RULE 16: MOTION TO DISMISS – NO PERSON OVER THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT rulings rendered in the action – is an element

the action – is an element of due process that is essential in all actions, civil
as well as criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in rem. Jurisdiction over the defendantin
MACASAET, et al. vs. FRANCISCO CO an action in rem or quasi in rem is not required, and the court acquires jurisdiction over an
G.R. No. 156759 | June 5, 2013 | J. Bersamin actionas long as it acquires jurisdiction over the resthat is thesubject matter of the action. The
purpose of summons in such action is not the acquisition of jurisdiction over the defendant but
DOCTRINE: To warrant the substituted service of the summons and copy of the complaint, the mainly to satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process.
serving officer must first attempt to effect the same upon the defendant in person. Only after
the attempt at personal service has become futile or impossible within a reasonable time may Abante Tonite is a juridical person. In rejecting their contention, the CA categorized Abante
the officer resort to substituted service. Tonite as a corporation by estoppel as the result of its having represented itself to the reading
public as a corporation despite its not being incorporated. APPEAL IS DENIED.
FACTS:
Respondent, a retired police officer, sued Abante Tonite, a daily tabloid of general circulation BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES INC. v. CA and LOLITA TOLEDO
– claiming damages because of an allegedly libelous article the petitioners (management and G.R. No. 173946 | June 19, 2013 | J. Perez
editors) published in its June 6, 2000 issue. The suit was raffled to Branch 51 of the RTC, which
issued summons to be served on each defendant, including Abante Tonite, at their business DOCTRINE: If one of the named defendant is dead at the time of the filing of the complaint,
address in Intramuros, Manila. the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person. It is a personal defense, and the surviving
defendants cannot invoke it as a ground for a motion to dismiss. No service of summons was
The RTC Sheriff proceeded to the stated address to effect the personal service of the summons effected to the dead defendant.
on the defendants. But his efforts to personally serve each defendant in the address were futile
because the defendants were then out of the office and unavailable. He returned in the FACTS:
afternoon of that day to make a second attempt at serving the summons, but he was informed On 24 December 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for the
that petitioners were still out of the office. (Always out for work daw as journalists). Realizing issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the spouses Manuel and Lolita Toledo.
the impossibility of his finding petitioners in person within a reasonable time, he decided to
resort to substituted service of the summons and reported the original copy of the summons However, in the Answer Lolita Toledo (Lolita) alleged that her husband and co-defendant,
returned yet duly served. Manuel Toledo (Manuel), is already dead. The death certificate of Manuel states "13 July 1995"
as the date of death.
Petitioners later moved for the dismissal of the complaint alleging:
1. Lack of jurisdiction over their persons because of the invalid and ineffectual substituted As a result, Petitioner filed a motion to require Lolita to disclose the heirs of Manuel. Lolita
service of summons (claiming the sheriff made no prior attempt to serve the summons submitted the required names and addresses of the heirs. Petitioner then filed a Motion for
personally on each of them); and, Substitution praying that Manuel be substituted by his children as party-defendants. Motion
2. That Abante Tonite is neither a natural nor a juridical person that could be impleaded as was granted on 9 October 2000. Trial ensued.
a party in a civil action, hence must be dropped as defendant.

RTC: Denied petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss. Upon the agreement of the parties, the reception of Lolita’s evidence was cancelled. On 24
CA: Denied petitioners’ MR. September 2004, counsel for Lolita was given a period of fifteen days within which to file a
demurrer to evidence. However, on 7 October 2004, Lolita instead filed a motion to dismiss
ISSUES: the complaint, citing the following as grounds:
1. Did the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the person of the editors and management of (1) that the complaint failed to implead an indispensable party or a real party in interest;
the tabloid? - YES hence, the case must be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action;
2. Should Abante Tonite be dropped as party in the instant case? (2) that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel pursuant to Sec.
5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.
HELD:
Jurisdiction over the person
Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam –the power of the court to render a The motion to dismiss was denied for having been filed out of time, citing Section 1, Rule 16 of
personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other the 1997 Rules of Court. Lolita’s motion for reconsideration of the order of denial was denied
on the ground that "defendants’ attack on the jurisdiction of this Court is now barred by Respondent is estopped from questioning jurisdiction
estoppel by laches" since Lolita failed to raise the issue despite several chances to do so. Petitioner’s argument is misplaced, in that, it failed to consider that the concept of jurisdiction
has several aspects, namely:
Lolita filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging that the trial court seriously erred and (1) jurisdiction over the subject matter;
gravely abused its discretion in denying her motion to dismiss despite discovery, during the (2) jurisdiction over the parties;
trial of the case, of evidence that would constitute a ground for dismissal of the case. (3) jurisdiction over the issues of the case; and
(4) in cases involving property, jurisdiction over the res or the thing which is the subject of
the litigation.
CA granted the petition. It reasoned that “courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant only when the latter voluntarily appeared or submitted to the court or by coercive
The aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred from being assailed as a result of estoppel by
process issued by the court to him. In this case, it is undisputed that when petitioner Boston
laches is jurisdiction over the subject matter. Here, respondent’s motion to dismiss was
filed the complaint on December 24, 1997, defendant Manuel S. Toledo was already dead.
questioning the court’s jurisdiction over the person of defendant Manuel. Thus, the principle
Such being the case, the court a quo could not have acquired jurisdiction over the person of
of estoppel by laches finds no application in this case. Instead, the principles relating to
defendant Manuel S. Toledo.” The complaint should have impleaded the estate of Manuel S.
jurisdiction over the person of the parties are pertinent herein.
Toledo as defendant, not only the wife, considering that the estate of Manuel S. Toledo is an
indispensable party, which stands to be benefited or be injured in the outcome of the case.
Under Rule 9: Effect of Failure to Plead
Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are
Petitioner claimed that respondent’s failure to raise the question of jurisdiction at an earlier
deemed waived.
stage bars her from later questioning it, especially since she actively participated in the
proceedings conducted by the trial court.
Under Rule 15: Motions
A motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections
CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, this Petition for Review on
then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived.
Certiorari.
Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of a party to a case is not one of those
ISSUE: defenses which are not deemed waived under Section 1 of Rule 9, such defense must be
Did the court acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant as a ground to deny the invoked when an answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in order to prevent a waiver of the
motion to dismiss? defense. If the objection is not raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, the
objection to the jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or the defendant is deemed
HELD: Yes. waived.
Motion to dismiss filed out of time
Respondent’s motion to dismiss was filed SIX YEARS AND FIVE MONTHS AFTER SHE FILED HER As the question of jurisdiction involved here is that over the person of the defendant Manuel,
AMENDED ANSWER. Under Section 1, Rule 16, of the Revised Rules of Court, a motion to the same is deemed waived if not raised in the answer or a motion to dismiss. In any case,
dismiss shall be filed within the time for but before the filing of an answer to the complaint or respondent cannot claim the defense since "lack of jurisdiction over the person, being subject
pleading asserting a claim. to waiver, is a personal defense which can only be asserted by the party who can thereby waive
it by silence."
Respondent’s motion to dismiss was filed after petitioner has completed the presentation of
its evidence in the trial court. The motion to dismiss was a mere ploy to delay the prompt Trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel Toledo
resolution of the case against her. A defendant is informed of a case against him when he receives summons. "Summons is a writ
by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him. Service of such writ is the
Also worth mentioning is the fact that respondent’s motion to dismiss under consideration means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person."
herein is not the first motion to dismiss she filed in the trial court. It appears that she had filed
an earlier motion to dismiss on the sole ground of the unenforceability of petitioner’s claim In this case, there was no valid service of summons upon him, precisely because he was already
under the Statute of Frauds, which motion was denied by the trial court. Respondent’s act of dead even before the complaint against him and his wife was filed in the trial court.
filing multiple motions was "not only improper but also dilatory."
In a case where one of the named defendants was already dead at the time of the filing the RTC – On appeal, the RTC ruled in favor of the defendants by setting aside the decision of the
complaint, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the dead person. Such defense is personal MeTC and dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendants
to the person claiming it; hence, it is now impossible to invoke such defense. Failure to serve because the Return did not clearly indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a
summons on the dead defendant will not be a cause for the dismissal of the complaint against reasonable time upon the respondents, the process server’s resort to substituted service of
the other named alive defendants, considering that they have been served with copies of the summons was unjustified.
summons and complaints, and have submitted their responsive pleadings.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal via a petition arguing that the RTC erred in ruling that the
Therefore, there is no basis for dismissing the complaint against Lolita. The collection case can MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondents due to improper service
proceed and can be satisfied by respondent only, even without impleading the estate of of summons considering that the respondents participated in the proceedings in the MeTC by
Manuel, which is not an indispensable party to petitioner’s complaint for sum of money. Lolita filing a Notice of Appearance with Motion to Dismiss, Answer with Counterclaim, entering into
is a surviving solidary debtor. pre-trial, submitting position papers, and presenting evidence, which militate against the
alleged improper service of summons.
PETITION IS GRANTED. The RTC is hereby directed to proceed with the trial of the civil case
against respondent Lolita Toledo only. CA – Denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the RTC. According it, the Return, with
only a general statement and without specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or
PRUDENTIAL BANK vs. AMADOR MAGDAMIT, JR. and AMELIA MAGDAMIT of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, will not suffice for purposes of complying with
G.R. No. 183795 | November 12, 2014 | J. Perez the rules of substituted service of summons. The CA also rejected petitioner’s contention that
respondents’ voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court cured any defect in the
DOCTRINE: Summons: Because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of substituted service of summons when as early as during the infancy of the proceedings in the
service and personal service of summons is preferred over substituted service, parties do not MeTC, Magdamit, Jr. seasonably raised the ground of lack of jurisdiction over his person by
have unbridled right to resort to substituted service of summons. filing a Notice of Appearance with Motion to Dismiss.

Voluntary appearance: A party who makes a special appearance in court, challenging the ISSUES:
jurisdiction of said court, is not deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the 1. Did the MeTC acquire jurisdiction over the defendants? – NO.
court. It should not be construed as voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. 2. Does filing of an Answer amount to Voluntary Appearance? – NO.

FACTS:
HELD:
Prudential Bank, now Bank of the Philippine Islands (petitioner), in its capacity as administrator
Court did not acquire jurisdiction
of the Estate of Juliana Diez Vda. De Gabriel (Estate) filed an unlawful detainer with The MeTC.
It is based on the ground of respondents’ failure to pay rentals and refusal to vacate the subject
Fundamental is the rule that jurisdiction over a defendant in a civil case is acquired either
property in Malate, Manila.
through service of summons or through voluntary appearance in court and submission to its
authority. In the absence or when the service of summons upon the person of the defendant
Instead of filing an Answer, Magdamit, Jr. filed a Notice of Special Appearance with Motion to is defective, the court acquires no jurisdiction over his person, and a judgment rendered
Dismiss. Among others, Magdamit, Jr. argued that: the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over against him is null and void.
his person because: a) the summons was served at his former address, b) the summons was
received by their underaged housemaid, and c) he was merely impleaded in place of his In actions in personam such as ejectment, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of
deceased father. the defendant through personal or substituted service of summons. However, Before
substituted service of summons is resorted to, the parties must:
MeTC – DENIED defendants’ MTD, citing that it is of no consequence that defendant is also
presently residing in Bacoor, Cavite. Suffice it to say that summons (although substituted 1. Indicate the impossibility of personal service within reasonable time;
because of his physical unavailability) was served upon him on the leased premises which 2. Specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and,
plaintiff is justified in assuming that he is also residing there at.
3. State that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is presentment. Reicon subsequently terminated the contract and entered into separate
residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business of the contracts with Jollibee and Maybunga over the portions of the property they occupy.
defendant.
Diamond filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages against Reicon, Jollibee, and
In the case at bar, the Returns contained mere general statements that efforts at personal Maybunga alleging that the January 9, 1991 contract did not provide for its unilateral
service were made. Not having specified the details of the attendant circumstances or of the termination by either of the parties. It also alleged that the act of defendants in entering into
efforts exerted to serve the summons,30 there was a failure to comply strictly with all the separate contracts, despite the existence of the January 9, 1991 Contract, constitutes unlawful
requirements of substituted service, and as a result the service of summons is rendered interference,17 for which they must be held solidarily liable for damages.
ineffective.
Reicon filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
A. Lack of jurisdiction over its person, considering that the summons was not served upon
Filing an Answer does not amount to voluntary appearance
its president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-
house counsel, as required by the Rules of Court but upon a certain Fernando Noyvo, a
The mandate under the Rules on Summary Proceedings that govern ejectment cases, is houseboy/gardener, at a residence located at 1217 Acacia St., Dasmari�as Village, Makati
expeditious administration of justice such that the filing of an Answer is mandatory. To give City, which is not the principal office of Reicon; and,
effect to the mandatory character and speedy disposition of cases, the defendant is required B. Lack of legal capacity to sue as a juridical person on the part of Diamond, its certificate of
to file an answer within ten (10) days from service of summons, otherwise, the court, motu registration having already been revoked by the Securities and Exchange Commission
proprio, or upon motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the (SEC) as early as September 29, 2003.
facts alleged in the complaint, limited to the relief prayed for by the petitioner. Through this
rule, the parties are precluded from resorting to dilatory maneuvers. Opposing Reicon’s motion to dismiss, Diamond argued that, even assuming that summons was
not properly served upon Reicon, improper service is not a ground to dismiss its complaint. It
Hence, sans voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction, filing an answer in compliance also insisted that it has legal capacity to sue, as the corporation whose certificate of
with the rules on summary procedure in lieu of obtaining an adverse summary judgment does registration was revoked was Diamond Dragon Realty and Mgt. Inc., while its name, per its
not amount to voluntary submission. PETITION DENIED. CA AFFIRMED. General Information Sheet29 for 2009, was Diamond Dragon Realty & Management, Inc.
Moreover, it claimed that its legal existence cannot be attacked except in a quo warranto
petition.
REICON REALTY vs. DIAMOND DRAGON REALTY
G.R. No. 204796 | February 4, 2015 | J. Perlas-Bernabe RTC – Denied Reicon and Jollibee’s motion to dismiss, ratiocinating that improper service of
summons is not among the grounds enumerated under Section 1,39 Rule 16 of the Rules
DOCTRINE: One who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction allowing for the dismissal of a complaint. With regard to the legal capacity of Diamond to sue
of the court. Objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must as a juridical person, the RTC cited Section 2040 of the Corporation Code,41 in relation to
be explicitly made; and failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of Sections 142 and 543 of Rule 66 of the Rules, in ruling that Diamond’s legal existence can only
the court. be impugned in a quo warranto proceeding.

FACTS: Aggrieved, Reicon filed a petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
Reicon is the owner of a parcel of land and the one-storey building erected thereon located at
the corner of Aurora Boulevard and Araneta Avenue, Sta. Mesa, Quezon City. Reicon and CA – Denied Reicon’s petition for failing to show cause as to why its petition for certiorari
respondent Diamond Dragon Realty and Management, Inc. (Diamond) entered into a Contract should not be dismissed for its failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of Diamond, as
of Lease whereby Reicon leased the subject property to Diamond for a period of twenty (20) private respondent, as required under Section 4,49 Rule 46 of the Rules. It appears that the
years, from January 15, 1991 to January 15, 2011, for a monthly rental of P75,000.00. Diamond CA’s earlier Resolution dated January 5, 2011 addressed to Diamond, with address at Suite
sublet portions of the subject property to Jollibee and Maybunga UK Enterprise. 305, AIC Burgundy Empire Tower, ADB Ave., cor[.] Garnet50 Road, Ortigas Center 1605 Pasig
City was returned to it, with the notation “RTS-Moved Out”.
Beginning June 2006, Diamond failed to pay the monthly rentals due, and the checks it had
issued by way of payments from June 2006 to December 2006 were all dishonored upon (Counsel for Diamond acknowleged it received a copy of Reicon’s Compliance, and filed a
manifestation under a special appearance, averring that Reicon’s petition for certiorari must
be dismissed outright for its failure to serve a copy thereof on its counsel of record. It cited the file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion
rule that when a party is represented by counsel, notice of proceedings must be served upon for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction.
said counsel to constitute valid service.)
FACTS:
ISSUE: On March 23, 2007, Monina Santos (Santos) filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages
Was Reicon’s petition for ceritorari properly served upon the person of Diamond as claimed against Petitioner Carson Realty & Management Corp. (Carson).
by Reicon?
April 11, 2007: Summons was issued.
HELD: YES.
Diamond declared the aforesaid address as its business address in its complaint before the On April 12, 2007: a copy of the Summons dated together with the Complaint and its annexes,
RTC, and that there is no evidence to show that it had since changed its address or had moved was served upon Carson at its business address through its "corporate secretary," Precilla
out. Hence, Reicon cannot be faulted for adopting the said address in serving a copy of its Serrano.
certiorari petition to Diamond in light of the requirement under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 46 of
the Rules of Court. On April 25, 2007: Atty. Tomas Z. Roxas, Jr. (Atty. Roxas) the appointed Corporate Secretary
and legal counsel of Carson filed an Appearance and Motion. He acknowledged that the
The Supreme Court further observed that jurisdiction over the person of Diamond had already Summons was served and received by one of the staff assistants of Carson. He further prayed
been acquired by the CA through its voluntary appearance by virtue of the Manifestation dated for an extension of fifteen (15) days from April 27, 2007 within which to file a responsive
May 5, 2011, filed by its counsel, Atty. Marqueda, who, as the records would show, had pleading. The RTC noted his appearance and granted his request for extension of time.
consistently represented Diamond before the proceedings in the court a quo and even before
this Court. To restate, Section 4, Rule 46 of the Rules provides: Instead of filing a responsive pleading, Atty. Roxas moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction over person of respondent, how acquired. The court shall acquire that the Summons dated April 11, 2007 was not served on any of the officers and personnel
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent by the service on him of its order or authorized to receive summons.
resolution indicating its initial action on the petition or by his voluntary submission
to such jurisdiction. Santos countered that while the Summons was initially received by Serrano, who as it turned
out was a staff assistant and not the corporate secretary of Carson, the corporation
Hence, while the CA’s resolution indicating its initial action on the petition, i.e., the Resolution acknowledged receipt of the Summons when Atty. Roxas alleged in his Appearance and Motion
dated January 5, 2011 requiring Diamond to comment, was returned with the notation RTS- that he may not be able to comply with the 15-day prescribed period stated in the Summons
Moved Out, the alternative mode of Diamond’s voluntary appearance was enough for the CA within which to file a responsive pleading. Thus, when Carson sought for an affirmative relief
to acquire jurisdiction over its person. Diamond cannot escape this conclusion by invoking the of a 15-day extension from April 27, 2007 to file its pleading, it already voluntarily submitted
convenient excuse of limiting its manifestation as a mere special appearance, considering that itself to the jurisdiction of the RTC.
it affirmatively sought therein the dismissal of the certiorari petition. Seeking an affirmative
relief is inconsistent with the position that no voluntary appearance had been made, and to RTC denied Carson's Motion to Dismiss and directed the issuance of an alias summons to be
ask for such relief, without the proper objection, necessitates submission to the Court’s served anew upon the corporation.
jurisdiction. September 24 2007: alias summons was issued.

PETITION GRANTED. On November 9, 2007: Process Server Pajila reported that he attempted to serve the alias
Summons on the President and General Manager of Carson, as well as on the Board of
CARSON REALTY & MANAGEMENT CORPORATION v. RED ROBIN SECURITY AGENCY and Directors and Corporate Secretary, but they were not around. Hence, he was advised by a
MONINA SANTOS certain Lorie Fernandez, the '"secretary" of the company, to bring the alias Summons to the
G.R. No. 225035 | February 08, 2017 | J. Velasco, Jr law office of Atty. Roxas. However, it was to no avail. Thus, resorted to substituted service of
the alias Summons by leaving a copy thereof with a certain Mr. JR Taganila, but the latter also
DOCTRINE: Even though substituted service of summons may be considered invalid, the court refused to acknowledge receipt of the alias Summons.
may still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant due to its voluntary submission
to the jurisdiction of the court. The filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to Atty. Roxas filed a Manifestation stating that the alias Summons was again improperly and
invalidly served as his law office was not empowered to receive summons on behalf of Carson.
He maintained that substituted service is not allowed if the party defendant is a corporation.
Hence, he manifested his intention of returning the alias Summons to the RTC. Carson moved for reconsideration but was denied by the CA. Hence, this Petition for review
under Rule 45.
On December 10, 2007: Santos filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default. However, RTC ISSUES:
denied the motion due to improper service of summons on Carson. Santos requested for the (1) Whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over Carson? YES.
issuance of another alias Summons. RTC granted it. (2) Whether Carson was properly declared in default? YES.

September 9, 2008: RTC issued the second alias Summons. RULING:

Service of Summons
On separate dates: October 2, 16, 27, and 28 Process Server Pajila attempted to serve the Alias In actions in personam, such as the present case, the court acquires jurisdiction over the
Summons to the President/General Manager of Carson at its office in Ortigas, but he was person of the defendant through personal or substituted service of summons. However,
informed that the said persons were not around and there was no one in the company because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service and personal
authorized to receive the alias summons. service of summons is preferred over substituted service, parties do not have unbridled right
to resort to substituted service of summons. Before substituted service of summons is resorted
Hence, on October 28, 2008: substituted service of summons was resorted to by leaving the to, the parties must:
copy of the Alias Summons at the company's office through its employee, MS. LORIE (a) indicate the impossibility of personal service of summons within a reasonable time;
FERNANDEZ, however, she refused to acknowledge receipt of the process. (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant;
(c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is
Loreta Fernandez (Fernandez), the receptionist filed a Manifestation before the RTC signifying residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business of the
her intention of returning the alias Summons, together with the Complaint; that as a mere defendant.
receptionist, she had no authority to receive the said documents and that there was an
improper service of summons. The RTC acquired jurisdiction over Carson
The substituted service of summons is valid
Santos filed a second Motion to Declare Carson in Default. RTC granted the motion and allowed
her to present her evidence ex-parte. Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint. On the other
hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of
On August 27, 2009, Carson filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of Default alleging that summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to
the RTC has yet to acquire jurisdiction over its person due to improper service of summons. its authority, as provided in Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
RTC denied it. “As a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to
the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare
Hence, Carson filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and for Leave of Court to Admit that:
Responsive Pleading. This was opposed by Santos. In the meantime, Santos filed an Ex-Parte 1. the filing of motions to admit answer,
Motion to Set for Hearing and for Reception of Evidence before the Branch Clerk of Court. RTC 2. for additional time to file answer,
denied Carson's motions, while granting Santos' motion. 3. for reconsideration of a default judgment,
4. to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration
Carson prayed for the annulment of the Orders. The RTC denied the motion. Thus, Carson filed are considered voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered
a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA essentially questioning the validity of the only by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special
service of the second alias Summons dated September 9, 2008, received by Fernandez, who is appearance to challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be
a receptionist assigned at its office in Ortigas. considered to have submitted to its authority.
From this, it is thus clear that:
CA denied the petition and ruled that the RTC had properly acquired jurisdiction over Carson (1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary
due to its voluntary appearance in court. Even assuming that Carson did not voluntarily submit appearance;
to the RTC's jurisdiction, it still acquired jurisdiction due to the substituted service of the alias (2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant
Summons. The order of default upheld. must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CLAIM
especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and
submitted to the court for resolution. Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corporation v. Bureau of Customs

If the defendant knowingly does an act inconsistent with the right to object to the lack of G.R. No. 209830 | June 17, 2015 | Perlas-Bernabe, J.
personal jurisdiction as to him, like voluntarily appearing in the action, he is deemed to have
DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and not by the consent or
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Seeking an affirmative relief is inconsistent
acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists
with the position that no voluntary appearance had been made, and to ask for such relief,
without the proper objection, necessitates submission to the Court's jurisdiction. FACTS:

Carson voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC when it filed, through Atty. Roxas,  Case arose from a collection suit for unpaid taxes and customs duties amounting to
the Appearance and Motion dated April 25, 2007 acknowledging Carson's receipt of the P46,844,385M filed by respondent BOC against petitioner before the RTC.
Summons dated April 11, 2007 and seeking additional time to file its responsive pleading.  BOC alleged that from 1997-1998, petitioner was able to secure tax credit certificates
Carson failed to indicate that it was being filed by way of a conditional appearance to question (TCCs) from various transportation companies; after which, it made several
the regularity of the service of summons. Thus, by securing the affirmative relief of additional importations and utilized said TCCs for the payment of various customs duties and
time to file its responsive pleading, Carson effectively voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction taxes in the aggregate amount of ₱46,844,385M.
of the RTC.  Believing the authenticity of the TCCs, respondent allowed petitioner to use the
same for the settlement of such customs duties and taxes. However, a post-audit
Carson was properly declared in default investigation of the Department of Finance revealed that the TCCs were fraudulently
secured with the use of fake commercial and bank documents, and thus, respondent
Section 3, Rule 9 states: deemed that petitioner never settled its taxes and customs duties pertaining to the
If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, aforesaid importations.
upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such  hereafter, respondent demanded that petitioner pay its unsettled tax and customs
failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to duties, but to no avail. Hence, it was constrained to file the instant complaint.
render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the  Petitioner argued that that it acquired the TCCs from their original holders in good
court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. faith and that they were authentic, and thus, their remittance to respondent should
be considered as proper settlement of the taxes and customs duties it incurred in
Carson moved to dismiss the complaint instead of submitting a responsive pleading within connection with the aforementioned importations.
fifteen (15) days from April 27, 2007 as prayed for in its Appearance and Motion. Clearly,  RTC – Dismissed the collection case due to the continuous absences of respondent’s
Carson failed to answer within the time allowed for by the RTC. At this point, Carson could lawyer during trial.
have already been validly declared in default. However, believing that it has yet to acquire  CA – Reinstated the case and trial on the merits continued before the RTC.
jurisdiction over Carson, the RTC issued the September 24, 2007 and September 9, 2008 alias  When the case reached the CA, it referred the case to the CTA for proper disposition
Summons. This culminated in the issuance of the assailed June 29, 2009 Order declaring Carson of the appeal. While the CA admitted that it had no jurisdiction to take cognizance
in default on the basis of the substituted service of the September 9, 2008 alias Summons. of respondent’s appeal, as jurisdiction is properly lodged with the CTA, it
While Carson filed its Urgent Motion to Lift Order of Default, the CA found that the same failed nevertheless opted to relax procedural rules in not dismissing the appeal outright.
to comply with the requirement under Sec. 3(b) that the motion be under oath. Instead, the CA deemed it appropriate to simply refer the matter to the CTA,
considering that the government stands to lose the amount of ₱46,844,385M in
It bears noting that the propriety of the default order stems from Carson's failure to file its taxes and customs duties which can then be used for various public works and
responsive pleading despite its voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court projects.
reckoned from its filing of the Appearance and Motion, and not due to its failure to file its  Petitioner files for MR, arguing that since the CA does not have jurisdiction, over
answer to the September 8, 2008 alias Summons. respondent’s appeal, it cannot perform any action on it except to order its dismissal.

PETITION IS DENIED. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly referred the records of the case to the CTA

HELD: NO.
 Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide 2. Appellate jurisdiction over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of
a case. In order for the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to dispose of the Regional Trial Courts in tax collection cases originally decided by them within
the case on the merits, it must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over the subject their respective territorial jurisdiction.
matter.
 It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and  The provisions explicitly provide that the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction
determine the general class to which the proceedings in question belong. over tax collection cases originally decided by the RTC.
 It is conferred by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the  In this case, the CA has no jurisdiction over respondent’s appeal, hence, it cannot
parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists. Thus, when a court has no perform any action on the same except to order its dismissal pursuant to Section 2,
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action. Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. Therefore, the act of the CA in referring respondent’s
 As such, the Court finds that the CA erred in referring the records of the case to the wrongful appeal before it to the CTA under the guise of furthering the interests of
CTA. Section 7 of R.A. 1125, as amended by RA 9282, reads: substantial justice is blatantly erroneous, and thus, stands to be corrected.
 In Anderson v. Ho, the Court held that the invocation of substantial justice is not a
Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. – The CTA shall exercise: magic wand that would readily dispel the application of procedural rules, Procedural
rules are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike
xxxx are enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While in certain instances, we allow a
relaxation in the application of the rules, we never intend to forge a weapon for
c. Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein provided: erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberal interpretation and
application of rules apply only in proper cases of demonstrable merit and under
xxxx justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance
with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of
2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax collection cases: justice. Party litigants and their counsels are well advised to abide by rather than
flaunt, procedural rules for these rules illumine the path of the law and rationalize
a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial the pursuit of justice.
Courts in tax collection cases originally decided by them in their respective  In view of respondent’s availment of a wrong mode of appeal via notice of appeal
territorial jurisdiction. stating that it was elevating the case to the CA – instead of appealing by way of a
petition for review to the CTA within 30 days from receipt of a copy of the RTC’s
xxxx August 3, 2012 Order, as required by Section 11 of RA 1125, as amended by Section
9 of RA 9282 – the Court is constrained to deem the RTC's dismissal of respondent's
collection case against petitioner final and executory.
 Similarly, Section 3, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals, as
amended, states:  It is settled that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period set
by law is not only mandatory, but jurisdictional as well, and that failure to perfect an
appeal within the period fixed by law renders the judgment appealed from final and
Sec. 3. Cases within the jurisdiction of the Court in Divisions. – The Court in executory.
Divisions shall exercise:
PETITION IS GRANTED. CA’s rulings are reversed and set aside. Appeal of BOC is dismissed.
xxxx

c. Exclusive jurisdiction over tax collections cases, to wit:

xxxx
Republic of the Philippines v. Bantigue Point Development Corporation  As for the 1st issue, the Republic is not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
the lower court, even if the former raised the jurisdictional question only on appeal.
G.R. No. 162322 | March 14, 2012 | Sereno, J. The rule is settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings.
DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be acquired through a waiver or
enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court.  Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the
law. It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the
FACTS: parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court. Consequently, questions of
jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time on appeal.
 On July 17, 1997, respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation filed with the  The CA’s ruling that a party may be estopped from raising such jurisdictional question
RTC of Rosario, Batangas an application for original registration of title over a parcel if he has actively taken part in the very proceeding which he questions, belatedly
of land with an assessed value of ₱4,330, ₱1,920 and ₱8,670, or a total assessed objecting to the court’s jurisdiction in the event that the judgment or order
value of ₱14,920 for the entire property, more particularly described as Lot 8060 of subsequently rendered is adverse to him is based on the doctrine of estoppel by
Cad 453-D, San Juan Cadastre, with an area of more or less 10,732 sqm., located at laches.
Barangay Barualte, San Juan, Batangas.  In Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, the party-litigant actively participated in the proceedings
 Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration on January before the lower court and filed pleadings therein. Only 15 years thereafter, and
8, 1998 while the records were still with the RTC. after receiving an adverse Decision on the merits from the appellate court, did the
 On March 31, 1998, the RTC Clerk of Court transmitted motu proprio the records of party-litigant question the lower court’s jurisdiction. Thus, it was held that estoppel
the case to the MTC of San Juan, because the assessed value of the property was by laches had already precluded the party-litigant from raising the question of lack
allegedly less than ₱100k. of jurisdiction on appeal.
 Thereafter, the MTC entered an Order of General Default and commenced with the  In Figueroa v. People, the Court cautioned that Tijam must be construed as an
reception of evidence. Among the documents presented by respondent in support exception to the general rule and applied only in the most exceptional cases whose
of its application are Tax Declarations, a Deed of Absolute Sale in its favor, and a factual milieu is similar to that in the latter case.
Certification from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)  The Tijam rule is inapplicable in this case because, here, the Republic filed its
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Batangas City Opposition to the application for registration when the records were still with the
that the lot in question is within the alienable and disposable zone. Thereafter, it RTC. At that point, petitioner could not have questioned the delegated jurisdiction
awarded the land to respondent Corporation. of the MTC, simply because the case was not yet with that court. When the records
 CA ruled that since the former had actively participated in the proceedings before were transferred to the MTC, petitioner neither filed pleadings nor requested
the lower court, but failed to raise the jurisdictional challenge therein, petitioner is affirmative relief from that court. On appeal, petitioner immediately raised the
thereby estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court on appeal. The jurisdictional question in its Brief. Clearly, the doctrine of estoppel by laches is
CA further found that respondent Corporation had sufficiently established the inapplicable.
latter’s registrable title over the subject property after having proven open,  Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
by itself and its predecessors-in-interest even before the outbreak of World War II. should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
 Dissatisfied with the CA’s ruling, petitioner Republic filed this Rule 45 Petition and reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it
raised 2 issues: either has abandoned or declined to assert it.
a. On whether petitioner is subject to estoppel or not;  In this case, petitioner Republic has not displayed such unreasonable failure or
b. On whether the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the application for neglect that would lead us to conclude that it has abandoned or declined to assert
original registration its right to question the lower court's jurisdiction.
ISSUE:  As for the 2nd issue, the application for original registration was filed on July 17,
1997. On July 18, 1997, or the next day, the RTC immediately issued an Order setting
 Whether or not the Republic is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction.
the case for initial hearing on Oct. 22, 1997, which was 96 days from the Order. While
NO.
the date set by the RTC was beyond the 90-day period provided for in Section 23, this
 Whether or not the MTC acquired jurisdiction. YES. fact did not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court.
HELD:
  In Republic v. Manna Properties, Inc., the Court said that a party to an action has no  In 1996, the City of Paranaque passed Ordinance No. 96-16, providing for the market
control over the Administrator or the Clerk of Court acting as a land court; he has no values of the properties within its jurisdiction as basis for assessment and real
right to meddle unduly with the business of such official in the performance of his property taxation. The ordinance also provided for a discount of 70% of the base
duties. A party cannot intervene in matters within the exclusive power of the trial value of the developed lots in the area, for low, sunken and undeveloped parcels of
court. No fault is attributable to such party if the trial court errs on matters within its land, such as the lots reclaimed and owned by petitioner.
sole power.  The City Assessor of Paranaque, however, assessed petitioner's lots based on the
 Republic then argued that the jurisdictional defect was still not cured because the rates applicable to Barangay Baclaran, which rates were higher than those applicable
second Order was issued more than 5 days from the filing of the application. But the to properties in Barangay Tambo. Petitioner informed the City Assessor of the
Court said that this is merely directory, and failure of such did not deprive the RTC of wrongful assessment in 1998; hence, starting on the 3rd quarter of 1998, the Tambo
its jurisdiction. rates were used, although petitioner claimed that the discount provision in the
 To rule that compliance with the five-day period is mandatory would make ordinance was still not applied.
jurisdiction over the subject matter dependent upon the trial court. Jurisdiction over  Subsequently, the City Treasurer declared petitioner’s properties delinquent and
the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It cannot be included them in the auction sale scheduled on Feb. 7, 2003.
contingent upon the action or inaction of the court.  On Feb. 4, 2003, petitioner filed with the RTC of Paranaque City a Complaint for
 Lastly, Republic argued that the MTC didn’t acquire jurisdiction since the Deed of collection of excess real property taxes and damages with prayer for the issuance of
Sale annexed to the application indicated P160k as the selling price. This is because a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction seeking to restrain
MTC only has jurisdiction over those whose value does not exceed P100k. respondents from enforcing the foreclosure sale. The RTC denied petitioners prayer
 But under Sec. 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act provides that the value of the for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Thus, to prevent its properties
property sought to be registered may be ascertained in three ways: 1st, by the from being auctioned, petitioner paid under protest the amount of P101,422,581.75
affidavit of the claimant; 2nd, by agreement of the respective claimants, if there are on Feb. 7, 2003. Said payment brought the total amount of real property taxes paid
more than one; or, 3rd, from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property. by petitioner to P111,424,157.10 for the taxable years 1995 to 2002.
 Here, value was ascertained with reference to the Tax Declarations submitted by  On March 20, 2003 petitioner amended its complaint. Essentially, petitioner argued
respondent which had a total assessed value of P14,920. Thus, it did not exceed that had the correct assessment been made, it should have paid
P100k, and, as a consequence, MTC may exercise its delegated jurisdiction. only P6,172,979.51 instead of P111,424,157.10 to the City of Paranaque. Petitioner
argued that pursuant to Ordinance No. 96-16, the properties located in Barangay
PETITIONER IS DENIED. Case is remanded to the MTC for reception of evidence to prove that Tambo should have been assessed based on the market value of P3,000.00 for the
the property sought to be registered is alienable and disposable land of the public domain. years 1995 to 1996 and P4,000.00 for the years 1997 to 1999. However, the City
Assessor used the market value applicable to properties located in Barangay
Baclaran, which were subject to a higher rate.
D.M. Wenceslao and Associates, Inc. v. City of Paranaque, Paranaque City Assessor,  Petitioner also pointed out that the ordinance provided that undeveloped parcels of
Paranaque City Treasurer, and Paranaque City Council land shall have 70% of the base value of the nearest developed or improved lots
located in that area. Thus, petitioner claimed that the City of Paranaque is liable to
G.R. No. 170728 | August 31, 2011 | Villarama, Jr., J. return the excess realty taxes under the principle of solutio indebiti.
 Respondents filed a motion to dismiss based on the following grounds: (1) the cause
DOCTRINE: A court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action only upon the of action is barred by prior judgment or by the statute of limitations; (2) the court
payment of the correct amount of docket fees regardless of the actual date of filing of the case in has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim; and (3) the complaint is filed
court in violation of the rule on forum shopping. Respondents contended that petitioners
FACTS: cause of action based on solutio indebiti is in reality a smoke screen to its real
intention which is to claim for tax refund. As such, petitioner’s action has already
 Petitioner D.M. Wenceslao and Associates, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in prescribed pursuant to the provisions of the LGC.
the construction business. It is the registered owner of more than 200k sqm of  RTC – Granted the motion to dismiss. Petitioner’s cause of action had already
reclaimed land in Barangay Tambo, Paranaque City, now known as the Aseana prescribed inasmuch as the allegations in the complaint show that the alleged
Business Park. overpayment of real property tax occurred in 1995-1999 and 2001-2002 while the
complaint was only filed in Feb. 4, 2003. Moreover, the RTC ruled that the action to
 undo the alleged wrong tax assessments and collections in order to ask for refund  In another case, Court ruled that no appeal was perfected where half of the appellate
would make the court do a technical job reserved for special administrative bodies like docket fee was paid within the prescribed period, while the other half was tendered
the LBAA and CBAA. after the period within which payment should have been made.
 Petitioner filed a notice of appeal but was dismissed by the CA for failure to pay the  Thus, where the appellate docket fee is not paid in full within the reglementary
required docketing fees. period, the decision of the trial court becomes final and no longer susceptible to an
 Petitioner then filed a MR alleging that it never intended to abandon its appeal. It appeal. For once a decision becomes final, the appellate court is without jurisdiction
explained that because of extremely heavy workload and by excusable inadvertence, to entertain the appeal.
petitioner’s lawyer overlooked the fact that the required appeal fee was not paid at  The right to appeal is not a natural right. It is also not part of due process. It is merely a
the time of the filing of the notice of appeal. Petitioner also informed the CA that its statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
counsel had already paid the appeal fee of P3k on Oct. 20, 2004. provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with
 CA denied the MR because the dismissal order had become final and executory due the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to
to perfect the appeal by paying the docket fees on time. It explained that although appeal.
there are recognized circumstances that warrant the relaxation of the rules on
payment of docket fees, such as fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence, or a PETITION IS DENIED. CA’s ruling is affirmed.
similar supervening casualty, the heavy workload and inadvertence of counsel are
City of Dumaguete, represented by City Mayor, Agustin Perdices v. Philippine Ports
not among them. The CA also noted that in this case, petitioner was delayed in the
Authority
payment of the docket fees for five months counted from the filing of the notice of
appeal. Finding no justifiable reason for such delay, the CA ruled that it can no longer G.R. No. 168973 | August 24, 2011 | Leonardo-De Castro, J.
accept such payment.
DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing petitioner’s appeal for late payment of by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts
docket fees. constituting the plaintiff's cause of action
HELD: NO. FACTS:
 The rule that appellate court docket and other lawful fees must be paid within the  On Oct. 14, 1998, petitioner City of Dumaguete, through Mayor Felipe Antonio B.
period for taking an appeal is stated in Section 4, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Remollo (Remollo), filed before the RTC an Application for Original Registration of
Procedure. Title over a parcel of land with improvements, located at Barangay Looc, City of
 In this case, petitioner received a copy of the trial court's Order on May 14, 2004. Dumaguete (subject property), under the Property Registration Decree.
Thus, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 41, in relation to Section 1, Rule 22, it had until May  Application stated that the City of Dumaguete, through Mayor Remollo, is the owner
31, 2004 within which to perfect its appeal by filing within that period the notice of of the land subject of this application with all improvements and buildings
appeal and paying the appellate docket and other legal fees. On May 17, 2004, comprising the Engineers Compound where it is now situated and has been in
petitioner filed its notice of appeal within the reglementary period. We note, continuous occupation and possession of the same for more than 30 years or from
however, that it paid the required docket fees only on October 20, 2004, or late by the year 1960.
almost five months.  The said land consist of 5,410 square meters and is situated and bounded and
 Payment of docket and other fees within this period is mandatory for the perfection described as shown on the plan. That said land at the last assessment for taxation
of the appeal. Otherwise, the right to appeal is lost. This is so because a court acquires was assessed at P676,250, Philippine currency, with market value of P1,352,500M.
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action only upon the payment of the correct  RTC – Ordered petitioner to submit the lacking records ( 2 blue print copies of the
amount of docket fees regardless of the actual date of filing of the case in court. The plan, 2 copies of the technical description of the lot, 2 copies of the application,
payment of appellate docket fees is not a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is certificate of the Surveryor and City Assessor, etc.). RTC explained that the extra
an essential requirement, without which the decision or final order appealed from copies submitted by petitioner shall be forwarded by the RTC Clerk of Court to the
becomes final and executory as if no appeal was filed. Land Registration Commission in Manila. Only thereafter would the RTC set the
 Court said that, in one case, the CA correctly dismissed the appeal where the docket application for hearing.
fees were not paid in full within the prescribed period of 15 days but were paid 41  After complying with the above requirements, the Republic, represented by the
days late due to inadvertence, oversight, and pressure of work. Director of Lands, and respondent, opposed the application for registration. They
 both aver that petitioner may not register the subject property in its name since HELD: YES.
petitioner had never been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
of the said property for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the  The RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when, in its Orders dated Dec. 7,
application; and the subject property remains to be a portion of the public domain 2000 and Feb. 20, 2001, it set aside the order of dismissal of LRC Case No. N-201 and
which belongs to the Republic. resolved to have a full-blown proceeding to determine factual issues in said case.
 Petitioner was able to present the testimony of its first witness, Eng. Dorado. After  The dismissal by the RTC of LRC Case No. N-201 for lack of jurisdiction is patently
such but before the next hearing, respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground erroneous.
that the RTC lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.  Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
 Respondent argued that Sec. 14(1) of P.D. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) refers conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise
only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action.
of ownership. The subject property in LRC Case No. N-201 is not alienable and  The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is
disposable, since it is a foreshore land, as explicitly testified to by petitioner’s own determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff,
witness, Engr. Dorado. A foreshore land is not registerable. This was precisely the irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of
reason why, respondent points out, that the subject property was included in Pres. the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the
Proc. 1232 (delineating the territorial boundaries of the Dumaguete Port Zone), so relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
that the same would be administered and managed by the State, through  Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested
respondent, for the benefit of the people. irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of
 Petitioner argued that the property was a swamp reclaimed about 40 years ago, the claims asserted therein.
which it occupied openly, continuously, exclusively, and notoriously under a bona  As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend
fide claim of ownership. The technical description and approved plan of the subject upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss; for otherwise,
property showed that the said property was not bounded by any part of the sea. the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What
 Petitioner invoked R.A. 1899, which authorizes chartered cities and municipalities to determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as
undertake and carry out, at their own expense, the reclamation of foreshore lands appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the
bordering them; and grants said chartered cities and municipalities ownership over character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
the reclaimed lands. Presidential Proclamation No. 1232 is immaterial to the present  Under Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act), as amended by Act No. 2347, jurisdiction
application for registration because it merely authorizes respondent to administer over all applications for registration of title to land was conferred upon the CFI of the
and manage the Dumaguete Port Zone and does not confer upon respondent respective provinces in which the land sought to be registered was
ownership of the subject property. situated. Jurisdiction over land registration cases, as in ordinary actions, is acquired
 RTC Sept. 7, 2000 ORder – Granted the motion to dismiss. Sec. 14 of P.D. 1529 refers upon the filing in court of the application for registration, and is retained up to the
to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain as proper subjects of end of the litigation.
registration, provided the applicant has met the other requirements such as open,  The land registration laws were updated and codified by the Property Registration
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession for at least 30 years under a bona Decree, and under Sec. 17 thereof, jurisdiction over an application for land
fide claim of ownership. It having been shown by petitioner’s own evidence that the registration was still vested on the CFI of the province or city where the land was
lot subject of the application for original registration is a foreshore land, and situated.
therefore not registerable, the application must be denied.  B.P. 129 created the RTC in place of the CFI. Presently, jurisdiction over an
 Petitioner filed a MR saying that the dismissal was premature. The testimony of Engr. application for land registration remains with the RTC where the land is situated,
Dorado was only as to the physical status of the land at the time when the cadastral except when such jurisdiction is delegated by the Supreme Court to the Metropolitan
survey was made sometime in 1916. Trial Court, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts under certain
 RTC Dec. 7, 2000 Order – Set aside the Sept. 7, 2000 Order which granted circumstances.
respondent’s motion to dismiss.  It is not disputed that the Application for Original Registration of Title filed by
 RTC Feb. 20, 2001 Order – Denied respondent’s MR. petitioner before the RTC conformed to Sec. 15 of the Property Registration Decree,
 CA – Ruled for respondent and granted its certiorari petition. RTC gravely abused its which prescribes the form and contents of such applications.
discretion when it issued the Orders dated Dec. 7, 2000, and Feb. 20, 2001.  In its Application, petitioner prayed that its title to the subject property, which it
repeatedly alleged to have acquired through continuous and adverse possession and
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in granting the certiorari petition of respondent.
 occupation of the said property for more than 30 years or since 1960, be placed  Sometime thereafter, the HLURB issued a cease and desist order (CDO) enjoining the collection
under the land registration laws. of amortization payments. This CDO was subsequently lifted. Thereafter, complainants went
 The allegations and prayer in the Application of petitioner were sufficient to vest to the Sps. Genato with the intention of resuming their amortization payments. The latter
jurisdiction on the RTC over the said Application upon the filing thereof. however refused to accept their payments and instead demanded for a lump sum payment of
 Respondent sought the dismissal of LRC Case No. N-201 on the ground of lack of all the accrued amortizations which fell due during the effectivity of the CDO.
jurisdiction, not because of the insufficiency of the allegations and prayer therein,  From the disorganized complaint, it can be gleaned that the following reliefs are prayed for:
but because the evidence presented by petitioner itself during the trial supposedly 1) That Sps. Genato accept the complainants' monthly amortization payments corresponding
showed that the subject property is a foreshore land, which is not alienable and to the period of effectivity of the (subsequently lifted) CDO, without any penalty;
disposable. 2) That the computation of interest on delinquent payments be at 3% per month and not
 When the RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss of respondent, it went beyond the compounded;
allegations and prayer for relief in the Application for Original Registration of 3) That Sps. Genato be responsible for correcting the deficiencies in the construction and
petitioner, and already scrutinized and weighed the testimony of Engr. Dorado, the replacement of sub-standard materials to conform with the plans and specifications;
only witness petitioner was able to present. 4) That Sps. Genato be held answerable/liable to make good their undertaking to provide
 As to whether or not the subject property is indeed foreshore land is a factual issue individual deep wells for the homeowners;
which the RTC should resolve in the exercise of its jurisdiction, after giving both 5) That Sps. Genato be responsible for maintaining the street lights and payment of the
parties the opportunity to present their respective evidence at a full-blown trial. corresponding electric bills;
 But in this case, petitioner was no longer afforded the opportunity to present other 6) That Sps. Genato maintain the contract price of the units for sale and not increase the prices;
witnesses and pieces of evidence in support of its Application. The RTC Order and
dated September 7, 2000 already declaring the subject property as inalienable public 7) That Sps. Genato be made accountable for the unregistered dwelling units.
land, over which the RTC has no jurisdiction to order registration was evidently  Housing Arbiter – Ordered complainants to resume payment of their monthly
premature. amortizations. Respondents are ordered to correct the deficiencies in the
construction and to put up commercial wells and other facilities and reimburse
PETITION FOR REVIEW IS GRANTED. CA’s order is set aside and RTC’s Orders dated Dec. 7, complainants of their total expenses for their water supply.
2000 and Feb. 20, 2001 are reinstated. RTC is directed to proceed with the hearing of the case.  HLURB Board of Commissioners – Modified the ruling by adding a directive for the
complainants to pay 3% interest per month for the unpaid amortizations due form
Spouses William Genato and Rebecca Genato v. Rita Viola
June 29, 1991.
G.R. No. 169706 | February 5, 2010 | Castillo, J.  A writ of execution was then issued by Arbiter Marino Torres and seized Rita Viola’s
2 delivery trucks and 315 sacks of rice. However, it was quashed by the HLURB First
DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law. In contrast, Division when Viola filed for a motion to quash.
jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the court by virtue of the party's voluntary submission to the  Genato spouses appealed to the Office of the President. But the latter affirmed in
authority of the court or through the exercise of its coercive processes. Jurisdiction over the person is toto the ruling. CA also affirmed.
waivable unlike jurisdiction over the subject matter which is neither subject to agreement nor conferred  Petitioners then raised procedural issues where the HLURB did not acquire
by consent of the parties. jurisdiction over Rita Viola’s person. They argued that jurisdiction over an action is
distinct from jurisdiction over the person. The latter can be conferred by consent
expressly/impliedly given by Rita Viola. But here, the HLURB never even impleaded
FACTS: Rita Viola.
 Petitioners also assert that the HLURB Decision subject of the writ of execution has long been
 In October 1991, a complaint titled "VILLA REBECCA HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. final and executory, hence, said Decision can no longer be modified. They further assert that
SPOUSES GENATO" was filed with the HLURB. It was verified by 34 individuals, including the the execution of the said Decision is a ministerial duty of the HLURB.
respondent herein, who referred to themselves as the "Complainants" who "caused the  Petitioners further argue that the best evidence of the value of the 315 sacks of rice seized and
preparation of the foregoing Complaint". auctioned off is the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale; hence the Board's ruling crediting to the account
 It stated that on various dates, complainants executed Contracts to Sell and/or Lease of Viola an amount other than that stated in the Certificate of Sale has no sound basis.
Purchase Agreements with the Sps. Genato pertaining to housing units in Villa Rebecca Homes
Subdivision.
  Respondent argues that the HLURB did not acquire jurisdiction over her person since she PETITION IS GRANTED. CA ruling is reversed and set aside. Order of Marino Torres is reinstated
was not a party to the case, hence, the HLURB decision is a nullity as against her and therefore and affirmed.
never acquired finality. With a void judgment, the resultant execution was likewise void.
 She also argues that, since the levy and auction were illegal, the correct valuation of the 315 MOTION TO DISMISS – IMPROPER VENUE
sacks of rice is not the price paid at the auction but its actual value of P318.5k
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK v. SPOUSES RAMOS
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the HLURB has not acquired jurisdiction over
Rita Viola’s person G.R. No. 228617 | September 20, 2017 | Reyes, Jr., J.

HELD: YES. DOCTRINE: Restrictive stipulations on venue shall restrict the venue of any action or suit that
may arise from the contract to a particular place, to the exclusion of all other jurisdictions.
 The Court said that, except for respondent Rita Viola, all the other individual
members/buyers/owners of the respective housing units have already paid and settled their FACTS:
obligations with Sps. Genato.  The Spouses Victoriano and Melanie Ramos (Spouses Ramos) applied for several
 It is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that are controlling. The inclusion credit lines with Planters Development Bank (PDB) for the construction of a
of the names of all the parties in the title of a complaint is a formal requirement under Section warehouse in Nueva Ecija.
3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.  The application was approved and was secured by a real estate mortgage over
 Here, respondent Viola, although her name did not appear in the title as a party, was one of properties owned by the spouses.
the persons who caused the preparation of the complaint and who verified the same. The  The Spouses Ramos requested for an additional loan and PDB, despite promising to
allegations in the body of the complaint indicate that she is one of the complainants. She extend them a further loan of P140 Million, only released P25 Million. This additional
considered, and held out, herself as one of the complainants from the time of the filing of the loan was also secured by a real estate mortgage.
complaint and up to the time the decision in the HLURB case became final and executory.
 The Spouses Ramos were not able to pay their obligations as they fell due, hence,
 Hence, having been set forth in the body of the complaint as a complainant, Viola was a party PDB filed a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage before the
to the case. RTC of San Jose, Nueva Ecija.
 It was only when the final and executory judgment of the HLURB was already being executed  The Spouses Ramos filed a Complaint for Annulment of Real Estate Mortgages and
against Viola that she, for the first time, reversed her position; and claimed that she was not a Promissory Notes, Accounting and Application of Payments, Injunction with
party to the case and that the HLURB did not acquire jurisdiction over her. Preliminary Injunction and TRO against PDB and its officers also before the RTC of
 Viola is estopped from taking such inconsistent positions. After petitioners had reasonably San Jose, Nueva Ecija.
relied on the representations of Viola that she was a complainant and entered into the  Instead of filing an Answer, PDB filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the
proceedings before the HLURB, she cannot now be permitted to impugn her representations venue of the action was improperly laid considering that the real estate mortgages
to the injury of the petitioners. signed by the parties contained a stipulation that any suit arising therefrom shall be
 The Court then differentiated jurisdiction over the subject matter and jurisdiction filed in Makati City only. It further noted that the complaint failed to state a cause of
over the person. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by action and must therefore be dismissed.
law. In contrast, jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the court by virtue of the party's  The RTC denied the Urgent Motion to Dismiss.
voluntary submission to the authority of the court or through the exercise of its coercive o It held that as a rule, the venue of an action may be agreed upon by the
processes. Jurisdiction over the person is waivable unlike jurisdiction over the subject matter parties. However, in this case, the Spouses Ramos’ contended that the
which is neither subject to agreement nor conferred by consent of the parties. contracts between them and PDB take the form of an adhesion contract.
 In civil case, courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, while o As such, the rule regarding the venue of real actions well be applied to
jurisdiction over the defendants is acquired either through the service of summons upon them avoid ruling on the merits without any evidence that would sufficiently
in the manner required by law or through their voluntary appearance in court and their support the same.
submission to its authority. o It also found that the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to
 The act of filing the complaint with the HLURB is unequivocally a voluntary submission by the constitute a cause of action.
complainants, including Viola, to the authority of the HLURB. Clearly, the HLURB acquired  The PDB filed a motion for reconsideration while the Spouses Ramos filed a motion
jurisdiction over Viola, who was one of the complainants, upon the filing of their complaint. to declare PDB in default. The RTC denied both motions.
  PDB filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, imputing grave abuse of discretion on  The RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion dismiss on the
the RTC for denying its motion to dismiss, despite the fact that the venue was ground of improper venue, especially when the said issue had been raised at the
improperly laid. most opportune time, that is, within the time for but before the filing of an answer.
 The CA denied the petition.  The CA likewise erred in ruling that the validity of the stipulation on venue depends
 PDB filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC. on whether the mortgage is valid which means there has to be a full-blown hearing
and presentation of evidence. This interpretation renders meaningless the very
purpose of the stipulation on venue.
ISSUE:  The Spouses Ramos, in fact, never really assailed the validity of the mortgage
contracts and promissory notes. What they were only claiming was that the said
Whether or not venue was improperly laid, thus warranting the dismissal of the petition?
contracts contain stipulations which are illegal, immoral and otherwise contrary to
customs or public policy. These matters do not affect the validity of the mortgage
contracts, hence, the stipulation on venue should have been upheld. PETITION IS
HELD: Yes, the contract provided that all actions arising therefrom shall be filed exclusively in DENIED.
Makati City. Since the parties intended the stipulation on venue to be restrictive, the case
should be dismissed on the ground of improper venue.
LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. SEDANO
 As a general rule, the venue of real actions shall be in the court which has jurisdiction
over the area where the real property or a portion thereof is situated. The venue of G.R. No. 222711 | August 23, 2017 | Perlas-Bernabe, J.
personal actions, on the other hand, shall be in the court where the plaintiff or any
DOCTRINE: The prevailing rule on objections to improper venue is that the same must be raised
of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
at the earliest opportunity, as in an answer or a motion to dismiss; otherwise, it is deemed
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be
waived.
found, at the election of the plaintiff.
 The general rules on venue, however, admit of exceptions: FACTS:
(1) Where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or
(2) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of  Ley Construction (LCDC) filed a complaint for collection of sum of money and
the action on the exclusive venue thereof. damages against respondent Sedano, before the RTC of Valenzuela.
 Stipulations on venue may be permissive or restrictive. When the stipulation is  LCDC alleged that it leased a parcel of land located at Pasay from the Philippine
restrictive, the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon. If it is permissive, the National Construction Corporation (PNCC).
suit may be filed not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by  LCDC then subleased a portion of the said property to Sedano for a term of ten (10)
law. years.
 In determining whether the stipulation is permissive or restrictive, what is essential  Sedano failed to pay the rent due for the period of August to December 2011 and
is the ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the matter. despite demands, refused to settle his obligations; hence, this complaint.
 The mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not enough to preclude the parties  In his Answer with Third-Party Complaint, Sedano countered that:
from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be able to show that such o He religiously paid rent to LCDC until PNCC demanded that the rent be paid
stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying to restrictive words, the directly to it, in view of LCDC’s eviction from the subject property by virtue
stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not of a court order;
as limiting venue to the specified place. o During the period from August to December 2011, he remitted the rentals
 In the present case, the real estate mortgages provided that the causes of action to PNCC. Should he be found liable to LCDC, he maintained that the RTC
shall be brought “exclusively in the proper court/s of Makati, Metro Manila, the should hold PNCC liable to reimburse to him the amounts he paid as
mortgagor waiving for this purpose any other venue.” rentals; hence, the third-party complaint; and
 The words “exclusively” and “waiving for this purpose any other venue” are o The venue was improperly laid since the lease contract provides that “all
restrictive. Therefore, the employment of the same language in the subject actions or cases filed in connection with case shall be filed with the RTC of
mortgages signifies the clear intention of the parties to restrict the venue of any Pasay, exclusive of all others.” Hence, the complaint should be dismissed
action or suit that may arise out of the mortgage to a particular place, to the on the ground of improper venue.
exclusion of all other jurisdictions.
  Sedano also interposed a counterclaim, seeking reimbursement from LCDC for the RADIO FINANCE COMPANY v. SPOUSES NOLASCO
overpaid amounts he made to the latter.
 The RTC-Valenzuela granted respondent’s motion and dismissed the complaint on G.R. No. 227146 | November 14, 2016 | Reyes, J.
the ground of improper venue. DOCTRINE: The RTC may not motu proprio dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue.
o It held that the stipulation in the lease contract regarding venue is void It is a matter personal to the parties and without their objection at the earliest opportunity, as
insofar as it limits the filing of cases with the RTC of Pasay, even when the in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, it is deemed waived.
subject matter jurisdiction over the case is with the MeTC.
o However, with respect to the filing of cases cognizable by the RTCs, the FACTS:
stipulation validly limits the venue to the RTC of Pasay.
o As for the alleged waiver of the right to question the venue, the RTC found  Romeo and Reynaldo Nolasco (Nolascos) are debtors of Radiowealth Finance
that there was no waiver when Sedano raised improper venue as a defense Company, Inc. (Radiowealth), a domestic financing corporation. The Nolascos
in his Answer. maintain a residence in Mandaluyong City and Radiowealth has its principal place of
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC of Valenzuela erred in ruling that venue was improperly laid? business in the same city.
 The Nolascos secured a loan from Radiowealth, payable in installments, as evidenced
HELD: No, since there was an exclusive stipulation on venue in the lease contract, the case can by a promissory note and a chattel mortgage over a Fuso Super Great Dropside Truck.
only be brought in the RTC of Pasay to the exclusion of all other courts.  The Nolascos defaulted in the payment of the installments which caused the entire
amount to become due and demandable.
 As a general rule, the venue for personal actions shall lie with the court which has
 Radiowealth repeatedly demanded from the Nolascos the payment of the balance
jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides, at the election of the
of the loan, but the latter would not take heed and even refused to surrender
plaintiff. As an exception, however, parties may, through a written instrument,
possession of the motor vehicle.
restrict the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue.
 Radiowealth filed a complaint for sum of money and damages with application for
 An exclusive venue stipulation is valid and binding, provided that:
writ of replevin with the RTC of San Mateo, Rizal, praying that the Nolascos be
(a) The stipulation on the chosen venue is exclusive in nature or intent;
ordered to pay their balance, or, in the alternative, surrender the possession of the
(b) It is expressed in writing by the parties thereto; and
motor vehicle.
(c) It is entered into before the filing of the suit.
 The RTC issued an Order directing the issuance of the writ of replevin. Subsequently,
 The Court found that all the above-mentioned elements are present and that the
however, it issued an Amended Order dismissing motu proprio the case for lack of
questioned stipulation in the lease contract is a valid stipulation that limits the venue
jurisdiction. It ruled that since neither of the parties reside within the jurisdiction of
of the cases to the courts of Pasay City.
the trial court, the case must be dismissed.
 The fact that the stipulation generalized that all actions or cases of the
 The motion for reconsideration of Radiowealth was denied.
aforementioned kind shall be filed with the RTC of Pasay, to the exclusion of all other
 Radiowealth filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC, challenging the
courts, does not mean that the same is a stipulation which attempts to curtail the
order of the RTC on pure questions of law.
jurisdiction of all other courts.
 Jurisdiction is conferred by law and not subject to stipulation of the parties. Hence,
following the rule that the law is deemed written into every contract, the said ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed the case?
stipulation should not be construed as a stipulation on jurisdiction but rather, one
which merely limits venue. HELD: No, jurisdiction in this case is vested with the RTC, hence, it incorrectly dismissed the
 Since LCDC’s action was one for collection of sum of money in an amount that falls case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The case was likewise brought in the proper venue
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, then it is the RTC of Pasay which has pursuant to the stipulation in the promissory note of the parties.
jurisdiction and the complaint is dismissible on the ground of improper venue,
without prejudice, however, to its refiling in the proper court.  The RTC confused the terms “jurisdiction” and “venue”, which are completely
 Furthermore, Sedano timely raised the ground of improper venue since it was one different concepts. There is no question that the RTC has jurisdiction over the
of the affirmative defenses raised in his Answer with Third-Party Complaint. As such, complaint filed by Radiowealth considering the nature of the case and the amount
it cannot be said that he had waived the same. PETITION IS DENIED. involved.
 “Jurisdiction” is the court’s authority to hear and determine a case. The court’s
jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by law.
 o B.P. 129, as amended, provides that the RTC shall exercise exclusive  The property was later sold in a public auction with EOI as the highest bidder and the
original jurisdiction over all cases in which the demand or the value of the final deed of sale in its favor was issued after the lapse of the redemption period.
property in controversy exceeds P300,000, or in such other cases in Metro  In 2002, an alias writ of execution was issued by the MeTC-Branch 7 in connection
Manila, where the demand exceeds P400,000. with the case between PMMSI and MBI. The properties subject of that case were
o Since the amount involved is P1.6 Million, the same is within the sold in a public auction in which Compas was the winning bidder who had the sale
jurisdiction of the RTC. It is, therefore, error for the RTC to claim lack of annotated on both titles.
jurisdiction over the case.  The final deed of sale was then issued to Compas after PMMSI failed to redeem the
 “Venue” pertains to the place where the case may be filed. Unlike jurisdiction, venue properties.
may be waived and subjected to the agreement of the parties provided that it does  In 2003, the TCT under PMMI’s name was cancelled and a new one was issued under
not cause them inconvenience. EOI’s name.
 Under the Rules of Court, the venue of personal actions is allowed to be subjected  In 2005, Compas filed a petition for the cancellation of TCT Nos. S-100612 and S-
to the stipulation of the parties for as long as it does not defeat the purpose of the 100613 and for the issuance of new titles in his name before the RTC-Las Piñas.
Rules which primarily aims for the convenience of the parties to the dispute. However, upon learning that TCT No. S-100612 has been cancelled and a new title
 In this case, in the promissory note executed and signed by the parties, there is a had been issued under EOI’s name, Compas filed a Motion to Admit Amended
provision which states that “any action to enforce payment of any sums due under Petition.
this Note shall exclusively be brought in the proper court within the NCR or in any  EOI filed two (2) motions to dismiss the Amended Petition of Compas.
place where Radiowealth has a branch/office, at its sole option.” o The first motion to dismiss was filed on the ground of failure to state a
 Thus, the filing of the case in San Mateo, Rizal, where Radiowealth maintains a cause of action. This was denied by the RTC-Las Piñas on the ground that
branch is proper and should have been respected by the RTC especially when there Compas could rightfully enforce its lien on the property under EOI’s name.
has been no objection by the Nolascos. o The second motion to dismiss was filed on the ground that under Sec. 108
 Moreover, the RTC may not motu proprio dismiss the case on the ground of improper of P.D. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree (PRD), the court with
venue. It is a matter personal to the parties and without their objection at the earliest jurisdiction was the court where the original registration was filed and
opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, it is deemed waived. docketed.
PETITION IS GRANTED.  The RTC denied the second motion to dismiss on the ground that Sec. 108 of the PRD
was inapplicable and that it was vested with jurisdiction under Sec. 2 thereof.
 The CA, on a petition for certiorari, sustained the jurisdiction of the RTC-Las Piñas
OPPEN v. COMPAS over the amended petition.

G.R. No. 203969 | October 21, 2015 | Mendoza, J.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to hear the amended petition of EOI?
DOCTRINE: Failure to challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss is deemed a waiver of
such objection. HELD: Yes, Sec. 2 of the PRD and not Sec. 108 is applicable. Sec. 2 provides that the RTC shall
have exclusive jurisdiction over registration proceedings, including petitions filed after the
FACTS: original registration of title.

 The subject matter of the case involves two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos.  Sec. 108 of the PRD can only apply if there is unanimity among the parties, or that
S-100612 and S-100613, which were registered in the name of Philippine Merchant there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest.
Marine School, Inc. (PMMSI).  EOI cannot insist that the action should have been filed with the RTC where the
 In 1984, the said properties were levied upon in favor of Manufacturers Building, Inc. original registration was filed and issued considering that the case involved
(MBI) pursuant to the decision and writ of execution issued by the MeTC-Branch 7. controversial issues. The parties, therefore, lacked unanimity as EOI even filed a
 In 1986, the notice of levy in favor of MBI was annotated at the back of the TCT of motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, claiming that its Torrens Title
the properties. was indefeasible and could not be collaterally attacked.
 Meanwhile, in 1987, Ernesto Oppen, Inc. (EOI), pursuant to a writ of execution issued  A closer scrutiny of Sec. 2 and Sec. 108 of the PRD will show that the former pertains
by the MeTC-Branch 15, annotated its lien on TCT No. S-100612. A certificate of sale to the grant of jurisdiction to RTCs while the latter refers to the venue where the
was subsequently issued in its favor and was likewise annotated on the TCT. action to be instituted, to wit:
 G.R. No. 183926 | March 29, 2010 | Nachura, J.
“Section 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. – Judicial
proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem DOCTRINE: Actions affecting title to or possession of real property or an interest therein (real
and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying the Torrens actions) shall be commenced and tried in the proper court that has territorial jurisdiction over
system. the area where the real property is situated.

FACTS:
Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for
original registration of title to lands, including improvements and interests therein,  Petitioner Generosa Latorre (Generosa) filed before the RTC of Muntinlupa a
and over all petitions 􏰄􏰄led after original registration of title, with power to hear complaint for collection and declaration of nullity of deed of absolute sale with
and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The court application for injunction against her own son, respondent Luis Latorre (Luis) and
through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration Commission with two one Ifzal Ali (Ifzal).
certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions 􏰄led or issued in  Generosa averred that:
applications or petitions for land registration, with the exception of stenographic o Luis and Ifzal entered into a contract of lease over a Makati property.
notes, within five days from the 􏰄ling or issuance thereof.” Under the said contract, Luis, as lessor, erroneously declared that he was
the absolute and registered owner of the subject property when in fact,
“Sec. 108. Amendment and alterations of certificates. – No erasure, alteration, or she and Luis were co-owners of the property in equal shares.
amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate o She and Luis executed their respective deeds of donation conveying the
of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same by the Register subject property in favor of The Porfirio D. Latorre Memorial & Fr. Luis
of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. Esteban Latorre Foundation, Inc. (the Foundation). Thus, the TCT of the
property was issued in the name of the Foundation.
All petitions or motions led under this Section as well as any other provision of this o Subsequently, Generosa and Luis executed separate Deeds of Revocation
Decree after original registration shall be filed and entitled in the original case in of Donation and Reconveyance of the subject property, consented to by
which the decree or registration was entered.” the Foundation.
o The deeds of revocation were not registered hence, the subject property
 EOI’s second motion to dismiss was supposed to be on the ground of lack of remained in the name of the Foundation.
jurisdiction. It, however, alleges that the petition should not have been filed with o To protect her rights as co-owner, she demanded from Ifzal the payment
the RTC-Las Piñas, but with the RTC were the original title was filed and issued. of her share of the rentals, which the latter refused to heed.
Based on the allegations thereof, the second motion was invoking the ground of o Luis later caused the annotation of an adverse claim on the TCT, claiming
improper venue. full ownership over the same by virtue of a deed of absolute sale.
 As such, the second motion to dismiss was rightfully denied as EOI waived the o This deed was a falsified document and that her signature was forged by
ground of improper venue after it had filed its first motion to dismiss pursuant to Luis. Furthermore, that she never received any amount as consideration
the Omnibus Motion Rule. for her share of the subject property.
o The ROC likewise provides that a motion attacking a pleading, order,  Luis filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the venue of the case was
judgment or proceedings shall include all objections then available, and improperly laid. He stressed that while the complaint was denominated as one for
all objections not so included shall be deemed waived. collection and declaration of nullity of absolute sale, the case was in fact a real action
 EOI only insisted that the proper venue was the RTC where the original case was affecting title to and interest over the property.
entered after its first motion to dismiss alleging the failure to state a cause of action  Luis further argued that since all of Generosa’s claims were anchored on her claim of
was filed and denied. ownership of one-half (1/2) portion of the subject property and since the same was
 The ground of improper venue was deemed waived and could no longer be located in Makati, the case should have been filed before the RTC of Makati.
questioned by EOI because the issue on venue was not raised in its prior motion to  Ifzal also filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of want of jurisdiction, asserting
dismiss. PETITION IS DENIED. that he was immune from suit because he was an officer of the Asian Development
Bank, an international organization.
 The RTC denied Luis’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the nature of an action whether
LATORRE v. LATORRE
real or personal was determined by the allegations in the complaint, irrespective of
 whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to recover upon the claims asserted – a PLAINTIFF HAS NO LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE
matter resolved only after, and as a result of, a trial.
 Luis then filed an answer ad cautelam insisting, among others, that the case was a TUNA PROCESSING, INC. vs. PHILILPPINE KINGFORD, INC.
real action and that the venue was improperly laid.
 The RTC dismissed Generosa’s claim against Ifzal because it found that the dispute G.R. No. 185582 | February 29, 2012 | Perez
was clearly between Generosa and Luis. DOCTRINE: When a party enters into a contract containing a foreign arbitration clause and
 The RTC, after trial, ruled in favor of Luis. It held that the case should have been filed submits itself to arbitration, it becomes bound by the contract, by the arbitration and by the
in the RTC of Makati as it involves recovery of possession of a real property in Makati. result of arbitration, conceding thereby the capacity of the other party to enter into the
 Generosa filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC. contract, participate in the arbitration and cause the implementation of the result.

FACTS:
ISSUE: Whether or not the case was properly dismissed?
1. Kanemitsu Yamaoka is a holder of US, Philippine and Indonesian patents (Yamaoka
patent) over a manufacturing process.
2. It entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with 5 Philippine Tuna Processors
HELD: Yes, since the case involved is an action affecting title to or possession of real property
(licensees), namely: Angel Seafood Corporation, East Asia Fish Co. Inc., Mommy Gina
or an interest therein (real action), it must be commenced and tried in the court that has
Tuna Resources, Santa Cruz Seafoods Inc and Philippine Kingford. It provides for the ff:
territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real property is situated. In this case, in the RTC
- Licensing of the patented processes, including enforcement and collection of
of Makati.
royalties in the Philippines;
 The action in the RTC, other than for collection, was for the declaration of nullity of - Establishment of Tuna Processors Inc. (TPI) for the implementation of the MOA;
the deed of absolute sale involving the subject property which is located in Makati. - Ownership of TPI by the Kanemitsu Yamaoka and the licensees.
The venue of such action is thus, the RTC of Makati and not the RTC of Muntinlupa. 3. The licensees withdrew from TPI and reneged on their obligations due to events not
 The nature of an action is determined by the allegations in the complaint itself, mentioned in the petition.
rather than by its title or heading. Also, what determines the venue of a case is the 4. TPI submitted the dispute for arbitration before the International Centre for Dispute
primary objective for the filing of the case. Resolution in California which awarded damages in its favor for breach of the MOA.
 In Generosa’s complaint, she sought the nullification of the deed of absolute sale on 5. TPI then filed a Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign
the strength of two (2) basic claims that (1) she did not execute the deed in favor of Arbitral Award before the RTC.
Luis; and (2) thus, she still owned one half (1/2) of the subject property. Indubitably, 6. Kingford filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue. It was
the complaint is a real action involving the recovery of the subject property on the initially denied but later granted after Judge Almeda inhibited himself and the case re-
basis of her co-ownership thereof. raffled to Judge Ruiz.
 The RTC also committed a procedural blunder when it denied Luis’s motion to  TPI is a foreign corporation established in California and had been doing business
dismiss on the ground of improper venue. It insisted that a trial on the merits be in the Philippines (by enforcing the patent) without a license. As such, it does not
conducted even when it was already pointed out in the motion to dismiss that venue have legal capacity to sue in the Philippines.
was improperly laid. 7. TPI filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to nullify the order of
 Luis should have also filed a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition when his dismissal. It argues that it is entitled to seek recognition of the foreign arbitral award in
motion to dismiss was denied inasmuch as such denial was done without jurisdiction accordance with R.A. No. 9285 (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004), the
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York
jurisdiction. Convention) and the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
 Despite this procedural lapse, however, it cannot be said that Luis waived his which do not require legal capacity to sue for enforcement.
objections to the fact of improper venue. Notably, after his motion to dismiss was - Kingford faults TPI for non-observance the principle of hierarchy or courts and failure
denied, Luis filed a motion for reconsideration to contest such denial. Even in his to file a motion for reconsideration.
answer ad cautelam, he stood his ground that the case ought to be dismissed on the ISSUE: WON a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines can enforce a
basis of improper venue. PETITION IS DENIED. foreign arbitral award;
HELD:  Oppositely, the enforcement of local arbitral award where the place of arbitration is in the
Philippines require facts showing that the persons named as petitioner or respondent have
Yes. A foreign corporation’s capacity to sue in the Philippines is not material insofaras the legal capacity to sue or be sued in a petition to concerning the arbitration agreement.
recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is concerned.
Other matters:
When a party enters into a contract containing a foreign arbitration clause and submits itself
to arbitration, it becomes bound by the contract, by the arbitration and by the result of  A motion for reconsideration is not required in certiorari under Rule 45.
arbitration, conceding thereby the capacity of the other party to enter into the contract,  Failure to observe the principle of hierarchy of courts ordinarily warrant the outright
participate in the arbitration and cause the implementation of the result. dismissal of the case.
- The novelty and paramount importance of the issue raised herein calls for the
Application of Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 relaxation of the rules. There is a need to strengthen arbitration as a means of
 A special law prevails over a general law such as the Corporation Code as provided in dispute resolution.
Koruga v. Arcenas and Hacienda Luisita v. Presidential Agrariam Reform Council.
 R.A. No. 9285 is a law specially enacted to actively promote party autonomy in dispute
resolution. Its provisions incorporate both the New York Convention and the Model Law. PETITION IS GRANTED. The case is remanded to the RTC for further proceedings on the validity
 There are exclusive grounds available to the party opposing an application for and enforceability of the foreign arbitral award.
recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award, none of which touch on capacity to
sue of the party seeking the recognition and enforcement of the award.1 LOLITA BAS CAPABLANCA vs. HEIRS OF PEDRO BAS AND REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE
PROVINCE OF CEBU
Application of Special Rules on Alternative Dispute Resolution
G.R. No. 224144 | June 28, 2017 | Leonen
 The Special Rules provides that any party to a foreign arbitration may petition the court
to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award. The contents of the petition do not DOCTRINE:
include capacity to sue.
Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived.

1 1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the (d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in
party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in
authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that: accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place; or
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law (e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside or
applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of
the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under which, that award was made.
the law of the country where the award was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the 2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the
appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought
unable to present his case; or finds that:
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling within the (a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration
terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the under the law of that country; or
scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters (b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public
submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, that part of policy of that country.
the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to arbitration may be
recognized and enforced; or
A judicial declaration of heirship in a special proceeding is not necessary to bring suit based on ISSUE: WON a judicial declaration of heirship is necessary for an heir to bring suit to assert her
a claim of ownership. right to the property;

FACTS: HELD:

1. Andres and Pedro Bas acquired Lot 2535 with an area of 6,120 sqm and the No. In Marabillas v. Quito, it was discussed that there is no established rule which imposes the
corresponding land patent in 1937. necessity of a previous legal declaration regarding their status as heirs to an intestate on those
2. Pedro sold his portion of the lot of Faustina Manreal as evidenced by a notarized Deed who, being of age and with legal capacity, consider themselves the legal heirs of a person, in
of Sale in 1939. order that they may maintain an action arising out of a right which belonged to their ancestor.
3. Several other transfers occurred until the lot was conveyed to Norberto Bas who built a
house thereon. The property of the deceased person becomes the property of the heir by the mere fact of
4. Norberto Bas died and was succeeded by his niece and only heir, Lolita Bas Capablanca death of his predecessor-in-interest. As such, he can deal with it in precisely the same way in
in 1995. which the deceased could have dealt.
5. Lolita learned that a TCT dated June 1996 was issued in the name of Andres and Pedro
Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario is not applicable.
Bas on the basis of a reconstituted Deed of Conveyance.
6. Josefina Bas Espinosa, representing the heirs of Pedro Bas, filed a complaint for  There, the motion to dismiss was filed immediately after the second Amendment
Clarification of Ownership over the lot against Lolita before the Lupon Tagapamayapa of Complaint was filed. It was granted therein as the heirs of Yaptinchay did not show proof
Bgry. Biasong, Talisay, Cebu. The conflict was not resolved and resulted to the issuance that they had been declared as the legal heirs.
of a Certification to file Action. - Lolita’s lack of capacity to sue was raised neither as an affirmative defense nor in
7. The heirs of Andres Bas and Lolita partitioned the lot among themselves through a a motion to dismiss. Defenses and objections not pleaded either a motion to
Partition Agreement of Real Property, Quitclaim and Waiver of Rights. dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
8. Lolita sought to register her portion of the lot but was denied by the Register of Deeds,  The pronouncement that declaration of heirship must be made only in a special
citing the need for a court order. proceeding and not an ordinary civil action for reconveyance was based on Litam v.
9. Lolita learned a new set of TCTs dated Mary 1997 had been issued in the name of the Rivera and Solivio v. CA where the adverse parties were putative heirs to a decedent’s
heirs of Pedro Bas. estate or parties to the special proceedings for settlement.
10. In Dec 1997, Lolita filed a complaint before the RTC for the cancellation of titles. - Lolita does not claim any filiation with Pedro. Rather, she seeks to enforce her
- Heirs of Pedro Bas argued that the sale between Pedro and Faustina was invalid. right over property. The issue on the annulment of title hinges on the validity of
The signature appearing on the Deed could not have been made by Pedro because the sale from Pedro to Faustina.
he was an illiterate who never learned to write his own name. - Her possession of the subject lot under a claim of ownership is a sufficient
- Cancellation of the previous TCT was pursuant to a final judgment in Civil Case No. interest to entitle her to bring suit.
840 for Partition.
11. RTC ruled in favor of Lolita. It held that: Moreover, requiring Lolita to institute a special proceeding would only be superfluous and
- There was substantial evidence to prove that Lolita had been in long possession of hamper justice considering was filed in 1997 and a full-blown trial had already taken place
the lot under a claim of ownership as the heir of Norberto and that it was not before the RTC. She already presented evidence to establish her filiation and heirship to
necessary for her to be first declared as his heir before filing the complaint. Norberto which was not disputed by the heirs of Pedro.
- Josefina’s uncorroborated testimony of Pedro’s illiteracy is self-serving and
unconvincing to contradict the regularity of the notarized deed of sale. Moreover, PETITION IS GRANTED.
there was another document containing the same signature and the heirs
themselves alleged in another civil case that Pedro sold his share to Faustina. GERARDO VILLANUEVA v. ST. MARTIN OF TOURS KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGPAPAUTANG,
- The judgment of the MTC in Civil Case no. 840 was not binding on Lolita who was INC.
a not a party to the case.
12. CA reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint. Relying on Heirs of G.R. no. 156746 | July 23, 2014 |
Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario, it ruled that Lolita must first be declared as the sole heir to the
DOCTRINE:
estate of Norberto in a proper special proceeding.
13. Hence, the present Petition for Review.
Defenses and objects not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed Nonetheless, Villanueva already admitted St. Martin’s juridical personality as a domestic
waived. corporation duly organized under Philippines in his answer and pre-trial brief. He did not even
challenge the existence of the loan.
The following company official or employees can sign the verification and certification without
need of a board resolution: The power of a corporation to sue and be sued is lodged in the Board of Directors which
exercises corporate powers. In Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. CIR, it was clarified that the
(1) Chairperson of the Board of Directors; following company official or employees can sign the verification and certification without
(2) President; need of a board resolution:
(3) General Manager or Acting General Manager;
(4) Personnel Officer; and (6) Chairperson of the Board of Directors;
(5) An Employment Specialist in a labor case; (7) President;
(8) General Manager or Acting General Manager;
FACTS: (9) Personnel Officer; and
(10) An Employment Specialist in a labor case;
1. Villanueva was a member of St. Martin of Tours Kilusang Bayan sa Pagpapautang, Inc.
(St. Martin), a corporation engaged in cooperative banking activities.
Here, Tamayo was then the Acting General Manager designated by the Board of Directors as
2. St. Martin filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure against Villanueva to foreclose the
shown by a copy of the minutes of the regular meeting.
chattel mortgage constituted over his vehicle for defaulting on his Php 135,000 loan.
Villanueva admitted the existence of the loan but raised the following defenses:
Action was not premature.
- There was no cause of action because he did not refuse to pay his obligation. He
tendered payment but the counsel demanded for attorney’s fees.
The issue on the existence of the promissory note and the maturity of the obligation, being a
- There was a verbal agreement on an out-of-court settlement/compromise
question of fact, is not the proper subject of an appeal by petition for review on certiorari. The
agreement.
Court reiterates that it is bound by the factual findings by the trial court.
- Dispute was not first brought to barangay mediation.
3. RTC ruled in favor of St. Martin. Villanueva was ordered to pay Php 1350,000. His motor
At any rate, the promissory note is not the only means of proof. Villanueva himself admitted
vehicle would be sold at public auction in case of default of payment.
his obligation in his pleadings.
4. Villanueva moved for reconsideration or new trial, assailing St. Martin’s lack of juridical
personality and the absence of proof of the existence of the chattel mortgage. Denied.
Nieto likewise testified as to the maturity date of his obligation. Even where no date of
5. CA affirmed. Villanueva now argues that:
payment was indicated, his obligation would be demandable at once. Here, his obligation
- St. Martin does not have the capacity to sue as there was no board resolution
matured upon the demand for payment by St. Martin. PETITION IS DENIED.
authorizing Tamayo, the Acting General Manager, to file of the complaint. What
was presented was only a letter signed by Rustico Galang authorizing Elvira Nieto
(account officer) to appear and testify. TERESITA S. LEE v. LUI YICK FONG, RIGOBERTO D. GALLARDO, JASON R. BARLIS, DELLA V.
- The action was premature. The deed of chattel mortgage referred to a promissory ROMERO, AND ARIANNA K SANTOS AKA ARIANNA KINGKINGAN
note that was indispensable to the determination of the maturity of his obligation.
It was the best evidence of the principal obligation.
G.R. No. 202814 | July 10, 2017
ISSUE: WON St. Martin had capacity to sue notwithstanding absence of a board resolution
DOCTRINE:
HELD:
The aggrieved party in the dismissal of a case is the property party to institute an appeal.
There was capacity to sue.
Where a corporation is an injured party, its power to sue is lodged with its board of directors
Defenses and objects not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed or trustees.
waived. Villanueva failed to raise the alleged of lack of capacity to sue neither in his answer
nor in a motion to dismiss. FACTS:
1. Lee, as the alleged President of Pines Commercial Corporation (PCC), filed a Complaint  Thus, the aggrieved party in the dismissal of the civil case is the corporation, not the
for Annulment of Document, Injunction, Recovery of Possession, Accounting, and petitioner as a stockholder.
Damages against the respondents to be restrained from acting as directors and officers  Under the Corporation Code, where a corporation is an injured party, its power to sue is
of PCC. lodged with its board of directors or trustees.
2. The case was initially docketed as a civil case raffled to a regular court. It was later  An individual stockholder may institute a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation
transferred to the special commercial court on the ground that it involves an intra- wherein he holds stocks in order to protect or vindicate corporate rights, whenever the
corporate dispute. officials of the corporation refuse to sue, or are to be sued, or hold the control of the
3. RTC granted the motion to dismiss filed by the respondents. It found that Lee has no corporation. However, he is regarded as a nominal party with the corporation as the real
authority to sue on behalf of the corporation. party in interest.
- The complaint contains a dubious statement as regards the status of a certain
Conrado Romero being PCC's majority stockholder as of February 2006 when said Lee committed forum shopping.
Romero already died in January.
- There could not have been any meeting or election of new officers for lack of  Test- whether the following elements of litis pendentia are present, to wit: (a) the
quorum due considering the death of the majority stockholder. identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b)
- The stock certificates of Lee and her siblings are falsified documents. The NBI the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
investigation shows that Romero’s signature in the certificate of transfer forged. facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which
- SEC revoked PCC’s registration in August 2011. party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
4. PCC, through Lee, filed a Notice of Appeal from the RTC Order to reinstate the case with  The elements of litis pendentia are present in this case.
the special commercial court. (a) The parties in this case and the appeal pending before the CA are the same or
5. PCC, through Lee, filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 with the CA, questioning: representing the same interest;
(1) the grant of the motion to dismiss since such motion is a prohibited pleading in intra- (b) Relief sought in both remedies is the same (setting aside of the order dismissing the
corporate proceedings; and (2) the finding that Lee and her siblings are not stockholders civil case);
of the corporation. CA, in its resolution, dismissed the petition for being the wrong mode (c) the resolution of both actions is anchored upon the determination of whether or not
of appeal. the civil involves an intra-corporate dispute, and the validity of petitioner's
6. Hence the present petition for review under Rule 45 by Lee in her personal capacity as representation as President of the suing corporation
a stockholder.  Lee seeks refuge from the SC for the reinstatement of the civil case to the special
- Lee argues that the all decisions and orders in cases falling under the Interim Rules commercial court which is the very issue in the ordinary appeal before the CA.
of Corporate Rehabilitation are appealable to the CA through a petition for review  The existence of forum shopping being established, it is well-settled that once there is a
under Rule 43. finding of forum shopping, the penalty is summary dismissal not only of the petition
- Respondents argue that Lee, a mere stockholder, does not have legal personality to pending before this Court, but also of the other case that is pending in a lower court.
file a suit on behalf of the corporation. PETITION IS DENIED.
- Respondents also contend that Lee is guilty of forum shopping as there is also an
GLOBAL BUSINESS HOLDINGS, INC vs. SURECOMP SOFTWARE, B.V.
ordinary appeal filed by Lee before the CA.
G.R. NO. 173463 | October 13, 2010 | Nachura
ISSUE: WON a stockholder can sue in behalf of a corporation;

HELD:
DOCTRINE: A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without license may sue in
No. Lee, in her personal capacity as a stockholder, is not the proper party to file the instant Philippine courts a Filipino citizen or a Philippine entity that had contracted with and benefited
petition. from it.
 This petition is an appeal from the CA Resolution, subject of which was the RTC Order FACTS:
dismissing the civil case. The parties to the civil case were the respondents and the
corporation, represented by Lee as the alleged president. Thus, the aggrieve 1. Surecomp is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of the Netherlands. It
entered into a software license agreement with Asian Bank Corporation (ABC), a
domestic corporation) for the use of its IMEX Software System for 20 years.
2. ABC merged with Global Holdings. It discontinued the agreement with Surecomp as It  The principle is applied to prevent a person contracting with a foreign corporation from
found that the software was unworkable for its operations. later taking advantage of its noncompliance with the statutes, chiefly in cases where such
3. Surecomp filed a complaint for breach of contract with damages with the RTC for Global’s person has received the benefits of the contract.
failure to pay its obligations under the agreement despite demands.  Due to Global's merger with ABC and because it is the surviving corporation, it is as if it
- Surecomp alleged that it is a foreign corporation not doing business in the was the one which entered into contract with Surecomp.
Philippines and is suing on an isolated transaction.
4. Global filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds: A special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy for a denial of a motion to dismiss.
(1) Surecomp had no capacity to sue because it was doing business in the Philippines
 An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates
without a license. It was not an isolated transaction since the contract was for a
period of 20 years. nor finally disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the
case is finally decided on the merits.
(2) The claim is unenforceable. The agreement was a technology transfer agreement
that failed to comply with the IP Code of the Philippines.  To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the denial of
- Further, it could not be accountable for any breach because the agreement was the motion todismiss must have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion
entered into between Surecomp and ABC. Global merely took over ABC’s operations  Global did not properly substantiate its claim of arbitrariness on the part of the trial court
as a result of a merger. judge that issued the assailed orders denying the motion to dismiss.
5. RTC issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss: PETITION IS DENIED.
- Global is estopped from Surecomp’s capacity to sue as the successor-in-interest of
ABC which entered into a contractual obligation with it.
- As to the unenforceability, the issues were not yet joined and disputed facts are
unclear. TOPIC: MOTION TO DISMISS (E) - LITIS PENDENTIA
6. Global filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before CA, contending that the RTC
abused its discretion. Denied. DOMINGA B. QUITO vs. STOP & SAVE CORPORATION
7. Hence, the present petition for review under Rule 45. G.R. No. 186657 | June 11, 2014 | Brion, J.
Digested by: ESCUETA, DAVID ANTONIO A.
ISSUE: WON Global is estopped from questioning Surecomp’s capacity to sue;

HELD: DOCTRINE: The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain
whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the
Yes. Global is already estopped. A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would
license may sue in Philippine courts a Filipino citizen or a Philippine entity that had contracted sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar
with and benefited from it. to the subsequent action.

As general rule, unlicensed foreign non-resident corporations doing business in the Philippines FACTS:
cannot file suits in the Philippines. - On March 11, 2005, DOMINGA filed before the MCTC a complaint for unlawful
detainer against Stop & Save and its sub-lessees/co-respondents Roberto Buan,
 A corporation has a legal status only within the state or territory in which it was
Henry Co, Angelina Lumotan, Rodel Pineda and Rose Calma. She alleged that STOP &
organized.
SAVE failed to pay the agreed monthly rentals since June 2003 and, despite repeated
 A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines must acquire a license from the verbal and written demands, refused to pay and vacate the leased building, in
SEC and appoint an agent for service of processes to be subjected to the jurisdiction of violation of their April 4, 2002 Lease Agreement. In its answer to the complaint, STOP
our courts. & SAVE denied that it committed a violation of the lease contract, but merely
Exception: Doctrine of Estoppel suspended its payment of rent because of DOMINGA’s failure to comply with their
subsequent agreement dated November 15, 2003; they had agreed that rent
 A party is estopped from challenging the personality of a corporation after having payments for the months of June, July, August, September and October 2003 shall
acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it. be deferred and paid on or before January 15, 2004 - the deadline given to DOMINGA
to complete the necessary repairs on the 2nd floor of the leased building. Stop &
Save anchored its right to suspend rental payments on Article 1658 of the Civil Code.
 - The MCTC ruled in favor of DOMINGA, and ordered STOP & SAVE to pay DOMINGA
all the rentals in arrears amounting to P1.8 million. In these lights, we see no reason to prevent the subject unlawful detainer case and annulment
- On appeal, the RTC set aside the MCTC’s decision and ordered the dismissal of of lease contract from proceeding separately and independently from one another.
DOMINGA’s unlawful detainer complaint due to the pending case for annulment of
lease contract filed by STOP & SAVE with the same RTC. It appeared that STOP & PETITION IS GRANTED.
SAVE had earlier filed, on January 13, 2005, a case to annul its April 4, 2002 Lease
Agreement with DOMINGA allegedly due to her misrepresentations on the leased
building’s condition and ownership. IGLICERIA VDA. DE KARAAN vs. ATTY. SALVADOR AGUINALDO ET.AL.
- The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision, and DOMINGA’s unlawful detainer complaint. It G.R. No. 182151 | September 21, 2015 | SERENO
ruled that the RTC correctly abated the unlawful detainer case because STOP Digested by: ESCUETA, DAVID ANTONIO A.
&SAVE’s annulment case was filed first in time and was the more appropriate vehicle
in litigating the issues between the parties, since both their claims were anchored on DOCTRINE: A finding of litis pendentia must be premised on the existence of the following
the same lease contract. elements: (a) identity of the parties in the two actions; and (b) substantial identity in the causes
of action and in the reliefs sought such that any judgment rendered in one case, regardless of
ISSUE: W/N the CA correctly dismissed the subject unlawful detainer case on the ground of litis which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
pendentia.NO
FACTS:
HELD: We find that litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action does not apply - On 20 September 1999, petitioner filed a Complaint against respondents before the
in the present case. RTC-Quezon City, where she sought payment of damages for the alleged destruction
of the cottages and other structures inside Fine Sand Beach Resort, which she owned
Litis pendentia refers to the situation where another action is pending between the same and operated. She alleged that respondents destroyed the structures inside her
parties for the same cause of action so that one of these actions is unnecessary and vexatious. property using a bulldozer in the guise of enforcing a Writ of Demolition issued by
To constitute litis pendentia, the following requisites must be present: (1) identity of the the RTC of Balanga.
parties in the two actions; (2) substantial identity in the causes of action and in the reliefs - Respondents filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss seeking the dismissal of
sought by the parties; (3) and the identity between the two actions should be such that any the case on the following grounds: (a) forum shopping; (b) lack of jurisdiction over
judgment that may be rendered in one case, regardless of which party is successful, would the person of deceased respondent Angel Aguinaldo and over nonresidents Pedro
amount to res judicata in the other. and Concepcion Aguinaldo; and (c) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case. Respondents again emphasized the failure of petitioner to disclose the
The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the existence of two cases for malicious mischief she had filed against them before the
same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential Ombudsman; and a civil action for right of way allegedly involving the same property
to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the and the same parties.
two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent - RTC denied such motion to dismiss. Upon appeal, the CA reversed such decision and
action. noted that the second case for right of way involved an identical claim for damages
being raised by the same parties and arising from the demolition of the same
In the present case, while there is an identity in the facts between the two actions, involving structures in Bataan.
as they do the same lease contract, the issues and the relief prayed for are different so that
the causes of action remain entirely distinct from each other. In the unlawful detainer suit, the ISSUE: W/N the filing of Civil Case No. 7345 (Easement of right of way) constituted forum
issue is who between the parties has a better right to physical possession over the property or shopping on the part of petitioner. NO
possession de facto and the principal relief prayed for is for STOP & SAVE to vacate the
property for failure to pay the rent. In contrast, in the annulment of lease contract, the issue HELD: We GRANT the Petition.
is the validity of the lease contract, where STOP & SAVE puts in issue DOMINGA’s ownership.
In other words, the issue of physical possession in the action for unlawful detainer cannot be A finding of litis pendentia must be premised on the existence of the following elements: (a)
identical with the issues of ownership and validity of contract in the action for annulment. identity of the parties in the two actions; and (b) substantial identity in the causes of action
From these essential differences, the lack of required identity in the causes of action for litis and in the reliefs sought such that any judgment rendered in one case, regardless of which
pendentia to exist cannot be denied.
party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. Of these elements, we find that in the aggregate amounts of ₱162,314,499.00 and US$797,176.47; (b) as collaterals,
only the identity of the parties in the two cases has been sufficiently established. petitioners mortgaged eight (8) parcels of land, as well as the improvements found
thereon; (c) under the MTI, EBC, as trustee, cannot commence foreclosure
There is no identity of Causes of Action. proceedings on any or all parts of the collaterals without the written instructions
from the majority creditors; (d) during the pendency of the MTI, BDO's majority
Notwithstanding the established identity of parties, the Court still finds the CA's finding of share in the MTI was effectively paid for by Sherwyn Yao et al.; (e) Sherwyn, et al.
forum shopping unjustified. There is merit in petitioner's argument that the causes of action should have been subrogated to BDO's majority interest in the MTI; (f) EBC refused
and reliefs sought in the two cases differ substantially. The instant case for damages is to honor the subrogation, causing Sherwyn, et al. to file an action for subrogation
premised on a cause of action for quasi-delict arising from the demolition of structures inside and injunction before the RTC of Makati City docketed as Civil Case No. 10-323; and
petitioner's beach resort, while Civil Case No. 7345, or the the claim for easement of right of (g) EBC commenced foreclosure proceedings without written instructions from the
way over respondents' property in Morong, Bataan, is based on Article 649 of the Civil Code. majority creditors under the MTI, which by virtue of subrogation, should be Sherwyn,
et al.
The reliefs sought in the two cases are likewise different. The Complaint in Civil Case No. Q-99- - In their Answer and Motion to Dismiss, respondents contended that the complaint
38762 (Damages case) prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's before the RTC-Malolos should be dismissed on the grounds of forum shopping and
fees, in connection with the demolition of structures inside Fine Sands Beach Resort. On the litis pendentia. They claimed that the action for subrogation pending before the RTC-
other hand, the reliefs sought in Civil Case No. 7345 (Easement of right of way), however, Makati basically involved the same parties, reliefs, and causes of action with the
pertain exclusively to the right-of-way claim over the Morong property. action pending before the RTC-Malolos
- The RTC-Malolos dismissed Civil Case No. 543-M-2010 on the ground of forum
Since the causes of action and the reliefs sought in the two cases are completely different, a shopping. It found that several similarities existed between the complaint filed
decision in either case will not amount to res judicata in the other. As there is no basis for the before it and that in Civil Case No. 10-323 pending in the RTC-Makati, i.e., (a) both
CA's finding of forum shopping, the Court finds the dismissal of petitioner's Complaint for complaints dealt with the same collaterals under the MTI, and (b) both cases
damages improper. Accordingly, we resolve to reinstate Civil Case No. Q-99-38762 and to involved substantially the same parties as the individual plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
remand it to the RTC for continuation of trial and resolution on the merits. 10-323 (herein Sherwyn, et al.) and the corporation plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 543-
M-2010 (herein petitioners) represented a common interest adverse to EBC, Allied,
PETITION IS GRANTED. CASE REMANDED TO THE RTC. and Security. In this light, the RTC-Malolos concluded that the determination of the
validity of foreclosure would necessarily be intertwined with the issue of whether or
not Sherwyn, et al. should be subrogated to the rights of BDO under the MTI - an
GRACE PARK INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION vs. EASTWEST BANKING CORPORATION issue already pending before the RTC-Makati.
G.R. No. 210606 | July 27, 2016 | PERLAS-BERNABE - Upon appeal, the CA upheld the RTC-Malolos's dismissal of Civil Case No. 543-M-
Digested by: ESCUETA, DAVID ANTONIO A. 2010 on the ground of forum shopping.

DOCTRINE: ISSUE: W/N the CA correctly upheld the dismissal of Civil Case No. 543-M-2010 on the ground
- Absolute identity of parties is not required, shared identity of interest is sufficient to of forum shopping in the concept of litis pendentia. NO
invoke the coverage of this principle.
- Identity of causes of action does not mean absolute identity; otherwise, a party could HELD: The petition is meritorious.
easily escape the operation of res judicata by changing the form of the action or the
relief sought. The test to determine the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis
pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in the
FACTS: other. Thus, there is forum shopping when the following elements are present, namely: (a)
- The instant case arose from an Amended Complaint for Injunction and Annulment of identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b)
Foreclosure Sale filed by petitioners Grace Park International and Woodlink Realty identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
Corporation against respondents Eastwest Banking Corporation (EBC) et al. before and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the
the RTC-Malolos, docketed as Civil Case No. 543-M-2010. In their complaint, other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amounts to res judicata in the action
petitioners alleged that: (a) they entered into a Mortgage Trust Indenture (MTI) with under consideration."
EBC, Allied, Security, and Banco De Oro Unibank (BDO), with EBC acting as trustee,
Anent the first requisite of forum shopping, there is identity of parties where the parties in G.R. No. 183035 | January 9, 2013 | SERENO
both actions are the same, or there is privity between them, or they are successors-in-interest Digested by: ESCUETA, DAVID ANTONIO A.
by title subsequent to the commencement of the action, litigating for the same thing and under
the same title and in the same capacity. Absolute identity of parties is not required, shared DOCTRINE: Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) Identity of
identity of interest is sufficient to invoke the coverage of this principle. parties, or at least their representation of the same interests in both actions; (2) Identity of
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3)
With respect to the second and third requisites of forum shopping, hornbook is the rule that Identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment
identity of causes of action does not mean absolute identity; otherwise, a party could easily that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would
escape the operation of res judicata by changing the form of the action or the relief sought. amount to res judicata in the other case.

The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the
same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential FACTS:
to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the - Optima, engaged in the business of leasing and renting, entered into a Contract of
two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent Lease with respondent over a 131-square-meter office unit and a parking slot in the
action. Hence, a party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of Optima Building for a period of three years commencing on 1 March 2003 and ending
presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of on 28 February 2006.
action shall not be twice litigated between the same parties or their privies. Among the several - Renovations in the Optima Building commenced in January and ended in November
tests resorted to in ascertaining whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action 2005. As a result, Hertz alleged that it experienced a 50% drop in monthly sales and
are: (1) whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and second causes a significant decrease in its personnel’s productivity. It then requested a 50%
of action; and (2) whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint discount on its rent for the months of May, June, July and August 2005.
in the other. Also fundamental is the test of determining whether the cause of action in the - Optima granted the request of Hertz. However, the latter still failed to pay its rentals
second case existed at the time of the filing of the first complaint. for the next seven months. In addition, Hertz likewise failed to pay its utility bills for
the next four months.
Here, it cannot be said that there is an identity of parties between Civil Case No. 10-323 - On 8 December 2005, Optima wrote another letter to Hertz, reminding the latter
pending before RTC-Makati and Civil Case No. 543-M-2010 pending before RTC-Malolos that the Contract of Lease could be renewed at least 90 days prior to the termination
because the plaintiffs in the former, herein Sherwyn, et al., represent substantially different of the lease period. On 21 December 2005, Hertz wrote a letter belatedly advising
interests from the plaintiffs in the latter, herein petitioners. This is because in Civil Case No. Optima of the former’s desire to negotiate and extend the lease. However, as the
10-323, Sherwyn, et al.'s interest is to be subrogated into the shoes of BDO as one of the Contract of Lease provided that the notice to negotiate its renewal must be given by
creditors under the MTI. the lessee at least 90 days prior to the expiration of the contract, petitioner no longer
entertained respondent’s notice.
On the other hand, petitioners' interest in Civil Case No. 543-M-2010 is the enforcement of - On 30 January 2006, Hertz filed a Complaint for Specific Performance, Injunction and
their rights as debtors to the MTI, i.e., ensuring that the foreclosure proceedings were in accord Damages and/or Sum of Money with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and Writ of
with the foreclosure provisions of the MTI. Secondly, the underlying circumstances Preliminary Injunction against Optima.
surrounding the causes of action in both cases are likewise substantially different in that: (a) - On 1 March 2006, Optima, through counsel, wrote Hertz a letter requiring the latter
in Civil Case No. 10-323, the cause of action arose from EBC's alleged unjust refusal to to surrender and vacate the leased premises in view of the expiration of the Contract
subrogate Sherwyn, et al. to the rights of BDO; while (b) in Civil Case No. 543-M-2010, the of Lease on 28 February 2006. It likewise demanded payment of unpaid rent and
cause of action stemmed from EBC's purported breach of Section 6.0536 of the MTI which other charges. Hertz, however, refused to vacate the leased premises. As a result,
provides that it should first secure a written instruction from the Majority Creditors37 before Optima was constrained to file before the MeTC a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer
commencing foreclosure proceedings against the collaterals. Finally, a judgment in Civil Case with Damages.
No. 10-323 will not necessarily result in res judicata in Civil Case No. 543-M-2010. - On 14 March 2006, Summons for the Unlawful Detainer Complaint was served on
Henry Bobiles, who complied with the telephone instruction of manager Rudy
PETITION IS GRANTED. REMANDED TO RTC. Tirador to receive the Summons.
- 14 days after service of the Summons, Hertz filed a Motion for Leave to File Answer.
In that Motion, Hertz stated that, "in spite of the defective service of summons, it
OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION vs. HERTZ PHIL. EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC opted to file the instant Answer with Counterclaim with Leave of Court."
 - On 22 May 2006, the MeTC ruled that petitioner Optima had established its right to SPOUSES ROSALINO R. REYES, JR. and SYLVIA S. REYES vs. SPOUSES HERBERT BUN HONG G.
evict Hertz from the subject premises due to nonpayment of rentals and the CHUNG and WIENNA T. CHUNG
expiration of the period of lease. Upon appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of the G.R. No. 228112 | September 13, 2017 | VELASCO
MeTC. Digested by: ESCUETA, DAVID ANTONIO A.
- The CA however, reversed such ruling and decided in favor of respondent Hertz
stating that due to the improper service of summons, the MeTC failed to acquire DOCTRINE:
jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz.
FACTS:
ISSUE: W/N the unlawful detainer case is barred by litis pendentia. NO - Sps. Reyes obtained from export and Industry Bank Inc. (EIBI), formerly Urban Bank,
Inc., a loan secured by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage on a 1,2020.60 square-meter
HELD: The instant ejectment case is not barred by litis pendentia. lot at No. 59 Pansol QC. The subject property was registered in Sps. Reyes’ name.
- Sps. Reyes defaulted in the payment of their loan obligation, the subject property
Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) Identity of parties, or was extrajudicially foreclosed and sold at public auction with EIBI as the highest
at least their representation of the same interests in both actions; (2) Identity of rights asserted bidder. The Certificate of Sale was then issued and registered with the Registry of
and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3) Identity with respect Deeds. They also failed to redeem the subject property within the 1 year redemption
to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be period/ Thus, the title was consolidated in EIBI' s name.
rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res - EIBI sold the subject property to LNC. Thus, the certificate of title in the name of EIBI
judicata in the other case. was likewise cancelled and a new one in the name of LNC was issued. By a Deed of
Absolute Sale and a Deed of Assignment, LNC sold and assigned to Sps. Chung the
Here, while there is identity of parties in both cases, we find that the rights asserted and the subject property. LNC’s certificate of title was cancelled.
reliefs prayed for under the Complaint for Specific Performance and those under the present - Sps. Chung made several demands on Sps. Reyes to vacate the same and surrender
Unlawful Detainer Complaint are different. As aptly found by the trial court: The Complaint for its possession. The demands, however, went unheeded. Thus, a Complaint for
Specific Performance seeks to compel plaintiff-appellee Optima to: (1) renegotiate the Ejectment was filed against Sps. Reyes the MeTC QC.
contract of lease; (2) reconnect the utilities at the leased premises; and (3) pay damages. On - MeTC; Dismissed; Insufficiency of evidence. The dismissal was appealed to RTC Br.
the other hand, the unlawful detainer case sought the ejectment of defendant-appellant Hertz 223. Pending resolution of the appeal, Sps. Chung filed an "Ex-Parte Petition for
from the leased premises and to collect arrears in rentals and utility bills. As the rights asserted Issuance of Writ of Possession under Act No. 3135" before the RTC-Br. 226.
and the reliefs sought in the two cases are different, we find that the pendency of the - RTC-Br. 226: the petition is sufficient, setting it for hearing and directing Sps. Chung
Complaint for Specific Performance is not a bar to the institution of the present case for to appear and show cause why the petition should be granted.
ejectment. - The following day, Sps. Chung withdrew their appeal before R TC-Br. 223. The trial
court allowed the withdrawal.
ON THE ISSUE WHETHER THE MeTC ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER RESPONDENT HERTZ - Thereafter RTC-Br. 226 granted the Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of Writ of
Possession. Accordingly, a notice to vacate addressed to the petitioners and a writ
The MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz. In civil cases, jurisdiction of possession directing the sheriff to place the respondents in possession of the
over the person of the defendant may be acquired either by service of summons or by the subject property were issued.
defendant’s voluntary appearance in court and submission to its authority. In this case, the - Upon the service of the writ of possession and the notice to vacate on Sps. Reyes,
MeTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent Hertz by reason of the latter’s the latter refused to sign them. Several efforts to implement the writ were made
voluntary appearance in court. thereafter, but all to no avail. Thus, Sps. Chung filed an "Urgent ExParte Omnibus
Motion" praying for the issuance of a Break Open Order to properly implement the
Furthermore, the Answer with Counterclaim filed by Hertz never raised the defense of writ of possession and to place them in possession of the subject property.
improper service of summons. The defenses that it pleaded were limited to litis pendentia, pari - Sps. Reyes filed a Motion to Quash anchored on the ground that Sps. Chung
delicto, performance of its obligations and lack of cause of action. Finally, it even asserted its committed forum shopping.
own counterclaim against Optima. - RTC Branch 226 held that Sps. Chung could validly file the "Ex-Parte Petition for
Issuance of Writ of Possession" and acquired all the rights of the previous
owner/buyer in the foreclosure sale including the right to ask for the writ of
possession. Further, the spouses are also not guilty of forum shopping in filing their
 "Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession" because an application for writ Forum shopping presupposes the availment of two or more simultaneous remedies, not to
of possession is a mere incident in the registration proceeding. Though denominated successive ones arising out of an error that may have been committed in good faith. Raising a
as a "petition," in substance, it is but a mere "motion," matter to the correct forum employing the wrong mode or remedy, and then later resorting
- Upon appeal, the CA held that Spouses. Chung acquired the absolute right, as to the correct one, does not make an instance of forum shopping. The remedies of appeal
purchaser and successors-in-interest of EIBI and LNC, to apply for the issuance of a and Ex-Parle Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession are mutually exclusive and not
writ of possession pursuant to Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. It also ruled alternative or successive.
that the Spouses Chung did not commit forum shopping. They withdrew their appeal
of the dismissal of their Complaint for Ejectment lodged with RTC-Br. 223 to avail of WRIT OF POSSESSION ISSUE
the proper legal remedy of filing an application for writ of possession, which was
raffled to RTC-Branch 226. The remedy of a writ of possession is available to a subsequent purchaser but only after
hearing
ISSUE: W/N Sps. Chung committed forum shopping? NO
A writ of possession may be issued under the following instances:
HELD: - in land registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act 496
- in a judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty
No forum shopping and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened
Forum shopping exists when a party avails himself of several judicial remedies in different - in an extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act No.
courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and 3135, as amended; and (4) in execution sales (last paragraph of Section 33, Rule 39
the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either of the Rules of Court).
pending in or already resolved adversely by some other courts.
In an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property, the purchaser becomes the absolute owner
The test to determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping is whether the thereof if no redemption is made within one year from the registration of the certificate of sale
elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount by those entitled to redeem. Being the absolute owner, he is entitled to all the rights of
to res judicata in another. ownership over a property recognized in Article 428 of the New Civil Code, not the least of
which is possession.
The requisites of litis pendentia: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the
same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief The remedy of a writ of possession, a remedy that is available to the mortgagee-purchaser to
being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in acquire possession of the foreclosed property from the mortgagor, is made available to a
one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. subsequent purchaser, but only after hearing and after determining that the subject property
is still in the possession of the mortgagor. In other words, if the purchaser is a third party who
The elements of res judicata: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) the court which acquired the property after the redemption period, a hearing must be conducted to determine
rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment whether possession over the subject property is still with the mortgagor or is already in the
on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, possession of a third party holding the same adversely to the defaulting debtor or mortgagor.
subject matter, and causes of action. If the property is not in the possession of the mortgagor, a writ of possession could thus be
issued. It was error for RTC-Branch 226 to issue the writ of possession to the respondents ex
In this case, even granting that the MeTC ruling had attained finality, still, such will not amount parte. Nonetheless, the Court is loath to abate the writ of possession already issued and
to res judicata in the subsequent Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession, there implemented as the petitioners were eventually given their day in court and allowed to file
being no identity or similarity of action between the two proceedings with the latter being just their Motion to Quash. PETITION IS DENIED
an incident in the transfer of title.
MOTION TO DISMISS [ Barred by prior judgment or statute of limitations (f)]
One (1) day after the filing of the Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession Sps.
Chung already moved for the withdrawal of their appeal with RTC Branch 223. They were still SPOUSES ANTONIO v. JULITA VDA. DE MONJE
within their rights in availing themselves of the proper remedy, i.e., to file the Ex-Parte Petition G.R. No. 149624 I September 29, 2010 I J. Peralta
having realized their erroneous resort to the wrong remedy.
Digested By: Cruz, Frances Claire, S. 11. RTC issued an order dismissing the complaint on the ground of res judicata. CA affirmed.

DOCTRINE/S: ISSUE/S: Whether or not the CA erred in applying the principle of res judicata with respect to
There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where the judgment was Civil Case No. 007-125 and Civil Case No. 506.?
rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an HELD: YES. There is no res judicator in this case.
absolute bar to the second action. But where there is identity of parties in the first and second Res judicata is defined as a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing
cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those or matter settled by judgment. According to the doctrine of res judicata, an existing final
matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of
involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as conclusiveness of judgment. competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the
parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of
FACTS: concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.
1. Spouses Catalino Manguiob and Andrea Pansaon were the original owners of the subject
parcel of coconut land consisting of 15,903 square meters. A final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of
2. Andrea Pansaon who survived her husband Catalino Manguiob, together with some other the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined
heirs, sold to Macedonio Monje Seven Thousand Five Hundred (7,500) square meters only in the former suit. The principle of res judicata is applicable by way of (1) bar by prior judgment
of the aforesaid property. and (2) conclusiveness of judgment. This Court had occasion to explain the difference between
3. Macedonio Monje immediately took possession thereof and constructed a house worth these two aspects of res judicata as follows:
P30,000.00.
4. On 16 January 1967, the heirs of spouses Catalino Manguiob and Andrea Pansaon who There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where the judgment was
also died, sold the subject property which was already sold to Macedonio Monje in 1962, rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject
in favor of Nicanor Manguiob and Carolina V. Manguiob. matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an
5. Immediately thereafter, spouses Nicanor Manguiob and Carolina V. Manguiob had absolute bar to the second action. But where there is identity of parties in the first and second
executed an absolute deed of sale in favor of the formers sister-in-law, Avelyn B. Antonio, cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those
the entire Lot No. (1) consisting of 15,903 square meters. matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely
6. Macedonio Monje knew it only on 11 August 1967 when he received a letter from Avelyn involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as conclusiveness of judgment.
B. Antonio, informing him that she is now the registered owner of the subject property Stated differently, conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or question has
under a new Transfer Certificate of Title No. TCT No. T-9643. been squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of
7. Macedonio Monje filed on 12 October 1967 before the CFI of Baganga, Davao Oriental, a competent jurisdiction. Thus, only the identities of parties and issues are required for the
complaint for the annulment of the deed of sale between the heirs of Catalino Manguiob operation of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment.
and Carolina Balanay/Nicanor Manguiob, as well as the subsequent deed of absolute sale
by the latter in favor [of] Avelyn Antonio and the cancellation of TCT No. T-9643 In the present case, there is no question that there is identity of parties in Civil Case No. 007-
8. The court rendered a decision ruling that the 2nd and 3rd deeds of sale of the property in 125 and Civil Case No. 506.
question null and void. The SC ruled that while the principle of res judicata is better
disregarded if its application would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality; to so However, as to identity of issues, a perusal of the records and other pleadings would show that
disregard it now and reopen the case would further delay its disposition. However, the the issue raised in Civil Case No. 007-125 is whether the sale to petitioners of the 7,500 square
lower court should take note of its erroneous order to deliver to Monje an area larger than meter portion of Lot No. 1 being contested by respondents is valid. On the other hand, in Civil
what he bought from the heirs of Manguiob and claimed in the action he had filed, in the Case No. 506, the issues are whether petitioners were deprived of possession of the remaining
eventual execution of its decision. 8,403 square meter portion of Lot No. 1 which was validly sold to them and whether they are
9. Prescinding from the decision of the Supreme Court, plaintiff-appellants [herein entitled to an accounting of the proceeds of the copra harvested from their property which
petitioners] filed a case for a sum of money, accounting of the proceeds of the copra, was supposedly appropriated by respondents. The Court finds that there is no identity of issues
damages and attorneys fees against herein defendant-appellees as the issue raised in Civil Case No. 007-125 is different from, and does not overlap with, the
10. Defendants-appellees [herein respondents], instead of filing an answer to the aforesaid issue raised in Civil Case No. 506.
complaint had opted to file a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and violation
of Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94 on non-forum shopping.
The final and executory judgment in Civil Case No. 007-125 cannot bar the filing of Civil Case possession of the subject property while the recovery ofpossession case not only involves
No. 506, since these cases involve entirely different subject matters. The bone of contention the right to the possession of the subject property, but the ownership thereof as well.
in Civil Case No. 007-125 is confined to the 7,500 square meter portion of Lot No. 1 bought by 9. CA rendered the herein assailed decision, which affirmed the RTC Decision dated
the predecessor-in-interest of respondents, while the subject matter in Civil Case No. 506 is September 3, 2008.The CA held that the doctrine of res judicata cannot be applied in this
the remaining 8,403 square meter parcel of the same lot. Since there is no identity of subject case since there is no identity of cause of action as between the forcible entry case and
matter between the two cases, it is but logical to conclude that there is likewise no identity of the recovery of possession case.
causes of action.
ISSUE/S:
SPOUSES OCAMPO v. HEIRS OF DIONISIO 1. Whether the finality of the decision in the forcible entry case constitutes res judicata,
G.R. No. 191101 I October 1, 2014 I J. Reyes which would warrant the dismissal of the respondents’ complaint for recovery of
possession?
Digested By: Cruz, Frances Claire, S. 2. Whether the respondents’ cause of action is already barred by laches.

DOCTRINE/S: For res judicata under the first concept, bar by prior judgment, to apply, the HELD:
following requisites must concur, viz: (a) finality of the former judgment; (b) the court which Issue 1: NO. There is no res judicata
rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court comprehends two distinct concepts of res judicata:
on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, (1) bar by former judgment and (2) conclusiveness of judgment.
subject matter and causes of action.
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the judgment was
rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject
FACTS: matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an
1. Bernardino U. Dionisio (Dionisio) filed a complaint for forcible entry with the Municipal absolute bar to the second action.
Trial Court (MTC) of Cardona, Rizal. (forcible entry case) against Mario and Felix Ocampo.
2. Dionisio sought to recover the possession of a portion of his property, alleging that Mario But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of
and Felix built a piggery thereon without his consent. action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly
3. MTC rendered a decision, which dismissed the complaint for forcible entry filed by controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the
Dionisio. The MTC opined that Dionisio failed to establish his prior possession of the concept of res judicata known as "conclusiveness of judgment.”
disputed parcel of land. Dionisio’s notice of appeal was denied by the MTC
4. Consequently, on July 3, 1998, the heirs of Dionisio (respondents), filed a complaint9 for For res judicata under the first concept, bar by prior judgment, to apply, the following
recovery of possession with the MTC (recovery of possession case) against the spouses requisites must concur, viz: (a) finality of the former judgment; (b) the court which rendered it
Mario and Carmelita (petitioners). The respondents sought to recover the same portion had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the
of the parcel of land. merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject
5. The respondents averred that the subject property was acquired by Dionisio on February matter and causes of action.
10, 1945 when he purchased the same from Isabelo Capistrano. That Dionisio thereafter
took possession of the subject property and was able to obtain a free patent covering the The first three requisites are present in this case. The Decision dated September 12, 1997 in
subject property. The respondents further claimed that sometime in 1995, Mario the forcible entry case rendered by the MTC, a court which has jurisdiction over the subject
constructed a piggery on a portion of the subject property without their consent. property and the parties, had long become final. The said MTC decision is an adjudication on
6. Petitioners claimed that the respondents’ complaint for recovery of possession of the the merits. However, the fourth requisite is not present. Although there is identity of parties
subject property is barred by res judicata in the light of the finality of the decision in the and subject matter as between the forcible entry case and recovery of possession case, there
forcible entry case. is no identity of causes of action.
7. MTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for recovery of possession filed by the
respondents on the ground of res judicata. As correctly found by the RTC and the CA, the forcible entry case only involves the issue of
8. RTC ruled that the MTC erred in dismissing the respondents’ complaint for recovery of possession over the subject property while the recovery of possession case puts in issue the
possession ofthe subject property solely on the ground of res judicata. The RTC opined ownership of the subject property and the concomitant right to possess the same as an
that the forcible entry case, only involves the question of who has a better right to the attribute of ownership.
 knowledge and permission. They later learned that the Spouses de Jesus occupied one
A judgment rendered in a forcible entry case will not bar an action between the same parties house while Macario occupied the other one.
respecting title or ownership because between a case for forcible entry and an accion 4. Spouses Supapo then filed a criminal case against the respondents for violation of
reinvindicatoria, there is no identity of causes of action. Such determination does not bind the Presidential Decree No. 772 or the Anti-Squatting Law. The trial court convicted the
title or affect the ownership of the land; neither is it conclusive of the facts therein found in a respondents.
case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession. 5. The respondents appealed their conviction to the CA. While the appeal was pending,
Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 8368, otherwise known as "An Act Repealing
Issue 2: No. The action is imprescriptible Presidential Decree No. 772," which resulted to the dismissal of the criminal case.
Equally untenable is the petitioners’ claim that the respondents’ right to recover the 6. Notwithstanding the dismissal, the Spouses Supapo moved for the execution of the
possession of the subject property is already barred by laches. As owners of the subject respondents' civil liability, praying that the latter vacate the subject lot. The Regional Trial
property, the respondents have the right to recover the possession thereof from any person Court (RTC) granted the motion and issued the writ of execution.
illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Assuming arguendo that the 7. The respondents thus filed with the CA a petition for certiorari to challenge the RTC's
petitioners indeed have been occupying the subject property for a considerable length of time, orders denying the quashal of the writ and the respondent's motion for
the respondents, as lawful owners, have the right to demand the return of their property at reconsideration.17 The CA granted the petition and held that with the repeal of the Anti-
any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. Squatting Law, the respondents' criminal and civil liabilities were extinguished.
8. The Spouses Supapo thus filed the complaint for action publiciana.
ESPERANZA SUPAPO AND THE HEIRS OF ROMEO SUPAPO, v. SPOUSES ROBERTO AND 9. MeTC denied the motion to set the affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing. RTC
SUSAN DE JESUS, MACARIO BERNARDO, AND THOSE PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER granted the petition for certiorari on two grounds, viz.: (i) the action has prescribed; and
THEM, Respondent. (ii) accion publiciana falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. CA dismissed the
appeal and held that the complaint for accion publiciana should have been lodged before
G.R. No. 198356 I April 20, 2015 I J. Brion the RTC and that the period to file the action had prescribed.

Digested By: Cruz, Frances Claire, S. ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by res judicata.?
DOCTRINE/S:The requisites for res judicata under the concept of bar by prior judgment are: 2. Whether the cause of action has prescribed?

(1) The former judgment or order must be final; HELD:

ISSUE 1: No. The cause of action is not barred by res judicata
(2) It must be a judgment on the merits;
Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39,
(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the Section 47(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39,
parties; and Section 47(c).

(4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and "Bar by prior judgment" means that when a right or fact had already been judicially tried on
cause of action. the merits and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, the final judgment or order
shall be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them and constitutes an absolute
FACTS: bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand or cause of action.
1. Spouses Supapo filed a complaint5 for accion publiciana against Roberto and Susan de
Jesus (Spouses de Jesus), Macario Bernardo (Macario), and persons claiming rights under The requisites for res judicata under the concept of bar by prior judgment are:
them.
2. The complaint sought to compel the respondents to vacate a piece of land located in (1) The former judgment or order must be final;
Novaliches.
3. The Spouses Supapo did not reside on the subject lot. They also did not employ an (2) It must be a judgment on the merits;
overseer but they made sure to visit at least twice a year.8 During one of their visits in
1992, they saw two (2) houses built on the subject lot. The houses were built without their
(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the possession of the subject property, the complaint having been filed beyond the period
parties; and provided by law.

(4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and At the core of this controversy is a parcel of land registered under the Torrens system. The
cause of action. Spouses Supapo acquired the TCT on the subject lot in 1979. Interestingly, the respondents do
not challenge the existence, authenticity and genuineness of the Supapo's TCT.
Res judicata is not present in this case.
In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be
While requisites one to three may be present, it is obvious that the there is no identity of acquired by prescription or adverse possession. We have also held that a claim of acquisitive
subject matter, parties and causes of action between the criminal case prosecuted under the prescription is baseless when the land involved is a registered land because of Article 112649
Anti-Squatting Law and the civil action for the recovery of the subject property. of the Civil Code in relation to Act 496.

First, there is no identity of parties. The criminal complaint, although initiated by the Spouses OPIC: MOTION TO DISMISS [ Barred by prior judgment or statute of limitations (f)]
Supapo, was prosecuted in the name of the people of the Philippines. The accion publiciana,
on the other hand, was filed by and in the name of the Spouses Supapo.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN
Second, there is no identity of subject matter. The criminal case involves the prosecution of a G.R. No. 182507 I June 18, 2010 I J. Nachura
crime under the Anti-Squatting Law while the accion publiciana is an action to recover
possession of the subject property. DOCTRINE/S: Res judicata is to be disregarded if its rigid application would involve the sacrifice
of justice to technicality, particularly in this case where there was actually no determination of
And third, there is no identity of causes of action. The people of the Philippines filed the the substantive issues in the first case
criminal case to protect and preserve governmental interests by prosecuting persons who
violated the statute. The Spouses Supapo filed the accion publiciana to protect their FACTS:
proprietary interests over the subject property and recover its possession. 1. Gina de Guzman obtained a P300,000.00 loan from petitioner, Philippine National Bank,
secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land registered in her name.
Even casting aside the requirement of identity of causes of action, the defense of res judicata 2. Gina acquired the property from her father, Francisco de Guzman, through a Deed of
has still no basis. Absolute Sale dated August 28, 1978. Gina's sister, Rosalia de Guzman, the beneficiary of
the family home standing on the said lot, gave her consent to the mortgage.
The concept of "conclusiveness of judgment" does not require that there is identity of causes 3. Later, Rosalia filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Document, Cancellation of
of action provided that there is identity of issue and identity of parties. Title, Reconveyance, Cancellation of Mortgage, and Damages against Gina and petitioner,
alleging that the purported sale of the property by Francisco to Gina was fraudulent.
Under this particular concept of res judicata, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly 4. Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the case due to plaintiff's failure to comply with its
adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court order to pay the legal fees so that alias summons could be served. No appeal was taken
in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein from this order; hence, the dismissal became final and executory.
and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies, whether or not the claim, 5. On April 11, 2000, respondent Intestate Estate filed another Complaint, also for
demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same. Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Cancellation of Title, Reconveyance, Cancellation of
Mortgage, and Damages, against Gina and petitioner, with essentially the same allegations
As already explained, there is no identity of parties between the criminal complaint under the as the former Complaint.
Anti-Squatting law and the civil action for accion publiciana. For this reason alone, 6. petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res judicata, alleging that the
"collusiveness of judgment" does not apply. Complaint is barred by prior judgment. This was denied by the RTC.
7. petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on the ground of forum shopping. This was
ISSUE 2: NO. The cause of action has not prescribed. also denied by the RTC.
The respondents point out that the Spouses Supapo filed the complaint for accion publiciana 8. Petitioner filed another Motion to Dismiss, raising the same ground, which was denied by
on March 7, 2008 or more than ten (10) years after the certificate to file action was issued on the RTC
November 25, 1992. The respondents contend that the Spouses Supapo may no longer recover
9. Petitioner then filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration 13 of the three RTC Orders, is to be disregarded if its rigid application would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality,
this time, raising the following grounds: (a) res judicata; (b) forum-shopping; (c) lack of particularly in this case where there was actually no determination of the substantive issues in
jurisdiction over the person; and (d) complaint states no cause of action. the first case and what is at stake is respondents' home.
10. On January 15, 2002, the RTC denied the omnibus motion for lack of merit and gave
petitioner five days within which to file its answer. The court held that the motion HEIRS OF MARCELO SOTTO v. MATILDE PALICTE
contained a mere rehash of the arguments raised in the three earlier Motions to Dismiss G.R. No. 159691 I June 13, 2013 I J. Bersamin
which had already been passed upon by the court in its three Orders
11. Finally, petitioner filed an Answer to the Complaint on February 19, 2002, again raising DOCTRINE/S: Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits
therein the issue of res judicata. Thereafter, the case was set for pre-trial. rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive about the rights of the parties or
12. Three years later, specifically on February 15, 2005, petitioner filed another Motion to their privies in all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the previous suit. The
Dismiss with leave of court, alleging res judicata and forum-shopping. foundation principle upon which the doctrine rests is that the parties ought not to be
13. RTC denied the motion for reconsideration. CA denied the petition for certiorari permitted to litigate the same issue more than once

ISSUE/S: Whether The Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that res judicata has not set in FACTS:
so as to bar the filing of the second case. 1. Filemon had four children, namely: Marcelo Sotto (Marcelo), Pascuala Sotto-Pahang
(Pascuala), Miguel Barcelona (Miguel), and Matilde. Marcelo was the administrator of the
HELD: NO. Estate of Sotto. Marcelo and Miguel were the predecessors-in-interest of petitioners.
The Court finds insufferable petitioner's repeated filing of Motions to Dismiss raising the same 2. Pilar Teves (Pilar) and other heirs of Carmen Rallos (Carmen), the deceased wife of
ground. In the three previous Motions to Dismiss and in an omnibus motion for Filemon, filed in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu City a complaint against the Estate
reconsideration, petitioner argued that the present case was barred by prior judgment and of Sotto seeking to recover certain properties that Filemon had inherited from Carmen,
that there was forum-shopping. Correspondingly, the issues had been repetitively passed upon and damages.
and resolved by the court a quo. 3. The CFI rendered judgment awarding to Pilar and other heirs of Carmen damages of
P233,963.65, among other reliefs. To satisfy the monetary part of the judgment, levy on
The motions were apparently filed for no other reason than to gain time and gamble on a execution was effected against six parcels of land and two residential houses belonging to
possible change of opinion of the court or the judge sitting on the case. The Motions to Dismiss the Estate of Sotto.
were filed in a span of five years, the first one having been filed on June 1, 2000 and the last 4. The levied assets were sold at a public auction. Later on, Matilde redeemed four of the
— the subject motion — on February 15, 2005, three years after petitioner filed its answer. In parcels of land in her own name, while her sister Pascuala redeemed one of the two
fact, since the first Motion to Dismiss, three judges had already sat on the case and resolved houses because her family was residing there.
the motions. By filing these motions, petitioner had disrupted the court's deliberation on the 5. Matilde filed in Civil Case No. R-10027 a motion to transfer to her name the title to the
merits of the case. This strategy cannot be tolerated as it will entail inevitable delay in the four properties.
disposition of the case. 6. However, the CFI denied her motion, and instead declared the deed of redemption issued
in her favor null and void, holding that Matilde, although declared in Special Proceedings
In any case, we agree with the CA's conclusion that the trial court did not commit grave abuse No. 2706-R as one of the heirs of Filemon, did not qualify as a successor-in-interest with
of discretion in denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. However, we do not agree that the the right to redeem the four properties.
judgment of dismissal in the first case was not on the merits. A ruling on a motion to dismiss, 7. Matilde directly appealed the adverse ruling to the Court via petition for review, and on
issued without trial on the merits or formal presentation of evidence, can still be a judgment September 21, 1987, the Court, reversing the CFI's ruling, granted Matilde's petition for
on the merits. Section 3 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court is explicit that a dismissal for failure review but allowed her co-heirs the opportunity to join Matilde as co-redemptioners for
to comply with an order of the court shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits. a period of six months before the probate court would grant her motion to transfer the
In other words, unless the court states that the dismissal is without prejudice, the dismissal title to her name.
should be understood as an adjudication on the merits and is with prejudice. 8. The other heirs of Filemon failed to exercise their option granted in the decision of
September 21, 1987 to join Matilde as co-redemptioners within the six-month period.
Nonetheless, bearing in mind the circumstances obtaining in this case, we hold that res Accordingly, on October 5, 1989, the trial court issued an order in Civil Case No. R-10027
judicata should not be applied as it would not serve the interest of substantial justice. approving Matilde's motion to transfer the title of the four lots to her name, and directing
Proceedings on the case had already been delayed by petitioner, and it is only fair that the case the Register of Deeds of Cebu to register the deed of redemption and issue new
be allowed to proceed and be resolved on the merits. Indeed, we have held that res judicata certificates of title
9. It appears that Pascuala, who executed a document on November 25, 1992 expressly latter were not impleaded in the first case, would be sufficient. As such, the fact that a previous
waiving her rights in the four properties covered by the deed of redemption, changed her case was filed in the name of the Estate of Sotto only was of no consequence.
mind and decided to file on September 23, 1996 in the RTC in Cebu City a complaint to
seek the nullification of her waiver of rights, and to have herself be declared as a co- Secondly, the subject matter of all the actions (Civil Case No. CEB-24293 included), was the
redemptioner of the four properties (DENIED) same, that is, Matilde's right to the four properties. On the one hand, Matilde insisted that she
10. The heirs of Miguel filed a motion for reconsideration in Civil Case No. R-10027 of the RTC had the exclusive right to them, while, on the other hand, the other declared heirs of Filemon,
of Cebu City, Branch 16, praying that the order issued on October 5, 1989 be set aside, like petitioners' predecessors-in-interest, maintained that the properties belonged to the
and that they be included as Matilde's co-redemptioners. (DENIED) Estate of Sotto.
11. On September 10, 1999, the heirs of Marcelo, and the heirs of Miguel instituted the
present action for partition against Matilde in the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 20 (Civil Case And, lastly, a judgment rendered in the other cases, regardless of which party was successful,
No. CEB-24293). Alleging in their complaint that despite the redemption of the four would amount to res judicata in relation to Civil Case No. CEB-24293.
properties having been made in the sole name of Matilde, the four properties still
rightfully belonged to the Estate of Sotto for having furnished the funds used to redeem Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by a
the properties court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive about the rights of the parties or their privies in
all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the previous suit. The foundation
ISSUE/S: The sole decisive question is whether or not the present action for partition was principle upon which the doctrine rests is that the parties ought not to be permitted to litigate
already barred by prior judgment. the same issue more than once; that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be
HELD: YES. conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate
Res judicata exists when as between the action sought to be dismissed and the other action
these elements are present, namely; (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the former TOPIC: RULE 16; MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE GROUND THAT THE PLEADING ASSERTING THE
judgment must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and CLAIM STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION
the parties; (3) the former judgment must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be
between the first and subsequent actions (i) identity of parties or at least such as representing MAGELLAN AEROSPACE CORPORATION v. PHILIPPINE AIR FORCE
the same interest in both actions; (ii) identity of subject matter, or of the rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and, (iii) identity of causes of GR No. 216566 | February 24, 2016 | Mendoza, J.
action in both actions such that any judgment that may be rendered in the other action will,
DOCTRINE: In determining whether an initiatory pleading sufficiently pleads, the test applied
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
is whether the court can render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer if the truth of
consideration.
the facts alleged is admitted.
FACTS:
Civil Case No. CEB-24293 was no different from the previous cases as far as parties, subject
matter, causes of action and issues were concerned. In other words, Civil Case No. CEB-24293  PAF contracted Chervin Enterprises, Inc. (Chervin) for the overhaul of two aircraft engines.
was an undisguised relitigation of the same settled matter concerning Matilde's ownership of  Due to its lack of technical capability, Chervin commissioned Magellan Aerospace
the four properties. Corporation (MAC) to do the work. MAC, in turn, outsourced the overhaul service from
another subcontractor, National Flight Services, Inc. (NFSI).
First of all, petitioners, as plaintiffs in Civil Case No. CEB-24293, were suing in their capacities  Satisfied with the service, PAF accepted the overhauled engines.
as the successors-in-interest of Marcelo and Miguel. Even in such capacities, petitioners'  MAC demanded from Chervin the payment of US$264,577.00 representing the balance
identity with the parties in the previous cases firmly remained. of the contract price.
 PAF confirmed that it had already released to Chervin the amount of ₱23,760,000.00, as
In all the five cases (Civil Case No. CEB-24293 included), an identity of parties existed because partial payment for the overhaul service, and that it withheld the amount of
the parties were the same, or there was privity among them, or some of the parties were ₱2,376,000.00 as retention fund.
successors-in-interest litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same
 Notwithstanding the release of funds to Chervin, MAC was not paid for the services
capacity. An absolute identity of the parties was not necessary, because a shared identity of
rendered despite several demands.
interest sufficed for res judicata to apply. Moreover, mere substantial identity of parties, or
 MAC filed a complaint for sum of money before the RTC against Chervin, and the PAF.
even community of interests between parties in the prior and subsequent cases, even if the
 It prayed that Chervin be ordered to pay plus legal interest; that in the event of failure of
Chervin to pay, PAF be ordered to pay the said amount In this case, MAC asserts that the allegations stating that Chervin "acted for and in behalf" of
 MAC alleged that Chervin merely acted as an agent of PAF. a "principal," PAF, in tapping its services for the overhaul of the aircraft engines, completed
 PAF moved to dismiss the complaint averring that its contract with Chervin was one for with the requirements of sufficiency in stating its cause of action against PAF. MAC claims that
repair and overhaul and not for agency; that it was never privy to any contract between its allegation of Chervin being "mere agents" of PAF, establishes clearly, under the premise of
Chervin and MAC; and that it already paid Chervin in full. admitting them as true for purposes of a Rule 16 challenge, its entitlement to recover from
 Chervin also asked the RTC to dismiss the complaint PAF, the latter being the "principal" and "beneficiary."
 RTC ordered the dismissal of the complaint filed by MAC.
 MAC appealed before the CA The Court is not persuaded. The assumption of truth (commonly known as hypothetical
 The CA ruled that MAC failed to show that PAF had a correlative duty of paying under the admission of truth), accorded under the test, does not cover all the allegations pleaded in the
overhauling contract as it was obvious that the contract was executed only between MAC complaint. Only ultimate facts or those facts which the expected evidence will support are
and Chervin. The CA partly granted MAC’s appeal by reversing the RTC order of dismissal considered for purposes of the test. It does not cover legal conclusions or evidentiary facts.
of the complaint against Chervin. It, however, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint
against PAF. What MAC entirely did was to state a mere conclusion of law, if not, an inference based on
 Hence this instant petition. matters not stated in the pleading. Consequently, the narrative that PAF can be held liable as
a principal in the agreement between Chervin and MAC cannot be considered in the course of
applying the sufficiency test used in Section 1(g) Rule 16. It, therefore, produces no link to the
ISSUE: alleged PAF’s correlative duty to pay the amounts being claimed by MAC – a necessary element
of a cause of action that must be found in the pleading.
Whether the CA erred in finding that the complaint against PAF failed to sufficiently state a
cause of action Lacking that essential link, and after hypothetically admitting the truth of all the allegations
other than those that are ought to be excluded for not being ultimate facts, it is demonstrable
that the CA correctly ruled for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of MAC’s failure
HELD: to state its cause of action against PAF. PETITION IS DISMISSED.

No. Cause of action is defined as an act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.
In pursuing that cause, a plaintiff must first plead in the complaint a "concise statement of the HEIRS OF ANTONIO SANTOS v. HEIRS OF CRISPULO BERAMO
ultimate or essential facts constituting the cause of action."
G.R. No. 151454 | August 9, 2010 | Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE: In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a

Under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, the defendant may file a motion to dismiss
cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or
"within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim"
allege facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset.
anchored on the defense that the pleading asserting the claim stated no cause of action.

In making such challenge, the defendant’s issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail,
but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. It has nothing to FACTS:
do with the merits of the case. The inquiry is then limited only into the sufficiency, not the
veracity of the material allegations. Thus, if the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient  Respondents heirs of Beramo filed an Amended Complaint for reivindicacion and/or
basis on which it can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that reconveyance of property against the heirs of Borreros and Spouses Borreros, et. al. with
may be presented by the defendants. the RTC of Roxas City
 Amended Complaint alleged that the subject property, Lots 660, 661 and 887, consisting
Accordingly, the survival of the complaint against a Rule 16 challenge depends upon the of around 140 hectares, belonged to respondents’ predecessor, the late Don Juan
sufficiency of the averments made. In determining whether an initiatory pleading sufficiently Beramo, by virtue of open, continuous, and exclusive possession thereof in the concept
pleads, the test applied is whether the court can render a valid judgment in accordance with of owner starting in 1892. Respondents succeeded the subject property of Don Juan and
the prayer if the truth of the facts alleged is admitted. his successors-in-interest.
 Sometime in 1938, the Spouses Borreros convinced Don Juan to convert the subject existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits
property into a fishpond, with Cornelio Borreros as partner-manager-administrator. of the case.PETITION IS DISMISSED.
 Later, the Spouses Borreros clandestinely and illegally registered the property in their
name. Then, together with the Spouses Ramirez, they simulated the exchange of the
subject property with a public land situated at Romblon. UNICAPITAL, INC. v. CONSING, JR.
 Spouses Ramirez sold one-half of the subject property to Spouses Santos and
subsequently sold to NORCAIC. G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285 | September 11, 2013 | Perlas-Bernabe, J.
 Respondents prayed that subject parcels of land be reconveyed to them and be declared
the rightful owners. DOCTRINE: It is a standing rule that issues that require the contravention of the allegations of
 Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Amended Complaint stated the complaint, as well as the full ventilation, in effect, of the main merits of the case, should
no cause of action against them. not be within the province of a mere motion to dismiss
 Petitioners allege that respondents failed to present any documentary proof which
established, at least prima facie, that the parcels of land were owned by respondents’ FACTS:
predecessor-in-interest.
 Rafael Jose Consing, Jr., an investment banker, and his mother, Dela Cruz, obtained an
 Trial Court denied the Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit. CA affirmed. P18,000,000.00 loan from Unicapital. Said loan was secured by a REM over a parcel of
land located at Imus, Cavite, registered in the name of Dela Cruz.
ISSUE: Whether the Amended Complaint states a cause of action for reivindicacion and/or  Prior to these transactions, Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI), a real estate company, entered into a
reconveyance of the subject property. joint venture with Unicapital, through URI, to develop the subject property.
 The loan and mortgage was later on modified into an Option to Buy Real Property. Dela
Cruz decided to sell the same to Unicapital and PBI. For this purpose, Dela Cruz appointed
Consing, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact
HELD: No. When the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of action under  Unicapital, purchased 1/2 of the subject property for a consideration of P21,221,500.00
Section 1 (g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, such fact must be determined from the allegations (against which Dela Cruz’s outstanding loan obligations were first offset), while PBI bought
of the complaint. The general rule is that the allegations in a complaint are sufficient to the remaining half.
constitute a cause of action against the defendant, if, admitting the facts alleged, the court can  However, before URI and PBI were able to have the titles transferred to their names, it
render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. To sustain a was revealed that Dela Cruz's title was actually of dubious origin.
motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief  Based on this finding, PBI and Unicapital sent demand letters to Dela Cruz and Consing,
does not exist.
Jr., seeking the return of the purchase price they had paid for the subject property.
 Consing, Jr. filed a complaint, denominated Complex Action for Injunctive Relief before
the RTC-Pasig City against Unicapital, URI, PBI.
The Court agrees with the CA that the Amended Complaint states a cause of action  In his complaint, Consing, Jr., among others claimed that:
for reivindicacion and/or reconveyance. As correctly ruled by the CA, from the amended - the incessant demands efforts made upon him by Unicapital and PBI constituted
complaint, it appears that that the subject property was merely entrusted by Don Juan to harassment and oppression which severely affected his personal and professional life.
Cornelio Borreros; and that the titling and transfers thereof were simulated. These averments - that he was coerced to commit a violation of BP Blg. 22 as he was forced to issue a
indicate that respondents are the rightful owners. Such averments make out a case for post-dated check, notwithstanding their knowledge that he had no funds for the same.
reconveyance. - that Unicapital and PBI’s representatives were speaking of him in a manner that
was inappropriate and libelous.
 Consing, Jr. prayed that Unicapital, URI, and PBI be enjoined from harassing or coercing
Contrary to the contention of petitioners, respondents did not have to present or append proof him, and from speaking about him in a derogatory fashion.
of their allegations in the complaint to establish a sufficient cause of action. In determining  For their part, Unicapital, et. al. filed separate Motions to Dismiss on the ground of failure
whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be to state a cause of action, considering that no document was attached against which
borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or allege facts proving the Consing, Jr. supposedly derived his right and against which his rights may be as certained;
and the utterances purportedly constituting libel were not set out in the complaint.
 RTC-Pasig denied the motion to dismiss, holding that Consing, Jr.’s complaint sufficiently  Thereafter, a Certificate of Sale of Delinquent Property was issued in Alvarado's favor
stated a cause of action for tort and damages pursuant to Article 19 of the Civil Code. CA  Respondents filed a complaint with the RTC-QC assailing the validity of the tax sale.
affirmed. Alvarado, the Quezon City Treasurer, the Quezon City Register of Deeds, and several John
and Jane Does who allegedly participated in the conduct of the levy and sale were
impleaded as defendants.
ISSUE: Whether the complaint of Consing, Jr. sufficiently states a cause of action.  In their complaint, respondent Ayala Hillside identified itself as "an association of lot
HELD: owners residing in Ayala Hillside Estate who set up their homes in such a location primarily
because of the green environment provided by the Capitol Golf Course." Ayala Land, Inc.
Yes, the Court finds that the complaint properly states a cause of action since the allegations noted that it had an "Agreement with Capitol for a joint development of the Capitol Golf
therein sufficiently bear out a case for damages under Articles 19 and 26 of the Civil Code. Course since Ayala Hillside Estate is located and situated inside the Capitol Golf Course
 The Complaint alleged several anomalies in the sale. It assailed the sale of the entire
parcel for P2,600,000.00, an amount that, as respondents alleged, equated to 14.41% of
its assessed value, 6.48% of its market value, and 1.01% of its zonal value. It asserted that
Records disclose that Consing, Jr.’s complaint contains allegations which aim to demonstrate
the sale of the entire parcel instead of merely a usable portion of it that sufficed to cover
the abusive manner in which Unicapital and PBI, et al. enforced their demands against him.
the tax delinquency, net of penalties, of P2,528,992.48 violated Section 260 of the Local
Government Code and Chapter Two, Article 7, Section 14, paragraph 4 of the Quezon City
Revenue Code. It added that the Final Bill of Sale was issued to Alvarado "palpably way
Corollary, Unicapital, et al.’s contention that the case should be dismissed on the ground ahead before the expiration of the redemption period" and that neither a notice of sale
that it failed to set out the actual libelous statements complained about cannot be given nor a notice of tax delinquency was posted in publicly accessible and conspicuous places,
credence. It is a standing rule that issues that require the contravention of the allegations of contrary to the requirements of Section 254 of the Local Government Code.
the complaint, as well as the full ventilation, in effect, of the main merits of the case, should  Alvarado filed his Answer. asserting that the Complaint was failed to state a cause of
not be within the province of a mere motion to dismiss, as in this case. Hence, as what is only action for not being the registered owner of the auctioned property and not having any
required is that the allegations furnish adequate basis by which the complaint can be authority from the registered owner. After filing his Answer, Alvarado filed his Motion to
maintained, the Court finds that the RTC-Pasig City’s denial of Unicapital, et al.’s motion to Dismiss, substantially reiterating the same procedural defect
dismiss was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion which would necessitate the reversal of  RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and subsequently the MR.
the CA’s ruling. PETITION IS DISMISSED.  RTC Judge noted that the Motion was filed out of time as Alvarado already filed his Answer
and that Alvarado is estopped from filing the subject Motion to Dismiss.
ALVARADO v. AYALA LAND, INC.

G.R. No. 208426 | September 20, 2017 | Leonen, J. ISSUE/S:

Whether the filing of answer precludes a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of
DOCTRINE: A motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action can still be availed action.
even after an answer has been filed.

HELD:
FACTS:
No. It is basic that motions to dismiss are not to be entertained after an answer has been
 Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club, Inc. (Capitol) owned a 15,598- square-meter parcel in filed. This rule, however, admits of exceptions. Apart from the exceptions recognized in Rule
Quezon City covered by TCT, alleged to have had an assessed value of P l 7,547,750.00 9, Section 1, jurisprudence has also clarified that, despite the prior filing of an answer, an action
,and a zonal value of P249,568,000.0. may still be dismissed on a ground which only became known subsequent to the filing of an
 In 2007, this entire parcel was levied by the QC treasurer on account of unpaid real estate answer.
taxes amounting to P1,857,136.89 plus penalties. It was subjected to a tax delinquency
sale.
In Obando v. Figueras, the Court explained:
 Alvarado was noted to have been the highest bidder of P2,600,000.00
 that the period to file a motion to dismiss depends upon the circumstances of
the case. Even after an answer has been filed, the Court has allowed a defendant to file
a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction, (2) litis pendentia,
(3) lack of cause of action, and (4) discovery during trial of evidence that would constitute
a ground for dismissal.

It must be pointed out that it was only after he had been convicted of estafa
through falsification that the probate court divested him of his representation of the
Figueras estates. It was only then that this ground became available to the
respondents. Hence, it could not be said that they waived it by raising it in a Motion to
Dismiss filed after their Answer was submitted. Verily, if the plaintiff loses his capacity to
sue during the pendency of the case, as in the present controversy, the defendant should
be allowed to file a motion to dismiss, even after the lapse of the reglementary period
for filing a responsive pleading.

As Obando's listing of exception indicates, a ground for dismissal that is equally availing, even
after an answer has been filed, is a motion to dismiss on account of lack of cause of action.
Lack of cause of action must be distinguished from failure to state a cause of action: while the
lack of cause of action may be pleaded after an answer has been filed, failure to state a cause
of action cannot. Thus, failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct
grounds to dismiss a particular action. The former refers to the insufficiency of the allegations
in the pleading, while the latter to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action.

PETITION IS DENIED.