EN BANC

[G.R. No. 71908. February 4, 1986.]

ALBERTO G. ROMULO, JOSE B. LAUREL, MARCELO B, FERNAN,

CECILIA MUÑOZ PALMA, EDMUNDO B. CEA, ANTONIO CUENCO,
HOMOBONO ADAZA, CIRIACO ALFELOR, ROLANDO ANDAYA,
HONORATO AQUINO, JOSE ATIENZA, JR., NATALIO BELTRAN, JR,,
CESAR V. BOLANOS, DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, FERMIN A. CARAM,
NENITA C. DALUZ, ARTHUR D. DEFENSOR, EMILIO N. DELA PAZ,
HILARIO DE PEDRO, DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, MANUEL C.
DOMINGO, CARLOS C. FERNANDEZ, JOLLY T. FERNANDEZ, JAIME N.
FERRER, WILSON P. GAMBOA, ROGELIO GARCIA, ROLLEO L.
IGNACIO, EVA ESTRADA KALAW, RAFAEL L. LAZATIN, EMIGDIO L.
LINGAD, GEMILIANO C. LOPEZ, JR., PEDRO M. MARCELLANA, JR.,
ROLANDO C. MARCIAL, BIENVENIDO MARQUEZ, ANTONIO C.
MARTINEZ, ORLANDO S. MERCADO, ROGACIANO M. MERCADO,
RAMON V. MITRA, JR., JUANITA L. NEPOMUCENO, ROY B. PADILLA,
HERNANDO B. PEREZ, GONZALO G. PUYAT, II, HIALMAR P.
QUINTANA, ISIDRO E. REAL, JR., ZAFIRO L. RESPICIO, VIRGILIO P.
ROBLES, AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, OSCAR F. SANTOS, FRANCISCO S.
SUMULONG, EMIGDIO S. TANJUATCO, LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE and
VICTOR ZIGA , petitioners, vs. HON. NICANOR E. YÑIGUEZ, MANUEL
M. GARCIA, GUARDSON R. LOOD, RENATO L. CAYETANO, ANTONIO
M. DIAZ, DAMIAN V. ALDABA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, ADELINO B.
SITOY, LEONARDO PEREZ, ALEJANDRO ALMENDRAS, SALACNIB F.
BATERINA, LUIS S. ETCUBANEZ, CONCORDIO C. DIEL, REGALADO E.
MAAMBONG, TEODULO C. NATIVIDAD, MACACUNA DIMAPORO,
SALVADOR B. BRITANICO and COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND GOOD GOVERNMENT , respondents.

Napoleon J. Poblador for respondent R. Cayetano.

DECISION

PATAJO , J : p

Petition for prohibition to restrain respondents from enforcing Section 4, 5, 6 and

8 of the Batasan Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings and mandamus to
compel the Batasan Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to
recall from the archives and report out the resolution together with the veri ed
complaint for the impeachment of the President of the Philippines.
Petitioners, representing more than one- fth of all members of the Batasan, led
with the Batasan on August 13, 1985 Resolution No. 644 calling for the impeachment
of President Marcos together with a veri ed complaint for impeachment. Said
resolution and complaint were referred by the Speaker to the Committee on Justice,
Human Rights and Good Government. The Committee found the complaint not
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 su cient in form and substance to warrant its further consideration and disapproved
Resolution No. 644 and dismissed all the charges contained in the complaint attached
thereto on August 14, 1985. It then submitted its report which was duly noted by the
Batasan and sent to the archives.
On August 14, 1985, MP Ramon V. Mitra led with the Batasan a motion praying
for the recall from the archives of Resolution No. 644 and the veri ed complaint
attached thereto. Said motion was disapproved by the Batasan.
On September 7, 1985, the present petition was led with this Court. In said
petition, petitioners pray that after hearing this Court declare Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 of
the Batasan Rules on Impeachment which was approved by the Batasan on August 16,
1984 by a vote of 114 in favor and 58 against, unconstitutional, and Committee Report
No. 154 of the Batasan Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government
dismissing Resolution No. 644 and the complaint for impeachment attached thereto,
null and void. They also pray that this Court issue a writ of preliminary injunction
restraining respondents from enforcing and questioned provisions of the
aforementioned Rules and a Writ of preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the
Batasan Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to recall from the
archives and report out the resolution and complaint for impeachment in order that the
impeachment trial can be conducted forthwith by the Batasan as a body. LLpr

In G.R. No. L-71688 led on August 17, 1985, Arturo M. de Castro and Perfecto L.
Cagampang, claiming to be members of good standing of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and taxpayers, led a petition with this Court for certiorari to annul the
resolution of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government, the very
same resolution subject of the present petition, dismissing the complaint for the
impeachment of the President of the Philippines signed by the petitioners in the
present case, and mandamus to compel said Committee on Justice and the Batasan,
represented by its Speaker, to give due course to said complaint for impeachment. In
denying due course to said petition and dismissing outright the same, We held:
"1. The 1973 Constitution has vested in the Batasan Pambansa the
exclusive power to initiate, try and decide all cases of impeachment. The action of
the Committee on Justice of the Batasan to whom the complaint for the
impeachment of the President had been referred dismissing said petition for
being insu cient in form and substance involves a political question not
cognizable by the Courts. The dismissal of said petition is within the ambit of the
powers vested exclusively in the Batasan by express provision of Sec. 2, Article
XIII of the Constitution and it is not within the competence of this Court to inquire
whether in the exercise of said power the Batasan acted wisely. There is no
allegation in the petition for certiorari that in the exercise of its powers the
Batasan had violated any provision of the Constitution. The fact that the
Committee on Justice dismissed the petition on the same day it was led after
deliberating on it for several hours as reported in the newspapers, radio and
television (which must have been the basis of petitioner' claim that the Committee
had acted with undue haste in unceremoniously dismissing the complaint for
impeachment) does not provide basis for concluding that there had been a
violation of any provision of the Constitution which would justify the Court's
intervention to ensure proper observance of constitutional norms and conduct.
Beyond saying that the Batasan may initiate impeachment by a vote of at least
one- fth of all its Members and that no o cial shall be convicted without the
concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the members thereof, the Constitution
says no more. It does not lay down the procedure to be followed in impeachment
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 proceedings. It is up to the Batasan to enact its own rules of procedure in said
impeachment proceedings, which it had already done. The interpretation and
application of said rules are beyond the powers of the Court to review. The
powers of the Batasan to dismiss a petition for impeachment which in its
judgment it nds not meritorious or defective in form and substance are
discretionary in nature and, therefore, not subject to judicial compulsion.

"2. The doctrine of separation of powers still exists under the 1973
Constitution though in a modi ed form made necessary because of the adoption
of certain aspects of the parliamentary system in the amended 1973 Constitution.
The major powers of the Government have been distributed by the Constitution to
the President, who is the head of the State and chief executive of the Republic, the
Batasan Pambansa and the Judiciary. Under the doctrine of separation of powers
as interpreted by the decisions of this Court, mandamus will not lie from one
branch of the government to a coordinate branch to compel performance of
duties within the latter's sphere of responsibility. More speci cally, this Court
cannot issue a writ of mandamus against the Batasan to compel it to give due
course to the complaint for impeachment." 1

We did not dismiss outright the present petition as We did G.R. No. L-71688 but
required respondents to comment thereto in view of the claim of petitioners that the
provisions of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, more speci cally
Sections 4, 5, 6 and 8 pursuant to which the Batasan Committee on Justice, Human
Rights and Good Government had dismissed Resolution No. 644 and the complaint for
the impeachment attached thereto are unconstitutional, implying thereby that the
Batasan or the Committee thereof had, in the exercise of powers vested upon it by the
Constitution, transgressed or violated the Constitution, certainly a justiciable question.
The provisions of the Rules of Procedure for Impeachment claimed by
petitioners to be violative of the Constitution are the following:
"SEC. 4. Notice to Complainant and Respondent. — Upon due referral the
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government shall determine
whether the complaint is su cient in form and substance. If it nds that the
complaint is not su cient in form and substance, it shall dismiss the complaint
and shall submit its report as provided hereunder. If it nds the complaint
su cient in form and substance, it shall furnish the respondent with copy of the
resolution and veri ed complaint with advice that he may answer the complaint
within fteen (15) days from notice. The answer may include a rmative
defenses. With leave of the Committee, the complainant may le a reply and the
respondent, a rejoinder.
"SEC. 5. Submission of Evidence and Memoranda. — After receipt of
pleadings provided for in Section 4, or the expiration of the time within which they
maybe led, the Committee shall determine whether su cient grounds for
impeachment exist. If it nds that su cient grounds for impeachment do not
exist, the Committee shall dismiss the complaint and submit the report required
hereunder. If the Committee nds that su cient grounds for impeachment exist,
the Committee shall require the parties to support their respective allegations by
the submission of a davits and counter-a davits, including duly authenticated
documents as may appear relevant. The Committee may, however, require that
instead of a davits and counter-a davits, oral testimony shall be given. It may
at all events examine and allow cross-examination of the parties and their
witnesses.

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 "After the submission of evidence, the Committee may require the
submission of memoranda, after which the matter shall be submitted for
resolution.
"SEC. 6. Report and Recommendations. — The Committee on Justice,
Human Rights and Good Government shall submit a report of the Batasan
containing its ndings and recommendations within thirty (30) session days from
submission of the case for resolution.
"If the Committee nds by a vote of majority of all its members that
probable cause has been established. It shall submit with its report a resolution
setting forth the Articles of Impeachment on the basis of the evidence adduced
before the Committee.

"If the Committee nds that probable cause has not been established, the
complaint shall be dismissed subject to Section 9 of these Rules.

"SEC. 8. Vote Required for Trial. — A majority vote of all the members of the
Batasan is necessary for the approval of the resolution setting forth the Articles of
Impeachment. If the resolution is approved by the required vote, it shall then be
set for trial on the merits by the Batasan. On the other hand, should the resolution
fail to secure approval by the required vote, the same shall result in the dismissal
of the complaint for impeachment."

It is petitioners' contention that said provisions are unconstitutional because

they amend Sec. 3 of Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, without complying with the
mandatory amendatory process provided for under Article XVI of the Constitution, by
empowering a smaller body to supplant and overrule the complaint to impeach
endorsed by the requisitive 115 of all the members of the Batasan Pambansa and that
said questioned provisions derail the impeachment proceedings at various stages by
vesting the Committee on Justice, etc. the power to impeach or not to impeach, when
such prerogative belongs solely to Batasan Pambansa as a collegiate body.
Petitioners further contend that Section 8 of the Rules is unconstitutional
because it imposes an unconstitutional and illegal condition precedent in order that the
complaint for impeachment can proceed to trial before the Batasan. By requiring a
majority vote of all the members of the Batasan for the approval of the resolution
setting forth the Articles of Impeachment, the Rules impose a condition not required by
the Constitution for all that Section 3, Article XIII requires is the endorsement of at least
one- fth of all the members of the Batasan for the initiation of impeachment
proceedings or for the impeachment trial to proceed.
It is the contention of the respondents Speaker Nicanor Yñiguez and the
Members of the Committee on Justice of the Batasan Pambansa that the petition
should be dismissed because (1) it is a suit against the Batasan itself over which this
Court has no jurisdiction; (2) it raises questions which are political in nature; (3) the
Impeachment Rules are strictly in consonance with the Constitution and even
supposing without admitting that the Rules are invalid, their invalidity would not nullify
the dismissal of the complaint for impeachment for the Batasan as a body sovereign
within its own sphere has the power to dismiss the impeachment complaint even
without the bene t of said Rules; and (4) the Court cannot by mandamus compel the
Batasan to give due course to the impeachment complaint.
Respondent Renato L. Cayetano on the other hand contends that (1) the question
involved is purely political; (2) the petitioners are not proper parties; (3) the petition is in
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 reality a request for an advisory opinion made in the absence of an actual case or
controversy; (4) prohibition and mandamus are not proper remedies, and (5)
preliminary mandatory injunction is not proper; while respondent Salacnib P. Baterina
contends that the petitioners lack standing to sue and impeachment is a power lodged
exclusively in the Batasan. Cdpr

A closer look at the substance than the form of the petition would reveal that
resolution of the constitutionality of the questioned provisions of the Rules is not even
necessary. What petitioners are really seeking is for this Court to compel the Batasan
to proceed with the hearing on the impeachment of the President since more than one-
fth of all the members of the Batasan had led a resolution for the impeachment of
the President and the Batasan as a body is bound under the Constitution to conduct
said trial and render judgment only after said trial and that the Committee on Justice
has no authority to dismiss the complaint for impeachment on the ground that it is not
su cient in form and substance. Petitioners, therefore, ask that this Court order the
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to recall from the Archives
the Resolution No. 644 and the complaint for impeachment "in order that the
impeachment trial can be conducted forthwith by the Batasan as a body." (Prayer of the
Petition, subpar, (ii) of Par, 2).
The question squarely presented before this Court is therefore: Has this Court
jurisdiction to order the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to
recall from the Archives and report out the resolution and complaint for impeachment?
Can this court, assuming said resolution and complaint for impeachment are recalled
from the Archives, order the Batasan to conduct a trial on the charges contained in said
resolution and complaint for impeachment?
What is important to note is that when the Batasan denied the motion of MP
Ramon Mitra for the recall from the Archives of Resolution No. 644 and the complaint
for impeachment, it had in effect con rmed the action of the Committee on Justice,
Human Rights and Good Government dismissing said resolution and complaint on
impeachment. That the Batasan by even a majority vote can dismiss a complaint for
impeachment cannot be seriously disputed. Since the Constitution expressly provides
that "no o cial shall be convicted without the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all
its members," a majority vote of all the members of the Batasan con rming the action
of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government disapproving the
resolution calling for the impeachment of the President and dismissing all the charges
contained in the complaint attached thereto, makes mathematically impossible the
required at least two-thirds vote of all members of the Batasan to support a judgment
of conviction. What purpose would be served by proceeding further when it is already
obvious that the required two-thirds vote for conviction cannot be obtained? Dismissal
of the impeachment proceedings would then be in order.
A dismissal by the Batasan itself as a body of the resolution and complaint for
impeachment (which is what the denial by the Batasan of MP Mitra's motion to recall
from the Archives said resolution and complaint for impeachment is tantamount to)
makes irrelevant under what authority the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and
Good Government had acted. The dismissal by the majority of the members of the
Batasan of the impeachment proceedings is an act of the Batasan as a body in the
exercise of powers that have been vested upon it by the Constitution beyond the power
of this Court to review. This Court cannot compel the Batasan to conduct the
impeachment trial prayed for by petitioners.
The fact that petitioners are asking that it is the Committee on Justice, Human
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 Rights and Good Government, not the Batasan itself, which shall be commanded by this
Court to recall from the Archives and report out the resolution and complaint for
impeachment is of no moment. Aside from the fact that said Committee cannot recall
from the Archives said resolution and complaint for impeachment without revoking or
rescinding the action of the Batasan denying MP Mitra's motion for recall (which of
course it had no authority to do and, therefore, said Committee is in no position to
comply with any order from this Court for said recall) such an order addressed to the
Committee would actually be a direct order to the Batasan itself Such in effect was the
ruling in Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83, where this Court said:
"It is intimated rather faintly that, conceding all that is said with reference
to the right of the Supreme Court to issue mandamus directed to the Philippine
Senate, yet we would be justi ed in having our mandate run not against the
Philippine Senate or against the President of the Philippine Senate and his fellow
Senators but against the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, the disbursing o cer of
the Senate. But this begs the question. If we have no authority to control the
Philippine Senate, we have no authority to control the actions of subordinate
employees acting under the direction of the Senate. The secretary, sergeant-at-
arms, and disbursing o cer of the Senate are mere agents of the Senate who
cannot act independently of the will of that body. Should the Court do as
requested, we might have the spectacle presented of the court ordering the
secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and the disbursing officer of the Philippine Senate
to do one thing, and the Philippine Senate ordering them to do another thing. The
writ of mandamus should not be granted unless it clearly appears that the person
to whom it is directed has the absolute power to execute it. (Turnbull vs. Giddings
[1893], 95 Mich. 314; Abueva vs. Wood, supra.) (On page 94).

See also Abueva vs. Wood, 46 Phil. 612, 636, where the Court said:
". . . While it has been decided in many cases that the courts will not
interfere with the legislative department of the government in the performance of
its duties, does that rule apply to the committees duly appointed by the legislative
department of the government and its o cers? The powers and duties conferred
upon said committee by the Legislature granting the legality of the object and
purpose of said committee, and granting that the Legislature itself had the power
to do and to perform the duties imposed upon said committee, then an
interference by the courts with the performance of those duties by it would be
tantamount to interfering with the workings and operations of the legislative
branch of the government itself. An interference by the judicial department of the
government with the workings and operations of the committee of the legislative
department would be tantamount to an interference with the workings and
operations of the legislative department itself. And, again, we are called upon to
say, that one branch of the government cannot encroach upon the domain of
another without danger. The safety of our institutions depends in no small degree
on a strict observance of this salutary rule. (Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S., 700, 718;
Clough vs. Curtis, 134 U.S., 361, 371; Wise vs. Bigger, 79 Va., 269)."

Moreover, while in their petition petitioners merely asked for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction "commanding the Batasan Committee on Justice, Human Rights
and Good Government to recall from the Archives and report out subject resolution and
veri ed complaint for the impeachment of President Ferdinand E. Marcos," their
ultimate objective is to have the Batasan as a body proceed with the impeachment trial.
Recall of the resolution and complaint for impeachment would be meaningless unless
the Batasan can also be compelled to conduct the impeachment trial.
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 For this Court to issue a writ of mandamus to the Committee on Justice, Human
Rights and Good Government, would be but an empty and meaningless gesture unless
it would also order the Batasan to proceed to try the impeachment proceedings. This,
of course, the Court cannot do. Quoting Judge Cooley in Sutherland vs. Governor of
Michigan, 29 Mich. 320:
". . . in a case where jurisdiction is involved, no doubt it is not consistent
with the dignity of the court to pronounce judgments which may be disregarded
with impunity . . ."

The admonition of Alejandrino vs. Quezon, supra, is of much relevance.

". . . But certainly mandamus should never issue from this court where it
will not prove to be effectual and bene cial. It should not be awarded where it will
create discord and confusion. It should not be awarded where mischievous
consequences are likely to follow. Judgment should not be pronounced which
might possibly lead to unseemly con icts or which might be disregarded with
impunity. This court should offer no means by a decision for any possible
collision between it as the highest court in the Philippines and the Philippine
Senate as a branch of a coordinate department or between the Court and the
Chief Executive or the Chief Executive and the Legislature." (On page 95).

In any event, We nd no basis for the contention of petitioners that Sections 4, 5,

6 and 8 of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment are violative of the provisions of the
Constitution on Impeachment. As We said in Arturo de Castro vs. Committee on
Justice, et al. (G.R. No. L-71688), "beyond saying that the Batasan may initiate
impeachment by a vote of at least one- fth of all its members and that no o cial shall
be convicted without the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the members thereof,
the Constitution says no more." The Batasan pursuant to its power to adopt rules of its
proceedings Article VIII, Sec. 8[3], may adopt, as it did adopt, necessary rules of
procedure to govern impeachment proceedings. The rules it adopted providing for
dismissal of a complaint for impeachment which is not su cient in form or substance,
or when su cient grounds for impeachment do not exist, or probable cause has not
been established, or requiring a majority vote of all members of the Batasan for the
approval of the resolution setting forth the Articles of Impeachment, are not
inconsistent with the provision of Section 3 of Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution.
More speci cally, the provision requiring concurrence of at least two-thirds votes
of all members of the Batasan for conviction is not violated by any provision of the
Rules which authorizes dismissal of a petition by a majority vote of the Batasan since
with such number of votes it is obvious that the two-thirds vote of all members
necessary for conviction can no longer be obtained. Such being the case, the Batasan
can specify in its rules how and when the impeachment proceedings can be terminated
or dismissed for Section 3, Article XIII merely provides for how a judgment of
conviction can be sustained but is silent on how a complaint for impeachment can be
dismissed when it becomes apparent that a judgment of conviction by the required
number of votes is not possible.
Neither is the Constitutional provision to the effect that impeachment may be
initiated by a vote of at least one- fth of the members violated by the provision of the
Rules authorizing the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government to
dismiss the complaint for impeachment which it nds not su cient in form and
substance (Sec. 4), does not have su cient grounds for impeachment (Sec. 5), or
where probable cause has not been established (Sec. 6). All of said actions of the
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 Committee refer to the disposition of a complaint for impeachment initiated by at least
one- fth of all the members of the Batasan. Their purpose is to determine whether or
not a complaint for impeachment initiated by the required number of members of the
Batasan warrants being referred to the Batasan for trial. They are not properly part of
the "initiation phase" of the impeachment proceeding but of the "trial phase", or more
accurately the "preparatory to trial" phase. Such actions are liken to actions taken by
this Court in determining whether a petition duly led should be given due course or
should be dismissed outright.
While the Batasan has assigned to the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and
Good Government the task of determining whether the petition is su cient in form or
substance, or that su cient ground for impeachment exist or that probable cause has
been established, said Committee is required to submit its report to the Batasan which
has the ultimate decision whether to approve or disapprove said report. If the Batasan
approves the Committee report dismissing the complaint, said report is noted by the
Batasan and sent to the Archives.
That the Rules on Impeachment of the Interim Batasan in the judgment of
petitioners is better is no argument against the validity or constitutionality of the Rules
on Impeachment approved by the Batasan. More importantly, said Rules are always
within the power of the Batasan to modify, change or replace any time. They do not
have the force of law but are merely in the nature of by-laws prescribed for the orderly
and convenient conduct of proceedings before the Batasan. They are merely procedural
and not substantive (43 C.J. 527). They may be waived or disregarded by the Batasan
and with their observance the Courts have no concern. (South Georgia Power Co. vs.
Baumann, 169 Ga. 649;151 SE 513). As the Court said in State vs. Alt, 6 Mo. A. 673,
quoted in 46 C.J. 1383 Note 31:
The rules of public deliberative bodies, whether codi ed in the form of a
'manual' end formally adopted by the body, or whether consisting of a body of
unwritten customs or usages, preserved in memory and by tradition, are matters
of which the judicial courts, as a general rule, take no cognizance. It is a principle
of the common law of England that the judicial courts have no conusance of
what is termed the lex et consuetudo parliamenti . . . And, although this doctrine is
not acceded to, in this country, to the extent to which it has gone in England,
where the judicial courts have held that they possess no jurisdiction to judge of
the powers of the House of Parliament, yet no authority is cited to us, and we do
not believe that respectable judicial authority exists, for the proposition that the
judicial courts have power to compel legislative, or quasi-legislative bodies to
proceed in the conduct of their deliberations, or in the exercise of their powers, in
accordance with their own rules. If the Congress of the United States disregards
the constitution of the United States, or, if the legislature of one of the states
disregards the constitution of the state, or of the United States, the power resides
in the judicial courts to declare its enactments void. If an inferior quasi legislative
body, such as the council of a municipal corporation, disregards its own organic
law, that is, the charter of the corporations, the judicial courts, for equal, if not for
stronger reasons, possess the same power of annulling its ordinances. But we are
not aware of any judicial authority, or of any legal principle, which will authorize
the judicial courts to annul an act of the legislature, or an ordinance of a
municipal council, merely because the one or the other was enacted in disregard
of the rules which the legislature, or the municipal council, or either house thereof,
had prescribed for its own government."

To the same effect is 67 Corpus Juris Secundum, 870, where it was said:
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 "Rules of parliamentary practice are merely procedural and not
substantive. The rules of procedure adopted by deliberative bodies have not the
force of a public law, but they are merely in the nature of by-laws, prescribed for
the orderly and convenient conduct of their own proceedings. The rules adopted
by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modi cation, or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them. Where a deliberative body adopts rules of
order for its parliamentary governance, the fact that it violates one of the rules so
adopted may not invalidate a measure passed in compliance with statute. The
rules of procedure passed by one legislative body are not binding on a
subsequent legislative body operating within the same jurisdiction, and, where a
body resolves that the rules of a prior body be adopted until a committee reports
rules, the prior rules cease to be in force on the report of the committee. It may be
of assistance, in determining the effect of parliamentary law, to consider the
nature of the particular deliberative body."

Finally, in the present case, injunction to restrain the enforcement of the particular
provisions of the Rules will not lie (aside from the fact that the question involved is
political) because the acts of the Committee sought to be restrained have already been
consummated. They are fait accompli. Prohibition or injunction would not issue to
restrain acts already performed or consummated. Remonte vs. Bonto, 16 SCRA 257,
Aragones vs. Subido, 25 SCRA 95.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the
petition for lack of merit, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Aquino, C.J., Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Gutierrez, Jr., De la
Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Abad Santos, J., I reserve my vote.
Teehankee, J., I reserve my vote. It may be observed, though, that this is one
petition that, following the Court's customary disposition, may well be dismissed for
having become moot and academic, in view of the expiration of the term of the
incumbent President upon the holding of the presidential elections scheduled on
February 7, 1986, in which the charges brought in the impeachment resolution and
veri ed complaint may be duly submitted to the people for their proper consideration
and judgment.
Footnotes
1. Resolution promulgated September 3, 1985.

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