Cases

IV.
Ombudsman
Qualifications, Appointment and Term of Office: Section 8-11, Article XI
Section 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and at the
time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity and independence, and members
of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any elective office in the immediately
preceding election. The Ombudsman must have, for ten years or more, been a judge or engaged in the
practice of law in the Philippines.
During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same disqualifications and prohibitions as provided for in
Section 2 of Article IX-A of this Constitution.
Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least
six nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees for every
vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled within
three months after they occur.
Section 10. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the rank of Chairman and Members,
respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, and they shall receive the same salary which shall not be
decreased during their term of office.
Section 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a term of seven years without
reappointment. They shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election immediately succeeding
their cessation from office.
Powers and Functions: Section 12-13, Article XI
Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled
corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop,
prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and
recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance
therewith.
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by
his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the
Commission on Audit for appropriate action.
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its
responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the
Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of
ethics and efficiency.
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties
as may be provided by law.
Tilendo v. Ombudsman, GR No. 165975, 13 September 2007
SECOND DIVISION
PAYAKAN G. TILENDO, G.R. No. 165975

Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
OMBUDSMAN and Promulgated:

SANDIGANBAYAN,
Respondents. September 13, 2007
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for certiorari[1] with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order assails the 13
January 2004 Resolution[2] and the 14 October 2004 Order[3] of the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman) in Case No. OMB-M-C-02-0632-K. The Ombudsman found probable cause
against Payakan G. Tilendo (Tilendo) for malversationunder Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019) or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
The Facts
In 1993, Tilendo was appointed as President of the Cotabato City State Polytechnic College (CCSPC).
In 1996, the CCSPC had an appropriation of P6 million for the construction of

[4]
its Agriculture Building and Science Academic Building. The Department of Budget and Management
Regional Office in Cotabato City released P5.7 million to the CCSPC, after deducting the 5% reserve. Out
of this amount, P3,496,797 was allocated for the construction of the Agriculture Building. The release of
this amount to CCSPC was evidenced by the following Notices of Cash Allocation
(NCA): (a) P237,500 per NCA dated 23 January 1996; (b) P702,640
per NCA dated 3 June 1996; (c) P763,477 per NCA dated 19 September 1996; and (d) P1,793,180 per
NCA dated 4 October 1996.
In December 1998, the Concerned Faculty Members of the CCSPC filed before the Ombudsman a letter-
complaint against Tilendo for violation of RA 3019.
The complaint basically alleged that Tilendo enriched himself and his family while he was President of the
CCSPC, using government funds for personal purposes. The complaint likewise accused Tilendo of
diverting and misusing the funds allocated for the construction of the CCSPC Agriculture Building. The
complaint pertinently reads:
3. Sometime in the late part of 1995, the decades-old academic main building was
demolished on instruction of Dr. Tilendo. Coincidentally, an allotment of P6,000,000.00 was
released by the Department of Budget and Management for the construction of an
agricultural building in the college satellite campus at Rebuken,
Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao. x x x There are no engineering designs, plans and bill of
materials. The contractor, Mr. Mohammad Oliver Uka, who is his nephew was so obedient
to Dr. Tilendo that he blindly obeyed his instructions.
Instead of utilizing the allotment for putting-up the agricultural building, he only instructed
Mr. Uka to buy steel bars, cement, sand and gravel and hollow blocks. Other materials like
lumber. G.I. sheets were taken from the scrap materials of the demolished academic school
building. x x x This illegal act was in connivance with his nephew-contractor MR.
MOHAMMAD OLIVER BOY UKA who is subservient to all the wishes and decisions of his
uncle Dr. Tilendo. We believe that only an actual inspection of the building can prove the
truth. He and his Budget Officer MR. PASTOR T. TAGURA has (sic) many ways to conceal
facts and justify their actions. Any document that will show an implementation of the project
is a mere fabrication in cahoots with other government officials to cover-up his anomalous
activities and enrich himself while in office.
The conversion of [Tilendos] 2-door apartment into a 3-storey building took place while the
agricultural building is being constructed. Truckloads of construction materials were
delivered from the Pigcawayan Hardware in the Poblacion Pigcawayan, Cotabato and other
hardware in Cotabato City to two (2) destinations his house in Pigcawayan and the house of
his 3rd wife, MS. SAMSIA IBRAHIM.[5]
On 2 February 1999, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao (Deputy Ombudsman-
Mindanao) forwarded the anonymous complaint, docketed as CPL-MIN-99-003, to the then Ministry of
Education, Culture and Sports (Ministry of Education) for the conduct of a fact-finding investigation.
The Ministry of Education transmitted the complaint to the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the
CCSPC to decide on who should conduct the investigation.
In a letter dated 19 March 1999, Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Chairman Angel
C. Alcala instructed CHED Region XII Director, Dr. Carmen V. Dormitorio (Dormitorio), to form and head a
committee, together with two other members, which would investigate on the complaints against Tilendo,
among others.
On 28 June 1999, the two investigating members of Dormitorios committee reported that it was the
Commission on Audit (COA) which could determine whether the government funds were properly used or
misused. The CHED alleged that it had neither the authority to examine the CCSPCs records nor the
technical knowledge of government accounting and auditing procedures.
The Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao also endorsed the anonymous complaint to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), Region XII for the conduct of a fact-finding investigation.
Subsequently, the NBI subpoenaed Tilendo several times and informed him of the complaints against
him.[6] Tilendo, through counsel, requested for several extensions of time to submit his counter-affidavit. It
was only on 22 October 1999 that he filed his counter-affidavit.[7]
On 10 March 2000, the NBI filed a Report on the investigation confirming that, despite
the P10,080,000 three-year allocation for the construction of the Agriculture Building,only P300,000
was actually used for this construction project. Further, only scrap materials from the
old Administrative Building were used. The pertinent portions of the report read:
Investigation conducted disclosed that the construction of Agricultural Building a[t] Rebuken,
Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao has an appropriation of P10,800,000.00 in three years
broken down as follows, i.e., in 1996 GAA P6,000,000.00, in 1997 GAA P1,080,000.00 and
in 1998 GAA P3,000,000.00. Witnesses alleged that the project was constructed without the
necessary Engineering Designs, Plans and Programs of Work. Most of the materials used
were scrap materials of the demolished Old Administrative Building at CCSPC
Campus, Cotabato City and the estimated amount spent for the said project did not
exceed P300,000.00. The said allegations were corroborated by the COA Special Audit
finding conducted on September 1996. The same COA report further states that the
balance was used in the construction of the Science Building and the Makeshift Building at
Main Campus. However, the realignment of such funds do not have the AUTHORITY from
the DBM. Inspection conducted by the NBI Investigators disclosed that the project
at Rebuken, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao was not completed and some of the materials
used were indeed scrap.[8]
xxxx
COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS:
xxx
The alleged Program of Works prepared by ENGR. HASANADDIN S. MAMA, designated

Project Engineer of CCSPC in 1996 per directive of [Tilendo] did not jibe or correspond to
the P6 million appropriation of the said project without mentioning the additional budget of
the project in 1997 and 1998, as what was prepared was only P1.05 million budget only.
The Counter-Affidavit of President Payakan G. Tilendo did not fully explain the P6 million
budget of the Construction of Agricultural Building
at Rebuken Sultan, Kudarat, Maguindanaowhich is the subject of this investigation, rather it
pertains to the Construction of Extension (4th Floor) of Academic Building in the amount
of P1,865,000.00. x x x
The admission of [Tilendo] in his Counter-Affidavit that the project had been completed in
accordance with the funds duly allocated thereto, and in consonance with the government
bidding procedures, Accounting and Auditing regulations and all other legal documents are
devoid of merit considering that the documents submitted showed that it did not respond to
the questioned project.
The attached publication of the Invitation to Bid dated February 27 to March 1, 1997 which
is published one year after the project or the Construction of the Agricultural Building
at Rebuken, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao was started sometime in April 1996. The alleged
publication seems to be that of the Construction of the Extension of Academic Building. In
the instant case, NO AUTHORITY FOR THE REALIGNMENT OF FUNDS FROM DBM was
given to the CCSPC Management.[9]
On 26 April 2002, the Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao received the NBI report

charging Tilendo, Samaon A. Ebrahim, Wilhelmina B. Monte de Ramos, and Abdulla Oliver Ukawith
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, and Articles 217, 218, and 219 of the RPC.
In January 2003, Tilendo filed his counter-affidavit,[10] alleging, among others, that the dragging of the
case for more than three years in preliminary investigation stage without his fault is violative of his right to
speedy disposition of cases. Tilendo also denied the allegations against him, insisting that the complaint
was aimed purely at harassing him. Tilendo claimed that the construction of
the CCSPC Agriculture Building was completed using the funds allocated for it, and following government
bidding procedures and auditing regulations.
In its Resolution dated 13 January 2004, the Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao disposed of the complaint, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds probable cause to believe that
the crime of Malversation and Violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 were committed and that
respondent DR. PAYAKAN G. TILENDO is probably guilty thereof. Consequently, let the
herein attached Informations be filed with the proper court.
Further, the charges against respondents SAMAON A. EBRAHIM, WHILHELMINA B.

MONTE DE RAMOS, ABDULLA OLIVER UKA, and NESTOR VILLARIN are hereby
DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
Lastly, the National Bureau of Investigation is hereby directed to forward to the Office of the
Special Prosecutor the original copy of their report, subject matter of the instant case,
together with its annexes.
SO RESOLVED.[11]
Tilendo moved for reconsideration which the Ombudsman denied in its Order dated 14 October 2004.
Hence, this petition.
The Ruling of the Ombudsman
The Ombudsman found probable cause against Tilendo for malversation under Article 217 of the RPC
and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
The Ombudsman found that since Tilendo received the P3,496,797 appropriated and released to the
CCSPC for the construction of the Agriculture Building, Tilendo, as head of the CCSPC, is accountable for
this amount. Tilendo, however, failed to account for the fund.
The Ombudsman found several lapses in the disbursement of the funds making it impossible
for Tilendo to liquidate the amount. First, the construction of the AgricultureBuilding was haphazardly
done. Second, there was no bidding for the construction project as required by law. Third, scrap materials
were used in the construction. Fourth, there was no showing when the construction was completed and
whether the construction was according to the alleged plans. Finally, the funds for the construction of
the AgricultureBuilding were used for another building within the CCSPC main
campus. However, Tilendo failed to show the actual amount used for the construction of this other building.
The Ombudsman also found that Tilendos acts caused undue injury to the government through bad
faith. The amount released for the construction of the Agriculture Buildingcould not be liquidated and
was presumed to have been lost due to Tilendos misappropriation. The use of scrap materials for the
construction of a supposedly new building, while it might bring savings to the government, was actually
hazardous to the lives of those who would use the building.
The Issues
Tilendo seeks the reversal of the assailed resolutions on the following grounds:
1. The Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in disregarding his constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.
2. The Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause
against him for malversation under Article 217 of the RPC and for violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended.[12]
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
On Tilendos right to speedy disposition of cases
Tilendo contends that the cases against him dragged for more than three years in preliminary
investigation phase without his fault. The anonymous letters addressed to the Ombudsman were dated 4
and 28 December 1998. The Ombudsman referred the matter to the NBI which required Tilendo to file his
counter-affidavit, which he did only on 22 October 1999. Nothing was heard from the NBI or the
Ombudsman until January 2003 when the Ombudsman directed Tilendo to submit his counter-affidavit to
the various criminal charges against him. According to Tilendo, the inordinate delay in the termination of
the preliminary investigation violates his right to speedy disposition of cases.
The right to a speedy disposition of cases is enshrined in the Constitution. Section 16 of Article III of the
Constitution provides: All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies. This right, however, is considered violated only when the
proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, which are absent in this case.[13]
The concept of speedy disposition of cases is relative or flexible.[14] A simple mathematical computation of
the time involved is insufficient. The facts and circumstances peculiar to each case must be
examined.[15] In ascertaining whether the right to speedy disposition of cases has been violated, the
following factors must be considered: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the
assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.
In this case, there was no unreasonable delay to speak of because the preliminary investigation stage
officially began when the NBI filed before the Ombudsman a complaint against Tilendo for violation of the
relevant provisions of RA 3019 and the RPC. Contrary to Tilendos view, the preliminary investigation did
not automatically commence upon the filing of the anonymous letters in the Ombudsman.
Administrative Order No. 07 (AO 7), as amended, or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman outlines the procedure applicable to all criminal and administrative complaints cognizable
by the Ombudsman. Section 2, Rule II of AO 7 clearly states that upon evaluating the complaint, the
investigating officer shall recommend whether it may be: (a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;
(b) referred to respondent for comment; (c) endorsed to the proper government office or agency which
has jurisdiction over the case; (d) forwarded to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding
investigation; or (e) referred for administrative adjudication; or (f) subjected to a preliminary investigation.
Significantly, the Court held in Raro v. Sandiganbayan,[18] that by referring the complaint to the NBI, the
Ombudsman did not thereby delegate the conduct of the preliminary investigation of the case to the NBI.
What was delegated was only the fact-finding function, preparatory to the preliminary investigation still to
be conducted by the Ombudsman.
In this case, after the fact-finding investigation, the NBI reported its findings to the Ombudsman and
consequently filed a complaint against Tilendo for various criminal charges.If we consider the fact-finding
investigation conducted by the NBI as part of the preliminary investigation stage, then the NBI served a
conflicting role. The NBI acted as the investigating body on the charges against Tilendo, and thereafter,
acted as the complainant against Tilendo. This is absurd. What the NBI clearly did, in accordance with
Section 2(d) of Rule II of AO 7, was to analyze the facts and gather evidence which could either exonerate
or further implicate Tilendo in the offenses charged.
Further, the NBI is not among those authorized under Section 3, Rule II of AO 7 to conduct preliminary
investigations for complaints cognizable by the Ombudsman, to wit:
1) Ombudsman Investigators;
2) Special Prosecuting Officers;
3) Deputized Prosecutors;
4) Investigating Officials authorized by law to conduct preliminary investigations; or
5) Lawyers in the government service, so designated by the Ombudsman.
Even assuming there was delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation, Tilendo is deemed to
have slept on his right to a speedy disposition of cases. From 22 October 1999, when he submitted to
the NBI his counter-affidavit, after asking for several extensions of time, Tilendo did nothing until
December 2002. It seems that Tilendo was insensitive to the implications and contingencies of the
projected criminal prosecution posed against him. He did not take any step whatsoever to accelerate the
disposition of the matter. Tilendos inaction gives the impression that he did not object to the supervening
delay, and hence it was impliedly with his acquiescence.[19] He did not make any overt act like, for
instance, filing a motion for early resolution. He asserted his right to a speedy disposition of cases only
when the Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao required him to file his counter-affidavit to the NBI complaint.
Tilendos contention of violation of his right to speedy disposition of cases must fail. There was no
unreasonable and unjustifiable delay which attended the resolution of the complaints against him in the
preliminary investigation phase.
On the finding of probable cause for the offenses charged
The Ombudsman conducts preliminary investigations in accordance with Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court, subject to the provisions in Section 4, Rule II of AO 7.
A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to

engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial.[20] Stated differently, during the preliminary investigation, the
prosecutor, or the Ombudsman in this case, determines whether there is probable cause to hold the
respondent for trial.
Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was
guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.[21]
In this case, the Ombudsman found probable cause against Tilendo for malversation under Article 217 of
the RPC and for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
Article 217 of the RPC states:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property. Presumption of malversation. Any public
officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property,
shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or
property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation
or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer: x x x
Section 3(e) of RA 3019 provides:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
This Court, as a rule, does not interfere with the Ombudsmans determination of probable cause to accord
respect to the discretion granted to the Ombudsman and for reasons of practicality. Otherwise, courts
would be swamped with petitions to review the Ombudsmans findings in preliminary investigations.[22] An
exception to this rule is where the Ombudsman abused his discretion by ignoring clear insufficiency of
evidence to support a finding of probable cause, thus denying the accused his right to substantive and
procedural due process.[23] Here, no such conduct can be imputed on the Ombudsman. Thus, we apply
the rule.
The Ombudsman found that Tilendo failed to account for the subject funds. According to the Ombudsman,
it would even be an impossibility to account for the funds due to the various lapses in its
disbursement. The Ombudsman cited the haphazard construction of the Agriculture Building, the absence
of any bidding required by law, the usage of scrap materials, the failure to show the completion date of the
building, and the failure to show the actual amount spent for the construction of another building within the
CCSPC main campus.
Tilendos claims of non-receipt of the subject funds, as well as his good faith in the transfer of the
Agriculture Building to the main campus, constitute evidentiary matters that must be ventilated in a full-
blown trial and not during the preliminary investigation. The presence or absence of the elements of the
crimes, which are by their nature evidentiary and defense matters, can be best passed upon after a trial
on the merits. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
parties evidence.What is presented is evidence only as may engender a well-founded belief that an
offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.[24]
Whether Tilendo, as a public officer, had custody or control of the funds allocated for the construction of
the CCSPC Agriculture Building, and whether he misappropriated the same are matters requiring an
examination of the parties evidence, which are not found in the case records and which can be properly
threshed out during the trial.
Based on the records, Tilendo, as President of the CCSPC, after being asked to liquidate the amount
released to the CCSPC for the construction of the Agriculture Building, failed to account for the
funds. Thus, the presumption that he misused or misappropriated the funds arises, resulting to the finding
of probable cause for malversation under Article 217 of the RPC. On the other hand, the haphazard
construction of the Agriculture Building, the absence of any bidding for its construction, the usage of scrap
materials for the construction of a school building in CCSPC, and the lack of engineering plans clearly
demonstrate undue injury to the government. These circumstances support the finding of probable cause
for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. Whether there was bad faith on Tilendos part is a different matter
which necessarily is subject to proof.
Further, nowhere in the records did Tilendo sufficiently rebut the Ombudsmans findings or clearly explain
what actually happened to the construction project. Tilendo admits that there was no construction of the
Agriculture Building in Rebuken in 1996. Instead, a school building was constructed using funds from
the CCSPCs MOOE, which construction project used scrap materials taken from the demolished main
building.[25] He also claims that the construction of the Agriculture Building had to be transferred due to the
peace and order problem in the original site. During the fact-finding investigation, Tilendo submitted an
Invitation to Bid which was published in the 23 February-1 March 1997 issue of The Mindanao
Newscast,[26] but there was no evidence that a bidding was held on the scheduled dates. He also
presented documents pertaining to the construction of the Academic Building and a make-shift building,
not the Agriculture Building, such as (1) a Notice of Award to Esperanza Gold Construction for the
extension (4th floor) of the Academic Building in the amount of P1,865,000;[27] (2) a list of materials and
labor requirements with their corresponding value;[28] and (3) floor plans.[29] Instead of showing completion
of the Agriculture Building, Tilendo introduced an Inspection/Evaluation Report dated 30 April 1999
referring to the 54.71% accomplishment of the construction of a two-storey Main Library Building inside
the CCSPC Campus worth more than P5.2 million and whose contractor was FFJJ Construction.[30]
Tilendo insists that he merely exercised administrative supervision and points to the CCSPC treasury as
the recipient of the funds and to the foreman, engineers, and workers as the ones who made the
expenses for the construction. Apparently, Tilendo is suggesting that these personnel were responsible
for the misuse or misappropriation of the funds.However, Tilendo miserably failed to substantiate his
allegations. He did not even attempt to mention names to clear his own name. Tilendo seems contented
with alleging that these personnel made the liquidations of the amounts they spent for the
construction.[31] Aside from this bare allegation, Tilendo did not introduce any convincing evidence that he
had no participation whatsoever with the unsatisfactory construction of the Agriculture Building and the
apparent wastage or diversion of the public funds.
Thus, we sustain the finding of probable cause against Tilendo for malversation under Article 217 of the
RPC and for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
____________________________________________________________________________
Uy v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 105965-70, 20 March 2001
FACTS: In Uy vs Sandiganbayan [G.R. Nos. 105965-70. August 9, 1999], petitioner Uy, who was Deputy
Comptroller of the Philippine navy and designated as Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for Comptrollership
was charged with estafa through falsification of official documents and violation of RA 3019. The petitioner
filed a motion to quash, arguing that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offense charged and
that the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor had no authority to file the offense.
The court ruled that :
1. It is the court-martial, not the Sandiganbayan, which has jurisdiction to try petitioner since he was a
regular officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and fell squarely under Article 2 of the Articles of
War mentioned in Section 1(b) of P.D. 1850, “Providing for the trial by courts-martial of members of the
Integrated National Police and further defining the jurisdiction of courts-martial over members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines”
2. As to the violations of Republic Act No. 3019, the petitioner does not fall within the “rank”
requirement stated in Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, thus, exclusive jurisdiction over petitioner is
vested in the regular courts , as amended by R.A. No. 8249, which states that “In cases where none of the
accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade ‘27’ or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.”
In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the
corresponding information/s against petitioner in the regional trial court. The Ombudsman
exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
In February 20, 2000, a motion for clarification which in fact appeared to be a partial motion for
reconsideration was filed by the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor filed, which was denied.
The instant case is a Motion for Further Clarification filed by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto of the
Court's ruling in its decision dated August 9, 1999 and resolution dated February 22, 2000.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman extends only to cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan and that the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute cases falling within the
jurisdiction of regular courts.
RULING: No. The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to
prosecute all criminal cases involving public officers and employees, not only those within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction of the regular courts as well. The power to
investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains
to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal
act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance
and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of office.
The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed
by public officers and employees. The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and
employees is one of the most important functions of the Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the Congress
deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with such power to make him a more active and effective agent of
the people in ensuring accountability in public office.
Even a perusal of the law (PD 1630) originally creating the Office of theOmbudsman then (to be known as
the Tanodbayan), and the amendatory laws issued subsequent thereto will show that, at its inception, the
Office of theOmbudsman was already vested with the power to investigate and prosecute civil and
criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan and even the regular courts.
*********** ************
GEORGE UY, petitioner, vs. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, THE HON. OMBUDSMAN AND THE
HON. ROGER C. BERBANO, SR., SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICER III, OFFICE OF THE
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
Before the Court is the Motion for Further Clarification filed by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto of the
Court's ruling in its decision dated August 9, 1999 and resolution dated February 22, 2000 that the
prosecutory power of the Ombudsman extends only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and that
the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts.
The Court stated in its decision dated August 9, 1999:
In this connection, it is the prosecutor, not the Ombudsman, who has the authority to file the
corresponding information/s against petitioner in the regional trial court. The Ombudsman exercises
prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
It explained in the resolution of February 22, 2000 that:
(t)he clear import of such pronouncement is to recognize the authority of the State and regular provincial
and city prosecutors under the Department of Justice to have control over prosecution of cases falling
within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The investigation and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman
relate to cases rightfully falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan under Section 15 (1) of R.A.
6770 ("An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman,
and for other purposes") which vests upon the Ombudsman "primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan" And this is further buttressed by Section 11 (4a) of R.A. 6770 which emphasizes that
the Office of the Special Prosecutor shall have the power to "conduct preliminary investigation and
prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan." Thus, repeated references to the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction clearly serve to limit the Ombudsman's and Special Prosecutor's authority to
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
Seeking clarification of the foregoing ruling, respondent Ombudsman raises the following points:
(1) The jurisdiction of the Honorable Sandiganbayan is not parallel to or equated with the broader
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman;
(2) The phrase "primary jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan" is not a delimitation of its jurisdiction solely to Sandiganbayan cases; and
(3) The authority of the Office of the Special Prosecutor to prosecute cases before the
Sandiganbayan cannot be confused with the broader investigatory and prosecutorial powers of
the Office of the Ombudsman.
Thus, the matter that needs to be discussed herein is the scope of the power of the Ombudsman to
conduct preliminary investigation and the subsequent prosecution of criminal offenses in the light of the
provisions of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (Republic Act [RA] 6770).
We held that the Ombudsman is clothed with authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to
prosecute all criminal cases involving public officers and employees, not only those within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, but those within the jurisdiction of the regular courts as well.
The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officers
and employees is founded in Section 15 and Section 11 of RA 6770. Section 15 vests the Ombudsman
with the power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient, thus:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties.--The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;
xxx
Section 11 grants the Office of the Special Prosecutor, an organic component of the Office of the
Ombudsman under the latters supervision and control, the power to conduct preliminary investigation and
prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It states:
Sec. 11. Structural Organization. x x x
xxx
(3) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall be composed of the Special Prosecutor and his prosecution
staff. The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall be an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman
and shall be under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman.
(4) The Office of the Special Prosecutor shall, under the supervision and control and upon authority of the
Ombudsman, have the following powers:
(a) To conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan;
(b) To enter into plea bargaining agreements; and
(c) To perform such other duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman.
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and
unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction
between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been
held that the clause any illegal act or omission of any public official is broad enough to embrace any crime
committed by a public officer or employee.[1]
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section
15 (1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and
Section 11 (4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation and
prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as
confining the scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.
Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman "to take over, at
any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases." The grant
of this authority does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving public
officers and employees cognizable by other courts. The exercise by the Ombudsman of his primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the discharge of his duty
to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed by public officers and employees. Indeed, it must
be stressed that the powers granted by the legislature to the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass
all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees
during their tenure of office.[2]
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited
authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is
merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control
and upon authority of the Ombudsman.[3] Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute
is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did
not intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these types of
cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against officers and employees of
the government and to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the
evidence warrants.[4] To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or
designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or
prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized
to assist him work under his supervision and control.[5] The law likewise allows him to direct the Special
Prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11
(4c) of RA 6770.
The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and employees is one of the most important
functions of the Ombudsman. In passing RA 6770, the Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman
with such power to make him a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in
public office.[6] A review of the development of our Ombudsman laws reveals this intent.
The concept of Ombudsman originated in Sweden in the early 19th century, referring to an officer
appointed by the legislature to handle the peoples grievances against administrative and judicial
actions.He was primarily tasked with receiving complaints from persons aggrieved by administrative
action or inaction, conducting investigation thereon, and making recommendations to the appropriate
administrative agency based on his findings. He relied mainly on the power of persuasion and the high
prestige of the office to effect his recommendations.[7]
In this jurisdiction, several Ombudsman-like agencies were established by past Presidents to serve as
the peoples medium for airing grievances and seeking redress against abuses and misconduct in the
government. These offices were conceived with the view of raising the standard in public service and
ensuring integrity and efficiency in the government. In May 1950, President Elpidio Quirino created the
Integrity Board charged with receiving complaints against public officials for acts of corruption, dereliction
of duty and irregularity in office, and conducting a thorough investigation of these complaints. The Integrity
Board was succeeded by several other agencies which performed basically the same functions of
complaints-handling and investigation. These were the Presidential Complaints and Action Commission
under President Ramon Magsaysay, the Presidential Committee on Administration Performance
Efficiency under President Carlos Garcia, the Presidential Anti-Graft Committee under President
Diosdado Macapagal, and the Presidential Agency on Reform and Government Operations and the Office
of the Citizens Counselor, both under President Ferdinand Marcos. It was observed, however, that these
agencies failed to realize their objective for they did not enjoy the political independence necessary for the
effective performance of their function as government critic. Furthermore, their powers extended to no
more than fact-finding and recommending.[8]
Thus, in the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the members of the Constitutional Convention saw the
need to constitutionalize the office of an Ombudsman, to give it political independence and adequate
powers to enforce its recommendations.[9] The 1973 Constitution mandated the legislature to create an
office of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan. Its powers shall not be limited to receiving
complaints and making recommendations, but shall also include the filing and prosecution of criminal, civil
or administrative case before the appropriate body in case of failure of justice. Section 6, Article XIII of the
1973 Constitution read:
Sec. 6. The Batasang Pambansa shall create an office of the Ombudsman, to be known as Tanodbayan,
which shall receive and investigate complaints relative to public office, including those in government-
owned or controlled corporations, make appropriate recommendations, and in case of failure of justice
as defined by law, file and prosecute the corresponding criminal, civil or administrative case
before the proper court or body.
Implementing this constitutional provision, President Marcos, on June 11, 1978, exercising his power
under Proclamation 1081, enacted Presidential Decree (PD) 1487 creating the Office of the Ombudsman
to be known as Tanodbayan. Its principal task was to investigate, on complaint, any administrative
act[10] of any administrative agency[11] including any government-owned or controlled corporation.[12] The
Tanodbayan also had the duty to file and prosecute the corresponding criminal, civil, or administrative
case before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or body if he has reason to believe that any public
official, employee, or other person has acted in a manner resulting in a failure of justice. [13] It should be
noted, however, that the prosecution of cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was to
be done by the Tanodbayan through the Special Prosecutor who, according to PD 1486, [14] had the
exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation, file information for and prosecute cases within the
jurisdiction of said court. The Special Prosecutor was then under the control and supervision of the
Secretary of Justice.[15]
Shortly after its enactment, PD 1487 was amended by PD 1607 which took effect on December 10,
1978. The amendatory law broadened the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate administrative acts
of administrative agencies by authorizing it to conduct an investigation on its own motion or initiative, even
without a complaint from any person.[16] The new law also expanded the prosecutory function of the
Tanodbayan by creating the Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor in the Office of the Tanodbayan and
placing under his direction and control the Special Prosecutor who had the exclusive authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan; to file informations therefor and to
direct and control the prosecution of said cases therein.[17] Thus, the law provided that if the Tanodbayan
has reason to believe that any public official, employee, or other person has acted in a manner warranting
criminal or disciplinary action or proceedings, he shall cause him to be investigated by the Office of the
Chief Special Prosecutor who shall file and prosecute the corresponding criminal or administrative case
before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or before the proper administrative agency. [18]
On July 18, 1979, PD 1630 was enacted further amending PD 1487 and PD 1607. PD 1630
reorganized the Office of the Tanodbayan and transferred the powers previously vested in the Special
Prosecutor to the Tanodbayan himself. Thus, the Tanodbayan was empowered to directly conduct
preliminary investigation, file information and prosecute cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
and other courts. The amendment gave the Tanodbayan the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary
investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan; to file information therefor and to direct and
control the prosecution of said cases.[19] Section 10 of PD 1630 provided:
Sec. 10. Powers.--The Tanodbayan shall have the following powers:
(a) He may investigate, on complaint by any person or on his own motion or initiative, any
administrative act whether amounting to any criminal offense or not of any administrative
agency including any government-owned or controlled corporation;
xxx
(e) If after preliminary investigation he finds a prima facie case, he may file the necessary
information or complaint with the Sandiganbayan or any proper court or administrative agency
and prosecute the same.
Section 18 further stated:
Sec. 18. Prosecution of Public Personnel or Other Person.--If the Tanodbayan has reason to believe
that any public official, employee or other person has acted in a manner warranting criminal or disciplinary
action or proceedings, he shall conduct the necessary investigation and shall file and prosecute the
corresponding criminal or administrative case before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or before the
proper administrative agency.
With the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman was created. The
present Ombudsman, as protector of the people, is mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in any
form or manner against public officials or employees of the government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and to notify the
complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.[20] He possesses the following powers, functions
and duties:
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper,
or inefficient;
2. Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any
government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any
act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent and correct any abuse or impropriety in the
performance of duties.
3. Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at
fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and
ensure compliance therewith.
4. Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions
entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and
report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.
5. Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of
its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.
6. Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due
prudence.
7. Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the
Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high
standards of ethics and efficiency.
8. Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or
duties as may be provided by law.[21]
As a new Office of the Ombudsman was established, the then existing Tanodbayan became the Office of
the Special Prosecutor which continued to function and exercise its powers as provided by law, except
those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution. [22]
The frameworks for the Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the Special Prosecutor were laid
down by President Corazon Aquino in Executive Order (EO) 243 and EO 244, both passed on July 24,
1987.
In September 1989, Congress passed RA 6770 providing for the functional and structural
organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. As in the previous laws on the Ombudsman, RA 6770 gave
the present Ombudsman not only the duty to receive and relay the people's grievances, but also the duty
to investigate and prosecute for and in their behalf, civil, criminal and administrative offenses committed
by government officers and employees as embodied in Sections 15 and 11 of the law.
Clearly, the Philippine Ombudsman departs from the classical Ombudsman model whose function is
merely to receive and process the people's complaints against corrupt and abusive government
personnel. The Philippine Ombudsman, as protector of the people, is armed with the power to prosecute
erring public officers and employees, giving him an active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and
corrupt practices and such other offenses that may be committed by such officers and employees. The
legislature has vested him with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions.Recognizing the
importance of this power, the Court cannot derogate the same by limiting it only to cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan. It is apparent from the history and the language of the present law that the legislature
intended such power to apply not only to cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those
within the jurisdiction of regular courts. The Court observed in the case of Republic vs.
Sandiganbayan:[23]
A perusal of the law originally creating the Office of the Ombudsman then (to be known as the
Tanodbayan), and the amendatory laws issued subsequent thereto will show that, at its inception, the
Office of the Ombudsman was already vested with the power to investigate and prosecute civil and
criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan and even the regular courts.
xxx
Presidential Decree No. 1630 was the existing law governing the then Tanodbayan when Republic Act No.
6770 was enacted providing for the functional and structural organization of the present Office of the
Ombudsman. This later law retained in the Ombudsman the power of the former Tanodbayan to
investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. x x x.
Finally, it must be clarified that the authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute cases involving public
officers and employees before the regular courts does not conflict with the power of the regular
prosecutors under the Department of Justice to control and direct the prosecution of all criminal actions
under Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Rules of Court must be read in
conjunction with RA 6770 which charged the Ombudsman with the duty to investigate and prosecute all
illegal acts and omissions of public officers and employees. The Court held in the case of Sanchez vs.
Demetriou[24] that the power of the Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of RA 6770 is not an exclusive
authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. Thus,
Administrative Order No. 8 issued by the Office of the Ombudsman provides:
The prosecution of case cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be under the direct exclusive control and
supervision of the Office of the Ombudsman. In cases cognizable by regular Courts, the control and
supervision by the Office of the Ombudsman is only in Ombudsman cases in the sense defined
(therein).[25] The law recognizes a concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of the Ombudsman and
other investigative agencies of government in the prosecution of cases cognizable by regular courts.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court's ruling in its decision dated August 9, 1999 and its resolution dated
February 20, 2000 that the Ombudsman exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan is SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-
Santiago, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., I concur in the result.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.
Pardo, J., I dissent. See attached.
De Leon, Jr., J., I join the dissenting opinion of Justice B. P. Pardo.
Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez, GR No. 172700, 23 July 2010

SECOND DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 172700

Petitioner,
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
- versus - ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
ROLSON RODRIGUEZ, Promulgated:
Respondent. July 23, 2010
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review[1] of the 8 May 2006 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
00528 setting aside for lack of jurisdiction the 21 September 2004 Decision[3] of the Ombudsman
(Visayas) in OMB-V-A-03-0511-H.
The Antecedent Facts
On 26 August 2003, the Ombudsman in Visayas received a complaint[4] for abuse of authority, dishonesty,
oppression, misconduct in office, and neglect of duty against Rolson Rodriguez, punong barangay in Brgy.
Sto. Rosario, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental. On 1 September 2003, the sangguniang bayan of
Binalbagan, Negros Occidental, through vice-mayor Jose G. Yulo, received a similar complaint[5] against
Rodriguez for abuse of authority, dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, and neglect of duty.
In its 8 September 2003 notice,[6] the municipal vice-mayor required Rodriguez to submit his answer within
15 days from receipt of the notice. On 23 September 2003, Rodriguez filed a motion to dismiss [7] the case
filed in the sangguniang bayan on the ground that the allegations in the complaint were without factual
basis and did not constitute any violation of law. In a compliance[8] dated 22 October 2003, Rodriguez
alleged complainants violated the rule against forum shopping.
Meanwhile, in its 10 September 2003 order,[9] the Ombudsman required Rodriguez to file his answer.
Rodriguez filed on 24 October 2003 a motion to dismiss[10] the case filed in the Ombudsman on the
grounds of litis pendentia and forum shopping. He alleged that the sangguniang bayan had already
acquired jurisdiction over his person as early as 8 September 2003.
The municipal vice-mayor set the case for hearing on 3 October 2003.[11] Since complainants had no
counsel, the hearing was reset to a later date. When the case was called again for hearing, complainants
counsel manifested that complainants would like to withdraw the administrative complaint filed in
the sangguniang bayan. On 29 October 2003, complainants filed a motion[12] to withdraw the complaint
lodged in the sangguniang bayan on the ground that they wanted to prioritize the complaint filed in the
Ombudsman. Rodriguez filed a comment[13] praying that the complaint be dismissed on the ground of
forum shopping, not on the ground complainants stated. In their opposition, [14]complainants admitted they
violated the rule against forum shopping and claimed they filed the complaint in the sangguniang
bayan without the assistance of counsel. In his 4 November 2003 Resolution, [15] the municipal vice-mayor
dismissed the case filed in the sangguniang bayan.
In its 29 January 2004 order,[16] the Ombudsman directed both parties to file their respective verified
position papers. Rodriguez moved for reconsideration of the order citing the pendency of his motion to
dismiss.[17] In its 11 March 2004 order,[18] the Ombudsman stated that a motion to dismiss was a
prohibited pleading under Section 5 (g) Rule III of Administrative Order No. 17. The Ombudsman
reiterated its order for Rodriguez to file his position paper.
In his position paper, Rodriguez insisted that the sangguniang bayan still continued to exercise jurisdiction
over the complaint filed against him. He claimed he had not received any resolution or decision dismissing
the complaint filed in the sangguniang bayan. In reply,[19] complainants maintained there was no more
complaint pending in the sangguniang bayan since the latter had granted their motion to withdraw the
complaint. In a rejoinder,[20] Rodriguez averred that the sangguniang bayan resolution dismissing the case
filed against him was not valid because only the vice-mayor signed it.
The Ruling of the Ombudsman
In its 21 September 2004 Decision,[21] the Ombudsman found Rodriguez guilty of dishonesty and
oppression. It imposed on Rodriguez the penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits,
disqualification to hold public office, and forfeiture of civil service eligibilities. Rodriguez filed a motion for
reconsideration.[22] In its 12 January 2005 Order,[23] the Ombudsman denied the motion for
reconsideration. In its 8 March 2005 Order,[24] the Ombudsman directed the mayor of Binalbagan, Negros
Occidental to implement the penalty of dismissal against Rodriguez.
Rodriguez filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for review with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its 8 May 2006 Decision,[25] the Court of Appeals set aside for lack of jurisdiction the Decision of the
Ombudsman and directed the sangguniang bayan to proceed with the hearing on the administrative case.
The appellate court reasoned that the sangguniang bayan had acquired primary jurisdiction over the
person of Rodriguez to the exclusion of the Ombudsman. The Court of Appeals relied on Section 4, Rule
46 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction over person of respondent, how acquired. The court shall acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent by the service on him of its order or resolution
indicating its initial action on the petition or by his voluntary submission to such jurisdiction.
The appellate court noted that the sangguniang bayan served on Rodriguez a notice, requiring the latter
to file an answer, on 8 September 2003 while the Ombudsman did so two days later or on 10 September
2003.
Petitioner Ombudsman contends that upon the filing of a complaint before a body vested with jurisdiction,
that body has taken cognizance of the complaint. Petitioner cites Blacks Law Dictionary in defining what to
take cognizance means to wit, to acknowledge or exercise jurisdiction. Petitioner points out it had taken
cognizance of the complaint against Rodriguez before a similar complaint was filed in the sangguniang
bayan against the same respondent. Petitioner maintains summons or notices do not operate to vest in
the disciplining body jurisdiction over the person of the respondent in an administrative case. Petitioner
concludes that consistent with the rule on concurrent jurisdiction, the Ombudsmans exercise of jurisdiction
should be to the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan.
Private respondent Rolson Rodriguez counters that when a competent body has acquired jurisdiction over
a complaint and the person of the respondent, other bodies are excluded from exercising jurisdiction over
the same complaint. He cites Article 124 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No.
7160,[26] which provides that an elective official may be removed from office by order of the proper court or
the disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other. Private
respondent insists the sangguniang bayan first acquired jurisdiction over the complaint and his person. He
argues jurisdiction over the person of a respondent in an administrative complaint is acquired by the
service of summons or other compulsory processes. Private respondent stresses complainants violated
the rule against forum shopping when they filed identical complaints in two disciplining authorities
exercising concurrent jurisdiction.
The Issues
The issues submitted for resolution are (1) whether complainants violated the rule against forum shopping
when they filed in the Ombudsman and the sangguniang bayan identical complaints against Rodriguez;
and (2) whether it was the sangguniang bayan or the Ombudsman that first acquired jurisdiction.
The Courts Ruling
The petition has merit.
Paragraph 1, Section 13 of Article XI of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 13. The Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office, or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient.
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, states:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions, and Duties. The Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission
of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at
any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigations of such cases.
The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or
employee applies only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. In cases cognizable by regular courts,
the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with other investigative agencies of government.[27] Republic
Act No. 8249, otherwise known as An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, limits
the cases that are cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to public officials occupying positions corresponding
to salary grade 27 and higher. The Sandiganbayanhas no jurisdiction over private respondent who,
as punong barangay, is occupying a position corresponding to salary grade 14 under Republic Act No.
6758, otherwise known as the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. [28]
Under Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan has disciplinary authority over any elective barangay official, to wit:
SEC. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. A verified complaint against any
erring elective official shall be prepared as follows:
xxxx
(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed before the sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned whose decision shall be final and executory.
Clearly, the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with the sangguniang bayan over administrative
cases against elective barangay officials occupying positions below salary grade 27, such as private
respondent in this case.
The facts in the present case are analogous to those in Laxina, Sr. v. Ombudsman,[29] which likewise
involved identical administrative complaints filed in both the Ombudsman and the sangguniang
panlungsod against a punong barangay for grave misconduct. The Court held therein that the rule against
forum shopping applied only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to administrative cases.[30] Thus, even if
complainants filed in the Ombudsman and the sangguniang bayan identical complaints against private
respondent, they did not violate the rule against forum shopping because their complaint was in the nature
of an administrative case.
In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining authorities, the
body in which the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires
jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. [31] In this case, since the
complaint was filed first in the Ombudsman, and the Ombudsman opted to assume jurisdiction over the
complaint, the Ombudsmans exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan
exercising concurrent jurisdiction.
It is a hornbook rule that jurisdiction is a matter of law. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the
instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.[32] When herein complainants first filed
the complaint in the Ombudsman, jurisdiction was already vested on the latter. Jurisdiction could no
longer be transferred to the sangguniang bayan by virtue of a subsequent complaint filed by the same
complainants.
As a final note, under Section 60 of the Local Government Code, the sangguniang bayan has no power to
remove an elective barangay official. Apart from the Ombudsman, only a proper court may do
so.[33] Unlike the sangguniang bayan, the powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory.
The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to directly remove[34] an erring public official other than
members of Congress and the Judiciary who may be removed only by impeachment.[35]
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 8 May 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 00528. We AFFIRM the 21 September 2004 Decision of the Ombudsman (Visayas) in
OMB-V-A-03-0511-H.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD
JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Judge Angeles v. Gutierrez, GR No. 189161 and 189173, 21 March 2012
Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES, G.R. Nos. 189161 & 189173

Petitioner,
- versus -
HON. MA. MERCEDITAS N.

GUTIERREZ, Ombudsman; HON. Present:
ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, Overall
Deputy Ombudsman; HON. SYLVIA A. CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
SEVERO, Graft Investigator and BRION,
Prosecution Officer I; HON. MARILOU PEREZ,
B. ANCHETA-MEJICA, Acting Director, SERENO, and
PIAB-D; HON. JOSE T. DE JESUS, JR., REYES, JJ.
Assistant Ombudsman, PAMO; All of
the Ombudsman; and SSP EMMANUEL
Y. VELASCO,
Respondents. Promulgated:
March 21, 2012
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
The Case
This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court. The Court is
once again asked to determine whether the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) committed grave
abuse of discretion in the exercise of its discretionary powers to investigate and prosecute criminal
complaints.
This Petition dated 01 September 2009 seeks to set aside the Joint Order [1] dated 21 March 2007
of the Ombudsman (the questioned Joint Order) exonerating respondent Senior State Prosecutor
Emmanuel Y. Velasco (respondent Velasco or respondent) from the charges filed by petitioner Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles (petitioner Judge Angeles or petitioner).
The Facts
The Complaint filed with the Ombudsman
Petitioner Judge Angeles was, at the time this Petition was filed, the Presiding Judge of Branch 121 of the
Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC); while private respondent Velasco was a senior state
prosecutor at the Department of Justice (DOJ).
On 20 February 2007, petitioner Judge Angeles filed a criminal Complaint against respondent
Velasco with the Ombudsman[2] and sought his indictment before the Sandiganbayan for the following
acts allegedly committed in his capacity as a prosecutor:
1. Giving an unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to the accused in a criminal case for
smuggling by failing to present a material witness;

2. Engaging in private practice by insisting on the reopening of child abuse cases against
petitioner;
3. Falsifying a public document to make it appear that a clarificatory hearing on the child abuse
Complaint was conducted.[3]
Failure to present a material witness
According to the Complaint, respondent Velasco, who was the trial prosecutor in a criminal case involving
the smuggling of jewelry,[4] failed to present a material witness in the aforesaid case.[5] The witness, a
gemmologist of the Bureau of Customs, was to testify on the type of substance making up the pieces of
smuggled jewelry.[6]
According to petitioner, considering the materiality of the gemmologists testimony, which respondent must
have known of, since he was the handling trial prosecutor of the case, his failure to offer the said
testimony in court shows that he tried to suppress the evidence in favor of the accused in the said case.
This act was alleged to be in violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,[7] which
considers as a corrupt practice the acts of public officers that give unwarranted benefits to any private
party through either manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence in the discharge
of their official functions.[8]
The gemmologist, however, was eventually presented as a witness after respondent Velasco had
filed a Motion to adduce additional evidence in the said case.[9]
Insistence on the reopening of child abuse cases
The second act complained of refers to respondent Velascos filing of two Petitions to reopen the
child abuse cases filed against petitioner Judge Angeles. Petitioner was previously charged with inflicting
physical and psychological abuse on Maria Mercedes Vistan, her 13-year-old grandniece. Respondent
was the one who conducted the preliminary investigation of the Complaint for child abuse and later
indicted petitioner for 21 counts thereof.[11] However, the DOJ later on reversed respondent Velascos
recommendation upon a Petition for Review filed by respondent. Consequently, the Informations, which
had been filed in the meantime, were ordered withdrawn by the trial court.[13] Petitioner later filed an
administrative Complaint against respondent for gross misconduct, gross ignorance of the law,
incompetence, and manifest bad faith arising from the alleged malicious indictment.
According to petitioner, the move of respondent to reopen the child abuse cases was allegedly
meant to exact vengeance for petitioners filing of the above-mentioned administrative Complaint.
Meanwhile, the two Petitions to reopen the child abuse cases, which were filed by respondent in the DOJ
and the Office of the President, were denied for having been filed in the wrong venues.
Petitioner alleges in her Complaint that since respondent Velasco was not the trial prosecutor in
the said case, his unauthorized act of filing two Petitions to reopen the child abuse cases constituted a
violation of Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees.[15] This code considers as unlawful the acts of public officials and employees engaging in
the private practice of their profession, unless authorized by the Constitution or by law.[16] This single act
of moving to reopen the child abuse cases was the only instance of private practice imputed to
respondent Velasco. No other act constituting private practice was cited by petitioner.
Falsification of Public Document
The alleged falsification of public document arose from the same preliminary investigation
conducted by respondent in the child abuse cases mentioned above. According to petitioner Judge
Angeles, respondent Velasco made it appear that he had conducted a clarificatory hearing on the
Complaint for child abuse on 22 June 1999 as shown in the Minutes [17] of the said hearing.[18] Petitioner
alleges that Leonila Vistan, the witness who supposedly attended the hearing, was seriously sick and
could not have appeared at the alleged clarificatory hearing.[19] Moreover, respondent had, in fact,
resolved the cases two days earlier, on 20 June 1999, as shown by the date on the Resolution indicting
petitioner. Thus, the latter alleges, the Minutes of the hearing on 22 June 1999 must have been falsified
by respondent by making it appear that Leonila Vistan had participated in an
inexistent proceeding. This act is in violation of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code,[20] which
criminalizes it as a falsification of a public document.[21]
The Decision of the Ombudsman
In the questioned Joint Order, the Ombudsman dismissed the charges against respondent Velasco. It
found that after evaluation of the facts and evidence presented by complainant, there was no cause to
conduct a preliminary investigation or an administrative adjudication with regard to the charges.
On the first charge of suppression of testimonial evidence in connection with the smuggling case,
the Ombudsman dismissed the charge on the ground that petitioner had no sufficient personal interest in
the subject matter of the grievance.[22] The Ombudsman explained that petitioner was neither one of the
parties nor the presiding judge in the said criminal case and, therefore, had no personal interest in it.
Moreover, granting that the personal interest of petitioner was not in issue, respondent Velasco
acted based on his discretion as prosecutor and his appreciation of the evidence in the case, and any
lapse in his judgment cannot be a source of criminal liability. The Ombudsman said that it had no authority
to investigate the prosecutors exercise of discretion, unless there
was sufficient evidence that the exercise was tainted with malice and bad faith.[23]
The Ombudsman likewise dismissed the second charge of private practice of profession on the
ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.[24] It pointed out that petitioner should have first
elevated her concern to the DOJ, which had primary jurisdiction over respondents actions and conduct as
public prosecutor.[25] Moreover, the Ombudsman found that respondent Velasco was not engaged in
private practice when he filed the two Petitions for the reopening of the child abuse cases against
petitioner, since he was the investigating prosecutor of the said cases. [26]
Finally, on the falsification of a public document, which was also dismissed, the Ombudsman said
that the issue should have been raised earlier, when petitioner Judge Angeles filed her Petition for Review
of the Resolution of respondent Velasco. Moreover, petitioner should have substantiated the allegation of
falsification, because the mere presentation of the alleged falsified document did not in itself establish
falsification. The Ombudsman also ruled that with the belated filing of the charge and the reversal by the
DOJ of respondent Velascos Resolution indicting petitioner, the materiality of the alleged falsified
document is no longer in issue.[27]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[28] of the questioned Joint Order, which was denied by
the Ombudsman for lack of merit.[29]
Hence, the present Rule 65 Petition.
Issue
Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing the Complaint against respondent Velasco.

The Courts Ruling
We dismiss the Petition.
Power of the Court over the Ombudsmans Exercise

of its Investigative and Prosecutorial Powers
As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsmans exercise of its investigative
and prosecutorial powers without good and compelling reasons. Such reasons are clearly absent in the
instant Petition.
At the outset, we emphasize that certiorari is an extraordinary prerogative writ that is never
demandable as a matter of right. Also, it is meant to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment committed in the exercise of the discretion of a tribunal or an officer. This is especially true in
the case of the exercise by the Ombudsman of its constitutionally mandated powers. That is why
this Court has consistently maintained its well-entrenched policy of non-interference in
the Ombudsmans exercise of its investigatory and prosecutorial powers.[30]
General Rule of Non-Interference

with the Plenary Powers of the Ombudsman
The general rule has always been non-interference by the courts in the exercise by the office of the
prosecutor or the Ombudsman of its plenary investigative and prosecutorial powers. In Esquivel v.
Ombudsman,[31] we explained thus:
The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to

believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof
and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts. Settled
is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with
the Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without
good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. Said exercise of powers is based
upon the constitutional mandate and the court will not interfere in its exercise. The rule is
based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well. Otherwise,
innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by
the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in much
the same way that courts will be swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion
on the part of public prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or dismiss a
complaint by a private complainant. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto,[32] we further clarified the plenary

powers of the Ombudsman. We emphasized that if the latter, using professional judgment, finds a
case dismissible, the Court shall respect that finding, unless the exercise of such
discretionary power was tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto[33] explained the
rationale for the plenary powers of the Ombudsman, which is virtually freefrom legislative, executive or
judicial intervention. Its plenary powers were constitutionally designed to insulate it from outside pressure
and improper influence. Accordingly, the Court has consistently respected and recognized, as we do now
in this case, the independence and competence of the Ombudsman, as it acts as the champion of the
people and the preserver of the integrity of public service.
The Discretionary Nature of

Preliminary Investigation
The determination by the Ombudsman of probable cause or of whether there exists a reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, is
usually done after the conduct of a preliminary investigation. However, a preliminary investigation is by no
means mandatory.
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman Rules of
Procedure),[34] specifically Section 2 of Rule II, states:
Evaluation. Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall recommend
whether it may be: a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit; b) referred to
respondent for comment; c) indorsed to the proper government office or agency which has
jurisdiction over the case; d) forwarded to the appropriate officer or official for fact-
finding investigation; e) referred for administrative adjudication; or f) subjected to a
preliminary investigation.
Thus, the Ombudsman need not conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt of a
complaint. Indeed, we have said in Knecht v. Desierto[35] and later in Mamburao, Inc. v. Office of
the Ombudsman[36] and Karaan v. Office of the Ombudsman[37] that should investigating officers
find a complaint utterly devoid of merit, they may recommend its outright dismissal. Moreover, it is
also within their discretion to determine whether or not preliminary investigation should be
conducted.
The Court has undoubtedly acknowledged the powers of the Ombudsman to dismiss a complaint
outright without a preliminary investigation in The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans v. Desierto.[38]
We reiterate that the Ombudsman has full discretion to determine whether a criminal case should
be filed, including whether a preliminary investigation is warranted. The Court therefore gives due
deference to the Ombudsmans decision to no longer conduct a preliminary investigation in this case on
the criminal charges levelled against respondent Velasco.
II
No Grave Abuse of Discretion in the

Ombudsmans Evaluation of Evidence
This Court acknowledges exceptional cases calling for a review of the Ombudsmans action when
there is a charge and sufficient proof to show grave abuse of discretion.
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise of power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility. The abuse must be in a manner so patent and so gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.[39]
The determination of grave abuse of discretion as the exception to the general rule of non-
interference in the Ombudsmans exercise of its powers is precisely the province of the extraordinary writ
of certiorari. However, we highlight the exceptional nature of that determination.
In this Petition, we do not find any grave abuse of discretion that calls for the Courts exceptional
divergence from the general rule.
Notably, the burden of proof to show grave abuse of discretion is on petitioner, and she has failed
to discharge this burden. She merely states why she does not agree with the findings of the Ombudsman,
instead of demonstrating and proving grave abuse of discretion. In her arguments, petitioner would also
have us pass upon the factual findings of the Ombudsman. That we cannot do, for this Court is not a trier
of facts.
Even if we were to extend liberally the exception to the general rule against the review of the
findings of the Ombudsman, an examination of the records would show that no grave abuse of discretion
was demonstrated to warrant a reversal of the Joint Order dismissing the Complaint against respondent
Velasco.
A. On the first charge of suppression of evidence
On the charge of suppression of evidence arising from the failure of respondent Velasco to present
the testimony of a material witness, the Ombudsman found and we defer to its findings that he acted
based on his discretion as prosecutor and on his appreciation of the evidence in the case, and any lapse
in his judgment cannot be a source of criminal liability. The Ombudsman also found that there was no
sufficient evidence that the failure of respondent to present the witness was tainted with malice; or that the
failure of respondent to do so gave any private party unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the
discharge of the formers official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
Moreover, in G.R. No. 187596,[40] a case involving the same incidents and parties as the present
Petition, this Court affirmed the factual findings of the Court of Appeals (CA). We take judicial notice of the
CAs factual finding that the charge of suppression of evidence by respondent in the smuggling case was
dispelled by the Chief State Prosecutor himself in a Certification dated 17 October 2002. [41] The
Certification vouching for the integrity and competence of respondent in his handling of the smuggling
case states:
This is to certify that I had never called the attention nor even had castigated State
Prosecutor EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO with regard to the way he handled the case of
People of the Philippines versus Lintag, et al. (Pasay Regional Trial Court, Criminal Case
Number 99-0129, for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines) specifically
with regard to the aspect of the presentation of one of the prosecutions witnesses, a
gemologist (sic). In fact, SP Velasco successfully prosecuted said case. [42]
Thus, we find no grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsmans dismissal of the first charge.
However, we need to clarify that we cannot subscribe to the other reason for the Ombudsmans
dismissal of the charge pursuant to paragraph 4, Section 20 of the Ombudsman Act. The provision allows
the Ombudsman to decide not to conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or
omission complained of, if it believes that the complainant has no sufficient personal interest in the subject
matter of the grievance. It is clear that, in relation to Section 19, Section 20 of the Ombudsman
Act applies only to administrative cases. As for Section 19, its subject heading is Administrative
Complaints. It lists acts or omissions that may be the subject of a complaint on which the Ombudsman
shall act. On the other hand, the subject heading of Section 20 is Exceptions. It lists the exceptional
situations in which the Ombudsman has the option not to investigate an administrative complaint even
when its subject is an act or omission listed in Section 19. That both Sections 19 and 20 of the
Ombudsman Act apply only to administrative complaints is made even clearer in the Ombudsman Rules
of Procedure. Their counterpart provisions appear in the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure under Rule III
which outlines the procedure for administrative cases.[43] Clearly, then, paragraph 4, Section 20 of the
Ombudsman Act applies only to administrative complaints. It should not have been used by the
Ombudsman as a ground to dismiss the first charge, since the Complaint filed by petitioner before the
Ombudsman was criminal in nature. The criminal nature of petitioners Complaint is clear from its prayer
seeking the indictment of respondent before the Ombudsman.[44] This lapse notwithstanding, we do not
find any arbitrariness or whim in the manner that the Ombudsman disposed of the charge. If there was
any abuse of discretion at all, it was not grave.
B. On the second charge of private practice
The Ombudsman found that respondent Velasco was not engaged in private practice when he filed
two Petitions for the reopening of the child abuse cases against petitioner on the ground that respondent
was acting in his capacity as the investigating prosecutor of the said cases. Again, this Court takes judicial
notice of the CAs finding in G.R. No. 187596, adverted to earlier, that respondents isolated act of filing a
pleading did not necessarily constitute private practice of law. [45] We have, in fact, said so in Maderada v.
Mediodea,[46] citing People v. Villanueva:[47]
Private practice has been defined by this Court as follows:

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise.
Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition for judges
and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor
General from engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as customarily or habitually
holding ones self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services. x x x.
Clearly, by no stretch of the imagination can the act of respondent Velasco be considered private
practice, since he was not customarily or habitually holding himself out to the public as a lawyer and
demanding payment for those services. The appellate court also noted that, on the contrary, he filed the
motion in good faith and in the honest belief that he was performing his duty as a public servant. [48]
Thus, the Ombudsman did not commit any grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the second
charge against respondent Velasco.
However, we again need to point out that we do not share the Ombudsmans finding that the
charge is dismissible on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to paragraph 1,
Section 20 of the Ombudsman Act. As already explained earlier, the said provision applies only to
administrative cases, while the Complaint before the Ombudsman was not administrative, but criminal, in
nature. Still, we do not find any abuse of discretion when the Ombudsman proffered this ground for
dismissing the second charge.
C. On the third charge of falsification of public document
Finally, the Ombudsman correctly found that the charge of falsification had not been substantiated,
and that the mere presentation of the alleged manufactured document alone would not in itself establish
falsification. To recall, petitioner Angeles claimed that Leonila Vistan could not have appeared before
respondent Velasco because she was sick, but offered no supporting evidence. Also, it does not follow
that a clarificatory hearing could not have been conducted, just because respondent Velasco had
prepared a Resolution on 20 June 1999, two days before that hearing.
Moreover, as found by the CA in G.R. No. 187596 adverted to earlier, a clarificatory hearing was in
fact conducted. The appellate court found that the declarations of petitioner could not prevail over the
positive assertion of Percival Abril and Jesusa Hernandez, who testified that they had seen Leonila Vistan
before Velasco at the clarificatory hearing on 22 June 1999.[49]
However, the Court differs with the Ombudsman on the latters pronouncement that the issue of
falsification of public document should have been raised by petitioner earlier, when she filed her Petition
for Review of the Resolution of respondent Velasco; and that, consequently, the charge of falsification of a
public document was no longer in issue because of its belated filing. We draw attention to the fact that the
Petition for Review of respondents Resolution indicting petitioner Judge Angeles was under an entirely
different proceeding. The purpose of the Petition was to reverse the aforesaid Resolution, and not to exact
criminal liability on respondent for the crime of falsification of a public document, as in the Complaint
before the Ombudsman. Thus, it cannot be said that the issue of falsification of a public document in the
criminal Complaint was raised belatedly, because the Complaint was not a continuation of the previous
Petition for Review of respondents Resolution. The two proceedings were completely independent of each
other. This lapse, however, did not constitute grave abuse of discretion.
In sum, this Court finds no compelling reason to depart from its long-standing policy of non-
interference in the exercise by the Ombudsman of its investigatory and prosecutorial powers which, as we
have emphasized, are plenary.
Although the Court diverges from some of the conclusions reached by the Ombudsman, we find
that its dismissal of the charges against respondent Velasco was arrived at after a rational
deliberation. Such deliberation was shown by its reasoned disposition of the case in the exercise of its
constitutionally mandated discretionary powers. The Ombudsman did not overstep the boundaries of its
plenary powers and acted within the permissible limits. We do not find any arbitrariness or abuse that was
so gross and patent in the manner it exercised its discretion as would warrant this Courts reversal.
Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion, we uphold the findings of the Ombudsman.
Final Note
Finally, the Court notes with strong disapproval both parties resort to abuse of the judicial
processes of this Court. This is the third case we know of that the parties have filed against each other,
and that has reached the Supreme Court.[50]
This fact is especially regrettable, considering that petitioner as judge and respondent as
prosecutor should have been well-cognizant of our clogged court dockets and should have thus exercised
more restraint in filing cases against each other. Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
enjoins a lawyer from filing multiple actions arising from the same cause and from misusing court
process.[51] Judging from the number of cases and the vengeful tone of the charges that the parties have
hurled against each other in their pleadings, they seem more bent on settling what has become a
personal score between them, rather than on achieving the ends of justice. [52]
The parties are warned against trifling with court process. This case shall, hopefully, serve as a
reminder of their ethical and professional duties and put an immediate end to their recriminations.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the Petition for Certiorari filed by Judge Adoracion G. Angeles.
We AFFIRM the two Joint Orders of the Ombudsman in Case Nos. OMB-C-C-07-0103-C and OMB-C-A-
O7-0117-C dated 21 March 2007 and 30 June 2008, respectively.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, GR No. 138142, 19
September 2
FIRST DIVISION
THE PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC G.R. No. 138142
FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE
ON BEHEST LOANS and
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION
ON GOOD GOVERNMENT,
Petitioners, Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
OMBUDSMAN ANIANO A. DESIERTO, ALICIA LL. REYES,

LEONIDES S. VIRATA, RODOLFO D. MANALO, VERDEN C.
DANGILAN, ISMAEL A. MATHAY, JR., JOSE Y. CAMPOS,
FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN and ERWIN G. VORSTER,
Respondents. Promulgated:
September 19, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari[1] seeking to nullify the resolution of then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto
dated October 12, 1998[2] dismissing the complaint against private respondents in OMB-0-98-0364, as
well as the order dated January 5, 1999[3] denying the motion for reconsideration.
On February 17, 1998, a complaint was filed by Orlando L. Salvador in his official capacity as consultant
of petitioner Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) detailed with the Presidential Ad Hoc
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Fact-Finding Committee) against the following private
respondents, all former officers of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and Pagdanan Timber
Products, Inc. (PTPI):
1. Leonides S. Virata (chairperson of the Board of Governors of DBP)
2. Alicia Ll. Reyes (manager of Industrial Projects, Department I of DBP)
3. Rodolfo D. Manalo and Verden C. Dangilan (both executive officers of DBP),[4]
4. Jose Y. Campos
5. Francisco de Guzman
6. Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. and
7. Erwin G. Vorster[5]
The latter four were officers and stockholders of PTPI.
All eight were charged with violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

In our resolution dated August 29, 2001, we dismissed the case insofar as private respondent
Virata was concerned since he had passed away.
Petitioner Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans was created pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 13 dated October 8, 1992 issued by former President Fidel V. Ramos, with the
chairman of PCGG as chairman, the Solicitor General as vice chairman and one representative each from
the Office of the Executive Secretary, Department of Finance, Department of Justice, DBP, Philippine
National Bank, Asset Privatization Trust, Office of the Government Corporate Counsel and the Philippine
Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation as members. It was tasked to inventory all behest loans,
identify the lenders and borrowers and recommend the course of action that the government should take
to recover such loans.
On November 9, 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61 which provided the following
criteria to indicate a behest loan:
a. it was undercollateralized;
b. the borrower corporation was undercapitalized;
c. direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials like presence of marginal

notes;
d. stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation were identified as cronies;
e. deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended;
f. use of corporate layering;
g. non-feasibility of the project for which financing was sought and
h. extraordinary speed at which the loan release was made.

The Fact-Finding Committee determined that the loan transaction between DBP and PTPI bore the
characteristics of a behest loan. Specifically, petitioners alleged that PTPI was a joint venture of Anchor
Estate Corporation and Jardine Group of Companies. It was organized on August 9, 1974 to take over the
properties acquired by DBP from Fil-Eastern Wood Industries, Inc. On the same date, PTPI applied for a
foreign guarantee loan in the amount of US $13.5 million to purchase these and other brand-new
equipment such as sawmill, veneering plant and logging equipment. The financial accommodation was
approved on August 14, 1974 or after only five days.[6]
According to petitioners, PTPI had no sufficient capital at the time the loan was granted since its
paid-up capital amounted to P25,000 only. However, it was able to obtain additional accommodations and
restructuring of accounts up to July 18, 1979. As of June 30, 1986, it had an outstanding and unpaid
balance of P454.85 million.[7] In addition, the loan was undercollateralized since there were no existing
assets offered as security except for assets to be acquired using the loan proceeds, assignment of the
forest concessions of PTPI and the joint and several undertaking of MacMillan Jardine. Petitioner claimed
that the processing of the original loan application was attended with haste and that there was a deviation
of the loan funds to other purposes.[8] They contended that there was evidence that the loan was granted
at the urging of former President Marcos.[9] They also asserted that DBP leased the properties it acquired
by foreclosure to PTPI beyond five years which was a violation of Section 25 of the General Banking
Act.[10]
Accordingly, a complaint was filed in the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of RA 3019, section
3 (e) and (g). In a resolution dated October 12, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the
complaint. It held that (1) there was no evidence that the loan was granted at the behest, command or
urging of previous government officials; (2) PTPI complied with the DBP requirement that it would
increase its paid-up capital from P25,000 to P1 million; (3) the loan was not undercollateralized and (4)
the complaint was barred by prescription. It denied reconsideration in an order dated January 5, 1999.
Hence this petition for certiorari.
The issue for our resolution is whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in
(1) holding that the offenses charged in the complaint had already prescribed and (2) dismissing the
complaint for lack of probable cause to indict private respondents for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g)
of RA 3019.
HAD THE OFFENSES PRESCRIBED?
The Ombudsman held that the ten-year prescriptive period commenced on the date of the
violation of law under Section 11 of RA 3019. The transaction occurred in 1974. Hence, the complaint
was allegedly barred by prescription when it was filed on February 17, 1998.
This issue had previously been resolved in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans v. Desierto.[11] The Court held:

Since the law alleged to have been violated, i.e., paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3,
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in the computation of the
prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of
the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from
the discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against

the guilty person and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy.
This simply means that if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall
commence to run on the day it was committed.
In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have
known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made
because, as alleged, the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the
"beneficiaries of the loans." Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive
period for the offenses with which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should
be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such
commission.[12] (Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine was reiterated in subsequent cases also involving petitioners and public respondent and
is now well-settled.[13]
Therefore, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the date of discovery of the
offenses in 1992 after the investigation of the Fact-Finding Committee.[14]When the complaint was filed
in 1998 or after six years, prescription had not set in. [15]
WAS THERE PROBABLE CAUSE?
The Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of discretion when he found that there was no
evidence to establish probable cause to sustain the charges against private respondents. Section 3 (e)
and (g) of RA 3019 provide:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. ― In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of
any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
e. Causing undue injury to any party, including the Government or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
xxx xxx xxx

g. Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit
thereby.[16]
Grave abuse is defined as:

... such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer
concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.[17]
The Ombudsman explained his reasons for dismissing the complaint:
There is no evidence on record to prove that the loan was granted to PTPI at the behest,
command or urging by previous government officials. As appearing from its Corporate
Profile, PTPI is a company organized on August 9, 1974 to take over the properties
acquired by DBP from Fil-Eastern Wood Industries, Inc. (FEWI). The foreign currency loan
of US $13.5 million will be used to purchase brand new sawmill and veneering plant and
additional logging equipment since the old equipment were found to be obsolete.
Although at the inception or at the time the loan was applied, its paid-up capital amounted
to P25,000.00 only, DBP required, under Board Resolution No. 2415, that prior to the
issuance of letter of guarantee and execution of deed of sale, in order to cover the pre-
operating expenses, PTPI shall first increase its paid-up capital from P25,000.00 to P1.0
million. The traditional equity requirement equivalent to 25% of investment was waived in
view of the joint and several signature of Macmillan Jardine and the guarantee of Macmillan
Bloedel and Jardine Matheson. In addition, PTPI should also comply with DBPs
requirement that the 80% collateral ratio is maintained.
Moreover, the loan granted to PTPI was not undercollateralized. Based on the evidence on
record, the financial accommodation was secured by the assets to be acquired; the forest
concession and the joint and several signature of Macmillan Jardine. In fact, DBP Board of
Governors Chairman Leonides S. Virata stated in his Memorandum to then President

Ferdinand E. Marcos, that the guarantee being requested will be more than the value of the
assets since the working capital requirement of about US $1.5 million and pre-operating
expenses of another US $350 million will be funded out of the US $14 million.[18]
Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and RA 6770 (The Ombudsman
Act of 1989), the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a
public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient.[19] It has been the consistent ruling of the Court not to interfere with the Ombudsman's
exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers as long as his rulings are supported by
substantial evidence.[20] Envisioned as the champion of the people and preserver of the integrity of
public service, he has wide latitude in exercising his powers and is free from intervention from the
three branches of government. This is to ensure that his Office is insulated from any outside pressure
and improper influence.[21]
We find no reason to deviate from this rule.
First, the loan accommodation was not undercollateralized. The assets to be acquired by PTPI
would serve as collateral for the loan. The value of these assets, when added to PTPI's
existing properties (which would also serve as collaterals) was higher than the value of the loan.
Second, PTPI complied with the DBP requirement to increase its paid-up capital from P25,000
to P1 million.
Third, the loan proposal was studied and evaluated by DBP. There was no showing that the
DBP officials did not exercise sound business judgment in approving said loan.
Fourth, petitioners did not point out circumstances or overt acts indicating a criminal design on
the part of the DBP and PTPI officials. In fact, they did not specify the particular roles or participation
of each of the private respondents in the commission of the alleged violation of RA 3019. [22]
Last, the fact that the loan was approved after only five days did not necessarily prove manifest
partiality or evident bad faith because there was full compliance with banking laws, practices and
procedures.[23]
In sum, from the facts presented, we cannot conclude that the Ombudsman committed grave
abuse of discretion in finding lack of probable cause. The complaint against the private respondents
should therefore be dismissed.
The Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its facts and
circumstances, should be filed or not. It is basically his call. He may dismiss the complaint
forthwith should he find it to be insufficient in form or substance or should he find it
otherwise, to continue with the inquiry; or he may proceed with the investigation if, in his
view, the complaint is in due and proper form and substance.[24]
In fact, the Ombudsman has the power to dismiss a complaint without going through a
preliminary investigation.[25]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The resolution dated October 12, 1998 and
order dated January 5, 1999 of respondent Ombudsman in OMB-0-98-0364 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Antonino v. Ombudsman, GR. No. 144492, 18 December 2008; Samson v. Restrivera, GR No.
178454, 28 March 2011
THIRD DIVISION
FILIPINA SAMSON, G.R. No. 178454
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - CARPIO MORALES, J.,

Chairperson,
BRION,
BERSAMIN,
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.
JULIA A. RESTRIVERA, Promulgated:

Respondent.
March 28, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Petitioner Filipina Samson appeals the Decision[1] dated October 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 83422 and its Resolution[2] dated June 8, 2007, denying her motion for
reconsideration. The CA affirmed the Ombudsman in finding petitioner guilty of violating Section 4(b) [3] of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner is a government employee, being a department head of the Population Commission with office
at the Provincial Capitol, Trece Martirez City, Cavite.
Sometime in March 2001, petitioner agreed to help her friend, respondent Julia A. Restrivera, to have the
latters land located in Carmona, Cavite, registered under the Torrens System. Petitioner said that the
expenses would reach P150,000 and accepted P50,000 from respondent to cover the initial expenses for
the titling of respondents land. However, petitioner failed to accomplish her task because it was found out
that the land is government property. When petitioner failed to return the P50,000, respondent sued her
for estafa.Respondent also filed an administrative complaint for grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming
a public officer against petitioner before the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of violating Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 and suspended her
from office for six months without pay. The Ombudsman ruled that petitioner failed to abide by the
standard set in Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 and deprived the government of the benefit of committed
service when she embarked on her private interest to help respondent secure a certificate of title over the
latters land.[4]
Upon motion for reconsideration, the Ombudsman, in an Order[5] dated March 15, 2004, reduced the
penalty to three months suspension without pay. According to the Ombudsman, petitioners acceptance of
respondents payment created a perception that petitioner is a fixer. Her act fell short of the standard of
personal conduct required by Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 that public officials shall endeavor to
discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage. The
Ombudsman held:
x x x [petitioner] admitted x x x that she indeed received the amount of P50,000.00 from the
[respondent] and even contracted Engr. Liberato Patromo, alleged Licensed Geodetic
Engineer to do the surveys.
While it may be true that [petitioner] did not actually deal with the other government
agencies for the processing of the titles of the subject property, we believe, however, that
her mere act in accepting the money from the [respondent] with the assurance that she
would work for the issuance of the title is already enough to create a perception that she is
a fixer. Section 4(b) of [R.A.] No. 6713 mandates that public officials and employees
shall endeavor to discourage wrong perception of their roles as dispenser or peddler of
undue patronage.
xxxx
x x x [petitioners] act to x x x restore the amount of [P50,000] was to avoid possible

sanctions.
x x x [d]uring the conciliation proceedings held on 19 October 2002 at the barangay level, it
was agreed upon by both parties that [petitioner] be given until 28 February 2003 within
which to pay the amount of P50,000.00 including interest. If it was true that [petitioner] had
available money to pay and had been persistent in returning the amount of [P50,000.00] to
the [respondent], she would have easily given the same right at that moment (on 19
October 2002) in the presence of the Barangay Officials.[6] x x x. (Stress in the original.)
The CA on appeal affirmed the Ombudsmans Order dated March 19, 2004. The CA ruled that contrary to
petitioners contentions, the Ombudsman has jurisdiction even if the act complained of is a private
matter. The CA also ruled that petitioner violated the norms of conduct required of her as a public officer
when she demanded and received the amount of P50,000 on the representation that she can secure a
title to respondents property and for failing to return the amount. The CA stressed that Section 4(b) of R.A.
No. 6713 requires petitioner to perform and discharge her duties with the highest degree of excellence,
professionalism, intelligence and skill, and to endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of her role as a
dispenser and peddler of undue patronage.[7]
Hence, this petition which raises the following issues:
1. Does the Ombudsman have jurisdiction over a case involving a private dealing by a
government employee or where the act complained of is not related to the performance of
official duty?
2. Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioner administratively liable
despite the dismissal of the estafa case?
3. Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in not imposing a lower penalty in view of
mitigating circumstances?[8]
Petitioner insists that where the act complained of is not related to the performance of official duty, the
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction. Petitioner also imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA
for holding her administratively liable. She points out that the estafa case was dismissed upon a finding
that she was not guilty of fraud or deceit, hence misconduct cannot be attributed to her. And even
assuming that she is guilty of misconduct, she is entitled to the benefit of mitigating circumstances such
as the fact that this is the first charge against her in her long years of public service. [9]
Respondent counters that the issues raised in the instant petition are the same issues that the CA
correctly resolved.[10] She also alleges that petitioner failed to observe the mandate that public office is a
public trust when she meddled in an affair that belongs to another agency and received an amount for
undelivered work.[11]
We affirm the CA and Ombudsman that petitioner is administratively liable. We hasten to add, however,
that petitioner is guilty of conduct unbecoming a public officer.
On the first issue, we agree with the CA that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over respondents complaint
against petitioner although the act complained of involves a private deal between them. [12] Section
13(1),[13] Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that the Ombudsman can investigate on its own or on
complaint by any person any act or omission of any public official or employee when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, or improper. Under Section 16[14] of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as
the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and nonfeasance committed by any public officer or employee during his/her
tenure. Section 19[15] of R.A. No. 6770 also states that the Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating,
but not limited, to acts or omissions which are unfair or irregular. Thus, even if the complaint concerns an
act of the public official or employee which is not service-connected, the case is within the jurisdiction of
the Ombudsman.The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or
employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to
or be connected with or arise from the performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish,
neither should we.[16]
On the second issue, it is wrong for petitioner to say that since the estafa case against her was dismissed,
she cannot be found administratively liable. It is settled that administrative cases may proceed
independently of criminal proceedings, and may continue despite the dismissal of the criminal charges.[17]
For proper consideration instead is petitioners liability under Sec. 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713.
We quote the full text of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6713:
SEC. 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. - (A) Every public
official and employee shall observe the following as standards of personal conduct in the
discharge and execution of official duties:
(a) Commitment to public interest. - Public officials and employees shall always
uphold the public interest over and above personal interest. All government resources and
powers of their respective offices must be employed and used efficiently, effectively,
honestly and economically, particularly to avoid wastage in public funds and revenues.
(b) Professionalism. - Public officials and employees shall perform and discharge
their duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and
skill. They shall enter public service with utmost devotion and dedication to duty. They shall
endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers
of undue patronage.
(c) Justness and sincerity. - Public officials and employees shall remain true to the
people at all times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate
against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged. They shall at all times respect
the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good
customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest. They shall not
dispense or extend undue favors on account of their office to their relatives whether by
consanguinity or affinity except with respect to appointments of such relatives to positions
considered strictly confidential or as members of their personal staff whose terms are
coterminous with theirs.
(d) Political neutrality. - Public officials and employees shall provide service to
everyone without unfair discrimination and regardless of party affiliation or preference.
(e) Responsiveness to the public. - Public officials and employees shall extend
prompt, courteous, and adequate service to the public. Unless otherwise provided by law or
when required by the public interest, public officials and employees shall provide
information on their policies and procedures in clear and understandable language, ensure
openness of information, public consultations and hearings whenever appropriate,
encourage suggestions, simplify and systematize policy, rules and procedures, avoid red
tape and develop an understanding and appreciation of the socioeconomic conditions
prevailing in the country, especially in the depressed rural and urban areas.
(f) Nationalism and patriotism. - Public officials and employees shall at all times be
loyal to the Republic and to the Filipino people, promote the use of locally-produced goods,
resources and technology and encourage appreciation and pride of country and
people. They shall endeavor to maintain and defend Philippine sovereignty against foreign
intrusion.
(g) Commitment to democracy. - Public officials and employees shall commit

themselves to the democratic way of life and values, maintain the principle of public
accountability, and manifest by deed the supremacy of civilian authority over the
military. They shall at all times uphold the Constitution and put loyalty to country above
loyalty to persons or party.
(h) Simple living. - Public officials and employees and their families shall lead
modest lives appropriate to their positions and income. They shall not indulge in
extravagant or ostentatious display of wealth in any form.
(B) The Civil Service Commission shall adopt positive measures to promote (1)
observance of these standards including the dissemination of information programs and
workshops authorizing merit increases beyond regular progression steps, to a limited
number of employees recognized by their office colleagues to be outstanding in their
observance of ethical standards; and (2) continuing research and experimentation on
measures which provide positive motivation to public officials and employees in raising the
general level of observance of these standards.
Both the Ombudsman and CA found the petitioner administratively liable for violating Section 4(A)(b)
on professionalism. Professionalism is defined as the conduct, aims, or qualities that characterize or mark
a profession. A professional refers to a person who engages in an activity with great competence. Indeed,
to call a person a professional is to describe him as competent, efficient, experienced, proficient or
polished.[18] In the context of Section 4 (A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713, the observance of professionalism also
means upholding the integrity of public office by endeavoring to discourage wrong perception of their roles
as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage. Thus, a public official or employee should avoid
any appearance of impropriety affecting the integrity of government services. However, it should be noted
that Section 4(A) enumerates the standards of personal conduct for public officers with reference to
execution of official duties.
In the case at bar, the Ombudsman concluded that petitioner failed to carry out the standard of
professionalism by devoting herself on her personal interest to the detriment of her solemn public
duty. The Ombudsman said that petitioners act deprived the government of her committed service
because the generation of a certificate of title was not within her line of public service. In denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration, the Ombudsman said that it would have been sufficient if petitioner
just referred the respondent to the persons/officials incharge of the processing of the documents for the
issuance of a certificate of title. While it may be true that she did not actually deal with the other
government agencies for the processing of the titles of the subject property, petitioners act of accepting
the money from respondent with the assurance that she would work for the issuance of the title is already
enough to create a perception that she is a fixer.
On its part, the CA rejected petitioners argument that an isolated act is insufficient to create those wrong
perceptions or the impression of influence peddling. It held that the law enjoins public officers, at all times
to respect the rights of others and refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good customs, public order,
public policy, public safety and public interest. Thus, it is not the plurality of the acts that is being punished
but the commission of the act itself.
Evidently, both the Ombudsman and CA interpreted Section 4(A) of R.A. No. 6713 as broad enough to
apply even to private transactions that have no connection to the duties of ones office. We hold, however,
that petitioner may not be penalized for violation of Section 4 (A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713. The reason though
does not lie in the fact that the act complained of is not at all related to petitioners discharge of her duties
as department head of the Population Commission.
In addition to its directive under Section 4(B), Congress authorized[19] the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) to promulgate the rules and regulations necessary to implement R.A. No. 6713. Accordingly, the
CSC issued the Rules Implementing the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (hereafter, Implementing Rules). Rule V of the Implementing Rules provides for an Incentive
and Rewards System for public officials and employees who have demonstrated exemplary service and
conduct on the basis of their observance of the norms of conduct laid down in Section 4 of R.A. No. 6713,
to wit:
RULE V. INCENTIVES AND REWARDS SYSTEM
SECTION 1. Incentives and rewards shall be granted officials and employees who
have demonstrated exemplary service and conduct on the basis of their observance of the
norms of conduct laid down in Section 4 of the Code, namely:
(a) Commitment to public interest. - x x x
(b) Professionalism. - x x x
(c) Justness and sincerity. - x x x
(d) Political neutrality. - x x x
(e) Responsiveness to the public. - x x x
(f) Nationalism and patriotism. - x x x
(g) Commitment to democracy. - x x x
(h) Simple living. - x x x
On the other hand, Rule X of the Implementing Rules enumerates grounds for administrative disciplinary
action, as follows:
RULE X. GROUNDS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY ACTION
SECTION 1. In addition to the grounds for administrative disciplinary action

prescribed under existing laws, the acts and omissions of any official or employee, whether
or not he holds office or employment in a casual, temporary, hold-over, permanent or
regular capacity, declared unlawful or prohibited by the Code, shall constitute grounds for
administrative disciplinary action, and without prejudice to criminal and civil liabilities
provided herein, such as:
(a) Directly or indirectly having financial and material interest in any transaction
requiring the approval of his office. x x x.
(b) Owning, controlling, managing or accepting employment as officer, employee,

consultant, counsel, broker, agent, trustee, or nominee in any private enterprise regulated,
supervised or licensed by his office, unless expressly allowed by law;
(c) Engaging in the private practice of his profession unless authorized by the
Constitution, law or regulation, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with his official functions;
(d) Recommending any person to any position in a private enterprise which has a
regular or pending official transaction with his office, unless such recommendation or
referral is mandated by (1) law, or (2) international agreements, commitment and obligation,
or as part of the functions of his office;
xxxx
(e) Disclosing or misusing confidential or classified information officially known to

him by reason of his office and not made available to the public, to further his private
interests or give undue advantage to anyone, or to prejudice the public interest;
(f) Soliciting or accepting, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment,
loan or anything of monetary value which in the course of his official duties or in connection
with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the
functions of, his office. x x x.
xxxx
(g) Obtaining or using any statement filed under the Code for any purpose contrary
to morals or public policy or any commercial purpose other than by news and
communications media for dissemination to the general public;
(h) Unfair discrimination in rendering public service due to party affiliation or

preference;
(i) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines and to the Filipino people;
(j) Failure to act promptly on letters and request within fifteen (15) days from receipt,
except as otherwise provided in these Rules;
(k) Failure to process documents and complete action on documents and papers
within a reasonable time from preparation thereof, except as otherwise provided in these
Rules;
(l) Failure to attend to anyone who wants to avail himself of the services of the office,
or to act promptly and expeditiously on public personal transactions;
(m) Failure to file sworn statements of assets, liabilities and net worth, and
disclosure of business interests and financial connections; and
(n) Failure to resign from his position in the private business enterprise within thirty
(30) days from assumption of public office when conflict of interest arises, and/or failure to
divest himself of his shareholdings or interests in private business enterprise within sixty
(60) days from such assumption of public office when conflict of interest arises: Provided,
however, that for those who are already in the service and a conflict of interest arises, the
official or employee must either resign or divest himself of said interests within the periods
herein-above provided, reckoned from the date when the conflict of interest had arisen.
In Domingo v. Office of the Ombudsman,[20] this Court had the occasion to rule that failure to abide by the
norms of conduct under Section 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713, in relation to its implementing rules, is not a
ground for disciplinary action, to wit:
The charge of violation of Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 6713 deserves further comment. The
provision commands that public officials and employees shall perform and discharge their
duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill. Said
provision merely enunciates professionalism as an ideal norm of conduct to be observed by
public servants, in addition to commitment to public interest, justness and sincerity, political
neutrality, responsiveness to the public, nationalism and patriotism, commitment to
democracy and simple living.Following this perspective, Rule V of the Implementing Rules
of R.A. No. 6713 adopted by the Civil Service Commission mandates the grant of incentives
and rewards to officials and employees who demonstrate exemplary service and conduct
based on their observance of the norms of conduct laid down in Section 4. In other words,
under the mandated incentives and rewards system, officials and employees who comply
with the high standard set by law would be rewarded. Those who fail to do so cannot expect
the same favorable treatment. However, the Implementing Rules does not provide that
they will have to be sanctioned for failure to observe these norms of conduct. Indeed,
Rule X of the Implementing Rules affirms as grounds for administrative disciplinary
action only acts declared unlawful or prohibited by the Code. Rule X specifically
mentions at least twenty three (23) acts or omissions as grounds for administrative
disciplinary action. Failure to abide by the norms of conduct under Section 4(b) of
R.A. No. 6713 is not one of them. (Emphasis supplied.)
Consequently, the Court dismissed the charge of violation of Section 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713 in that case.
We find no compelling reason to depart from our pronouncement in Domingo. Thus, we reverse the CA
and Ombudsman that petitioner is administratively liable under Section 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713. In so
ruling, we do no less and no more than apply the law and its implementing rules issued by the CSC under
the authority given to it by Congress.Needless to stress, said rules partake the nature of a statute and are
binding as if written in the law itself. They have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent
court.[21]
But is petitioner nonetheless guilty of grave misconduct, which is a ground for disciplinary action under
R.A. No. 6713?
We also rule in the negative.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the
additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which
must be proved by substantial evidence.Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. [22] Conversely, one
cannot be found guilty of misconduct in the absence of substantial evidence. In one case, we affirmed a
finding of grave misconduct because there was substantial evidence of voluntary disregard of established
rules in the procurement of supplies as well as of manifest intent to disregard said rules.[23] We have also
ruled that complicity in the transgression of a regulation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue constitutes
simple misconduct only as there was failure to establish flagrancy in respondents act for her to be held
liable of gross misconduct.[24] On the other hand, we have likewise dismissed a complaint for knowingly
rendering an unjust order, gross ignorance of the law, and grave misconduct, since the complainant did
not even indicate the particular acts of the judge which were allegedly violative of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.[25]
In this case, respondent failed to prove (1) petitioners violation of an established and definite rule of action
or unlawful behavior or gross negligence, and (2) any of the aggravating elements of corruption, willful
intent to violate a law or to disregard established rules on the part of petitioner. In fact, respondent could
merely point to petitioners alleged failure to observe the mandate that public office is a public trust when
petitioner allegedly meddled in an affair that belongs to another agency and received an amount for
undelivered work.
True, public officers and employees must be guided by the principle enshrined in the Constitution that
public office is a public trust. However, respondents allegation that petitioner meddled in an affair that
belongs to another agency is a serious but unproven accusation. Respondent did not even say what acts
of interference were done by petitioner.Neither did respondent say in which government agency petitioner
committed interference. And causing the survey of respondents land can hardly be considered as
meddling in the affairs of another government agency by petitioner who is connected with the Population
Commission. It does not show that petitioner made an illegal deal or any deal with any government
agency. Even the Ombudsman has recognized this fact. The survey shows only that petitioner contracted
a surveyor. Respondent said nothing on the propriety or legality of what petitioner did. The survey shows
that petitioner also started to work on her task under their agreement. Thus, respondents allegation that
petitioner received an amount for undelivered work is not entirely correct. Rather, petitioner failed to fully
accomplish her task in view of the legal obstacle that the land is government property.
However, the foregoing does not mean that petitioner is absolved of any administrative liability.
But first, we need to modify the CA finding that petitioner demanded the amount of P50,000 from
respondent because respondent did not even say that petitioner demanded money from her. [26] We find in
the allegations and counter-allegations that respondent came to petitioners house in Bian, Laguna, and
asked petitioner if she can help respondent secure a title to her land which she intends to sell. Petitioner
agreed to help. When respondent asked about the cost, petitioner said P150,000 and accepted P50,000
from respondent to cover the initial expenses.[27]
We agree with the common finding of the Ombudsman and the CA that, in the aftermath of the aborted
transaction, petitioner still failed to return the amount she accepted. As aptly stated by the Ombudsman, if
petitioner was persistent in returning the amount of P50,000 until the preliminary investigation of
the estafa case on September 18, 2003,[28]there would have been no need for the parties agreement that
petitioner be given until February 28, 2003 to pay said amount including interest. Indeed, petitioners
belated attempt to return the amount was intended to avoid possible sanctions and impelled solely by the
filing of the estafa case against her.
For reneging on her promise to return aforesaid amount, petitioner is guilty of conduct unbecoming a
public officer. In Joson v. Macapagal, we have also ruled that the respondents therein were guilty of
conduct unbecoming of government employees when they reneged on their promise to have pertinent
documents notarized and submitted to the Government Service Insurance System after the complainants
rights over the subject property were transferred to the sister of one of the respondents. [29] Recently,
in Assistant Special Prosecutor III Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S. Ong, et al., we
said that unbecoming conduct means improper performance and applies to a broader range of
transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed
method.[30]
This Court has too often declared that any act that falls short of the exacting standards for public office
shall not be countenanced.[31] The Constitution categorically declares as follows:
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. [32]
Petitioner should have complied with her promise to return the amount to respondent after failing to
accomplish the task she had willingly accepted. However, she waited until respondent sued her for estafa,
thus reinforcing the latters suspicion that petitioner misappropriated her money. Although the element of
deceit was not proven in the criminal case respondent filed against the petitioner, it is clear that by her
actuations, petitioner violated basic social and ethical norms in her private dealings. Even if unrelated to
her duties as a public officer, petitioners transgression could erode the publics trust in government
employees, moreso because she holds a high position in the service.
As to the penalty, we reprimanded the respondents in Joson and imposed a fine in Jamsani-Rodriguez. Under
the circumstances of this case, a fine of P15,000 in lieu of the three months suspension is proper. In imposing
said fine, we have considered as a mitigating circumstance petitioners 37 years of public service and the fact
that this is the first charge against her.[33]Section 53[34] of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service provides that mitigating circumstances such as length of service shall be considered. And
since petitioner has earlier agreed to return the amount of P50,000 including interest, we find it proper to order
her to comply with said agreement. Eventually, the parties may even find time to rekindle their friendship.
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the Decision dated October 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals and its
Resolution dated June 8, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 83422, as well as the Decision dated January 6, 2004
and Order dated March 15, 2004 of the Ombudsman in OMB-L-A-03-0552-F, and ENTER a new
judgment as follows:
We find petitioner GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a public officer and impose upon her
a FINE of P15,000.00 to be paid at the Office of the Ombudsman within five (5) days from finality of this
Decision.
We also ORDER petitioner to return to respondent the amount of P50,000.00 with interest thereon at 12%
per annum from March 2001 until the said amount shall have been fully paid.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Cabalit v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 180236, 17 January 2012
EN BANC
GEMMA P. CABALIT, G.R. No. 180236
Petitioner,
- versus -
COMMISSION ON AUDIT-REGION VII,
Respondent.
x----------------------------------------------x
FILADELFO S. APIT, G.R. No. 180341
Petitioner,
- versus -
COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) Legal

and Adjudication, Region VII,
Respondent.
x----------------------------------------------x
LEONARDO G. OLAIVAR, in his capacity G.R. No. 180342

as Transportation Regulation Officer and
Officer-In-Charge of Land Transportation
Office, Jagna, Province of Bohol,
Present:
Petitioner,
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
- versus -
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,*
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
HON. PRIMO C. MIRO, in his official

capacity as Deputy Ombudsman
for Visayas, EDGARDO G. CANTON, in Promulgated:
his capacity as Graft Investigator Officer,
ATTY. ROY L. URSAL, in his capacity as
Regional Cluster Director, Commission
on Audit, Cebu City, January 17, 2012
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Three employees from the Land Transportation Office (LTO) in Jagna, Bohol were found by the
Ombudsman to have perpetrated a scheme to defraud the government of proper motor vehicle
registration fees. They now seek in the present consolidated petitions a judgment from this Court
annulling the January 18, 2006 Decision1 and September 21, 2007 Resolution2of the Court of Appeals
(CA) which affirmed with modification the Decision3 of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas dismissing
them from government service.
The facts follow:
On September 4, 2001, the Philippine Star News, a local newspaper in Cebu City, reported that
employees of the LTO in Jagna, Bohol, are shortchanging the government by tampering with their income
reports.4 Accordingly, Regional Director Ildefonso T. Deloria of the Commission on Audit (COA) directed
State Auditors Teodocio D. Cabalit and Emmanuel L. Coloma of the Provincial Revenue Audit Group to
conduct a fact-finding investigation. A widespread tampering of official receipts of Motor Vehicle
Registration during the years 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001 was then discovered by the investigators.
According to the investigators, a total of 106 receipts were tampered. The scheme was done by detaching
the Plate Release and Owners copy from the set of official receipts then typing thereon the correct details
corresponding to the vehicle registered, the owners name and address, and the correct amount of
registration fees. The other copies, consisting of the copies for the Collector, EDP, Record, Auditor, and
Regional Office, meanwhile, were typed on to make it appear that the receipts were issued mostly for the
registration of motorcycles with much lower registration charges. Incorrect names and/or addresses were
also used on said file copies. The difference between the amounts paid by the vehicle owners and the
amounts appearing on the file copies were then pocketed by the perpetrators, and only the lower amounts
appearing on the retained duplicate file copies were reported in the Report of Collections.5 According to
State Auditors Cabalit and Coloma in their Joint-Affidavit, the scheme was perpetrated by LTO employees
Leonardo G. Olaivar, Gemma P. Cabalit, Filadelfo S. Apit and Samuel T. Alabat, and resulted in an
unreported income totaling P169,642.50.6
On August 8, 2002, COA Regional Cluster Director Atty. Roy L. Ursal reported the tampering of official
receipts to Deputy Ombudsman Primo C. Miro.7 According to Atty. Ursal, the irregularity is penalized
under Article 217, in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code;8 Section 3(e)9 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, and likewise violates Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713.10
In a Joint Evaluation Report, Graft Investigators Pio R. Dargantes and Virginia Palanca-Santiago found
grounds to conduct a preliminary investigation.11 Hence, a formal charge for dishonesty was filed
against Olaivar, Cabalit, Apit and Alabat before the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, and the parties
were required to submit their counter-affidavits.
In compliance, Olaivar, Cabalit, Apit and Alabat submitted separate counter-affidavits, all essentially
denying knowledge and responsibility for the anomalies. As to Olaivar, he maintained that the receipts
were typed outside his office by regular and casual employees. He claimed that the receipts were
presented to him only for signature and he does not receive the payment when he signs the
receipts.12 Cabalit, for her part, claimed that her duty as cashier was to receive collections turned over to
her and to deposit them in the Land Bank of the Philippines in Tagbilaran City. She claimed that she was
not even aware of any anomaly in the collection of fees prior to the investigation.13 As to Apit, he admitted
that he countersigned the official receipts, but he too denied being aware of any illegal activity in their
office. He claimed that upon being informed of the charge, he verified the photocopies of the tampered
receipts and was surprised to find that the signatures above his name were falsified. 14 Alabat, meanwhile,
claimed he did not tamper, alter or falsify any public document in the performance of his duties. He
insisted that the initial above his name on Official Receipt No. 64056082 was Apits, while the initial on
Official Receipt No. 64056813 was that of Olaivar.15
During the hearing before Graft Investigator Pio R. Dargantes, State Auditor Cabalit testified on the
investigation he conducted in the LTO in Jagna, Bohol. He testified that he was furnished with the owners
and duplicate copies of the tampered receipts. Upon comparison of the Owners copy with the Collector or
Records copy, he noticed that the amounts shown in the original copies were much bigger than those
appearing in the file copies. State Auditor Cabalit also declared that the basis for implicating Olaivar is the
fact that his signature appears in all the 106 tampered official receipts and he signed as verified correct
the Report of Collections, which included the tampered receipts. As to Apit and Cabalit, they are the other
signatories of the official receipts.16 In some official receipts, the Owners copy is signed by F.S. Apit as
Computer Evaluator, G.P. Cabalit as Cashier, and Leonardo Olaivar as District Head, but their signatures
do not appear on the file copies.17
On February 12, 2004, the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas directed18 the parties to submit their
position papers pursuant to Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 17, dated September 7, 2003, amending
the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.19 No cross-examination of State
Auditor Cabalit was therefore conducted.
Complying with the above Order, the COA submitted its position paper on March 18,
2004. Olaivar, Cabalit and Apit, for their part, respectively submitted their position papers on April 29,
2004, March 18, 2004 and March 15, 2004.
In its position paper,20 the COA pointed out that the signatures of Cabalit, Apit and Olaivar were
indispensable to the issuance of the receipts. As to Olaivar, the original receipts bear his signature,
thereby showing that he approved of the amounts collected for the registration charges. However, when
the receipts were reported in the Report of Collections, the data therein were already tampered reflecting
a much lesser amount. By affixing his signature on the Report of Collections and thereby attesting that the
entries therein were verified by him as correct, he allowed the scheme to be perpetrated. As to Cabalit,
the COA pointed out that as cashier, Cabalits signature on the receipts signified that she received the
registration fees. The correct amounts should have therefore appeared in the Report of Collections, but as
already stated, lesser amounts appeared on the Report of Collections, which she prepares. In the same
manner, Apit, as computer evaluator, also signed the subject receipts allowing the irregularities to be
perpetuated.
In his position paper,21 Olaivar meanwhile insisted that he had no participation in the anomalies. He
stressed that his only role in the issuance of the official receipts was to review and approve the
applications, and that he was the last one to sign the official receipts. He argued that based on the
standard procedure for the processing of applications for registration of motor vehicles, it could be
deduced that there was a concerted effort or conspiracy among the evaluator, typist and cashier, while he
was kept blind of their modus operandi.
Cabalit, for her part, questioned the findings of the investigators. She stressed in her position paper 22 that
had there been a thorough investigation of the questioned official receipts, the auditors would have
discovered that the signatures appearing above her name were actually that of Olaivar. She outlined the
standard paper flow of a regular transaction at the LTO. It begins when the registrant goes to the
computer evaluator for the computation of applicable fees and proceeds to the cashier for payment. After
paying, the typist will prepare the official receipts consisting of seven (7) copies, which will be routed to
the computer evaluator, to the district head, and to the cashier for signature. The cashier retains the
copies for the EDP, Regional Office, Collector and Auditor, while the remaining copies (Owner, Plate
Release and Records copy) will be forwarded to the Releasing Section for distribution and release.
Cabalit insisted that on several occasions Olaivar disregarded the standard procedure and directly
accommodated some registrants who were either his friends or referred to him by friends. For such
transactions, Olaivar assumes the functions of computer evaluator, typist and cashier, as he is the one
who computes the fees, receives the payment and prepares the official receipts. Olaivar would then remit
the payment to her. As the cashier, she has to accept the payment as a matter of ministerial duty.
Apit, meanwhile, stressed in his position paper23 that the strokes of the signatures appearing above his
typewritten name on the official receipts are different, indicating that the same are falsified. He also
explained that considering that the LTO in Jagna issues around 20 to 25 receipts a day, he signed the
receipts relying on the faith that his co-employees had properly accomplished the forms. He also pointed
out that Engr. Dano admitted signing accomplished official receipts when the regular computer encoder is
out, which just shows that other personnel could have signed above the name of F.S. Apit.
On May 3, 2004, the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas rendered judgment finding petitioners liable for
dishonesty for tampering the official receipts to make it appear that they collected lesser amounts than
they actually collected. The OMB-Visayas ruled:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby resolved that the following respondents be found guilty
of the administrative infraction of DISHONESTY and accordingly be meted out the penalty of DISMISSAL
FROM THE SERVICE with the accessory penalties of cancellation of civil service eligibility, forfeiture of
retirement benefits and disqualification from re-employment in the government service:
1. Leonardo G. Olaivar -Transportation Regulation Officer II/ Office[r]-In-Charge

LTO Jagna District Office
Jagna, Bohol;
2. Gemma P. Cabalit - Cashier II, LTO Jagna District Office Jagna, Bohol;
3. Filadelpo S. Apit - Clerk II, LTO Jagna District Office Jagna, Bohol;
The complaint against respondent Samuel T. Alabat, presently the Head of Apprehension Unit of
the Tagbilaran City LTO, is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
The complaint regarding the LTO official receipts/MVRRs issued by the LTO Jagna District Office, which
are not covered by original copies are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate
charges upon the recovery of the original copies thereof.
SO DECIDED.24
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the decision, but their motions were denied by the
Ombudsman.25 Thus, they separately sought recourse from the CA.
On January 18, 2006, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision in CA-G.R. SP. Nos. 86256, 86394 and
00047. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by US DISMISSING the instant
consolidated petitions. The assailed decision of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas dated May 3, 2004
in OMB-V-A-02-0415-H is hereby AFFIRMED with a modification that petitioner Olaivar be held
administratively liable for gross neglect of duty which carries the same penalty as provided for dishonesty.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.26
According to the CA, it was unbelievable that from 1998 to 2001, Cabalit and Apit performed vital
functions by routinely signing LTO official receipts but did not have any knowledge of the irregularity in
their office. With regard to Olaivar, the CA believed that the tampering of the receipts could have been
avoided had he exercised the required diligence in the performance of his duties. Thus, the CA held him
liable merely for gross neglect of duty.
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the CA decision, but the CA denied their motions.27 Hence, they filed
the instant petitions before the Court.
In her petition, petitioner Cabalit argues that

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE OMBUDSMAN'S
DECISION WHICH GAVE RETROACTIVE EFFECT TO THE NEW ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 17 IN
THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW THAT WAS ALREADY ON TRIAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 07.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALTHOUGH THE
TRIAL TYPE HEARING UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 07 DID NOT PUSH THRU,
PETITIONER WAS STILL ACCORDED HER RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE SUMMARY
PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 17.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN DESPITE HAVING FAILED TO MAKE A
CATEGORICAL RULING ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE QUESTIONED AND/OR FORGED
SIGNATURES BELONG TO PETITIONER GEMMA CABALIT.
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED
TO RULE ON THE DOCTRINAL VALUE AND/OR APPLICABILITY OF THE TAPIADOR VS. OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN (G.R. [129124], MARCH 15, 2002) RULING HERE IN THE INSTANT CASE.28
Meanwhile, Apit interposes the following arguments in his petition:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN LIMITING ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS AS AN
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD ONLY.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THE DEFENSE OF PETITIONER APIT AS
MERE DENIAL.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS FAILURE TO RECONSIDER THE EVIDENCE THAT
CLEARLY PROVED THAT THE SIGNATURES ABOVE THE NAME OF PETITIONER APIT IN THE
QUESTIONED RECEIPTS ARE ALL FORGED AND FALSIFIED.29
As for Olaivar, he assails the CA Decision raising the following issues:

I. WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT
PETITIONER LEONARDO G. OLAIVAR IS ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR GROSS
NEGLIGENCE.
II. WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT
PETITIONER LEONARDO G. OLAIVAR WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN THE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VISAYAS FOUND HIM GUILTY FOR DISHONESTY AND
METED OUT THE PENALTY OF DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE.30
On January 15, 2008, said petitions were consolidated.31
Essentially, the issues for our resolution are: (1) whether there was a violation of the right to due process
when the hearing officer at the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas adopted the procedure under A.O. No.
17 notwithstanding the fact that the said amendatory order took effect after the hearings had started; and
(2) whether Cabalit, Apit and Olaivar are administratively liable.
As regards the first issue, petitioners claim that they were denied due process of law when the
investigating lawyer proceeded to resolve the case based only on the affidavits and other evidence on
record without conducting a formal hearing. They lament that the case was submitted for decision without
giving them opportunity to present witnesses and cross-examine the witnesses against
them. Petitioner Cabalit also argues that the Office of the Ombudsman erred in applying the amendments
under A.O. No. 17 to the trial of the case, which was already in progress under the old procedures under
A.O. No. 07. She stressed that under A.O. No. 07, she had the right to choose whether to avail of a formal
investigation or to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the evidence on record. Here, she was
not given such option and was merely required to submit her position paper.
Petitioners arguments deserve scant consideration.
Suffice to say, petitioners were not denied due process of law when the investigating lawyer proceeded to
resolve the case based on the affidavits and other evidence on record. Section 5(b)(1) 32 Rule 3, of
the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, plainly provides
that the hearing officer may issue an order directing the parties to file, within ten days from receipt of the
order, their respective verified position papers on the basis of which, along with the attachments thereto,
the hearing officer may consider the case submitted for decision. It is only when the hearing officer
determines that based on the evidence, there is a need to conduct clarificatory hearings or formal
investigations under Section 5(b)(2) and Section 5(b)(3) that such further proceedings will be conducted.
But the determination of the necessity for further proceedings rests on the sound discretion of the hearing
officer. As the petitioners have utterly failed to show any cogent reason why the hearing officers
determination should be overturned, the determination will not be disturbed by this Court. We likewise find
no merit in their contention that the new procedures under A.O. No. 17, which took effect while the case
was already undergoing trial before the hearing officer, should not have been applied.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that one does not have a vested right in procedural rules. In Tan, Jr. v. Court
of Appeals,33 the Court elucidated:
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in
that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the
litigants rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The
retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may
feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes
constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may
attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been held that a person has no vested
right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the
trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of
procedure. (Emphasis supplied.)
While the rule admits of certain exceptions, such as when the statute itself expressly or by necessary
implication provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation, or where to apply it would
impair vested rights, petitioners failed to show that application of A.O. No. 17 to their case would cause
injustice to them. Indeed, in this case, the Office of the Ombudsman afforded petitioners every opportunity
to defend themselves by allowing them to submit counter-affidavits, position papers, memoranda and
other evidence in their defense. Since petitioners have been afforded the right to be heard and to defend
themselves, they cannot rightfully complain that they were denied due process of law. Well to remember,
due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type
proceeding. It is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to
explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable
opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum
requirements of due process. More often, this opportunity is conferred through written pleadings that the
parties submit to present their charges and defenses.34 But as long as a party is given the opportunity to
defend his or her interests in due course, said party is not denied due process.35
Neither is there merit to Cabalits assertion that she should have been investigated under the old rules of
procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, and not under the new rules. In Marohomsalic v. Cole,36 we
clarified that the Office of the Ombudsman has only one set of rules of procedure and that is A.O. No. 07,
series of 1990, as amended. There have been various amendments made thereto but it has remained, to
date, the only set of rules of procedure governing cases filed in the Office of the Ombudsman. Hence, the
phrase as amended is correctly appended to A.O. No. 7 every time it is invoked. A.O. No. 17 is just one
example of these amendments.
But did the CA correctly rule that petitioners Cabalit and Apit are liable for dishonesty while
petitioner Olaivar is liable for gross neglect of duty?
Cabalit argues that the CA erred in affirming the decision of the Ombudsman finding her liable for
dishonesty. She asserts that it was not established by substantial evidence that the forged signatures
belong to her. Meanwhile, Apit contends that the CA erred in not considering evidence which proves that
the signatures appearing above his name are falsified. However, we note that both Cabalit and Apit raise
essentially factual issues which are not proper in petitions filed under Rule 45. Settled jurisprudence
dictates that subject to a few exceptions, only questions of law may be brought before the Court via a
petition for review on certiorari. In Diokno v. Cacdac,37 the Court held:
x x x [T]he scope of this Courts judicial review of decisions of the Court of Appeals is
generally confined only to errors of law, and questions of fact are not entertained. We
elucidated on our fidelity to this rule, and we said:
Thus, only questions of law may be brought by the parties and

passed upon by this Court in the exercise of its power to review. Also,
judicial review by this Court does not extend to a reevaluation of the
sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper x x x tribunal has based
its determination. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is aphoristic that a re-examination of factual findings cannot be done through a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because this Court is not a trier of facts; it reviews only
questions of law. The Supreme Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence
considered in the proceedings below. 38
Here, the CA affirmed the findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas which are supported
by substantial evidence such as affidavits of witnesses and copies of the tampered official receipts. 39 The
CA found that a perusal of the questioned receipts would easily reveal the discrepancies between the
date, name and vehicle in the Owner's or Plate Release copies and the File, Auditor, and Regional Office
copies. It upheld the factual findings of the Ombudsman that petitioners Cabalit and Apit tampered with
the duplicates of the official receipts to make it appear that they collected a lesser amount. Their
participation was found to have been indispensable as the irregularities could not have been committed
without their participation. They also concealed the misappropriation of public funds by falsifying the
receipts.
Now, superior courts are not triers of facts. When the findings of fact of the Ombudsman are supported by
substantial evidence, it should be considered as conclusive.40 This Court recognizes the expertise and
independence of the Ombudsman and will avoid interfering with its findings absent a finding of grave
abuse of discretion.41 Hence, being supported by substantial evidence, we find no reason to disturb the
factual findings of the Ombudsman which are affirmed by the CA.
As for Olaivar, he insists that the CA erred in holding him administratively liable for gross negligence when
he relied to a reasonable extent and in good faith on the actions of his subordinates in the preparation of
the applications for registration. He questions the appellate courts finding that he failed to exercise the
required diligence in the performance of his duties.
While as stated above, the general rule is that factual findings of the CA are not reviewable by this Court,
we find that Olaivars case falls in one of the recognized exceptions laid down in jurisprudence since the
CAs findings regarding his liability are premised on the supposed absence of evidence but contradicted by
the evidence on record.42
The Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas found Olaivar administratively liable for dishonesty while the CA
ruled that he may not be held liable for dishonesty supposedly for lack of sufficient evidence. The CA
ruled that there was no substantial evidence to show that Olaivar participated in the scheme, but the
tampering of the official receipts could have been avoided had he exercised the required diligence in the
performance of his duties as officer-in-charge of the Jagna District Office. Thus, the CA found him liable
only for gross neglect of duty. This, however, is clear error on the part of the CA.
For one, there is clear evidence that Olaivar was involved in the anomalies.
Witness Joselito Taladua categorically declared in his affidavit43 that he personally paid Olaivar the sum
of P2,675 for the renewal of registration of a jeep for which he was issued Official Receipt No. 47699853.
Much to his dismay, Taladua later found out that his payment was not reflected correctly in the Report of
Collections, and that the vehicle was deemed unregistered for the year 2000.
More, Cabalit pointed to Olaivar as the person behind the anomaly in the LTO-Jagna District Office. She
narrated in her position paper that on several times, Olaivar directly accommodated some registrants and
assumed the functions of computer evaluator, typist and cashier, and computed the fees, received
payment and prepared the official receipts for those transactions. She also revealed that Olaivar would
ask her for unused official receipts and would later return the duplicate copies to her with the cash
collections. Later, he would verify the Report of Collections as correct. 44
Likewise, Motor Vehicle Inspector Engr. Lowell A. Dano confirmed that in several instances, he
witnessed Olaivar type the data himself in the official receipts even if they have a typist in the office to do
the job. Engr. Dano added that after typing, Olaivar personally brought the accomplished official receipts
for him (Engr. Dano) to sign.45
Moreover, Jacinto Jalop, the records officer of the LTO in Jagna, Bohol, illustrated how the official receipts
were tampered. He disclosed that the correct charges were typed in the Owners copy and the Plate
Release copy of the official receipts, but a much lower charge and an incorrect address were indicated in
the other copies. He asserted that Olaivar was responsible for tampering the official receipts.46
Neglect of duty implies only the failure to give proper attention to a task expected of an employee arising
from either carelessness or indifference.47 However, the facts of this case show more than a failure to
mind ones task. Rather, they manifest that Olaivar committed acts of dishonesty, which is defined as the
concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to ones office or connected with the
performance of his duty. It implies a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack
of integrity; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle. 48 Hence, the CA should have
found Olaivar liable for dishonesty.
But be that as it may, still, the CA correctly imposed the proper penalty upon Olaivar. Under Section 52,
Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty, like gross neglect
of duty, is classified as a grave offense punishable by dismissal even if committed for the first
time.49 Under Section 58,50 such penalty likewise carries with it the accessory penalties of cancellation of
civil service eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and disqualification from re-employment in the
government service.
One final note. Cabalit contends that pursuant to the obiter in Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman,51 the
Office of the Ombudsman can only recommend administrative sanctions and not directly impose
them. However, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing,52 this Court has already settled the issue when
we ruled that the power of the Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability is not merely
recommendatory but actually mandatory. We held,
We reiterated this ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja, where we emphasized

that the Ombudsmans order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an
officer or employee is not merely advisory or recommendatory but is actually mandatory.
Implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the
proper officer. Recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, we also held
While Section 15(3) of RA 6770 states that the Ombudsman has the power to
recommend x x x removal, suspension, demotion x x x of government officials
and employees, the same Section 15(3) also states that the Ombudsman in
the alternative may enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in
Section 21 of RA 6770. (emphasis supplied.)53
Subsequently, in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,54 and Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals,55 the
Court upheld the Ombudsmans power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault in the exercise of its
administrative disciplinary authority. In Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, we held that the
exercise of such power is well founded in the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as The
Ombudsman Act of 1989, thus:
The Court further explained in Ledesma that the mandatory character of the Ombudsmans
order imposing a sanction should not be interpreted as usurpation of the authority of the
head of office or any officer concerned. This is because the power of the Ombudsman to
investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an exclusive
authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. By stating
therefore that the Ombudsman recommends the action to be taken against an erring officer
or employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in Republic Act No. 6770 intended that
the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper officer.
Consequently in Ledesma, the Court affirmed the appellate courts decision which had, in
turn, affirmed an order of the Office of the Ombudsman imposing the penalty of suspension
on the erring public official.56
The duty and privilege of the Ombudsman to act as protector of the people against the illegal and unjust
acts of those who are in the public service emanate from no less than the 1987 Constitution. Section 12 of
Article XI thereof states:
Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.
In addition, Section 15 (3) of R.A. No. 6770, provides:
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:
xxxx
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or
employee at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law,
and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and
ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21
of this Act: Provided, That the refusal by any officer without just cause to comply with an
order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure or prosecute an officer
or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required
by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer.
xxxx
Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770 grants to the Ombudsman the authority to act on all administrative
complaints:
SEC. 19. Administrative Complaints. The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating,
but not limited to acts or omissions which:
(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;
(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agencys functions, though in accordance
with law;
(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.
In the exercise of his duties, the Ombudsman is given full administrative disciplinary authority. His power
is not limited merely to receiving, processing complaints, or recommending penalties. He is to conduct
investigations, hold hearings, summon witnesses and require production of evidence and place
respondents under preventive suspension. This includes the power to impose the penalty of removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, or censure of a public officer or employee. 57
The provisions in R.A. No. 6770 taken together reveal the manifest intent of the lawmakers to bestow on
the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority. These provisions cover the entire
gamut of administrative adjudication which entails the authority to, inter alia, receive complaints, conduct
investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its rules of procedure, summon witnesses and require the
production of documents, place under preventive suspension public officers and employees pending an
investigation, determine the appropriate penalty imposable on erring public officers or employees as
warranted by the evidence, and, necessarily, impose the said penalty. 58 Thus, it is settled that the Office
of the Ombudsman can directly impose administrative sanctions.
We find it worthy to state at this point that public service requires integrity and discipline. For this reason,
public servants must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and dedication to duty. By the very
nature of their duties and responsibilities, public officers and employees must faithfully adhere to hold
sacred and render inviolate the constitutional principle that a public office is a public trust; and must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency.59
WHEREFORE, the petitions for review on certiorari are DENIED. The assailed Decision dated January 18,
2006 and Resolution dated September 21, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. Nos. 86256,
86394 and 00047 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Leonardo G. Olaivar is held
administratively liable for DISHONESTY and meted the penalty of dismissal from the service as well as
the accessory penalties inherent to said penalty.
With costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
(On official leave)

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO BIENVENIDO L. REYES
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.
-________________________________________________________________
Office of the Ombudsman v. Santiago, G.R. No. 161098, 13 September 2007

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 161098 September 13, 2007
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,

vs.
CELSO SANTIAGO, Respondent.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated June 18,
2003 and Resolution dated December 8, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66744.
The facts are:
On July 27, 2000, the City of Manila, through the City Budget Office, released a calamity fund for
Barangay 183, Zone 16, same city, in the amount of P44,053.00. This was received by Barangay
Chairman Celso Santiago, respondent herein.
On October 3, 2000, Rebecca B. Pangilinan, Mario B. Martin, Rolando H. Lopez and Alfredo M. Escaño,
Sr., all barangay kagawad of Barangay 183, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner, an
administrative complaint for technical malversation, violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming of a public officer against respondent, docketed
as OMB-ADM-0-00-0828.
The complaint alleges that (a) respondent failed to utilize the calamity fund for the purpose for which it
was allocated; (b) he leased a portion of the barangay sidewalk to Amity Food Corporation without the
conformity of the barangay kagawad; (c) Amity Food Corporation issued checks payable to respondent,
not in the name of the Barangay; (d) he did not open any bank account for and in the name of Barangay
183, Zone 16; and (e) he collected fees for the use of the barangay chapel without remitting any single
centavo to the barangay treasurer.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the administrative complaint denying all the charges and contending
that the complaint was filed to harass him.
In a Decision dated May 22, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman declared respondent guilty of dishonesty,
grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and dismissed him from the
service, thus:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, respondent CELSO R. SANTIAGO, Barangay

Chairman of Barangay 183, Zone 16 of the Second District of Manila is hereby found GUILTY of the
administrative offenses of DISHONESTY, GRAVE MISCONDUCT and CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO
THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE with the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE
pursuant to the pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of
1989.
The City Mayor of Manila is hereby directed to immediately implement this DECISION in accordance with
law and to inform this office of its initial action within fifteen (15) days upon receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and an urgent motion to hold in abeyance the
implementation of the Decision, but both motions were denied by the Office of the Ombudsman in an
Order dated July 24, 2001.
Thus, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a "Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandatory
Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order." Apparently, the Court of
Appeals considered this action a petition for review.
In its Decision3 dated June 18, 2003, the Court of Appeals partially granted the petition, thus:
However, assuming arguendo, that petitioner is administratively liable, public respondent has no authority
to directly dismiss the petitioner from the government service, more particularly from his elective position
of Barangay Captain. (Renato A. Tapiador vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 129124, March 15,
2002)
xxx
Clearly, public respondent has the duty to investigate and prosecute only for and in its behalf, civil,
criminal, and administrative offenses committed by government officers and employees embodied in
Sections 15 and 11 of R.A. 6770 (George Uy vs. the Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al., 354 SCRA 651). It
cannot directly impose any disciplinary measure upon any erring public officer.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The portions of
the Decision dated May 22, 2001 rendered by the Office of the Ombudsman in Administrative Case No.
OMB-0-00-0828 for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service, ordering the dismissal of petitioner and directing the City Mayor of Manila to implement said
Decision are hereby DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
The Office of the Ombudsman filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the Court of
Appeals in its Resolution4 of December 8, 2003.
Hence, the present petition.

Petitioner contends, inter alia, that the obiter dictum in the case of Tapiador v. Office of the
Ombudsman5 to the effect that the Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss an erring public
official or employee from the government service6 is not a controlling doctrine.
For his part, respondent maintains that the petition should be denied for lack of merit.
The issue for our resolution is whether the Ombudsman has the power to dismiss erring government
officials or employees.
Section 13(3), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and
recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance
therewith.
Invoking Tapiador, respondent contends that the word "recommend" be given its literal meaning, that is,
that the Ombudsman’s action, pursuant to the above provision, is only recommendatory.
In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,7 we held:
Several reasons militate against a literal interpretation of the subject constitutional provision. Firstly, a
cursory reading of Tapiador reveals that the main point of the case was the failure of the complainant
therein to present substantial evidence to prove the charges of the administrative case. The statement
that made reference to the power of the Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter dictum and, as it is
unsupported by sufficient explanation, is susceptible to varying interpretations, as what precisely is before
us in this case. Hence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of this Court nor is it safe from judicial
examination.
In interpreting a statute, care should be given that every part thereof be given effect. 8 Hence, the use of
the word "recommend" must be read in conjunction with the words "ensure compliance therewith" in order
not to run counter to the intention of the framers of the Constitution to give the Ombudsman full and
complete disciplinary authority, with powers that are not merely persuasive in character. In fact, Section
13(3), Article XI is complemented by Section 15 of Republic Act No. 67709 which reads:
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions and duties:
...
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault or
who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its
disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act: Provided, That the refusal by any officer without
just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or
prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty
required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer; x x x
Considering that the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with an order of the Ombudsman
to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, it follows that the
Ombudsman’s "recommendation" is not merely advisory but is actually mandatory within the bounds of
law.10
At any rate, the power of the Ombudsman to directly remove an erring public official has been
jurisprudentially settled. In Estarija v. Ranada,11 we ruled:
The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. His office was given teeth to render this
constitutional body not merely functional but also effective. Thus, we hold that under Republic Act No.
6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from
government service an erring public official other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary.
(Emphasis supplied).
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 66744 are REVERSED. The Decision dated May 22, 2001 of the Office of the
Ombudsman is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
RENATO C. CORONA ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Office of the Ombudsman v. Cordova, G.R. No. 188650, 6 October 2010

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 188650 October 6, 2010
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,

vs.
PRISCILLA S. CORDOVA, Deputy Collector for Assessment, Bureau of Customs, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 187166
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE-REVENUE INTEGRITY PROTECTION SERVICE (DOF-RIPS) AND

COMMISSIONER NAPOLEON MORALES, Petitioners,
vs.
PRISCILLA S. CORDOVA, Deputy Collector for Assessment, Bureau of Customs, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Department of Finance-Revenue Integrity Protection Service (DOF-RIPS), by Complaint-

Affidavit1 executed by two of its legal officers, charged on October 11, 2007 before the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB) Priscilla S. Cordova (respondent), Deputy Collector for Assessment of the Bureau of
Customs, Port of Subic, together with Atty. Baltazar Morales (Morales), Chief of the Assessment Division,
for violating, inter alia, Section 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019,2 the pertinent provisions of the Tariff
and Customs Code, as amended, Republic Act No. 6713,3 and the pertinent provisions of the Revised
Penal Code in connection with their alleged participation in the alleged smuggling of sixteen (16) high-end
luxury vehicles consigned to Hidemitsu Trading Corporation (Hidemitsu Trading), 144 of which were taken
out of the Subic Bay Freeport Zone (SBFZ) without paying the required taxes and duties therefor.
The Complaint-Affidavit alleged that respondent’s act of issuing the 14 Certifications 5 that "per our record
the following appears: FULLY PAID (IMPORTATION) . . ." and Certificates of Payment6 attesting to the
full payment of taxes due to the 14 vehicles, enabled their release from SBFZ without paying the required
taxes and duties therefor.7 Morales was accused of coordinating and conspiring with respondent.8
After preliminary investigation, the OMB, finding probable cause to hold respondent liable which may
warrant her dismissal from the service, issued Order9 dated November 12, 2007 placing respondent under
preventive suspension without pay during the pendency of the administrative case, but not to exceed a
total period of six (6) months. The Order was issued pursuant to Section 9 of Administrative Order (AO)
No. 7, as amended, vis-à-vis Section 24 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6770.10
Section 9 of AO No. 7 reads:
SECTION 9. Preventive Suspension. Pending investigation, the respondent maybe preventively

suspended without pay if, in the judgment of the Ombudsman or his proper deputy, the evidence of guilt is
strong and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or gross
misconduct or gross neglect in the performance of duty; or (b) the charge would warrant removal from the
service; or (c) the respondent’s continued stay in office may prejudice the just, fair and independent
disposition of the case filed against him.
Upon the other hand, Section 24 of RA No. 6770 reads:
SECTION 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his deputy may preventively suspend any
officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is
strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression, grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service;
or (c) the respondent’s continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
In granting the prayer for preventive suspension of respondent, OMB ratiocinated as follows:
It became readily apparent from the pieces of evidence presented that there is a strong basis for this
Office to grant the preventive suspension prayed for. The accusatory allegations contained in the
complaint constitute an act of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct which, if proved true, could warrant her
removal from government service.
The evidence of guilt was given strength by the documentary evidence proving her possible participation
in the anomalous release of the subject vehicles. The presence of her name and signature in the
Certifications brings forth the prima facie presumption that she deliberately made a misrepresentation by
making it appear in the said Certificates that the taxes due on the subject vehicles were paid when, in
truth and in fact, it was not.11(underscoring supplied)
With respect to Morales, the OMB dismissed the complaint against him after noting that all that was
proffered to substantiate the accusation against him was his being the right-hand man and trusted
lieutenant of respondent.
Respondent assailed the OMB’s November 12, 2007 Order via Certiorari, Prohibition, and
Injunction12 before the Court of Appeals, contending that the suspension order was issued without giving
her due notice and an opportunity to be heard; and that the evidence of her guilt is not strong because the
supporting documents attached to the Complaint-Affidavit do not pertain to the vehicles allegedly
smuggled. Respondent likewise sought injunctive relief against Commissioner Napoleon Morales
(Commissioner Morales) of the Bureau of Customs (BOC) for his efforts to enforce the OMB Order. 13
By Decision14 of February 27, 2009, the Court of Appeals set aside the OMB Order for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion.
In setting aside the OMB Order, the appellate court, citing Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole,15 held that while
preventive suspension can be decreed on an official under investigation after charges are brought and
even before the charges are heard, evidence sufficiently strong to justify the imposition of preventive
suspension was wanting. For, the appellate court reasoned, the engine and serial numbers of the
allegedly smuggled vehicles enumerated in the Complaint-Affidavit were indeed different from those of the
vehicles reflected in the Certificates of Payment and Certifications issued by respondent.
The OMB moved for reconsideration but the motion was, by Resolution16 of June 23, 2009, denied. OMB
assailed the appellate court’s issuances by petition for review filed with the Court, docketed as G.R. No.
188650. DOF-RIPS, together with Commissioner Morales, filed a separate petition for review, docketed as
G.R. No. 187166. By Resolution17 of August 19, 2009, the Court consolidated the petitions.
In G.R. No. 188650, the OMB posits that while there may be discrepancies in the description of the
vehicles in the Certificates of Payment and Certifications issued by respondent vis-à-vis those of the
vehicles listed in the Complaint-Affidavit, these could be mere typographical errors, or could have been
deliberately made by respondent and her office to hide the irregularities attendant to the smuggling of the
vehicles.18
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 187166, DOF-RIPS and Commissioner Morales point out that 14 of the 16
vehicles in question were subjected to seizure and forfeiture proceedings before the Office of the Collector
of Customs during which the same set of evidence consisting of, among others, the Certificates was
presented; and that the vehicles were eventually forfeitured. 19 They assert that a comparison of the
description of the vehicles listed in the Complaint-Affidavit with that reflected in the Consolidated
Decision20 dated June 15, 2007 of the Collector of Customs in the Port of Subic reveals no discrepancies.
In her Comment,21 respondent, reiterating her claim that the Certificates of Payment and Certifications
show that the vehicles subject thereof are not the same vehicles smuggled out of the SBFZ, 22 argues that
those certifications were proffered, not by the Republic of the Philippines or the BOC but, by Hidemitsu
Trading purportedly to prove payment of taxes/customs duties thereon; and that the BOC’s forfeiting of
the vehicles in favor of the government for non-payment of taxes/customs duties shows that the
certificates were not favorably considered by BOC as evidence of payment.23
The petition is meritorious.
A comparison of the engine and chassis numbers of the vehicles listed in the Complaint-Affidavit with
those listed in the Certificates of Payment and Certifications shows that the serial numbers of at least
three of the 14 vehicles subject of the Complaint-Affidavit match the serial numbers of those subject of the
Certificates of Payment, viz:
Serial Numbers in the Complaint Serial Numbers reflected in the

Affidavit Certificate of Payment
BMW 750 Li – BMW - WBAHN83516DT62802
WBAHN83516DT6280224 (Annex "A")25
BMW 750 Li - BMW 750 Li -
WBAHN83506DT6060526 WBAHN83506DT60605 (Annex "A-
5")27
AUDI A8I - AUDI -
WAUML44E16N01819628 WAUML44E16N018196
(Annex "A-10")29
To the Court, this fact suffices to justify petitioner’s preventive suspension of respondent under the earlier-
quoted provision of Section 24 of R.A. 6770.1avvphi1
Whether the Certificates of Payment and Certifications issued by respondent were proffered by Hidemitsu
Trading as evidence of payment of taxes/customs duties or by the BOC for its purposes is thus immaterial.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated February 27, 2009 and
Resolution dated June 23, 2009 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The November 12, 2007 Order of
petitioner, the Office of the Ombudsman, for the preventive suspension of respondent is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
ARTURO D. BRION LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

ATTESTATION
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
V. Special Prosecutor
G.R. Nos. 79690
-
707 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR vs. RAUL M. GONZALEZ,
FACTS:
The following are the subjects of this Resolution filed by the Petitioner : a Motion, dated 9 February 1988,
to Cite in
Contempt filed by petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar
against public respondent Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan)
Raul M. Gonzalez, in connection with G.R. Nos. 79690
-
707 and G.R. No. 80578. and a Resolution of this Court dated 2 May 1988 requiring respondent Hon.
Raul Gonzalez to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to
administrative sanctions for making certain public statements.The Motion cited as bases the acts of
respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having caused the filing of the information against petitioner in Criminal Case
No. 12570 before the Sandiganbayan; and (2) issuing certain allegedly contemptuous statements to the
media in relation to the proceedings in G.R. No. 80578. In respect of the latter, petitioner annexed to
hisMotion a photocopy of a news article which appeared in the 30 November 1987 issue of the "Philippine
Daily Globe."
ISSUE: Are lawyers entitled to the same degree of latitude of freedom of speech towards the Court?
RULING:
No. The Court begins by referring to the authority to discipline officers of the court and members of the
Bar. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court's constitutional mandate to regulate
admission to the practice of law, which includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of law.
Moreover, the Su
preme Court has inherent power to punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct
of ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers andall other persons connected in any manner with a
case before the Court.Only slightly (ifat all) less important is the public interest in the capacity of the Court
effectively to prevent and control professional misconduct on the part of lawyers who are, first and
foremost, indispensable participants in the task of rendering justice to every man. Some courts have held,
persuasively it appears to us, and that a lawyer's right of free expression may have to be more limited
than that of a layman.While the Court may allow criticism it has In Re: Almacen held: Intemperate and
unfair criticism is agross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a
lawyer to disciplinary action. The lawyer's duty to renderrespectful subordination to the courts is essential
to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those
gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
****** ******

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and
acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondents.
G.R. No. 80578 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman ombudsman
under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
The following are the subjects of this Resolution:

1) a Motion, dated 9 February 1988, to Cite in Contempt filed by petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar against
public respondent Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez, in connection with G.R.
Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578. and 2) a Resolution of this Court dated 2 May 1988 requiring
respondent Hon. Raul Gonzalez to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt and/or
subjected to administrative sanctions for making certain public statements.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal Cases Nos.

12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) pending before
the Sandiganbayan. The Office of the Tanodbayan conducted the preliminary investigation and filed the
criminal informations in those cases (originally TBP Case No. 86-00778).
On 10 September 1987, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus
(G.R. Nos. 79690-707) naming as respondents both the Sandiganbayan and Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez.
Among other things, petitioner assailed: (1) the 5 February 1987 Resolution 1 of the "Tanodbayan"
recommending the filing of criminal informations against petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in TBP
Case No. 86-00778; and (2) the 1 September 1987 Resolution 2 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases
Nos. 12159-12161 and 1216312177 denying his Motion to Quash the criminal informations filed in those
cases by the "Tanodbayan." In this respect, petitioner alleged that respondent Gonzalez, as Tanodbayan
and under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, was no longer vested with power and authority
independently to investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft and corruption against public officials
and employees, and hence that the informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 12163-
12177 were all null and void.
On 11 September 1987, this Court issued a Resolution, which read:
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan and
Honorable Raul M. Gonzalez, Claiming To Be and Acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman
under the 1987 Constitution ).—Acting on the special civil action for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with urgent motion for preliminary
elimination injunction, the Court Resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to
require the respondents to COMMENT thereon, within ten (10) days from notice.
The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective

immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering respondent
Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from hearing and trying Criminal Cases Nos. 12159
to 12161 and 12163 to 12177 insofar as petitioner Enrique Zaldivar is concerned and from
hearing and resolving the Special Prosecutor's motion to suspend dated September 3, 1987.
The parties later filed their respective pleadings.
Petitioner Zaldivar filed with this Court a second Petition for certiorari and Prohibition (G.R. No. 80578) on
19 November 1987, initially naming only Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez as respondent. That Petition assailed the
24 September 1987 Resolution 3 of the "Tanodbayan" in TBP Case No. 87- 01304 recommending that
additional criminal charges for graft and corruption be filed against petitioner Zaldivar and five (5) other
individuals. Once again, petitioner raised the argument of the Tanodbayan's lack of authority under the
1987 Constitution to file such criminal cases and to investigate the same. Petitioner also moved for the
consolidation of that petition with G.R. No. 79690-707.
In a Resolution dated 24 November 1987, 4 this Court, without giving due course to the second petition:
(1) required respondent Gonzalez to submit a comment thereon: and (2) issued a temporary restraining
order "ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from further acting in TBP
Case No. 87-01394 ... and particularly, from filing the criminal information consequent thereof and from
conducting preliminary investigation therein." In a separate resolution of the same date, 5 G.R. Nos.
79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578 were ordered consolidated by the Court.
In the meantime, however, on 20 November 1987 or four (4) days prior to issuance by this Court of a
temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 80578, the Office of the Tanodbayan instituted Criminal Case No.
12570 6 with the Sandiganbayan which issued on 23 November 1987 an Order of Arrest 7 for petitioner
Zaldivar and his co-accused in Criminal Case No. 12570. Upon Motion 8 of petitioner Zaldivar, this Court
issued the following Resolution on 8 December 1987:
G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan). The
motion filed by the Solicitor General for respondents for an extension of thirty (30) days from
the expiration of the original period within which to file comment on the petition for certiorari
and prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order is
GRANTED.
Acting on the manifestation with motion to treat the Sandiganbayan as party-respondent,

the Court Resolved to (a) Consider IMPLEADED the Sandiganbayan as party respondent;
and (b) In pursuance of and supplementing the Temporary Restraining Order of November
24, 1987 "ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from further
acting in TBP Case No. 87-01304 entitled, "Commission on Audit vs. Gov. Enrique Zaldivar,
et al." and particularly, from filing the criminal information consequent thereof and from
conducting preliminary investigation therein" ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering
respondents Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from
further acting in Criminal Case No. 12570, entitled, "People of the Philippines vs. Enrique M.
Zaldivar, et al." and from enforcing the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan in said
case.
The Solicitor General filed a Comment 9 on the petition in G.R. No. 80578, and we required the petitioner
to submit a Reply 10 thereto.
On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion to Cite in Contempt 11 directed at
respondent Gonzalez. The Motion cited as bases the acts of respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having caused
the filing of the information against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 12570 before the Sandiganbayan; and
(2) issuing certain allegedly contemptuous statements to the media in relation to the proceedings in G.R.
No. 80578. In respect of the latter, petitioner annexed to his Motion a photocopy of a news article,
reproduced here in toto, which appeared in the 30 November 1987 issue of the "Philippine Daily Globe:"
Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case
TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez said yesterday the Supreme Court order stopping
him from investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar can aggravate
the thought that affluent persons "an prevent the progress of a trial."
What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that while rich and
influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, it is difficult for an
ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course. Gonzalez told the Daily Globe in
an exclusive interview.
Gonzalez said the high tribunal's order '"eightens the people's apprehension over the justice
system in this country, especially because the people have been thinking that only the small
fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free."
Gonzalez was reacting to an order issued by the tribunal last week after Zaldivar petitioned
the court to stop the Tanodbayan from investigating graft cases filed against him.
Zaldivar had charged that Gonzalez was biased in his investigations because the latter
wanted to help promote the political fortunes of a friend from Antique, lawyer Bonifacio
Alentajan.
Acting on Zaldivar's petition, the high court stopped Gonzalez from investigating a graft
charge against the governor, and from instituting any complaint with the Sandiganbayan.
While President Aquino had been prodding me to prosecute graft cases even if they involve
the high and mighty, the Supreme Court had been restraining me. Gonzalez said.
In accordance with the President's order, Gonzalez said he had filed graft cases against two
"very powerful" officials of the Aquino government-Commissioner Quintin Doromal of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government and Secretary Jiamil I.M. Dianlan of the
Office of Muslim Affairs and Cultural Communities.
While I don't wish to discuss the merits of the Zaldivar petition before the Supreme Court, I
am a little bit disturbed that (the order) can aggravate the thinking of some people that
affluent persons can prevent the progress of a trial, he said.
He disclosed that he had a talk with the Chief Executive over the weekend and that while
she symphatizes with local officials who are charged in court during election time, 'She said
that it might be a disservice to the people and the voters who are entitled to know their
candidates.
Gonzalez said that while some cases filed against local officials during election time could
be mere harassment suits, the Constitution makes it a right of every citizen to be informed
of the character of tile candidate, who should be subject to scrutiny. (Emphasis supplied)
Acting on petitioner's Motion to Cite in Contempt, the Court on 16 February 1988 required respondent
Gonzalez "to COMMENT on aforesaid Motion within ten (10) days from notice." 12 On 27 April 1988, the
Court rendered its Decision 13 (per curiam) in the Consolidated Petitions. The dispositive portion thereof
read:
WHEREFORE, We hereby:
(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by petitioner Zaldivar and hereby NULLIFY the
criminal informations filed against him in the Sandiganbayan; and
(2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease and desist from conducting investigations
and filing criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise exercising the powers and
functions of the Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED.
A Motion for Reconsideration 14 was filed by respondent Gonzalez the next day, 28 April 1988. In his
Motion, respondent Gonzalez, after having argued the legal merits of his position, made the following
statements totally unrelated to any legal issue raised either in the Court's Decision or in his own Motion:
1. That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a leading member of the court ... and he was
asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him;' "
2. That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA report on
illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass the Court;" and
3. That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the phone by a
leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases against (two Members of
the Court)."
Respondent Gonzalez also attached three (3) handwritten notes 15 which he claimed were sent by "some
members of this Honorable Court, interceeding for cases pending before this office (i.e., the
Tanodbayan)." He either released his Motion for Reconsideration with facsimiles of said notes to the press
or repeated to the press the above extraneous statements: the metropolitan papers for the next several
days carried long reports on those statements and variations and embellishments thereof On 2 May 1988,
the Court issued the following Resolution in the Consolidated Petitions:
G.R. No. 79690-707 (Enrique Zaldivar vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al. G.R. No. 80578
(Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, etc).
1. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Gonzalez under date of
April 28, 1988, the Court Resolved to REQUIRE the petitioner to COMMENT thereon within
ten (10) days from notice hereof.
2. It appearing that respondent Raul M. Gonzalez has made public statements to the media
which not only deal with matters subjudice but also appear offensive to and disrespectful of
the Court and its individual members and calculated, directly or indirectly, to bring the Court
into disrepute, discredit and ridicule and to denigrate
and degrade the administration of justice, the Court Resolved to require respondent
Gonzalez to explain in writing within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why he should not be
punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for making such
public statements reported in the media, among others, in the issues of the "Daily Inquirer,"
the "Journal," the "Manila Times," the "Philippine Star," the "Manila Chronicle" the "Daily
Globe" and the "Manila Standard" of April 29 and 30, and May 1, 1988, to wit:
(a) That the Court resolution in question is merely "an offshoot of the position he had taken
that the SC Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation by government
prosecutors or motivated by a desire to stop him 'from investigating cases against some of
their proteges or friends;"
(b) That no less than six of the members of the Court "interceded for and on behalf of
persons with pending cases before the Tanodbayan," or sought "to pressure him to render
decisions favorable to their colleagues and friends;"
(c) That attempts were made to influence him to go slow on Zaldivar and not to be too hard
on him and to refrain from investigating the Commission on Audit report on illegal
disbursements in the Supreme Court because it will embarass the Court;
(d) That there were also attempts to cause the dismissal of cases against two Associate
Justices; and
(e) That the Court had dismissed judges' without rhyme or reason' and disbarred lawyers
'without due process.
3. It further appearing that three (3) affidavits relative to the purpose of and circumstances
attendant upon the notes written to said public respondent by three (3) members of the
Court have since been submitted to the Court and now form part of its official records, the
Court further Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to ATTACH to this Resolution copies of
said sworn statements and the annexes thereto appended, and to DIRECT respondent
Gonzalez also to comment thereon within the same period of ten (10) days.
4. It finally appearing that notice of the Resolution of February 16, 1988 addressed to
respondent Gonzalez was misdelivered and therefore not served on him, the Court
Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to CAUSE SERVICE of said Resolution on the
respondent and to REQUIRE the latter to comply therewith.
Respondent Gonzalez subsequently filed with this Court on 9 May 1988 an Omnibus Motion for Extension
and Inhibition 16 alleging, among other things: that the above quoted 2 May 1988 Resolution of the Court
"appears to have overturned that presumption [of innocence] against him:" and that "he gravely doubts
whether that 'cold neutrality [of an impartial judge] is still available to him" there being allegedly "at least 4
members of this Tribunal who will not be able to sit in judgment with substantial sobriety and neutrality."
Respondent Gonzalez closed out his pleading with a prayer that the four (4) Members of the Court
Identified and referred to there by him inhibit themselves in the deliberation and resolution of the Motion to
Cite in Contempt.
On 19 May 1988 17 after receipt of respondent's Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. 18 this Court in
an extended per curiam Resolution 19 denied the Motion and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.
That denial was made "final and immediately executory.
Respondent Gonzalez has since then filed the following pleadings of record:
20
1. Manifestation with Supplemental Motion to Inhibition dated 23 May 1988;
2. Motion to Transfer Administrative Proceedures to the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines 21dated 20 May 1988
3. Urgent Motion for Additional Extension of Time to File Explanation Ex Abundante

Cautelam, 22 dated 26 May 1988;
4. Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion
(a) For Extension of Time
(b) For Inhibition and
(c) For Transfer of Administrative Proceedings to the IBP, Under Rule 139-B 23 dated 4
June 1988 (with Annex "A;" 24 an anonymous letter dated 27 May 1988 from the alleged
Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court and addressed to respondent):
5. Ex-Parte Manifestation 25 dated 7 June 1988;
6. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration 26 1988; and
7. Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with Motion 27 member 1988.
In compliance with the 2 May 1988 Resolution of this Court quoted earlier, respondent Gonzalez
submitted on 17 June 1988 an Answer with Explanation and Comment 28 offering respondent's legal
arguments and defenses against the contempt and disciplinary charges presently pending before this
Court. Attached to that pleading as Annex "A" thereof was respondent's own personal
Explanation/Compliance 29 second explanation called "Compliance," 30 with annexes, was also submitted
by respondent on 22 July 1988.
II
We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of the court and
members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regulator and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary
disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court's
constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes as well authority to
regulate the practice itself of
law. 31 Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over
members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper administration of justice and essential to
an orderly discharge of judicial functions. 32 Moreover, the Supreme Court has inherent power to punish
for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court
including lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner
with a case before the Court. 33 The power to punish for contempt is "necessary for its own protection
against an improper interference with the due administration of justice," "(it) is not dependent upon the
complaint of any of the parties litigant. 34
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases like that before us here;
the Court's inherent power to discipline attorneys and the contempt power. The disciplinary authority of
the Court over members of the Bar is broader than the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court
may be committee both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where the
contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes professional misconduct which calls
into play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. 35 Where the respondent is a lawyer, however,
the Supreme Court's disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into play whether or not the misconduct
with which the respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power to punish for
contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. 36 The
disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power
of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such,
he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in
society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the
administration of justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary
action against him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power.
It is sometimes asserted that in the exercise of the power to punish for contempt or of the disciplinary
authority of the Court over members of the Bar, the Court is acting as offended party, prosecutor and
arbiter at one and the same time. Thus, in the present case, respondent Gonzalez first sought to get some
members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution of this case for alleged bias and prejudice
against him. A little later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the issues
involved in this proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due process from this Court, that the Court
has become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. Respondent Gonzalez misconceives the
nature of the proceeding at bar as well as the function of the members of the Court in such proceeding.
Respondent's contention is scarcely an original one. In In Re Almacen, 37 then Associate (later Chief)
Justice Fred Fruiz Castro had occasion to deal with this contention in the following lucid manner:
xxx xxx xxx
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in the premises,
that, as Atty. Almacen would have it appear, the members of the Court are the
'complainants, prosecutors and judges' all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter
misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand
but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not—and does not
involve—a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the
conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its
primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is
still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the property and honest administration of justice by purging the profession
of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any
tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the
individual members thereof But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as
an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members. Consistently
with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such
individuals but only as a duly constituted court. The distinct individualities are lost in the
majesty of their office. So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case
at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof—as well as the
people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed
at grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the
Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal
fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of
the power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested
exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally
renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. So that even if it be conceded that the
members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and
cannot disqualify them from the exercise of the power because public policy demands that
they, acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The
present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the
personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
xxx xxx xxx. 38
It should not be necessary for the members of this Court expressly to disclaim any bias or prejudice
against the respondent that would prevent them from acting in accordance with the exacting requirements
of their oaths of office. It also appears to the Court that for all the members to inhibit themselves from
sitting on this case is to abdicate the responsibility with which the Constitution has burdened them.
Reference of complaints against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor
General is not mandatory upon the Supreme Court; such reference to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
or to the Solicitor General is certainly not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the
Revised Rules of Court, especially where the charge consists of acts done before the Supreme Court.
There is no need for further investigation of facts in the present case for it is not substantially disputed by
respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements attributed to him. In any case,
respondent has had the amplest opportunity to present his defense; his defense is not that he did not
make the statements ascribed to him but that those statements give rise to no liability on his part, having
been made in the exercise of his freedom of speech. The issues which thus need to be resolved here are
issues of law and of basic policy and the Court, not any other agency, is compelled to resolve such issues.
III
It is necessary to become very explicit as to what respondent Gonzalez was saying in his statements set
out above. Respondent has not denied making the above statements; indeed, he acknowledges that the
newspaper reports of the statements attributed to him are substantially correct. 39Respondent Gonzalez
was in effect saying, firstly, that the Supreme Court deliberately rendered an erroneous or wrong decision
when it rendered its per curiam Decision dated 27 April 1988 in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. That
decision according to respondent Gonzalez, was issued as an act of retaliation by the Court against him
for the position he had taken "that the (Supreme Court) Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or
investigation by government prosecutors," and in order to stop respondent from investigating against
"some of (the) proteges or friends (of some Supreme Court Justices)." The Court cannot, of course, and
will not debate the correctness of its Decision of 27 April 1988 and of its Resolution dated 19 May 1988
(denying respondent Gonzalez Motion for Reconsideration) in the consolidated Zaldivar cases.
Respondent Gonzalez, and anyone else for that matter, is free intellectually to accept or not to accept the
reasoning of the Court set out in its per curiam Decision and Resolution in the consolidated Zaldivar cases.
This should not, however, obscure the seriousness of the assault thus undertaken by respondent against
the Court and the appalling implications of such assault for the integrity of the system of administration of
justice in our country. Respondent has said that the Court rendered its Decision and Resolution without
regard to the legal merits of the Zaldivar cases and had used the judicial process to impose private
punishment upon respondent for positions he had taken (unrelated to the Zaldivar cases) in carrying out
his duties. It is very difficult to imagine a more serious affront to, or a greater outrage upon, the honour
and dignity of this Court than this. Respondent's statement is also totally baseless. Respondent's
statements were made in complete disregard of the fact that his continuing authority to act
as Tanodbayan or Ombudsman after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, had been questioned before
this Court as early as 10 September 1987 in the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus filed
against him in these consolidated Petitions 40 that is, more than seven (7) months before the Court
rendered its Decision. Respondent also ignores the fact that one day later, this Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order effective immediately ordering the Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from hearing the
criminal cases filed against petitioner Zaldivar by respondent Gonzalez. Respondent also disregards the
fact that on 24 November 1987, upon the filing of a second Petition for certiorari for Prohibition by Mr.
Zaldivar, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order this time requiring the respondent to cease and
desist from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-0934. Thus, the decision finally reached by this Court in
April 1988 on the constitutional law issue pending before the Court for the preceding eight (8) months,
could scarcely have been invented as a reprisal simply against respondent.
A second charge that respondent Gonzalez hurled against members of the Supreme Court is that they
have improperly Id pressured" him to render decisions favorable to their "colleagues and friends,"
including dismissal of "cases" against two (2) members of the Court. This particularly deplorable charge
too is entirely baseless, as even a cursory examination of the contents of the handwritten notes of three
(3) members of this Court addressed to respondent (which respondent attached to his Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision of this Court of 27 April 1988 in the consolidated Petitions) win show. It is
clear, and respondent Gonzalez does not pretend otherwise, that the subject matters of the said notes
had no relation at all to the issues in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. This charge appears to have been
made in order to try to impart some substance (at least in the mind of respondent) to the first accusation
made by respondent that the Court had deliberately rendered a wrong decision to get even with
respondent who had, with great fortitude, resisted "pressure" from some members of the Court. Once
again, in total effect, the statements made by respondent appear designed to cast the Court into gross
disrepute, and to cause among the general public scorn for and distrust in the Supreme Court and, more
generally, the judicial institutions of the Republic.
Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing him from prosecuting "rich and
powerful persons," that the Court was in effect discrimination between the rich and powerful on the one
hand and the poor and defenseless upon the other, and allowing "rich and powerful" accused persons to
go "scot-free" while presumably allowing or affirming the conviction of poor and small offenders. This
accusation can only be regarded as calculated to present the Court in an extremely bad light. It may be
seen as intended to foment hatred against the Supreme Court; it is also suggestive of the divisive tactics
of revolutionary class war.
Respondent, finally, assailed the Court for having allegedly "dismissed judges 'without rhyme or reason'
and disbarred lawyers 'without due process.'" The Court notes that this last attack is not without relation to
the other statements made by respondent against the Court. The total picture that respondent clearly was
trying to paint of the Court is that of an "unjudicial" institution able and willing to render "clearly erroneous"
decisions by way of reprisal against its critics, as a body that acts arbitrarily and capriciously denying
judges and lawyers due process of law. Once again, the purport of respondent's attack against the Court
as an institution unworthy of the people's faith and trust, is unmistakable. Had respondent undertaken to
examine the records 'of the two (2) judges and the attorney he later Identified in one of his Explanations,
he would have discovered that the respondents in those administrative cases had ample opportunity to
explain their side and submit evidence in support thereof. 41 He would have also found that there were
both strong reasons for and an insistent rhyme in the disciplinary measures there administered by the
Court in the continuing effort to strengthen the judiciary and upgrade the membership of the Bar. It is
appropriate to recall in this connection that due process as a constitutional precept does not, always and
in all situations, require the trial-type proceeding, 42 that the essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of one's
defense. 43 "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there
is no denial of procedural due process. 44
As noted earlier, respondent Gonzalez was required by the Court to explain why he should not be
punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative discipline for making the statements adverted to
above. In his subsequent pleadings where he asked the full Court to inhibit itself and to transfer the
administrative proceedings to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, respondent made, among others, the
following allegations:
(a) That the Members of the Court "should inhibit [themselves] in the contempt and
administrative charges against the respondent, in the light of the manifest prejudice and
anger they hold against respondent as shown in the language of the resolution on the
Motion for Reconsideration;"
(b) That "the entire membership of the court has already lost that 'cold neutrality of an
impartial judge' [to] be able to allow fairness and due process in the contempt citation as
well as in the possible administrative charge;
(c) That "respondent honestly feels that this court as angry and prejudiced as it is,
respondent has no china man's chance to get fair hearing in the contempt and possible
administrative charges;"
(d) That one must consider "the milieu before this Tribunal with, perhaps passion and
obfuscation running riot;"
(e) That respondent, "after having been castigated with such venom by the entire Court in
its decision denying the Motion for Reconsideration, does not have confidence in the
impartiality of the entire Court" and that he "funds it extremely difficult to believe that the
members of this Tribunal can still act with unbiased demeanor towards him;" and
(f) That "the Tribunal is determined to disbar [respondent] without due process" and that a
specified Member of the Court "has been tasked to be the ponente, or at least prepare the
decision." (Underscoring in the original)
Thus, instead of explaining or seeking to mitigate his statements earlier made, respondent sought to heap
still more opprobrium upon the Court, accusing it of being incapable of judging his acts and statements
justly and according to law. Once again, he paints this Court as a body not only capable of acting without
regard to due process but indeed determined so to act. A grand design to hold up this Court to public
scorn and disrespect as an unworthy tribunal, one obfuscated by passion and anger at respondent,
emerges once more. It is very difficult for members of this Court to understand how respondent Gonzalez
could suppose that judges on the highest tribunal of the land would be ready and willing to violate their
most solemn oath of office merely to gratify any imagined private feelings aroused by respondent. The
universe of the Court revolves around the daily demands of law and justice and duty, not around
respondent nor any other person or group of persons.
Whether or not the statements made by respondent Gonzalez may reasonably be regarded by this Court
as contumacious or as warranting exercise of the disciplinary authority of this Court over members of the
Bar, may best be assayed by examining samples of the kinds of statements which have been held in our
jurisdiction as constituting contempt or otherwise warranting the exercise of the Court's authority.
1. In Montecillo v. Gica, 45 Atty. Quirico del Mar as counsel for Montecillo, who was accused in a slander
case, moved to reconsider a decision of the Court of Appeals in favor of the complainant with a veiled
threat that he should interpose his next appeal to the President of the Philippines. In his Motion for
Reconsideration, he referred to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment," and "judgment rendered through negligence" and implied that the Court of Appeals had
allowed itself to be deceived. Atty. del Mar was held guilty of contempt of court by the Court of Appeals.
He then sued the three (3) justices of the Court of Appeals for damages before the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, seeking to hold them liable for their decision in the appealed slander case. This suit was
terminated, however, by compromise agreement after Atty. del Mar apologized to the Court of Appeals
and the justices concerned and agreed to pay moral damages to the justices. Atty. del Mar some time
later filed with this Court a Petition for Review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals in a
slander case. This Court denied the Petition for Review. Atty. del Mar then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and addressed a letter to the Clerk of the Supreme Court asking for the names of the
justices of this Court who had voted in favor of and those who had voted against his Motion for
Reconsideration. After his Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit, Atty. del Mar filed a
Manifestation in this Court saying:
I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with certified true
copies of the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming the decision of the Court
of Appeals in the case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed
against the Justices supporting the same, civil and criminal suits as I did to the Justices of
the Court of Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by Mr.
Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the City Court and the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of
exposing to the people the corroding evils extant in our Government, so that they may well
know them and work for their extermination. (60 SCRA at 240;emphasis supplied)
Counsel was asked to explain why he should not be administratively dealt with for making the above
statements. In his additional explanation, Atty. del Mar made the following statements:
... Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the Government. It is this
state of things that convinced me that all human efforts to correct and/or reform the said
evils will be fruitless and, as stated in my manifestation to you, I have already decided to
retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling up deficiencies.
(60 SCRA at 242)
The Court suspended Atty. del Mar, "until further orders," from the practice of law saying:
... Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft, corruption and injustice
allegedly rampant in and outside of the government as justification for his contemptuous
statements. In other words, he already assumed by his own contemptuous utterances that
because there is an alleged existence of rampant corruption, graft and injustice in and out of
the government, We, by Our act in G.R. No. L-36800, are among the corrupt, the grafters
and those allegedly committing injustice. We are at a complete loss to follow respondent del
Mar's logic ...
xxx xxx xxx
To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to the
duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the
Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138,
Rules of Court). But We do remind them of said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren
its paramount importance. A lawyer must always remember that he is an officer of the court
exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of administering justice.
xxx xxx xxx.
As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A G.R. No. 46504-R was based
on its evaluation of the evidence on only one specific issue. We in turn denied in G.R. No.
L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the decision because We found no reason for
disturbing the appellate court's finding and conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of
Appeals and this Court exercised judicial discretion in a case under their respective
jurisdiction. The intemperate and imprudent act of respondent del Mar in resorting to veiled
threats to make both Courts reconsider their respective stand in the decision and the
resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but pure contumely for aid
tribunals.
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Court of the land
when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge
the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In
short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of
the law, in disposing of the case of his client.
xxx xxx xxx
... To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will choose to enter
this profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder for them to imprint in their
hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to himself to respect the courts of justice and its
officers as a fealty for the stability of our democratic institutions. (60 SCRA at 242-247:
emphasis supplied)
2. In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 46 four (4) members of the bar, acting as counsel for
MacArthur International Minerals Company were required by this Court to explain certain statements
made in MacArthur's third Motion for Reconsideration:
d. ...; and I the Supreme Court I has overlooked the applicable law due to the mis-
representation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence, par. 1, Third
Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
e. ... Never has any civilized democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring to the
"right to reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous executives to cover up and
excuse losses to the public, a government agency or just plain fraud ... and it is thus difficult,
in the light of our upbringing and schooling, even under many of the incumbent justices, that
the Honorable Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in effect does precisely that
in a most absolute manner. (Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for Reconsideration
dated Sept. 10, 1968). (31 SCRA at 6)
They were also asked to explain the statements made in their Motion to Inhibit filed on 21 September
1968 asking
Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit
themselves from considering, judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof
retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion charges "It that the brother of the Honorable
Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary
of the false, erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31, 1968" and the ex-
parte preliminary injunction rendered in the above-entitled case, the latter in effect
prejudging and predetermining this case even before the joining of an issue. As to the Chief
Justice, the motion states [t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
was given a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President a short
time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this case. The appointment
referred to was as secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments. The motion
presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, and makes a number of side comments
projecting what is claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It
enumerates "incidents" which, according to the motion, brought about respondent
MacArthur's belief that unjudicial prejudice had been caused it and that there was 'unjudicial
favoritism' in favor of 'petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party directly
benefited by the said decision
(31 SCRA at 6-7)
Another attorney entered his appearance as new counsel for MacArthur and filed a fourth Motion for
Reconsideration without leave of court, which Motion contained the following paragraphs:
4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the Republic of the
Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case—which condition is
prohibited by the New Rules of Court—Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: "Justices; who
may take part—... . Only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral
argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication ... ." This requirement is
especially significant in the present instance because the member who penned the decision
was the very member who was absent for approximately four months or more. This
provision also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.
xxx xxx xxx
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons its quest for
justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will inevitably either raise the graft
and corruption of Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965, required
by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World
Court on grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation of property and/or to the United
States Government, either its executive or judicial branches or both, on the grounds of
confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested rights by the Philippine Government without
either compensation or due process of law and invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment
requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the
sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually, until restitution or
compensation is made.
(31 SCRA at 10-11)
Finding their explanations unsatisfactory, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sanchez, held three (3)
attorneys guilty of contempt:
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for reconsideration,
we, indeed, find language that is not to be expected of an officer of the courts. He pictures
petitioners as 'vulturous executives.' He speaks of this Court as a 'civilized, democratic
tribunal,' but by innuendo would suggest that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968 as 'false,
erroneous and illegal' in a presumptuous manner. He then charges that the ex parte
preliminary injunction we issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined the case even
before the joining of an issue. He accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this Court for
being interested in the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because
his brother is the vice president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the
decision, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was appointed secretary of the
newly-created Board of Investments, 'a significant appointment in the Philippine
Government by the President, a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was
rendered.' In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that 'it would seem that the principles thus
established [the moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority by the
Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself.' He puts forth the claim that lesser and
further removed conditions have been known to create favoritism, only to conclude that
there is no reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice
and Justice Castro would be less likely to engender favoritism and prejudice for or against a
particular cause or party.' Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro
are insensible to delicadeza, which could make their actuation suspect. He makes it plain in
the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not free from the
appearance of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect their
judgment. He points out that courts must be above suspicion at all times like Ceasar's wife,
warns that loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to
happen in our country, 'although the process has already begun.
xxx xxx xxx
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in
law. The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It sweepingly
casts aspersion on the whole court. For, inhibition is also asked if, we repeated any other
justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners
or any members of any board-petitioner or their agents or principals, including the
president.' The absurdity of this posture is at once apparent. For one thing, the justices of
this Court are appointed by the President and in that sense may be considered to have
each received a favor from the President. Should these justices inhibit themselves every
time a case involving the Administration crops up? Such a thought may not certainly be
entertained. The consequence thereof would be to paralyze the machinery of this Court. We
would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of government operating in this
country. Counsel is presumed to know this. But why the unfounded charge? There is the not
too-well concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant's attorney to downgrade this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern. Such
disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an expression
of faith, counsel's words are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief.
xxx xxx xxx
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. and
yet, this Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades
the administration of justice. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules against
improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice is thus transgressed. Atty.
Santiago is guilty of contempt of court.
xxx xxx xxx
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court and/or
the United States government. It must be remembered that respondent MacArthur at that
time was still trying to overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so,
unnecessary statements were in ejected. More specifically, the motion announced that
McArthur 'will inevitably ... raise the graft and corruption of the Philippine government
officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965 ... to the World Court' and would invoke 'the
Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine
Government, including the sugar price premium, amount to more than fifty million dollars
annually ...
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the blind of this Court to decide the case' in its
favor. A notice of appeal to the World Court has even been embodied in Meads return.
There is a gross inconsistency between the appeal and the move to reconsider the decision.
An appeal from a decision presupposes that a party has already abandoned any move to
reconsider that decision. And yet, it would appear that the appeal to the World Court is
being dangled as a threat to effect a change of the decision of this Court. Such act has no
aboveboard explanation.
xxx xxx xxx
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where infraction of
ethics meets with complacency rather than punishment. The people should not be given
cause to break faith with the belief that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To
preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio
of honor, we prefer to think, is a standard of behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a
cause before a court of justice. (31 SCRA at 13-23; emphasis supplied)
3. In In re Almacen, supra, Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, in protest against what he asserted was "a great
injustice committed against his client by the Supreme Court," filed a Petition to Surrender Lawyer's
Certificate of Title. He alleged that his client was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," and
had become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy," saying that "justice as
administered by the present members of the Supreme Court [was) not only blind, but also deaf and
dumb." Atty. Almacen vowed to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum" so that "the people
may know of this silent injustice committed by this Court' and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and
injustices that were committed [may] never be repeated." Atty. Almacen released to the press the contents
of his Petition and on 26 September 1967, the "Manila Times" published statements attributed to him as
follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did not expose the
tribunal's 'unconstitutional and obnoxious' practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals
without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's 'short-cut justice.' Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to
pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, 'where our
Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of justice, who ignore
without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity.'
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the
present members of the Supreme Court 'will become responsible to all cases brought to its
attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious
"lack of merit' or "denied resolutions. (31 SCRA at 565566; emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen was required by this Court to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken
against him. His explanation, which in part read:
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolized in paintings that can be found in all courts and
government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb.
Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity,
generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that
inspire of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeals
has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or
ailment in the above statement. We only described the impersonal state of Things and
nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court and
for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY.
Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as
our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end our self-
sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in
the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and
be condemned by the members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the
latter. (31 SCRA at 572; emphasis supplied)
was found by the Court to be "undignified and cynical" and rejected. The Court indefinitely suspended
Almacen from the practice of law holding, through Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, that Almacen had
exceeded the boundaries of "fair criticism."
4. In Paragas V. Cruz, 47 Counsel, whose Petition for Ceriorari ran was dismissed by this Court, made the
following statements in his Motion for Reconsideration:
The petitioner respectfully prays for a reconsideration of the resolution of this Honorable
Court dated April 20,1966 on the ground that it constitutes a violation of Section 14 of Rule
11 2 of the Rules of Court promulgated by this very Hon. Supreme Court, and on the further
ground that it is likewise a violation of the most important right in the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution of the Philippines, a culpable violation which is a ground for impeachment.
... The rule of law in a democracy should always be upheld and protected by all means,
because the rule of law creates and preserves peace and order and gives satisfaction and
contentment to all concerned. But when the laws and the rules are violated, the victims
resort, sometimes, to armed force and to the ways of the cavemen We do not want Verzosa
and Reyes repeated again and again, killed in the premises of the Supreme Court and in
those of the City Hall of Manila. Educated people should keep their temper under control at
all times! But justice should be done to all concerned to perpetuate the very life of
Democracy on the face of the earth. (14 SCRA at 810; emphasis supplied)
The Court considered the above statements as derogatory to the dignity of the Court and required counsel
to show cause why administrative action should not be taken against him. Counsel later explained that he
had merely related factual events (i.e., the killing of Verzosa and Reyes) and to express his desire to
avoid repetition of such acts. The Court, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, found these explanations
unsatisfactory and the above statements contumacious.
... The expressions contained in the motion for reconsideration ... are plainly contemptuous
and disrespectful, and reference to the recent killing of two employees is but a covert threat
upon the members of the Court. ... That such threats and disrespectful language contained
in a pleading filed in courts are constitutive of direct contempt has been repeatedly
decided (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; People vs. Venturanza, 52 Off. Gaz. 769;
Medina vs. Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; De Joya vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 1, 9785,
September 19,1956; Sison vs. Sandejas L- 9270, April 29,1959; Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil.
86). What makes the present case more deplorable is that the guilty party is a member of
the bar; for, as remarked in People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 580-
Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges who try his cases with that courtesy all
have a right to expect. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build
and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential
to the proper administration of justice.
It in light and plausible that an attorney in defending the cause and rights of his client,
should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never
will be so, for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the
propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts require. (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, [In re
Francisco], 61 Phil. 729)' (1 4 SCRA at 811-812; emphasis supplied)
5. In In re Sotto, 48 a newspaper reporter, Mr. Angel Parazo, invoking the Press Freedom Law, refused to
divulge the source of the news item which carried his by-line and was sent to jail for so refusing. Atty.
Vicente Sotto, a senator and author of said law, caused the publication of the following item in a number
of daily newspapers in Manila:
As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53), interpreted by the Supreme
Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has to suffer 30 days
imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a news published in his paper, I regret
to say that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is
once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its
members. In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during
these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change
the members of the Supreme Court. To this effect, I announce that one of the first measures,
which I will introduce in the coming congressional sessions, will have as its object the
complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, the Supreme Court
of today constitutes a constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly, very
loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: The Supreme Court of today is a far cry from the
impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino
Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the
Philippine Judiciary. (82 Phil. at 597-598; emphasis supplied)
In finding Atty. Sotto in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the
constitutional guarantee of free speech and in requiring him to show cause why he should
not be disbarred, the Court, through Mr. Justice Feria, said-
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately
so many blunders and injustices that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party
knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in
whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would
tend necessarily to undermine the coincidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of
the members of this Court, and consequently to lower and degrade the administration of
justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the
last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or
protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their
confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they
cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their hands, and
disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of
the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and
authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such
attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts
guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting
on a very shaky foundation. (82 Phil. at 601-602; emphasis supplied)
6. In Salcedo v. Hernandez, 49 Atty. Vicente Francisco filed a Motion before the Supreme Court which
contained the following paragraph (in translation):
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court,
denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage
to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at
the polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within
our power in order that this error may be corrected by the very court which has committed it,
because we should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of
Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do,
the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and because it is our
utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of each and every
member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely
that erroneous decisions like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will
necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of sakdalism and make the public lose
confidence in the administration of justice. (61 Phil. at 726; emphasis supplied)
When required by the Court to show cause why he should not be declared in contempt, Atty. Francisco
responded by saying that it was not contempt to tell the truth. Examining the statements made above, the
Court held:
... [they] disclose, in the opinion of this court, an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of
the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged
with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights of the parties,
and of the untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and
flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client, because the acts of outraging
and mocking from which the words 'outrage' and mockery' used therein are derived, means
exactly the same as all these, according to the Dictionary of the Spanish Language
published by the Spanish Academy (Dictionary of the Spanish Language, 15th ed., pages
132-513).
The insertion of the phrases in question in said motion of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, for
many years a member of the Philippine bar, was neither justified nor in the least necessary,
because in order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points
relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in
his said motion were sufficient and the phrases in question were superfluous. In order to
appeal to reason and justice, it is highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to
threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done, because both means are annoying and
good practice can ever sanction them by reason of their natural tendency to disturb and
hinder the free exercise of a serene and impartial judgment, particularly in judicial matters,
in the consideration of questions submitted for resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion contains
a more or less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated therein, after the author
shows the course which the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt,
that they will resort to the press for the purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a
judicial outrage of which his client has been the victim; and because he states in a
threatening manner with the intention of predisposing the mind of the reader against the
court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices against it in order to make it odious in the
public eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred to in his motion to promote distrust in
the administration of justice and increase the proselytes of sakdalism a movement with
seditious and revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge,
occurred in this country a few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt of the
dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so devoid of the sense of justice that, if
he did not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error notwithstanding the fact that it
may be proven, with good reasons, that it has acted erroneously.
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any
attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not
only because it had conferred upon him the high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics,
158 and 160), of being what he now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St., Rep.,
492, 669), but also because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes distrust in the
administration of justice, and prevents anybody from harboring and encouraging discontent
which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon
which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for
protection and relief (61 Phil. at 727-728; emphasis supplied)
It should not be supposed that the six (6) cases above discussed exhaust our case law on this matter. In
the following cases, among others, the Supreme Court punished for contempt or administratively
disciplined lawyers who had made statements not very different from those made in the cases discussed
above:
1) In re Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987);
2) Borromeo v. Court of appeals, 87 SCRA 67 (1978);
3) Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441 (1967);
4) Malolos v. Reyes, 1 SCRA 559 (1961);
5) De Joya, et al. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, 99 Phil. 907 (1956);
6) People v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211 (1956);
7) In re Suzano A. Velasquez, per curiam Resolution (unreported), Promulgated 29 April

1955;
8) Cornejo v. Tan, 85 Phil. 772 (1950);
9) People v. Carillon, 77 Phil. 572 (1946);
10) Intestate Estate of Rosario 0lba; Contempt Proceedings against Antonio Franco, 67 Phil.
312 (1939); and
11) Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 (1932).
Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed above which the Court has in the past
penalized as contemptuous or as warranting application of disciplinary sanctions, this Court is compelled
to hold that the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the
exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Respondent's statements, especially the
charge that the Court deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust decision in the Consolidated
Petitions, necessarily implying that the justices of this Court betrayed their oath of office, merely to wreak
vengeance upon the respondent here, constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Court. Such
statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system
of administration of justice in the country. That respondent's baseless charges have had some impact
outside the internal world of subjective intent, is clearly demonstrated by the filing of a complaint for
impeachment of thirteen (13) out of the then fourteen (14) incumbent members of this Court, a complaint
the centerpiece of which is a repetition of the appalling claim of respondent that this Court deliberately
rendered a wrong decision as an act of reprisal against the respondent.
IV
The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely exercising his constitutional right of
free speech. He also invokes the related doctrines of qualified privileged communications and fair criticism
in the public interest.
Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny him
that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of
expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on
occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests.
One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the
administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of
administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured
only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in
other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general
community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it:
... A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent

judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensable to a
free society. The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary
through which that freedom may, if necessary be vindicated. And one of the potent means
for assuring judges their independence is a free press. 50
Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the following terms:
The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This constitutional right
must be protected in its fullest extent. The Court has heretofore given evidence of its
tolerant regard for charges under the Libel Law which come dangerously close to its
violation. We shall continue in this chosen path. The liberty of the citizens must be
preserved in all of its completeness. But license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the
citizens should not be confused with liberty ill its true sense. As important as is the
maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizens is the
maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot be had
if persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good purposes, and if
such persons are to be permitted by subterranean means to diffuse inaccurate accounts of
confidential proceedings to the embarassment of the parties and the courts. 51 (Emphasis
supplied)
Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the capacity of the Court effectively to prevent
and control professional misconduct on the part of lawyers who are, first and foremost, indispensable
participants in the task of rendering justice to every man. Some courts have held, persuasively it appears
to us, that a lawyer's right of free expression may have to be more limited than that of a layman. 52
It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a
Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to this Court as the
embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility
of the respondent "to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court' and "not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice 53 is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.
Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course, entitled to criticize the rulings of this Court, to
point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. Once more, however, the right of criticism
is not unlimited. Its limits were marked out by Mr. Justice Castro in In re Almacen which are worth noting
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bonafide and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the
one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the
other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It
is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those
gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
xxx xxx xxx 54
(Emphasis supplied)
The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent has criticized the Court; it is
addressed rather to the nature of that criticism or comment and the manner in which it was carried out.
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the Court. The subjectivities of the
respondent are irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct or misconduct is concerned. He will not,
however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and plain import of his words and acts. 55 It is upon the other
hand, not irrelevant to point out that respondent offered no apology in his two (2) explanations and
exhibited no repentance. 56
Respondent Gonzalez also defends himself contending that no injury to the judiciary has been shown,
and points to the fact that this Court denied his Motion for Reconsideration of its per curiam Decision of 27
April 1988 and reiterated and amplified that Decision in its Resolution of 19 May 1988. In the first place,
proof of actual damage sustained by a court or the judiciary in general is not essential for a finding of
contempt or for the application of the disciplinary authority of the Court. Insofar as the Consolidated
Petitions are concerned, this Court after careful review of the bases of its 27 April 1988 Decision, denied
respondent's Motion for Reconsideration thereof and rejected the public pressures brought to bear upon
this Court by the respondent through his much publicized acts and statements for which he is here being
required to account. Obstructing the free and undisturbed resolution of a particular case is not the only
species of injury that the Court has a right and a duty to prevent and redress. What is at stake in cases of
this kind is the integrity of the judicial institutions of the country in general and of the Supreme Court in
particular. Damage to such institutions might not be quantifiable at a given moment in time but damage
there will surely be if acts like those of respondent Gonzalez are not effectively stopped and countered.
The level of trust and confidence of the general public in the courts, including the court of last resort, is not
easily measured; but few will dispute that a high level of such trust and confidence is critical for the
stability of democratic government.
Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggests that punishment for contempt is not the proper remedy in this case
and suggests that the members of this Court have recourse to libel suits against him. While the remedy of
libel suits by individual members of this Court may well be available against respondent Gonzalez, such is
by no means an exclusive remedy. Moreover, where, as in the instant case, it is not only the individual
members of the Court but the Court itself as an institution that has been falsely attacked, libel suits cannot
be an adequate remedy. 57
The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of
gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the practice of law
indefinitely and until further orders from this Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman, the Secretary of Justice,
the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.

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IV.

Qualifications, Appointment and Term of Office: Section 8-11, Article XI

Powers and Functions: Section 12-13, Article XI

Tilendo v. Ombudsman, GR No. 165975, 13 September 2007

PAYAKAN G. TILENDO, G.R. No. 165975

OMBUDSMAN and Promulgated:

In 1996, the CCSPC had an appropriation of P6 million for the construction of

COMMENTS AND OBSERVATIONS:

The alleged Program of Works prepared by ENGR. HASANADDIN S. MAMA, designated

On 26 April 2002, the Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao received the NBI report

Further, the charges against respondents SAMAON A. EBRAHIM, WHILHELMINA B.

The Ruling of the Ombudsman

The petition has no merit.

On Tilendos right to speedy disposition of cases

On the finding of probable cause for the offenses charged

A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

It explained in the resolution of February 22, 2000 that:

Sec. 11. Structural Organization. x x x

(b) To enter into plea bargaining agreements; and

(c) To perform such other duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman.

Sec. 10. Powers.--The Tanodbayan shall have the following powers:

Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez, GR No. 172700, 23 July 2010

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 172700

The Ruling of the Ombudsman

The Courts Ruling

The petition has merit.

Paragraph 1, Section 13 of Article XI of the Constitution provides:

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

Judge Angeles v. Gutierrez, GR No. 189161 and 189173, 21 March 2012

Republic of the Philippines

JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES, G.R. Nos. 189161 & 189173

HON. MA. MERCEDITAS N.

March 21, 2012

Adoracion G. Angeles (petitioner Judge Angeles or petitioner).

The Complaint filed with the Ombudsman

prosecutor at the Department of Justice (DOJ).

acts allegedly committed in his capacity as a prosecutor:

smuggling by failing to present a material witness;

Complaint was conducted.[3]

Failure to present a material witness

of their official functions.[8]

filed a Motion to adduce additional evidence in the said case.[9]

Insistence on the reopening of child abuse cases

Falsification of Public Document

by respondent by making it appear that Leonila Vistan had participated in an

criminalizes it as a falsification of a public document.[21]

The Decision of the Ombudsman

conduct a preliminary investigation or an administrative adjudication with regard to the charges.