Alia A Citizen of The Philippines and A Qualified Voter of The Constituency

ELECTION LAW – Atty.
Gallant Soriano
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
JUAN FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC ISSUE: Whether or notFrivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time
G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989 of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.
DOCTRINE:Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials HELD:NO. Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply
and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all recovered. Under CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may
times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter repatriation.Frivaldo did not invoke either of the first two methods and it
alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency cannot also be said that he was repatriated because even if he lose his
where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides naturalized citizenship by filing a certificate of candidacy with the
further that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen COMELEC, it did not and could not have the effect of automatically
of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced.
under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. Qualifications for public
office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the The reason for resolving Frivaldo’s citizenship at the time of his election
time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public
officer's entire tenure. Filipino citizenship, if previously renounced, may officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at
be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local
repatriation. Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter
alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency
FACTS: PetitionerJuan Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides
Sorsogon province on January 22, 1988 and assumed office in due time. further that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen
Respondent Salvador Estuye, president of the League of Municipalities, of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage
Sorsogon Chapter, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
of the election and proclamation of Frivaldo on the ground that he was
not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States in 1983. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption
Frivaldo’s American citizenship was admitted by him and was reflected in of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
a certification issued by a US District Court. However, he pleaded the qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. The fact that
defense that the American citizenship was forced on him as a measure he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent
of protection from the persecution of the Marcos Dictatorship and that by violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to
actively participating in the elections, he automatically forfeited the same the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office
under the laws of the United States. He further contends that by filing his cannot be erased by the electorate alone. Hence, Frivaldo is not a citizen
certificate of candidacy he had already effectively recovered Philippine of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of
citizenship. the Province of Sorsogon.
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ELECTION LAW – Atty. Gallant Soriano
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
RAMON L. LABO, JR. VS. COMELEC G.R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989 citizenship is a futile technicality that should not frustrate the will of the electorate
of Baguio City, who elected him by a majority.
DOCTRINE:The will of the electorate cannot change the requirement of the Local
Government Code and the Constitution as would permit a foreigner owing his total ISSUE:Whether or not Petitioner Labois eligible as a candidate for mayor of
allegiance to the Queen of Australia or at least a stateless individual owing no Baguio City.
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of
their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their HELD: NO. Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship
countrymen. may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
It did not appear in the record, nor did the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired
The probability that many of those who voted for the public official with alleged Philippine citizenship by any of these methods.
lack of citizenship may have done so in the belief that he was qualified, only
strengthens the conclusion that the results of the election cannot nullify the For this reason, Labo’s claim for recognition as a citizen of the Philippines must
qualifications for the office held by him. These qualifications are continuing be denied. Labo was not a citizen of the Philippines on the day of the local
requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself elections on January 18, 1988. He was not even a qualified voter under the
is deemed forfeited. Constitution because of his alienage. He was therefore ineligible as a candidate
for mayor of Baguio City, under Section 42 of the Local Government Code which
FACTS: Petitioner Ramon Labo was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City on provides that “An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least
January 20, 1988. Questioning Labo’s citizenship as a qualification for his office, twenty-three years of age on election day, a qualified voter registered as such in
private respondent Luiz Lardizabal filed a petition for quo warranto on January the barangay, municipality, city or province where he proposes to be elected…”
26, 1988, but the filing fee was paid only on February 10, 1988, or twenty-one
days after his proclamation. Moreover, even if Labo was elected by the majority, the people of that locality
could not change the requirements of the Local Government Code and the
Labo contends that the petition should not be given due course as it was filed Constitution. The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total
beyond the reglementary period of ten days under Section 253 of the Omnibus allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no
Election Code.Prior to the filing of the petition for quo warranto, two administrative allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of
decisions were rendered on the question of the Labo’s citizenship. their city. *Doctrine
The first was rendered by the COMELEC finding Labo to be a citizen of the In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently
Philippines on the ground that there was no direct proof that he had been formally lost but were not possessed at all in the first place on the day of the election. The
naturalized as a citizen of Australia. The second was rendered by the Commission petitioner was disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is not
on Immigration and Deportation, acting upon Labo’s application for the now qualified to serve as such.
cancellation of his alien certificate of registration
It ruled that he was not a citizen of the Philippines based on the official statement
of the Australian Government that Labo was an Australian citizen by reason of his
naturalization in 1976. However,Labo claims that his marriage to an Australian
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national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship, but
instead it made him a dual national. He further argues that his alleged lack of
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC elections in the First District of Leyte, but such resolution was reversed
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995 on the same day it was issued and directed that Marcos’ proclamation be
suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.
DOCTRINE: For the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous
with domicile. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a Marcos filed a petition averring that she won the elections for the
change of domicile, one must demonstrate: (1) An actual removal or an congressional seat in the First District of Leyte based on the canvass
actual change of domicile; (2) A bona fide intention of abandoning the completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.
former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) Acts which
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement
correspond with the purpose.
as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 6 of the Constitution
FACTS:Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and Cirilo Roy Montejo were
SC RULING: YES
candidates for the Congressional seat in the First District of Leyte.
Montejo filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" against The court ruled that Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the
Marcos on the ground that the latter did not meet the constitutional factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical
requirement for residency, which is not less than one year immediately presence of a person in a given area, community or country. However,
preceding the election. Marcos declared in her certificate of candidacy for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile.
that she has been a resident in the constituency where she seeks to be The court ruled that it is the fact of residence, not a statement in a
elected for seven months only. certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether
or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification
Marcos filed an Amended certificate of candidacy changing the entry
requirement.
"seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended
certificate but the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte rejected the It further held that Marcos merely committed an honest mistake in jotting
certificate on the ground that it was filed out of time. Marcos went ahead the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification
and filed the same certificate with the COMELEC’s Head Office in Manila. requirement. An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived
and maintained residences in different places. Marcos held various
She contends that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her
residences for different purposes during the last four decades but none
domicile or residence. Thereafter, the 2nd division of the COMELEC
of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her
granted Montejo’s petition for disqualification and cancelled Marcos’
domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.
original certificate of candidacy. It held that In election cases, the term
"residence" has always been considered as synonymous with "domicile" Lastly, it ruled that domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully
which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: (1) An actual removal
personal presence in-that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such or an actual change of domicile; (2) A bona fide intention of abandoning
intention. Furthermore, it held that when she returned to the Philippines the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) Acts
in 1991, she chose San Juan, Metro Manila as her residence. Thus, which correspond with the purpose. All the three requirements must
her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban. concur, otherwise, the presumption of continuity of residence cannot be
rebutted.
After the May 1995 elections, the COMELEC issued two resolutions, the
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first allowed Marcos’ proclamation should the results of the canvass show
Page
that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
Aquino vs. COMELEC Aquino filed a motion to lift the suspension, and on June 2, the COMELEC
G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995 resolved to proceed with the proclamation. However, on the same day,
the COMELEC reversed the May 6 resolution and declared Aquino
ineligible to run for office and thus disqualified as a candidate.
DOCTRINE:
Hence this present petition.
Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change
ofdomicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change ISSUE: WON petitioner failed to comply with the residency requirement
of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of mandated by the Constitution?
residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond
with the purpose. SC RULING: YES
FACTS: The Court agreed with the COMELEC that in order that Aquino could
qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati
Agapito Aquino is a candidate for a congressional post in the the new City the latter "must prove that he has established not just residence
Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, but domicile of choice. It held that the place "where a party actually or
he declared that he is a resident in the constituency where he seeks to constructively has his permanent home," where he, no matter where he
be elected for a period of 10 months. Thereafter, Move Makati, a duly may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the LAKAS- remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it
NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.
disqualify on the ground that latter lacked the residence qualification as a
candidate for congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 The Court upheld the COMELEC’s findings that Aquino is a resident of
the Constitution, should be for a period not less than one (1) year San Jose, Concepcion Tarlac for 52 years immediately preceding the
immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections. 1992 elections, that his birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the
birthplace of both of his parents. It is therefore clear that domicile of
The following day, Aquino filed another certificate of candidacy where he origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of
declared that he resided in the constituency where he sought to be candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.
elected for one (l) year and thirteen (13) days. During the hearing of the
case against Aquino, the latter presented among others, a lease contract Furthermore, Aquino’s intention not to establish a permanent home in
between him & Feliciano. In May 6, 1995, The COMELEC declares Makati City was evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of
Aquino eligible to run for the Office of Representative in the Second buying one. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a
Legislative District of Makati City. Move Makati &Bedon filed a motion for change ofdomicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual
reconsideration. change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place
of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which
After the elections were held, Aquino garnered the highest number of correspond with the purpose.
votes as against his two other competitors. Therafter, Move Makati
&Bedon filed an Urgent Motion to suspend Aquino’s proclamation. On
May 15, 1995, the COMELEC issued an Order suspending Aquino’s
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proclamation.
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, COMELEC are generally respected and even given the status of
ANTONIO V. GONZALES AND ORLANDO R. BALBON, JR., Respondent. finality.
2) that the Court erred in taking cognizance of the present petition since
BRION, J.: the issues raised therein are essentially factual in nature. It claims that
it is elementary that the extraordinary remedy of certioraris limited to
FACTS: correcting questions of law and that the factual issues raised in the
We annulled in this Decision the February 10, 2010 and May 4, 2010 present petition are not appropriate for a petition for review on
Resolutions of the COMELEC, and denied the private respondents petition to certiorari.
cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra
(Mitra). ISSUES: Whether the SC erred when it reviewed the probative value of
the evidence presented and substituted its own factual findings over
Our Decision emphasized that despite our limited certiorari jurisdiction in that of the public respondent.
election cases, we are not only obliged but are constitutionally bound to
intervene when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation and evaluation of HELD: We resolve to deny, for lack of merit, the motions for
evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion in this case, a situation where reconsideration and for oral arguments.
resulting errors, arising from the grave abuse committed by the COMELEC, REMEDIAL LAW: petition for certiorari
mutated from being errors of judgment to errors of jurisdiction.
COMELEC's submission in this regard that the extraordinary remedy of
Based on our evaluation of the evidence presented by both parties, we found certiorari is limited to corrections of questions of law and that the
that Mitra did not commit any deliberate material misrepresentation in his COC. factual issues raised in the present petition are not appropriate for a
petition for review on certiorari is wholly erroneous.
We noted, too, that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in its
appreciation of the evidence, leading it to conclude that Mitra is not a resident of To recall, Mitra brought this case before us via petition for certiorari,
Aborlan, Palawan. We also found that the COMELEC failed to critically consider pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of
whether Mitra deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact that Court. Thus, in our July 2, 2010 Decision, we emphasized that our
would otherwise render him ineligible for the position of Governor of Palawan. review (under the Rule 65 standard of grave abuse of discretion, and
not under the Rule 45 question of law standard) is based on a very
In fact, Mitra adduced positive evidence of transfer of residence which the limited ground,i.e., on the jurisdictional issue of whether the COMELEC
private respondents evidence failed to sufficiently controvert. Specifically, the acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
private respondents evidence failed to show that Mitra remained a Puerto discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Princesa City resident.
POLITICAL LAW: judicial power
In this regard, we took note of the incremental moves Mitra undertook to
establish his new domicile in Aborlan, as evidenced by the following:(1) The COMELEC should likewise be aware that the Constitution itself, in
hisexpressed intentto transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa City to defining judicial power, pointedly states that
make him eligible for a provincial position; (2) his preparatory moves starting in
early 2008; (3) the transfer of registration as a voter in March 2009; (4) his initial Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
transfer through a leased dwelling at Maligaya Feedmill; (5) the purchase of a lot controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
for his permanent home; and (6) the construction of a house on the said lot enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
which is adjacent to the premises he was leasing pending the completion ofhis abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
house. part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Based on these considerations, we cannot accept the COMELEC's
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The COMELEC position that patently confuses the mode of review in election cases
Page
1) argues that we overstepped our review power over its factual findings; under Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court, with the appellate review
as a specialized constitutional body, the findings and conclusions of the that Rule 45 of the same Rules provides.
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
We, thus, stand by our ruling that the February 3, 2009 CTC, if at all, carries
We likewise reject the COMELEC and the private respondents very little evidentiary value.
proposition that the Court erred in exercising its limited certiorari
jurisdiction 3.The private respondents likewise belatedly submitted a Certification, dated
July 17, 2010, from the Municipal Agriculturist of Aborlan, stating that its office
As we emphasized in our Decision, we have in the past recognized exceptions does not have any record of the supposed pineapple plantation in Barangay
to the general rule that the Court ordinarily does not review in a certiorari case Isaub, Aborlan, Palawan. This late submission was made to show that Mitra has
the COMELECs appreciation and evaluation of evidence . no established business interests in Aborlan.
One such exception is when the COMELECs appreciation and evaluation of At the risk of repetition, we reiterate that Mitras business interests in Aborlan
evidence go beyond the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly stand undisputed in the present case. Not only was Mitra able to present
unreasonable. In this situation, we are duty bound under the Constitution to photographs of his experimental pineapple plantation; his claim of ownership
intervene and correct COMELEC errors that, because of the attendant grave was also corroborated by the statements of Dr. Carme Caspe, Ricardo Temple
abuse of discretion, have mutated into errors of jurisdiction. and other witnesses.
ELECTION LAW: residence ELECTION LAW: deliberate material misrepresentation in his COC
The main critical points are the alleged deliberate misrepresentation by Mitra One important point in the present case is that the private respondents failed to
and the underlying question of his residency in Aborlan, Palawan. prove that there was deliberate material misrepresentation in Mitras statement
on his required residency prior to the May 10, 2010 elections. This, as we
While it is undisputed that Mitras domicile of origin is Puerto Princesa City, Mitra stressed in our Decision, is a glaring gap in the private respondents case:
adequately proved by substantial evidence that he transferred by incremental
process to Aborlan beginning 2008, and concluded his transfer in early 2009. We do not believe that he committed any deliberate misrepresentation given
what he knew of his transfer, as shown by the moves he had made to carry it
The private respondents failed to establish by sufficiently convincing evidence out. From the evidentiary perspective, we hold that the evidence confirming
that Mitra did not effectively transfer, while the COMELEC not only grossly residence in Aborlan decidedly tilts in Mitras favor; even assuming the worst for
misread the evidence but even used the wrong considerations in appreciating Mitra, the evidence in his favor cannot go below the level of anequipoise,
the submitted evidence. i.e.,when weighed,Mitras evidence of transfer and residence in Aborlan cannot
be overcome by the respondents evidence that he remained a Puerto Princesa
At this point, we only need to address some of the private respondents City resident.
misleading points in order to clear the air:
Under the situation prevailing when Mitra filed his COC, we cannot conclude
1.The private respondents reliance on the expiration date of the lease contract, that Mitra committed any misrepresentation, much less a deliberate one, about
to disprove Mitras claim that the room at the Maligaya Feedmill is his residence, his residence.
is misplaced. That a lease is fixed for a one-year term is a common practice.
What is important is that it is renewable at the option of the parties.In the The character of Mitras representation before the COMELEC is an aspect of the
absence of any objection from the parties, the lease contract simply continues case that the COMELEC completely failed to consider as it focused mainly on
and is deemed renewed. the character of Mitras feedmill residence.For this reason, the COMELEC was
led into error one that goes beyond an ordinary error of judgment.
2.In an attempt to show that Mitra considers himself a resident of Puerto
Princesa City, the private respondents submitted in their Motion for By failing to take into account whether there had been a deliberate
Reconsideration a colored certified true copy of Mitras alleged Puerto Princesa misrepresentation in Mitras COC, the COMELEC committed the grave abuse of
City Community Tax Certificate (CTC) dated February 3, 2009 allegedly simply assuming that an error in the COC was necessarily a deliberate falsity in
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showing Mitras signature. To recall, we found that based on the records before a material representation. In this case, it doubly erred because there was no
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us, the purported February 3, 2009 CTC did not bear the signature of Mitra . falsity; as the carefully considered evidence shows, Mitra did indeed transfer his
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
residence within the period required by Section 74 of the OEC. is the parties affirmation before a notary public of the contracts genuineness and
due execution.
ELECTION LAW: the private respondents failed to establish by sufficiently
convincing evidence that Mitra remained a Puerto Princesa City resident The significance of Mitras statement in his Motion for Reconsideration that he
had already transferred to his newly constructed house in Aborlan must not be
The evidence before us, properly considered and carefully reviewed, fully read in isolation; it must be appreciated under the backdrop of Mitras explicit
supports our conclusion that the private respondents evidence failed to show intention to make Aborlan his permanent residence through an incremental
that Mitra remained a Puerto Princesa City resident. As discussed now and in transfer of residence, as evidenced by the following:
our Decision of July 2, 2010, Mitra adequately proved by substantial evidence
that he transferred by incremental process to Aborlan beginning 2008, (1) his initial transfer through the leased dwelling at the mezzanine portion of the
concluding his transfer in early 2009.Given this proof, the burden of evidence Maligaya Feedmill;
lies with the private respondents to establish the contrary.
(2) the purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and
Proof to the contrary is sadly lacking, as the dissents reliance on the
Certification of the Punong Barangay of Sta. Monica,PuertoPrincesaCity is (3) the construction of a house on this lot which is adjacent to the premises he
misplaced. Theponenciacannot give full evidentiary weight to the was leasing pending the completion of his house.
aforementioned Certification.
All these should of course be read with the establishment of Mitras business
On the other hand, Commodore Hernandez declaration on its face did not interest in Aborlan and his transfer of registration as a voter.
controvert Carme E. Caspes sworn statement which adequately proved that
Mitras transfer to Aborlan was accomplished, not in a single move, but through With the conclusion that Mitra did not commit any material misrepresentation in
an incremental process that started in early 2008 and concluded in March 2009. his COC, we see no reason in this case to appeal to the primacy of the
electorates will. We cannot deny, however, that the people of Palawan have
ELECTION LAW: the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in spoken in an election where residency qualification had been squarely raised
the appreciation of the evidence and in using wrong considerations which and their voice has erased any doubt about their verdict on Mitras qualifications.
lead it to incorrectly conclude that Mitra is not a resident of Aborlan and
that he committed a deliberate misrepresentation in his COC Under these terms, we cannot be any clearer.
To buttress our finding that the COMELEC used personal and subjective WHEREFORE, premises considered, we resolve to DENY with FINALITY,
assessment standards instead of the standards prescribed by law, we cited for lack of merit, the motions for reconsideration and motion for oral
Coquilla v. COMELEC, which characterized the term residence as referring to arguments now before us.Let entry of judgment be made in due course.
domicile or legal residence, that is the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus
manendi).
ELECTION LAW: the validity or invalidity of the lease contract is not

determinative of question of Mitras residence in Aborlan
The validity of the lease contract, however, is not the issue before us; what
concerns us is the question of whether Mitra did indeed enter into an agreement
for the lease, or strictly for the use, of the Maligaya Feedmill as his residence
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(while his house, on the lot he bought, was under construction) and whether he
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indeed resided there. The notarys compliance with the notarial law likewise
assumes no materiality as it is a defect not imputable to Mitra; what is important
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
ROMMEL JALOSJOS VS. COMELEC The LGC requires that a gubernatorial candidate be a resident of the
province for at least one year before the elections. For the purposes of
Doctrine: Proof required to establish domicile of a reinstated Filipino election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with
citizen running for governor of a province domicile: i.e. he must have an intention to reside in a particulaar place,
FACTS: but must also have personal presence coupled with conduct indicative
of such intention.
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He migrated to
Australia when he was eight years old and acquired Australian The question of residence is a question of intention. To determine
citizenship. In 2008, he returned to the Philippines and lived in compliance with the residency/domicile requirement, jurisprudence has
Zamboanga, he took an oath of allegiance to the Philippines and was laid down the following guidelines:
issued a certificate of reacquisition of citizenship by the Bureau of
Immigration and he renounced his Australian citizenship. (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere;
Jalosjos applied for registration as a voter in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay,

but Private Respondent Erasmo, the barangay captain, opposed the (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he
registration. COMELEC approved the application and included Jalosjos acquires a new one; and
in the voter's list. This decision was affirmed at the MCTC and at the (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.
RTC.
The facts show that Jalosjos' domicile of origin was Quezon city. When
he acquired Australian citizenship, Australia became his domicile by
Jalosjos then filed a certificate of candidacy (COC) for Governor of operation of law and by choice. On the other hand, when he came to
Zamboanga Sibugay for the 2010 elections. Erasmo filed a petition to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga
cancel the COC on the ground of failure to comply with the one year Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his
residency requirement of the Local Government Code (LGC). domicile for good.
He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his
COMELEC held that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona allegiance to that country and reacquired his old citizenship by taking an
fide intention to establish a domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. It held oath of allegiance to the Philippines. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his
that when he first moved back to the Philippines, he was merely a guest legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his
or transient at his brother's house in Ipil, and for this reason, he cannot domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil,
claim Ipil as his domicile. Meanwhile, Jalosjos won the elections. Zamboanga Sibugay.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC is correct in holding that To hold that Jalosjos has not established a new domicile in Zamboanga
petitioner did not present ample proof of a bona fide intention to Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his
establish domicile at Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the
settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence
somewhere.
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HELD: NO. The COMELEC is incorrect. Jalosjos has successfully
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proven by his acts of renouncing his Australian citizenship and by living
in Ipil, that he has changed his domicile to Zamboanga Sibugay.
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
Neither can COMELEC conclude that Jalosjos did not come to settle his
domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brother's
house. A candidate is not required to have a house in order to establish
his residence or domicile in that place. It is enough that he should live
there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or
relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives
would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is
that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and
an intention of making it his domicile.
As evidence, Jalosjos presented his next-door neighbors who testified
that he was physically present in Ipil, he presented correspondence with
political leaders and local and national party mates, furthermore, he is a
registered voter by final judgement of the RTC. The court also noted
that Jalosjos has since acquired a lot in Ipil and a fish pond in San
Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. This, without a doubt is sufficient to
establish his intent to set his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
DISPOSITIVE
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division dated February 11, 2010
and the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc dated May 4, 2010 that
disqualified petitioner Rommel Jalosjos from seeking election as
Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.
9
Page
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
CASE DIGEST: JALOSJOS V. COMELEC On 04 June 2010, the COMELEC Second Division ruled that respondent
G.R. No. 193314 : February 26, 2013 was DISQUALIFIED for the position of mayor.
SVETLANA P. JALOSJOS, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON The COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution on 19 August 2010
ELECTIONS, EDWIN ELIM TUMPAG and RODOLFO Y. denying the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner for lack of merit and
ESTRELLADA, Respondents. affirming the Resolution of the Second Division denying due course to or
cancelling her CoC.
SERENO, J.:
ISSUE: Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
FACTS: holding that petitioner had failed to prove compliance with the one-year
residency requirement for local elective officials.
On 20 November 2009, petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy
(CoC) for mayor of Baliangao, MisamisOccidental for the 10 May 2010 HELD: Petitioner failed to comply with theone-year residency
elections. She indicated therein her place of birth and residence as requirement forlocal elective officials.
BarangayTugas, Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental (Brgy. Petitioner uncontroverted domicile of origin is Dapitan City. The question
Tugas). is whether she was able to establish, through clear and positive proof,
that she had acquired a domicile of choice in Baliangao, Misamis
Asserting otherwise, private respondents filed against petitioner a Occidental, prior to the May 2010 elections.
Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy,
in which they argued t hat she had falsely represented her place of birth When it comes to the qualifications for running for public office,
and residence, because she was in fact born in San Juan, Metro Manila, residence is synonymous with domicile. Accordingly, Nuval v. Gurayheld
and had not totally abandoned her previous domicile, Dapitan City. as follows:
On the other hand, petitioner averred that she had established her The term esidenceas so used, is synonymous with omicilewhich imports
residence in the said barangay since December 2008 when she not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence
purchased two parcels of land there, and that she had been staying in in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
the house of a certain Mrs. Lourdes Yap (Yap) while the former was
overseeing the construction of her house. Furthermore, petitioner There are three requisites for a person to acquire a new domicile by
asserted that the error in her place of birth was committed by her choice. First, residence or bodily presence in the new locality. Second,
secretary. Nevertheless, in aCoC, an error in the declaration of the an intention to remain there. Third, an intention to abandon the old
place of birth is not a material misrepresentation that would lead to domicile.
disqualification, because it is not one of the qualifications provided by
law. These circumstances must be established by clear and positive proof,
as held in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELECand subsequently in
The Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Dumpit- Michelena v. Boado:
Candidacy remained pending as of the day of the elections, in which
petitioner garnered the highest number of votes. On 10 May 2010, the In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the
10
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence
proclaimed her as the duly elected municipal mayor. showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of
Page
continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal Fernandez v. COMELEChas established that the ownership of a house
residences at the same time. or some other property does not establish domicile. This principle is
especially true in this case as petitioner has failed to establish her bodily
Moreover, even if these requisites are established by clear and positive presence in the locality and her intent to stay there at least a year before
proof, the date of acquisition of the domicile of choice, or the critical the elections.
date, must also be established to be within at least one year prior to the
elections using the same standard of evidence. Finally, the approval of the application for registration of petitioner as a
voter only shows, at most, that she had met the minimum residency
In the instant case, we find that petitioner failed to establish by clear and requirement as a voter. This minimum requirement is different from that
positive proof that she had resided in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, for acquiring a new domicile of choice for the purpose of running for
one year prior to the 10 May 2010 elections. public office.
There were inconsistencies in the Affidavits of Acas-Yap, Yap III, The Petition is DENIED.
Villanueva, Duhaylungsod, Estrellada,Jumawan, Medija, Bagundol,
Colaljo, Tenorio, Analasan, Bation, Maghilum and Javier.
First, they stated that they personally knew petitioner to be an actual

and physical resident of Brgy. Tugassince 2008. However, they
declared in the same Affidavits that she stayed in Brgy. Punta Miray
while her house was being constructed in Brgy. Tugas.
Second, construction workers Yap III, Villanueva, Duhaylungsod and

Estrellada asserted that in December 2009, construction was still
ongoing. By their assertion, they were implying that six months before
the 10 May 2010 elections, petitioner had not yet moved into her house
at Brgy. Tugas.
Third, the same construction workers admitted that petitioner only

visited Baliangao occasionally when they stated that "at times when she
(petitioner) was in Baliangao, she used to stay at the house of Lourdes
Yap while her residential house was being constructed."
These discrepancies bolster the statement of the Brgy. Tugas officials

that petitioner was not and never had been a resident of their barangay.
At most, the Affidavits of all the witnesses only show that petitioner was
building and developing a beach resort and a house in Brgy. Tugas, and
that she only stayed in Brgy. PuntaMiray whenever she wanted to
11
oversee the construction of the resort and the house.
Page
Assuming that the claim of property ownership of petitioner is true,
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
Dela Torre vs. Comelec Issue:

G.R. No. 121592. July 5, 1996 1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral
turpitude. 2.
Doctrine: Whether or not a grant of probation affects Section 40 (a)’s
applicability.
 In determining whether a criminal act involves moral turpitude
the Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes in Held:
mala in se involve moral turpitude while crimes in mala prohibita
do not. 1. Yes. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness,
 Whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his
question of fact and frequently depends on all the fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute. customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or
 Actual knowledge by the fence of the fact that property received conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
is stolen displays a degree of malicious deprivation of one’s From Sec 2 of PD 1612 fencing may be committed when “The
rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft accused knows or should have known that the said article, item,
which by their very nature are crimes of moral turpitude. object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds
 The legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of of the crime of robbery or theft”
the sentence.
Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actual
knowledge by the “fence” of the fact that property received is
Facts:
stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one’s
On May 6, 1995, Comelec declared Ronaldo Dela Torre disqualified rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft
from running as the Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the last May 8, 1995 which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. And
citing Sec. 40 (a) of RA 7160 (Local Govt. Code 1991) that a person who although the participation of each felon in the unlawful taking
is sentenced by final judgement for an offence involving moral turpitude differs in point in time and in degree, both the “fence” and the
for an offense by 1 year or more of imprisonment within 2 years after actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded one’s peaceful
serving sentence is disqualified from running for any elective local dominion for gain - thus deliberately reneging in the process
position. Comelec further held that Dela Torre was found to be guilty of “private duties” they owe their “fellowmen” or “society” in a
violation of the Anti fencing law by the Municipal Trial Court on June 1, manner “contrary to x x x accepted and customary rule of right
1990 and the decision was later affirmed on appeal in the RTC and and duty x x x, justice, honesty x x x or good morals.”
became final by January 18, 1991. Comelec held that there exist a legal 2. No. Dela Torre’s conviction of fencing which we have heretofore
ground to disqualify Dela Torre to run as a candidate since the nature of declared as a crime of moral turpitude and thus falling squarely
the offence of the Anti Fencing Law certainly involves moral turpitude. under the disqualification found in Section 40 (a), subsists and
remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation
Dela Torre claims that Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code
does not apply to his case inasmuch as the probation granted him by the
MTC on December 21, 1994 which suspended the execution of the
12
judgment of conviction and all other legal consequences flowing
therefrom, rendered inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well.
Page
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
CASE TITLE: Villaber V. COMELEC ISSUE: WON violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude
GR NO. 148326 DATE: November 15, 2001 HELD: Yes, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude, because
its violation imports deceit and certainly relates to and affects the good
DOCTRINE: The presence of the second element manifests moral moral character of a person. A drawer who issues an unfunded check
turpitude. In People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda, we held that a conviction for deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 “imports deceit” and “certainly relates to and society in a manner contract to accepted and customary rule of right and
affects the good moral character of a person…. The effects of the duty, justice, honesty or food morals.
issuance of a worthless check, as we held in the landmark case of Lozano
vs. Martinez, through Justice Pedro L. Yap, “transcends the private
interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a
wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public” since the
circulation of valueless commercial papers “can very well pollute the
channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.”
FACTS: Both petitioner Pablo Villaber and respondent Douglas

R. Cougas were rival candidate for a congressional seat in the First
District of Davao Del Sur dating the May 14, 2001 elections. Villaber filed
his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Congressman on Feb. 1, 2001 file
Cagas filed his on Feb. 28, 2001. On March 4 ,2001, Cagas filed with the
Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, COMELEC, Davao Del Sur,
a consolidated petition to disqualify Villaber and to cancel the latter COC.
Cagas alleged in the said consolidated petition that on March 2, 1990,

Villaber was convicted by the RTC of Manila for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg.22 and was sentenced to suffer 1 year imprisonment. The
check that bounced was in the sum of P100,00.00. Cagas further alleged
that this crime involves moral turpitude; hence under Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC), he is disqualified to run for any public
office. In his answer to the disqualification suit, Villaber countered mainly
that his conviction has not become final and executory because the
affirmed Decision was not remanded to the trial court for promulgation in
his presence.
13
Further, even if the judgment of conviction was already final and
executory, it cannot be the basis for his disqualification since violation of
Page
B.P. Blg. 22 does not involve moral turpitude.
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
Moreno vs. COMELEC and Mejes Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied pardon of his previous
G.R. No. 168550 August 10, 2006 misconduct.Hence, this petition.
DOCTRINE: ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from running as Punong
Barangay.
In harmonizing the LGC and the Probation Law, the Courts deem that
the Probation Law is an exception to the LGC. Sec. 40(a) which SC RULING: NO
provides that those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of The Probation Law is an exception to the provision of the LGC as
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence, are disqualified the legislature did not intend the inclusion of probationers in the
from running for any elective local position and this should not include disqualification as it can be gleaned from its act when it can, through its
probationers since they do not serve the sentence adjudged to them since legislative wisdom and power, include Probationers since those covered
probation suspends it and final discharge of probation shall operate to by the disqualification also covers those who can apply for Probation.
restore him all civil rights lost or suspended. Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code appears innocuous enough at
FACTS: first glance. The phrase “service of sentence,” understood in
its general and common sense, means the confinement of a
In this Petition dated July 6, 2005, Urbano M. Moreno (Moreno) assails convictedperson in a penal facility for the period adjudged by the court.
the ResolutionCOMELEC which disqualified him from running for the COMELEC has broadened the coverage of the law to include even those
elective office of Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar who did not serve a day of their sentence because they were granted
in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and SangguniangKabataan probation.
Elections. The disqualification was an off shoot of a petition filed by
Norma L. Mejes on the ground that the latter was convicted by final It is to be noted that those who have not served their sentence by reason
judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer of the grant of probation which, the Court reiterates, should not be
imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and equated with service of sentence, should not likewise be disqualified from
Four (4) Months by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of Catbalogan, running for a local elective office because the two (2)-year period of
Samar on August 27, 1998. Moreno filed an answer claiming that the ineligibility under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code does not even
petition states no cause of action because he was already granted begin to run. Moreover, Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides
probation. But the COMELEC since he was only released from probation that the grant of probation suspends the execution of the sentence and
on December 20, 2000, disqualification shall commence on this date and during the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty
end two (2) years thereafter thus he is still disqualified for the upcoming imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all
elections. the conditions prescribed in the probation order.
Petitioner argues that the disqualification applies only to those

who have served their sentence and not to probationers because the
latter do not serve the adjudged sentence. The Probation Law should
14
allegedly be read as an exception to the Local Government Code
because it is a special law which applies only to probationers. Further,
Page
even assuming that he is disqualified, his subsequent election as Punong
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
Grego v. Comelec and Basco The COMELEC conducted a hearing of the case on May 14, 1995, where
G.R. No. 125955 June 19, 1997 it ordered the parties to submit simultaneously their respective
memoranda.Before the parties could comply with this directive, however,
DOCTRINE:Absent any express provision in the Law, a newly enacted the Manila City BOC proclaimed Basco on May 17, 1995, as a duly
statute applies prospectively and not retroactively. There is no provision elected councilor for the Second District of Manila, placing sixth among
in the statue which would clearly indicate that the same operates several candidates who vied for the seats. Basco immediately took his
retroactively. Lexprospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not oath of office before the Honorable Ma. Ruby Bithao-Camarista,
backward. Thus, the LGC only applies to instances that occurred on Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch I, Manila.
January 1, 1992 and thereafter.
Petitioner herein, comes to the Court for relief and anchors his
basis for disqualification of Basco on the retroactive effect of the LGC, the
FACTS:
irregularity of the implied condonation of the electorate, the invalidity of
The instant special civil action for certiorari and prohibition impugns the proclamation of Basco because it was. He asks
the resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc in thatRomualdoMaranan, the 7th in the elections and next to Basco be
SPA No. 95-212 dated July 31, 1996, dismissing petitioner’s motion for proclaimed as the winner of the last slot.
reconsideration of an earlier resolution rendered by the COMELEC’s First
ISSUE:Whether or not respondent is disqualified because he was
Division on October 6, 1995, which also dismissed the petition for
disqualificationfiled by petitioner Wilmer Grego against private removed from office due to an administrative case which removed him
respondent HumbertoBasco. from Office in 1981.
On October 31, 1981, Basco was removed from his position as SC RULING: NO
Deputy Sheriff by no less than this Court upon a finding of serious The court proclaimed that there was no grave abuse of discretion
misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged by a certain amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction evinced by COMELEC in
NenaTordesillas. The Court held: dismissing the petition for disqualification of Basco. In answering the
contentions of Grego, the Court ruled that in construing Sec. 40 (b) of the
“WHEREFORE, FINDING THE RESPONDENT DEPUTY SHERIFF
LGC, which provides for the disqualification from running in an elective
HUMBERTO BASCO OF THE CITY COURT OF MANILA GUILTY OF
office of people removed from office as a result of an Administrative Case
SERIOUS MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE FOR THE SECOND TIME, HE IS which was promulgated and took effect on January 1, 1992. Absent any
HEREBY DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE WITH FORFEITURE OF express provision in the Law, a newly enacted statute applies
ALL RETIREMENT BENEFITS AND WITH PREJUDICE TO prospectively and not retroactively.
REINSTATEMENT TO ANY POSITION IN THE NATIONAL OR LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING ITS AGENCIES AND
INSTRUMENTALITIES, OR GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR
CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS”.
Basco ran for councilor of the Second District of Manila and won
in the three elections he participated in, respectively the Jan. 18, 1988
15
elections, May 11, 1992 synchronized National Elections and May 8,
1995. His second election was contested due to the Tordesillas ruling but
Page
was dismissed. On his third election, Grego filed for his disqualification.
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
that the Sanggunian had terminated the proceedings in the case and
WAS ABOUT TO RENDER JUDGMENT, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Regional Trial Court, alleging
that the proceedings had been terminated without giving him a chance to
be heard. SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN found petitoner guilty.
A temporary restraining order was issued by the court, enjoining
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan from proceeding with the case. As a
result, the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan could not be served
upon Reyes. Following the expiration of the temporary restraining order
and without any injunction being issued by the Regional Trial Court, an
attempt was made to serve the decision upon petitioner’s counsel in
Manila. However, the latter refused to accept the decision. Subsequent
attempts to serve the decision upon petitioner himself also failed, as he
also refused to accept the decision.
Petitoner filed a certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC in
Bongabong. A complainant sought the disqualification of petitioner as
candidate for mayor, citing the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC)
which states that persons removed from office as a result of an
administrative case are disqualified from running for any elective
postition. Nonetheless, because of the absence of any contrary order
from the COMELEC, petitioner Reyes was voted for in the elections held
on May 8, 1995.
COMELEC’s Second Division issued the questioned resolution,
REYES vs. COMELEC which found the petitioner DISQUALIFIED from running for public office,
GR No. 120905, March 17, 1996 in conformity with the Local Government Code. Julius M. Garcia, who
obtained the second highest number of votes next to petitioner Reyes
DOCTRINE: The filing of a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial intervened in the COMELEC, contending that because Reyes was
Court did not prevent the administrative decision from attaining finality. disqualified, he (Garcia) was entitled to be proclaimed mayor of
An original action of certiorari is an independent action and does not Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. The Municipal Board of Canvassers of
interrupt the course of the principal action nor the running of the Bongabong, apparently unaware of the disqualification of Reyes by the
reglementary period involved in the proceeding; a case shall not be COMELEC, proclaimed him the duly-elected mayor.
rendered moot and academic if dilatory tactics were employed to render ISSUES:
such case moot and academic; the second highest in votes cannot be
proclaimed winner if should it appear that the candidate with the highest 1. Whether or not the filing of petition for certiorari prevented the
votes was declared disqualified. Sangguning Panlalawigan from attaining finality.
16
FACTS: Petitioner Renato U. Reyes was the incumbent mayor of the 2. Whether or not Reyes' reelection rendered the administrative complaint
against him moot and academic.
Page
municipality of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. An administrative complaint
was filed against him with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. After learning
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
3. Whether or not Garcia is entitled to be proclamed mayor of Bongabong. 3. No. In the latest ruling on the question, this Court said:
RULING: To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the
other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter.
1. No. The filing of a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court did
The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He
not prevent the administrative decision from attaining finality. An original
was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be
action of certiorari is an independent action and does not interrupt the
considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which
course of the principal action nor the running of the reglementary period
excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have
involved in the proceeding.
substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results
Consequently, to arrest the course of the principal action during the under the circumstances.
pendency of the certiorari proceedings, there must be a restraining order
Garcia’s plea that the votes cast for Reyes be invalidated is without merit.
or a writ of preliminary injunction from the appellate court directed to the
The votes cast for Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the belief
lower court.
that Reyes was qualified and for that reason can not be treated as stray,
In the case at bar, although a temporary restraining order was issued by void, or meaningless. The subsequent finding that he is disqualified
the Regional Trial Court, no preliminary injunction was subsequently cannot retroact to the date of the elections so as to invalidate the votes
issued. The temporary restraining order issued expired after 20 days. cast for him.
From that moment on, there was no more legal barrier to the service of
the decision upon petitioner. The net result is that when the elections were
held on May 8, 1995, the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had
already become final and executory.
2. No. Herein respondent Mayor Reyes was given by this Sanggunian a
period of sixty one (61) days to file his verified answer however, he
resorted to dilatory motions which in the end proved fatal to his cause.
Veritably, he neither filed nor furnished the complainant a copy of his
answer. Failure of the respondent to file his verified answer within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the complaint shall be considered a waiver of
his rights to present evidence in his behalf (Art. 126 of Rules and
Regulations implementing the Local Government Code of 1991). All
persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies (Sec. 16, Art. III of the
Contitution).
Indeed, it appears that petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to file
his answer. He failed to do so. Nonetheless, he was told that the
complainant would be presenting his evidence and that he (petitioner)
would then have the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. But on
the date set, he failed to appear. He would say later that this was because
17
he had filed a motion for postponement and was awaiting a ruling thereon.
This only betrays the pattern of delay he employed to render the case
Page
against him moot by his election.
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen

and, under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with
dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position.
Kuya Edu filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion
remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to the above COMELEC Resolution, the board of
canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but
suspended the proclamation of the winner.
Petitioner sought to intervene in the case. However, this motion
was not resolved by COMELEC. Instead, COMELEC en banc reversed
the ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified
to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Pursuant this resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of
canvassers, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of
Makati. Petitioner filed certiorari before SC.
ISSUE:
MERCADO vs. MANZANO and COMELEC 1. Whether or not Kuya Edu is disqualified from running for any elective
GR No. 135083, May 26, 1999 position on the ground of dual citizenship under the LGC. NO
DOCTRINE: Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The RULING:

prohibition in Section 5 of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution) was not with 1. No. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises
dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the
Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in R.A. No. 7160, Section 40(d) and said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person
in R.A. No. 7854, Section 20 must be understood as referring to “dual whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
allegiance.” sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a
FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is
B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
May 11, 1998 elections. Eduardo B. Manzano (si Kuya Edu!) obtained the Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a
highest votes; followed by Ernesto S. Mercado and Gabriel Daza. The person simultaneously owes, by some POSITIVE ACT, loyalty to two or
proclamation of private respondent (Kuya Edu) was suspended in view of more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the
a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril result of an individual’s volition.
who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines
but of the United States. [Born in the US (jus soli), of Filipino parents (jus With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, Section 5 of the Constitution
provides: “Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
18
sanguinis)]
and shall be dealt with by law.” This provision was included in the 1987
In its resolution, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted
Page
Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained
the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of its necessity as follows:
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual
citizenship. I have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee
according to which a dual allegiance - and I reiterate a dual allegiance - Lopez vs. Comelec
is larger and more threatening than that of mere double citizenship which G.R. No. 182701. July 23, 2008
is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never insidious. That is often a
function of the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And
so, I do not question double citizenship at all.
Doctrine:
Clearly, in including Section 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of
the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with  Citizen Retention and Reaquisition Act of 2003 expressly
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired
origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” Filipino citizenship may run for public office in the Philippines.
in R.A. No. 7160, Section 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, Section 20 must be i.e. that they make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
understood as referring to “dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with all foreign citizenship
mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those  Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the
with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with election of a disqualified candidate because the application of
respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is
citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of not a matter of popularity.
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. Facts:
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the position of Chairman
renounce “all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City in the synchronized
or sovereignty” of which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on October 29,
can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines. 2007.
On October 25, 2007, Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition before the
Provincial Election Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the
disqualification of petitioner on the ground that he is an American citizen,
hence, ineligible from running for any public office.
Lopez argued that he is a dual citizen, a Filipino and at the same time an
American, by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, otherwise known as
the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. Thus
possessing all the qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman. After the
votes for Barangay Chairman were canvassed, petitioner emerged as the
winner.
19
On February 6, 2008, COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution granting
the petition for disqualification of Lopez,
Page
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
ruling that he was not able to regain his Filipino citizenship in the manner
provided by law. According to the poll body, to be able to qualify as a
candidate in the elections, petitioner should have made a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship which he failed to do.
Issue:
Is Lopez a qualified candidate in the elections?
Held:
No. R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who
re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in the
Philippines. Section 5(2) of the said law states that those who retain or
reaquire their citizenship and seek elective public office must meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
While Lopez re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law, the
law explicitly provides that should one seek elective public office, he
should first “make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath. Lopez failed to comply with this requirement. There is no evidence
presented that will show that respondent complied with the provision of
R.A. No. 9225.
The affiant must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is Case no. 11
renouncing all foreign citizenship for it to be effective. In the instant case,
respondent Lopez’s failure to renounce his American citizenship as Rodriguez v. COMELEC
proven by the absence of an affidavit that will prove the contrary leads
this Commission to believe that he failed to comply with the positive Doctrine: The Marquez Decision defining "fugitive from justice” includes
mandate of law. Absent such proof Lopez cannot be allowed respondent not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise
to run for Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bagacay. who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. The definition thus
indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates
While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. Obviously, there can only be an
to discharge the functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory cannot cure intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by
the defect of his candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a
20
not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the promulgated judgment of conviction.
application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on
Page
disqualification is not a matter of popularity. Facts:
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
Petitioner won the Gobernatorial post in Quezon City Province during

the May, 1992 elections. Respondent Marquez then challenged such Case no. 12
victory contending that Rodriguez was a “fugitive from justice” which is a
ground for his disqualification/ineligibility under Section 40(e) of the Mateo Caasi v. CA
Local Government Code. Marquez revealed that Rodriguez left the US
where a charge, filed on November 12,1985 is pending against the latter Doctrine: To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the
before the Los Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims, law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have
grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property. "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
Petitioner on the other hand contends that long before the felony country." The waiver of an immigrant status must be manifested by
complaint was allegedly filed, he was already in the Philippines and he some act/s independent of and done prior to the filing of candidacy for
did not know of the filing of the same nor was he aware that he was elective office in the country for without such prior waiver, he is
being proceeded against criminally. He cannot be deemed a fugitive disqualified to run for any office.
from justice, because to be so, one must be aware of the filing of the
criminal complaint, and his disappearance in the place where the long Facts:
arm of the law, thru the warrant of arrest, may reach him is predicated Respondent Merito Miguel won as the Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan
on a clear desire to avoid and evade the warrant. during the 1988 local elections. Petitioner Caasi sought Merito’s
disqualification on the ground that the former is a green card holder,
Issue: hence a permanents resident in US and not Bolinao. Merito contended
Whether or not Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice” as comprehended that although he holds a green card, he is not a permanent resident in
in the Marquez Decision US but in Bolinao, that he obtained the green card only for convenience,
and that he was able to vote in all previous elections including the
Held: plebiscite, ratification of the Constitution and the Congressional
No. The Marquez Decision defining "fugitive from justice” includes not elections in 1987.
only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise
who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution The intent to evade Issue:
is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular W.O.N. Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident/or of
jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade immigrant to USA prior to local elections in 1988?
prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing
subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment Held:
of conviction. NO. To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law
requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have
Rodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. There is no dispute that "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
his arrival in the Philippines from the US on June 25, 1985, preceded country", Sec. 68 of BP 881. The waiver of an immigrant status must be
the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November manifested by some act/s independent of and done prior to the filing of
12, 1985 and of the issuance on even date of the arrest warrant by that candidacy for elective office in the country for without such prior waiver,
same foreign court, by almost 5 months. It was clearly impossible for he is disqualified to run for any office.
Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest
21
warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint and The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to
arrest warrant — much less conviction — to speak of yet at such time. find. Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective
Page
office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public on 3 grounds namely: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction on the subject-
office must possess (Sec. 42, Chap. 1, Title 2, Local Government matter of the complaint; (2) that the court has no jurisdiction over the
Code). Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a person of the members of the board of canvassers; and (3) the petition
permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a failed to state a cause of action.
period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the
Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that ISSUE: WON the failure of Lucero in filing his certificate of candidacy
municipality on January 18, 1988. under oath was fatal to his proclamation as the duly elected governor of
La Union
HELD: No. The seeming irregularity in the filing of Lucero’s certificate of

candidacy does not invalidate his election for the fundamental reason that
after it was proven by the count of the votes that Juan T. Lucero had
obtained the majority of the legal votes, the will of the people cannot be
frustrated by a technicality consisting in that his certificate of candidacy
had not been properly sworn to. In the case of Gardiner vs. Romulo, it
was held that The provisions of the Election Law declaring that a certain
irregularity in an election procedure is fatal to the validity of the ballot or
of the returns, or when the purpose and spirit of the law would be plainly
CASE 14 defeated by a substantial departure from the prescribed method, are
mandatory. When the Election Law does not provide that a departure from
CASE TITLE: De Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers of La Union a prescribed form will be fatal and such departure has been due to an
GR NO. L-24721 DATE: November 3, 1925 honest mistake or misinterpretation of the Election Law on the part of him
who was obligated to observe it, and such departure has not been used
DOCTRINE: When the Election Law does not provide that a departure as a means for fraudulent practices or for the intimidation of voters, and
from a prescribed form will be fatal and such departure has been due to it is clear that there has been a free and honest expression of the popular
an honest mistake or misinterpretation of the Election Law on the part of will, the law will be held directory and such departure will be considered
him who was obligated to observe it, and such departure has not been a harmless irregularity. And in Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, it was held that
used as a means for fraudulent practices or for the intimidation of voters, he rules and regulations, for the conduct of elections, are mandatory
and it is clear that there has been a free and honest expression of the before the election, but when it is sought to enforce them after the
popular will, the law will be held directory and such departure will be election, they are held to be directory only, if that is possible, especially
considered a harmless irregularity. where, if they are held to be mandatory, innocent voters will be deprived
of their votes without any fault on their part. The various and numerous
FACTS: Tomas De Guzman filed a petition for mandamus before the
provisions of the Election Law were adopted to assist the voters in their
Supreme Court seeking to compel the Board of Canvassers of La Union
participation in the affairs of the government and not to defeat that object.
to annul the votes counted in favor of Juan Lucero and to declare him as
When the voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be
22
the duly elected governor of La Union based on the fact that certificate of
nullified simply because the officers appointed under the law to direct the
candidacy filed by Juan Lucero was not made under oath in violation of
election and guard the purity of the ballot have not done their duty. The
Page
Sec. 404 of the Election Law. Lucero filed a motion to dismiss the petition
law provides a remedy, by criminal action, against them. They should be
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
prosecuted criminally, and the will of the honest voter, as expressed

through his ballot, should be protected and upheld.
CASE 15
CASE TITLE: RODILLAS vs. COMELEC
GR NO. 119055 DATE: July 10, 1995
DOCTRINE: The requirement of an appeal fee is by no means a mere

technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement without
which the decision appealed from would become final and executory as
if no appeal was filed at all. The right to appeal is merely a statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in
accordance with, the provision of the law.
FACTS: Petitioner (Roy Rodillas) and private respondent

(IsabeloDotimas) were both candidates for Punong Barangay in
Barangay San Rafael, San Nicolas, Pangasinan in the May 9, 1994
elections. Petitioner obtained 65 votes as against private respondent's 61
votes. An election protest was consequently filed by respondent with the
9th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tayug — San Nicolas presided by
respondent Judge. After due hearing, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
rendered its judgment on May 27, 1994 finding private respondent to have
obtained 68 votes as against petitioner's 66 votes. On May 31, 1994,
petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court and
paid P150.00 as appeal fees with the Regional Trial Court, Tayug,
Pangasinan. On June 14, 1994, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
forwarded the records of the case to the COMELEC. At the same time,
petitioner paid with the COMELEC the amount of P510.00. On July 20,
1994, the First Division of the COMELEC denied the appeal for
petitioner's belated filing of the appeal and legal research fees. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in

dismissing the appeal outright when the most it could have done was to
23
refuse to take action on the case until the fees were paid in full
Page
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
HELD: No, The procedure for perfecting an appeal from the decision of
the Municipal Trial Court in a barangay election protest case is set forth
in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as follows: Sec. 3. Notice of
Appeal. — Within five (5) days after promulgation of the decision of the
court, the aggrieved party may file with said court a notice of appeal, and
serve a copy thereof upon the attorney of record of the adverse party
(Rule 22). Sec. 3. Appeal fees. — The appellant in election cases shall
pay an appeal fee as follows: (b) Election cases appealed from courts of
limited jurisdiction. . . . P500.00. Sec. 18. Non-payment of prescribed
fees. If the fees above prescribed are not paid, Commission may refuse
to take action until they are paid and dismiss the action or proceeding
(Rule 40). The mere filing of the notice of appeal was not enough. It
should be accompanied by the payment of the correct amount of appeal
fee Petitioner had only five days from receipt of the decision of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court or until June 5, 1994 to perfect his appeal.
While he timely filed his Amended Notice of Appeal on June 2, 1994, he
paid the amount of P510.00 representing the appeal and legal research
fees only on June 14, 1994. It is, therefore, evident that petitioner
belatedly paid said amount. Besides, the correct amounts of the appeal
and the research fees are P500.00 and P20.00 respectively, or P520.00
not P510.00 as paid by petitioner.
PNOC ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and MARCELINO

TONGCO, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and MANUEL S.
PINEDA, respondents.
G.R. No. 100947 May 31, 1993
DOCRTINE: Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code applies to officers

and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, even
those organized under the general laws on incorporation and therefore
not having an original or legislative charter, and even if they do not fall
under the Civil Service Law but under the Labor Code. In other words,
24
Section 66 constitutes just cause for termination of employment in
addition to those set forth in the Labor Code, as amended.
Page
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
FACTS: Manuel S. Pineda was employed with the PNOC-EDC (a statutes, particularly as regards the rule that any employee "in
subsidiary of PNOC) as Geothermal Construction Secretary. Pineda government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso
decided to run and eventually proclaimed elected to, the office of facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
councilor. Despite so qualifying as councilor, and assuming his duties as candidacy."
such, he continued working for PNOC-EDC as the latter's Geothermal
Construction Secretary. What all this imports is that Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code
applies to officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
Upon inquiry by Tongco (Dept Manager PNOC-EDC), the Legal corporations, even those organized under the general laws on
Department rendered an opinion to the effect that Manuel S. Pineda incorporation and therefore not having an original or legislative charter,
should be considered ipso facto resigned upon the filing of his Certificate and even if they do not fall under the Civil Service Law but under the
of Candidacy in November, 1987, in accordance with Section 66 of the Labor Code. In other words, Section 66 constitutes just cause for
Omnibus Election Code. termination of employment in addition to those set forth in the Labor Code,
as amended.
Pineda, invoked that while the government-owned or controlled
corporations are covered by the Civil Service Law (as is taken to mean in
Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code of 1985), the subsidiaries or
corporate offsprings are not."
ISSUE: Whether or not an employee in a government-owned or

controlled corporations without an original charter (and therefore not
covered by Civil Service Law) nevertheless falls within the scope of
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.
HELD: YES. Sec. 66. Any person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
It was no doubt aware that in light of Section 2 (1), Article IX of the 1987
Constitution: (a) government-owned or controlled corporations were of
two (2) categories — those with original charters, and those organized
under the general law — and (b) employees of these corporations were
of two (2) kinds — those covered by the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations because employed in corporations having original charters,
and those not subject to Civil Service Law but to the Labor Code because
employed in said corporations organized under the general law, or the
25
Corporation Code. Yet Congress made no effort to distinguish between
these two classes of government-owned or controlled corporations or
Page
their employees in the Omnibus Election Code or subsequent related
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
HELD: YES.
The filing of the affidavit of withdrawal with the election officer of Baybay,
Leyte, at 12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001 was a substantial compliance with the
requirement of the law.
REP. MA. CATALINA L. GOvs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Section 73, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code, provides that:
G.R. No. 147741 May 10, 2001
"No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the
DOCTRINE: An administrative resolution can not contradict, much less same election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than
amend or repeal a law, or supply a deficiency in the law. Such one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. However, before the
requirement is merely directory, and is intended for convenience. It is not expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the
mandatory or jurisdictional. person who has file more than one certificate of candidacy may declare
under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the
FACTS: On 27 February 2001, petitioner filed with the municipal election certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices."
officer of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte, a certificate of candidacy for
mayor of Baybay, Leyte.On 28 February 2001, at 11:47 p.m., petitioner There is nothing in this Section which mandates that the affidavit of
filed with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, with office at withdrawal must be filed with the same office where the certificate of
Tacloban City, another certificate of candidacy for governor of the candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed directly with the
province of Leyte. Simultaneously therewith, she attempted to file with the main office of the COMELEC, the office of the regional election director
provincial election supervisor an affidavit of withdrawal of her candidacy concerned, the office of the provincial election supervisor of the province
for mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte. However, the provincial to which the municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal
election supervisor of Leyte refused to accept the affidavit of withdrawal election officer of the said municipality.
and suggested that, pursuant to a COMELEC resolution, she should file
it with the municipal election officer of Baybay, Leyte where she filed her While it may be true that Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-
certificate of candidacy for mayor. A, adopted on 20 November 2000, requires that the withdrawal be filed
before the election officer of the place where the certificate of candidacy
At that later hour, with only minutes left to midnight, the deadline for filing was filed,such requirement is merely directory, and is intended for
certificates of candidacy or withdrawal thereof, and considering that the convenience. It is not mandatory or jurisdictional. An administrative
travel time from Tacloban to Baybay was two (2) hours, petitioner decided resolution can not contradict, much less amend or repeal a law, or supply
to send her affidavit of withdrawal by fax to her father at Baybay, Leyte a deficiency in the law. Hence, the filing of petitioner's affidavit of
and the latter submitted the same to the office of the election officer of withdrawal of candidacy for mayor of Baybay with the provincial election
Baybay, Leyte at 12:28 a.m., 01 March 2001.5 On the same day, at 1:15 supervisor of Leyte sufficed to effectively withdraw such candidacy. the
p.m., the election officer of Baybay Leyte, received the original of the COMELEC thus acted with grave abuse of discretion when it declare
affidavit of withdrawal. petitioner ineligible for both positions for which she filed certificates of
26
candidacy.
ISSUE: Is there a valid withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy for
Page
municipal mayor of Baybay, Leyte?
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire

electorate of the country, with the Commission.
Facts: Luna filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of vice-
mayor of Lagayan, Abra as a substitute for Hans Roger, who withdrew
his certificate of candidacy on the same date. Ruperto Blanco, Election
Officer of Lagayan, Abra removed the name of Hans Roger from the list
of candidates and placed the name of Luna. Private respondents filed a
petition for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy or
disqualification of Luna. They alleged that Luna made a false material
representation in her certificate of candidacy because Luna is not a
registered voter of Lagayan, Abra but a registered voter of Bangued,
Abra. They also claimed that Luna’s certificate of candidacy was not
validly filed because the substitution by Luna for Hans Roger was invalid
and that Hans Roger was only 20 years old on Election Day and,
therefore, he was disqualified to run for vice-mayor and cannot be
substituted by Luna. COMELEC affirmed the finding that Hans Roger,
being underage, may not be validly substituted by Luna. It also ruled that
Luna’s right to due process was not violated because Luna was notified
of the petition and was given the opportunity to be heard. However, the
COMELEC ruled that Luna was a registered voter of Lagayan, Abra.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

when it ruled that there was no valid substitution by Luna for Hans Roger.
Ruling: YES. Section 77 of the Election Code prescribes the rules on

Luna v COMELEC substitution of an official candidate of a registered political party who dies,
G.R. No. 165983 April 24, 2007 withdraws, or is disqualified for any cause after the last day for the filing
of certificate of candidacy.
Doctrine: If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an
official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of
withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and another. - If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an
certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies,
replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. If the death, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and
withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to
27
election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The
board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file
Page
his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
preceding sections not later than mid-day of election day of the election.
If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day
before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be
filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision
where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by
the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.
Since Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy and the

COMELEC found that Luna complied with all the procedural requirements
for a valid substitution, Luna can validly substitute for Hans Roger. In this
case, there was no petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate
Monsale v. Nico
of candidacy of Hans Roger For if the COMELEC cancelled Hans Roger’s
certificate of candidacy after the proper proceedings, then he is no G.R. No. L-2539 May 28, 1949
candidate at all and there can be no substitution of a person whose
certificate of candidacy has been cancelled and denied due course. Doctrine:The evident purposes of the law in requiring the filling of
However, Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy was never cancelled or certificates of candidacy and in fixing a time limit therefor are (a) to enable
denied due course by the COMELEC. Moreover, Hans Roger already the voter to know, at least sixty days before a regular election the
withdrew his certificate of candidacy before the COMELEC declared that candidate among whom they are to make the choice, and (b) to avoid
he was not a valid candidate. Therefore, unless Hans Roger’s certificate confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast; for if the
of candidacy was denied due course or cancelled in accordance with law did not confine the choice or election by the voter to duly registered
Section 78 of the Election Code, Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy candidates, there might be as many person voted for as there were
was valid and he may be validly substituted by Luna. voters, and votes might be cast even for unknown or fictitious person as
a mark to identify the votes in favor of a candidate for another office in the
same election.
Facts:Monsale withdrew his certificate of candidacy on October 10, 1947,
but on November 7, attempted to revive it by withdrawing his withdrawal.
The COMELEC, however, rules on November 8 that Monsale could no
longer be a candidate in spite of his desire to withdrawal. A canvass of
the election returns showed that Paulino M. Nico received 2,291 votes;
another candidate, Gregorio Fagutao126, votes; and the protestant Jose
F. Monsale, none, evidently because the vote cast in his favor had not
been counted for the reason that he was not a registered candidate.
Consequently, Nico was proclaimed elected.
Issue: Whether a candidate who has withdrawn his certificate of

candidacy may revive it, either by withdrawing his letter of withdrawal or
28
by filling a new certificate of candidacy, after the deadline provided by law
Page
for the filling of such certificate.
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
Ruling: No. Section 31 of the Revised Election Code (Republic Act No.
180) providesthat "no person shall be eligible unless, within the time fixed
by law, he files a duty signed and sworn certificate of candidacy." Section
36 provides that "at least sixty days before a regular election and thirty
days at least before a special election, the . . . certificates of candidacy
for municipal offices shall be filed with the municipal secretary, who shall
immediately send copies thereof to the polling place concerned, to the
secretary of the provincial board and to the Commission on Elections."
Section 38 further that "if, after the expiration of the time limit for filling
certificate of candidacy, a candidate with a certificate of candidacy duly
filed should die or become disqualified, any legally qualified citizen may
file a certificate of candidacy for the office for which the deceased or
disqualified person was a candidate in accordance with the preceding
section on or before midday of the day of the election, and, if the death or
disqualification should occur between the day before the election and the
midday of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of
inspection of the political division where he is a candidate or in the case
of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate, with the Commission
on Elections."
Therefore, thirty-one days before the election, the protestant ceased to

be candidate by his own voluntary act. When he withdrew his withdrawal
of his certificate of candidacy, can only be considered as a new certificate
of candidacy which, having been filed only four days before the election,
could not legally be accepted under the law, which expressly provides
that such certificate should be filed at sixty days before the election.
The only instance wherein the law permit the filling of a certificate
ofcandidacy after the expiration of the time limit for filing it is when a
candidate with a certificate of candidacy duty filed dies or becomes
disqualified.The Commission on Election was, therefore, right in holding
as it did that the protestant "can no longer be a candidate in spite of his
desire to withdraw his withdrawal."
CASE TITLE: CIPRIANO VS COMELEC
29
G.R. No. 158830 August 10, 2004
Page
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
DOCTRINE: The denial of due course or cancellation of one’s certificate candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a
of candidacy is not within the administrative powers of the Commission, ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its receipt. While the
but rather calls for the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Commission may look into patent defects in the certificates, it may not go
into matters not appearing on their face. The question of eligibility or
FACTS: Petitioner Ellan Marie Cipriano filed with the COMELEC ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance
her certificate of candidacy as Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan of said body.
(SK) for the SK elections. On the date of the elections, the COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 5363 adopting the recommendation of the The denial of due course or cancellation of one’s certificate of
Commission’s Law Department to deny due course to or cancel the candidacy is not within the administrative powers of the Commission, but
certificates of candidacy of several candidates for the SK elections, rather calls for the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. The
including petitioner. The ruling was based on the findings of the Law determination whether a material representation in the certificate of
Department that petitioner and all the other candidates affected by said candidacy is false or not, or the determination whether a candidate is
resolution were not registered voters in the barangay where they intended eligible for the position he is seeking involves a determination of fact
to run. Despite this, her name was not deleted on the list and she later on where both parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of their
landed as the winner. After learning of Resolution No. 5363, petitioner contentions. Because the resolution of such fact may result to a
filed with the COMELEC a motion for reconsideration of said resolution. deprivation of one’s right to run for public office, or, as in this case, one’s
Petitioner claimed that she was denied due process when her certificate right to hold public office, it is only proper and fair that the candidate
of candidacy was cancelled by the Commission without notice and concerned be notified of the proceedings against him and that he be given
hearing. The COMELEC asserts that it is authorized to motu proprio deny the opportunity to refute the allegations against him.
due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy based on its broad
administrative power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of elections.
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC, in the exercise of its administrative

power erred in disqualifying petitioner.
HELD: YES. It was an error on the part of the COMELEC to disqualify a

candidate while in the exercise of its administrative power.
The COMELEC as an independent Constitutional Commission is

clothed with the three powers of government - executive or administrative,
legislative, and quasi-judicial powers. Administrative power is concerned
with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by
proper governmental organs. On the other hand, where a power rests in
judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does
not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an
30
officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial.The
Commission may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due
Page
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. When a
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
candidacy of Alfredo Abcede was filed for motives other than a bona fide
desire to obtain a substantial number of votes of the electorate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC erred in denying the certificate of

candidacy of petitioner.
HELD: Yes. The COMELEC erred in denying petitioner’s certificate of

candidacy. The Revised Election Code in Section 36 and 37 mandates
the commission to accept certificate of candidacy and shall order the
preparation and distribution of copies for the same to all the election
precincts of the Philippines. The laws give the Commission no discretion
to give or not to give due course to petitioner's certificate of candidacy.
On the contrary, the Commission has, admittedly, the "ministerial" duty to
receive said certificate of candidacy.
As the branch of the executive department to which the

Constitution has given the "exclusive charge" of the "enforcement and
CASE TITLE: ABCEDE VS IMPERIAL administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," the power
G.R. No. L-13001 March 18, 1958 of decision of the Commission is limited to purely "administrative
questions." (Article X, sec. 2, Constitution of the Philippines.) It cannot
DOCTRINE: in the absence of clear and positive provision to such therefore rule as to who whether among the individuals who equally
effect in the law, the COMELEC cannot pass upon the question as to possess the minimum requirements of the law can run and pursue its
whether a candidate is qualified to run for the aspired position. candidacy. The question whether in order to enjoy those benefits — a
candidate must be capable of "understanding the full meaning of his acts
and the true significance of election," and must have — over a month
FACTS: In anticipation of the upcoming presidential election, prior, to the elections "the tiniest chance to obtain the favorable
petitioner Alfredo Abcede filed before the COMELEC a certificate of
indorsement of a substantial portion of the electorate," is a matter of
candidacy for presidency. After which, the COMELEC celled its attention policy, not of administration and enforcement of the law, which policy
together with other candidates to appear before the same on "to show must be determined by Congress in the exercise of its legislative
cause why their certificates of candidacy should be considered as filed in functions. Apart from the absence of specific statutory grant of such
good faith and to be given due course". After due hearing, at which general, broad power as the Commission claims to have, it is dubious
Abcede appeared and introduced evidence, the Commission issued a
minate and undefined manner necessary in order that it could pass upon
resolution, ordering that the certificates of candidacy of including that of
the factors relied upon in said resolution and such grant must not he
said petitioner, "shall not be given due course. The commission reasoned
deemed made, in the absence of clear and positive provision to such
that with petitioner’s platform of redeeming the Japanese war notes which
effect, which is absent in the case at bar.
is in violation of Fraud Order No. 2 issued by Bureau of Posts, his filing of
certificate of candidacy was attendant with bad faithas he was engaged
31
in a scheme to obtain money from the public by means of false or Hence, it was an error on the part of the COMELEC to deny
fraudulent pretenses. The Commission is convinced that the certificate of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy.
Page
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
Case No. 22
Garvida v. Sales
G.R. No. 124893 April 18, 1997
Doctrine:
The general rule is that an elective official of the Sangguniang
Kabataan must not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his
election. The only exception is when the official reaches the age of 21
years during his incumbency. The SK official must hot have turned 21
years old before his election. Reading Section 423 (b) together with
Section 428 of the Local Government Code, the latest date at which an
SK elective official turns 21 years old is on the day of his election. The
maximum age of a youth official must therefore be exactly 21 years on
election day.
Facts:
On April 13, 1996, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for

the position of Chairman, Sangguning Kabataan, Brgy. San Lorenzo,
Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The election officer disapproved petitioner’s
certificate of candidacy on the ground that she exceeded the age limit.
The COMELEC en banc issued an order directing the Board of Election
Tellers and Board of Canvassers to suspend the proclamation of
petitioner in the event that she won. Petitioner garnered 78 votes as
against respondent’s votes of 76. In accordance with the COMELEC
order, the Board of Election Tellers did not proclaim petitioner as the
winner. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was eligible to run as SK Chairman.
Held:
32
No.
Page
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
In the case at bar, petitioner was 21 years old, 11 months and 5 Held:
days on the day of the election. If the candidate is over the maximum age
limit on the day of the election, he is ineligible. In view whereof, petitioner No. Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that in case
is declared ineligible for being over the age qualification for candidacy a filing a certificate of candidacy has committed false representation, a
and is ordered to vacate her position as SK Chairman. petition to cancel the certificate of the aforesaid person may be filed within
25 days from the time the certificate was filed. Clearly SPA 90-006 was
filed beyond the 25-day period.
We do not agree with respondent’s contention that the petition for

disqualification may be filed at any time after the last day for filing a
certificate of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation,
applying Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. The
petition filed to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter made a
Case No. 23 false representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age does not
fall under the grounds for disqualification in Rule 25. Moreover, Section
Loong v. Comelec
3, Rule 25 is merely a procedural rule issued by respondent Commission
G.R. No. 93986. December 22, 1992.
which has no legislative power. Thus, it cannot supersede Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code which is a legislative enactment.
Doctrine:
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that in case a
filing a certificate of candidacy has committed false representation, a
petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy may be filed within 25 days
from the time the certificate was filed. Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure which provides that the petition for disqualification
may be filed at any time after the last day for filing a certificate of Case No. 24
candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation cannot apply.
Lanot v. Comelec
Facts: G.R. No. 164858. November 16, 2006.
Doctrine:
Petitioner Loong filed his certificate of candidacy on 15 January The essential elements of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election
1990 (the last day for the filing of the same) for vice-governor of the Code are (1) a person engages in an election campaign or partisan
Muslim Mindanao Autonomous Region. Private respondent filed the political activity; (2) the act is designed to promote the election or defeat
petition (SPA 90-006) to disqualify candidate Loong on the ground that of a particular candidate; (3) the act is done outside the campaign period.
petitioner made a false representation as to his age only 49 days from the The second element requires the existence of a “candidate.” Under
date Loong’s certificate of candidacy was filed, and 16 days after the Section 79(a), a candidate is one who “has filed a certificate of candidacy”
election itself. to an elective public office. Unless one has filed his certificate of
33
Issue: candidacy, he is not a “candidate.”
Page
Whether the petition for disqualification was timely filed. Facts:
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
On 19 March 2004, petitioners filed a petition for disqualification G.R. No. 103956. March 31, 1992
under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code against Vicente Eusebio
before the Comelec. Petitioners alleged that Eusebio engaged in an DOCTRINE: COMELEC cannot impose prohibitions which will curtail
election campaign in various forms on various occasions outside the rights enshrined under the Constitution.
designated campaign period. The Comelec granted the petition, but later FACTS: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution
on reversed the same with the issuance of another order. No. 2347. Petitioner BloUmparAdiong, a senatorial candidate in the May
Issue: 11, 1992 elections now assails the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it
prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile" places like cars
Whether or not respondent was guilty of Section 80 of the and other moving vehicles. Sec 21(f) RA 2134.
Omnibus Election Code.
ISSUE: whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) may
Held: prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or
private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting
No. areas that it fixes.
Because of the early deadline of 2 January 2004 for purposes of RULING: The COMELEC's prohibition is null and void on constitutional
printing of official ballots, Eusebio filed his certificate of candidacy on 29 grounds. First — the prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's
December 2003. Congress, however, never intended the filing of a fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4,
certificate of candidacy before 2 January 2004 to make the person filing Article III). In the National Press Club, case, the Court had occasion to
to become immediately a “candidate” for purposes other than the printing reiterate the preferred status of freedom of expression even as it validated
of ballots. COMELEC regulation of campaigns through political advertisements.
Under Section 3(b) of the Omnibus Election Code, the campaign When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a
period for local officials commences 45 days before election day. For the candidate or party and freedom to know on the part of the electorate are
2004 local elections, this puts the campaign period on 24 March 2004. invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free elections,
This also puts the last day for filing of COCs on 23 March 2004. Eusebio the police, local officials and COMELEC, should lean in favor of freedom.
is deemed to have filed his COC on this date for purposes other than the Prohibition did not pass the clear and preset danger rule. Second — the
printing of ballots because this is the interpretation of Section 80 most questioned prohibition premised on the statute and as couched in the
favorable to the one charged with this violation. Thus, Eusebio became a resolution is void for overbreadth. It is so broad that it encompasses even
“candidate” only on 23 March 2004. Acts committed by Eusebio prior to the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned
his becoming a “candidate” even constituting election campaigning or vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule
partisan election activities are not punishable under Section 80. prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of
the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law. Third — the constitutional objective to give a
rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the
electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section
34
26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the
Page
Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and
BLO UMPAR ADIONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS other private vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles or suppress the incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without
needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of transgressing in any manner the fundamental rights of our people. An exit
the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or
financial resources of the candidate. groups of individuals for the purpose of determining the probable result of
an election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they
have voted for, immediately after they have officially cast their ballots. The
results of the survey are announced to the public, usually through the
mass media, to give an advance overview of how, in the opinion of the
polling individuals or organizations, the electorate voted. In our electoral
history, exit polls had not been resorted to until the recent May 11, 1998
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION vs. COMELEC elections.
G.R. No. 133486. January 28, 2000
DOCTRINE: COMELEC cannot ban exit polls.

FACTS: ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR
groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections x xx and to make
[an] exit survey of the x xx vote during the elections for national officials
particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be
[broadcast] immediately."[2] The electoral body believed that such project
might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial
quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also Social Weather Stations, Incorporated and Kamahalan Publishing
noted that it had not authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to Corporation, Doing Business As Manila Standard vs.
undertake the exit survey. COURT ISSUED RESTRAINING ORDER. Commission On Elections
APPROVED BY COMELEC. G.R. No. 147571. May 5, 2001
ISSUE: Whether or not the Respondent Commission acted with grave DOCTRINE: Ban on publication surveys is invalid being contrary to
abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction when it the Constitution.
approved the issuance of a restraining order enjoining the petitioner or
any [other group], its agents or representatives from conducting exit polls FACTS: Petitioner SWS is a private non-stock, non-profit social
during the x xx May 11 elections. research institution conducting surveys in various
fields.Petitioner KPC publishes the Manila Standard, a
RULING: The holding of exit polls and the dissemination of their results newspaper of general circulation, which features
through mass media constitute an essential part of the freedoms of newsworthy items of information including election
speech and of the press. Hence, the Comelec cannot ban them totally in surveys. Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to
the guise of promoting clean, honest, orderly and credible elections. Quite enjoin the Comelec from enforcing Section 5.4 of R.A.
35
the contrary, exit polls -- properly conducted and publicized -- can be vital No. 9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides: “Surveys
affecting national candidates shall not be published
Page
tools in eliminating the evils of election-fixing and fraud. Narrowly tailored
countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec so as to minimize fifteen days before an election and surveys affecting
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
local candidates shall not be published seven days

before an election.”To implement Section 5.4, Resolution Francisco I. Chavezvs. Commission On Elections, Represented By
3636, Section 24(h), dated of the COMELEC enjoins. Its Chairman, Benjamin S. Abalos, Esmeralda Amora-Ladra,
In Her Capacity As Acting Director Iv, National Capital
ISSUE: WON Sec.5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 and Resolution 3636 Sec. 24(h) Judicial Region, Commission On Elections, And The
areinvalid? Solicitor General
G.R. No. 162777. August 31, 2004
HELD: YES. We hold that Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006
constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of DOCTRINE: Ban on media advertising is valid to prevent premature
speech, expression, and the press. campaign and equalize the situation of candidates, that
To be sure, section 5.4 lays a prior restraint on freedom is, within the regulation and supervision of the
of speech, expression, and the press by prohibiting the COMELEC.
publication of election survey results affecting candidates
within the prescribed periods of fifteen (15) days FACTS: Petitioner entered into formal agreements with certain
immediately preceding a national election and seven (7) establishments to endorse their products. Petitioner who
days before a local election. Because of the preferred filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
status of the constitutional rights of speech, expression, Senator was directed to comply with the provision of
and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty Section 32 of Resolution No 6520. Petitioner, however,
presumption of invalidity. The purpose of Art. IX-C, requested the Comelec that he be exempted from the
section 4 is to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space application of Section 32, considering that the billboards
and the right of reply, including reasonable, equal rates adverted to are mere product endorsements and cannot
therefor for public information campaigns and forums be construed as paraphernalia for premature
among candidates. Hence the validity of the ban on campaigning under the rules. The Comelec ordered him
media advertising. It is noteworthy that R.A. No. 9006, to remove or cause the removal of the billboards, or to
section 14 has lifted the ban and now allows candidates cover them from public view pending the approval of his
to advertise their candidacies in print and broadcast request. Petitioner Chavez asks this Court that the
media. Indeed, to sustain the ban on the publication of COMELEC be enjoined from enforcing the assailed
survey results would sanction the censorship of all provision.
speaking by candidates in an election on the ground that
the usual bombasts and hyperbolic claims made during ISSUE: WON Resolution No. 6520 is invalid?
the campaigns can confuse voters and thus debase the
electoral process.In sum, we hold that §5.4 is invalid HELD: NO. Under the Omnibus Election Code, “election
because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of campaign” or “partisan political activity” is defined as an
expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a act designed to promote the election or defeat of a
category of expression even though such suppression is particular candidate or candidates to a public office. It is
only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or
interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by agreements to endorse certain products, he acted as a
36
means other than the suppression of freedom of private individual and had all the right to lend his name
expression. and image to these products. However, when he filed his
Page
certificate of candidacy for Senator, the billboards
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
featuring his name and image assumed partisan political

character because the same indirectly promoted his
candidacy. Therefore, the COMELEC was acting well
within its scope of powers when it required petitioner to
discontinue the display of the subject billboards. If the
subject billboards were to be allowed, candidates for
public office whose name and image are used to
advertise commercial products would have more
opportunity to make themselves known to the electorate,
to the disadvantage of other candidates who do not have
the same chance of lending their faces and names to
endorse popular commercial products as image models.
Similarly, an individual intending to run for public office
within the next few months, could pay private
corporations to use him as their image model with the
intention of familiarizing the public with his name and
image even before the start of the campaign period. This,
without a doubt, would be a circumvention of the rule
against premature campaigning. Under Article IX (C) (4),
the COMELEC is expressly authorized to supervise or
regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all media
communication or information to ensure equal
opportunity, time, and space. All these are aimed at the
holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.
JUANITO C. PILAR v COMELEC

G.R. No. 115245, July 11, 1995
DOCTRINE:The law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether

the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term
"every candidate" must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who
pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy.It is
not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has
accepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the short span
of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too
37
remote.It is noteworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the
Page
situation where a candidate may not have received any contribution or
made any expenditure. Such a candidate is not excused from filing a
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
statement, and is in fact required to file a statement to that effect. Under It is noteworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the situation
Section 15 of Resolution No. 2348, it is provided that "if a candidate or where a candidate may not have received any contribution or made any
treasurer of the party has received no contribution, made no expenditure, expenditure. Such a candidate is not excused from filing a statement, and
or has no pending obligation, the statement shall reflect such fact." is in fact required to file a statement to that effect. Under Section 15 of
Resolution No. 2348, it is provided that "if a candidate or treasurer of the
FACTS:On March 22, 1992, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for party has received no contribution, made no expenditure, or has no
the position of member of the SangguniangPanlalawigan of the Province pending obligation, the statement shall reflect such fact."Lastly, we note
of Isabela.On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of that under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the
candidacy.In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065, the COMELEC imposed Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided that "the filing or
upon petitioner the fine of P10, 000.00 for failure to file his statement of withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil,
contributions and expenditures.In M.R. No. 94-0594, the COMELEC criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred."
denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner and deemed final M.R. Petitioner's withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for
Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065. Petitioner went to the COMELEC En the administrative fine.
Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition.Hence, this petition
for certiorari.
ISSUE:Whether or not a candidate is excused in filing his statement of

contributions and expenditures after he has withdrawn his certificate of
candidacy.
HELD:No.Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has

the obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures.Well-
recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts
should not distinguish, Ubilex non
distinguitnecnosdistingueredebemos.In the case at bench, as the law
makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued
his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must be
deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but
also to one who withdrew his candidacy.
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2348 in implementation or

interpretation of the provisions of R.A. No. 7166 on election contributions
and expenditures. Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers
to "all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy."Furthermore,
Section 14 of the law uses the word "shall." As a general rule, the use of
the word "shall" in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory, and
38
imposes a duty which may be enforced, particularly if public policy is in
favor of this meaning or where public interest is involved. We apply the
Page
general rule.
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
"Fraud is not presumed. It must be sufficiently established. Moreover,

Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code provides in part that 'in the
reading and appreciation of ballots, every ballot shall be presumed to be
valid unless there is clear and good reason to justify its rejection.' In the
instant case, there is no evidence to support protestant's allegation that
the ballots he enumerated in his Motion for Reconsideration are substitute
ballots. The absence of the BEI Chairman's signature at the back of the
ballot cannot be an indication of ballot switching or substitution. At best,
such absence of BEI Chairman's signature is a prima facie evidence that
the BEI Chairmen concerned were derelict in their duty of authenticating
MARCELINO C. LIBANAN v HRET the ballots. Such omission, as stated in the Decision, is not fatal to the
G.R. No. 129783, Dec. 22, 1997 validity of the ballots."
DOCTRINE:What should, instead, be given weight is the consistent rule ISSUE:Whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in
laid down by the HRET that a ballot is considered valid and genuine for ruling that the absence of the signature of the Chairman of the BEI in the
as long as it bears any one of these authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the ballots did not render the ballots spurious.
COMELEC watermark, or (b) the signature or initials, or thumbprint of the
Chairman of the BEI; and, (c) in those cases where the COMELEC
HELD:No. Section 24 of R.A. No. 7166, provides: “Signature of Chairman
watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent to the naked eye, the
at the back of Every Ballot. - In every case before delivering an official
presence of red and blue fibers in the ballots.It is only when none of these
ballot to the voter, the Chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors shall,
marks appears extant that the ballot can be considered spurious and
in the presence of the voter, affix his signature at the back
subject to rejection.
thereof. Failure to authenticate shall be noted in the minutes of the Board
FACTS:Petitioner MarcelinoLibanan and private respondent Jose of Election Inspectors and shall constitute an election offense punishable
Ramirez were among the candidates for the lone congressional seat of under Section 263 and 264 of the Omnibus Election Code."
Eastern Samar in the May 1995 elections. After the canvass of the
returns was made on May 13, 1995, the Provincial Board of Canvassers There is really nothing in the above law to the effect that a ballot which is
of Eastern Samar proclaimed respondent Ramirez to have been duly not so authenticated shall thereby be deemed spurious. The law merely
elected Representative of the District.Petitioner Libananfiled an renders the BEI Chairman accountable for such failure. The courts may
election protest before the HRET. The HRET ruled in favor of respondent not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and
Ramirez. Petitioner Libanan moved for a reconsideration of the decision embrace situations neither provided nor intended by the
of the HRET arguingthat the absence of the BEI Chairman's signature at lawmakers. Where the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure
the back of the ballots could not but indicate that the ballots were not and ambiguous, the meaning and intention of the legislature should be
those issued to the voters during the elections. He averred that the law determined from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity
would require the Chairman of the BEI to authenticate or sign the ballot in the words, there should be no room for construction.
before issuing it to the voter.
As regards the absence of BEI Chairman's signature at the back of the What should, instead, be given weight is the consistent rule laid down by
39
ballots, the HRET stressed: the HRET that a ballot is considered valid and genuine for as long as it
bears any one of these authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC
Page
watermark, or (b) the signature or initials, or thumbprint of the Chairman
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
of the BEI; and, (c) in those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are DOCTRINE:
blurred or not readily apparent to the naked eye, the presence of red and Laws and statutes governing election contests especially
blue fibers in the ballots.It is only when none of these marks appears appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will
extant that the ballot can be considered spurious and subject to rejection. of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by
technical infirmities.
FACTS:
Two losing mayoralty candidates (Punzalan and Manalastas) in
Pampanga filed separate election protests before the trial court
challenging the results of the elections alleging massive fraud and illegal
electoral practices against the declared winner (Meneses).The trial court
found that there was massive fraud and upon examination of the
contested ballots declared Punzalan as the winner. Meneses elevated the
case to the COMELEC with the latter annulling the trial court’s decision
and affirming the proclamation of Meneses. Punzalan appealed to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in declaring as valid the ballots credited to
Meneses which did not bear the signature of the BEI
Chairman?
2. Whether or not the trial court’s finding on the authenticity of

the handwritings on the ballots must prevail over the findings
of the COMELEC?
HELD:
1. No. COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
BP Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) provides that in

reading and appreciation of ballots, every ballot shall be
presumed to be valid unless there is a clear and good reason
to justify its rejection.
Here, the failure of the election officer (BEI Chairman) to affix
his signature at the back of the ballot does not constitute as
a reason or justification to reject the said ballot. While the law,
RA 7166 “An Act Providing for Synchronized National and
Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms”, requires the BEI
Chairman to affix his signature at the back of the ballot, failure
40
to affix the same does not invalidate the ballot.
Punzalan v. Comelec
Page
G.R. No. 126669, April 27 1998.
2E A.Y. 2014 - 2015
2. No. The trial court’s finding must give way to the findings of Here, it is clearly impossible and improbable that no one from the
the COMELEC. eight candidates of the Nationalist Party received any vote from any voter
in the said
The COMELEC is a constitutional commission vested with
the exclusive original jurisdiction over election contests
involving regional, provincial and city officials, as well as
appellate jurisdiction over election protests involving elective
municipal and barangay officials.
Here, the appreciation of the contested ballots and election
documents involves a question of fact which is best left to the
determination of the COMELEC.
.
LAGUMBAY V. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-25444, January 31 1966
DOCTRINE:
The Doctrine of Statistical Improbabilities occurs when there is a
unique uniformity of tally of all the votes cast in favor of all the candidates
belonging to one party and the systematic blanking of all the candidates
of all the opposing parties appear intheelection return.
FACTS:
The election returns of certain precincts of some municipalities
were being questioned because in these certain precincts no single vote
was received by any of the eight candidates of the Nacionalista Party.
The Commission on Elections declined to reject the said election returns.
Thus, the petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a block voting or a zero vote is probable to be
achieved in one precinct?
HELD:
No. A block voting or zero voting is not probable.
The Supreme Court has held that election result showing no vote
to any candidate was utterly improbable and clearly incredible. It is not
41
likely, in the ordinary course of things that all the electors of one precinct
would, as one man, vote for all the candidates of one party, without giving
Page
a single vote to one of the candidates of the contending party.

Alia A Citizen of The Philippines and A Qualified Voter of The Constituency

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ELECTION LAW – Atty.

ELECTION LAW: the validity or invalidity of the lease contract is not

Jalosjos applied for registration as a voter in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay,

First, they stated that they personally knew petitioner to be an actual

Second, construction workers Yap III, Villanueva, Duhaylungsod and

Third, the same construction workers admitted that petitioner only

These discrepancies bolster the statement of the Brgy. Tugas officials

Dela Torre vs. Comelec Issue:

FACTS: Both petitioner Pablo Villaber and respondent Douglas

Cagas alleged in the said consolidated petition that on March 2, 1990,

Petitioner argues that the disqualification applies only to those

candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen

DOCTRINE: Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The RULING:

Petitioner won the Gobernatorial post in Quezon City Province during

HELD: No. The seeming irregularity in the filing of Lucero’s certificate of

prosecuted criminally, and the will of the honest voter, as expressed

CASE TITLE: RODILLAS vs. COMELEC

GR NO. 119055 DATE: July 10, 1995

DOCTRINE: The requirement of an appeal fee is by no means a mere

FACTS: Petitioner (Roy Rodillas) and private respondent

ISSUE: WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in

PNOC ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and MARCELINO

G.R. No. 100947 May 31, 1993

DOCRTINE: Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code applies to officers

ISSUE: Whether or not an employee in a government-owned or

candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire

Issue: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

Ruling: YES. Section 77 of the Election Code prescribes the rules on

Since Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy and the

Issue: Whether a candidate who has withdrawn his certificate of

Therefore, thirty-one days before the election, the protestant ceased to

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC, in the exercise of its administrative

HELD: YES. It was an error on the part of the COMELEC to disqualify a

The COMELEC as an independent Constitutional Commission is

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC erred in denying the certificate of

HELD: Yes. The COMELEC erred in denying petitioner’s certificate of

As the branch of the executive department to which the

On April 13, 1996, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for

Whether or not petitioner was eligible to run as SK Chairman.

We do not agree with respondent’s contention that the petition for

DOCTRINE: COMELEC cannot ban exit polls.

local candidates shall not be published seven days

featuring his name and image assumed partisan political

JUANITO C. PILAR v COMELEC

DOCTRINE:The law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether

ISSUE:Whether or not a candidate is excused in filing his statement of

HELD:No.Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has

The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2348 in implementation or

"Fraud is not presumed. It must be sufficiently established. Moreover,

2. Whether or not the trial court’s finding on the authenticity of

BP Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) provides that in

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