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POLITICAL LAW CASES (2018)

F. PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE

G.R. No. 110662. August 4, 1994.*

TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTAÑEZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO F. ZAMORA, Presiding Judge,
Br. 94, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and RAFAEL S. ORTAÑEZ, respondents.

Facts:

Rafael S. Ortañez filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for annulment of marriage with
damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortañez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological
incapacity of the petitioner.

Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations
between petitioner and unidentified persons. Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent’s oral offer
of evidence but on the same day, the trial court admitted all of private respondent’s offered evidence. A motion for
reconsideration from petitioner was denied. A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals
assailing the admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes are not inadmissible per se. They and any other
variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they are presented and offered and on
how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and fairness and administration of justice. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals were correct in admitting the tape recordings of telephone
conversations of petitioner with unidentified persons

Held:

No, because it was expressly provided by Republic Act 4200 that tape recordings, absent any consent from the
parties, are inadmissible.

In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of the evidence offered by private
respondent, including tape recordings of telephone conversations of petitioner with unidentified persons. These tape
recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home
telephone.

Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the
Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes” expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. Clearly,
respondents trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to consider the provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the
cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of
the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.

The Supreme Court SET ASIDE the decsion of the Court of Appeals and declared the cassette tapes were
inadmissible as evidence.

G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996.

CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin, a doctor of medicine. Petitioner entered the
clinic of her husband and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondents secretary, forcibly opened the
drawers and cabinet in her husbands clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr.
Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the
practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought an action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against petitioner. After trial,
the court rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin ordering petitioner to return said documents and
papers taken from his clinic without his knowledge and consent. It also enjoined her from using them in evidence. Court of
Appeals, affirmed the decision of the lower court.
Petitioners only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr.,1 this Court ruled that the documents and papers
were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioners attorney, Alfonso Felix, Jr., did not constitute malpractice
or gross misconduct.
The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. The Court took note of the defense of Atty. Felix, Jr. on the alleged
malpractice or gross misconduct that at the time he used the documents and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial
court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition for

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certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial courts order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the further use
of the documents and papers became effective again.
Further, Petitioners admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself under oath. Such verified
admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in evidence against him. Petitioner became bound by his
admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her husband’s admission and use the same in her action for legal separation
cannot be treated as malpractice.
ISSUE: W/N the seized documents and papers are admissible in evidence

HELD: No

The acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a declaration that his use of the
documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martins admission as to their genuiness and authenticity did not
constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no means does the decision in that case establish the
admissibility of the documents and papers in question.
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the
privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable 3is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who
thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public
safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. 4 Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 5
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the
other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed
his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband
nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.6 Neither
may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. 7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that
each owes to the other.
G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998
BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner,
vs. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS,
CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL
COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.

FACTS
This is a petition raised by Senator Blas Ople to invalidate the Administrative Order No. 308 or the Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System issued by President Fidel V. Ramos.

The petitioner contends that the implementation of the said A.O. will violate the rights of the citizens of privacy as
guaranteed by the Constitution and it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate.

ISSUE
1. Whether or not petitioner has legal standing and if the issue is ripe for judicial review
2. Whether or not AO 308 is a law hence it is beyond the power of the President to issue as it is a usurpation of the
power of Congress
3. Whether or not AO 308 is unconstitutional on the ground that it violates one’s right to privacy

RULING
1. YES. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the
requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. As
taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the
misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.
All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for
the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten
the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an important constitutional principle
and a fundamental right.

2. YES. It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It
establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate

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adjustment of various contending state policies — the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against
dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc.
It is here that administrative legislation must he restricted in its scope and application. Regulations are not
supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of a public law.
Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an
independent source of power to make laws."

3. YES. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it
is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The right of privacy is guaranteed in several provisions of the Constitution
namely: Sections 3 (1), 1, 2, 6, 8 and 17 of the Bill of Rights
A.O. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to
conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and
(2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic
services. While it is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. 308, it
is not arguable that the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. 308, if implemented, will put our
people’s right to privacy in clear and present danger.

The heart of A.O. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a “common
reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies” through the use of “Biometrics Technology” and
“computer application designs.” Biometry or biometrics is “the science of the application of statistical methods to biological
facts; a mathematical analysis of biological data.” The methods or forms of biological encoding include finger-scanning and
retinal scanning, as well as the method known as the “artificial nose” and the thermogram. A.O. 308 does not state what
specific biological characteristics and what particular biometrics technology shall be used.

Moreover, A.O. 308 does not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for
identification purposes. The Solicitor General’s claim that the adoption of the Identification Reference System will
contribute to the “generation of population data for development planning” is an admission that the PRN will not be used
solely for identification but for the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. 308. The
computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information, but there are no controls to guard against
leakage of information. When the access code of the control programs of the particular computer system is broken, an
intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data
stored within the system.

A.O. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered about our people will only be
processed for unequivocally specified purposes. The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. 308 may interfere
with the individual’s liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also
enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against self-
incrimination; it may pave the way for “fishing expeditions” by government authorities and evade the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer
technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID,
much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.

KILUSANG MAYO UNO vs. DIRECTOR GENERAL G.R. No. 167798 April 19, 2006

FACTS: This case involves two consolidated petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, seeking the nullification of Executive Order No. 420 (EO 420) on the ground that it is unconstitutional. EO 420,
issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 13 April 2005.

REQUIRING ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO

STREAMLINE AND HARMONIZE THEIR IDENTIFICATION (ID) SYSTEMS, AND AUTHORIZING FOR SUCH PURPOSE
THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT THE SAME,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Thus, under EO 420, the President directs all government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations to
adopt a uniform data collection and format for their existing identification (ID) systems. Petitioners in G.R. No. 167798 allege
that EO 420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of legislative functions by the executive branch of the
government. Furthermore, they allege that EO 420 infringes on the citizens right to privacy. Petitioners in G.R. No. 167930
allege that EO 420 is void based on the following grounds:

1. EO 420 is contrary to law. It completely disregards and violates the decision of this Honorable Court in Ople v. Torres et
al., G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998. It also violates RA 8282 otherwise known as the Social Security Act of 1997.

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2. The Executive has usurped the legislative power of Congress as she has no power to issue EO 420. Furthermore, the
implementation of the EO will use public funds not appropriated by Congress for that purpose.

3. EO 420 violates the constitutional provisions on the right to privacy (i) It allows access to personal confidential data
without the owners consent. (ii) EO 420 is vague and without adequate safeguards or penalties for any violation of its
provisions. (iii) There are no compelling reasons that will legitimize the necessity of EO 420.

4. Granting without conceding that the President may issue EO 420, the Executive Order was issued without public hearing.

5. EO 420 violates the Constitutional provision on equal protection of laws and results in the discriminatory treatment of and
penalizes those without ID.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 420 infringes on the citizens right to privacy.

HELD: Prior to EO 420, government entities had a free hand in determining the kind, nature and extent of data to be
collected and stored for their ID systems. Under EO 420, government entities can collect and record only the 14 specific
data mentioned in Section 3 of EO 420. In addition, government entities can show in their ID cards only eight of these
specific data, seven less data than what the Supreme Courts ID shows.

Also, prior to EO 420, there was no executive issuance to government entities prescribing safeguards on the collection,
recording, and disclosure of personal identification data to protect the right to privacy. Now, under Section 5 of EO 420, the
following safeguards are instituted:

a. The data to be recorded and stored, which shall be used only for purposes of establishing the identity of a person, shall
be limited to those specified in Section 3 of this executive order;

b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of other data in violation of a persons right to privacy be allowed or tolerated
under this order;

c. Stringent systems of access control to data in the identification system shall be instituted;

d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be kept and treated as strictly confidential and a personal or written
authorization of the Owner shall be required for access and disclosure of data;

e. The identification card to be issued shall be protected by advanced security features and cryptographic technology;

f. A written request by the Owner of the identification card shall be required for any correction or revision of relevant data, or
under such conditions as the participating agency issuing the identification card shall prescribe.

On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly limits the data that can be collected,
recorded and shown compared to the existing ID systems of government entities. EO 420 further provides strict safeguards
to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast to the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative
safeguards. The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities. Some one
hundred countries have compulsory national ID systems, including democracies such as Spain, France, Germany, Belgium,
Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal. Other countries which do not have national ID systems, like the United States, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, the Nordic Countries and Sweden, have sectoral cards for health, social or other public
services. Even with EO 420, the Philippines will still fall under the countries that do not have compulsory national ID systems
but allow only sectoral cards for social security, health services, and other specific purposes.

In U.S. Justice Department, the issue was not whether the State could collect and store information on individuals from
public records nationwide but whether the State could withhold such information from the press. The premise of the issue in
U.S. Justice Department is that the State can collect and store in a central database information on citizens gathered from
public records across the country. In fact, the law authorized the Department of Justice to collect and preserve fingerprints
and other criminal identification records nationwide. The law also authorized the Department of Justice to exchange such
information with officials of States, cities and other institutions. The Department of Justice treated such information as
confidential. A CBS news correspondent and the Reporters Committee demanded the criminal records of four members of a
family pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Freedom of Information Act
expressly exempts release of information that would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and the
information demanded falls under that category of exempt information.

With the exception of the 8 specific data shown on the ID card, the personal data collected and recorded under EO 420 are
treated as strictly confidential under Section 6(d) of EO 420. These data are not only strictly confidential but also personal
matters. Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution grants the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern. Personal matters are exempt or outside the coverage of the peoples right to information on matters of public
concern. The data treated as strictly confidential under EO 420 being private matters and not matters of public concern,

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these data cannot be released to the public or the press. Thus, the ruling in U.S. Justice Department does not collide with
EO 420 but actually supports the validity EO 420.

Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to privacy. Petitioners cannot show such violation by a mere
facial examination of EO 420 because EO 420 narrowly draws the data collection, recording and exhibition while prescribing
comprehensive safeguards. Ople v. Torres is not authority to hold that EO 420 violates the right to privacy because in that
case the assailed executive issuance, broadly drawn and devoid of safeguards, was annulled solely on the ground that the
subject matter required legislation. As then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban noted in his
concurring opinion in Ople v. Torres, The voting is decisive only on the need for appropriate legislation, and it is only on this
ground that the petition is granted by this Court

EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards pursuant to their regular
functions under existing laws. EO 420 does not grant such government entities any power that they do not already possess
under existing laws. In contrast, the assailed executive issuance in Ople v. Torres sought to establish a National
Computerized Identification Reference System, a national ID system that did not exist prior to the assailed executive
issuance. Obviously, a national ID card system requires legislation because it creates a new national data collection and
card issuance system where none existed before.

In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but makes the existing sectoral card systems of
government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable and user-friendly to the public.
Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under the Presidents constitutional power of control over
government entities in the Executive department, as well as under the Presidents constitutional duty to ensure that laws are
faithfully executed. WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. Executive Order No. 420 is declared VALID.

G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners,
vs. ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES, Respondents.

Topic: Facebook (Right to Privacy)

Facts: In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College (STC), uploaded on Facebook several
pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara) wearing only their undergarments.

Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their teacher, Mylene Escudero. Escudero, through her
students, viewed and downloaded said pictures. She showed the said pictures to STC’s Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate
action.

Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the student’s handbook and banned them from “marching” in their graduation
ceremonies scheduled in March 2012.

The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining order) granted by the Cebu RTC enjoining the school from
barring the students in the graduation ceremonies, STC still barred said students.

Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of
habeas data against the school. They argued, among others, that:

1. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at “Friends Only.” They, thus, have a reasonable
expectation of privacy which must be respected.
2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their consent.
Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them
to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of the children were intruded upon;
3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and digital images happened
at STC’s Computer Laboratory;
They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subject data and
have such data be declared illegally obtained in violation of the children’s right to privacy.

The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
1.) Whether or not a writ of habeas data should be issued given the factual milieu?

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2.) Whether or not STC violated petitioner’s daughter’s right to privacy?

Held:
1.) Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper.

Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that:

1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a case of extralegal killing or enforced
disappearance; and
2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not an entity engaged in the business of
“gathering, collecting, or storing data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party”.

First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied only in cases of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances. Second, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only against
abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data.

Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking Sites)

The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like Facebook has privacy tools, and the user makes use of
such privacy tools, then he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy (right to informational privacy, that is). Thus, such
privacy must be respected and protected.

In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned made use of such privacy tools. Evidence would
show that that their post (status) on Facebook were published as “Public”.

Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can view a user’s posts on his “wall” (profile page):
(a) Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;
(c) Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
(d) Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook user; and
(e) Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.

The default setting is “Public” and if a user wants to have some privacy, then he must choose any setting other than “Public”.
If it is true that the students concerned did set the posts subject of this case so much so that only five people can see them
(as they claim), then how come most of their classmates were able to view them. This fact was not refuted by them. In fact,
it was their classmates who informed and showed their teacher, Escudero, of the said pictures. Therefore, it appears that
Tan et al never use the privacy settings of Facebook hence, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy on the pictures
of them scantily clad.

2.) No. STC did not violate petitioners’ daughter’s right to privacy.

Without these privacy settings, respondents’ contention that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in Facebook
would, in context, be correct. However, such is not the case. It is through the availability of said privacy tools that many OSN
users are said to have a subjective expectation that only those to whom they grant access to their profile will view the
information they post or upload thereto.

STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy. The manner which the school gathered the pictures cannot be considered
illegal. As it appears, it was the classmates of the students who showed the picture to their teacher and the latter, being the
recipient of said pictures, merely delivered them to the proper school authority and it was for a legal purpose, that is, to
discipline their students according to the standards of the school (to which the students and their parents agreed to in the
first place because of the fact that they enrolled their children there).

G.R. No. 203254, October 08, 2014

DR. JOY MARGATE LEE, Petitioner, v. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN, Respondent.

FACTS: In his Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data, Ilagan alleged that he and petitioner Dr. Joy Margate Lee
(Lee) were former common law partners. Sometime in July 2011, he visited Lee at the latter’s condominium, rested for a
while and thereafter, proceeded to his office. Upon arrival, Ilagan noticed that his digital camera was missing. On August 23,
2011, Lee confronted Ilagan at the latter’s office regarding a purported sex video (subject video) she discovered from the

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aforesaid camera involving Ilagan and another woman. Ilagan denied the video and demanded Lee to return the camera,
but to no avail.5 During the confrontation, Ilagan allegedly slammed Lee’s head against a wall inside his office and walked
away.6Subsequently, Lee utilized the said video as evidence in filing various complaints against Ilagan, namely: (a) a
criminal complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 9262,- “Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004,”
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati; and (b) an administrative complaint for grave misconduct before the
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM).8 Ilagan claimed that Lee’s acts of reproducing the subject video and
threatening to distribute the same to the upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated not only
his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that of the other woman, and thus, the issuance of a writ of habeas
data in his favor is warranted.
Lee admitted that she indeed kept the memory card of the digital camera and reproduced the aforesaid video but averred
that she only did so to utilize the same as evidence in the cases she filed against Ilagan. She also admitted that her
relationship with Ilagan started sometime in 2003 and ended under disturbing circumstances in August 2011, and that she
only happened to discover the subject video when Ilagan left his camera in her condominium. Accordingly, Lee contended
that Ilagan’s petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data should be dismissed because: (a) its filing was only aimed at
suppressing the evidence against Ilagan in the cases she filed; and (b) she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting, or
storing of data regarding the person of Ilagan.12

The RTC - granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data in Ilagan’s favor. The RTC opined that Lee’s use of the subject
video as evidence in the various cases she filed against Ilagan is not enough justification for its reproduction.

Issue: whether or not the RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of Ilagan. – NO.

As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as “a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party.” Thus, in order to support a petition
for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges,
among others, “[t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty
or security of the aggrieved party.” In other words, the petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between
the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other .19 Corollarily, the allegations
in the petition must be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy
in life, liberty or security of the victim.

In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty or security
was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While
Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video – which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or
be uploaded in the internet for public consumption – he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any
violation of his right to life, liberty or security.

As the records show, all that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his self-serving testimony which hardly meets
the substantial evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule. This is because nothing therein would
indicate that Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards the end of violating Ilagan’s right to privacy in life,
liberty or security. Nor would anything on record even lead a reasonable mind to conclude 22 that Lee was going to use the
subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends – say for instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin Ilagan’s reputation.
Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in her testimony that the only reason why she reproduced the subject video was to
legitimately utilize the same as evidence in the criminal and administrative cases that she filed against Ilagan.23 Hence, due
to the insufficiency of the allegations as well as the glaring absence of substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to
reverse the RTC Decision and dismiss the habeas data petition.