The Office of The Solicitor General For Petitioner. Adelino B. Sitoy For Private Respondents
The Office of The Solicitor General For Petitioner. Adelino B. Sitoy For Private Respondents
The Office of The Solicitor General For Petitioner. Adelino B. Sitoy For Private Respondents
L-45127 May 5, 1989 motion to quash was subsequently reduced to writing on June 13,
1975. 3 On August 21, 1975, the municipal court denied the motion to
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Provincial Fiscal quash for lack of merit. 4 On September 2, 1975, private respondents filed
of Leyte, petitioner, a motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid denial order on the same
vs. ground of lack of jurisdiction, but with the further allegation that the facts
HON. JUDGE AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY, CELESTINO S. MATONDO, charged do not constitute an offense considering that Section 32 of
SEGUNDINO A, CAVAL and CIRILO M. ZANORIA, respondents. Republic Act No. 4670 is null and void for being unconstitutional. In an
undated order received by the counsel for private respondents on
The Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner. October 20,1975, the motion for reconsideration was denied. 5
Adelino B. Sitoy for private respondents. On October 26, 1975, private respondents filed a petitions 6 for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction before the former Court of First
Instance of Leyte, Branch VIII, where it was docketed as Civil Case No.
B-622, to restrain the Municipal Judge, Provincial Fiscal and Chief of
Police of Hindang, Leyte from proceeding with the trial of said Criminal
REGALADO, J.: Case No. 555 upon the ground that the former Municipal Court of
Hindang had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. Subsequently, an
Involved in this special civil action is the unique situation, to use an amended petition 7 alleged the additional ground that the facts charged do
euphemistic phrase, of an alternative penal sanction of imprisonment not constitute an offense since the penal provision, which is Section 32 of
imposed by law but without a specification as to the term or duration said law, is unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) It imposes a
thereof. cruel and unusual punishment, the term of imprisonment being unfixed
and may run to reclusion perpetua; and (2) It also constitutes an undue
As a consequence of such legislative faux pas or oversight, the petition at delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of
bar seeks to set aside the decision of the then Court of First Instance of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter
Leyte, Branch IV, dated September 8,1976, 1 penned by herein were the legislative department of the Government.
respondent judge and granting the petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction filed by herein private respondents and On March 30, 1976, having been advised that the petition of herein
docketed therein as Civil Case No. 5428, as well as his resolution of private respondents was related to Criminal Case No. 1978 for violation
October 19, 1976 2 denying the motions for reconsideration filed by the of Presidential Decree No. 442 previously transferred from Branch VIII to
parties therein. Subject of said decision were the issues on jurisdiction Branch IV of the erstwhile Court of First Instance of Leyte, Judge
over violations of Republic Act No. 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Fortunate B. Cuna of the former branch transferred the said petition to
Carta for Public School Teachers, and the constitutionality of Section 32 the latter branch for further proceedings and where it was subsequently
thereof. docketed therein as Civil Case No. 5428. 8 On March 15, 1976, the
petitioner herein filed an opposition to the admission of the said amended
In a complaint filed by the Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte on April 4, petitions 9 but respondent judge denied the same in his resolution of April
1975, herein private respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. 20, 1976. 10 On August 2, 1976, herein petitioner filed a supplementary
Caval and Cirilo M. Zanoria, public school officials of Leyte, were charged memorandum in answer to the amended petition. 11
before the Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte in Criminal Case No. 555
thereof for violation of Republic Act No. 4670. The case was set for On September 8, 1976, respondent judge rendered the aforecited
arraignment and trial on May 29, 1975. At the arraignment, the herein challenged decision holding in substance that Republic Act No. 4670 is
private respondents, as the accused therein, pleaded not guilty to the valid and constitutional but cases for its violation fall outside of the
charge. Immediately thereafter, they orally moved to quash the complaint jurisdiction of municipal and city courts, and remanding the case to the
for lack of jurisdiction over the offense allegedly due to the correctional former Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte only for preliminary
nature of the penalty of imprisonment prescribed for the offense. The investigation.
As earlier stated, on September 25, 1976, petitioner filed a motion for unusual form of punishment. Hence, it is vigorously asserted, said
reconsideration. 12 Likewise, private respondents filed a motion for Section 32 is unconstitutional.
reconsideration of the lower court's decision but the same was limited
only to the portion thereof which sustains the validity of Section 32 of The basic principle underlying the entire field of legal concepts pertaining
Republic Act No. 4670. 13 Respondent judge denied both motions for to the validity of legislation is that in the enactment of legislation a
reconsideration in a resolution dated October 19, 1976. 14 constitutional measure is thereby created. In every case where a
question is raised as to the constitutionality of an act, the court employs
The instant petition to review the decision of respondent judge poses the this doctrine in scrutinizing the terms of the law. In a great volume of
following questions of law: (1) Whether the municipal and city courts have cases, the courts have enunciated the fundamental rule that there is a
jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act No. 4670; and (2) Whether presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative enactment. 15
Section 32 of said Republic Act No. 4670 is constitutional.
It is contended that Republic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional on the
We shall resolve said queries in inverse order, since prior determination ground that the imposable but indefinite penalty of imprisonment provided
of the constitutionality of the assailed provision of the law involved is therein constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment, in defiance of the
necessary for the adjudication of the jurisdictional issue raised in this express mandate of the Constitution. This contention is inaccurate and
petition. should be rejected.
1. The disputed section of Republic Act No. 4670 We note with approval the holding of respondent judge that —
provides:
The rule is established beyond question that a
Sec. 32. Penal Provision. — A person who shall wilfully punishment authorized by statute is not cruel or unusual
interfere with, restrain or coerce any teacher in the or disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is
exercise of his rights guaranteed by this Act or who shall a barbarous one unknown to the law or so wholly
in any other manner commit any act to defeat any of the disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock
provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished the moral sense of the community. Based on the principle,
by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more our Supreme Court has consistently overruled contentions
than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment, in the of the defense that the punishment of fine or
discretion of the court. (Emphasis supplied). imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is cruel
and unusual. (Legarda vs. Valdez, 1 Phil. 146; U.S. vs.
Two alternative and distinct penalties are consequently imposed, to wit: Pico, 18 Phil. 386; People vs. Garay, 2 ACR 149; People
(a) a fine ranging from P100.00 to P1,000.00; or (b) imprisonment. It is vs. Estoista 93 Phil. 647; People vs. Tiu Ua. 96 Phil. 738;
apparent that the law has no prescribed period or term for the imposable People vs. Dionisio, 22 SCRA 1299). The language of our
penalty of imprisonment. While a minimum and maximum amount for the Supreme Court in the first of the cases it decided after the
penalty of fine is specified, there is no equivalent provision for the penalty last world war is appropriate here:
of imprisonment, although both appear to be qualified by the phrase "in
the discretion of the court. The Constitution directs that 'Excessive
fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and
Private respondents contend that a judicial determination of what unusual punishment inflicted.' The
Congress intended to be the duration of the penalty of imprisonment prohibition of cruel and unusual
would be violative of the constitutional prohibition against undue punishments is generally aimed at the
delegation of legislative power, and that the absence of a provision on the form or character of the punishment rather
specific term of imprisonment constitutes that penalty into a cruel and than its severity in respect of duration or
amount, and apply to punishments which
never existed in America, or which public legislative power, the duration of penalty of imprisonment being solely left
sentiment has regarded as cruel or to the discretion of the court as if the lattter were the legislative
obsolete (15 Am. Jur., p. 172), for department of the government."
instance there (sic) inflicted at the
whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at Petitioner counters that the discretion granted therein by the legislature to
the stake, breaking on the wheel, the courts to determine the period of imprisonment is a matter of statutory
disemboweling, and the like (15 Am. Jur. construction and not an undue delegation of legislative power. It is
Supra, Note 35 L.R.A. p. 561). Fine and contended that the prohibition against undue delegation of legislative
imprisonment would not thus be within the power is concerned only with the delegation of power to make laws and
prohibition.' (People vs. de la Cruz, 92 not to interpret the same. It is also submitted that Republic Act No. 4670
Phil. 906). 16 vests in the courts the discretion, not to fix the period of imprisonment,
but to choose which of the alternative penalties shall be imposed.
The question that should be asked, further, is whether the constitutional
prohibition looks only to the form or nature of the penalty and not to the Respondent judge sustained these theses of petitioner on his theory that
proportion between the penalty and the crime. "the principle of separation of powers is not violated by vesting in courts
discretion as to the length of sentence or amount of fine between
The answer thereto may be gathered from the pronouncement in People designated limits in sentencing persons convicted of crime. In such
vs. Estoista, 17 where an "excessive" penalty was upheld as constitutional instance, the exercise of judicial discretion by the courts is not an attempt
and was imposed but with a recommendation for executive clemency, to use legislative power or to prescribe and create a law but is an
thus: instance of the administration of justice and the application of existing
laws to the facts of particular cases." 19 What respondent judge obviously
... If imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is out of proportion overlooked is his own reference to penalties "between designated limits."
to the present case in view of certain circumstances, the
law is not to be declared unconstitutional for this reason. In his commentary on the Constitution of the United States, Corwin
The constitutionality of an act of the legislature is not to be wrote:
judged in the light of exceptional cases. Small
transgressors for which the heavy net was not spread are, .. At least three distinct ideas have contributed to the
like small fishes, bound to be caught, and it is to meet development of the principle that legislative power cannot
such a situation as this that courts are advised to make a be delegated. One is the doctrine of separation of powers:
recommendation to the Chief Executive for clemency or Why go to the trouble of separating the three powers of
reduction of the penalty... government if they can straightway remerge on their own
motion? The second is the concept of due process of laws
That the penalty is grossly disproportionate to the crime is an insufficient which precludes the transfer of regulatory functions to
basis to declare the law unconstitutional on the ground that it is cruel and private persons. Lastly, there is the maxim of agency
unusual. The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe "Delegata potestas non potest delegari." 20
does not make it cruel or unusual. 18 In addition, what degree of
disproportion the Court will consider as obnoxious to the Constitution has An apparent exception to the general rule forbidding the delegation of
still to await appropriate determination in due time since, to the credit of legislative authority to the courts exists in cases where discretion is
our legislative bodies, no decision has as yet struck down a penalty for conferred upon said courts. It is clear, however, that when the courts are
being "cruel and unusual" or "excessive." said to exercise a discretion, it must be a mere legal discretion which is
exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law and which, when
We turn now to the argument of private respondents that the entire penal discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow. 21
provision in question should be invalidated as an 49 "undue delegation of
So it was held by the Supreme Court of the United States that the in the graduated scales of penalties in Article 71 of said Code. There is
principle of separation of powers is not violated by vesting in courts no rule for transmutation of the amount of a fine into a term of
discretion as to the length of sentence or the amount of fine between imprisonment. Neither does the Code contain any provision that a fine
designated limits in sentencing persons convicted of a crime. 22 when imposed in conjunction with imprisonment is subordinate to the
latter penalty. In sum, a fine is as much a principal penalty as
In the case under consideration, the respondent judge erronneously imprisonment. Neither is subordinate to the other. 24
assumed that since the penalty of imprisonment has been provided for by
the legislature, the court is endowed with the discretion to ascertain the 2. It has been the consistent rule that the criminal jurisdiction of the court
term or period of imprisonment. We cannot agree with this postulate. It is is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of
not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no points of the action. 25
reference have been provided by the legislature. What valid delegation
presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of discretion to fix the length of With the deletion by invalidation of the provision on imprisonment in
service of a term of imprisonment which must be encompassed within Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670, as earlier discussed, the imposable
specific or designated limits provided by law, the absence of which penalty for violations of said law should be limited to a fine of not less
designated limits well constitute such exercise as an undue delegation, if than P100.00 and not more than P1,000.00, the same to serve as the
not-an outright intrusion into or assumption, of legislative power. basis in determining which court may properly exercise jurisdiction
thereover. When the complaint against private respondents was filed in
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable 1975, the pertinent law then in force was Republic Act No. 296, as
period of imprisonment, with neither a minimum nor a maximum duration amended by Republic Act No. 3828, under which crimes punishable by a
having been set by the legislative authority. The courts are thus given a fine of not more than P 3,000.00 fall under the original jurisdiction of the
wide latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment, without even former municipal courts. Consequently, Criminal Case No. 555 against
the benefit of any sufficient standard, such that the duration thereof may herein private respondents falls within the original jurisdiction of the
range, in the words of respondent judge, from one minute to the life span Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte.
of the accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be allowed. It vests in the courts
a power and a duty essentially legislative in nature and which, as applied WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of respondent judge are
to this case, does violence to the rules on separation of powers as well as hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 555 filed against
the non-delegability of legislative powers. This time, the preumption of private respondents herein is hereby ordered to be remanded to the
constitutionality has to yield. Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte for trial on the merits.