[G.R. No. 141530.

March 18, 2003]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the NATIONAL

CENTENNIAL COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. CHRISTOPHER LOCK, in his capacity as the Presiding
Judge of Branch 88 of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, and
FE A. MANUEL and METROBANK, Cavite City
Branch, respondents.

DECISION
CORONA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure seeking to annul the Resolution dated March 15, 1999 of the
Court of Appeals which dismissed (1) the petition for certiorari filed by the
[1]

petitioner Republic of the Philippines for having been filed out of time and (2)
the subsequent resolution which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts follow.
In line with the centennial celebration of Philippine Independence on June
12, 1998, the government embarked on several commemorative Centennial
Freedom Trail (CFT) projects. One of these projects was the construction of the
Tejeros Convention Center and the founding site of the Philippine Army on the
3,497 sq. m. property of respondent Fe Manuel located in Tejeros, Rosario,
Cavite. The said property was declared by the National Historical Institute (NHI)
as a historical landmark in its Resolution No. 2 dated April 19, 1995. [2]

To carry out the Tejeros Convention Project, the government, through the
National Centennial Commission (NCC), filed on December 4, 1997 a complaint
for expropriation against respondents Fe Manuel and Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company (Metrobank). The land was mortgaged by Fe Manuel to
[3]

Metrobank and was extrajudicially foreclosed by the latter on November 20,

1997. Respondent Fe Manuel interposed no objection to the expropriation as
[4]

long as just compensation was paid. [5]

On May 27, 1998, Presiding Judge Christopher Lock of the Regional Trial
Court of Cavite City, Branch 88, dismissed the complaint for expropriation on
the ground of lack of cause of action. The trial court ruled that, based on the
1987 Administrative Code, there were: (1) no prior determination by the
[6]

President as to the necessity or wisdom of the exercise of the right of eminent

domain, and (2) no prior written authority for the Solicitor General to institute
the expropriation case. Without such conditions precedent, the trial court ruled
that plaintiff had no cause of action to file the expropriation case. The trial court
[7]

also ruled that the NCC had no power under Executive Order No. 128 to [8]

acquire real estate properties through negotiated sale, nor to recommend to the
President the propriety of taking property through condemnation proceedings. It
explained that since the NCCs life was only up to the June 12, 1998
celebrations, the fear of defendant Metrobank that there would be no more
entity to process its claim for just compensation was perfectly valid. Accordingly,
the trial court dismissed the complaint for expropriation. [9]

On June 17, 1998, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial
courts order dismissing its complaint. The trial court denied the motion in its
order dated October 6, 1998, a copy of which was received by the petitioner on
October 12, 1998. [10]

On December 11, 1998, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge
Christopher Lock for summarily dismissing its complaint and denying its motion
for reconsideration. [11]

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, in its resolution dated March
15, 1999, for having been filed out of time. It also denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration in its January 13, 2000 resolution. [12]

Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition for review, arguing that the
Court of Appeals should not have applied to its case the amendment made to
Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on
September 1, 1998. Procedural rules, petitioner argued, should not be given
retroactive effect where their application would result in injustice. Petitioner
invoked Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides
that liberality should be observed in construing the Rules of Court in order to
promote its objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding. Petitioner also called the Courts attention to the
case of Solar Team Entertainment vs. Ricafort, wherein we accorded liberality
[13]

to the implementation of Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure. We ruled in the said case that strict compliance with Section 11,
[14]

Rule 13 thereof shall be required 1 month from the promulgation of the Courts
decision or 2 years from the time the Rules actually took effect. Petitioner said
that Solar Team and its case were similar in that both arose about the time
when a new amendment was being implemented; hence, its case should be
accorded the same consideration given in Solar Team. [15]

In its Memorandum dated September 11, 2001, petitioner invoked A.M. No.
00-2-03-SC which took effect on September 1, 2000, specifically amending
Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC
was the amendment reverting to the original rule that the 60-day period for filing
a petition for certiorari shall be reckoned from receipt of the order denying the
motion for reconsideration. [16]

Private respondent Fe Manuel, owner and mortgagor of the land subject of

expropriation, interposed no objection to the expropriation in her Comment to
the petition for review. She in fact adopted the arguments of the petitioner in
[17]

her Memorandum. [18]

On the other hand, Metrobank asserted that the petition for certiorari was
correctly dismissed because it was filed out of time. It argued that when
petitioner received the order of the trial court denying its motion for
reconsideration on October 12, 1998, the new Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended by the Resolution of the Supreme Court
En Banc dated July 21, 1998 in Bar Matter No. 803, was already in effect. Said
amended rule, effective as of September 1, 1998, provides that the 60-day
period shall be reckoned from receipt of the assailed decision, order or
resolution. Thus, based on this new rule, the petition for certiorari was filed 14
days late. [19]

The sole issue at hand is whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the
Republic of the Philippines before the Court of Appeals was filed out of time.
The petition is meritorious.
In dismissing the petition for certiorari for having been filed out of time, the
Court of Appeals applied Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended by the July 21, 1998 Bar Matter No. 803, effective
September 1, 1998, which provides:

Sec. 4. Where and when petition to be filed. ─ The petition may be filed not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed
in the Supreme Court, or if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be
filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the
acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by the law
or the Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of
Appeals.

If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration in due time after
notice of said judgment, order or resolution, the period herein fixed shall be
interrupted. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within
the remaining period but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event,
reckoned from notice of such denial. No extension of time to file the petition shall be
granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15)
days. (Emphasis ours)

Strictly speaking, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition
for having been filed out of time because the prevailing rule at that time provided
that the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari shall be reckoned from
receipt of the assailed decision or order. The period is interrupted when a
motion for reconsideration is filed but it starts to run again from receipt of the
denial of the said motion for reconsideration. Based on this amendment,
respondent Court of Appeals ruled that the filing of the petition for certiorari was
14 days late. The respondent Court of Appeals ruled:

In the petition at bench, records show that the Office of the Solicitor General received
a copy of the Court a quos Order dated May 7, 1998 on June 3, 1998 and that a
motion for reconsideration was filed on June 17, 1998. Therefore, there was a lapse of
fourteen (14) days from receipt of the assailed Order before the OSG filed a motion
for reconsideration.

Considering the material dates stated above, the Office of the Solicitor General had
only forty-six 46 days left from October 12, 1988 (sic), date when it received the
Order denying the motion for reconsideration dated October 6, 1998 or until
November 27, 1998 within which to file the instant petition for certiorari. However,
the petition was filed only on December 11, 1998 by registered mail. Therefore, it was
filed fourteen (14) days late.
[20]

However, Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as

amended by Bar Matter No. 803 effective September 1, 1998, was recently
amended by A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC effective September 1, 2000. The recent rule
no longer provides that the 60-day period shall be reckoned from receipt of the
assailed decision, order or resolution. Instead, it provides that the 60-day period
shall be reckoned from receipt of the order denying the motion for
reconsideration. The rule at present reads as follows:
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty
(60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not,
the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.

The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions
of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial
Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court.
It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. It if involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless
otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable
only by the Court of Appeals.

No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason
and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis ours)

The amendment under A.M. 00-2-03-SC quoted above is procedural or

remedial in character. It does not create new or remove vested rights but only
operates in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already
existing. It is settled that procedural laws do not come within the legal
conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against retroactive operation
of statutes. They may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a
person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no
vested rights in rules of procedure. [21]

The retroactive application of A.M. 00-2-03-SC has, in fact, already been

ordered by this Court in a number of recent cases, such as Systems Factors
Corporation vs. NLRC, Unity Fishing Development Corporation vs. Court of
[22]

Appeals, Docena et. al. vs. Lapesura, Pfizer vs. Galan and Universal
[23] [24] [25]

Robina Corporation et. al. vs. Court of Appeals et. al. [26]

Thus, by virtue of this retroactive application of A.M. 00-2-03-SC, we hold

that the instant petition for certiorari was filed on time. In fact, there is no dispute
that the petition was filed by petitioner on the 60th day from receipt of the order
denying the motion for reconsideration. Petitioner received the denial on
October 12, 1998 and it filed the petition for certiorari on December 11, 1998.
Clearly therefore the petition was filed on time.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolutions of the
Court of Appeals dated March 15, 1999 and January 13, 2000 are hereby set
aside and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
 No costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 104796. March 6, 1998]

SPOUSES ROSALINA S. DE LEON and ALEJANDRO L. DE

LEON, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, GLICERIO MA.
ELAYDA II, FEDERICO ELAYDA and DANILO
ELAYDA, respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

The question for decision is whether in assessing the docket fees to be paid
for the filing of an action for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale, the
value of the real property, subject matter of the contract, should be used as
basis, or whether the action should be considered as one which is not capable
of pecuniary estimation and therefore the fee charged should be a flat rate of
P400.00 as provided in Rule 141, 7(b)(1) of the Rules of Court. The trial court
held the fees should be based on the value of the property, but the Court of
Appeals reversed and held that the flat rate should be charged. Hence this
petition for review on certiorari.
The facts are as follows:

On August 8, 1991, private respondents filed in the Regional Trial Court of

Quezon City a complaint for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of
two (2) parcels of land against petitioners, praying for the following reliefs:

1. Ordering the nullification or rescission of the Contract of Conditional Sale

(Supplementary Agreement) for having violated the rights of plaintiffs (private
respondents) guaranteed to them under Article 886 of the Civil Code and/or
violation of the terms and conditions of the said contract.

2. Declaring void ab initio the Deed of Absolute Sale for being absolutely
simulated; and

3. Ordering defendants (petitioners) to pay plaintiffs (private respondents)

attorneys fees in the amount of P100,000.00.
Other reliefs and remedies as are just and equitable in the premises are also
prayed for.[1]

Upon the filing of the complaint, the clerk of court required private
respondents to pay docket and legal fees in the total amount of P610.00,
broken down as follows:

P450.00 - Docket fee for the Judicial Development Fund under Official
Receipt No. 1877773

150.00 - Docket fee for the General Fund under Official Receipt No. 6834215

10.00 - for the Legal Research Fund under Official Receipt No. 6834450.[2]

On September 26, 1991, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the

complaint on the ground that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case by reason of private respondents nonpayment of the correct amount of
docket fees. Petitioners contended that in addition to the fees already paid
based on the claim for P100,000.00 for attorneys fees, private respondents
should have paid docket fees in the amount of P21,640.00, based on the
alleged value of the two (2) parcels of land subject matter of the contract of sale
sought to be annulled.[3]
On September 30, 1991, private respondents filed opposition to the motion
to dismiss, arguing that outright dismissal of their complaint was not warranted
on the basis of the alleged nonpayment of the correct amount of docket fees,
considering that the amount paid by them was that assessed by the clerk of
court.[4] On October 9, 1991, petitioners filed a reply to which private
respondents filed, on October 17, 1991, a rejoinder.
On October 21, 1991, the trial court[5] denied petitioners motion to dismiss
but required private respondents to pay the amount of docket fees based on
the estimated value of the parcels of land in litigation as stated in the
complaint.
Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but their motion was
denied by the trial court. They therefore, brought the matter to the Court of
Appeals which, on February 26, 1992, rendered a decision[6] annulling the
orders of the trial court. The appellate court held that an action for rescission
or annulment of contract is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation and,
therefore, the docket fees should not be based on the value of the real
property, subject matter of the contract sought to be annulled or rescinded.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but their motion was denied in a
resolution dated March 25, 1992 of the appellate court. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. - (a) For filing an action or a

permissive counter-claim or money claim against an estate not based on
judgment, or for filing with leave of court a third-party, fourth-party,
etc. complaint, or a complaint in intervention, and for all clerical services in the
same, if the total-sum claimed, exclusive of interest, or the stated value of the
property in litigation, is:

1. Not more than P20,000.00 .............P120.00

2. More than P20,000.00 but less than

P40,000.00 ......................... 150.00

3. P40,000.00 or more but less than

P60,000.00 ......................... 200.00

4. P60,000.00 or more but less than

P80,000.00 ... ...................... 250.00

5. P80,000.00 or more but less than

P100,000.00 ........................... 400.00

6. P100,000.00 or more but less than

P150,000.00 ........................... 600.00

7. For each P1,000.00 in excess of

P150,000.00 ............................. 5.00

(b) For filing:

1. Actions where the value of the subject

matter cannot be estimated ............. P400.00

2. Special civil actions except judicial

foreclosure of mortgage which shall be

governed by paragraph (a) above .... 400.00

3. All other actions not involving

property........................... 400.00

In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the
estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis
in computing the fees. (emphasis added)

Petitioners argue that an action for annulment or rescission of a contract of

sale of real property is a real action and, therefore, the amount of the docket
fees to be paid by private respondent should be based either on the assessed
value of the property, subject matter of the action, or its estimated value as
alleged in the complaint, pursuant to the last paragraph of 7(b) of Rule 141, as
amended by the Resolution of the Court dated September 12, 1990. Since
private respondents alleged that the land, in which they claimed an interest as
heirs, had been sold for P4,378,000.00 to petitioners, this amount should be
considered the estimated value of the land for the purpose of determining the
docket fees.
On the other hand, private respondents counter that an action for
annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of real property is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and, so, the docket fees should be the fixed amount
of P400.00 in Rule 141, 7(b)(1). In support of their argument, they cite the
cases of Lapitan v. Scandia, Inc.[7] and Bautista v. Lim.[8] In Lapitan this Court,
in an opinion by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, held:

A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining

whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining
the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts
of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where
the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money,
or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of
the contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for
annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has
considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not
be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of
first instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class cases,
besides the determination of damages, demand an inquiry into other factors
which the law has deemed to be more within the competence of courts of first
instance, which were the lowest courts of record at the time that the first
organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction (Act 136 of
the Philippine Commission of June 11, 1901).

Actions for specific performance of contracts have been expressly

pronounced to be exclusively cognizable by courts of first instance: De Jesus
vs. Judge Garcia, L-26816, February 28, 1967; Manufacturers Distributors,
Inc. vs. Yu Siu Liong, L-21285, April 29, 1966. And no cogent reason appears,
and none is here advanced by the parties, why an action for rescission (or
resolution) should be differently treated, a rescission being a counterpart, so
to speak, of specific performance. In both cases, the court would certainly
have to undertake an investigation into facts that would justify one act or the
other. No award for damages may be had in an action for rescission without
first conducting an inquiry into matters which would justify the setting aside of
a contract, in the same manner that courts of first instance would have to
make findings of fact and law in actions not capable of pecuniary estimation
expressly held to be so by this Court, arising from issues like those raised in
Arroz v. Alojado, et al., L-22153, March 31, 1967 (the legality or illegality of
the conveyance sought for and the determination of the validity of the money
deposit made); De Ursua v. Pelayo, L-13285, April 18, 1950 (validity of a
judgment); Bunayog v. Tunas, L-12707, December 23, 1959 (validity of a
mortgage); Baito v. Sarmiento, L-13105, August 25, 1960 (the relations of the
parties, the right to support created by the relation, etc., in actions for
support); De Rivera, et al. v. Halili, L-15159, September 30, 1963 (the validity
or nullity of documents upon which claims are predicated). Issues of the same
nature may be raised by a party against whom an action for rescission has
been brought, or by the plaintiff himself. It is, therefore, difficult to see why a
prayer for damages in an action for rescission should be taken as the basis for
concluding such action as one capable of pecuniary estimation a prayer which
must be included in the main action if plaintiff is to be compensated for what
he may have suffered as a result of the breach committed by defendant, and
not later on precluded from recovering damages by the rule against splitting a
cause of action and discouraging multiplicity of suits.
 Conformably with this discussion of actions where the value of the case
cannot be estimated, the Court in Bautista v. Lim, held that an action for
rescission of contract is one which cannot be estimated and therefore the
docket fee for its filing should be the flat amount of P200.00 as then fixed in
the former Rule 141, 5(10). Said this Court:

We hold that Judge Dalisay did not err in considering Civil Case No. V-144 as
basically one for rescission or annulment of contract which is not susceptible
of pecuniary estimation (1 Morans Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed,
p. 55; Lapitan vs. Scandia, Inc., L-24668, July 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 479, 481-
483).

Consequently, the fee for docketing it is P200, an amount already paid by

plaintiff, now respondent Matilda Lim. (She should pay also the two pesos
legal research fund fee, if she has not paid it, as required in Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 3870, the charter of the U.P. Law Center).

Thus, although eventually the result may be the recovery of land, it is the
nature of the action as one for rescission of contract which is controlling. The
Court of Appeals correctly applied these cases to the present one. As it said:

We would like to add the observations that since the action of petitioners
[private respondents] against private respondents [petitioners] is solely for
annulment or rescission which is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation, the
action should not be confused and equated with the value of the property
subject of the transaction; that by the very nature of the case, the allegations,
and specific prayer in the complaint, sans any prayer for recovery of money
and/or value of the transaction, or for actual or compensatory damages, the
assessment and collection of the legal fees should not be intertwined with the
merits of the case and/or what may be its end result; and that to sustain
private respondents [petitioners] position on what the respondent court may
decide after all, then the assessment should be deferred and finally assessed
only after the court had finally decided the case, which cannot be done
because the rules require that filing fees should be based on what is alleged
and prayed for in the face of the complaint and paid upon the filing of the
complaint.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.