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AIRBUS INDUSTRIE
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N U M B E R 2 6 S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 0
A I R B U S T E C H N I C A L D I G E S T
S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 0
Dialogue 2
Portable Equipment 3
for testing radomes
Bernard CARAYON
Modern technology - 23
What has changed?
William WAINWRIGHT
Changes to technology 32
FAST / NUMBER 26 1
Dialogue
Airbus Industrie and its Suppliers flight crew and maintenance training
have always helped the Operators of costs which lead to Cross Crew
its aircraft to get the best out of them Qualification (CCQ) and Mixed Fleet
through dialogue. There is a constant Flying (MFF) and provides unheard
wish of all parties to improve and an of levels operational flexibility to the
essential part of this improvement airlines.
process is by holding and attending Two recent conferences covered the
operators’ conferences and liaison A330 and A340, and Training. Three
meetings. This is a continuous others will take place in the coming
process that benefits the airlines in months covering the A320 family,
different ways. For example Airbus Performance and Operations, and
aircraft enjoy very high levels of A300/A310.
Dispatch Reliability and low Direct The study of human behaviour and
Maintenance Costs; an innovative cultural effects in the cockpit environ-
spare parts investment policy has sig- ment are particularly important to
nificantly lowered capital investment; Airbus and the airline industry. To this
with the Airbus fly-by-wire concept end Airbus run a series of very popu-
about 50% of the airliners being sold lar regional conferences on Human
today have the same systems, same Factors. The 11th was in Melbourne
cockpit and same operating proce- earlier this year and the 12th will be in
dures. This allows greatly reduced the USA in the autumn.
A330/A340
Ind
ustr
tors’ aspects of aircraft
ie 2000 All ri
gh
ts
erv
©A
Technical
design training and oper-
ed
Symposium
family. More than 1,300 aircraft Cairo nical solutions for sub-
D
22-26 May 2000 ations. Regional meet-
from the A320 family have been
es
11th AIRBUS
ed
rved
ce
re
i
us
sM
tr ark ts
ie
igh
e
© 2 ti n g
provide operators with an update of the tech- themselves, and with Airbus
nical status on the A320 family in service, cooperation of Ansett Australia and the
and the suppliers. In this respect it was very Australian Transport Safety Bureau. Its spe-
and give them the opportunity to report on successful with 371 attendees from 55 air-
their experience and share it with others. cific objectives were to diffuse the Airbus
lines and a number of suppliers. A CD-ROM culture, showing its rationale for design and
containing all the presentations, questions automation, philosophy for training and
11th Performance and and answers is available to Customer operations and its balanced approach
Operations Conference Airlines from their Customer Support towards prevention and reaction in safety
Puerto Vallarta, Mexico Managers. management.
26-30 March 2001 To reflect the importance of cultural
This conference, held on a two 5th Training Symposium aspects in the cockpit, panels were organised
to three year rotational cycle, 5th AIRBUS Toulouse, France 22- on the development of a “Culture of
is organised in different parts TRAINING
SYMPOSIUM 26 May 2000 Organisational Safety”, and “Cultural needs
of the world, and will be held 5th AIRBUS The importance of good for Crew Resource Management (CRM)”.
next year in Latin America. It TRAINING 160 persons, from airlines, civil aviation
SYMPOSIUM
TOULOUSE
training cannot be over
provides a dialogue between Airbus authorities and organisations, airforces and
22-26 MAY 2000
d
se
ir bu
re
s
In ts
Industrie and the operators of Airbus aircraft defence organisations, universities, accident
du
s tri e r igh
2 0 0 0 A ll
FAST / NUMBER 26 3
Reasons for Predictive windshear
detection mode
testing the In the predictive windshear detection
radome mode, the radar detects small raindrops
“flying” in opposite directions
The function of the (microburst event). It generates an aural
radome is to protect the warning and displays the area where the
antennas installed in the windshear is present on the navigation
nose of the aircraft from display. The predictive windshear
airflow, rain, hail, light- detection system identifies microbursts
ning strike, bird strike, up to five nautical miles ahead, giving
by Michel TREMAUD, Manager ETOPS Performance and Operations
Flight Operations Support, Customer Services Directorate etc. At the same time it up to sixty seconds of advance warning
A turbulence encounter
is a play featuring three
must provide a radio-fre- to the crew. This allows the crew to
avoid entering a windshear, thus further
characters:
Whenever applicable,
specific considerations are ing system. The most poor quality of radomes. This is the
demanding system in reason why radomes installed on
given for non-fly-by-wire
and fly-by-wire models
respectively.
Side lobes
4 FAST / NUMBER 26
Windshear detection Transmission
The radar processor detects the Doppler efficiency
frequency shift of the microwave pulses The average and minimum transmission
caused by the microbursts of wind efficiencies within the window area
direction. Return microwave signals should not be less than indicated for the
must not be disturbed, to allow the following classes:
measurement of direction and speed of
the precipitation of the tiny droplets. So
a poor transparency to radio frequency Average Minimum
from the radome may lead to
undetected windshear. Class A 90% 85%
As for the weather function, return
signals from secondary lobes may
Class B 87% 82%
disturb the radar system and cause the Class C 84% 78%
radar to trigger false windshear alarms.
Therefore both functions demand an
Class D 80% 75%
undistorted forward view in terms of Class E 70% 55%
radio-frequency performance. That is, a
high-performing radome in terms of
radio-frequency transparency and level
of side lobe capability.
Side lobe level
Sources of The radome should not increase
radome antenna side lobe levels. For side lobe
levels between –21dB and –26dB, the
degradation increase should not be more than 2dB
There are many reasons for the for Category 1 requirements.
performance level of a radome to
degrade below minimum requirements.
They range from lightning strike, bird
strike, natural erosion, water ingress for
some types of radomes, ageing, poor
repairs such as wrong material used, or
over-painting.
FAST / NUMBER 26 5
Methods, means prototype tool and with a referenced
anechoic chamber. The data collected
& procedures from the prototype of the ‘light’ test
tool were then compared with the data
available collected from the anechoic chamber. A
To check the performance level of a two-day run on a Cray 2 computer
radome, a number of techniques are sorted out the data.
described in the ARTC 4 and RTCA To carry out a test of the radome’s
MOPS D0213 documents such as radio-frequency performance level, two
anechoic chamber, test in ‘free’ area, sets of measurements have to be
two-horn transmission test tools. collected:
However, all of them require extensive, ◗ Reflection coefficient in open circuit
costly means and specialised personnel, which, once converted, gives an
quite unaffordable to most operators. In indication of transparency.
addition, a considerable burden is
placed upon the operators to send the ◗ Reflection coefficient in short
radome to specialised repair stations circuit which, once converted,
sometimes halfway across the world. A indicates the size of the side lobe
tool ‘light’ enough to be usable in levels.
airline facilities and cheap enough was
definitely required. A conversion formula was compiled
and the software was written for use on
History of tools a laptop computer. Various types of
radomes were again tested with the
development Aerospatiale Matra Airbus Test &
Services portable test equipment and
Airbus Industrie and Aerospatiale-
with a referenced anechoic chamber.
Matra initiated work on the
The two sets of results were compared
development of the portable radome
to enable the validation of the principle
test equipment in 1990 on airline
of the portable test equipment. In the
request. First, a review of all the
course of the development different
techniques used to measure the radio-
levels of radome degradation were
frequency characteristics was carried
simulated on an A320 aircraft. The
out to assess the most promising
results met the official requirements
method. It was decided that only a
laid out in various documents such as
method using a single horn, about six
ARTC 4, RTCA D0213, ARINC 708,
centimeters (2.3 inches) in diameter
ARINC 708A… and therefore is a clear
could meet the requirements of the
qualification of the design.
operators. Yet, the method had to be
The portable test equipment is now in
first demonstrated as workable.
industrial production and is available
Consideration was given for a robot
for purchase. (See page 8).
to move the horn over the radome
surface. Measurements would be
Radome test tool
performed along the path of the horn.
procedure...
This solution was quickly abandoned
due to its prohibitive cost. It was then
decided to use a single hand-held horn
including both transmitter and receiver
and to manually move the horn point-
by-point in close contact over the
radome surface, performing the
measurements all along a path of the
radome surface to be covered.
Obviously each type and size of radome
would require a specific path to be
developed. The collected data would
then be converted to meaningful data to
determine the performance level of the
radome.
The data collected from the
measurements does not provide a direct
reading of the radio-frequency
performance level of the radome. The
relation (mathematical model) between
the collected data and the transparency
level with side lobes level had to be
determined. Airbus Industrie then tested
a high number of radomes both with a
6 FAST / NUMBER 26
Brief description
of the equipment
FAST / NUMBER 26 7
Portable test equipment
optional features
Development is still continuing and
the following optional features are foreseen:
Conclusion
Aerospatiale Matra Airbus Test & Services’ portable radome test equipment provides
operators with a low cost in-house capability to test radomes for serviceability and to
identify non-acceptable areas. The test procedure using this tool will be referenced in the
relevant Airbus technical documentation such as the Component Maintenance Manual
(CMM) and the Structure Repair Manual (SRM).
8 FAST / NUMBER 26
Methodology
Analysis
for
of Operational
Interruption Costs
Jean-Pierre POUBEAU
Department Manager
Maintenance Economics Analysis
Customer Services
Emmanuel HERINCKX
M.Sc. Air Transport
Cranfield University
FAST / NUMBER 26 9
Introduction
Airlines are continuously under pressure to improve their punctuality (i.e: on-time
performance), setting ambitious and very challenging objectives.
Increased awareness, new generations of travellers and changing attitudes have led
to a change in demand. Punctuality has become one of the most significant factors
for defining a passenger’s satisfaction with an airline.
Delays, cancellations and other operational interruptions cost airlines money.
Passenger ill-will, associated losses of revenue and compensations are among these
costs. Operational interruptions also pose extra costs to airlines due to higher fuel
burn, additional maintenance, crew and aircraft utilisation. Airlines are extremely
concerned about controlling costs.
25 1997
Airports & ATC
20
15 Weather
10
Handling,
5 operations & technical
0
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Source: Association of European Airlines, Yearbook 1999
…
Fig. 1 Main causes
of departure delays
over 15 minutes
Objective Questionnaire
Operational disruptions result To undertake the above research, two
from many different causes. different questionnaires were designed
The International Air Transport and sent to target both passenger
Association already lists more than 70 carriers and integrators (package
different factors that cause delays. This carriers) respectively. Nearly 65
research has been designed by Airbus different Airbus operators were
Industrie with the aim of providing contacted to provide a large enough
airlines with a methodology to clearly sample on which to base the analysis.
identify and appraise the costs hidden The questionnaires included seven
behind the various operational sections related to the different
interruptions. operational interruption types classified
As clearly presented by AEA, the as follows:
Association of European Airlines, Ground Interruptions:
technical faults only account for a small ◗ Flight dispatch delays
proportion of total disruptions (see Fig. ◗ Ground turnbacks
1 above). ◗ Aborted take-offs
However, this proportion of ◗ Aircraft substitutions
◗ Flight cancellations
operational interruptions, although
(at main base/out-station)
small, is under airlines’ responsibility
and control. This is what they can Air Interruptions:
improve. This is also where the ◗ Air turnbacks
manufacturer can bring all its expertise ◗ Diversion
and support to further improve airlines’ A checklist of cost items, adapted to
each particular type of operational
on-time performance.
interruption, was provided within the
appropriate section. The purpose of
these checklists was to give airlines the
ability to specify which costs and their
respective percentage of the total
interruption costs were included in their
calculations. A presentation of the
section related to delays is given in Fig. 2.
10 FAST / NUMBER 26
Questionnaire
feedback
Very good feedback was received from Crew Y N SUB-TOTAL / %
many airlines that found these Cockpit Crew Overtimes
checklists helpful and good starting Cabin Crew Overtimes
points for internal analyses. Salaries of Stand-by Crew
Operators, wishing to undertake their Hotel & Meals Expenses
own internal analysis, may obtain the Other costs to be specified
lists from the address at the end of this Ramp Services SUB-TOTAL / %
article. It could be of interest to many
Station / gate Agent Overtimes
carriers to undertake such analysis, as
Airport Facility Expenses
only 13 airlines were at this time able to Others
participate in this survey.
The aim of the questionnaires was to Passengers SUB-TOTAL / %
collect information regarding existing Hotel & Meal Expenses
industry models so as to analyse Rerouting of Passengers
operational interruption costs. The Lost of Delayed Luggage
information received has formed the Passenger ill-will
basis of the following analysis, Revenue lost from connecting pax
Others
providing a presentation of what
operators considered as the driving Aircraft SUB-TOTAL / %
factors affecting their operational Fuel Cost
interruption costs. Extra APU / Ground Unit Expenses
Data are based on their respective Stand-by Aircraft Amortization
fleet, including many different aircraft Airport Fees
types from different aircraft Others
manufacturers. Unfortunately, out of
the different operational interruption Cargo SUB-TOTAL / %
types, only the delays and cancellations Penalties for the delay
were presented. Moreover, not enough Others
information came back from
integrators, therefore limiting the scope COST OF A DELAY TOTAL / % 100 %
FAST / NUMBER 26 11
Crew-related expenses Reported Costs
The crew-related costs can be evaluated
by accounting the extra flight labour
US $ / seat / hour Single-aisle Operators
costs (cockpit and cabin crews) incurred 60.0
Sce 7
when a flight is delayed. Pilot and flight Sce 6
attendant salaries vary from airline to
40.0 Sce 4
airline.
Sce 2 Sce 3
The substitution of crews by stand-by Sce 5 Sce 9
crews also increases these expenses. 20.0
Sce 1
Additional hotel and meal expenses have Sce 8
also to be taken into account. These 0.0
increase airlines’ delay costs. "
Delay Costs
Fig. 3
The aircraft type and its associated staff
requirement also affects delay costs, and
therefore, should be considered when US $ / seat / hour Wide-body Operators Sce 7
60.0
calculating them. Sce 6
Ramp-related expenses
Sce 4
These are the lowest contributing costs 40.0
Sce 2 Sce 3
and should not exceed 3 or 4 % of total
Sce 5 Sce 8
delay costs.
20.0
Only ramp-agent overtime and other Sce 1
additional airport facility expenses should
be included. 0.0
"
Aircraft-related expenses Fig. 4
Aircraft-related expenses are strongly
dependent on operational specifications. 100.0
US $ / seat Single-aisle Operators
Sce 3
Therefore the costs associated with fuel Sce 1 Sce 5
burn, navigation charges, extra aircraft
utilisation and maintenance will vary Sce 4 Sce 6
Sce 2
accordingly. 50.0
It is expected that the cost per seat will Sce 7
be lower for wide-body than for single-
aisle aircraft.
Cancellation Costs
0.0
Long-haul flights also lead to "
significantly lower aircraft-related Fig. 5
expenses per seat.
When airlines have the opportunity to 300.0
US $ / seat Sce 3 Wide-body Operators
speed-up their operations so as to catch
up from delays, additional costs should
Sce 4
be added taking into account, for 200.0
example, the increased fuel burned. Sce 5
Sce 1
100.0 Sce 2
When airlines have high frequencies of flights on a given Sce 6
route, their operations are exposed to delays in a completely
0.0
different way to those with low frequency operations. Delays "
can have significant knock-on effects on their operations. Fig. 6
Furthermore, combined with short sector lengths and short
turn-around times, the opportunity to speed-up their
operations in order to catch up remains very limited.
To cope with the problem of knock-on effect, airlines
sometimes add flexibility within their fleet by operating stand-
by aircraft. This of course has a cost, but leads to significantly
improved service quality and reduction in the cost of the
operational interruption. Therefore this should also be taken
into account for the calculation. Stand-by aircraft are either
owned by the airline, used from a pool between airlines or
chartered under specific agreements.
12 FAST / NUMBER 26
Methodology Passenger-related expenses
FASTF
/ NUMBER 26 13
Methodology For example, domestic operators based
in North America face significantly
For cancellation analysis lower airport and navigational charges
The table in figure 9 below presents the compared with European operators,
methodology used by airlines to leading to lower operating costs and,
appraise their cancellation costs with therefore lower potential savings.
examples of percentages. It highlights Moreover, the savings can also be
that cancellation costs are driven by different depending on when the
cancellation occurs. Catering sometimes
passenger-related costs. However, some
cannot be saved if it is already on board
operational savings from not operating
the aircraft.
the flight reduce cancellation costs.
When do cancellations occur? The
Depending on airlines’ type of opera- question is: “Are there any alternatives?”
tions and their respective environment, As reported by the airlines, when dealing
passenger-related expenses and the with a delay, if it is expected to last for
amount of operation cost savings are some time and alternatives are available
expected to vary significantly. Therefore to dispatch the passengers, airlines often
it is recommended that all operators balance the flight cancellation cost with
should do their own calculation based on that of the expected delay and take the
their respective operation type. appropriate measure.
Total / % Single-aisle Cancellation costs are fixed costs. On
Passengers-related cost 130% $xx the contrary, delay costs are running, as a
Hotel & Meal Expenses function of time, and are often reported
Rerouting of Passengers as costs per minute. It is therefore
Luggage Complaints possible to determine whether it is more
Revenue Losses
cost effective to cancel the flight or not.
Total cost savings -30%
The sooner the decision is taken (if
possible prior to the scheduled
Hotel & Meal Expenses departure), the lower the final costs. If,
Rerouting of Passengers on the other hand, no alternatives are
Luggage Complaints
Revenue Losses
available, the cost of delays will go well
TOTAL: $ / SEAT
above the cancellation costs, and delays
$xx / seat
can last for more than 24 hours.
"
Fig. 9 Items contributing cost to
cancellations
Application
of delay and cancellation costs
Delay and cancellation costs can be used to evaluate the cost benefit of modifications to
improve the dispatch reliability of an aircraft fleet. A balanced computation between the
airline’s cost of delays and cancellations, the cost of improvement actions, and the
savings over a specified amortisation period can be done.
In other words, by knowing the rate of delays and cancellations caused by a specific
component or a specific system, the average delay time they cause, their repercussion on
operational interruption costs and the necessary investment for reliability improvement,
the break-even point and further cost savings can be calculated.
In this respect, all operators wishing to carry out such analyses will find Airbus
Industrie’s computerised Service Bulletin Cost Benefit Model of much help. It is
available on request from the address below, free of charge for Airbus Industrie’s
customers.
Conclusion
For any questions or complementary
Airlines, airframe and engine manufacturers, and equipment suppliers all information, please contact:
have a degree of responsibility and control of operational interruptions
due to technical reasons. Reduction in the number of operational Mr. Jean-Pierre POUBEAU
interruptions can lead to substantial cost savings. However, there is MAINTENANCE ECONOMICS
always a cost associated with these improvements. Therefore, this cost ANALYSIS DEPARTMENT
should be properly balanced with the potential resulting savings.
Working closely with the manufacturers and suppliers, operational Fax:
reliability can be improved, to the benefit of the airlines and to the +33 (0) 5 62 11 01 56
satisfaction of their passengers. The method presented for the analysis of
delay and cancellation costs can help airlines appraise their operational e-mail:
interruption costs, and therefore, identify future reliability improvement jean-pierre.poubeau@airbus.fr
benefits ■
14 FAST / NUMBER 26
By Ross WALKER
Senior Fuel Systems Engineer
Hydro-mechanical Systems, Airbus Industrie
FAST / NUMBER 26 15
Fuel storage
In summary Differences Functions On the A340-500 fuel is stored in nine fuel
Rib 1
Below, you have a summary of the differences for The functions of the A340-500/-600 fuel system tanks:
Rib 4
Centre
A340-500/-600 fuel system: remain similar to the A340-200/-300: Three Tanks in each wing, comprising:
◗ An increase in the number of fuel tanks ◗ One ‘Outer’ wing transfer tank; Inn
Rib 1
Fuel storage and tank venting er T
wo er T
hre
1
In n e
◗ ◗ Engine and APU fuel feed supply Two Engine feed tanks called Spa
r
Rib 2
A revised ECAM fuel system page Cen
tre
◗ ‘Inners’. (Within each ‘Inner’
3
Inn
Fuel quantity indication O ne er F
◗ Secondary wing refuel and transfer galleries tank is a dedicated engine In n e
r Collector Cells our
Rib 3
(One per Inner Tank) Out
◗ ter
Rib 4
Temperature indication feed collector cell); Ou er
5
◗ Dedicated fuel jettison/transfer & engine feed pumps Sur
1
rg e
◗ Refuel/Defuel control One Transfer tank in the centre Su
Rear Centre
Tank (RCT)
ge
◗ Separate APU and trim transfer lines ◗ Transfer control wing box called the ‘Centre’ tank; (-500 only)
◗ Segregation of computing and fuel probe interface functions ◗ Centre of gravity control One Transfer tank in the Trim
SURGE
Fuel level sensing ‘Trim tank’;
◗ (-500 only) A fuel tank positioned between the forward end ◗ Fuel system advisories and warnings One Transfer tank positioned at the
of the rear cargo hold & the centre landing gear bay ◗ Maintenance BITE indication forward end of the rear cargo hold.
This tank is called the ‘Rear Centre At each wing tip and on the right wing tip of the horizontal stabiliser is a
◗ Change of vendor to Parker for fuel control monitoring system ◗ Fuel jettison
Tank’ or ‘RCT’. surge tank. These tanks do not normally contain fuel but are used as part
of the tank ventilation system to link the fuel tank system to the outside
The A340-600 has only eight tanks, the
Fuel system
air and prevent fuel spillage during refuelling, aircraft manoeuvres or due
RCT not being fitted.
to thermal expansion of the fuel. These tanks are the interface to outside
ENG ENG air through flame arrestors and flush non-icing inlets.
2 3 REFUEL/DEFUEL VALVES
ER RIGH
INN T INN AIRCRAFT
ENG LEFT CENTRE
ER ENG
R Left refuel isolation "
1 R S 4 S Right refuel isolation A340-500/-600 Fuel tanks
2 3 BM Auxiliary refuel
ER AA EE OUTE
OUT R BN Defuel
C Z
1 4 INNER A340-500 A340-600
BA Inner 1 inlet
B D F Inner 2 inlet Volume Mass Volume Mass
EA EB H Inner 3 inlet
BB Inner 4 inlet
SURGE
SURGE
Q P litres US gals kg lb litres US gals kg lb
M N OUTER
F V W G GG H M Outer inlet
N Outer inlet 6,360 1,680 5,088 11,216 6,360 1,680 5,088 11,216 Left Outer
CENTRE 6,360 1,680 5,088 11,216 6,360 1,680 5,088 11,216 Right Outer
K G Centre inlet
GG Centre restrictor 25,690 6,786 20,552 45,305 25,690 6,786 20,552 45,305 Inner 1
X " Y BC Inner 1 transfer Inner 2
A340-200/-300 J 33,280 8,792 26,624 58,698 33,280 8,792 26,624 58,698
BG Inner 2 transfer
BH Inner 3 transfer 33,280 8,792 26,624 58,698 33,280 8,792 26,624 58,698 Inner 3
BD Inner 4 transfer 25,690 6,786 20,552 45,305 25,690 6,786 20,552 45,305 Inner 4
Text legend TRIM
APU W Trim pipe isolation 55,980 14,788 44,784 98,729 55,980 14,788 44,784 98,729 Centre
All A340 L Trim inlet
L T TRIM 8,238 2,177 6,590 14,534 8,238 2,177 6,590 14,534 Trim
A340-500/-600 RCT
CA RCT isolation 19,930 5,265 15,944 35,151 Not fitted RCT
SURGE
A340-500
CB RCT inlet 214,808 56,746 171,846 378,854 194,878 51,481 155,902 343,703 Total
A340-200/-300
TRANSFER PUMPS
A340-500/-600 " CENTRE (For mass figures a density of 0.8 kg/litre = 6.676 lb/US gallons is used) "
Centre left The total aircraft and individual tank
ENG ENG
GNE
Centre right usable fuel capacities
TRIM
2 O INNE 23 Left trim transfer JETTISON/ ENGINE /
R TW R TH
ENG INNE REE
INNE
ENG
GNE Right trim transfer TRANSFER PUMPS APU FEED VALVES
1 R I NNER ONE CENTRE R FO S 14 Trim transfer Inner 1 jettison/transfer ISOLATION
UR R
Refuel
2 3 RCT Inner 2 jettison/transfer EC Transfer control 2
ER AA EE OUTE RCT forward Inner 3 jettison/transfer ED Transfer control 3
OUT C Z R
RCT aft Inner 4 jettison/transfer EA Left Inner
1
EC
4 Left Centre jettison/transfer EB Right Inner The refuel system is
ED TRANSFER VALVES Right Centre jettison/transfer APU designed to refuel the
BC BG BN BH BD OUTER J APU LP aircraft from empty to full
BM Q Left outer transfer ENGINE/APU FEED PUMPS K APU isolation
in 33 minutes on the A340-
SURGE
SURGE
MAIN
EGRUS
Refuel distribution
The automatic refuel distribution is
defined in two steps in a first stage by
specific masses for each tank followed by A & B - The automatic refuel
a second ‘top-up’ phase to the volumetric distribution for the complete range
high level for all tanks. " of fuel densities and fuel quantities
50
FOB 85.8 tonnes -
FOB 109.4 tonnes -
All Inners 19.1 tonnes (continue filling Inners 2&3 & start filling Centre & Trim)
Inners 2&3 24.6 tonnes (continue filling Centre & Trim)
The Outer, Trim and RCT tanks each have
Individual Fuel Tank Mass Tonnes
FOB 144.3 tonnes - Centre 41.4 and Trim 6.1 tonnes (start to fill RCT)
FOB 159 tonnes - All tanks max. volume with min. density a single tank inlet valve. To minimise any
(all tanks filled simultaneously to max. vol.)
40
FOB 189 tonnes - All tanks max. volume with max. density
surge pressures in the refuel gallery the
OUTER
INNERS (1&4)
Centre and Inner tanks have two valves
30 INNERS (2&3)
CENTRE which are closed in sequence. The Centre
TRIM
20
Rear Centre Tank (RCT) tank has a tank inlet valve in series with a
restrictor valve and the Inner tanks each
10
have two tank inlet valves in parallel.
To enter the aircraft, fuel must pass
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 through one of the two refuel isolation
Total Fuel on Board (FOB), Tonnes
valves which form part of the refuel
couplings fitted to each wing. To prevent
B A340-600 Refuel Distribution (All Densities 0.74 - 0.88 kg/litre)
60
spillage of fuel, the detection of fuel within
FOB 12 tonnes - All Inners 3 tonnes (start to fill Outers) either of the wing tip surge tanks or a
FOB 21.4 tonnes - Outers 4.7 tonnes (continue filling Inners)
50
FOB 85.8 tonnes -
FOB 109.4 tonnes -
All Inners 19.1 tonnes (continue filling Inners 2&3 & start filling Centre & Trim)
Inners 2&3 24.6 tonnes (continue filling Centre & Trim)
Jettison valve detected open will
Individual Fuel Tank Mass Tonnes
FOB 144.3 tonnes - All tanks max. volume with min. density
(all tanks filled simultaneously to max. vol.)
automatically stop the refuelling of the
40 FOB 171.5 tonnes - All tanks max. volume with max. density
complete aircraft by closing the refuel
OUTER
INNERS (1&4) isolation valves.
30 INNERS (2&3)
CENTRE
TRIM
In addition, detection of the fuel in the
20
horizontal stabiliser surge tank will
automatically stop automatic refuelling
10 and manual refuelling of the Trim tank.
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200
18 FAST / NUMBER 26
Engine feed Jettison
Under normal operation each engine is A jettison system is provided to avoid
fed by an independent fuel feed system. the necessity for heavy maintenance
This consists of main and standby tasks, by providing a means to
engine feed booster pumps located minimise the potential for an
within a collector cell, which in turn is overweight landing. (The system is not
located within an engine feed tank required for certification reasons
(Inner). The main pump operates relating to the performance of the
continuously, the standby pump only aircraft). The system is activated by
operates if the main pump becomes means of two dedicated pushbuttons
defective or is set to OFF. ‘Arm’ and ‘Active’ located on the
The collector cells are maintained full cockpit overhead panel. The system can
until the Inner wing tanks are near be manually stopped by de-selection of
empty (see fuel transfer section) to help either of these pushbuttons, or
ensure a supply of fuel to the engine automatically if all jettison/transfer
under negative ‘G’ manoeuvres. The pumps are running dry (low pressure)
collector cells are maintained full by or when the fuel quantity drops below a
the use of jet pumps driven by fuel flow predetermined target input into the
taken from the main engine feed MCDU by the flight crew.
booster pumps. The system jettisons fuel through two
All engine feed systems can be joined jettison valves positioned in the number
to the crossfeed gallery by their three flap fairing between the two
independent crossfeed valves. The engines on each wing. Up to ten
crossfeed system is used under jettison/transfer pumps are used to
abnormal operational conditions such provide the fuel flow, one situated in
as loss of all electrical power requiring each of the four Inner tanks and two in
gravity feeding or to connect all the centre tank, two in the Trim tank
engines to a single engine feed boost and Two in the RCT. The refuel gallery
pump when only the emergency is used to connect the jettison valves to
electrical supply is available or to allow the pumps. The Centre, Trim and RCT
the crew to correct an imbalance pumps only function if the associated
between symmetrical wing tanks. tank contains fuel. In addition, if the
In common with all other Airbus Outer tanks contain fuel, a transfer of
Industrie programmes, all fuel pump the fuel to the Inner tanks is
and valve electrical wiring is routed automatically initiated.
outside of the fuel tanks to eliminate
the potential for introducing ignition
sources into the fuel tanks.
Fuel transfers
& usage
Note: Identical pumps are used for
On the A340-600 under normal
engine feed, jettison and transfer on all
operation all fuel transfers, except those
A340s.
for centre-of-gravity control, are to the
four Inner tanks, prior to transfer to the
collector cells, and are controlled
APU Feed automatically. Automatic transfers are
The APU is fed via a dedicated line controlled to balance the fuel quantities
from a tapping off the number one in symmetrical wing tanks to prevent an
engine fuel feed line. The number one imbalance which could adversely effect
engine booster pumps normally supply the aircraft handling. On the A340-500
the fuel pressure. However, if these transfers from the RCT are to the
pumps are not selected then a dedicated Centre tank. On the cockpit overhead
APU pump is installed in the line to panel four pushbuttons are provided to
supply the fuel pressure. allow manual transfer control of the
Outers to Inners, Centre to Inners, Trim
to Centre and RCT to Centre.
FAST / NUMBER 26 19
A340-500 fuel usage
& transfer sequencing
The normal tank usage sequence is
in the following order: ◗ Transfers from the RCT to the Centre tank forward refuel/transfer gallery and
are by means of two pumps located in the independently controlled tank inlet valves, one
1 Centre 4 Outers RCT and two valves, one valve situated at each for each Inner tank. In the event of certain
end of the RCT refuel/transfer line. failures, transfers are by means of two pumps
2 RCT 5 Inners located in the Centre tank which are
◗ Transfers from the Centre to the Inner tanks
6 Collector cells connected to the aft refuel/transfer gallery and
3 Trim are normally by means of two pumps located
independently controlled tank inlet valves, one
in the Centre tank which are connected to the
for each Inner tank.
50000 ◗ Transfers from the Trim to Inners are by
45000 INNERS (1&4) means of two pumps located in the Trim tank,
Individual Tank Fuel Quantity (kg)
INNERS (2&3)
40000
CENTRE two valves situated at opposite ends of the
RCT
TRIM
Trim tank transfer line and independently
35000
OUTERS controlled tank inlet valves, one for each Inner
30000 tank, connected to the aft refuel/transfer
25000 gallery. If the centre tank contains usable fuel
20000
then trim transfers will be to this tank.
15000 ◗ Transfers from the Outer tanks to the Inner
10000
tanks are by gravity. For transfers to Inner
tanks one and four the refuel inlet valves, for
5000
the concerned tanks and refuel gallery, are
0
172 162 153 143 133 124 114 105 95 86 76 66 57 47 38 28 18 9
used. For transfers to Inner tanks two and
0 60 120 180 240 300 360 420 480 540 600 660 720 780 840 900 960 1020
three dedicated transfer valves and associated
(FOB) Tonnes pipework is used.
Flight Time (minutes)
20 FAST / NUMBER 26
Fuel quantity measurement
& level sensing (cont’d)
Within the normal ground standing In the case of a complete failure of the
attitude range of the aircraft the fuel control and monitoring system
accuracy of the FQI system will be in (FCMS), a secondary manual fuel level
the order of 0.4% of the full capacity indication system is installed in the six
near empty to 1% at full. wing tanks and the centre tank for
To further enhance the security of the ground use. Height data from the
fuel system designs on Airbus aircraft probes is used in conjunction with
the potential for an ignition source to be aircraft attitude information, fuel
present in a fuel tank has been density measurement and a set of look
mitigated by the following measures: up tables to calculate the fuel mass in
the tank being measured.
◗ The harnesses to the capacitive The level sense function is used to
probes are segregated from all other detect high and low fuel level states in
aircraft wiring ; all fuel tanks and a fuel overflow in the
◗ The length of the harnesses is three surge tanks.
minimised (the FDCs being fitted
within the centre fuselage section). This information is used to control:
These measures limit the potential for a ◗ Refuel
short circuit to power cables. ◗ Inter tank transfers
◗ Transfer pump shut-down
◗ Overflow protection
◗ Indication of low fuel state.
Fuel temperature
measurement
Dual element in-tank temperature sensors are fitted to the Trim, Outer
and Engine feed tanks. These sensors enable the flight crew to monitor
the evolution of the tank fuel temperatures to ensure that they are within
the operational limitations for the specific fuel types being used (e.g.,
JET A or JET A1).
FAST / NUMBER 26 21
Cockpit control panels
& indication
Due to the differences in the fuel sys- Despite the differences, there is still a
tem architecture, the fuel system con- pushbutton for each engine feed and
A340-500/600 Cockpit Hydraulic & trol panel and ECAM system page dif- transfer pump, for each crossfeed
Fuel Control Panel " fer from the A340-200/-300. valve and each transfer function, as
well as a dedicated tog-
gle switch associated
with the Trim tank isola-
tion, as can be seen on
the main fuel system
overhead panel. Under
normal operation, after
initialisation at the start
of a mission, no crew
action is required on the
panel. Manual transfer
control is by selection of
the dedicated transfer
pushbuttons or the dese-
lection of the transfer
pump pushbuttons.
Adjacent to the main
panel are the pushbut-
tons for jettison and the
Inner 2 and 3 wing tank
isolation valves.
A340-500 only
A340-500/600 ECAM
"
For any questions or complementary
fuel page
information, please contact:
22 FAST / NUMBER 26
By William WAINWRIGHT
Chief Test Pilot
Airbus Industrie
FAST / NUMBER 26 23
Changes
in technology
Not so long ago sophisticated aircraft
systems, such as autopilots and
autothrottles, were made up of
complicated linkages involving cogs,
cams, springs, and gears. They could
clog up, seize up, slip a gear, or just
slow down because they were
contaminated.
"
Computer rack in a This has all changed...
Hawker Siddeley Trident
They are now made up of various
electrical components, and some
software.
Computer rack
#
in an A340
from cogs
wonderfully, with remarkable accuracy
for many years. But then it became less
accurate – it needed cleaning.
24 FAST / NUMBER 26
Software Design It may even happen that the engines
reduce to idle to avoid the speed
Designing any flight control system is a increasing too quickly. Then, when the
compromise. I will take autothrust as an shear reverses, and thrust has to be
example. To have good accuracy of increased, the engine acceleration will
speed tracking you need a high gain
system. However, a Gain is a number
be relatively slow, as with all modern
big-fan engines at high altitude, such
Computers work
high gain system in a formula used
is susceptible to in a control law.
overcontrolling, which High gain means a
in the extreme case may high multiplication
that a speed excursion occurs briefly in
the opposite sense. This behaviour has
been criticised when it has occurred in
‘as
designed’...
of a parameter. service because it was considered to be
lead to instability,
which in this example might be due to a faulty autothrust system. This
oscillations in power setting. And even may have been true in the past, with
with a system free of instability, autothrottles full of gears, cams, levers
frequent thrust variations in the cruise etc., but this is no longer true of digital
will increase fuel consumption and systems. We have designed our
annoy the passengers. Thus, you have autothrust system to work that way, for
to find a compromise that will give you very good reasons, which may not
reasonable comfort together with
always be obvious to the pilot.
acceptable accuracy. For example, in
the cruise we set a reasonably high gain
initially, allowing quite high thrust
variations, so that the autothrust system
can quickly find a mean thrust setting
to maintain the selected speed.
Thereafter, a lower gain is used to With modern technology
minimize thrust variations whilst
allowing a looser speed tracking with Computers, having the same hardware,
variations in speed of up to +/-4kt. If and the same software, will always work
the speed goes outside this bracket, due in the same way. Thus, changing the
to the wind suddenly changing, the autothrust computer to another of the
system progressively switches back to same standard, will have no effect. No
its high gain until the stabilised matter how many new boxes you try, the
situation is regained. Thus, in certain only way to correct what has happened
conditions speed tracking may be less is to change the software. Unlike some
accurate than some pilots think it popular perceptions, this is not an easy
should be. matter and it is certainly not cheap. We
Extreme
have designed our software as it is for
good reasons, and it is always based on
Conditions a compromise solution. Of course,
sometimes we realise that we could
Furthermore, if a large windshear is have done it in a different, perhaps a
encountered, particularly when flying at better, way. But you always have to be
speeds near Vmo/Mmo, we need the very careful when you change the
autothrust to act quickly to prevent or software to correct something that you
minimize an overspeed. Thus, it may do not like, that you don’t make it worse
happen that the autothrust varies somewhere else. This is why, when we
between high and low power settings change something, we always do a lot
for a short time. Even though the of extra flight tests to prove that there is
relatively high gain that is used is still no degradation.
rather low by comparison with what a
pilot would have used in these
circumstances to do his initial
correction, we cannot change the gain,
as he would do, after the possibility of
overspeed has been avoided.
In addition, we always avoid using
very high gains, which may cause
instability. Therefore, we use
compromises which will work very
well in most cases, but which might not
be optimum in some extreme cases.
FAST / NUMBER 26 25
Characteristics of
Automatic Systems
“I believe that one of the reasons why it is not always obvious to the
pilot that a system is working ‘as per design’, when it is working below
his expectations, is that we all expect a little too much of modern
automatic systems”.
Also, we sometimes meet conditions where we have
They never
get tired! never seen them working before. They work better than
the human being in some aspects, but not as well in
others. For example, they never get tired, and thus
they can follow a speed target for hours with
excellent accuracy if the conditions do not change.
But they cannot adjust their strategy when the
conditions change. In fact, they are less adaptable
than human beings.
Adaptability Autoland was developed to land an aircraft large, particularly when landing on dif-
when the pilot could not see where he was ficult runways or in difficult weather
in going; blind landings in fog. This put the conditions. A variation in touchdowns
autoland emphasis on landing the aircraft in a reason- between 2ft/second and 5ft/second is
able touchdown zone. The com- not unusual. The autopilot should never
do a ‘kiss’ landing. This is because we
fort of the landing was of sec- design it to touchdown in the correct
ondary importance. Now landing zone. Therefore, we have to
autoland is being used in many make sure that it will not float.
different conditions, and on many For this reason we have incorporated
different runways, which are not a sort of anti-long flare. If after a certain
always ideally suited to automat- time, the aircraft has not touched down,
ic landings, because they have it is programmed to make a slight nose-
rising ground before them, or down pitch change to search for the
cliffs, or they have significant ground. This means that in certain con-
slopes. ditions, which cause the aircraft to have
a tendency to float, it will suddenly
pitch nose-down to touchdown relative-
Unlike a human pilot, the ly firmly. In fact the touchdown will still
autopilot cannot change the be within our normal dispersion, but it
way it flies to cope with dif- may disappoint the pilot who was
ferent local conditions. It can- expecting something better, and it may
not change its priorities be rather untidy.
between making a smooth
landing when the weather
conditions are good and land- The reality
ing relatively firmly but right
We had a customer’s pilot, come to
in the centre of the touchdown
accept a new aircraft, who asked to
Blind landing in fog
" zone when they are bad. It cannot decide
to change its flare height to suit a rising re-fly his aircraft after such an
runway, nor can it change its technique autoland. The repeat test was done
to cater for thermal activity. Of course, at the same airport in the same
we could attempt to give them a lot of weather conditions and the same
complicated logic that would try to cater thing happened again. Another
Automatic systems for this. But this may cause problems
elsewhere, because it is often better to
flight was requested. The pilot was
expecting a perfect performance
are less have simple logic. And you have to be
careful not to have a system which
from his new aircraft, which he had
every right to expect, but in fact, a
26 FAST / NUMBER 26
What never
changes Rectification action they always work
The flying characteristics in normal law We had one case on a production
never change. They depend on a set of
software, and as I have already said,
first flight of an aircraft that passed
into the de-rotation phase of an
in the
that always works in the same way. At
least unless, or until, we make a change
to it. You may or may not like all the
De-rotation is the autoland whilst
time between still airborne.
touch-down of the
same way...
main wheels and The test pilot
characteristics, and occasionally you touch-down of the had to intervene
may be surprised by something that you nose wheels. to prevent a hard
had not noticed before. But changing landing. It was due to an error in the
the computers to others of the same wiring that caused the autopilot to
standard will do nothing. see the wheels as turning
During a customer acceptance flight permanently. As soon as the radio
on an A340, the customer ’s pilot altitude part of the condition was
suddenly complained about the rate of
seen, the aircraft started its de-
roll. He was doing a part of the
programme that checked the flying rotation. This is a good example of
characteristics in normal law. This calls why autolands must be done during
for some more vigorous manoeuvring production test flights and is a case
than is normally done in line service, where rectification action was
and he found the roll rate to be less than necessary.
he expected. I said that it was probably
because he was not used to using such a
large sidestick input. Perhaps he was We have also seen cases where aircraft
looking for an instantaneous 15° per did not pass into flare law during
second roll rate, as might be interpreted manual landings. The aircraft remained
from the book. Whereas we have to
in its normal ‘g’ and pitch rate law for
design the aircraft, with all its inertia, to
the landing, which is less dramatic, but
have roll characteristics which start
still requires us to do some corrective
with a gentle acceleration initially
before arriving at the maximum action. However, in this case, working
stabilised roll rate, which will always on the aircraft would have been
be 15° per second. ineffective; a change of design was
I have to admit that we ask the necessary. In fact, it was due to the way
customer’s pilot to verify the handling in which the transition was triggered
characteristics during their acceptance and the way the radio altitude signal
flight. We also do this during our own was sampled. We discovered that a
production test flights. This is an easy particular runway profile could cause a
way to manoeuvre the aircraft a bit perturbation in the signal around the
more vigorously than would normally height for changing the laws which
happen in service with passengers meant that the transition did not take
aboard. In fact, we are verifying that no place. In fact, the aircraft over-flew a
other anomalies occur. We are not lighting post at the exact instant
really checking roll rates or maximum where it passed below
bank angles. They are always the same, 100ft.
although some small variations may be At that time the
seen according to the exact way in transition was
which the manoeuvres are done. triggered by the
aircraft passing
What can 100ft when in
descent. This
change was hidden by
Although the software will not change, the momentary
an external parameter that is used by blip in altitude
the software may be deficient, either caused by the
permanently or temporarily. A good post. The cure
example is the transition into another was to change
phase of a law – both in manual flight the trigger
and in autoland. This may be a reason mechanism to be
to either change the equipment or to when below 100ft
change the software by producing a and not when passing
new standard. 100ft.
FAST / NUMBER 26 27
Fail soft
This latter example is a very good
Computer faults illustration of our philosophy which
leads us to design monitoring circuits
“System failures are “I have to admit that computers are not infallible, and they can stop working in the way that we do. Our philosophy
correctly. I imagine that we have all experienced a home computer that has blocked and
software…” has to be re-started to clear itself. Of course a similar situation can occur to an aircraft
computer. But it is important to realize which part of the computer can block, and which
is quite clear; it is to never leave a sick
computer in charge of normal law.
Thus, the monitoring circuits are
will always work exactly in the same way.” designed so that the slightest doubt
We had one case where all three individual programme, such as Word leads to the relevant computer
Primary Computers were lost, and I or Excel, always works as it is meant declaring itself faulty and dropping
know that various explanations are to. In aviation terms, the equivalent of off-line. Therefore, failures are soft,
circulating, as rumours do, which Word or Excel might be the flight and we have eliminated the hard-over
have nothing to do with what actually control law software, which I have failures which were a significant risk
happened. But, before I tell you what already said will always work ‘as factor with previous generation
did cause this incident, I will explain aircraft. This may lead us to have more
designed’.
how the system works.
The equivalent of Windows, or any technical defects, but the effect on the
To illustrate my point, even though I
other management software, is the aircraft and the pilot will be minimal
am not a software expert, I will use an
example from the world of home Command/Monitoring structure that due to the redundancy that is built into
computers. As I understand it, it is the supervises each computer and manages the flying control systems.
software that manages the computer the system, which consists of several
that may block. The programme individual computers, just like a
software always works as designed. network. I will give an illustration of
For example, in terms of the home how our ‘network’ works, and an
computer, it would be an interaction example of a ‘glitch’, which has now
between programmes that might
provoke a blockage whereas each
been cured by a re-design of the
managing software.
Summary and conclusion
In conclusion, software design is a compromise and may not
always please everyone. But the programme software, such as
that used in Normal Law or autopilot or autothrust, will always
The cured ‘glitch’ behave in the same way in an identical set
We can consider the three Primary fact, onlywould
one Prim is required
given bytothebe of circumstances. Failures that occur to
How our ‘network’ works
flight control computers on the
which
active to
have been
maintain full normal
We had one case where all three Prims were lost whereas only one
first Prim if it had not fallen sick. law
In Prim was sick. computers are usually in the
We
A330/340 can consider
as three the three Primary
generals who just capability, provided
fact, only one Prim is of courseto that
required be This was due to a weakness in the monitoring process. supervising and management part of
happen to be identical on
flight control computers the
triplets both Secondary
active to maintain computers
full normal law are the system. They will cause the
A330/340 as three generals who just To ensure that we never leave a sick computer in charge of normal
commanding identical army divisions serviceable.
capability, provided of course that both system to fail soft. We have a
happen to 1,2,3).
be identical triplets law, each Prim continuously sends messages to its brothers about
(called Prim Being identical Incidentally, the Secondary
Secondary computers computers
are serviceable. the state of its health. similar situation with aircraft to
commanding
triplets they all identical
thinkarmy anddivisions
work in that prevailing in the car industry.
(Sec) are dissimilar
Incidentally, to thecomputers
the Secondary Prims in In this case, when Prim 1 started to feel sick it stammered and did
(calledthe
exactly Prim 1,2,3).
same wayBeing
andidentical
have the both hardware & software. Oneinof You no longer have to spend your
(Sec) are dissimilar to the Prims not get its message out straight away.
triplets
same they alltothink
reactions eachand work
and everyin them weekends tuning carburettors or
bothcan control
hardware andthe aircraftOne
software. onofits Prims 2 and 3 hearing a garbled message thought that they were
exactly the
situation. same way
Having and havearmy
identical the tweaking electrical points.
own.
themIt is
canascontrol
if the three generals
the aircraft had
on its themselves sick, and they declared themselves faulty. Tuning & tweaking!
same reactions
divisions under their to each
commandand every they twoown.
twin Thanks to fuel injection and
It iscolonels in reserve,
as if the three less
generals had Prim 1 then got his message out to say that he was faulty and was
each have identical
situation. Havingresources
identical toarmy cope capable,
two twinwith smaller
colonels forces,less
in reserve, but handing over control, but there was no one left to hear him. electronic ignition your car will
with any situation.
divisions under theirBut in anythey
command well absolutely
capable,reliable.
with smaller forces, but Thus, the aircraft passed into Direct Law under the command of its give maximum performance just
disciplined army, only one general
each have identical resources to cope can absolutely two Secondary computers until Prims 2 and 3 were reset. until there is a failure in the
This was a reliable.
case where one of the
be with
the supreme
any situation.commander.
But in anyThis wellis
This was a case where one of
hardware, usually in the electronic circuit. You don’t have any
thedisciplined
case for our flight
army, onlycontrol system.
one general can the Prims (Prim 1) was redundancy on your car; it just stops working. In aircraft, systems
be the supreme commander.
Only one Prim is in command at any This is defective and needed failures are soft and hard-overs have been eliminated ■
the case for our flight control
one time. It passes its orders to the system. changing. However, changing
others Onlywhoonecontinue,
Prim is in command
however,atto
“…and hard-overs
Prims 2 and 3 for new ones
any one time. It passes
calculate their own commands its orderswhichto would not prevent this
thekeep
they otherstowho continue, however,
themselves. Of course, to situation happening again,
calculate
being their own
identical and commands
having access whichto because they would be
thethey
samekeepinformation,
to themselves. the Of course,
orders identical to the ones replaced. have been eliminated”
being identical
calculated withinand having
each access
Prim are to It was an unlikely occurrence
For any questions or comments, please contact:
the same
identical. Thus,information,
if one Prim thefalls
orderssick that does not happen every
time a Prim is faulty. However, Mr. William WAINWRIGHT
andcalculated
passes thewithincommand eachtoPrimone of areits
CHIEF TEST PILOT
brothers, the brother continues to give
identical. Thus, if one Prim falls sick it could not be ruled out that it
would never happen again. The Fax:
orders which the
and passes willcommand
be identical
to one toofthose
its
solution lay in re-designing the +33 (0) 5 61 93 29 34
which would
brothers, the have
brotherbeen giventoby
continues the
give
monitoring process, which has e-mail:
first Primwhich
orders if it will
hadbenot fallentosick.
identical thoseIn
been done. william.wainwright@airbus.fr
USA / CANADA
Thierry van der Heyden, Vice President Customer Services
Telephone: +1 (703) 834 3484 / Telefax:+1 (703) 834 3464
CHINA
Emmanuel Peraud, Director Customer Services
Telephone: +86 10 6456 7720 / Telefax: +86 10 6456 76942 /3 /4
REST OF THE WORLD
Mohamed El-Borai, Vice President Customer Support Services Division
Telephone: +33 (0) 5 61 93 35 04 / Telefax:+33 (0) 5 61 93 41 01
RESIDENT CUSTOMER SUPPORT ADMINISTRATION
Philippe Bordes, Director of Resident Customer Representation Administration
Telephone: +33 (0) 5 61 93 31 02 / Telefax:+33 (0) 5 61 93 49 64
Sixty years later life had become more complicated and expensive. Complete aircraft, special
hangars and test equipment. Fatigue tests as well as static tests had become the standard in
Europe with the arrival of the jet transport age in 1949 when the de Havilland Comet first flew.
32 FAST / NUMBER 26
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In the 1920s
static tests of
wing structures
were fairly
simple affairs.
All you needed
were a few
sand bags.
Static test of an upturned
Dewoitine D27 wing.
The D27 first flew on 3rd June 1928
piloted by Marcel Doret.
Sixty years later life had become more complicated and expensive. Complete aircraft, special
hangars and test equipment. Fatigue tests as well as static tests had become the standard in
Europe with the arrival of the jet transport age in 1949 when the de Havilland Comet first flew.
32 FAST / NUMBER 26