G.R. No.

196945, September 27, 2017

DANILO REMEGIO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision,1 dated 16 September 2008,
and Resolution,2 dated 6 April 2011, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00312,
which affirmed with modification the Decision,3 dated 16 September 2005, of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 13, Culasi, Antique (RTC), in Criminal Case No. C-358 finding petitioner
Danilo Remegio (petitioner) guilty of homicide as defined and penalized under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

THE FACTS

In an Information, dated 19 November 1999, petitioner was charged with homicide, committed
as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of December 1998, in the Municipality of Culasi,
Province of Antique, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, being then armed with an illegally
possessed firearm, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said firearm one Felix Sumugat,
thereby inflicting upon the latter fatal wound on the vital part of his body
which caused his instantaneous death.

Contrary to the provisions of Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.4

Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. In the pre-trial conference, the parties
stipulated on the fact that petitioner killed Felix Sumugat (Sumugat) on 12 December 1998, at
Barangay Jalandoni, Culasi, Antique, without prejudice to petitioner's plea of self-defense.5 As
a result of petitioner's claim of self-defense, the order of trial was reversed.

Version of the Defense

The defense presented petitioner and Diosdado Bermudez (Bermudez) as its witnesses. Their
combined testimony tended to establish the following:

Petitioner was the caretaker of a parcel of land belonging to his brother-in-law, Isidro Dubria. The
said land was planted with various fruit-bearing trees as well as coconut, mahogany,
and ipil-ipil trees.6 On 12 December 1998, at around nine o'clock in the morning, petitioner heard
the sound of a chainsaw. He then saw the victim, Sumugat, cutting the ipil-ipil tree which was
uprooted during the typhoon that occurred on the previous day.7

Petitioner approached Sumugat. He told him to cut only the branches of the ipil-ipil tree and not its
trunk as it would be placed in the warehouse because his in-laws would be arriving from the United
States. Sumugat became infuriated and shouted, "You have nothing to do with this. You are only an
in-law. I will kill you." He then drew a revolver from his waist and aimed it at petitioner.8

Petitioner raised both of his hands and told Sumugat that he would not fight him, but Sumugat
repeated that he would kill him. Fearing for his life, petitioner grappled with Sumugat for possession
of the gun. He successfully took the gun from Sumugat but the latter picked up the chainsaw, turned
it on, and advanced towards petitioner. Petitioner stepped back and shot at the ground to warn
Sumugat, but the latter continued thrusting the chainsaw at him. Petitioner parried the chainsaw
blade with his left hand, but he lost his balance and accidentally pressed the gun's trigger, thus firing
a shot which hit Sumugat in the chest.9
Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented Bernardo Caduada (Caduada), Hermie Magturo (Magturo), Rolando
Dubria, and Dr. Feman Rene M. Autajay as its witnesses. Their combined testimony tended to
establish the following:

Petitioner approached Sumugat who was cutting the ipil-ipil tree with the chainsaw.10 He told
Sumugat that if the latter did not desist from cutting the tree, he would shoot him. Sumugat
answered that the tree was obstructing the way. Petitioner then drew his gun and fired at
Sumugat's direction, but he missed.11 Sumugat turned on the chainsaw, which provoked petitioner
to shoot him on the left foot. Infuriated, Sumugat continued to brandish the chainsaw, but petitioner
shot him in the chest.12 Before he fell down, Sumugat swung the chainsaw, hitting petitioner in the
palm. Petitioner then threw the gun into a canal.13

Magturo and Caduada executed a Joint Affidavit14 on 2 February 1999, narrating the incident
they witnessed on 12 December 1998. In his direct examination, however, Magturo stated that he
did not understand the affidavit's contents at the time of signing.15 Moreover, he testified that he
was unfamiliar with the contents of the said affidavit because he did not witness the incident.16 On
the other hand, Caduada, on cross-examination, affirmed that he executed an Affidavit of
Retraction17 on 9 December 2002, because his conscience bothered him for telling a narration of
facts which he did not actually witness.18

The RTC Ruling

In its Decision, dated 16 September 2005, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of homicide. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced him to imprisonment of ten (10)
years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as maximum, and
to pay the heirs of Sumugat the amount of P300,000.00.

The RTC ruled that the act of petitioner in telling the victim to stop cutting the tree was a
provocation on his part. It added that from the moment petitioner wrested the firearm from the
victim, his life was already free from any threat coming from the victim. It opined that the firing of
the gun was no longer justified as the victim was already unarmed and was already crippled by the
gunshot wound he sustained on his left foot. Hence, it concluded that petitioner's evidence in
support of his theory of self-defense did not meet the requirements of Article 11 of the RPC.
The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, having admitted the killing of Felix Sumugat,
accused's evidence in the Record claiming self-defense, being not clear, not
credible, not convincing, not justifiable, the Court found the accused guilty of the
crime of Homicide which carries an imposable penalty of reclusion temporal, a
penalty divisible by three (3) periods. Pursuant to Article 64, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code, there being one mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, in relation to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby
sentences the accused to an imprisonment often (10) years and one (1) day as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months as maximum. (same being
the minimum of Reclusion Temporal) and the Court hereby, pursuant to Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 1, Rule Ill of the Rules of
Court, further orders the accused Danilo Remegio to indemnify the heirs of Felix
Sumugat in the sum of P300,000.00.19
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed before the CA. Meanwhile, he was granted provisional liberty
pending appeal after puting up a bail bond in the amount of P40,000.00.20

The CA Ruling

In a Decision, dated 16 September 2008, the CA affirmed the conviction of petitioner, but modified
the penalty imposed to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. It also ordered petitioner to pay the heirs
of Sumugat the amounts of P50,000.00 as funeral expenses and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
instead of the P300,000.00 imposed by the trial court.

The CA held that the element of unlawful aggression was present. It observed that the testimonies
of petitioner and Bermudez were consistent and supported by the medical certificate evidencing
that petitioner sustained wounds in his left hand due to parrying the chainsaw which the victim
thrust at him. The appellate court declared that the prosecution's version was hardly believable
considering that Caduada retracted his testimony and Magturo admitted that he was not around
when the incident happened. It further noted that Rolando Dubria, a 13-year-old child, spoke only
on 24 January 2005, or more than six years from the time the incident occurred; and that he was
never made to give his account to the police authorities during the investigation stage. The CA also
stated that the child admitted on cross-examination that Sumugat was able to inflict wounds on
petitioner with the use of the chainsaw.

The appellate court, however, ruled that the element of reasonable necessity of the means
employed to repel the aggression is absent. It reasoned that there could have been several ways
for petitioner to repel the aggression without having to kill the victim, considering that the latter
was already wounded and he held a chainsaw which was difficult to handle.

Finally, the CA adjudged that petitioner's act of telling the victim not to cut the trunk of the
uprooted ipil-ipil tree could not be considered provocation. It disposed the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the DECISION of the Regional Trial Court Branch 13, Culasi, Antique
in Criminal Case No. C-358, convicting accused-appellant of HOMICIDE is
hereby AFFIRMED but with the following modifications:
HE IS SENTENCED TO SUFFER THE INDETERMINATE PENALTY OF 2 YEARS AND
4 MONTHS OF PRISION CORRECCIONAL AS MINIMUM, TO 6 YEARS AND 1
DAY OF PRISION MAYOR AS MAXIMUM;

HE IS DIRECTED TO PAY THE HEIRS OF FELIX SUMUGAT THE FOLLOWING SUMS:

FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) AS FUNERAL EXPENSES;

FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) AS CIVIL INDEMNITY.21 (emphasis in the

original)
Unconvinced, petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA in a
Resolution, dated 6 April 2011.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

WHETHER PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO INVOKE THE JUSTIFYING

CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE.
Petitioner argues, citing US. v. Molina,22 that the person attacked is not duty bound to expose
himself to be wounded or killed and while the damages to his person or life subsist, he has a perfect
and indisputable right to repel such danger by wounding his adversary, to disable him completely,
so that he may not continue the assault; and that from the inception of the incident, until it ended,
the victim did not desist from attacking the petitioner, hence, the attending circumstance of
reasonable necessity of the means employed is present.23

In its Comment,24 the Office of the Solicitor General avers that the petition, anchored on the claim
of self-defense, merely raises a pure question of fact which had already been rejected by both the
trial and the appellate courts, hence, it should be denied outright.

In his Reply,25 petitioner counters that reasonableness of the means employed does not depend on
the harm done, but upon the reality and imminence of the danger or injury to the person defending
himself; and that one who is persistently assaulted by another cannot be expected to act in a normal
manner, and to follow the normal processes of reasoning, and weigh the necessity of employing a
certain means of defense.
 THE COURT'S RULING

Self-defense, when invoked as a justifying circumstance, implies the admission by the accused
that he committed the criminal act. Generally, the burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt rather than upon the accused that he was in fact
innocent. When the accused, however, admits killing the victim, it is incumbent upon him to prove
any claimed justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence.26 Well-settled is the rule
that in criminal cases, self-defense shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the
defense.27

For self-defense to prosper, petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence the
following elements as provided under the first paragraph, Article 11 of the RPC: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.28

Unlawful aggression

In self-defense, unlawful aggression is a primordial element.29 There can be no self-defense,

whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against
the person who defended himself.30 It presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or
imminent danger on the life and limb of a person - not a mere threatening or intimidating
attitude - at the time the defensive action was taken against the aggressor.31

The pertinent parts of the transcript of stenographic notes provide thus:

[Atty.
Operiano:]

What exactly did you tell Felix Sumugat when you went near him while he
Q:
was sawing the ipil-ipil tree?

A: I told him. "Nong, please stop this first. We have to talk."

Q: And what was the tone of your voice when you uttered those words?

A: It was in a low voice because I still respect him being older than me, s1r.

Q: What did Felix Sumugat do, if any when you uttered those words?

He stopped the engine of the chainsaw and then laid down on the ground
A:
and said, "What?"

Q: What did Felix Sumugat say to you, if any?

Felix Sumugat said, "So, what do you mean to say?" I told him, "Nong, just cut
A: the branches and the main trunk will be placed in the bodega because my
father-in-law and my brother-in-law will be arriving in March."
Q: And what did Felix Sumugat say, if any?

He said, "You have nothing to do with this. You are only an in-law. I will kill
A:
you."

Q: When Felix Sumugat uttered those words, what was the tone of his voice?

A: He was shouting, sir.

Q: And after he said, "I will kill you," what happened, if any?

A: He drew his revolver and aimed at me, sir.

xxxx

While Felix Sumugat was pointing that gun at you, what did you do, if you
Q:
did anything?

A: I raised both my hands, sir.

Q: And when you raised both your hands, what did you say, if any?

A: I said, "Nong, I will not fight you."

What did Felix Sumugat do, if any after you said you will not fight him, at the
Q:
same time raising both your hands?

A: He said, "I will kill you."

Q: How many times did he say, "I will kill you"?

A: Twice, sir.

xxxx

Now, after you were able to wrest the possession of that gun from Felix
Q:
Sumugat, what did you intend to do with the same?

I stepped a little backward but he was fast in picking up the chainsaw and
A:
then started its engine.
 And what did Felix Sumugat do with the chainsaw after he picked it up and
Q:
started the engine?

A: He thrust the chainsaw towards me, sir.

And what did you do when Felix Sumugat made a forward thrust of that
Q:
chainsaw directed to you?

I stepped backward a little and with the use of that firearm which I wrested
A:
from him, I fired a shot to the ground, sir.

Q: What was your intention in firing that gun on the ground?

A: Just to warn him that he will not assault me, sir.

Now, after you fired that gun pointed on the ground, what did Felix Sumugat
Q:
do, if any?

A: He insisted in trying to reach me with the chainsaw but I leaned backward, sir.

Now, when you stepped backward and leaned backward to evade the
Q:
blade of the chainsaw, what else happened, if any?

When I leaned backward at the same time parrying the chainsaw,

A:
accidentally, I pressed the trigger of that gun, sir.32

xxxx
Witness Bermudez, who was 40 meters away and saw what transpired, corroborated
petitioner's account33 He remained steadfast and unwavering even on cross-examination.
Moreover, petitioner's narration of the events is supported by the medico-legal report34 stating
that he indeed suffered wounds in his left hand.

Doubtless, the utterance of Sumugat to kill petitioner coupled by his act of aiming a gun at him,
and his continued thrusting of the chainsaw that hit petitioner's palm constitute unlawful
aggression.

Reasonable necessity of the means employed

In People v. Catbagan35 the Court ruled that the means employed by the person invoking
self-defense is reasonable if equivalent to the means of attack used by the original aggressor.
Whether or not the means of selfdefense is reasonable depends upon the nature or quality of the
weapon; the physical condition, the character, the size and other circumstances of the aggressor; as
well as those of the person who invokes self-defense, and also the place and the occasion of the
assault.36

In ruling that the element of "reasonable necessity of the means employed" is absent, the appellate
court opined that "[t]here could have been several ways for petitioner to repel the aggression
without having to kill the victim, especially that the latter was already wounded on the foot and
physically feebler than [petitioner]. More so, the victim only had a chainsaw, a crude weapon more
difficult to handle x x x."37

The Court disagrees with the CA.

First, it must be noted that the gun which petitioner grabbed from the victim was the only weapon
available to him and that the victim was continuing to thrust the chainsaw towards him. Indeed, a
chainsaw is difficult to operate. It could be reasonably inferred, however, that it was not the
victim's first time to operate a chainsaw considering that he was previously using the same to cut
the uprooted tree without any person assisting him for that matter. Also, the chainsaw was switched
on when the victim was thrusting it towards petitioner. Hence, the danger that petitioner would be
cut into pieces by the chainsaw was very real. Perfect balance between the weapon used by the
one defending himself and that of the aggressor is not required, because the person assaulted loses
sufficient tranquility of mind to think, to calculate or to choose which weapon to use.38 Certainly, it
would have been different if the vtctlm assaulted petitioner using a blunt object for in that case, the
use of a gun to repel such attack would undoubtedly be unreasonable. The ruling of the Court
in Cano v. People39thus applies in this case, viz:
x x x the reasonableness of the means employed to repel an actual and positive
aggression should not be gauged by the standards that the mind of a judge, seated
in a swivel chair in a comfortable office, free from care and unperturbed in his
security, may coolly and dispassionately set down. The judge must place himself in
the position of the object of the aggression or his defender and consider his feelings,
his reactions to the events or circumstances. It is easy for one to state that the
object of the aggression or his defender could have taken such action, adopted
such remedy, or resorted to other means. But the defendant has no time for cool
deliberation, no equanimity of mind to find the most reasonable action, remedy or
means to. He must act from impulse, without time for deliberation. The
reasonableness of the means employed must be gauged by the defender's hopes
and sincere beliefs, not by the judge's.40
Second, the fact that the victim was older than petitioner is not an accurate gauge to declare that
the former was weaker than the latter. Youth is not tantamount to strength as advanced age does
not connote frailty. In this case, the victim, despite being 62 years of age at the time of the incident,
was certainly not feeble considering that he was able to operate the chainsaw to cut the uprooted
tree. Further, even if the victim's left foot was wounded by the first shot fired, it is not entirely
impossible that he continued to assault petitioner using the chainsaw. In the same way that
petitioner was impelled by the instinct of self-preservation, the victim, too, could have been driven
by fury and adrenaline in continuing to attack petitioner.

Third, the nature and number of wounds inflicted by the accused are constantly and unremittingly
considered as important indicia.41 It is worthy to note that petitioner did not immediately shoot the
victim when he successfully took possession of the gun. He shot Sumugat only when the latter
continued to attack him with the chainsaw. In addition, petitioner's first shot wounded the victim on
the left foot. It was only when he was slashed by the chainsaw on his left hand that petitioner fired
the fatal shot.

Finally, as stated in the case of People v. Boholst-Caballero:42

The law on self-defense embodied in any penal system in the civilized world finds
justification in man's natural instinct to protect, repel and save his person or rights
from impending danger or peril; it is based on that impulse of self-preservation
born to man and part of his nature as a human being.43
It would be wrong to compel petitioner to discern the legally defensible response to the victim's
attack when he himself was staring at the evil eye of danger.44 Our laws on self-defense are
supposed to approximate the natural human responses to danger, and not serve as our inconvenient
rulebook based on which we should acclimatize our impulses in the face of peril.45

Lack of sufficient provocation

When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as an essential element
of self-defense, it requires that the same be sufficient or proportionate to the act committed and
that it be adequate to arouse one to its commission. It is not enough that the provocative act be
unreasonable or annoying.46 Petitioner's act of telling the victim not to cut the trunk of the uprooted
tree could hardly be considered provocation.

Under the law, a person does not incur any criminal liability if the act committed is in defense of his
person. Thus, all the elements of self-defense having been established in this case, petitioner is
entitled to an acquittal.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The 16 September 2008 Decision and 6 April 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00312 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Danilo Remegio is hereby ACQUITTED of homicide. The bail bond posted for his
temporary liberty is hereby cancelled and ordered released to petitioner or his duly authorized
representative.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Leonen, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.