ASSIGNMENT 4.

SUBMITTED BY:
LEADER:
Lorenzo, Gladys Mae G.

MEMBERS:
Lasay, Gabrielle B.
Leaño, Julius Adolf
Lopez, Alpha Grace P.
Loresco, Isaiah RB S.
GED102 – A3

SUBMITTED TO:
Sir Francis Anthony Llacuna

June 19, 2019

EXERCISE 1.1

1. What is the quota criterion for apportionment?

Quota criterion is a test of fairness in apportionment method. Standard quota should be
examined in order to prove the fairness. If any data is apportioned lesser than the lower quota or
greater than the upper quota, then the criterion is violated. It should always be equal or a little
higher to the value of standard quota. Only the Hamilton method satisfies the quota criterion
because it does not require to have a modified standard divisor which makes the difference
among apportionment methods.
2. How do you compute for the standard divisor using the Hamilton method?
To get the standard divisor using Hamilton method, the total number of population (P) and total
number of allocated seats (A) must be determined. These two components are needed to solve
for the standard divisor, as defined by the formula:
𝑃
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟 (𝑆𝐷) =
𝐴
3. Explain how to calculate the standard quota of a group in the Hamilton method.
To get the standard quota using Hamilton method, the size or population per group (G) and the
computed SD must be determined to define the standard quota, as defined by the formula:
𝐺
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑎 (𝑆𝑄) =
𝑆𝐷

4. Explain how to calculate the lower quota of a group in the Hamilton method.
After computing for the SQ of each group, the lower quota (LQ) is determined by taking the whole
number from the given SQ. For example:
𝑆𝑄 𝐿𝑄
9.48 9

5. In the Hamilton method, what should you do if the sum of the lower quota does not meet
the required value for apportionment?
If the sum of the lower quotas did not meet the required total value for apportionment, then the
groups with the highest fractional values are given one more seat. For example, the total
apportionment must be 22. Since the sum of LQ is only 20, two among the groups with the
highest fractional value shall be given one more seat.
𝑆𝑄 𝐿𝑄 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
9.48 9 9
6.89 6 +1 7
5.92 5 +1 6
20 22
EXERCISE 2.1

1.) The following is the preference table form a science club election where the candidates
are Arrow (A), Bennett (B), Candice (C), and Danny (D).

Number of 42 23 35 28 14
Voters
st
1 choice A B C A D
2nd choice D A D B A
3rd choice B C B D C
4th choice C D A C B

a.) Plurality Method

Candidate Total 1st place votes

A 1 2 4 1 2 70

B 3 1 3 2 4 23

C 4 3 1 4 3 35

D 2 4 2 3 1 14

No. Of voters 42 23 35 28 14 142

Total 1st place votes

A - 42+28=70
B - 23
C - 35
D - 14

Since Arrow has most 1st place votes, Arrow wins the election.
 b.) Plurality with elimination method

Candidate Total 1st place votes

A 1 2 3 1 1 70

B 2 1 2 2 3 23

C 3 3 1 3 2 35

No. Of voters 42 23 35 28 14 128

Total 1st place votes

A - 42+28+14=84
B - 23
C - 35

Since Arrow has most 1st place votes, Arrow wins the election.

c.) Borda count

N=4 ARROW (A)

RANK RANK POINT NO. OF VOTES TOTAL

1 4 42 168

2 3 23 69

4 1 35 35

1 4 28 112

2 3 14 42

Borda count = 426

N=4 BENNETT (B)

RANK RANK POINT NO. OF VOTES TOTAL

3 2 42 84

1 4 23 92

3 2 35 70

2 3 28 84

4 1 14 14

Borda count = 344

N=4 CANDICE (C)

RANK RANK POINT NO. OF VOTES TOTAL

4 1 42 42

3 2 23 46

1 4 35 140

4 1 28 28

3 2 14 28

Borda count = 284

N=4 DANNY (D)

RANK RANK POINT NO. OF VOTES TOTAL

2 3 42 126

4 1 23 23

2 3 35 105

3 2 28 56

1 4 14 56

Borda count = 366

Since Arrow has the highest Borda count, thus, he wins the election.

d.) Top Two Runoff Method

Candidate Total 1st place votes

A 1 1 2 1 1 70

C 2 2 1 2 2 35

No. Of voters 42 23 35 28 14 142

Total 1st place votes

A - 42+23+28+14=107
C - 35

Since Arrow has most 1st place votes, Arrow wins the election.

2. One hundred customers were asked to rank their choices of five most popular food chains in
the country. The results are shown in the preference table below

Number of 72 20 25 18 7
Voters
st
1 choice A B C A D
2nd choice D A D B A
3rd choice B C B D C
4th choice C D A C B

a. Plurality method
Food chain Total 1st place votes

A 1 2 4 1 2 90

B 3 1 3 2 4 20

C 4 3 1 4 3 18

D 2 4 2 3 1 7

No. Of voters 72 20 25 18 7 135

 Total 1st place votes
A - 72+18=90
B - 20
C - 18
D-7

Since A has most 1st place votes, A wins the poll.

b. Plurality with elimination method

Food chain Total 1st place votes

A 1 2 3 1 1 90

B 2 1 2 2 3 20

C 3 3 1 3 2 18

No. Of voters 72 20 25 18 7 128

Since food chain A has most 1st place votes, A wins the poll.

c. Borda count

N=4 (A)

RANK RANK POINT NO. OF VOTES TOTAL

1 4 72 288

2 3 20 60

4 1 25 25

1 4 18 72

2 3 7 21

Borda count = 466

N=4 (B)

RANK RANK POINT NO. OF VOTES TOTAL

3 2 72 144

1 4 20 80

3 2 25 50

2 3 18 54

4 1 7 7

Borda count = 335

N=4 (C)

RANK RANK POINT NO. OF VOTES TOTAL

4 1 72 72

3 2 20 40

1 4 25 100

4 1 18 18

3 2 7 14

Borda count = 244

N=4 (D)

RANK RANK POINT NO. OF VOTES TOTAL

2 3 72 216

4 1 20 20

2 3 25 75

3 2 18 36

1 4 7 28

Borda count = 375

Since A has the most borda count, A wins the poll.

3. Forty senior high school students from a math class were asked to pick four varieties of food
that will be served for a dinner event. The students were allowed to vote for more than one
choice. Which food will be served for the dinner event using the approval voting method?

Approval Voting Method

Choices Number of Votes

American Food 7+7+14+4= 32

Korean Food 7+14+4= 25

Filipino Food 7+8+4= 19

Chinese Food 8+14+4= 26

American Food will be served for the dinner event.

4. Shown below is the preference list of three candidates. Determine the winner using the Borda
count method.

Candidate Ranking
A 3 2 1
B 1 3 3
C 2 1 2
Total Votes 83 75 5

N=3 (A)

RANK RANK POINT NO. OF VOTES TOTAL

3 1 83 83

2 2 75 150

1 3 5 15

Borda count = 248

 N=3 (B)

RANK RANK POINT NO. OF VOTES TOTAL

1 3 83 249

3 1 75 75

3 1 5 5

Borda count = 329

N=3 (C)

RANK RANK POINT NO. OF VOTES TOTAL

2 2 83 166

1 3 75 225

2 2 5 10

Borda count = 401

Since C has the most Borda count, Candidate C wins the election.

Does this election violate the majority criterion using the Borda count method?

It does. In a way, if we consider the majority criterion or the majority system of voting
that entails at least half plus 1 of all the votes should go to the winning candidate. If we account
the total number of votes, which is 163 and divide it by 2 we get at least 82 votes. Add another
vote to that, a total of 83 votes which candidate B has for their rank 1 votes should be accounted
for. But actually giving weight to the ranking system would turn the tables around.

5. Given the customers’ preference list for three different choices of ice cream flavors, determine
the top choice of the customers using the Borda count method. Re-evaluate the vote counting if
the option cheese flavor is removed from the choices and determine if the IIA criterion is
violated.
Borda count

N=3 CHEESE (A)

RANK RANK POINT NO. OF VOTES TOTAL

2 2 6 12

1 3 81 241

3 1 90 90

Borda count = 343

N=3 CHOCOLATE (B)

RANK RANK POINT NO. OF VOTES TOTAL

1 3 6 18

2 2 81 162

2 2 90 180

Borda count = 360

N=3 MANGO (C)

RANK RANK POINT NO. OF VOTES TOTAL

3 1 6 6

3 1 81 81

1 3 90 270

Borda count = 357

Chocolate is the top choice of the customers.

There are 3 candidates ad 50 voters in an election.

a. What is the maximum number of votes that a candidate can receive using the Borda count
method?

Maximum votes a candidate can receive is at most 150 votes. There are 3 candidates and
each can be ranked either first, second or third. The weight of those ranks are equivalent to at 3
points, 2 points and 1 point respectively. In order to win by Borda count method, it is a must to
accumulate the most number of votes in the highest rank to give more weight to that vote.

b. What is the minimum number of votes that a candidate can receive?

At minimum, a candidate can at least receive 50 votes. The weight of the third place in rank
is only but just one. By 50 voters, the not so preferred candidate may receive this minimum
votes.

EXERCISE 3.1

For each of the given weighted system in Problems 1 to 6, do the following:

a. Identify the type of weighted voting system it represents

b. Find all the winning coalitions
c. Find the critical voters
d. Compute the Banzhaf Power Index for each of the voters
e. Identify any dictator or dummies in the system

1. {54: 45,10,1}
a. Type of weighted voting system
Veto power system

b. Find all the winning coalitions and the critical voters

Winning Coalitions Weight Critical Voters

A&B 55 A&B

A, B, & C 57 A&B

A, B, C, & D 58 A&B
 c. Compute for the Banzhaf Power Index
VOTER Banzhaf Power Index

A 0.50

B 0.50

C 0.00

D 0.00

e. identify any dictator or dummies in the system.

Voters C & D are dummies since their weight doesn’t affect any voting outcome in the system.

2. {18:9,5,4,3}
a. Type of weighted voting system
Veto power system

b. find all the winning coalitions and the critical voters

Winning Coalitions Weight Critical Voters

A, B, & C 18 A, B, & C

A, B, C, & D 21 A, B, & C

c. Compute for the Banzhaf Power Index

VOTER Banzhaf Power Index

A 0.33

B 0.33

C 0.33

D 0.00

e. identify any dictator or dummies in the system.

Voter D is a dummy.

3. {21: 21, 7, 4, 2, 1}
a. type of weighted voting system
Dictatorship
b. find all the winning coalitions and the critical voters.
WINNING CRITICAL
COALITIONS TOTAL
COALITION VOTERS
A 21
B 7
C 4
D 2
E 1
AB 28 YES A AND B
AC 25 YES A AND C
AD 23 YES A
AE 22 YES A
BC 11
BD 9
BE 8
CD 6
CE 5
DE 3
ABC 32 YES A
ABD 30 YES A
ABE 29 YES A
ACD 27 YES A
ACE 26 YES A
ADE 24 YES A
BCD 13
BCE 12
BDE 10
CDE 7
ABCD 34 YES A
ABCE 33 YES A
ABDE 31 YES A
ACDE 28 YES A
BCDE 14
ABCDE 35 YES A

d. compute the Banzhaf Power Index for each of the voters

VOTER Banzhaf Power Index
A 17/17 1.0
B 1/17 0.06
C 1/17 0.06
D 0/17 0.0
E 0/17 0.0
e. identify any dictator or dummies in the system
- A is a dictator and the rest are dummies.

4. W={38:24,12,6,2}

a. Find the type of weighted system it presents: Coalition

b. Find all the winning coalitions and critical voters, compute the Banzhaf Power Index

Winning Critical
Coalitions Total
Coalition Voters
A 24
Voter Index Identification
B 12
C 6 A 3/8 0.38
D 2 B 3/8 0.38
AB 36 C 1/8 0.13
AC 30 D 1/8 0.13
AD 26
BC 18
BD 14
CD 8
ABC 42 yes A&B&C
ABD 38 yes A&B&D
BCD 20
ACD 32
ABCD 44 yes A&B
QUOTA 38

c. Identify and dictator or dummies in the system.

There is neither a dictator nor a dummy in the system.

5. W={19:13,12,4,3,1}

a. Find the type of weighted system it presents: Coalition

b. Find all the winning coalitions and critical voters, compute for the Banzhaf Power
Index (see table next page)
c. Identify any dictator or dummies in the system
There is at least one dummy in the system and that is voter E.
 Winning Critical
Coalitions Total
Coalition Voters
A 13
B 12 Voter Index Identification
C 4 A 8/24 0.33
D 3
B 8/24 0.33
E 1
AB 25 yes A&B C 4/24 0.17
AC 17 D 4/24 0.17
AD 16
AE 14 E 0/24 0.00 dummy
BC 16
BD 15
BE 13
CD 7
CE 5
DE 4
ABC 29 yes A&B
28 yes A&B
ABE 26 yes A&B
BCD 19 yes B&C&D
BCE 17
ACD 20 yes A&C&D
ACE 18
CDE 8
ADE 17
BDE 16
ABCD 32 yes NONE
ABCE 30 yes A&B
ABDE 29 yes A&B
ACDE 21 yes A&C&D
BCDE 20 yes B&C&D
ABCDE 33 yes NONE
QUOTA 19
 6. {160: 100, 90, 60, 50, 10}
a. type of weighted voting system. Veto power system
b. find all the winning coalitions, compute the Banzhaf Power Index
WINNING CRITICAL BANZHAF
COALITION TOTAL
COALITION VOTERS POWER INDEX
A 100 12/34 0.3529
B 90 10/34 0.2941
C 60 7/34 0.2059
D 50 3/34 0.0882
E 10 2/34 0.0588
AB 190 YES A AND B
AC 160 YES A AND C
AD 150
AE 110
BC 150
BD 140
BE 100
CD 110
CE 70
DE 60
ABC 250 YES A, B, AND C
ABD 240 YES A, B, AND D`
ABE 200 YES A, B, AND E
ACD 210 YES A, C, AND D
ACE 170 YES A, C, AND E
ADE 160 YES A, D, AND E
BCD 200 YES B, C, AND D
BCE 160 YES B, C, AND E
BDE 150
CDE 120
ABCD 300 YES A AND B
ABCE 260 YES A
ABDE 250 YES A
ACDE 220 YES A
BCDE 210 YES B, AND C
ABCDE 310 YES NONE

A HAS THE MOST POWER WHILE D AND E HAS THE LEAST.

e. identify any dictator or dummies in the system

B, C, D, and E are dummies. A has a veto power.
 7. A weighted voting system consists of four voters A, B, C, and D whose vote weighs are
8, 3, 3, and 2 respectively. Find:
a. The quota
𝑊 = {𝑞 ∶ 8, 3, 3, 2}

8+3+3+2
𝑞= +1
2
𝑞=9

b. The type of weighted voting system

c. The type of coalition {A, D}
𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝐴𝐷 10 𝑌𝑒𝑠 𝐴

10 > 8, 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

d. The winning coalitions

𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝐴𝐵 11 𝑌𝑒𝑠 𝐴&𝐵
𝐴𝐶 11 𝑌𝑒𝑠 𝐴&𝐶
𝐴𝐷 10 𝑌𝑒𝑠 𝐴&𝐷
𝐵𝐶 6
𝐵𝐷 5
𝐶𝐷 5
𝐴𝐵𝐶 14 𝑌𝑒𝑠 𝐴
𝐴𝐵𝐷 13 𝑌𝑒𝑠 𝐴
𝐵𝐶𝐷 8
𝐴𝐶𝐷 13 𝑌𝑒𝑠 𝐴
𝐴𝐵𝐶𝐷 16 𝑌𝑒𝑠 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒
𝑄𝑈𝑂𝑇𝐴 = 9 >9

e. For what values of q is there a dummy in the system

𝑞 ≤8
f. The values of q that will make the system a veto power system
𝑞 ≤ 8, 𝑞 = 16
g. The minimum value of q that gives a null system.
𝑞 ≥8

8. A city council consists of mayor, a vice mayor, and 8 councilors. The mayor and the
vice mayor must vote for the resolution to pass. It is also required that at least 6 members vote for
the resolution. What is the weighted voting system for this council.
Like the UN Security Council, this is a veto power system, since the total of member votes
probably will not reach the quota.
 9. Four voters, A, B, C, and D, make decisions according to a voting system defined by
{5,4,1,1,1}, except when aa tie exists. In the event that a tie exists, a fifth voter, E must vote to
break the tie. Determine the Banzhaf Power Index, including voter E.

Based on the numbers above, we can conclude that Voters A and B would be integral to
the winning coalitions and therefore would have the highest Banzhaf Power Index. Next to that, is
voter B with the second highest votes. Voters C, D, and E would have the same Banzhaf Power
Index. Their values of 1 vote (whether to break or not break a tie) can still be computed as the
same value although one might think that the weight of Voter E would have been at least higher
than the last two voters since there is an inclusion of “fifth voter”.

10. Each of the senators in the Philippine Senate has one vote and at least two-thirds
supermajority is required to impeach an official.

a. Is this weighted voting system a one voter-one vote system?

The weighted voting system is a one voter-one vote system.
{Q: 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,1, 1, 1, 1, 1,1, 1, 1, 1, 1}
2
Quota: 3 × 24 = 𝟏𝟔

b. Is this weighted voting system a veto power system?

No, this is not a veto power system since the sum of votes is greater than the quota.

c. What is the Banzhaf Power Index of each senator?

For each senator, their Banzhaf Power Index should be 1/24 each—equal power for each
senaor.