DR.

RAM MANOHAR LOHIA NATIONAL

LAW UNIVERSITY, LUCKNOW

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE

Project
On
Illiteracy and Poverty and Condonation of delay

Submitted To: Submitted By:

Dr. Radhe Shyam Prasad Anurag Chaudhari

Asst. Professor(Law) Semester IV-A

Roll No.25
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I sincerely thank Dr.Radhe Shyam Prasad for allowing us to work on an area of our interest.
Her invaluable assistance and patience to stand us all in a class of undisciplined learners is
commendable. We are highly thankful to her for her infallible help and support. I am highly
indebted to the staff of the RMLNLU library for their kind consideration in the same regard.
And last but not the least I would take the opportunity to thank my parents, friends and well-
wishers without whose support and criticism this project of mine would not have gathered
enough momentum. This is as much theirs.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 1
INDEX OF CASES 3
BACKGROUND 4
INTRODUCTION 4
LAW OF LIMITATION...........................................................................................................5

WHAT DOES LIMITAION MEAN?...........................................................................................6

BAR OF LIMITATION ...................................................................................................7

PERIODS AS PRESCRIBED IN SCHEDULE TO THE ACT .......................................................7

IF COURT IS CLOSED ON LAST DAY ..............................................................................7

CONTINOUS RUNNING OF TIME .......................................................................................8

CONDONATION OF DELAY RULE ...................................................................................8

DIFFERENTS GROUND AND ESTABLISHED CASE LAW ................................................................9

CONCLUSION..........................................................................................................................17

BIBLIOGRAPHY 19

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INDEX OF CASES

Cases

The state ofd M P v prandeep kumar .................................................................................. 9

Raj Bahadur Singh & Ors D J & Others (civil misc writ petition no 12718 of 2002 ............... 9
State Of J & K v Ghulam Rasool Rather .............................................................................9
State of Nagaland v Lipok A O and ors reported in (2005)3SCC752 .................................... 10
N Balakrishnan v M Krishnamurthy [(1998)7SCC123:AIR 1998SC3222] ........................... 11
Scheduled Caste coop lad owning society ltd. Bhatinda v UOI &Ors [1991)SCC174 ........11
Binod Bihari Singh v UOI [(1993)1SCC574......................................................................12
M/S Shakambori &co. v UOI [(1993)SUPP.1 SC S 487.....................................................12
Ram Krishnan &anothers v UP state Road ways Transport corp & anothers [(1994)supp.2
SCC 507.........................................................................................................................12
G P Srivastava v R K Raizada and others reported as (2000)3 SCC54 .................................12
Salil Dutta v T M & Mc(P) Ltd. 1993 SCR (1),1993SCC(2)185............................................12
Smt. K M Sharmila Umesh v Smt Maryamma.......................................................................13
Arjun Singh v Mahindra Kumar &amp, Ors AIR 1964 SC 993 ..........................................14
Parimal v Veena Bharti )reported (2011)3SCC545..............................................................14
The State of Karnataka v H B Munivenkatappa 2007(4)kar LJ 439.......................................14
Mohamed Yusuf v Faij Mohammed &Ors Reported in AIR 2009 SC 1741......................... 15
Kalyan Singh Chouhan v C P Joshi 2011...........................................................................16
Ram Sarup Gupta (dead)by L Rs. v Bishun Narain Inter College &Ors AIR 1987.............16
Improovement Trust Ludhiyan v Ujagar Singh &Ors. 2010 6SCC786................................17

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INTRODUCTION

The provision of section 5 and the observations made by the Apex Court show that there are
two considerations in section 5 of the Limitation Act. The provision needs to be considered
from both the angles mentioned by the Apex Court. So far as the construction of expression
“sufficient cause” is concerned, the law is well settled. Section 5 does not require a “good
cause” butrequires “sufficient cause” which is something more than good cause. The
expression “sufficient cause” is not defined but it is laid down by various Courts that it must
mean a cause which is beyond the control of the party invoking the section. Any cause which
prevents the parties approaching the Court within time is sufficient. Here only it needs to be
observed that the cause must have arisen within prescribed time and the cause must have
continued beyond that. In ascertaining cause, the test of reasonable burden in this man in
normal circumstance needs to be applied. The regard rests on the party seeking condonation
of delay. He needs to discharge it by adducing evidence.

The Apex Court has laid down that the purpose of provision is to advance substantial justice
and so the Court using discretion whether denying must prima facie ascertain of relief would
amount to frustrating meritorious case and denying substantial justice. As care needs to be
taken in this regard, it can be said that the expression “sufficient cause” is widely elastic. In
one case, a ground may not be acceptable as sufficient ground for condonation of delay but
the same ground in other case, in view of facts and circumstances of that case, may be a
valid ground for condonation of delay. In one case if Court that the party seeking condonation
has arguable finds case, there is prima facie merit in the matter, the Court may hold on the
basis of explanation given by the party that sufficient cause is shown. In other case even
when the ground is the same, if Court finds that condoning the delay would unnecessarily
cause harassment to the other side, it will be defeating the interests of justice, the party
applying for condonation has is no arguable case, the Court may refuse to condone the delay.
The provision of section 5 of the Act has given discretionary power to the Court and the party
applying for condonation has no right as such. In a case the party applying for condonation of
delay may be in a position to show “sufficient cause” and there may be a ground in that
regard which cannot be disputed. However, in such a case also the Court has to exercise
discretion judiciously and the exercise must be to advance substantial justice. The Court is
expected to give reasons for refusing to condone the delay or for giving relief of condonation
of delay. This needs to be done in systematic manner as observed above. The reasons must be

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on the grounds mentioned to make out sufficient cause and there must also be reasons on the
point of prima facie merits of the case and bona fides .

Law of limitation:-

The Code of Civil Procedure confers a right to appeal, but does not prescribe a period of
limitation for filing an appeal. The Limitation Act, 1963, however, provides the period of
filing up appeals. It states that the appeals against a decree or order can be filed in a High
Court within ninety days and in any other court in thirty days from the date of the decree or
order appealed against.

It is for general welfare that a period be put on litigation. Further, it is a general principle of
law that law is made to protect only diligent and vigilant people. Equity aids the vigilant and
not the indolent. Law will not protect people who are careless about their rights. (Vigilantibus
non domientibus jur A subventiunt). Moreover, there should be certainty in law and matters
cannot be kept in suspense indefinably. It is, therefore, provided that Courts of Law cannot be
approached beyond fixed period. In civil matters, the limit is provided in Limitation Act,
1963.

The 'Law of Limitation' prescribes the time-limit for different suits within, which an
aggrieved person can approach the court for redress or justice. The suit, if filed after the
exploration of time-limit, is struck by the law of limitation. It's basically meant to protect the
long and established user and to indirectly punish persons who go into a long slumber over
their rights.

The statutory law was established in stages. The very first Limitation Act was enacted for all
courts in India in 1859. And finally took the form of Limitation Act in 1963.
A citizen is not expected to master the various provisions which provide for limitation in
different matters but certain basic knowledge in this regard is necessary. For instance, Section
12 of the Limitation Act lays down certain guidelines regarding computation of limitation
period. It says that in computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application,
the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded.

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Further, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite
for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from shall be excluded.
However, any time taken by the court to prepare the decree or order before an application for
a copy thereof is made shall not be excluded.

Section 14 of the act, similarly, says that in computing the period of limitation for any suit,
the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting in civil proceedings, whether in a
court of first instance or of appeal or revision against the defendant shall be excluded where
the proceedings relate to the same matter in a court which is unable to entertain it on account
of defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature.

What does limitation period mean?

The law prescribes different periods within which a person who has a grievance should go to
court. For example, if somebody has borrowed your money and not returned it, you should
approach the court within three years from the date you lent the money. If you don't go to the
court within that time, the courts will not be of help to recover your money. This is called the
limitation period. After the limitation period, you cannot enforce your rights in a court. The
Limitation Act 1963 prescribes different limitation periods for different kinds of claims.
Some other Acts such as the Consumer Protection Act also prescribe limitation periods

Bar of limitation (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) every
suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be
dismissed although limitation has not been set up as defense;

(1) For the purposes of this Act,

(a) A suit is instituted,

(i) in an ordinary case, when the plaint is presented to the proper officer;

(ii) in the case of a pauper, when his application for leave to sue is a pauper is made; and

(ii) in the case of a claim against a company which is being wound up by the court, when the
claimant first sends in his claim to the official liquidator;

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(b) any claim by way of a set-off or a counter claim, shall be treated as a separate suit and
shall be deemed to have been instituted-

(i) in the case of a set-off, on the dame date as the suit in which the set off is pleaded;

(ii) in the case a counter claim, on the date on which the counter claim is made in court;

(c) an application by notice of motion in a High Court is made when the application is
presented to the proper officer of that court.

Short title, extent and commencement - (1) This Act may be called the Limitation Act,1963.

2. It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir.
3. It shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may be notification in the
Official Gazette, appoint.

BAR OF LIMITATION – Subject to provisions of sections 4 to 24 of the Act (i.e. Limitation

Act),every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the ‘prescribed period’
shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. [section 3(1)].
‘Period of limitation’ means the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or
application by the schedule to the Act and ‘prescribed period’ means the period of limitation
computed as per provisions of the Act. [section 2(j)].

PERIOD AS PRESCRIBED IN SCHEDULE TO THE ACT – The period has been

prescribed in Schedule to the Act. Generally, it is as follows – (a) 3 years for a suit relating to
accounts, contracts, declarations, decrees, suits relating to movable property, recovery of law
suit under a contract etc. (b) 12 years for suits relating to possession of immovable property
and 30 years for mortgaged property (c) One year for suit relating to torts (3 years for
compensation in certain cases (d) 30 to 90 days in case of appeals under Civil Procedure
Code and Criminal Procedure Code. - - Period of filing appeal and application can be
extended if proper cause is shown (but not the suit) [section 5].

IF COURT IS CLOSED ON LAST DAY – If court is closed on last day of limitation, suit,

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appeal or application can be filed on next day when Court reopens. [section 4].

CONTINUOUS RUNNING OF TIME – When once period of limitation starts running, it

continues even if there is any subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or make an
application. [section 9]. - - However, if at the time when person is entitled to file a suit or
make application, if a person was disabled (as he was minor or insane), the period of
limitation will start after the disability is removed. [section 6(1)].

A misjoinder of parties or of cause of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature

mentioned above. Under Section 15 of the act, the time during which an injunction or
restraint order issued by a court remains in force, is to be excluded while computing the
period of limitation for any suit or application for the execution of a degree. In cases, where
the previous consent or sanction of the government or any other authority is required under
the law, the time required for obtaining such consent or sanction shall be excluded. Where a
defendant has been absent from India, the time during which he has been absent can be
excluded from the period of limitation.

In case, the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the
court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted on the day when the court
reopens, as provided under Section 4 of the act. This is based on the principle "actus curial
neminem gravabit", which means that an act of court shall not prejudice any one. The court
can condone the delay, if satisfied that it causes were beyond the control of the plaintiff too.

Condonation of delay Rule 3-A:-

Condonance may be made when an accuser has previously forgiven or condoned (in some
way or at some level) the act about which they are complaining. In some legal jurisdictions,
and for certain behaviours, it may prevent the accuser from prevailing.

Rule 3-A has been inserted by the Amendment Act of 1976. It provides that where an appeal
has been presented after the expiry of the period of limitation specified therefor, it shall be
accompanied by an application that the applicant has sufficient cause for not preferring the
appeal within the time.

Prior to the insertion of rule 3-A, the practice was to admit such an appeal subject to the

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opinion regarding limitation. This practice was disapproved by privy – council, and it
stressed the expediency of adopting a procedure for securing the final determination of the
question as to limitation before admission of appeal. This rule is added to give effect to give
effect to the recommendation of the privy council.

As observed by the Supreme Court in the State of M.P v. Prandeep Kumar, the object of the
provision is two-fold; frstly to inform the appellant that the delayed appeal will not be
entertained unless it is accompanied by an application accompanying the delay; and secondly,
to communicate to the respondent that it may not be necessary for him to get ready on merits
as the court has to first deal with an application for condonation of delay as a condition
precedent. The provision is, however, directory not mandatory. If the memorandum of appeal
is filed without an accompanying application for condonation of delay the consequence is not
necessarily fatal. The defect is curable.

DIFFERENT GROUND AND ESTABLISHED CASE LAW

Raj Bahadur Singh & Another v. D.J. & Others(Civil Misc.Writ Petition No.12718 of
2002) :
According to the learned Judge the application 4-Ga had been rejected on two grounds firstly
being barred by limitation and secondly being without any valid ground. Thus, the appeal
filed by the respondents was fully maintainable. He further submitted that the learned District
Judge vide order dated11.2.2002 had admitted the appeal while over ruling the preliminary
objections and the writ petition filed by the petitioners is not maintainable.

In the present case the question is as to whether an appeal lies against an order passed by the
trial Court wherein it had by a common order rejected both the applications under section 5 of
the Limitation Act and Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C. on the ground that the application is barred by
Limitation and no ground for condonation of delay has been made out, or a revision lies. If it
is held that no appeal lies then the order admitting the appeal is wholly without jurisdiction
and in such a circumstance a writ petition is maintainable.

State of Jammu and Kashmir v/s Ghulam Rasool Rather

J&K Limitation Act, S. 3 – Condonation of delay - Sufficient cause - What amounts to - On

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the facts of the case, held that the cause shown was reasonable and satisfactory - Delay
condoned.
The expression "sufficient cause" in section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal
construction so as to advance substantial justice. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy
the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to deliberate tactics,
but seek their remedy promptly. While considering a case for condonation of delay, the court
must always remember that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the
litigant concerned. That alone is not sufficient to turn down his plea and shut the door against
him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put-forth as part of a dilatory
strategy the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable
ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the
court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. The discretion exercised in the
matter of condonation of delay should be proper and judicious.
THE INNOCENT LITIGANT COULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO SUFFER
INJUSTICE FOR THE FAULT OF HIS ADVOCATE

In Rafiq and Anr., Appellants v. Munshilal and Anr., Respondents, reported in AIR 1981
SUPREME COURT 1400, the apex court has observed that It is not proper that an innocent
litigant, after doing everything in his power to effectively participate in his proceedings by
entrusting his case to the Advocate, should be made to suffer for the inaction, deliberate
omission or misdemeanour of his agent. For whatever reason the Advocate might have
absented himself from the Court, the innocent litigant could not be allowed to suffer injustice
for the fault of his Advocate. The respondent's costs should be recovered from the Advocate
who absented himself from Court. "The problem that agitates us is whether it is proper that
the party should suffer for the inaction, deliberate omission, or misdemeanor of his agent.
The answer obviously is in the negative. May be that the learned advocate absented himself
deliberately or intentionally. We have no material for ascertaining that aspect of the matter.
However, we cannot be a party to an innocent party suffering injustice merely because his
chosen advocate defaulted."
MERELY BECAUSE THE ADDITIONAL ADVOCATE GENERAL DID NOT FILE
AN APPEAL IN SPITE OF THE INSTRUCTIONS - RECORDS WERE
PURPORTEDLY MISSING WAS NOT A VALID GROUND
In State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO and Ors. reported in (2005) 3 SCC 752, the apex court
observed as under on this aspect in para 8 to 14: "8. The proof by sufficient cause is a

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condition precedent for exercise of the extraordinary restriction (sic discretion) vested in the
court. What counts is not the length of the delay but the sufficiency of the cause and shortness
of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken into account in using the discretion. In
support of the application for condonation of delay, it was submitted that the aspects
highlighted clearly indicated that the authorities were acting bonafide and various decisions
of this court were pressed into service to seek condonation of delay. High Court, however,
refused to condone the delay of 57 days on the ground that it is the duty of the litigant to file
an appeal before the expiry of the limitation period. Merely because the Additional Advocate
General did not file an appeal in spite of the instructions issued to him, that did not constitute
sufficient cause and further the fact that the records were purportedly missing was not a valid
ground. It was noted that merely asking the Additional Advocate General to file an appeal
was not sufficient and the department should have pursued the matter and should have made
enquiries as to whether the appeal had in fact, been filed or not. Accordingly the application
for condonation of delay in filing the appeal was rejected and consequentially the application
for grant of leave was rejected.
SECTION 5 IS TO BE CONSTRUED LIBERALLY SO AS TO DO SUBSTANTIAL
JUSTICE TO THE PARTIES
In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy [(1998) 7 SCC 123: AIR 1998 SC 3222] it was
held by court that section 5 is to be construed liberally so as to do substantial justice to the
parties. The provision contemplates that the court has to go in the position of the person
concerned and to find out if the delay can be said to have resulted from the cause which he
had adduced and whether the cause can be recorded in the peculiar circumstances of the case
as sufficient. Although no special indulgence can be shown to the Government, which in
similar circumstances, is not shown to an individual suitor, one cannot but take a practical
view of the working of the Government without being unduly indulgent to the slow motion of
its wheels.
SUFFICIENT CAUSE TO CONDONE THE DELAY – PERIOD BETWEEN LAST
DATES OF LIMITATION AND THE DATE ON WHICH APPLICATION
ACTUALLY FILED TO BE EXPLAINED
In Scheduled Caste Coop. Land Owning Society Ltd., Bhatinda v. Union of India & Ors.
[(1991) 1 SCC 174], a Bench of three Judges of this Court held that the bona fides of the
parties are to be tested on merits and the delay of 1146 to 1079 days was not condoned on the
ground that the parties approached the court after decision on merits was allowed in other

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cases by this Court. Therefore, it was held that it did not furnish a ground for condonation of
delay under Section 5.
In Binod Bihari Singh v. Union of India [(1993) 1 SCC 572], it was held that it is not at all a
fit case where in the anxiety to render justice to a party so that a just cause is not defeated, a
pragmatic view should be taken by the court in considering sufficing cause for condonation
of the delay under Section 5. It was held that when the party has come with a false plea to get
rid of the bar of limitation, the court should not encourage such person by condoning the
delay and result in the bar of limitation pleaded by the opposite party. This Court, therefore,
refused to condone the delay in favour of the party who came forward with false plea.
In M/s. Shakambari & Co. v. Union of India[(1993) Supp. 1 SCS 487], a Bench of three
Judges held that delay caused in filing the appeal due to fluctuation in laying down the law
was held to be a sufficient cause and delay of 14 days was condoned.
In Ram Krishan & Anr. v. U.P. State Roadways Transport Corpn. & Anr. [(1994) Supp. 2
SCC 507], Court had held that although the story put forward by the applicant for not filing
the application for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act within the period of
limitation was not found convincing but keeping in vies the facts and circumstances and
cause of justice, the delay was condoned and the appeal was set aside and the matter was
remitted to the Tribunal to dispose it on merits.

COURT SHOULD BE LIBERAL IN SETTING ASIDE EXPARTE DECREES

Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of G. P. Srivastava vs. R. K. Raizada and others reported as
(2000) 3 Supreme Court Cases 54. The ratio of law laid down in these judgments is that the
Court should be liberal in setting aside ex-parte decree and a party should be allowed to
contest the litigation and substantial justice should be done. In view of these judgments also,
it would not be desirable to interfere with the impugned order of the trial court.

PARTY CANNOT DISOWN HIS ADVOCATE AND SEEK RELIEF

In Salil Dutta v. T.M. & Mc (P) Ltd. 1993 SCR (1) 794, 1993 SCC (2) 185 the Apex Court,
after considering its earlier judgment in Rafiq (supra) observed that the said case was decided
on the facts involved therein and, thus, it did not lay down any absolute proposition. The
Court observed as under: It is true that in certain situations, the Court may, in the interest of
justice, set aside a dismissal order or an ex parte decree notwithstanding the negligence
and/or misdemeanour of the advocate where it finds that the client was an innocent litigant

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but there is no such absolute rule that a party can disown its advocate at any time and seek
relief. No such absolute immunity can be recognised. Such an absolute rule would make the
working of the system extremely difficult. It is difficult to believe that the respondents
implicitly believed their advocate's advice. Being educated businessmen they would have
known that non-participation at the final hearing of the suit would necessarily result In an
adverse decision. This Court is not prepared to believe that such an advice was in fact
tendered by the advocate. No advocate worth his salt would give such advice to his client.
Secondly, there are several contradictions in his deposition. Therefore, the story set up by the
respondent- company in its application under Order 9 Rule 13 is an after-thought and ought
not to have been accepted by the Division Bench, more particularly, when it had rejected the
very case in its earlier judgment.

WHAT IS SUFFICIENT CAUSE ?

Justice A. Ananda of Karnataka High Court in the case of Smt K M Sharmila Umesh vs Smt
Maryamma observed as follows:- “In the decision of (Parimal vs Veena Bharti) reported in
(2011) 3 SCC 545, at paragraph 13, the Supreme Court has held as under: "Sufficient cause"
is an expression which has been used in a large number of statutes. The meaning of the word
"sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose
intended. Therefore, word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a
platitutde which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts
and circumstances existing in a case and duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable
standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party had not
acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts
and circumstances of a case or the party cannot be alleged to have been "not acting
diligently" or "remaining inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must
afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason
that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. (Vide Ramlal
v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 361; , Lonand Grampanchayat v. Ramgiri Gosavi AIR
1968 SC 222; Surinder Singh Sibia v. Vijay Kumar Sood AIR 1992 SC 1540; and Oriental
Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd., v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corpn. (2010) 5 SCC
459). In the aforestated judgment, the Supreme Court has held the facts and circumstances of
each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion
for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously.

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SUFFICIENT CAUSE AND GOOD CAUSE DIFFERENTIATED
In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 993, Court observed that
every good cause is a sufficient cause and must offer an explanation for non-appearance. The
only difference between a “good cause” and “sufficient cause” is that the requirement of a
good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of a “sufficient cause”.

COURT SHALL DO SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE TO ALL THE PARTIES

(Parimal vs Veena Bharti) reported in (2011) 3 SCC 545 :- While deciding whether there is
a sufficient case or not, the court must bear in mind the object of doing substantial justice to
all the parties concerned and that the technicalities of the law should not prevent the court
from doing substantial justice and doing away the illegality perpetuated on the basis of the
judgment impugned before it. (Vide: State of Bihar & Ors. v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh
& Anr., AIR 2000 SC 2306; Madanlal v. Shyamlal, AIR 2002 SC 100; Davinder Pal
Sehgal & Anr. v. M/s. Partap Steel Rolling Mills (P) Ltd. & Ors., AIR 2002 SC
451; Ram Nath Sao alias Ram Nath Sao & Ors. v. Gobardhan Sao & Ors., AIR
2002 SC 1201; Kaushalya Devi v. Prem Chand & Anr. (2005) 10 SCC 127; Srei
International Finance Ltd., v. Fair growth Financial Services Ltd. & Anr., (2005) 13
SCC 95; and Reena Sadh v. Anjana Enterprises, AIR 2008 SC 2054).

GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC DUPED BY OFFICIALS

In The State Of Karnataka VS H.B. Munivenkatappa 2007 (4) KarLJ 439 JUSTICE N
KUMAR OBSEERVED:- “The officials of the Government, the advocates who are
conducting the cases on behalf of the Government and others have let down the interest of the
Government and public. Under these circumstances, I am of the view it would be appropriate
to refer the entries in the original ledger book where Form No. 7 is noted and orders passed
by the Land Reforms Tribunal, Bangalore South Taluk in all those cases at any rate as
contained in this book, for enquiry to the aforesaid committee which may throw some light
on the way the tribunal, the Government officials and others have discharged their duties in
protecting public property, and if illegalities are found to take steps to restore the land to the
Government.”
DO NOT REGULARIZE INJUSTICE ON TECHNICAL GROUNDS REMOVE
INJUSTICE
In The State Of Karnataka VS H.B. Munivenkatappa 2007 (4) KarLJ 439 JUSTICE N
KUMAR OBSEERVED:- “The judiciary is respected not on account of its power to

14
regularize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is
expected to do so. If appeals brought by the Government are lost on account of delay, no
person is individually affected, but what in the ultimate analysis suffers is, the public interest.
The law of Limitation is no doubt the same for private citizen as well as for Governmental
authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take the responsibility for the acts or
omissions of its officers. But some what different complexion is imparted to the matter where
Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to the
acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were
clearly at cross-purposes with it. On account of impersonal machinery, no one Page 0797
incharge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal
and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing and
passing on the buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more
difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represent collective cause of the
community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts therefore, have to be
informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of
the expression of sufficient cause. Refusing to condone the delay can result in a meritorious
matter being thrown out, at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against
this, when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a case would be decided on
merits after hearing the parties. When substantial justice and technical considerations are
pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred. The
technicalities of procedure should yield to considerations which would promote public
interest and substantial justice. The Courts should decide the matters on merits, unless it is
hopelessly without any merit.”

DELAY IN FILING WS AFTER 90 DAYS CANNOT BE CONDONED ROUTINELY

– ONLY IN RARE AND EXCEPTIONAL CASE
THE HONBLE JUSTICE S.B. Sinha, & THE HONBLE JUSTICE Cyriac Joseph in the case
of MOHAMMED YUSUF VS FAIJ MOHAMMAD & ORS. Reported in AIR 2009 SC
1741 A dispensation that makes Order 8 Rule 1 directory, leaving it to the courts to extend
the time indiscriminately would tend to defeat the object sought to be achieved by the
amendments to the Code. It is, therefore, necessary to emphasise that the grant of extension
of time beyond 30 days is not automatic, that it should be exercised with caution and for
adequate reasons and that an extension of time beyond 90 days of the service of summons
must be granted only based on a clear satisfaction of the justification for granting such

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extension, the court being conscious of the fact that even the power of the court for extension
inhering in Section 148 of the Code, has also been restricted by the legislature. It would be
proper to encourage the belief in litigants that the imperative of Order 8 Rule 1 must be
adhered to and that only in rare and exceptional case, will the breach thereof will be
condoned. Such an approach by courts alone can carry forward the legislative intent of
avoiding delays or at least in curtailing the delays in the disposal of suits filed in courts.

CONCLUSION ON DELAY IN WS FILING:-

The provision of Order 8 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as amended by the
amending Acts of 1999 and 2002 has now been sufficiently expounded by the Supreme Court
by holding that the said provision of Order 8 Rule 1 is directory and not mandatory. The Civil
Procedure Code is a procedural code for the conduct of the suit and the same has been held to
be a handmaid of justice. One of the first judgments on this aspect holding the provision of
Order 8 Rule 1 to be directory was the case of Kailash Vs. Nankhu 2005 (4) SCC 480. The
ratio of the decision in the case of Kailash has also thereafter been repeatedly followed by the
Supreme Court in various other judgments including Rani Kusum (Smt.) Vs. Kanchan Devi
(Smt.) and others (2005) 6 SCC 705, Mr. Shaikh Salim Haji Abdul Khayumsab Vs. Mr.
Kumar & Ors. 2006 (1) SCC 46 and R.N.Jadi & Brothers & Ors. Vs. Subhashchandra 2007
(6) SCC 420. Of course, the provision of Order 8 Rule 1 is not to be so liberally interpreted
so as to allow gross delays and negligence on the part of the defendant in filing the written
statement. The facts of each case therefore have to be seen as to whether there is gross delay
or negligence so as to disentitle the defendant for extension of time for filing of the written
statement.

IMPORTANCE OF PLEADINGS IN CIVIL CASES AS EXPLAINED WITH

CITATIONS BY JUSTICE P SATHASIVAM AND JUSTICE DR B.S. CHAUHAN

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Decision in a case of election matter, in Kalyan

Singh Chouhan vs C.P.Joshi Decided on 24 January, 2011, Justice P. SATHASIVAM &
Justice Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN observed following principles of case law on “Importance of
pleadings” as also applicable to civil court proceedings:-
This Court in Ram Sarup Gupta (dead) by L.Rs. v. Bishun Narain Inter College & Ors.,
AIR 1987 SC 1242 held as under: "It is well settled that in the absence of pleading, evidence,
if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered. It is also equally settled that no party

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should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading and that all necessary and material facts
should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by it. The object and purpose of
pleading is to enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet. In such a case it is
the duty of the court to ascertain the substance of the pleadings to determine the question."
DELAY CONDONATION CASE LAWS
Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Improvement Trust, Ludhiana Vs. Ujagar Singh & Ors.,
reported in (2010) 6 SCC 786
It has been observed in this judgment that hyper technical approached to be avoided and what
should be matters to be considered unless malafides are pointed out, normally rule is that
delay should be condoned as observed, the matter should be allowed to be contested on
merits rather than throwing it out on technicalities.

Conclusion:
Thus we can understand from the above examples that law of Limitation and Condonation of
Delay are two effective implementations in the quick disposal of cases and effective
litigation. On the one hand if the law of limitation keeps a check on the pulling of cases and
prescribes a time period within which the suit can be filed and the time available within
which the person can get the remedy conveniently. The law of Condonation of Delay keeps
the principle of natural justice alive and also states the fact that different people might have
different problems and the same sentence or a singular rule may not apply to all of them in
the same way. Thus it is essential to hear them and decide accordingly whether they fit in the
criteria of the judgement or whether they deserve a second chance.

Above are the principles which should control the exercise of judicial discretion vested in the
Court under these provisions. The explained delay should be clearly understood in
contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay. Delay is just one of the ingredients which
has to be considered by the Court. In addition to this, the Court must also take into account
the conduct of the parties, bona fide reasons for condonation of delay and whether such delay
could easily be avoided by the applicant acting with normal care and caution. The statutory
provisions mandate that applications for condonation of delay and applications belatedly filed
beyond the prescribed period of limitation for bringing the legal representatives on record,
should be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay. The larger

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benches as well as equi-benches of this Court have consistently followed these principles and
have either allowed or declined to condone the delay in filing such applications. Thus, it is
the requirement of law that these applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even
in a routine manner. An applicant must essentially satisfy the above stated ingredients; then
alone the Court would be inclined to condone the delay in the filing of such applications

Condonation of delay should be allowed to the weaker section of the society, as sometime
they are unable to pay the fees of good advocates & the advocates provided to them by the
Government are less knowledge & experience comparatively ( no person of deprived
category provided the service of Shri Ram Jethmalani and like advocates) and ultimately they
loose their case. Consequently the justice to the deprived categories or weaker sections, very
poor is denied, which is a violation of Fundamental Right of the Constitution. If their wife,
children or any other blood-relative are later capable for the justice himself/herself or through
good advocate, condonation of delay should be allowed in the interest of the justice towards
weaker sections or such deprived litigants.

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Civil Procedure with Limitaion act 1963 by Justice C K Takwani

2. The key to Indian Practice (A Summary of the code of Civil Procedure ) by mulla

3. www,lawweb.in

4. www.legalservicesindia.com

5. www.sribd.com

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