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    Gonzales Vs Macaraig

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    Ja Ru
    This case stems from the president vetoing Section 55 of the 1989 General Appropriation Bill, which Congress later enacted into law over the veto as RA 6688. Petitioners alleged the veto was unconstitutional as it violated separation of powers. Respondents, through the Solicitor General, argued the veto was valid under the constitution's authorization for the president and other heads of government to augment budgets from savings. The Supreme Court ruled the veto was valid, as the provision vetoed would have nullified the augmentation powers guaranteed to the president and other heads of government under the constitution. Upholding prior rulings, the court found legislative control cannot encumber appropriations with veto-proof measures or riders unrelated to the budget.

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    Gonzales Vs Macaraig

    Uploaded by

    Ja Ru
    506 views2 pages
    This case stems from the president vetoing Section 55 of the 1989 General Appropriation Bill, which Congress later enacted into law over the veto as RA 6688. Petitioners alleged the veto was unconstitutional as it violated separation of powers. Respondents, through the Solicitor General, argued the veto was valid under the constitution's authorization for the president and other heads of government to augment budgets from savings. The Supreme Court ruled the veto was valid, as the provision vetoed would have nullified the augmentation powers guaranteed to the president and other heads of government under the constitution. Upholding prior rulings, the court found legislative control cannot encumber appropriations with veto-proof measures or riders unrelated to the budget.

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    Gonzales vs Macaraig

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    Gonzales vs Macaraig

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    This case stems from the president vetoing Section 55 of the 1989 General Appropriation Bill, which Congress later enacted into law over the veto as RA 6688. Petitioners alleged the veto was unconstitutional as it violated separation of powers. Respondents, through the Solicitor General, argued the veto was valid under the constitution's authorization for the president and other heads of government to augment budgets from savings. The Supreme Court ruled the veto was valid, as the provision vetoed would have nullified the augmentation powers guaranteed to the president and other heads of government under the constitution. Upholding prior rulings, the court found legislative control cannot encumber appropriations with veto-proof measures or riders unrelated to the budget.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    506 views2 pages

    Gonzales Vs Macaraig

    Uploaded by

    Ja Ru
    This case stems from the president vetoing Section 55 of the 1989 General Appropriation Bill, which Congress later enacted into law over the veto as RA 6688. Petitioners alleged the veto was unconstitutional as it violated separation of powers. Respondents, through the Solicitor General, argued the veto was valid under the constitution's authorization for the president and other heads of government to augment budgets from savings. The Supreme Court ruled the veto was valid, as the provision vetoed would have nullified the augmentation powers guaranteed to the president and other heads of government under the constitution. Upholding prior rulings, the court found legislative control cannot encumber appropriations with veto-proof measures or riders unrelated to the budget.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as docx, pdf, or txt
    of 2

    G.R. No. 87636. November 19, 1990. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ERNESTO M.

    MACEDA, ALBERTO G. ROMULO, HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, EDGARDO J.


    ANGARA, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., ERNESTO F.
    HERRERA, JOSE D. LINA, JR., JOHN OSMEÑA, VICENTE T. PATERNO, RENE A.
    SAGUISAG, LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI, MAMINTAL ABDUL J. TAMANO,
    WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, JOVITO R. SALONGA, ORLANDO S. MERCADO, JUAN
    PONCE ENRILE, JOSEPH ESTRADA, SOTERO LAUREL, AQUILINO PIMENTEL,
    JR., SANTANINA RASUL, VICTOR ZIGA, Petitioners, v. HON. CATALINO
    MACARAIG, JR., HON. VICENTE JAYME, HON. CARLOS DOMINGUEZ, HON.
    FULGENCIO FACTORAN, HON. FIORELLO ESTUAR, HON. LOURDES
    QUISUMBING, HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS, HON. ALFREDO BENGSON, HON. JOSE
    CONCEPCION, HON. LUIS SANTOS, HON. MITA PARDO DE TAVERA, HON.
    RAINERIO REYES, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, HON. ROSALINA CAJUCOM
    and HON. EUFEMIO C. DOMINGO, respondents MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

    Facts: Issue in this case stems from the vetoing of Sec. 55 of the General Appropriation
    Bill of 1989 by the president, which was later signed into law as R.A 6688, alleging that
    such veto of provision is unconstitutional, for it violates the principle of separation of
    powers. On the other hand, the respondents through the Solicitor General as quoted
    reason for the veto "The provision violates Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the Constitution.
    If allowed, this Section would nullify not only the constitutional and statutory authority of
    the President, but also that of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
    Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and Heads of Constitutional
    Commissions, to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
    offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. A careful review of
    the legislative action on the budget as submitted shows that in almost all cases, the
    budgets of agencies as recommended by the President, as well as those of the Senate,
    the House of Representatives, and the Constitutional Commissions, have been reduced.
    An unwanted consequence of this provision is the inability of the President, the President
    of the Senate, Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
    Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions to augment any item of appropriation
    of their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations
    even in cases of calamity or in the event of urgent need to accelerate the implementation
    of essential public services and infrastructure projects. "Furthermore, this provision is
    inconsistent with Section 12 and other similar provisions of this General Appropriations
    Act"

    Issue: Whether or not the veto of the president of Sec. 55 of the General Appropriation
    is unconstitutional?

    Ruling: No, it is valid pursuant to the constitution. Legislative control cannot be exercised
    in such a manner as to encumber the general appropriation bill with veto-proof ‘logrolling
    measure,’ special interest provisions which could not succeed if separately enacted, or
    ‘riders,’ substantive pieces of legislation incorporated in a bill to insure passage without
    veto. President promptly vetoed Section 55 (FY ‘89) and Section 16 (FY ‘90) because
    they nullify the authority of the Chief Executive and heads of different branches of
    government to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law for their respective
    offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations, as guaranteed by
    Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the Constitution. Said provision reads: "Sec. 25. (5) No law
    shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the
    President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice
    of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be
    authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
    offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations." This Court upheld
    the validity of the power of augmentation from savings in Demetria v. Alba, which ruled:
    ". . . to afford the heads of the different branches of the government and those of the
    constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and
    resources, the constitution allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of
    funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the
    appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body concerned. The leeway
    granted was thus limited. The purpose and conditions for which funds may be transferred
    were specified, i.e., transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and
    such transfer may be made only if there are savings from another item in the appropriation
    of the government branch or constitutional. Dispositive portion: WHEREFORE, the
    constitutionality of the assailed Presidential veto is UPHELD and this Petition is hereby
    DISMISSED.

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