the writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued against the use of the
documents, papers and effects seized in the said residences is made
permanent; and
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings
satisfactorily demonstrated that they have legal standing to move
for the suppression of the documents, papers and effects seized in
the places other than the three residences adverted to above, the
opinion written by the Chief
Justice refrains from expressly declaring as null and void the such
warrants- served at such other places and as illegal the searches and
seizures made therein, and leaves "the matter open for
determination in appropriate cases in the future."
It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized
in the immediately preceding paragraph (numbered 5) with which I
am not in accord.
I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare,
at this time, the nullity of the search warrants served at places other
than the three residences, and the illegality of the searches and
seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In my view even the
exacerbating passions and prejudices inordinately generated by the
environmental political and moral developments of this case should
not deter this Court from forthrightly laying down the law not only
for this case but as well for future cases and future
generations. All the search warrants, without exception, in this case
are admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are
therefore admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the Constitution;
and the searches and seizures made were therefore unlawful. That
the peti-
400
tioners, let us assume in gratia argumente,have no legal standing to
ask for the suppression of the papers, things and effects seized from
places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in any
manner affect, alter or otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the
search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and
seizures made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess
legal standing the said warrants are void and remain void, and the
searches and seizures were illegal and remain illegal. No inference
can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that "legal
standing" or the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity
of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or illegality of a search or
seizure.
On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon
the pleadings submitted to this Court the petitioners have the
requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and return of
the documents, papers and effects that were seized from places other
than their family residences.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived
almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and
interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts have
invariably regarded as doctrinal the pronouncement made on the
Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the Federal
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for
the suppression or return of documents, papers and effects which
are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be summarized
as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives
"standing;" (b) ownership and/or control or possession—actual or
constructive—of premises searched gives "standing"; and (c) the
"aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn
application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and
exclusively against the "aggrieved person," gives "standing."
401
VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967 401
An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show
that, excepting three, all were directed against the petitioners
followed by the designation, "the President and/or General
Manager" of the particular corporation. The three warrants
excepted named three corporate defendants. But the "office/house/
warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were
also the same "office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be
owned by or under the control of the petitioners in all the other
search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the
President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation.
(see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of April 2, 1962). The searches
and seizures were to be made, and were actually made, in the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of
the petitioners.
Ownership of matters seized gives "standing"
Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners
to bring a motion to return and suppress, and gives them standing
as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure regardless
of their location at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362
U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (narcotics stored In the apartment of a friend
of the defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d. 650, 652-53
(5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of corporation of
which the defendant was president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342
U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in an apartment not belonging to the
defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir. 1925)
(books seized from the defendant's sister but belonging to the
defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United States,310 F. 2d 680, 683 (10th
Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in exclusive
possession of the def endant).
In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on
December 12, 1966), it was held that under the constitutional
provision against unlawful searches and seizures. a person places
himself or his property within a
402
constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel
room or his automobile:
"Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and scope of
Fourth Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a man
relies upon when he places himself or his property with-in a constitutionally protected area,
be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile. There he is protected from
unwarranted governmental intrusion. And when he puts something in his filing cabinet, in
his desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be secure from an
unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth Amendment could
not tolerate the warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the purloining of the
petitioner's private papers in Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic surveilance
in Silverman. Countless other cases which have come to this Court over the years have
involved a myriad of differing factual contexts in which the protections of the Fourth
Amendment have been appropriately invoked. No doubt, the future will bring countless
others. By nothing we say here do we either foresee or foreclose factual situations to which
the Fourth Amendment may be applicable." (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct. 408 (December 12,
1966). See also U.S, vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951). (Italics
supplied).
Control of premises searched gives "standing."

Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records
and documents seized, the petitioners have standing to move for
return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or leasehold
interest in many of the premises searched. These proprietary and
leasehold interests have been sufficiently set forth in their motion
for reconsideration and need not be recounted here, except to
emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or in-directly, for
practically all the premises searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts.;
Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises 2008, Dewey Boulevard;
1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the
corporate offices (IBMC, USTC); had made improvements or
furnished such offices; or had paid for the filing cabinets in which
the papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club) ; and
individually, or through their respective spouses, owned the
controlling stock of the corporations involved. The petitioners'
proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the premises searched
therefore independently gives
403
VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967 403
them standing to move for the return and suppression of the books,
papers and effects seized therefrom.
In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court
delineated the nature and extent of the interest in the searched
premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After
reviewing what it considered to be the unduly technical standard of
the then prevailing circuit court decisions, the Supreme Court said
(362 U.S. 266) :
"We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are persuaded,
however, that it is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions,
developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of private property law which,
more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is
largely historical. Even in the area from which they derive, due consideration has led to the
discarding of those distinctions in the homeland of the common law. See Occupiers' Liability
Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c, 31, carrying out Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd.
9305. Distinctions such as those between 'lessee,' 'licensee,' 'invitee, ''guest,' often only of
gossamer strength, ought not be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable
to constitutional safeguards. See also Chapman vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17
(1961).
It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the
premises searched must own the property seized in order to have
standing in a motion to return and suppress, In Alioto vs. United
States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a bookkeeper for several corporations
from whose apartment the corporate records were seized
successfully moved for their return. In United States vs. Antonelli,
Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W. D. N. Y. 1943), the
corporation's president successfully moved for the return and
suppression as to him of both personal and corporate documents
seized from his home during the course of an illegal search:
"The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property," either his own or the
corporation'swas entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Under the
circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure were unreasonable and unlawful.
The motion for the return of seized articles and the suppression of the evidence so obtained
should be granted." (Italics supplied).
404
Time was when only a person who had property interest in either
the place searched or the articles seized had the necessary standing
to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But in MacDonald
vs. United States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson,
joined by Justice Felix Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a
guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree he is under against
criminal intrusion." This view finally became the official view of the
U.S. Supreme Court and was articulated in United States vs.
Jeffers, 432 U.S. 48 (1951). Nine years later, in 1960, in Jones vs.
United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a
step further. Jones was a mere guest in the apartment unlawfully
searched, but the Court nonetheless declared that the exclusionary
rule protected him as well. The concept of "person aggrieved by an
unlawful search and' seizure" was enlarged to include "anyone
legitimately on premises where the search occurs."
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant
organizer, sole stockholder and president of a corporation had
standing in a mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the
return and suppression of corporate property. Henzel vs. United
States, 296 F. 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The court
concluded that the defendant had standing on two independent
grounds: First—he had a suff icient interest in the property seized,
and second—he had an adequate interest in the premises searched
(just like in the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully
searched the corporation's premises and had seized most of the
corporation's books and records. Looking to Jones, the court
observed:
"Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required to qualify one as a 'person aggrieved
by an unlawful search and seizure.' It tells us that appellant should not have been precluded
from objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and seizure of the corporation's books and
records merely because the appellant did not show ownership or possession of the books and
records or a substantial possessory interest in the invaded premises xxx." (Henzel vs. United
States, 296 F. 2d at 651).
Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d

680. 683, (10th Cir. 1962). In Villano,
405
VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967 405
police officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's
place of employment; the defendant did not claim ownership of
either; he asserted that several employees (including himself) used
the notebooks. The Court held that the employee had a protected
interest and that there also was an invasion of privacy.
Both Henzel and Villano considered also the fact that the search
and seizure were "directed at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs.
United States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d
at 683.
In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files
in storage and went to Puerto Rico, the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to quash as
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution a grand jury subpoena duces tecum directed to
the custodian of his files. The Government contended that the
petitioner had no standing because the books and papers were
physically in the possession of the custodian, and because the
subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court rejected the
contention, holding that
"Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in the
books and papers as not to enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure to be
escaped through the mere procedural device of compelling a third-party naked possessor to
produce and deliver them." Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).
Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant is primarily

directed against said person gives "standing."
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United
States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191 (1965, U.S.D.C., S.D.N.Y.). The
defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and papers,'
which attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the
seizing of the records, Birrell's attorney. Dunn,, in turn, had stored
*
most of the records at his home in the country and on a farm which,
according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and
management." The papers
________________
* Attorney-client relationship played no part in the decision of the case.
406
turned out to be private, personal and business papers together with
corporate books and records of certain unnamed corporations in
which Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of these type
records were seized in the case at bar), Nevertheless, the search in
Birrell was held invalid by the court which held that even though
Birrell did not own the premises where the records were stored, he
had "standing" to move for the return of all the papers and
properties seized. The court, relying on Jones vs. U. S., supra; U.S.
vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d
631: Henzel vs. U.S. supra; and Schwimmer vs. U.S., supra, pointed
out that
"It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed solely and
exclusively against Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as having violated the
law was Birrell. The first search warrant described the records as having been used 'in
committing a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the mails
by one Lowell M. Birrell, x x x.' The second search warrant was captioned: 'United States of
America vs. Lowell M, Birrell." (p. 198)
"Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to
suppress. Such was the rule even before Jones." (p, 199)
"If, as thus indicated, Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored
with Dunn, it matters not whether he had any interest in the premises searched." See
also Jeffers v, United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S.
48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).
The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for

reargument; the United States did not appeal from this decision.
The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the
present petitioners; as in Birrell,many personal and corporate
papers were seized from premises not petitioners' family residences;
as in Birrell, the searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED SOLELY
AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of
documents were suppressed in Birrell because of the illegal search.
In the case at bar, the petitioners connection with the premises
raided is much closer than in Birrell.
Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing
of all the warrants regardless whether these
407
VOL 20, JUNE 19, 1907 407
were directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as
long as the documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to
the extent that they were corporate papers) were held by them in a
personal capacity or under their personal control.
Prescinding from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should
order the return to the petitioners all personal and private papers
and effects seized, no matter where these were seized, whether from
their residences or corporate offices or any other place or places.
The uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in their
various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show that
amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and other
places were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the
petitioners.
If there should be any categorization of the documents, "papers
and things which where the objects of the unlawful searches and
seizures, I submit that the grouping should be:
(a) personal or private papers of the petitioners wherever they were
unlawfully seized, be it their family residences, offices, warehouses
and/or premises owned and/or controlled and/or possessed (actually
or constructively) by them as shown in all the search warrants and
in the sworn applications filed in securing the void search warrants,
and (b) purely corporatepapers belonging to corporations. Under
such categorization or grouping, the determination of which
unlawfully seized papers, documents and things
are personal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate
papers will have to be left to the lower courts which issued the void
search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression and/or
return of the said documents.
'And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the
petitioners likewise have clear legal standing to move for the
suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or General
Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically mentioned in
the void search warrants.
Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases
cited in my disquisition were criminal prosecutions, the great
clauses of the constitutional proscription
408
on illegal searches and seizures do not withhold the mantle of their
protection from cases not criminal in origin or nature.
Writs granted in part and denied in part; motion for
reconsideration denied.
Collector of Customs vs. Villaluz
No. L-34038. June 18, 1976.*
THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS Airport Customhouse, Pasay

City, petitioner, vs. HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, as Judge of the
Circuit Criminal Court, 7th Judicial District, stationed at Pasig,
Rizal, and CESAR T. MAKAPUGAY, respondents.
No. L-34243. June 18, 1976. *
NICANOR MARCELO, petitioner, vs. HON. ONOFRE A.

VILLALUZ, as Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, 7th Judicial
District stationed at Pasig, Rizal, and SALVADOR T. MASCARDO,
as Collector of Customs stationed at the MIA Airport Customhouse,
respondents.
No. L-36376. June 18, 1976. *
CALIXTO D. ENRIQUEZ, REYNALDO REYES AND LUCILA

ENRIQUEZ, petitioners,vs. HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ,
GREGORIO CONDE AND ANASTACIA TORILLO, respondents.
No. L-38688. June 18, 1976. *
FRANCISCO P. FELIX, petitioner, vs. THE HON. JUDGE

ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ and FELIX C. HALIMAO, respondents.
__________________
*EN BANC
357
VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 357
No. L-39525. June 18, 1976.*
PEDRO E. NIEVA, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. ONOFRE A.
VILLALUZ, in his capacity as Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court,
7th Judicial District, JOSE ARELLANO, and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
No. L-40031. June 18, 1976.*
PACITA NIEVA, petitioner, vs. HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, in
his capacity as Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, 7th Judicial
District, JOSE ARELLANO and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Courts; Circuit Criminal Courts; Jurisdiction; Circuit criminal courts
are of limited jurisdiction only in the nature of criminal cases they can try.—
Circuit criminal courts are of limited jurisdiction only because they cannot
try and decide all criminal cases falling under the jurisdiction of the courts
of first instance as courts of general jurisdiction. They can only take
cognizance of cases expressly specified in Section 1 of R.A. 5179 as amended
by Pres. Decree 126. Nevertheless, they have the same powers and functions
as those conferred upon regular courts of first instance necessary to
effectively exercise such special and limited jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Circuit criminal courts have the same power to
conduct preliminary examination and preliminary investigation as regular
courts of first instance.—The power of preliminary examination and
investigation, which may be exercised by judges of the Circuit Criminal
Courts, is without doubt, “not inconsistent with the provisions of R.A. 5179,”
and likewise, “necessary to carry their jurisdiction into effect.”
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional law; Both the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions vest the power to determine probable cause before ordering the
arrest of one charged with a criminal offense to all courts which includes the
circuit criminal courts.—More decisively, the 1935 as well as 1973
Constitutions vests this essential power in all courts to first
determine probable cause before ordering the arrest of those charged with a
criminal offense. The determination of “probable cause” is the sole object of
preliminary examinations. Surely, Congress could not have possibly
intended to deny the Circuit Criminal Courts such constitutional
prerogative, which is part of the
358
basic, constitutional right of an individual whose person cannot be
legally seized without prior preliminary examination.
Same; Same; Same; Preliminary Investigation; Circuit criminal courts
have the same power as courts of first instance to conduct preliminary
investigations.—If the main purposes then in creating Circuit Criminal
Courts are to alleviate the burden of the regular Courts of First Instance
and to accelerate the disposition of the cases therein as well as stem the tide
of criminality, it is only logical that such authority vested in the judges of
the Courts of First Instance is likewise conferred on Circuit Criminal
Courts. Otherwise, the Courts of First Instance would still be carrying the
burden of conducting preliminary investigations in those cases where
Circuit Criminal Courts have jurisdiction and consequently delaying the
trial and disposition of criminal cases pending before such Courts of First
Instance.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory construction; The word “judge” as
used in Presidential Decree No. 44 (and in the 1935 and 1973 constitutions)
does not refer to municipal judges only, but to all judges.—It is urged that
the word “judge” in the above-quoted section of P.D. 44 (and also in the 1935
and 1973 constitutions) contemplates not the Court of First Instance Judge
nor the CCC Judge but the municipal judge. As heretofore stated, it is an
elementary precept in statutory construction that where the law does not
distinguish, we should not distinguish. The statute cannot give a restricted
meaning to the generic term “judge” used in the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The law or rule on preliminary investigation
is a rule of procedure which is within the rule-making powers vested in the
Supreme Court by the Constitution.—The contrary view appears to
entertain the mistaken notion that Section 13, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
of Court, being a rule of procedure, the same should be rendered inoperative
by reason of the fact that the Supreme Court cannot, by promulgating a rule
of procedure, arrogate jurisdiction unto itself or grant any to the lower
courts. It is of course basic that only the Constitution and the law can confer
jurisdiction to hear and decide certain cases. But equally true is the fact
that both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions expressly delegated to the
Supreme Court the rule-making authority—the power to promulgate rules
of pleading, practice and procedure and to amend the existing laws thereon.
The law or rule on preliminary investigations is undoubtedly a rule of
procedure.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The power granted to certain city
359
VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 359
fiscals to conduct preliminary investigation does not include the
authority to issue warrants of arrest which the courts alone can issue.—But
the power thus granted to the Manila City Fiscals (and later to City Fiscals
and City Attorneys of other chartered cities) to conduct preliminary
investigations did not and does not include the authority to issue warrants
of arrest and search warrants, which warrants the courts alone can issue
then as now. x x x It is patent that under the 1935 Constitution, only the
“Judge” is directed to conduct a preliminary examination for the issuance of
the warrant of arrest by express constitutional conferment. But the 1973
Constitution empowers the National Assembly to grant the power to issue
search warrants or warrants of arrest after conducting the necessary
preliminary examination to “other responsible officer.” Until such a law is
enacted by the National Assembly, only the judge can validly conduct a
preliminary examination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest or search
warrant.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The power to conduct preliminary
examination by circuit criminal courts is essential to the purposes for which
they were created.—The two-fold purpose for which the Circuit Criminal
Courts were created was to alleviate the burden of the regular Courts of
First Instance and accelerate the disposition of criminal cases filed therein.
Such being the admitted purpose, the power to conduct preliminary
examination must necessarily attach to the duties of a Circuit Criminal
Court Judge; for aside from being one of the instruments by which a case
may be accelerated and disposed of, it is a duty which truly lies within the
scope of the office, essential to the accomplishment of the main purpose for
which the office was created, even if regarded as incidental and collateral,
is germane to, and serves to promote the accomplishment of the principal
purpose.
Constitutional law; Double jeopardy; Preliminary investigation; The
right against double jeopardy exist not after the preliminary examination or
investigation, but after trial; a judge has no power to dismiss a criminal case
“with prejudice” during the stage of preliminary investigation.—The
challenged order x x x dismissed the criminal complaint x x x with prejudice,
obviously meaning that the case may not be re-filed without exposing the
accused to double jeopardy. The respondent Judge seriously erred in so
issuing said order, contravening as it does a basic legal principle on double
jeopardy, and committing thereby a grave abuse of discretion. The
constitutional right against double jeopardy exists, not after the first
preliminary examination or investigation, but only after the first trial which
results either in conviction or acquittal or in the dismissal or termination of
the case without the express consent of the accused x x x. As correctly stated
by the Solicitor General,
360
“dismissal at preliminary investigation is never with prejudice. Refiling
of the same is allowed if evidence has become sufficient to warrant
conviction of private respondent.”
Same; Same; Same; Customs laws; A circuit court judge cannot order
return to importer of goods seized by the Collector of Customs even if the
criminal complaint against the importer is dismissed by said judge.
Jurisdiction to replevin seized imported articles belongs exclusively to the
Bureau of Customs subject to appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals.—
Respondent Judge ignored the established principle that from the moment
imported goods are actually in the possession or control of the customs
authorities, even if no warrant of seizure had previously been issued by the
Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings,
the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over such imported
goods for the purpose of enforcing the customs laws, subject to an appeal
only to the Court of Tax Appeals and to final review by the Supreme Court.
Such exclusive jurisdiction precludes the Court of First Instance as well as
the Circuit Criminal Court from assuming cognizance of the subject matter
and divests such courts of the prerogative to replevin properties subject to
seizure and forfeiture proceedings for violation of the Tariff and Customs
Code; because proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally imported are
not criminal in nature x x x.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A judge should first ascertain whether
Collector of Customs intended to institute or had instituted seizure
proceedings before ordering return of imported articles after dismissal of
criminal complaint.—Prudence should have counselled him, so as not to
frustrate the petitioner Collector of Customs in enforcing the tariff and
customs laws, against ordering the release of the seized articles without
first ascertaining from the petitioner Collector of Customs whether the
latter intended to institute or had instituted seizure proceedings.
Courts; Judges; Appeals; Granting of only one (1) day within which to
file a petition for certiorari and denying peremptorily a motion for extension
of one day more to file said petition is arbitrary.—In this case, petitioners
were given an unreasonable period of one (1) day within which to elevate
the matter before this Tribunal. But considering the novelty of the issue, a
grant of 24 hours to prepare a petition for certiorari is a virtual denial of the
motion. And petitioners’ motion for an extension of at least one (1) day was
peremptorily brushed aside by respondent Judge with one single word—
DENIED. The fact that petitioners succeeded in bringing the matter before
the Supreme Court within the constricted period of time granted them is
beside the point. More important is the
361
VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 361
consideration by this Court of the dangers posed by respondent Judge’s
peremptory denial of a reasonable time. x x x We once again stress that “One
important judicial norm is that a judge’s official conduct should be free from
appearance of impropriety.”
Preliminary investigation; While circuit criminal judges have the power
to conduct preliminary examination, the Supreme Court as a matter of policy
enjoins them to concentrate on hearing and decided cases and not to
encumber themselves with preliminary examination and investigation of
complaints.—But while we sustain the power of the Circuit Criminal Courts
to conduct preliminary examination pursuant to Our Constitutional power
of administrative supervision over all courts as a matter of policy, WE enjoin
the respondent Judge and other Circuit Criminal Court Judges to
concentrate on hearing and deciding criminal cases filed before their courts.
x x x Circuit criminal judges therefore, should not encumber themselves
with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints,
which they should refer to the municipal judge or provincial or city fiscal,
who in turn can utilize the assistance of the state prosecutor to conduct such
preliminary examination and investigation. Or the Judge of the CCC can
directly request the Secretary of Justice to assign a state prosecutor for the
same purpose.
Fernando, J., concurring:

Constitutional law; Preliminary examination; Constitution confers of
circuit criminal judge power to conduct preliminary examination, but said
judges should curb any eagerness to make use of such competence.—It is my
understanding then that the decision reached is at most an affirmation that
the present Constitution, as did the 1935 Constitution, confers the power to
conduct preliminary examination preparatory to issuing a warrant of
arrest, to a circuit criminal court judge. Even then, however, he should for
sound policy reasons curb any eagerness or propensity to make use of such
competence. x x x As to his competence regarding a preliminary
investigation, it is my understanding that the question has been left open.
Barredo, J., concurring in result:

Constitutional law; Preliminary examination; Congress did not intend
to confer on circuit criminal courts the power to conduct preliminary
investigations.—Notwithstanding the scholarly and extended main opinion,
I am not persuaded that the legislature ever intended to confer upon Circuit
Criminal Courts the power to conduct preliminary investigations. Not only
the specific words of the above
362
provision, but the development of the law on preliminary investigations
and circumstances obtaining at the time R.A. 5179 was enacted point
unmistakably, in my considered opinion, to this conclusion.
MAKASIAR, J.:
G.R. No. L-34038

On July 1, 1971, petitioner Collector of Customs, Salvador T.
Mascardo, filed against Cesar T. Makapugay, a letter complaint
with respondent Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court for violation of:
(a) Section 174 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 4713, (b) Central Bank Circular No. 265, in
relation to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, otherwise known as
The Central Bank Act, and (c) Section 3601 and 3602 of Republic Act
No. 1937, in relation to Sections 2505 and 2530 (m) 1 of the same
Act, claiming that Cesar T. Makapugay “with malicious intention to
defraud the government criminally, willfully and feloniously
brought into the country FORTY (40) cartons of ‘untaxed blue seal’
Salem cigarettes and FIVE (5) bottles of Johny Walker Scotch
Whiskey, also ‘untaxed’, without the necessary permit from the
proper authorities. The respondent submitted a Baggage
Declaration Entry which did not declare the said articles. The
Customs Examiner assigned further asked him if he has something
more to declare but the answer was in the negative. And in utter
disregard of existing Central Bank Circulars, particularly C.B.
Circular 265, as amended, the respondent brought into the country
various Philippine Money in the amount of Two Thousand Two
Hundred Eighty (P2,280.00) Pesos cleverly hidden in one of the
pieces of baggage examined by the assigned customs examiner,
without any prior permit from the Central Bank authorities. x x x”
(p. 11, rec.).
Respondent Judge assumed jurisdiction to conduct and did
conduct the preliminary investigation, and on July 6, 1971, issued
the challenged order, dismissing “the case with prejudice and
ordering the return to private respondent the amount of P2,280.00,
his passport No. Ag-2456 FA - No. B103813, and one (1) box of
airconditioning evaporator only, as well as the forfeiture of forty (40)
cartons of untaxed blue seal Salem cigarettes and five (5) bottles of
Johnny Walker Scotch Whiskey” (p. 13, rec.).
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VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 363
Armed with said order, private respondent Makapugay demanded
that petitioner release the articles so stated. Petitioner Collector of
Customs refused to obey the order due to the “prior institution of
seizure proceedings thereon.” The refusal prompted respondent
Makapugay to file a complaint for “Open Disobedience” under
Article 231 of the Revised Penal Code, before the City Fiscal of Pasay
City.
Hence, this petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction,
seeking to annul and set aside the order dated July 6, 1971 on the
ground that respondent Judge has no power to conduct a
preliminary investigation of criminal complaints directly filed with
him, cannot legally order the dismissal “with prejudice” of a criminal
case after conducting a preliminary investigation thereon, and is
without authority to order the return of articles subject of seizure
proceedings before Customs authorities.
In due time, respondents filed their respective answers to the
petition and subsequently both parties submitted their respective
memoranda in lieu of oral argument.
G. R. No. L-34243
On June 22, 1971, respondent Collector of Customs filed a letter-
complaint with respondent Judge against petitioner Nicanor
Marcelo for an alleged violation of Section 3602 in relation to Section
2505 of Republic Act 1937, otherwise known as the Tariff and
Customs Code, supposed to have been committed in the following
manner:
“x x x Mr. Marcelo who is an arriving passenger from Hongkong on board a
Philippine Air Lines plane, Flight 307, on June 22, 1971, criminally,
feloniously, and with intention to defraud the government did not declare
the contents of his pieces of baggage in the Baggage Declaration Entry nor
with the assigned Customs Examiner. x x x x When his pieces of baggage
were examined, instead of personal effects as declared in the Baggage
Declaration Entry, what were found were various assorted Watches, Bags,
Montagut shirts and Dress materials which are highly taxable.
“The act of passenger Marcelo in intentionally refusing to declare the said
articles in the Baggage Declaration Entry, and before the Customs
Examiner despite inquiries made, constitute a criminal offense within the
meaning of Section 3602 of the Tariff and Customs
364
Code of the Philippines. x x x (p. 19, rec.).
The criminal complaint having been docketed as Case No. CCC-VII-
854-P.C, the respondent Judge assumed jurisdiction over the
objection of petitioner’s counsel, conducted the preliminary
examination and investigation, simultaneously in the manner
provided for by Section 13, Rule 112 of the New Rules of Court, and
thereafter on October 6, 1971 issued the following order:
“WHEREFORE, there being a preliminary investigation and examination
conducted by the Court and considering that the respondent was given a
chance to defend himself let a Warrant of Arrest be issued for his
apprehension. The respondent is hereby ordered to post a bond in the
amount of P5,000.00 for his provisional release.
“Pursuant to Section 6, Rule 135 of the New Rules of Court, in relation to
Section 13, Rule 113 thereto, the City Fiscal of Pasay is hereby ordered to
file the corresponding information against the respondent before this court
of competent jurisdiction within FORTY EIGHT (48) HOURS from receipt
hereof” (p. 23, rec.)
Petitioner Nicanor Marcelo filed this action for certiorari with
preliminary injunction, impugning the validity of the order of
respondent Judge dated October 6, 1971, on the same ground as the
petition in G.R. No. L-34038.
On October 20, 1971, the Supreme Court adopted resolution
requiring respondents to file an answer and likewise issued a writ
of preliminary injunction, “restraining respondent Judge, his
representatives, assigns or persons acting upon his orders, place or
stead, from executing, enforcing and implementing his order of
October 6, 1971 x x x” (p. 32, rec.).
In compliance therewith, respondent Judge filed a petition for
admission of answer on November 29, 1971 (pp. 43-44, rec.), which
was granted by this Court in its December 13, 1971 resolution (p.
62, rec.).
On the other hand, respondent Collector of Customs, through the
Solicitor General, filed a manifestation on February 1, 1972,
adopting as his answer to the petition, the legal grounds averred in
the original petition in G.R. No. L-34038, Collector of Customs, etc
versus Hon. Onofre A. Villaluz, etc, et al. (p. 72, rec.).
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VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 365
On June 13, 1972, the Supreme Court by resolution resolved to
consider the case submitted for decision after noting the failure of
petitioner to file his memorandum (p. 94, rec.).
G. R. No. L-36376
On February 22, 1973, private respondents Gregorio Conde and
Anastacia Torillo, filed a complaint directly with the Circuit
Criminal Court, indicting petitioners with violations of the Anti-
Graft Law.
The complaint was ultimately docketed and on the same day
(February 22, 1973), respondent Judge forthwith issued an order of
the following tenor:
“Considering that the complaint filed x x x x sufficient in form and
substance, the same having been filed in accordance with Section 13, Rule
112 of the New Rules of Court, and pursuant to the doctrine laid down by
the Supreme Court in the case of ‘Mateo vs. Villaluz,’ let the preliminary
investigation of this case be set on February 24, 1973 at 8:00 o’clock in the
morning” (p. 22, rec.).
On the day set, petitioners appeared at the sala of respondent Judge
who proceeded to conduct a preliminary investigation of the case.
The same was reset on February 26, 1973.
Immediately before the hearing of February 26, 1973, petitioners,
through counsel, filed an “Urgent Motion to Suspend Preliminary
Investigation” contesting the power of the respondent Judge to
conduct the preliminary examination and investigation (p. 23, rec.),
which was denied by respondent Judge in his order dated February
27, 1973 (p. 31, rec.). Counsel for petitioners then asked for time to
raise the issue before this Court, which respondent Judge granted
by giving petitioners a period of just one (1) day to seek relief from
this Tribunal.
Accordingly, herein petitioners filed this petition.
On March 2, 1973, this Court required respondents to answer the
petition and issued a temporary restraining order “enjoining
respondent Judge from x x x causing and effecting the arrest of
petitioners herein” (p. 39, rec.).
In his answer filed on March 14, 1973, respondent Judge, invoking
the same arguments in G.R. No. L-34243, held on to the view that
the Circuit Criminal Courts are vested with the power and authority
to conduct preliminary investigations.
366
Private respondents conformed thereto.
G. R. No. L-38688
On May 23, 1974, private respondent Felix Halimao filed a criminal
complaint directly with the Circuit Criminal Court presided over by
respondent Judge charging herein petitioner with alleged violations
of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, which complaint was docketed as Criminal
Case No. Prel. Inv. - 116-Rizal.
At the hearing of May 27, 1974, petitioner, through counsel, filed
an “Urgent Motion to Suspend Preliminary Investigation” (p. 9, rec.)
based on the ground that respondent Judge has no authority to
conduct the same.
After arguments by counsels for both parties, the respondent
Judge denied petitioner’s motion. An oral motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied (pp. 14-15, rec.).
Hence, this petition.
On May 31, 1974, this Court by resolution gave due course to the
petition and issued a restraining order, “enjoining respondent
Judge, his agents, representatives, and/or any person or persons
acting upon his orders or in his place or stead from proceeding
further with the preliminary investigation x x x” (p. 24, rec.)
On June 17, 1974, it appearing that the case involved in the
petition is criminal in nature, the Court required herein petitioner
to IMPLEAD the People of the Philippines as party-respondent (p.
26, rec.). In conformity thereto, petitioner through counsel, filed on
June 28, 1974 an amended petition impleading The People (pp. 49-
50, rec.).
Except for the Solicitor General who appeared for The People of
the Philippines, respondents in answer frontally met the averments
of petitioner.
G. R. No. L-39525
On October 24, 1974, petitioner filed this instant petition seeking to
annul “any preliminary investigation conducted by respondent
Judge in Preliminary Inv. No. 72-Rizal, Circuit Criminal Court, 7th
Judicial District, as well as the warrant, if
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VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 367
any, that may be issued for the arrest and imprisonment of
petitioner” and to enjoin permanently respondent Judge from
conducting preliminary investigations and from ordering
petitioner’s arrest.
On October 30, 1974, the Court required the respondents to file
their answer within ten (10) days from notice thereof and issued,
effective immediately, a temporary restraining order against
respondent Judge (p. 64, rec.).
On November 13, 1974, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation
requesting to be excused from filing an answer considering that in
three other cases (The Collector of Customs v. Hon. Onofre A,
Villaluz, G.R. No. L-34038; Nicanor Marcelo v. Hon. Onofre A.
Villaluz, G.R. No. L-34243; and Francisco Felix v. Hon. Onofre A.
Villaluz, G.R. No. L-38688) which involve the same legal issue, his
office maintains that respondent Judge has no authority to conduct
a preliminary investigation of criminal cases which he may try and
decide under Republic Act No. 5179 (p. 81, rec.).
On November 20, 1974, private respondent filed his answer (pp.
87-104, rec.).
Petitioner, on January 22, 1975, filed a motion praying that the
instant case be consolidated and decided jointly with G.R. Nos. L-
34038, L-34243, L-36376 and L-38688 as they involve the same
issue; and that the memoranda filed for petitioners in said four cases
be reproduced and adopted as the memorandum for petitioner in
this case, which should be deemed submitted for decision together
with the aforementioned cases (pp. 122-124, rec.). Said motion was
granted in the resolution of February 10, 1975 (p. 129, rec.).
In his pleading dated February 5, 1975, private respondent (pp.
130-132, rec.) stated that he joins the petitioner in his plea for the
consolidation of the instant case with cases Nos. L-34038, L-36376
and L-38688 and prayed that the memorandum filed by respondent
in L-38688 be considered reproduced and adopted as the
memorandum for private respondent in this case, in addition to the
affirmative defenses and arguments contained in private
respondent’s answer to the petition, and that this case be submitted
for decision together with the aforementioned cases (p. 137, rec.).
The records disclosed the following antecedent facts.
On January 11, 1974, herein private respondent Jose Arellano
filed a complaint against Pedro E. Nieva, Jr., herein petitioner,
368
together with his wife Pacita and daughter Patricia N. Sacasas, with
the Circuit Criminal Court, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, Rizal,
for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA No.
3019) in connection with the P230,000.00 industrial loan obtained
by the Areson Woodtech Manufacturing Company headed by the
complainant, Jose Arellano, from the Development Bank of the
Philippines, where herein petitioner holds the position of Auditor.
The case was docketed therein as Criminal Case Prel. Inv. CCC-VII-
72 Rizal (pp. 1-2, 90-91, pp. 14-16 [Annex “A”] rec).
On the same day the aforesaid complaint was filed in court,
respondent Judge issued an order that reads:
“Pursuant to Section 14, Rule 112 of the New Rules of Court in relation to
the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of ‘Mateo versus
Villaluz’, Assistant City Fiscal Teodoro B. Santos is hereby ordered to
conduct the preliminary investigation of the above-entitled case within five
(5) days from receipt hereof and to file the necessary information in a court
of competent jurisdiction if the evidence so warrants.
“x x x x x” (pp. 2, 91 [Annex “B”], pp. 21-22, rec.).
On May 22, 1974, investigating Fiscal Teodoro B. Santos endorsed
the records of the case back to respondent Judge, because
“ . . . . (T)he facts and circumstances which has (sic) been the basis of this
instant suit is the same set of facts and circumstances and involving the
same parties in a case of ESTAFA THRU FALSIFICATION now pending
preliminary investigation and also before this Honorable Court. Hence, this
endorsement in order to avoid duplication of effort and time in the
resolution and disposition of the same incident.”
In an urgent ex-parte motion dated May 24, 1974 filed with the
Circuit Criminal Court pursuant to paragraph 1 of the Joint
Circular of the Department of Justice and the Department of
National Defense dated April 29, 1974, herein private respondent
prayed that the endorsement of Fiscal Santos be given due course
and that the preliminary investigation be conducted by the
respondent Judge (pp. 3, 92, 104 [Annex “I”], rec.).
Herein petitioner opposed the same in a pleading dated June 1,
1974 (p. 3, pp. 40-49 [Annex “F”], rec.), which was amplified in
369
VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 369
another pleading dated September 24, 1974 (pp. 3, 50-59 [Annex
“G”], rec.).
Under date of June 18, 1974, private respondent filed a motion to
strike out herein petitioner’s opposition to complainant’s ex-parte
urgent motion for preliminary investigation in view of the failure of
herein petitioner’s counsel to comply with the order of the Court to
furnish a copy of his opposition to complainant Jose Arellano (pp.
93, 105-106 [Annex “2”], rec.).
On September 24, 1974, herein petitioner filed his opposition to
the motion to strike out herein respondent’s opposition (pp. 7, 55-59
[Annex “G”], rec.). On the same day, a hearing was conducted by the
respondent Judge on the urgent motion for preliminary
investigation and immediately thereafter, he denied said opposition
of herein petitioner (Annex “H”, p. 62, pp. 3, 93, rec.).
Hence, this petition.
G. R. No. L-40031
On November 2, 1973, Jose Arellano, private respondent herein,
filed with the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig, Rizal, a complaint
charging herein petitioner with estafa, allegedly committed under
the circumstances provided for in paragraph 4 l(b), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code (p. 12, rec.). Said complaint was subsequently
docketed as CCC Case No. Prel. Inv. -65-Rizal. Thereupon,
respondent Judge proceeded to conduct the preliminary
investigation in question. After the termination of the proceedings,
respondent Judge issued on May 31, 1974 the challenged resolution
which reads:
“Wherefore, pursuant to Section 13, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court,
Assistant City Fiscal Teodoro B. Santos is hereby ordered to file the
necessary information for the crime of Estafa against respondent Pacita
Nieva, in a court of competent jurisdiction, within forty-eight (48) hours
from receipt hereof.
“Let a warrant of arrest be issued for the immediate apprehension of
respondent Mrs. Pacita Nieva, and for her provisional liberty, she is hereby
ordered to post a bond in the amount of P20,000.00” (p. 24, rec.).
On July 26, 1974, petitioner’s counsel filed an urgent motion to
declare the preliminary investigation proceedings null and void ab
initio due to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court.
370
to conduct the same, re-echoing the arguments invoked by
petitioners in G. R. Nos. L-34038, L-34243, L-36376 and L-38688 (p.
14, rec.).
In an order dated August 8, 1974, respondent Judge denied the
same (p. 22, rec.).
On January 28, 1975, this Court by resolution required
respondents to file an answer to the petition and not to move for the
dismissal of the same. The Court further resolved to consolidate the
case with Cases Nos. L-38688, L-34038, L-34243, and L-36376(p. 26,
rec.). In a manifestation filed on February 10, 1975, the Solicitor
General requested that he be excused from filing an answer on the
ground that in three cases (G.R. Nos. L-34038, L-34243 and L-
38688), which involve the same legal issue, the counsel for the
People has taken the position that respondent Judge has no
authority or jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation of
criminal cases which he may try and decide under Republic Act No.
5179.
Private respondent, on the other hand, through the Citizens Legal
Assistance Office of the Department of Justice, filed his answer on
February 20, 1975, maintaining that respondent Judge has
jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation, invoking
particularly Section 13, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court in
relation to Sections 1, 3 and 6 of Republic Act No 5179.
The one common legal issue posed by these six cases is whether a
Circuit Criminal Court possesses the power to conduct preliminary
investigations.
Neither the explanatory note to House Bill No. 9801 (now R.A. No.
5179) nor the available Congressional debates intimate that Circuit
Criminal Courts are clothed with the authority to conduct
preliminary examinations and investigations (Congressional
Records of House, March 28, 1967, pp. 41-45; May 15, 1967).
WE therefore examine the law.
Petitioners, in maintaining that respondent Judge has no such
power, rest their claim on Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5179, which
provides:
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VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 371
“In each of the sixteen judicial districts for the Court of First Instance as
presently constituted, there is hereby created a Circuit Criminal Court with
limited jurisdiction, concurrent with the regular Court of First Instance, to
try and decide the followingcriminal cases falling under the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the latter:
1. “a.Crimes committed by public officers, crimes against persons and
crimes, against property as defined and penalized under the Revised
Penal Code, whether simple or complex with other crimes;
2. “b.Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, x x x ;
3. “c.Violations of Sections 3601, 3602 and 3604 of the Tariff and
Customs Code and Sections 174, 175 and 345 of the National Internal
Revenue Code” (italics supplied).
Petitioners argue that said courts, having been conferred limited,

jurisdiction, cannot exercise such power of preliminary
investigation, the same not being embraced and contemplated
within its given function to “try and decide” specific criminal cases.
What is limited by Republic Act No. 5179 is the scope of the cases
that may be tried by Circuit Criminal Courts.
Circuit Criminal Courts are of limited jurisdiction, only because
they cannot try and decide all criminal cases falling under the
jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance as courts of general
jurisdiction. They can only take cognizance of cases expressly
specified in Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5179, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 126. Nevertheless, they have the same
powers and functions as those conferred upon regular Courts of First
Instance necessary to effectively exercise such special and limited
jurisdiction. This is plain and evident from Sections 3 and 6 of their
organic law, Republic Act No. 5179:
“Section 3. The provisions of all laws and the Rules of Court relative to the
judges of the Courts of First Instance and the trial, and disposition and
appeal of criminal cases therein shall be applicable to the circuit judge and
the cases cognizable by them insofar as they are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this act.
xx xx xx xx xx
“Section 6. x x x Unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, the

Circuit Criminal Courts shall have the same powers as
372
those conferred by the Judiciary Act and the Rules of Court upon regular
Courts of First Instance, insofar as may be necessary to carry their
jurisdiction into effect.”
Judges of the regular Courts of First Instance are expressly
conferred the authority to conduct preliminary examination and
investigation by Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
of Court:
“Section 13. Preliminary examination and investigation by the judge of the
Court of First Instance.—Upon complaint filed directly with the Court of
First Instance, without previous preliminary examination and investigation
conducted by the fiscal, the judge thereof shall either refer the complaint to
the justice of the peace referred to in the second paragraph of Section 2,
hereof for preliminary examination and investigation, or himself conduct
both preliminary examination and investigation simultaneously in the
manner provided in the preceding sections, and should he find reasonable
ground to believe that the defendant has committed the offense charged, he
shall issue a warrant for his arrest, and thereafter refer the case to the fiscal
for the filing of the corresponding information” (italics supplied).
“Section 14. Preliminary examination and investigation by provincial or
city fiscal or by state attorney in cases cognizable by the Court of First
Instance.—Except where an investigation has been conducted by a judge of
first instance, justice of the peace or other officer in accordance with the
provisions of the preceding sections, no information for an offense
cognizable by the Court of First Instance shall be filed by the provincial or
city fiscal, or state attorney, without first giving the accused a chance to be
heard in a preliminary investigation conducted by him or by his assistant
by issuing a corresponding subpoena. x x x”
The power of preliminary examination and investigation, which may
be exercised by judges of the Circuit Criminal Courts, is without
doubt, “not inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act No.
5179,” and likewise, “necessary to carry their jurisdiction into
effect.”
Moreover, Congress further confirmed that the Court of First
Instance has the power to conduct preliminary investigation by
approving on September 8, 1967 Republic Act No. 5180, prescribing
a uniform system of preliminary investigation by all government
prosecutors, which provides:
“Sec. 1. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary
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VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 373
and except when an investigation has been conducted by a Judge of First
Instance, city or municipal judge or other officer in accordance with law and
the Rules of Court of the Philippines, no information for an offense
cognizable by the Court of First Instance shall be filed by the provincial or
city fiscal or any of his assistants, or by a state attorney or his assistants,
without first giving the accused a chance to be heard in a preliminary
investigation conducted by him by issuing a corresponding subpoena. x x
“Sec. 2. The provisions of Section fifteen, Rule 112, of the New Rules of
Court of the Philippines, shall be observed in the investigations of persons
in custody.”
From the above-quoted provisions, Republic Act No. 5180 likewise
continues the procedure prescribed in the Revised Rules of Court of
1964, particularly Rule 112 thereof.
The aforequoted portion of Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5180 was
not modified by the amendatory Presidential Decrees Nos. 77 and
911 issued respectively on December 6, 1972 and March 23, 1976.
More decisively, the 1935 as well as 1973 Constitutions vests this
essential power in all courts to first determine probable cause before
ordering the arrest of those charged with a criminal offense (Section
1[3], Art. III, 1935 Constitution; Sec. 3, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution).
The determination of “probable cause” is the sole object of
preliminary examinations. Surely, Congress could not have possibly
intended to deny the Circuit Criminal Courts such constitutional
prerogative, which is part of the basic constitutional right of an
individual whose person cannot be legally seized without prior
preliminary examination by a judge.
WE enunciated that the creation of the Circuit Criminal Courts is
for the purpose of alleviating the burden of the regular Courts of
First Instance and to accelerate the disposition of criminal cases
pending or to be filed therein(People vs. Gutierrez, etc., et al., 36
SCRA 172; Osmeña vs. Sec. of Justice, G.R. No. L-32033, Sept. 30,
1971, 199) or to contribute to the speedy resolution of criminal cases
and help curb the progression of criminality in the
country (Paraguya vs. Tiro, 41 SCRA 137). As opined by Mr. Justice
Barredo in his concurring opinion in the Gutierrez case, supra, “x x
x Circuit Criminal Courts are nothing but additional branches of the
regular Courts of First Instance in their respective districts x x x”,
374
which he reiterated in his concurring opinion in the Osmeña case,
thus:
“My principal reason for my vote in favor of the judgment in this case is that
I cannot find any justification for allowing the Secretary of Justice to have
any part at all in the distribution or assignment of cases among the different
branches of any Court of First Instance, of which the corresponding Circuit
Criminal Court is one. I took this view in my concurring opinion in the case
of People v. Gutierrez, cited in the main opinion of Justice Villamor, and I
cannot see why I must opine differently now. x x x ” (41 SCRA 211).
If the main purposes then in creating Circuit Criminal Courts are to
alleviate the burden of the regular Courts of First Instance and to
accelerate the disposition of the cases therein as well as stem the
tide of criminality, it is only logical that such authority vested in the
judges of the Courts of First Instance is likewise conferred on Circuit
Criminal Courts. Otherwise, the Courts of First Instance would still
be carrying the burden of conducting preliminary, investigations in
those cases where Circuit Criminal Courts have jurisdiction and
consequently delaying the trial and disposition of criminal cases
pending before such Courts of First Instance.
That Congress, in enacting Republic Act No. 5179 clearly
intended, by Sections 3 and 6 thereof, to clothe the Circuit Criminal
Court with all the powers vested in regular Courts of First Instance
including the authority to conduct preliminary examinations and
investigations, is confirmed by the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
otherwise known as Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 44, Section 39 of which confers on Circuit
Criminal Courts, Courts of First Instance and Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Courts concurrent original jurisdiction over all
offenses punishable thereunder and expressly directs that the
“preliminary investigation of cases filed under this Act shall be
terminated within a period of thirty (30) days from the date of their
filing.” Before the amendment, the law required only seven (7) days
from the date of the commencement of the preliminary
investigation. Section 39, as amended, reads:
“Sec. 39. Jurisdiction.—The Court of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Court,
and Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court shall have concurent original
jurisdiction over all cases involving offenses
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VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 375
punishable under this Act: Provided, that in cities or provinces where there
are Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the said courts shall take
exclusive cognizance of cases where the offenders are under sixteen years of
age.
“The preliminary investigation of cases filed under this Act shall be
terminated within a period of thirty (30) days from the date of their filing.
“Where the preliminary investigation is conducted by a prosecuting
officer and a prima faciecase is established, the corresponding information
shall be filed in court within twenty-four (24) hours from the termination of
the investigation. If the preliminary investigation is conducted by a judge
and a prima facie case is found to exist, the corresponding information shall
be filed by the proper prosecuting officer within forty-eight (48) hours from
the date of receipt of the records of the case.
“Trial of the cases under this section shall be finished by the court not
later than ninety (90) days from the date of the filing of the information.
Decision on said cases shall be rendered within a period of fifteen (15) days
from the date of submission of the case.”
It is patent that the aforequoted provision of Section 39 of Republic
Act No. 6425 affirms the power of the Circuit Criminal Courts to
conduct preliminary examination and investigation in all the cases
falling under their jurisdiction and additionally fixes the period for
preliminary investigation, the filing of the information and the
rendition of decisions in all offenses penalized by the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972.
Under the amendment, the Circuit Criminal Court no longer has
exclusive, but still retains concurrent, jurisdiction with the Court of
First Instance and Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts under
the Dangerous Drugs Act. Its authority to conduct preliminary
examination and investigation granted under Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 5179, remains intact and undiminished; because the
amendatory decree expressly directs that “If the preliminary
investigation is conducted by a judge and a prima facie case is found
to exist, the corresponding information should be filed by the proper
prosecuting officer x x x.” There is nothing in the amendatory decree
from which it can be reasonably inferred that since the jurisdiction
of the Circuit Criminal Court over violations of the Dangerous Drugs
Act is no longer exclusive, Circuit Criminal Court Judges no longer
possess the authority to conduct preliminary examination and
investigation.
Recognizing the constitutional power of the courts, including
376
the Courts of First Instance, to conduct preliminary examination,
other special laws specifically vest such authority exclusively in the
Court of First Instance in cases of violation of the Revised Election
Code (Sec. 187, 1947 Revised Election Code, as amended; Sec. 234,
1971 Rev. Election Code) and of the Anti-Subversion Act when the
penalty imposable for the offense is prision mayor to death (Sec. 16,
Rep. Act No. 1700).
It is urged that the word “judge” in the above -quoted section of
Presidential Decree No. 44 (and also in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions) contemplates not the Court of First Instance Judge
nor the Circuit Criminal Court Judge but the municipal judge. As
heretofore stated, it is an elementary precept in statutory
construction that where the law does not distinguish, WE should not
distinguish (Colgate Palmolive Philippines, Inc. vs. Gimenez, L-
14787, Jan. 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 267). The statute cannot give a
restricted meaning to the generic term “judge” used in the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
Furthermore, in People versus Manantan (L-14129, July 31,
1962, 5 SCRA 684), a justice of the peace, accused of violating
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, moved to dismiss the
information on the ground that the law refers merely to a justice,
judge, or fiscal and that being a justice of the peace, he is beyond the
coverage of the said Code. The Supreme Court in denying such
contention, held that there was no need of including justices of the
peace in the enumeration in said section because the legislature had
availed itself of the more generic term “judge”. The term “judge”, not
modified by any word or phrase, is intended to comprehend all kinds
of judges, including justices of the peace.
The cases of People versus Paderna (22 SCRA 273) and Paraguya
versus Tiro (41 SCRA 137) involved not the power of the Circuit
Criminal Court to conduct preliminary investigation, but its
jurisdiction to try and decide certain cases. They do not at all reveal
an iota of any further restriction on the limited jurisdiction of the
Circuit Criminal Court other than those delineated in existing laws.
Thus, in the Paderna case, supra, involving a violation of Section
174 of the Tax Code, Mr. Chief Justice Castro, then Associate
Justice, speaking for the Supreme Court in ruling that the Circuit
Criminal Court was without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
case, stated:
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VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 377
“x x x [T]he charge is for unlawful possession of untaxed ‘blue seal cigarettes’
of an appraised value of less than P500.00 x x x and the penalty provided
under Republic Act 4713 is a fine of not less than P50.00 nor more than
P200.00 and imprisonment of not less than 5 nor more than 30 days because
the value of the cigarettes does not exceed P500.00, this case falls within
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the city court x x x.”
“x x x Section 1 of Republic Act 5179, which took effect on September 8,
1967, provides in part that circuit criminal courts shall have—limited
jurisdiction concurrent with the regular court of first instance, to try and
decide the following criminal cases falling under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the latter.
xx xx xx xx
“The jurisdiction of the circuit criminal courts is thus dependent not only
on the type of cases but also on the penalties provided for those cases.
Inasmuch as the case at bar falls within the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the City Court, it cannot, even if it involves a violation of
section 174 of the Tax Code, be taken cognizance of by circuit criminal
courts, the jurisdiction of which is concurrent with that of courts of first
instance where the latter’s jurisdiction is original and exclusive.”
The same ruling was substantially reiterated in the more recent Tiro
case, supra, involving indirect bribery committed by a public officer.
In passing upon the issue of the Circuit Criminal Court’s limited
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Jose B. L.
Reyes, held:
“x x x The law (R.A. 5179) confined the jurisdiction of the circuit criminal
courts (which is even made concurrent with the courts of first instance) to
crimes committed by public officers; x x x only where they are falling within
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the court of first instance. In short,
circuit criminal courts’ jurisdiction was limited merely to cases involving
crimes specifically enumerated in Section 1 of Republic Act 5179, for which
the penalty prescribed by law is imprisonment for more than 3 years (or 6
years in proper cases), or fine of more than P3,000.00 (or P6,000.00 as the
case may be), or both such fine and imprisonment (Sec. 44[f] in relation to
Sec. 87[c], Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended; Esperat vs. Avila, L-25922,
June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 596; Mangila vs. Lantin, L-24735, October 31,
1969, 30 SCRA 81; People vs. Tapayan, L-36885, November 28, 1969, 30
SCRA 529; Andico vs. Roan, L-26563, April 16, 1968, 23 SCRA 93).
“Since indirect bribery is penalized under the Revised Penal Code with
imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months, suspension and public
censure (Art. 211, RPC), the case is clearly removed from
378
the competence of the circuit criminal court to pass upon. It is not denied
that the crime of indirect bribery is essentially one committed by public
officers. Jurisdiction of the court, however, is determined not only by nature
of the offense charged in the information, but also by the penalty imposable
thereto. x x” (italics supplied).
In these two cases, it was made clear that for the Circuit Criminal
Court to acquire jurisdiction, the offense must not only be one of
those enumerated under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5179; it
should also be within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
regular Courts of First Instance. In the aforesaid cases, the Circuit
Criminal Court was clearly without jurisdiction to hear and decide
the offenses involved, by command of the specific provisions of its
charter, the Judiciary Act and the Revised Penal Code; and not by a
directive of the Supreme Court, which merely applied in said cited
cases the statutory prescriptions. The Supreme Court cannot legally
define additional restrictions, which is the sole prerogative of the
law-making authority.
The contrary view appears to entertain the mistaken notion that
Section 13, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court, being a rule of
procedure, the same should be rendered inoperative by reason of the
fact that the Supreme Court cannot, by promulgating a rule of
procedure, arrogate jurisdiction unto itself or grant any to the lower
courts.
It is of course basic that only the Constitution and the law can
confer jurisdiction to hear and decide certain cases. But equally true
is the fact that both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions expressly
delegated to the Supreme Court the rule-making authority—the
power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure and
to amend the existing laws thereon. The law or rule on preliminary
investigation is undoubtedly a rule of procedure.
The 1935 Constitution states:

“The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade
and shall not diminish, increase or modify, substantive rights. The existing
laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes,
and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court
to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal,
alter, or
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VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 379
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines” (Sec. 13, Art. VIII, 1935
Constitution).
The 1973 Constitution similarly authorizes the Supreme Court to
“Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar,
which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the National
Assembly. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure
for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights” (Sec.
5[5], Art, X, 1973 Constitution).
Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court merely
implement Section 3 of Article III of the 1935 Constitution (now
Section 3 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution). Section 13 of Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Court was not an innovation as it merely
restated Section 13 of General Order No. 58, Section 37 of Act No.
1627, and Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 108 of the 1940 Rules of Court,
in obedience to its rule-making authority under Section 13, Article
VIII of the 1935 Constitution. Rule 112 does not modify substantive
rights but continues the procedure already operative prior to the
1935 Constitution.
WE have ruled that Rule 108 of the 1940 Rules of Court, which is
the predecessor of Rule 112 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, is an
adjective or procedural rule (Bustos vs. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640).
While admitting that Courts of First Instance were previously
clothed with the power of preliminary investigation by virtue of
Section 37 of Act 1627, nevertheless, it is argued that this same
section was amended when the Judiciary Act of 1948 was enacted
since under Section 99 of said Judiciary Act, “All laws and rules
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act” were repealed. The
inconsistency, it is claimed, lies in the fact that while the authority
of municipal courts and city courts to conduct preliminary
investigation was reiterated in said Judiciary Act, there was no
mention therein whether Courts of First Instance Judges are still
possessed of such authority.
If such repeal was intended, it is unconstitutional; because the
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973 vest in the judge the power to
380
issue a warrant of arrest or search warrant after conducting a
preliminary investigation or examination. Congress could not divest
the court of such authority as the Constitution does not permit it,
for the constitutional guarantee on arrest or search warrant is not
qualified by some such phrase as “unless otherwise provided by law.”
For a clearer appreciation, the Constitutional guarantee on arrest
and search warrant reads:
“(3) The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized” (Art. III, 1935
Constitution, italics supplied).
“Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law,
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized” (Art. IV, 1973 Constitution,
italics supplied).
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1973 Constitution
that until now only the judge can determine the existence of
probable cause and can issue the warrant of arrest. No law or
presidential decree has been enacted or promulgated vesting the
same authority in a particular “responsible officer.” Hence, the 1973
Constitution, which was ratified and took effect on January 17,
1973, should govern the last four cases, namely, Nos. L-36376, L-
38688, L-39525 and L-40031, which arose after January 17, 1973.
But even under the 1935 Constitution, the
term seizures or seized comprehends arrest. Thus, in Vivo versus
Montesa (July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 155), reiterating the doctrines in
the cases of Qua Chee Gan, et al. vs. Deportation Board (L-20280,
Sept. 30, 1963) and Morano vs. Vivo (L-22196, June 30, 1967, 20
SCRA 162), WE ruled unanimously through Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes:
“Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that the issuance of warrants
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VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 381
of arrest by the Commissioners of Immigration, solely for purposes of
investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued, conflicts with
paragraph 3, Section 1, of Article III (Bill of Rights) of our Constitution,
providing:
‘3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.’
“It will be noted that the power to determine probable cause for warrants
of arrest is limited by the Philippine Constitution to judges exclusively,
unlike in previous organic laws and the Federal Constitution of the United
States that left undetermined which public officials could determine the
existence of probable cause. And in Qua Chee Gan, et al. vs. Deportation
Board, L-20280, promulgated on September 30, 1963, this Court pointed out
that Executive Order No. 69, of July 29, 1947, issued by President Roxas, in
prescribing the procedure for deportation of aliens, only required the filing
of a bond by an alien under investigation, but did not authorize his arrest.
“Discussing the implications of the provision of our Bill of Rights on the
issuance of administrative warrants of arrest, this Court said in the same
case:
xxx xxx xxx
‘Under the express terms of our Constitution it is, therefore, even doubtful whether
the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if
the purpose is merely to determine the existence of probable cause, leading to an
administrative investigation. The Constitution does not distinguish between
warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative
proceedings. And if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a
determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge, why should one
suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee? Of course
it is different if the order of arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of a violation,
either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly authorized for the purpose,
as then the warrant is not that mentioned in the Constitution which is issuable only
on probable cause. Such, for example, would be a warrant of arrest to carry out a final
order of deportation, or to effect compliance of an order of contempt.
‘The(n) contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is
necessary to carry into effect the power of
382
deportation is valid only when, as already stated, there is already an order of
deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously has the
power to order the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation, it
is not indispensable that the alien be arrested. It is enough, as was true before the
executive order of President Quirino, that a bond be required to insure the
appearance of the alien during the investigation, abs was authorized in the executive
order of President Roxas.’
“Following the same trend of thought, this Court, in Morano vs. Vivo (L-
22196, 30 June 1967, 20 SCRA, 562; Phil. 1967-B, page 741), distinguished
between administrative arrest in the execution of a final deportation order
and arrest as preliminary to further administrative proceedings. The Court
remarked in said case:
‘Section 1 (3), Article III of the Constitution, we perceive, does not require judicial
intervention in the execution of a final order of deportation issued in accordance with
law. The constitutional limitation contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of
judicial power as a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or proceedings for a
given offense or administrative action, not as a measure indispensable to carry out a
valid decision by a competent official, such as a legal order of deportation, issued by
the Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance of a valid legislation’ ” (L-24576, pp.
161-162).
The foregoing doctrine was last reiterated in Ang, et al. versus
Galang, etc. (L-21426, Oct. 22, 1975).
Under the American Constitution, the aforesaid terms include not
only arrest but also invitations for police interview or interrogation
as well as stop-and-frisk measures. In the 1968 case of Terry versus
Ohio, the United States Supreme Court enunciated:
“x x x. It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs ‘seizures’ of the
person which do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution
for crime—‘arrests’ in traditional terminology. It must be recognized that
whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to
walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person (392 U.S. 1, 16 88 S.C.T. 1868, 20
L.ED. 2d 889; 903 [1968].)”
That the aforesaid terms seizures and seizedsignify arrest was
deliberately intended by the founding fathers of the 1935
Constitution, which words are likewise employed in the 1973
Constitution, Delegate Miguel Cuaderno categorically recounted:
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VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 383
“An amendment affecting the issuance of an order of arrest and search
warrant, to the effect that in each case the order must be supported by the
testimony of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, made before
the judge, and also an amendment providing that prisoners charged with
capital offenses shall be bailable before conviction unless the evidence of
guilt is strong, were approved upon the initiative of Delegate Francisco. It
was the prevailing opinion among many delegates that some courts had been
rather easy in the issuance of orders of arrest or search warrants, and quite
strict in the matter of bail in cases where persons had been charged with
capital offenses” (Cuaderno, the Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p.
65, italics supplied).
Delegate Jose Aruego added:

“During the debates on the draft, Delegate Francisco proposed an
amendment which was adopted by the Convention, the amendment being
the insertion of the words, to be determined by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce. The idea in the Francisco amendment was not new in the
Philippines; for it was provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure of the
Philippines. The dignification of the idea into a constitutional provision was
zealously insisted upon, in order to make the principle more sacred to the
judges and to prosecuting officials,. The amendment was intended to be a
remedy for the evils pointed out in the debates, caused by the issuance of
search warrants, many of which were in blank, upon mere affidavits on facts
most of which were generally found afterwards to be false”
(Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. I, p. 160).
The term “judge” employed in both Constitutions cannot be so
limited to “municipal judge” as to exclude the judges of the Court of
First Instance and Circuit Criminal Court (People vs. Manantan, 5
SCRA 684, 690-695). WE are not justified to create a distinction
where the Constitution does not make any.
In general, “judge” is a term employed to designate a public officer
selected to preside and to administer the law in a court of justice
(Ark.—School Dist. No. 18 vs. Grubbs Social School Dist., 43 S. W.
2d 765, 766, 184 Ark. 863, 48 CJS 946).
According to intent or context, the term “judge” may include an
assistant judge (N.H.—City Bank v. Young, 43 N.H. 457); a county
or court justice (Mo. State v. O’Gorman, 75 Mo. 370); a justice of the
peace (N.Y. People v. Mann 97 N.Y. 530, 49 Am. R. 556).
The term “a judge”, in Gen. St. C. 47, Art. 1 & 22, providing
384
that “a judge” may cause any house or building to be searched for
the protection of gambling tables, etc., is equivalent to “any judge”
and comprehends an entire class, and cannot, without disturbing its
meaning, be restricted in its applications to judges of county, city and
police courts and therefore the judge of the Louisville Law and equity
court has authority to issue a warrant for such a search (Com. v.
Watzel, 2 S.W. 123, 125, 84 KY 537).
Admittedly, Section 99 of the Judiciary Act contains a repealing
clause which provides: “All laws and rules inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.” The question may now
be asked: What is the nature of this repealing clause? It is certainly
not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or
designate the Act or Acts that are intended to be repealed
(Sutherland, Statutory Construction, [1934], Vol. 1, p. 467). Rather,
it is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the
condition that a substantial and an irreconcilable conflict must be
found in existing and prior Acts. Such being the case, the
presumption against implied repeals and the rule against strict
construction regarding implied repeals apply ex propio vigore; for
repeals and amendments by implication are not favored (Jalandoni
vs. Andaya, L-23894, Jan. 24, 1974, 55 SCRA 261, 265-6; Villegas vs.
Subido, L-31711, Sept. 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 190; Quimseng vs.
Lachica, 2 SCRA 182). Indeed, the legislature is presumed to know
the existing laws; so that, if a repeal is intended, the proper step is
to so express it with specificity (Continental Insurance Co. vs.
Simpson, 8 F[2d] 439; Webb vs. Bailey, 151 Ore. 2188, 51 P[2d]
832; State vs. Jackson, 120 W. Va. 521, 199 S.E. 876). The failure to
add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to
repeal any existing law (Crawford, Construction of Statute, 1940 ed.,
p. 631), unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist
between the terms of the new and of the old statutes (Iloilo Palay
and Corn Planters Association, Inc. vs. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377).
Here, there is no such inconsistency.
To begin with, the two laws, although with a common objective,
refer to different persons and different methods applicable under
different circumstances. Thus, while Section 87 of the Judiciary Act
provides that municipal judges and judges of city courts may also
conduct preliminary investigation for any offense alleged to have
been committed
385
VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 385
within their respective municipalities and cities x x x; Section 37 of
Act 1627 reads in part that such power of “every justice of the peace
including the justice of Manila, x x x shall not exclude the proper
judge of the Court of First Instance x x x from exercising such
jurisdiction.”
WE should not, and cannot, adopt the theory of implied repeal
except upon a clear and unequivocal expression of the will of
Congress, which is not manifest from the language of Section 99 of
the Judiciary Act, apart from the fact that Congress by itself alone
had no power to amend the Constitution.
The opposite view likewise denies that the jurisdiction of our
courts to conduct preliminary investigation could be traced to the
Constitution, adding that the Charter of Manila and other cities
confer upon the respective fiscals of said cities the power to conduct
preliminary investigations.
The organic acts prior to the 1935 Constitution did not prohibit
the conferment of such a power to conduct preliminary examination
or investigation on quasi-judicial officers like the city fiscals of
chartered cities (see the instructions of President McKinley to First
Philippine Commission, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Jones Law of
1916, and the Revised Administrative Code of 1917).
But the power thus granted to the Manila City Fiscals (and later
to City Fiscals and City Attorneys of other chartered cities) to
conduct preliminary investigations did not and does not include the
authority to issue warrants of arrest and search warrants, which
warrants the courts alone can issue then as now. The constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures under the
1935 Constitution provides that only a judge can issue a search
warrant or warrant of arrest after he has by himself personally
determined the existence of probable cause upon his examination
under oath of the complainant and his witnesses; although as ruled
in one case, he may rely on the investigation conducted by the fiscal
or prosecutor (Amarga vs. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739, 741-42).
It is patent that under the 1935 Constitution, only the “judge” is
directed to conduct a preliminary examination for the issuance of
the warrant of arrest by express constitutional conferment.
But the 1973 Constitution empowers the National Assembly to
grant the power to issue search warrants or warrants of
386
arrest after conducting the necessary preliminary examination to
“other responsible officer.” Until such a law is enacted by the
National Assembly, only the judge can validly conduct a preliminary
examination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest or search
Warrant.
Even when the fiscal or prosecutor conducts the preliminary
investigation, only the judge can validly issue the warrant of arrest.
This is confirmed by Section 6 of Rule 112 of the 1964 Revised Rules
of Court, which directs the judge to issue the warrant of arrest when
he is “satisfied from the preliminary examination conducted by him
or by the investigating officer (referring to the fiscal or the municipal
mayor under Sec. 5) that the offense complained of has been
committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the
accused has committed it, x x x.”
Thus, the power of the city prosecutors to conduct preliminary
examination and investigation (minus the authority to issue
warrants of arrest or search warrant) is purely statutory. On the
other hand, the judge derives his authority not only from the Rules
of Court, but also—and originally—from the fundamental law to
which all other laws are subordinate. If an objection must be raised,
it should be against the authority of the fiscal to exercise such power
of preliminary investigation, which, as has been stated, is merely
statutory. No less than the Constitution confers upon the judge the
power to conduct such examination and investigation.
The case of Albano versus Alvarez(December 22, 1965, 15 SCRA
518) is authority for the proposition that Sec. 13 of Rule 112 of the
1964 Revised Rules of Court contains an innovation, which requires
that, when the Court of First Instance itself conducts the
preliminary investigation, it must not only conduct the preliminary
examination proper but the preliminary investigation as well since
Section 13 commands the Court of First Instance to conduct both the
preliminary examination and investigation simultaneously (523-
524). Said Albano case does not negate, but recognizes the authority
of the judge of the Court of First Instance to conduct such
preliminary investigation.
It is true that this COURT held expressly and impliedly that
under the charters of the cities of Manila, Bacolod and Cebu, the
power to conduct preliminary investigation is exclusively lodged in
the city prosecutor (Sayo vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859, 868-
387
VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 387
869, May 12, 1948; Espiritu vs. De la Rosa, 45 OG 196; Montelibano
vs. Ferrer, 97 Phil. 228, June 23, 1955; and Balite vs. People, 18
SCRA 280, 285-286, Sept. 30, 1966). But the charters of the cities of
Manila, Bacolod and Cebu do not contain any provision making such
grant of power to city prosecutors exclusive of the courts
(Kapunan, Criminal Procedure, 3rd Edition, 1960), which cannot be
deprived of such authority to conduct preliminary examination
because said prerogative of the courts emanates from the
Constitution itself. Unless the Constitution is amended, the judge
cannot be divested of such a power, which is an essential element of
the cardinal right of an individual against unreasonable searches
and seizures. If the present city charters conferred on city fiscals or
city prosecutors the power to issue warrants of arrest, it would be
an unconstitutional grant of power under the 1935 Constitution. As
heretofore intimated, the present practice or rule of court
authorizing the judge to issue warrants of arrest based on the
preliminary investigation conducted by the city fiscal, seems to
violate the 1935 Constitution, which requires the judge himself to
conduct the preliminary examination. Neither the judge nor the law
can delegate such an authority to another public officer without
trenching upon this constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
The theory that Courts of First Instance and Circuit Criminal
Courts Judges cannot exercise the power of preliminary
examination and investigation, and that as a necessary
consequence, they cannot also issue warrants of arrest, obviously
collides with the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
Moreover, the theory tolerates an unthinkable—because
anomalous—situation wherein the Court of First Instance and the
Circuit Criminal Court must wait for prosecutors and courts inferior
to them to conduct the preliminary examination and/or to issue the
needed warrants of arrest before they could effectively exercise their
power to try and decide the cases falling under their respective
jurisdiction. This situation would make the Courts of First Instance
and Circuit Criminal Courts totally dependent upon state
prosecutors and municipal courts, which are inferior to them, for
their proper functioning. The possibility that the administration of
criminal justice might stand still will not be very remote.
The two-fold purpose for which the Circuit Criminal Courts were
created was to alleviate the burden of the regular Courts
388
of First Instance and accelerate the disposition of criminal cases
filed therein (Osmeña vs. Secretary of Justice, supra; People vs.
Gutierrez, supra). Such being the admitted purpose, the power to
conduct preliminary examination must necessarily attach to the
duties of a Circuit Criminal Court Judge; for aside from being one of
the instruments by which a case may be accelerated and disposed of,
it is a duty which trully lies within the scope of the office, essential
to the accomplishment of the main purpose for which the office was
created (Sec. 3, Art. III, 1935 Constitution; Sec. 3, Art. IV, 1973
Constitution), even if regarded as incidental and collateral, is
germane to, and serves to promote the accomplishment of the
principal purpose (Lo Cham vs. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 635).
WE RULE that both Section 1(3), Article III of the 1935
Constitution and Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution
provide the source of the power of all Judges, including Judges of the
Court of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, and other
courts of equivalent rank, to conduct the examination to determine
probable cause before the issuance of the warrant of arrest and
therefore sustain the proceedings conducted by respondent Judge
leading to the issuance of the warrants of arrest and his referral of
the cases to the fiscal or other government prosecutor for the filing
of the corresponding information.
II
It may be well to trace briefly the historical background of our law
on criminal procedure.
During the Spanish regime, the rules of criminal procedure were
found in the Provisional Law on Criminal Procedure which
accompanied the Spanish Penal Code. These two laws were
published in the Official Gazette in Manila on March 13 and 14,
1887 and became effective four (4) months thereafter (U.S. vs.
Tamparong, 31 Phil. 32-33; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1969,
ed., p. 8).
While the Provisional Law on Criminal Procedure provided for a
preliminary summary oral trial by the justice of the peace
or gobernadorcillo, it did not require any preliminary examination
or investigation before trial. The sumario was abolished by General
Order No. 58 (U.S. vs. Tamparong, supra; Navarro, Criminal
Procedure, 1960 ed., pp. 171, 174; Revilla,
389
VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 389
Vol. 2, Philippine Penal Code and Procedure, 1930 ed., pp. 1134-35).
When the Philippines came under American sovereignty, General
Order No. 58 was promulgated by the U.S. Military Governor in the
exercise of his legislative powers as commander-in-chief of the
occupation army and took effect on April 13, 1900. General Order
No. 58 was amended by Act No. 194 of August 10, 1901, the
Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 590 of January 9, 1903, Act No. 1627
of July 1, 1907, the Jones Law of 1916, Section 2474 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917, Act No. 3042 of March 10, 1922, and
Act No. 4178 of December 5, 1934.
General Order No. 58 amended (Sec. 1) the Criminal Code of
Procedure enforced during the Spanish regime and vested in
the magistrate “the authority to conduct preliminary investigation
(Sec. 13) for the issuance of the warrant of arrest” and authorized “a
judge or a justice of the peace” to issue a search warrant upon his
determination of the existence of probable cause therefor
“particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or
thing to be seized” (Secs. 95 and 97). The term “magistrate”
comprehended the Court of First Instance (Temporosa vs. Yatco, 79
Phil. 225, 226 [1947]; Marcos vs. Cruz, 68 Phil. 96, 104-107
[1939]; People vs. Red, 55 Phil. 706, 710 [1931]; People vs. Solon, 47
Phil. 443, 441 [1925]; Navarro, Criminal Procedure, 1960 ed., 1973;
Padilla, Criminal Procedure, 1965 ed., p. 270).
“A ‘magistrate’ is an ‘officer having power to issue a warrant for the arrest
of a person charged with a public offense.’ People vs. Swain, 90 P. 720, 722
5 Cal. App. 421, citing Pen. Code, S807.
“A ‘magistrate’ is an officer having power to issue a warrant for the arrest
of a person charged with the commission of a crime. The following persons
are magistrates:
1. (1)the justices of the Supreme Court;

2. (2)the judges of the Circuit Court;
3. (3)the county judges and justices of the peace;
4. (4)all municipal officers authorized to exercise the powers and
perform the duties of a justice of the peace. Wallowa County v. Oakes,
78 P. 892, 46 Or. 33” (26 Words and Phrases, pp. 44, 45).
Act No. 194 of August 10, 1901 amended General Order No. 58 by
empowering “every justice of the peace x x x to make preliminary
investigation of any crime alleged to have been
390
committed within his municipality, jurisdiction to hear and
determine which is by law now vested in the judges of the Courts of
Firs t Instance” (italics supplied).
The obvious inference from the aforequoted provision of Act No.
194 is that before its passage, the justice of the peace had no power
to conduct preliminary investigation of any offense triable by the
Court of First Instance, which alone can conduct such preliminary
investigation of a crime under its original jurisdiction pursuant to
General Order No. 58. But its enactment did not divest the Court of
First Instance of such authority.
In the 1939 case of Marcos, et al. versus Cruz, the Supreme Court,
through Justice Imperial, sustained the power of the Court of First
Instance to conduct preliminary investigations under Sections 13
and 14 of General Order No. 58 (68 Phil. 96, 106-107), which was
impliedly followed in the 1947 case of Temporosa versus Yatco, et
al., supra.
While General Order No. 58 vested the authority in a magistrate,
a generic term which includes judges of the Courts of First Instance
and justices of the peace; Section 1 of Act No. 194 is less categorical
by employing the clause “jurisdiction to hear and determine which
is by law now vested in the judges of the Courts of First Instance.”
The Philippine Bill of 1902 in a similar ambiguous vein contained
such authority when it merely provided that the “Supreme Court
and the Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands shall
possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such
additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by the
Government of said Islands, subject to the power of said Government
to change the practice and method of procedure. The municipal
courts of said Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as
heretofore provided by the Philippine Commission, subject in all
matters to such alteration and amendment as maybe hereafter
enacted by law; x x x” (Sec. 9, italics supplied).
Act No. 590 of January 9, 1903 further amended Act No. 194 by
extending the power to conduct preliminary investigation to the
justice of the peace of the provincial capital or of the town wherein
the provincial jail is situated of crimes committed anywhere within
the province but again utilized the equivocal clause “jurisdiction to
hear and determine which is by law now vested in the Courts of First
Instance; x x x” (Sec. 7, Act 590,
391
VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 391
italics supplied).
Act No. 1627 of July 1, 1907 had the virtue of greater clarity when
it authorized expressly every justice of the peace, including the
justice of the peace of Manila, to “conduct preliminary investigation
of all crimes and offenses alleged to have been committed within his
municipality and cognizable by Courts of First Instance, but this
shall not exclude the proper judge of the Court of First Instance or of
a municipal court from exercising such jurisdiction. The justice of the
peace of a capital or of a municipality in which the provincial jail is
located, when directed by an order from the judge of First Instance,
shall have jurisdiction to conduct investigation at the expense of the
municipality wherein the crime or offense was committed, although
alleged to have been committed anywhere within the province, to
issue orders of arrest, xxxx” (Sec. 37, Act No. 1627, italics supplied).
The Jones Law of 1916, like the Philippine Bill of 1902, merely
provides “that the Supreme Court and the Courts of First Instance
of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as
heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall
hereafter be prescribed by law” (Sec. 26, Jones Law).
Section 2474 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 reaffirms
the power of the Court of First Instance of Manila to conduct
preliminary examination—
“Sec. 2474. Persons arrested to be promptly brought before a court.—
Preliminary examinations in municipal court and Court of First Instance.—
Every person arrested shall, without unnecessary delay, be brought before
the municipal court, or the Court of First Instance for preliminary hearing,
release on bail, or trial. In cases triable in the municipal court the defendant
shall not be entitled as of right to a preliminary examination, except a
summary one to enable the court to fix the bail, in any case where the
prosecution announces itself ready and is ready for trial within three days,
not including Sundays, after the request for an examination is presented. In
cases triable only in the Court of First Instance the defendant shall not be
entitled as of right to a preliminary examination in any case where the fiscal
of the city, after a due investigation of the facts, shall have presented an
information against him in proper form. But the Court of First Instance may
make such summary investigation into the case as it may deem necessary to
enable it to fix the bail or to determine whether the offense is bailable” (italics
supplied).
392
It is clear that both the Manila Court of First Instance and
municipal court can conduct a preliminary hearing or examination.
Section 2474 aforequoted, adds, however, that the City Fiscal
impliedly may conduct such preliminary examination; because it
provides that in “cases triable only in the Court of First Instance the
defendant shall not be entitled as of right to a preliminary
examination in any case where the fiscal of the city, after a due
investigation of the facts, shall have presented an information
against him in proper form.” It will be noted, however, that it is only
after the City Fiscal has conducted a preliminary examination that
the accused ceases to “be entitled as of right” to a preliminary
examination by the Judge of the Court of First Instance who,
however, retains inferentially the discretion to conduct another
preliminary investigation because the Court of First Instance Judge
is not foreclosed by the preliminary examination conducted by the
City Fiscal. But, when the City Fiscal has not conducted any
preliminary examination, the Court of First Instance Judge himself
certainly can proceed with such preliminary examination, which the
defendant can demand as a matter of right.
Act No. 3042 of March 10, 1922, while amending Section 13 of
General Order No. 58, re-states the power of the magistrate to
conduct the preliminary examination for the issuance of the warrant
of arrest.
Act No. 4178 of December 5, 1934 further amended Section 13 of
General Order No. 58 but still retained the authority of
the magistrate to conduct the preliminary examination. As
heretofore stated, Sections 13 and 14 of General Order No. 58, as
amended, were applied by the Supreme Court in Marcos, et
al. versus Cruz (68 Phil. 96, 99, 106-107).
Under the jurisprudence then or prior to the 1935 Constitution,
the preliminary investigation before the justice of the peace or
municipal court consisted of two stages, namely, preliminary
examination for the issuance of the warrant of arrest where only the
complainant and his witnesses are heard by the justice of the peace;
and the second stage where the accused and his witnesses are heard.
The Judge of the Court of First Instance conducts only the first
stage, that is, preliminary examination for purposes of the issuance
of the warrant of arrest, to be followed by the actual trial (Marcos,
vs. Cruz, supra; People vs. Moreno, 77 Phil. 548, 555 [1946]).
393
VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 393
The basic source of the power of the Courts of First Instance to
conduct preliminary examination or investigation from May 14,
1935 to January 17, 1973, is paragraph 3 of Section 1 of Article III
of the 1935 Constitution, which guarantees “the right of the people
to be secure in their persons x x x against unreasonable x x x
seizures x x x and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause,
to be determined by the judge after an examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing x x x the persons x x x to be seized.”
Construing the foregoing constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, the Supreme Court, through then Chief
Justice Ricardo Paras, pronounced that the determination of the
existence of “probable cause must depend upon the judgment and
discretion of the judge x x x issuing the warrant. x x x. His conclusion
as to whether ‘probable cause’ existed or not is final and conclusive.
If he is satisfied that ‘probable cause’ exists from the facts stated in
the complaint, made upon the investigation by the prosecuting
attorney, then his conclusion is sufficient upon which to issue a
warrant of arrest. He may, however, if he is not satisfied, call such
witnesses as he may deem necessary before issuing the warrant. x x
x. There is no law which prohibits him from reaching the conclusion
that ‘probable cause’ exists from the statement of the prosecuting
attorney alone, or any other person whose statement or affidavit is
entitled to credit in the opinion of the judge x x x. The preliminary
investigation conducted by the petitioner (Provincial Fiscal) under
Republic Act No. 732 x x x does not, as correctly contended by the
respondent Judge, dispense with the latter’s duty to exercise his
judicial power of determining, before issuing the corresponding
warrant of arrest, whether or not probable cause exists therefor. The
Constitution vests such power in the respondent judge who,
however, may rely on the facts stated in the information filed after
preliminary investigation by the prosecuting attorney” (Amarga vs.
Abbas, March 28, 1956, 98 Phil. 739, 741-742).
While the power to conduct preliminary examination may be
delegated by law to government prosecutors, only the judge can
issue the warrant of arrest under the 1935 Constitution and prior
thereto (Sayo, et al. vs. Chief of Police, et al. 80 Phil. 859; Lino vs.
Fugoso, 77 Phil. 933; Hashim vs. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216).
394
The valid seizure of a person can only be executed through a lawful
warrant of arrest. Arrest without a warrant can only be legally
effected by a police officer or private individual a) when the person
to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to
commit an offense in his presence; b) when an offense has in fact
been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and c) when the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another (Sec. 6, Rule 113, 1964 Revised
Rules of Court).
In all other cases, there must be a valid warrant of arrest. When
the seizure of a person is made without a warrant of arrest or with
a warrant of arrest which is not based on a determination by the
judge of the existence of probable cause, the arrest becomes
unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional.
Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 108 of the 1940 Rules of Court expressly
confer on the municipal or city judge, the City Fiscal and the Judge
of the Court of First Instance the power to conduct preliminary
examination or investigation.
On June 20, 1957, Republic Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the
Anti-Subversion Law, was approved. The proviso of Section 5 thereof
expressly provides that the preliminary investigation of offenses
defined and penalized therein by prision mayor to death shall be
conducted by the proper Court of First Instance. This grant
obviously is exclusive of the provincial or city fiscal or other
government prosecutors whose power to conduct preliminary
investigation in all other cases is affirmed in the first clause of
Section 5 thereof.
Sections 13 and 14 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court re-state
Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 108 of the 1940 Rules of Court.
As aforestated, aside from the challenged Sections 3 and 6 of
Republic Act No. 5179 creating the Circuit Criminal Courts,
Republic Act 5180 was approved on September 8, 1967, which
affirms the prerogative of the Courts of First Instance to conduct
preliminary investigation of offenses punishable by said courts.
Presidential Decrees Nos. 77 and 911 promulgated respectively on
December 6, 1972 and March 23, 1976, amending
395
VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 395
Republic Act No. 5180, did not modify the opening clause of Section
1 of said Republic Act 5180 affirming the power of the Court of First
Instance to conduct preliminary investigation in accordance with
law and the Rules of Court.
Section 234 of the 1971 Revised Election Code, otherwise known
as Republic Act No. 6388, vests in the Court of First Instance
“exclusive original jurisdiction to make preliminary investigations,
issue warrants of arrest and try and decide any criminal case or
proceeding for violation of” the Election Law. This provision was a
reiteration of the previous election laws (Act No. 1582 of 1907; Com.
Act No. 357 of 1938; and Republic Act No. 180 of 1947, as amended).
After the ratification of the 1973 Constitution on January 17,
1973, the source of the authority of the judge to conduct preliminary
examination for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest, is still the
Constitution, this time the 1973 Constitution, which likewise
guarantees “the right of the people to be secure in their persons x x
x against unreasonable x x x seizures for whatever nature and for
any purpose x x x and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or
such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing x x x the
persons x x x to be seized” (Sec. 3 of Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). The
1973 Constitution, instead of employing the generic
term warrants to comprehend both search warrants and warrants of
arrest, as did the 1935 Constitution, expressly specifies “search
warrants or warrants of arrest.” The purpose of such specification
was apparently to clarify the doubt raised by the dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice Montemayor in the Amarga case, supra, that the 1935
Constitution merely guarantees against unreasonable searches but
not against unreasonable arrests, despite the fact that the
constitutional guarantee expressly affirms “the right of the people
to be secure in their persons x x x against unreasonable x x x
seizures x x x and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause,
to be determined by the persons x x x x to be seized” (Par. 3, Sec. 1,
Art. III, 1935 Constitution).
In passing, the dissent of Justice Montemayor in the Amarga
396
case seems to deny equal, if not greater, importance to individual
freedom from illegal arrest or arbitrary detention vis-a-vis property
rights and right against self-incrimination. It will also likewise be
noted that the 1973 Constitution also authorizes the law-making
authority to empower other responsible officers to conduct such
preliminary examination for purposes of the issuance of a warrant
of arrest. As enunciated in the Amarga case and in U.S. versus
Ocampo (18 Phil. 1, 41-42), the government prosecutors may be
authorized to conduct such preliminary examination and their
determination of the existence of probable cause may be relied upon
by the judge, who may, as a consequence, issue the warrant of arrest;
although the judge himself is not precluded from conducting his own
preliminary examination despite the conclusion of the prosecuting
attorney as to the existence or nonexistence of probable cause.
III
1. 1.The challenged order of July 6, 1971 issued by the

respondent Judge in G.R. No. L-34038 (Collector of Customs,
etc. vs. Hon. Onofre Villaluz, et al.) dismissed the criminal
complaint filed by petitioners therein against private
respondent with prejudice, obviously meaning that the case
may not be re-filed without exposing the accused to double
jeopardy. The respondent Judge seriously erred in so issuing
said order, contravening as it does a basic legal principle on
double jeopardy, and committing thereby a grave abuse of
discretion. The constitutional right against double jeopardy
exists, not after the first preliminary examination or
investigation, but only after the first trial which results either
in conviction or acquittal or in the dismissal or termination of
the case without the express consent of the accused by a court
of competent jurisdiction upon a valid complaint or
information and after the accused had pleaded to the charge
(Sec. 9, Rule 117, Revised Rules of Court; Taladua vs.
Ochotorena, et al.L-25595, February 15, 1974; Republic vs.
Agoncillo, L-27257 August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 579; People vs.
Obsania, L-24447, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1249; People vs.
Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851).
As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, petitioner’s counsel,

“dismissal at preliminary investigation is never with prejudice. Re-
filing of the same is allowed if evidence has
397
VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 397
become sufficient to warrant conviction of private respondent.”
There has been no deviation from such established jurisprudence
exemplified in People vs. Bagsican (6 SCRA 400), wherein the Court
held that “the finding in the preliminary in restitution that no prima
facie case existed against the accused does not bar subsequent
prosecution and conviction.—Such finding is not final acquittal as
would preclude further proceedings” (italics supplied).
1. 2.Aggravating his grave mistake and misapprehension of the

law, respondent Judge also directed through the same order
the return of the articles allegedly seized from the person of
respondent Makapugay. This portion of the questioned order
is fraught with undesirable consequences.
As stated heretofore, the dismissal of a case, even with prejudice,

during the stage of preliminary investigation does not bar
subsequent prosecution and conviction if the evidence warrants the
re-filing of the same. But with the challenged order commanding the
return of the articles subject matter of the complaint, the re-filing of
the same becomes next to impossible. For the enforcement of such
order would virtually deprive herein petitioner Collector of Customs
of the evidence indispensable to a successful prosecution of the case
against the private respondent. Worse, the order nullified the power
of seizure of the customs official.
Respondent Judge ignored the established principle that from the
moment imported goods are actually in the possession or control of
the Customs authorities, even if no warrant of seizure had
previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection
with seizure and forfeiture proceedings, the Bureau of Customs
acquires exclusive jurisdiction over such imported goods for the
purpose of enforcing the Customs laws, subject to an appeal only to
the Court of Tax Appeals and to final review by the Supreme Court
(Sections 2205 and 2303, Tariff and Customs Code; Papa, et al. vs.
Mago, et al., Feb. 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 857; Virata, et al. vs. Aquino,
et al. Sept. 30, 1973, 53 SCRA, 24; see also Vierneza vs.
Commissioner, July 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 394; Farm Implement &
Machinery vs. Commissioner, August 30, 1968, 24 SCRA
905; Lazatin vs. Commissioner, et al., July 30, 1969, 28 SCRA
1016; Asaali, et al. vs. Commissioner, December 16, 1968, 26 SCRA
382; Sare Enterprises vs. Commissioner, Aug. 28, 1969, 29 SCRA
112; Geotina, etc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., August 30, 1971, 40
SCRA 362;
398
Commissioner vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., January 31,
1972; Lopez vs. Commissioner, et al., January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA
327; Geotina vs. Broadway, etc., et al., January 30, 1971, 37, SCRA
410; Auyong Hian vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., September 12,
1974, 59 SCRA 110; and Pacis, et al. vs. Pamaran, etc., et al., March
15, 1974, 56 SCRA 16). Such exclusive jurisdiction precludes the
Court of First Instance as well as the Circuit Criminal Court from
assuming cognizance of the subject matter (Enrile, et al. vs. Venuya,
et al., January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 381) and divests such courts of
the prerogative to replevin properties subject to seizure and
forfeiture proceedings for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code
(Diosamito, et al. vs. Balanque, et al., July 28, 1969, 28 SCRA
836; Señares vs. Frias, June 10, 1971, 39 SCRA 533); because
proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not
criminal in nature since they do not result in the conviction of
wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon him of a penalty (Lazatin vs.
Commissioner, et al., July 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 1016).
Respondent Judge claims that the pendency of a seizure
proceeding was never brought to his attention (p. 038, rec.) and that
he could not have foreseen the possibility that petitioner would be
instituting seizure proceedings x x x and besides, it is understood
that the order of the court commanding the release of the subject
articles was on a premise that herein petitioner was not holding or
withholding the same for some other lawful reason (p. 039, rec.).
The questioned order of respondent Judge is unqualified and
contains no intimation that the “release x x x was on a premise that
herein petitioner was not holding or withholding the same for some
other lawful reason.” On the contrary, the tenor of the order is so
absolute and so emphatic that it really leaves no alternative for
petitioner Collector of Customs except to return the articles.
The records of the case, moreover, reveal that a report of
seizure (p. 14, rec.) and a warrant of seizure and detention (p. 15,
rec.) were made by petitioner Collector of Customs on June 30, 1971
and on July 9, 1971 respectively. It is patent that respondent Judge
knew actually of the existence at least of the report of seizure of June
30, 1971, which is six days prior to his order of dismissal dated July
6, 1971. He should have anticipated that a warrant of seizure and
detention will logically be issued as in fact it was issued on July 9,
1971,
399
VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 399
because it was the petitioner Collector of Customs who filed the
criminal complaint directly with him on July 1, 1971. Respondent
Judge chose to ignore the presence of the report of seizure dated
June 30, 1971, six days before his order of dismissal and the filing
of the criminal complaint on July 1, 1971. Prudence should have
counselled him, so as not to frustrate the petitioner Collector of
Customs in enforcing the tariff and customs laws, against ordering
the release of the seized articles without first ascertaining from the
petitioner Collector of Customs whether the latter intended to
institute or had instituted seizure proceedings.
As aptly expressed by Mr. Justice Barredo in his Concurring
Opinion in People vs. Gutierrez, supra, “It is not enough that a judge
trusts himself or can be trusted as capable of acting in good faith, it
is equally important that no circumstance attendant to the
proceedings should mar that quality of trustworthiness.” We have
enjoined judges to apply the law as interpreted by the Supreme
Court and not to dispose of a case according to their personal views
(Albert vs. Court of First Instance, 23 SCRA 948).
IV
In G.R. No. L-36376 (Enriquez, et al. vs. Hon. Onofre Villaluz, et al.),
the arbitrary denials displayed by respondent Judge of motions
presented before him likewise invite some cautionary reminders
from this Court.
In this case, petitioners were given an unreasonable period of one
(1) day within which to elevate the matter before this Tribunal. But
considering the novelty of the issue, a grant of twenty-four hours to
prepare a petition for certiorari is a virtual denial of the motion. And
petitioners’ motion for an extension of at least one (1) day was
peremptorily brushed aside by respondent Judge with one single
word - DENIED.
The fact that petitioners succeeded in bringing the matter before
the Supreme Court within, the constricted period of time granted
them is beside the point. More important is the consideration by this
Court of the dangers posed by respondent Judge’s peremptory denial
of a reasonable time.
Indeed, it is commendable to see judges hasten the disposition of
cases pending before them. But more commendable would be for
judges to contribute their share in maintaining the
400
unswerving faith of litigants in the courts of justice. WE once again
stress that “One important judicial norm is that a judge’s official
conduct should be free from appearance of impropriety” (Luque vs.
Kayanan, 29 SCRA 165).
V
But while we sustain the power of the Circuit Criminal Courts to
conduct preliminary examination (p. 36), pursuant to OUR
constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts
(Sec. 6, Art. X, 1973 Constitution) as a matter of policy, WE enjoin
the respondent Judge and other Circuit Criminal Court Judges to
concentrate on hearing and deciding criminal cases filed before their
courts (see Mateo vs. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18, 28-29, March 31, 1973).
The primary purpose of the creation of the Circuit Criminal Courts
in addition to the existing Courts of First Instance, as above
intimated, is to mitigate the case load of the Courts of First Instance
as well as to expedite the disposition of criminal cases involving
serious offenses specified in Section 1 of Republic Act 5179, as
amended. Circuit Criminal Judges therefore, should not encumber
themselves with the preliminary examination and investigation of
criminal complaints, which they should refer to the municipal judge
or provincial or city fiscal, who in turn can utilize the assistance of
the state prosecutor to conduct such preliminary examination and
investigation. Or the Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court can
directly request the Secretary of Justice to assign a state prosecutor
for the same purpose (Sec. 3, Republic Act No. 5184).
Moreover, it seems that respondent Judge does not have adequate
time to hear and dispose of the 34 criminal cases with detention
prisoners pending in his sala, aside from the 479 pending cases of
voluntary submission by drug addicts as of January 31, 1975 (A.M.
No. 230-CCC, Item 42, Agenda of March 13, 1975), as revealed by
his letter dated February 26, 1975, wherein he requested the
Supreme Court to renew the temporary detail in his sala of
Municipal Judge Hermenegildo C. Cruz of Mandaluyong, Rizal, to
assist him. This significant fact should further dissuade him from
actively conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal cases
directly filed with him.
Furthermore, Judges of the Circuit Criminal Courts whose
401
VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 401
dockets permit, may be assigned by the Supreme Court for a period
not exceeding 6 months, unless with their consent, to assist Judges
of regular Courts of First Instance with clogged dockets (Sec. 5[3],
Art. X, 1973 Constitution).
WHEREFORE, IN G.R. NOS. L-34243, 36376, 38688 AND 39525,
THE PETITIONS ARE HEREBY DISMISSED AND THE WRITS
OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR RESTRAINING
ORDERS ISSUED THEREIN ARE HEREBY LIFTED; IN G.R. No.
L-40031, THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED; AND IN G.R.
NO. L-34038, THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE DATED
JULY 6, 1971 IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AS NULL AND VOID
INSOFAR AS THE SAME DISMISSED THE CRIMINAL
CASE WITH PREJUDICE AND INSOFAR AS THE SAME
DIRECTED THE RETURN TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT
THEREIN OF THE ARTICLES SEIZED FROM HIM WHICH ARE
NOW SUBJECT OF SEIZURE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE
CUSTOMS AUTHORITIES, AND THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION ISSUED THEREIN IS HEREBY MADE
PERMANENT. NO COSTS.
Castro, C.J., Teehankee, Antonio, Esguerra, Muñoz
Palma, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.
Fernando and Barredo, JJ., concurs and submits a brief
opinion.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Petitions dismissed and writs lifted.
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
The opinion of the Court, both thorough and comprehensive, penned

by Justice Makasiar, is impressive for its analytical skill and
scholarly attributes. On the whole then, especially so where
reference is made to our previous decisions, there is no impediment
to full concurrence. This is particularly true where it concerns the
ruling announced by this Court, i.e., “that both Section 1(3), Article
III of the 1935 Constitution and Section 3, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution provide the source of the power of all Judges, including
Judges of the Court of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts,
and other courts of equivalent rank, to conduct the examination to
determine probable cause before the issuance of the warrant of
arrest and therefore sustain the proceedings conducted by
respondent
402
Judge leading to the issuance of the warrants of arrest and his
referral of the cases to the fiscal or other government prosecutor for
the filing of the corresponding information.” At that, there is still
1
need, it seems to me, for a few words not only to set forth the extent
of my agreement with my brethren but also to indicate what for me
are the precise limits of our holding. The full and exhaustive
treatment of the specific issue dealing with the power of the circuit
criminal courts to conduct preliminary examination, with historical
and textual allusions to the previous judicial pronouncements and
comparable statutory provisions, certainly a virtue to be
commended, may for those not sufficiently discerning, yield
implications which, for me, go further than is intended by us. It is
my understanding then that the decision reached is at most an
affirmation that the present Constitution, as did the 1935
Constitution, confers the power to conduct preliminary examination
preparatory to issuing a warrant of arrest, to a circuit criminal court
judge. Even then, however, he should for sound policy reasons curb
any eagerness or propensity to make use of such competence.
1. 1.To repeat, it is solely the first stage in the criminal process

that may lead to the apprehension of the accused that has
been passed upon by this Court. It has not considered the
second stage, that of preliminary investigation proper, one of
equal significance. As far back as 1910, its importance was
stressed in United States v. Grant and Kennedy. Thus: “The
2
object or purpose of a preliminary investigation, or a previous

inquiry of some kind, before an accused person is placed upon
trial, is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and
oppressive prosecutions, and to protect him from an open and
public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense, and
anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the State from
useless and expensive trials.” It is of the essence then that the
3
___________________
1 Opinion, I (36).
2 18 Phil. 122.
3 Ibid, 147. The United States v. Grant decision was cited with approval in United
States v. Laban, 21 Phil. 297(1912); United States v. Carlos, 21 Phil.

553 (1911); United States v. Go Chanco, 23 Phil. 641 (1912); United States v. Ipil, 27
Phil. 530 (1914); United States v Remigio, 37 Phil. 599 (1918); United States v.
Alabot, 38 Phil. 698 (1918); Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 (1920); People v.
Solon, 47
403
VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 403
1. accused should be heard. There are overtones in the opinion

of the Court susceptible to being misinterpreted in this regard,
if it be assumed that upon the termination of the preliminary
examination the arraignment and trial could then proceed. I
would dissociate myself from such a view. I am gratified
therefore that it is made explicit therein that our ruling is
limited to the power of a judge under the Circuit Criminal
Court Act to conduct a preliminary examination. As to his
4
competence regarding a preliminary investigation, it is my

understanding that the question has been left open.
2. 2.Respondent Judge was likewise admonished “to concentrate
on hearing and deciding criminal cases filed before their
courts (see Mateo v. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18, 28-29, March 31,
1973.” That is as it should be. It is well that it is so. The
5
occasion for its exercise should be minimized. That is the

teaching of Mateo v. Villaluz, the same respondent Judge in
these petitions. The facts could be differentiated, but the
principle announced holds true. The load to be shouldered by
a trial judge is heavy enough for him to attend to matters
which could be looked after by municipal judges. So this
excerpt from Mateo would indicate: “To avoid any further
controversies of this nature, lower court judges are well-
advised to limit themselves to the task of adjudication and to
leave to others the role of notarizing declarations. The less an
occupant of the bench fritters away his time and energy in
tasks [that could be left to other hands], the less the danger of
his being a participant in any event that might lend itself to
the interpretation that his impartiality has been
compromised. There is much to be said for displaying zeal and
eagerness in stamping out criminality, but that role is hardly
fit for a judge who must bide his time until the case is before
him. He must
__________________
Phil. 443 (1925); People v. Villegas, 55 Phil. 567 (1931); People v. Caringan, 61
Phil. 416 (1935); People v. Castillo, 76 Phil. 72 (1946); People v. Dizon, 76 Phil.
265 (1946); People v. Zapanta, 79 Phil. 308 (1947); Sayo v. Chief of Police of
Manila, 80 Phil. 859 (1948); Bustos v. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640 (1948); Lozada v.
Hernandez, 92 Phil. 1051(1953); Rodriguez v. Arellano, 96 Phil. 954 (1955); Santos,
Jr. v. Flores, L-18251, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1136; Molinyawe v. Flores, L-18256,
Aug. 31 1962, 5 SCRA 1137; People v. Figueroa, L-24273, April 30, 1969, 27 SCRA
1239; Sausi v. Querubin, L-24122, Jan. 29, 1975, 62 SCRA 154.
4 Republic Act No. 5179 (1967).
5 Opinion, V.
404
1. ever be on guard lest what is done by him, even from the best
of motives, may be thought of as eroding that objectivity and
sobriety which are the hallmarks of judicial conduct. Thus
should he attend to the performance of the sacred trust that
is his.” For me, the fact that a judge had listened to testimony
6
damaging to a prospective accused, without his being given

the opportunity to refute the same, may lead to a subsconcious
prejudice difficult to erase at the stage of trial.
BARREDO, J.: Concurring—
I concur in the result of the judgment in these cases, for although

the main opinion sustains the authority of Circuit Criminal Courts
to conduct preliminary investigations, it strictly ordains, however,
that “as a matter of policy (sic) We enjoin the respondent Judge and
other Circuit Criminal Court Judges to concentrate on hearing and
deciding criminal cases filed before their courts.” With such an
imperious mandate, I am satisfied that Circuit Criminal Courts will
not anymore do what I am fully convinced they are not legally
permitted to do. I am certain no Criminal Court Judge will dare
deviate from the “policy” announced in the main opinion, which, of
course, I say is the policy of Republic Act 5179 itself. Indeed, my
uncompromising position is that it is the policy of the law itself,
rather than that of this Court alone as the main opinion would seem
to imply, that Circuit Criminal Courts should strictly confine
themselves to merely trying and deciding the cases assigned to
them, and I have always insisted that it should be on the basis of
that very policy of the law itself informed in public interest that this
Court should construe the statutory provision here in issue, Section
1 of Republic Act 5179 which provides as follows:
“In each of the sixteen judicial districts for the Court of First Instance as
presently constituted, there is hereby created a Circuit Criminal Court with
limited jurisdiction, concurrent with the regular Court of First Instance, to
try and decide the following criminal cases fulling under the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the latter:
1. ‘a.Crimes committed by public officers, crimes against poisons

and crimes against property as defined and penalized under
the Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complexed with
other crimes;
___________________
6 L-34756-59, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 18, 28-29.

405
VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 405
1. ‘b.Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, x x x;
2. ‘c.Violations of Sections 3601, 3602 and 3604 of the Tariff and
Customs Code and Sections 174, 175 and 345 of the National-
Internal Revenue Code.’ ”
Thus, the judgment of the Court in these cases will after all
effectively effectuate what I maintain is the spirit of the Act,
notwithstanding the considerations predicating the main opinion
which, with due respect to my learned brethren in majority, I find it
impossible to agree with. And so, I can give my assent to the
judgment in these cases without my having to sacrifice my
conviction regarding the question of statutory construction herein
involved, which I am explaining in this separate opinion. Frankly, I
will never be able to comprehend why the majority can give the
above provision a construction contrary to what plainly appears to
be policy that underlies it, only for them to just the same “enjoin” all
Circuit Criminal Courts “as a matter of policy”, (of the Court) that
they should not conduct preliminary investigations, which I say the
statute, as a matter of policy, never intended to allow them to do
anyway.
Notwithstanding the scholarly and extended main opinion, I am
not persuaded that the legislature ever intended to confer upon
Circuit Criminal Courts the power to conduct preliminary
investigations. Not only the specific words of the above provision,
but the development of the law on preliminary investigations and
the circumstances obtaining at the time Republic Act 5179 was
enacted point unmistakably, in my considered opinion, to this
conclusion.
There are already two earlier cases in which this Court had to
dwell on the extent of the jurisdiction of the circuit criminal courts.
In both of them, the approach was restrictive. Way back in 1968, in
the case of People vs. Paderna, 22 SCRA 273, the Court was
confronted with the question of whether or not the mere fact that
under Section 1 (c) of Republic Act 5179, the organic act of the circuit
criminal courts, mentions violations of Section 174 of the National
Internal Revenue Code to be among the cases under the jurisdiction
of said courts, is enough justification for disregarding the penalty
provided in the Revenue Code of fine of not less than P50 nor more
than P200 and imprisonment of not less than 5 nor more than 30
days when the value of the cigarettes involved does not exceed P500,
406
which ordinarilay would make such violation fall within the original
jurisdiction of the City Court of La Carlota City and considering
such violations to be within the jurisdiction of the corresponding
Circuit Criminal Court. The Court, thru Justice Fred Ruiz Castro,
resolved the problem this wise:
“The jurisdiction of the circuit criminal courts is thus dependent not only on
the type of cases but also on the penalties provided for those cases.
Inasmuch as the case at bar falls within the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the city court, it cannot, even if it involves a violation of
section 174 of the Tax Code, be taken cognizance of by the circuit criminal
courts the jurisdiction of which is concurrent with that of courts of first
instance in criminal cases where the latter’s jurisdiction is original and
exclusive.” (At p. 279.)
Almost four years later, in Paraguya vs. Tiro, 41 SCRA 137, the
issue was whether or not a case of indirect bribery, a crime
committed by a public officer included in Section 1(a) of the Act, but
punishable under Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code with arresto
mayor,suspension and public censure, penalties which are
imposable by the city of municipal courts concurrently, with the
courts of first instance, may be considered as within the jurisdiction
of the. Circuit Criminal Courts. We held that the fact alone that the
crime involved was one committed by a public officer did not suffice
to place the case within the jurisdiction of said courts. Reiterating
the predicate of adherence to the letter of the statute adopted in
Parenda, supra, Justice J.B.L. Reyes, exphasized the reason
therefor thus:
“In fact, the intention of the legislature to bestow unto these special criminal
courts limited jurisdiction is clear not only from the provision of the law
itself; it was so stated that this limited jurisdiction of the circuit courts
would enable them to act with dispatch on the cases cognizable by said
tribunals. And, this is precisely the purpose for which the circuit criminal
courts were created—to contribute to the speedy resolution of criminal cases
and help curb the progression of criminality in the country (Explanatory
Note to Senate Bill No. 388, which became Republic Act No. 5179)” (At p
142.)
In the cases at bar, it is admitted in the main opinion that because
“the primary purpose of the creation of the Circuit Criminal Courts
in addition to the existing Courts of First Instance, as above
intimated, is to expedite the disposition of criminal cases involving
serious offenses specified in Section 1
407
VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 407
of Republic Act 5179, . . . Circuit Criminal Judges, therefore, should
not encumber themselves with attending to the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints, which they
should refer to the Provincial or City Fiscals, who, in turn can utilize
the assistance of the state prosecutor for the same purpose.” What
is more, as if to predicate such observations on actuality and project
them in the context of what is happening in the very court of
respondent judge, the main opinion invites attention to the number
of pending cases and matters therein which compelled respondent
judge, according to the opinion, to seek from this Court the detail of
a municipal judge to assist him. It further points out that under
Section 5(3) Article X of the Constitution, Criminal Court Judges
may be temporarily assigned by the Supreme Court to other
stations, provided that, without the consent of the judges concerned,
such assignment may not last longer than six months. And to these
1
very apt observations, it may be added that unlike in the regular

courts of first instance, in circuit criminal courts “the trial of cases .
. . once commenced, shall be continuous until terminated and the
judgment shall be rendered within thirty days from the time the
case is submitted for decision.” (Sec. 6, R.A. 5179).
To my mind, all these considerations were precisely what the
Congress had in mind when it enacted the law creating the circuit
criminal courts. As may be seen, all of these considerations point to
the necessity of freeing the said courts from all functions other than
“to try and decide” the cases enumerated in the Act. It is
inconceivable that with said considerations in view, Congress could
have meant by omitting mention of preliminary investigations in the
statute that it should nevertheless be construed in the sense of
“encumbering”, to borrow the language of the main opinion, the
circuit criminal courts with the burden of “attending to preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints”, which the
main opinion emphasizes and the legislature must be presumed to
have known can be better performed by the multitudinous other
offices in the prosecution staff of the government already referred to
above.
___________________
1 Under Section 7 of Republic Act 5179, itself the Secretary of Justice, (now the
Supreme Court) could make Circuit Criminal Court Judges hold sessions and try
cases pertaining to other districts for a period of not more than three months.
408
It is important to note that the conferment in the Judiciary Act of
jurisdiction upon the regular courts of first instance is worded thus:
“SEC. 44. Original jurisdiction.—Courts of First Instance shall have
original jurisdiction:
1. (a)In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not
capable of pecuniary estimation;
2. (b)In all civil actions which involve the title to or possession of real
property, or any interest therein, or the legality of any tax, impost or
assessment, except actions of forcible entry into and detainer on
lands or buildings, original jurisdiction of which is conferred by this
Act upon city and municipal courts;
3. (c)In all cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value
of property in controversy, amounts to more than ten thousand pesos;
(RA Nos. 2613 & 3828.)
4. (d)In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, irrespective
of the value of the property in controversy or the amount of the
demand;
5. (e)In all matters of probate, both of testate and intestate estates,
appointment of guardians, (See also Section 90, and note thereof.)
trustees and receivers, and in all actions for annulment of marriage,
and in all such special cases and proceedings as are not otherwise
provided for;
6. (f)In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is
imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two
hundred pesos;
7. (g)Over all crimes and offenses committed on the high seas or beyond
the jurisdiction of any country, or within any of the navigable waters
of the Philippines, on board a ship or watercraft of any kind
registered or licensed in the Philippines in accordance with the laws
thereof. The jurisdiction herein conferred may be exercised by the
Court of First Instance in any province into which the ship or
watercraft upon which the crime or offense was committed shall come
after the commission thereof: Provided, That the court first lawfully
taking cognizance thereof shall have jurisdiction of the same to the
exclusion of all other courts in the Philippines, and
8. (h)Said court and their judges, or any of them, shall have the power to
issue writ of injunction, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo
warranto and habeas corpus in their respective provinces and
districts, in the manner provided in the Rules of Court.”
Significantly, unlike Section 1 of Republic Act 5179, this provision

does not say that the Courts of First Instance shall
409
VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 409
“try and decide” the cases therein enumerated. Rather, it simply
says they shall have original jurisdiction “in” and “over” the
respective cases mentioned. In other words, Section 1 of Republic
Act 5179 does not grant the circuit criminal courts jurisdiction “in”
or “over” the cases listed, but, as may be plainly seen in the above-
quoted tenor of its pertinent provision, only “the limited jurisdiction
. . . to try and decide” them. To my mind, this difference in
phraseology must have been intentional in order to emphasize the
restricted and limited prerogatives of Circuit Criminal Courts, not
only as to the nature of the cases that can be filed with them but also
as to the extent of their functions and powers relative to said cases.
I maintain that consonant with the need to make of the Circuit
Criminal Courts the courts of special and limited jurisdiction
designed to attend with utmost expeditiousness to the cases
assigned to them, as undoubtedly the law intends them to be,
Section 1 of the Act should be construed, even in case of doubt in the
sense not only that the jurisdiction of said courts is limited to the
cases which they may take cognizance of, but also in that any other
work not strictly part of the functions to “try and decide” said cases,
is not contemplated to be performed by them.
It is a familiar rule that the jurisdiction of a court, may not be
deemed granted by mere implication, unless perhaps in instances
when this is indubitably clear. Whenever there is reason to doubt,
as in the case before Us, precisely because of the considerations
expounded in the main opinion as to why, as a matter of this Court’s
policy, at least, the circuit criminal courts should refrain from
holding preliminary investigations, the rule, as I know it, is to deny
the existence of power. In this connection, it should be borne in mind
that the power to conduct preliminary investigations has never been
deemed as a mere incidental prerogative of any court. It exists only
when duly granted.
It should be noted from the provisions of Section 44 of the
Judiciary Act aforequoted that even the authority of the regular
courts of first instance to grant writs of injuction, mandamus,
certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus, which by
their nature could reasonably be deemed inferable from the grant of
general jurisdiction, had still to be granted expressly to said courts,
and only within their respective provinces and districts. And this
Court has been very restrictive in construing
410
this particular grant of jurisdiction. (See Director of Forestry vs.
Ruiz, L-24882, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 559, and cases therein
cited.) To repeat, such authority would seem to be implicit from the
grant of general jurisdiction, and yet We always insist that it should
be specifically conferred. Now, is there anything in the conduct of
preliminary investigations that makes it more inherent or
inseparable from the expressed power “to try and decide” that
necessarily, We must consider the same as included in said power or
as something that must indispensably be added thereto, such that
the authority therefor need not be spelled out in black and white?
Withal, if in the case of inferior courts, which everyone knows have
always conducted preliminary investigations since the enactment of
Act 194 in 1901, the Judiciary Act had to expressly provide for the
grant of such authority to them, what special reason is there why
the conferment upon circuit criminal courts of the faculty to “try and
decide” certain types of criminal cases should be deemed as
necessarily including the authority to conduct preliminary
investigations related thereto, when according to what the main
opinion emphasizes, such function can be better performed by the
prosecution staff of the government?
The main opinion holds that it “is plain and evident from Sections
3 and 6 of their organic act, Republic Act 5179” that circuit criminal
courts “have the same powers and functions as those conferred upon
regular Courts of First Instance necessary to effectively exercise
(their) special and limited jurisdiction.” But I am afraid this
reasoning ignores that “the powers and functions (of) the regular
Courts of First Instance” conferred upon the circuit criminal courts
are only those “necessary (for them) to effectively exercise (their)
special and limited jurisdiction”, and the issue precisely is what is
the extent of that special and limited jurisdiction. As I have already
pointed out, that “special and limited jurisdiction” is “to try and
decide” the cases enumerated, and this power does not have to be
accompanied, whether by logical implication or by the reasons
behind the organization of the courts, by the authority to conduct
preliminary investigations. I dare say, in connection with the
provisions of Section 3 of the Act, that the provisions of laws and
Rules of Court, if any, granting jurisdiction to regular courts of first
instance to conduct preliminary investigations are inconsistent with
the provisions of the Act, considering that these latter provisions
contemplate circuit criminal courts
411
VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 411
which should not undertake the functions of conducting preliminary
investigations, as found factually by the main opinion, albeit
surprisingly the majority would give weight to such factual finding
only to serve as basis for a policy only of the Court, instead of
utilizing the same as premise for the proper construction of the Act
in order that such policy may be legally effectuated, since it is indeed
the policy underlying the law itself. And besides, a careful reading
of Section 3 should make it clear to everyone that its phraseology
studiously refers not to all the powers of the judges of the Courts of
First Instance, but only to “the provisions of the laws and the Rules
of Court relative to the Judges of the Courts of First Instance”,
meaning their qualifications, salaries, transfer etc. and to their
powers and prerogatives in “the trial, and disposition and appeal of
criminal cases” in the circuit criminal courts, which is plainly
consistent with the scope of the power granted to them under Section
1 “to try and decide.”
The main opinion quotes from my concurring opinion in People vs.
Gutierrez, 36 SCRA 172, apparently to show that in my view, “circuit
criminal courts are nothing but additonal branches of the regular
Courts of First Instance in their respective districts”. But the portion
quoted from my opinion is not complete. What I said was this:
“I take it that under Republic Act 5179, Circuit Criminal Courts arc nothing
but additional branches of the regular Courts of First Instance in their
respective districts with the limited concurrent jurisdiction to take
cognizance of, try and decide only those cases enumerated in Section 1 of
the Act. This is readily implied from Section 3 of the Act which says:
“ ‘SEC. 3. The provisions of all laws and the Rules of Court relative to the judges of
the Courts of First Instance and the trial, disposition and appeal of criminal cases
therein shall be applicable to the circuit judge and the cases cognizable by them
insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.’
“x x x x”
In other words, I adhered closely to the language of the statute and

referred to the jurisdiction of the criminal courts as comprising of
the power “to take cognizance of, try and decide” only the cases
therein enumerated. I did not concede that the authority was
broadly “over” those cases, as in Section 44 of Judiciary Act, but
strictly “to take cognizance of, try and
412
decide” them.
There is another point which is more transcendental. The main
opinion assumes the correctness of the generally prevailing
impression that courts of first instance continue to possess the
jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigations. It cites the Rules
of Court as the source of such authority. For my part, I am not sure,
to put it mildly, that the Supreme Court can arrogate jurisdiction
unto itself or grant any to the lower courts by merely promulgating
a rule to such effect. I believe it is safer to hold that jurisdiction to
act on any given matter may be granted only by statute or legislative
enactment, for the simple reason that jurisdiction is substantive and
not adjective in nature. And so, the question in my mind is simply
this, assuming arguendo that circuit criminal courts have all the
powers of the regular courts of first instance, which I dispute, is it
clear that the latter courts continued to possess, after the Judiciary
Act of 1948 went into effect, the power to conduct preliminary
investigations? In other words, are the provisions of the Rules of
Court invoked in the main opinion, Section 13 of Rule 112,
predicated on any law or statute?
According to former Chief Justice Moran, this section was “taken,
with amendments, from Section 4 of former Rule 108, which was a
substantial re-statement of the ruling of the Supreme Court in one
case”, citing People vs. Solon, supra. (See 4 Moran, Rules of Court,
p. 117, 1970 ed.) But Sec. 4 of Rule 108 was part of the Rules of Court
of 1940, when Act 1627 was still in force. Apparently, when Rule 108
was revised in the 1964 Rules, it was overlooked that under Section
99 of the Judiciary Act, “all laws and rules inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act” was repealed thereby wiping away Section 37
of Act 1627.
No matter how many times one may read the provisions of the
whole Judiciary Act of 1948 and particularly those that refer to the
jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance, one will never find any
word therein that directly or indirectly confers upon said courts the
authority to conduct preliminary investigations. In pointing out this
patent omission, I am of course assuming that the jurisdiction to
conduct preliminary investigations, while sometimes given to courts
in spite of its being basically an executive function per Orendain, is 2
not inherent in every court. For instance, in the Judiciary Act itself,
__________________
2Estrella v. Orendain, G.R. No. L-19611, February 27, 1971, 37 SCRA 640.
413
VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 413
it can be clearly seen that as in the case of Act 194, seventy-five
years ago, by Section 87 of the Act, the legislature had to expressly
vest upon inferior courts the power to conduct such preliminary
investigations. Thus, Section 87 provides in unmistakable terms:
x x x x x x
“Said municipal judges and judges of city courts may also conduct
preliminary investigation for any offense alleged to have been committed
within their respective municipalities and cities which are cognizable by
Courts of First Instance and the information filed with their courts without
regard to the limits of punishment, and may release, or commit and bind
over any person charged with such offense to secure his appearance before
the proper court.”
x x x x x x
If, as the majority maintain, the power to conduct preliminary
investigation is vested in all our courts by the Bill of Rights in the
Constitution, of what need is there for the provision just quoted?
Upon the other hand, if such conferment is merely confirmatory of
an existing constitutionally based authority, I see no reason at all
why there should be such an express confirmation of the power of
inferior courts alone and none at all of that of the Courts of First
Instance.
My position is that the silence of the pertinent provisions of the
Judiciary Act on the matter, taken together with the fact that
Section 99 of the Act repeals all laws and rules inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act, indicates an unmistakable legislative
intention to remove from the Courts of First Instance the
prerogative under discussion.
It is argued that to thus argue is to rely on repeal by implication
which is not favored. I contend, however, that such pose overlooks
the fact that the Judiciary Act of 1948 is indisputably in the nature
of a codification of all laws existing at the time of its passage related
to the judiciary, the judges, the courts and their respective
jurisdictions. Such being the case, the applicable rule of statutory
construction is that to the effect that when scattered statutes and
provisions relative to the same subject matter are embodied
subsequently in a single comprehensive legislation, any particular
provision not incorporated therein and germane to the main subject
matter is
414
deemed to be repealed. (Sutherland Statutory Construction, Vol. 1,
Sec. 2019, pp. 480-481.) Which is but logical, as otherwise, of what
use is the integration?
The main opinion points to certain legislations subsequent to 1948
which it contends constitute recognition on the part of Congress of
the continued authority of Courts of First Instance to conduct
preliminary investigations, such as, the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 or Republic Act 6425, and Republic Act 5180 governing
preliminary investigations by fiscals.
As regards Republic Act 5180, the main opinion claims that
because Section 1 thereof makes mention of “investigation . . .
conducted by a Court of First Instance . . . in accordance with law,”
said provision is proof of a legislative assumption that said courts
can exercise such power. To start with, I have never denied that
there are instances when by specific provision of the pertinent laws,
preliminary investigations in prosecutions under said laws have to
be done by the Courts of First Instance, such as, in violations of the
Election Law, the Anti-Subversion Act, Republic Act 1700 and the
Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 44.
But as I see it, if Republic Act 5180 is of any materiality in this
discussion, it is in that it makes more patent that the policy of the
law on preliminary investigations is to make them as expeditious as
possible but without depriving the accused of the opportunity to be
heard, which is likely to happen in a preliminary investigation in a
Court of First Instance, following Solon and Marcos, unless, of
3 4
course, the procedure provided for in Section 13, Rule 112 is followed
pursuant to Albano vs. Arranz. It sounds to me rather anachronistic
5
for a law to emphasize the right of an accused to be heard before he

is arrested, while it perpetuates in the same breadth as a general
rule a procedure which denies that right. Besides, why did not
Republic Act 5180 which was approved on the same day as Republic
Act 5179, mention preliminary investigations by Circuit Criminal
Courts, just as the other later law, Republic Act 6425, cited in the
main opinion expressly treated and referred to said courts
separately from the Courts of First
___________________
3 People vs. Solon, 47 Phil. 443.

4 Marcos vs. Cruz, 68 Phil. 96.
5 15 SCRA 518.
415
VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 415
Instance and Domestic Relations Courts, if really Congress intended
to confer the power in issue on them?
The reference to Republic Act 6425 is even more revealing of the
insistence of the majority to cling to any drifting straw in their effort
to prove their point. Republic Act 6425 originally granted to the
Circuit Criminal Courts exclusively jurisdiction over cases for
violation thereof. Of course, it also contained provisions about
preliminary investigations, but these did not in any manner indicate
whether expressly or impliedly that the same courts would have
authority to conduct such investigations. Here is the pertinent
provision, before it was amended by Presidential Decree No. 44:
“SEC. 39. Jurisdiction of the Circuit Criminal Court.—The Circuit Criminal
Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases involving
offenses punishable under this Act.
The preliminary investigation of cases filed under this Act shall be
resolved within a period of seven (7) days from the date of termination of
the preliminary investigation. Where a prima facie case is established, the
corresponding information shall be filed in court within twenty-four (24)
hours. Decision on said cases shall be rendered within a period of fifteen
(15) days from the date of submission of the case.”
It is to be noted that there is here a requirement that the
corresponding information should be filed in court within 24 hours.
Does not this show that the preliminary investigation is not to be
conducted by the court itself? But, as if to make it more patent that
it is better that the investigation is undertaken by another
authority, Presidential Decree 44 amended the above provision as
follows:
“SEC. 39. Jurisdiction.—The Court of First Instance, Circuit Criminal
Court, and Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court shall have concurrent
original jurisdiction over all cases involving offenses punishable under this
Act: Provided, That in cities or provinces where there are Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Courts, the said courts shall take exclusive cognizance
of cases where the offenders are under sixteen years of age.
The preliminary investigation of cases filed under this Act shall be
terminated within a period of thirty (30) days from the date of their filing.
Where the preliminary investigation is conducted by a prosecuting officer
and a prima facie case is established, the
416
corresponding information shall be filed in court within twenty-four (24)
hours from the . termination of the investigation. If the preliminary
investigation is conducted by a judge and a prima facie case is found to
exist, the corresponding information shall be filed by the proper prosecuting
officer within forty-eight (48) hours from the date of receipt of the records of
the case.
Trial of the cases under this section shall be finished by the court not
later than ninety (90) days from the date of the filing of the information.
Decision on said cases shall be rendered within a period of fifteen (15) days
from the date of submission of the case.”
That the foregoing provision does not vest any preliminary
investigation authority in any of the courts mentioned is best proven
by the fact that the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts have
never conducted any preliminary investigation whether under its
original charter or under this provision. I am not aware that any
Court of First Instance has ever done so. The mention of “the
preliminary investigation (being) conducted by a judge” in the above
provision contemplates, to my mind, not the judges of the courts
specified therein, but the proper municipal judges, bearing in mind
the considerations already discussed above relative to the tendency
of the every new law to remove from superior courts the power to
conduct preliminary investigations. Indeed, in this connection, it is
to me a mystery how easily my brethren have forgotten that when
in another case the very same respondent judge here did nothing
more than act as the officer before whom the accused swore a
confession which the said accused later on repudiated as having
been secured thru violence and intimidation, We disqualified
respondent from trying the case for fear that he might not be able to
maintain “the cold nuetrality of an impartial judge”. Quite
inconsistently, they now hold that the law in question allows a judge
to conduct the preliminary examination of the witnesses of the
prosecution to issue a warrant of arrest and to subsequently try the
main case on the merits, even if the language of said law in issue is
not really clear and the existence of the pretended power is just
being gathered from inference of doubtful logic, while, on the other
hand, there is a multitude of reasons strongly justifying the contrary
construction.
In what I consider, with the pardon I hope of my learned
colleagues, to be a desperate but vain effort to provide substantive
law basis for Section 13 of Rule 112, the main opinion falls back on
of all things the provision of the Bill of
417
VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 417
Rights of the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973 enjoining that no
warrant (of arrest) “may issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or
6
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.”

It is posited that this constitutional mandate is the ultimate source
of the authority of the Courts of First Instance, assuming the
absence of any statutory basis, to conduct preliminary investigation.
As I understand it, the theory is that under the Constitution,
warrants of arrests may be issued only by judges (under the 1935
Constitution), and since before doing so, they must examine the
complainant and his witnesses under oath, ergo, judges, and I
presume that would mean all judges, are constitutionally vested
with jurisdiction to conduct preliminary examinations, if not
investigations. But as I will demonstrate anon, I sense some kind
of non sequitur here. At this point, however, I will just make the
observation that if it were true that all judges may conduct
preliminary examinations by virtue of the above provision of the Bill
of Rights, why did the majority have to go thru all the trouble of a
lengthy and laborious, if scholarly, desertation of why Circuit
Criminal Courts have all the powers of the Courts of First Instance
to prove that they can like the latter courts conduct preliminary
examinations, when all they had to say is that Circuit Criminal
Court Judges are among the judges the Constitution contemplates.
Moreover, if the theory of the majority is to be pursued to its logical
conclusion, then the jurisdiction of judges in the matter in issue
cannot but be exclusive, for the Constitution mentions no other
officer who may issue warrants of arrest. But then the question
would arise, from where did our municipal mayors derive their
authority under existing rules to perform such function?
I have carefully perused with deep interest the elaborate
statement in the main opinion of the “historical background of our
law on criminal procedure.” I regret to state, however, that even
after such a very refreshing intellectual excursion, I still cannot see
that such historical background traced by my scholarly brethren
necessarily leads to the conclusion that the power of our courts to
conduct preliminary investigation springs from the Constitution or
that after the Judiciary Act of
___________________
6In the 1973 Constitution includes “such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law.” (Sec. 3, Article IV)
418
1948 repealed all laws and rules inconsistent with its provisions, the
statutory authority of Courts of First Instance to conduct
preliminary examinations and investigations still continued to exist.
Quite to the contrary, my reading of the history of the law on
preliminary investigations in this jurisdiction indicates that this
Court has been consistently holding that the right to a preliminary
investigation is not a constitutional right, at least in so far as the so-
called second stage thereof is concerned. In Marcos vs. Cruz, 68 Phil.
96, this Court unanimously held: “In this jurisdiction, the
preliminary investigation in criminal cases is not a creation of the
Constitution; its origin is statutory and the right thereto can be
invoked when so established and granted by law.” (at p. 104)
According to the same decision, it is only when there is a statute
granting such right and still it is denied to the accused in spite of his
demand therefor that there is a violation of the due process clause
of the Constitution. More authoritatively, in my opinion, in Hashim
vs. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216, no less than Justice Laurel took occasion
to say: “Viewed in the light of fundamental principles, the right to
preliminary investigation is statutory, not constitutional.” (at p.
225.)
Of course, I am not overlooking the fact that seemingly what the
main opinion contends to be constitutionally based is the power of
judges to issue warrants of arrest, which corresponds only to the
first stage of the prosecution known as preliminary examination,
and for this reason, it is maintained the purported ruling can stand
together with the Marcos and Hashim doctrines which relate to the
second stage known as the preliminary investigation. I do not see it
that way.
My understanding of the Bill of Rights provision pertinent to this
discussion, which reads thus:
“SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.” (Art. IV, 1973 Constitution.)
is that it is a prohibition against any judge issuing a warrant of
arrest without complying with the requirements set forth
419
VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 419
therein. In fact, an arrest may even be made without a warrant, and
it is only when a warrant is needed that the judge who is to issue
the same is constitutionally bound to adhere to the conditions
therein laid down. Literally, the provision does not refer to all
judges, but only to “the judge” who will issue the warrant and that
to me is presumably only the judge who by statute is authorized to
act in the premises. In fine, the Constitution does not vest upon just
any judge, much less upon all judges, jurisdiction to issue warrants
of arrests; it merely limits and lays down conditions before any judge
authorized by law to issue warrants may do so. In like manner, it
cannot be argued that because Section 4 (1) of the Bill of Rights
provides that privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, just any court in the
Philippines, even a municipal court can grant such authority or that
because the liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court, according to Section 5, also of
the Bill, it follows that all courts in the Philippines may act in the
premises, regardless of the definition and allocation of jurisdiction
by the National Assembly or the legislature, who, after all is
constitutionally endowed with authority to precisely make such
allocation. (Sec. 1, Art. X, 1973 Constitution.) Indeed, this provision
which reads thus:
“SECTION 1. The Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such inferior courts as may be established by law. The National Assembly
shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
the various courts, but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction
over cases enumerated in Section five hereof.”
readily connotes that except in the case of the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, it is not the Constitution but the statutes that are
the sources of the jurisdiction of all the various courts of the country.
Moreover, to my mind, the development of the law on preliminary
investigations in this jurisdiction evinces a clear tendency not only
to give the accused in all such investigations the opportunity to be
present, to cross-examine the witnesses of the prosecution and to
present his own evidence, until lately when the right to cross-
examine was eliminated by Presidential Decree 77 as amended by
Presidential Decree 911, but also (2) to
420
transfer the function of conducting preliminary investigations, sans
the power to issue warrants of arrest, to prosecuting officers
belonging to the Executive Department to which the prerogative to
prosecute or not to prosecute properly belongs in the exercise of the
President’s duty to see to it that the laws are properly executed.
(Estrella vs. Orendain, 37 SCRA 640.) Of course, in special cases
wherein it is required by what in the legislature’s judgment is the
public interest, the particular statute concerned expressly provides
that the preliminary investigation be conducted by the Court of First
Instance, such as, in cases of violation of Election Code and cases of
violations of the Anti-Subversion Law (Act 1700). Indeed, with the
broad control given to the Secretary of Justice over crime
prosecution by Presidential Decree 911, not to mention Our own
ruling in Estrella recognizing his power of supervision and control
over fiscals, as long as the case has not passed to the jurisdiction of
the court, it does not sound realistic and in keeping with the trend
of recent developments in the pertinent laws to further allow
prosecutions to be initiated in the Courts of First Instance. 7
At this juncture, I would like to address myself to the separate

concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando, whose specialization in
matters of constitutional law has won recognition not only for him
but also for our country from no less than the organizers of the
constitutional aspect of the bicentennial celebration of the
American. I do not mind saying that whenever I want to be
comprehensive in my study of constitutional issues, I always find his
views illuminating. But on the point now in controversy, I find it
difficult to see his point. Thus, he particularly underlines his
conformity to the ruling in the main opinion that the 1935 as well as
the 1973 Constitution “provide the source of the power of all Judges,
including Judges of the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit
Criminal Courts, and other courts of equivalent rank to determine
probable cause before the issuance of arrest and
___________________
7 In Albano vs. Arranz, supra, the Supreme Court held, without delving into the
question of whether or not the power of Courts of First Instance to conduct
preliminary investigation has been eliminated in the Judiciary Act of 1948, that
under Section 13 of Rule 112, the Courts of First Instance have to give the accused a
chance to be heard before issuing a warrant of arrest. Even then, the question of the
repeal of Act 1627 was not raised in this case.
421
VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 421
therefore sustain the proceedings conducted by respondent Judge
leading to the issuance of the warrants of arrest and his referral of
the cases to the fiscal or other government prosecutor for the filing
of the corresponding information,” not without hastening to clarify,
however, that “it is (his) understanding. . . that the decision reached
is at most an affirmation that the present Constitution, as did the
1935 Constitution, confers the power to conduct (the) preliminary
examination preparatory to issuing a warrant of arrest, to a circuit
criminal court judge” and that “it is only the first stage in the
criminal process that may lead to the apprehension of the accused
that has been passed upon by the Court”, such that as to the judges’
competence regarding a preliminary investigation,” or “the second
stage, (the) preliminary investigation proper,” . . . “that question has
been left open.”
Of course, that such specifically was what the members of the
Court were made to understand during the deliberations by the
distinguished writer of the main opinion is clear and distinct in my
recollection. As a matter of fact, for a moment I entertained
earnestly the thought that I could probably join my brethren in the
formulation of such a ruling. I had in mind then Mr. Justice
Fernando’s pose in his book on the Bill of Rights (1970 Edition) that
the significance of entrusting the responsibility of determining the
existence of probable cause exclusively to judiciary (under the 1935
Constitution) in the defense of freedom cannot be overestimated, (p.
177) But after trying very hard to see it his way, I have to confess, I
have arrived at the conclusion that such a proposition cannot stand
close scrutiny, if only because even if none but judges may issue
warrants of arrest, it is not indispensable that all judges be vested
with such power, so it is really up to the legislature to determine
which court or judge should be endowed with it.
My knowledge, if limited, of the origin of the competence of judges
to issue warrants of arrest is to the effect that it is a prerogative that
antedates both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions. It was in fact
recognized by the American military occupation authorities from the
very inception of their rule over the Philippine Islands in 1901, as
evidenced by General Orders No. 58, our first code of criminal
procedure of American vintage. Surely, such military order cannot
in any sense be deemed to be a mandate of constitutional stature.
No doubt, Section 13 of Rule 112 appears to be a mere reiteration, if
with
422
substantial modifications, of similar provisions of General Orders
No. 58 and Section 37 of Act 1627, but I regret I cannot accept the
hypothesis emphasized in the main opinion that because said
provision of the rules is supposed to be an implementation of the Bill
of Rights provision against unreasonable searches and seizures, We
must perforce conclude that the Bill of Rights is the source of the
jurisdiction of the judges to act in the manner provided in said rule.
There can be no dispute about the imperative need to make the
safeguards against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures as
air tight as possible, but it is equally undeniable that giving the
power to determine the existence of probable cause exclusively to
judges is not the only guarantee that can ensure that end. Not only
fiscals but even municipal mayors have for decades exercised said
power in this jurisdiction, and instead of condemning such practice,
this Court has expressly sanctioned the same as being conducive to
a more efficient system of prosecution of offences. (See Hashim vs.
Boncan, supra.) What is more, the 1973 Constitution has given the
practice explicit constitutional basis by providing that probable
cause may also be determined by “such other responsible officer (not
necessarily a judge) as may be authorized by law.”
More than ever before, I now hold that the Bill of Rights provision
under discussion has not been designed to confer the power to
determine probable cause to every judge in the courts of the
Philippines; rather said provision lays down the conditions and
limitations which the particular judges authorized by law to perform
such function must observe. I feel I am supported in this view by the
following excerpts from the records of the Constitutional Convention
of 1934 containing the apt observations of no less than Senator
Vicente J. Francisco and Justice Jose P. Laurel:
“EL PRESIDENTE. Tiene la palabra el Delegado por Cavite.
EL SR. FRANCISCO RAZONA SU ENMIENDA
SR. FRANCISCO. Señor Presidente y Caballeros de la Convoncion: bajo el

proyecto del Comite de 7, se puede expedir mandamientos de registro, con
tal de que la peticion vaya acompañada de un affidavit en el que aparezcan
hechos y circunstancias que demuestren causas probables. Bajo mi
enmienda, un juez puede expedir un mandamiento de registro sino solo
despues de haber
423
VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 423
examinado al denunciante y a sus testigos bajo juramento. Parace ser que
la diferencia es grande. El texto en ingles del projecto dice:
‘x x x and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.’
Esta expresion ha sido interpretada por los tribunales de America en el
sentido de que el juez tiene dos medios: o puede tomar en cuenta para la
expedition de un mandamiento de registro un affidavit en el que consten
hechos y demuestren la causa probable, o mediante examen del
denunciante. Someto a la consideracion de esta Asamblea que es
completamente peligroso permitir que un juez expida mandamiento de
registro, atendiendose exclusivamente a lo que consta en un affidavit. Esta
idea de que se puede expedir mandamiento de registro mediante affidavit, o
sea, solamente mediante un documento Jurado en el que aparezcan hechos
probables, no ha sido aceptada por esta jurisdiccion, no solamente en la
practica sino tambien por la orden general Num. 58. Esta convencion, creo,
se habra fijado que en dicha Orden General Num. 58 esta disposicion que
aparece en el proyecto del Comite de 7 que es una reproduccion o copia del
precepto que aparece en el bill de Filipinas y luego en la Ley Jones, aparece
reproducida, como ya he dicho, en la Orden General Num. 58, como articulo
27. Este articulo 27, dice lo siguiente: ‘No se expedira mandamiento de
registro sino por causa probable y por falta de peticion apoyada por
juramento’. Como ya he dicho, ‘peticion apoyada por juramento’ puede ser
testimonio del testigo o affidavit. Considerandose, sin embargo, que estos es
verdaderamente peligroso para el derecho que tiene un individuo a la
seguridad de sus bienes y papeles, nuestro mismo Codigo de Procedimiento
Civil inserta en su Articulo 28 una disposicion que exige como requisite ‘sine
quanon’ el que el Juez no pueda expedir mandamiento de registro sino
mediante el examen de testigos, especialmente del denunciante. Este
articulo viene a ser el Articulo 28 del Codigo de Procedimiento Civil que dice
lo siguiente: ‘El Juez de Primera Instancia o el Juez de paz debera, antes de
expedir el mandamiento, examinara bajo juramento al denunciante o al
testigo presente, consignando sus declaraciones por escrito.’ De modo que
mi enmienda es a tenor o en consonancia con esta disposicion legal. Como
ya he dicho, si mantuvieramos el precepto del proyecto de constitucion, esta
disposicion de la Orden General Num. 58 podra en cierto modo ser
contradictoria al precepto del proyecto de constitucion, y nosotros sabemos
muy bien que si se aprobara una constitucion en la forma como esta el
precepto, cuya enmienda pido, y si encontrara una discrepancia sustancial
entre dicho precepto y el Codigo de Procedimiento Civil, creo que este ultimo
tendria que quedarse derogado, o al menos no puede mantenerse este
precepto por
424
anti-constitucional. Pero yo creo que ninguno de los miembros de esta
Asamblea vera que mi enmienda no responde a una razon fundamental y a
una necesidad que se ha sentido en la practica. Los tibogados que estamos
en el ejercicio de la profesion hemos visto muchas voces casos en que agentes
secretos consiguen mandamientos de registro solamente mediante la
presentacion de un affidavitque reune los requisitos de la Ley. Pero que
expedido el registro e impugnados despues los terminos del affidavit se
descubre que los hechos que aparecen en el mismo son completamente
falsos. De ahi quo si queremos salvaguardar en todo lo posible el derecho de
un individuo a arrestos o registros arbitrarios; si queremos que el derecho
del individuo a la seguridad de sus bienes o papeles este rodeado de todas
las garantias que puedan impedir o que impidan la expedicion de registros
inmotivados o infundados que pueden dar lugar a molestias o vejaciones
injustas e irreparables, creo que debemos hacer que en nuestra constitucion
se consigne el precepto tal como yo propongo que se enmienda.” (Pp. 750-
752, Vol. III.)
“EL PRESIDENTE. El Delegado por Batangas (Señor Laurel) acepta la
enmienda?
SR. LAUREL. No, senor Presidente, y quisiera decir dos palabras.
MR. LAUREL. Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Convention: The
anomalies pointed out by the Honorable gentleman from Cavite, Mr.
Francisco, if they ever occur at the present time, it is because of the
irregularities committed by some justices. The amendment intoduced by the
distinguished Delegate from Cavite is already covered by existing
legislation, and if those irregularities pointed out by him really occured, it
is because some justices have not enforced and adhered to the specific
provision of the General Order. The General Order, or the Code of Criminal
Procedure, now provides that the judge, before issuing a search warrant,
must examine the complainant and his witnesses and that he must take
their depositions in writing. The reason why we are in favor of this
amendment is because we are incorporating in our constitution something
of a fundamental character. Now, before a judge could issue a search
warrant, he must be under the obligation to examine personally under oath
the complainant and if he has any witness, the witnesses that he may
produce. It is not necessary for me to recall here one of the grievances of the
early settlers in America which was one of the causes of the revolution
against the mother country, England; the issuing of the so-called general
search warrant. It is, therefore, quite important that we impose this
obligation upon the judge, so that he will not be issuing search warrant in
blank, or simply accompanied by affidavits, but that he must consider the
sanctity of the home. It is necessary that we surround that power with the
necessary constitutional guaranty. You might say that as this amendment
is
425
VOL. 71, JUNE 18, 1976 425
already in the general legislation, what is the necessity of incorporating this
in the constitution. The necessity consists in that the constitution is
something permanent for the protection of the individual citizen. It is proper
that we incorporate that provision rather than general legislation in this
constitution that we shall adopt. For this reason, the committee accepts and
approves of the amendment as suggested by Delegate Francisco.” (Pp. 757-
758, Vol. 111.)
And so, since there is neither any constitutional provision nor
statute that presently confers on Judges of the Courts of First
Instance the power to conduct preliminary examinations, and the
trend of our laws is to leave such function to other responsible
officers, except the very act of issuing the warrant of arrest, I have
no alternative but to deny to Circuit Criminal Courts such power.
I cannot close this separate opinion without inviting attention to
certain specific points of procedure which the main opinion seems
not to have bothered to pass upon, notwithstanding what I consider
to be their importance. In G.R. No. L-34038, I notice that respondent
judge conducted a preliminary investigation on the basis of nothing
more than a letter-complaint of the petitioner Collector of Customs.
It is not stated whether or not it was in due form or under oath.
While as Mr. Justice Fernando stresses, this decision recognizes
only the power of respondent judge to conduct the first stage or the
preliminary examination, in G.R. No. L-34038, L-34243, L-
39525 and L-40031, what are actually involved are preliminary
investigations, both the first and second stages. It is only in G.R.
Nos. L-36376 and L-38688that respondent judge has not been able
to conduct even the preliminary examination. Frankly, I am at a loss
as to how the dispositive portion of Our judgment is to be
understood, considering that the consensus among the members of
the Court, as attested to by Mr. Justice Fernando, reaches only
preliminary examinations and not preliminary investigations, in
order precisely to avoid having to overrule Hashim vs.
Boncan and Marcos vs. Cruz, which I understand some members of
the Court are not ready to do.
Regarding G.R. No. L-34038, I agree that respondent judge
exceeded his authority in providing that his order of dismissal is
with prejudice and in ordering the return of the articles seized by
the customs authorities to his co-respondent Makapugay. Of course
anyway, in legal contemplation the qualification “with
426
Republic vs. Director of Lands
prejudice” thus made by respondent judge means nothing. In no way
can it have the effect of jeopardy, since what was conducted by him
was only a preliminary investigation, which in my opinion is
unauthorized and void. And assuming it to be valid, there would be
no need of setting aside the order of dismissal itself; it is enough to
say that it is a dismissal before arraignment and jeopardy has not
thereby attached, the express qualification therein of “with
prejudice” notwithstanding.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, I vote to grant the petitions
in G.R. No. L-34038 insofar as the respondent judge’s impugned
order of July 6, 1971 orders the return of the articles seized to his
co-respondent Makapugay, and insofar as G.R. Nos. L-34243, L-
36376, L-39525, L-38688 and L-40031 are concerned, I am giving my
concurrence to the judgment therein subject to the qualifications I
have discussed in this separate opinion.
Notes.—The jurisdiction of circuit criminal courts is limited
merely to cases involving crimes specifically enumerated in Section
1 of R.A. 5179, as amended. (Paraguya vs. Tiro, 41 SCRA 137).
The transfer of a pre-selected case from the Court of First Instance
to the Circuit Criminal Court is null and void. (Osmeña, Jr. vs.
Secretary of Justice, 41 SCRA 199).
——o0o——
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VOL.

20, JUNE 19, 1967 383

384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:

386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Upon application of the officers of the government named on the

warrants against petitioners herein and/or the corporations of

persons above-named and/ or the premises of their offices,

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or

4 Harry S, Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck.

contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in

settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the

objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personaland

has been held:

8 Newingham, et al. vs. United States, 4 F. 2d. 490.

287 F 60 Moris vs. U.S., 26 F. 2d 444.

Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional

12 On March 22, 1962.

Court that "a search warrant

theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable

17 Wolf vs. Colorado, 93 L. ed. 1782.

This view was, not only reiterated, but. also, broadened in

18 Pugliese (1945) 133 F. 2d. 497.

Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter,

We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged

Castro, .J., concurring and dissenting:

From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto

Control of premises searched gives "standing."

Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d

Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant is primarily

* Attorney-client relationship played no part in the decision of the case.

The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for

384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 20, JUNE 19, 1967 385

CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:

386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Upon application of the officers of the government named on the

warrants against petitioners herein and/or the corporations of

persons above-named and/ or the premises of their offices,

4 Harry S, Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck.

contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in

settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the

objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personaland

has been held:

8 Newingham, et al. vs. United States, 4 F. 2d. 490.

287 F 60 Moris vs. U.S., 26 F. 2d 444.

Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against

12 On March 22, 1962.

Court that "a search warrant

theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable

17 Wolf vs. Colorado, 93 L. ed. 1782.

This view was, not only reiterated, but. also, broadened in

18 Pugliese (1945) 133 F. 2d. 497.