FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 153206 October 23, 2006

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review seeking the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CV No. 59400 which affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) Branch 41, Dagupan City granting the petition for legal separation filed by herein
respondent, as well as the Resolution2 of the CA dated April 26, 2002 which denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.

Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong (William) and Lucita G. Ong (Lucita) were married
on July 13, 1975 at the San Agustin Church in Manila. They have three children: Kingston,
Charleston, and Princeton who are now all of the age of majority.3

On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the
Family Code4 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 41 alleging that
her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive
conduct.5

Lucita claimed that: soon after three years of marriage, she and William quarreled almost every
day, with physical violence being inflicted upon her; William would shout invectives at her like
"putang ina mo", "gago", "tanga", and he would slap her, kick her, pull her hair, bang her head
against concrete wall and throw at her whatever he could reach with his hand; the causes of
these fights were petty things regarding their children or their business; William would also scold
and beat the children at different parts of their bodies using the buckle of his belt; whenever she
tried to stop William from hitting the children, he would turn his ire on her and box her; on
December 9, 1995, after she protested with William’s decision to allow their eldest son Kingston
to go to Bacolod, William slapped her and said, "it is none of your business"; on December 14,
1995, she asked William to bring Kingston back from Bacolod; a violent quarrel ensued and
William hit her on her head, left cheek, eye, stomach, and arms; when William hit her on the
stomach and she bent down because of the pain, he hit her on the head then pointed a gun at
her and asked her to leave the house; she then went to her sister’s house in Binondo where she
was fetched by her other siblings and brought to their parents house in Dagupan; the following
day, she went to her parent’s doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzano for treatment of her injuries. 6

William for his part denied that he ever inflicted physical harm on his wife, used insulting
language against her, or whipped the children with the buckle of his belt. While he admits that
he and Lucita quarreled on December 9, 1995, at their house in Jose Abad Santos Avenue,
Tondo, Manila, he claimed that he left the same, stayed in their Greenhills condominium and
only went back to their Tondo house to work in their office below. In the afternoon of December
14, 1995, their laundrywoman told him that Lucita left the house.7

On January 5, 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision decreeing legal separation, thus:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the legal
separation of plaintiff and defendant, with all the legal effects attendant thereto,
particularly the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties, for
which purpose the parties are hereby ordered to submit a complete inventory of said
properties so that the Court can make a just and proper division, such division to be
embodied in a supplemental decision.

SO ORDERED.8

The RTC found that:

It is indubitable that plaintiff (Lucita) and defendant (William) had their frequent quarrels
and misunderstanding which made both of their lives miserable and hellish. This is even
admitted by the defendant when he said that there was no day that he did not quarrel
with his wife. Defendant had regarded the plaintiff negligent in the performance of her
wifely duties and had blamed her for not reporting to him about the wrongdoings of their
children. (citations omitted)

These quarrels were always punctuated by acts of physical violence, threats and
intimidation by the defendant against the plaintiff and on the children. In the process,
insulting words and language were heaped upon her. The plaintiff suffered and endured
the mental and physical anguish of these marital fights until December 14, 1995 when
she had reached the limits of her endurance. The more than twenty years of her
marriage could not have been put to waste by the plaintiff if the same had been lived in
an atmosphere of love, harmony and peace. Worst, their children are also suffering. As
very well stated in plaintiff’s memorandum, "it would be unthinkable for her to throw away
this twenty years of relationship, abandon the comforts of her home and be separated
from her children, whom she loves, if there exists no cause, which is already beyond her
endurance.9

William appealed to the CA which affirmed in toto the RTC decision. In its Decision dated
October 8, 2001, the CA found that the testimonies for Lucita were straightforward and credible
and the ground for legal separation under Art. 55, par. 1 of the Family Code, i.e., physical
violence and grossly abusive conduct directed against Lucita, were adequately proven.10

As the CA explained:

The straightforward and candid testimonies of the witnesses were uncontroverted and
credible. Dr. Elinzano’s testimony was able to show that the [Lucita] suffered several
injuries inflicted by [William]. It is clear that on December 14, 1995, she sustained
redness in her cheek, black eye on her left eye, fist blow on the stomach, blood clot and
a blackish discoloration on both shoulders and a "bump" or "bukol" on her head. The
presence of these injuries was established by the testimonies of [Lucita] herself and her
sister, Linda Lim. The Memorandum/Medical Certificate also confirmed the evidence
presented and does not deviate from the doctor’s main testimony --- that [Lucita]
suffered physical violence on [sic] the hands of her husband, caused by physical trauma,
slapping of the cheek, boxing and fist blows. The effect of the so-called alterations in the
Memorandum/Medical Certificate questioned by [William] does not depart from the main
thrust of the testimony of the said doctor.
 Also, the testimony of [Lucita] herself consistently and constantly established that
[William] inflicted repeated physical violence upon her during their marriage and that she
had been subjected to grossly abusive conduct when he constantly hurled invectives at
her even in front of their customers and employees, shouting words like, "gaga", "putang
ina mo," tanga," and "you don’t know anything."

These were further corroborated by several incidents narrated by Linda Lim who lived in
their conjugal home from 1989 to 1991. She saw her sister after the December 14, 1995
incident when she (Lucita) was fetched by the latter on the same date. She was a
witness to the kind of relationship her sister and [William] had during the three years she
lived with them. She observed that [William] has an "explosive temper, easily gets angry
and becomes very violent." She cited several instances which proved that William Ong
indeed treated her wife shabbily and despicably, in words and deeds.

xxx

That the physical violence and grossly abusive conduct were brought to bear upon
[Lucita] by [William] have been duly established by [Lucita] and her witnesses. These
incidents were not explained nor controverted by [William], except by making a general
denial thereof. Consequently, as between an affirmative assertion and a general denial,
weight must be accorded to the affirmative assertion.

The grossly abusive conduct is also apparent in the instances testified to by [Lucita] and
her sister. The injurious invectives hurled at [Lucita] and his treatment of her, in its
entirety, in front of their employees and friends, are enough to constitute grossly abusive
conduct. The aggregate behavior of [William] warrants legal separation under grossly
abusive conduct. x x x11

William filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA on April 26, 2002.12

Hence the present petition where William claims that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN DISREGARDING

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN DISREGARDING

William argues that: the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the case is to wrest control
and ownership of properties belonging to the conjugal partnership; these properties, which
include real properties in Hong Kong, Metro Manila, Baguio and Dagupan, were acquired during
the marriage through his (William’s) sole efforts; the only parties who will benefit from a decree
of legal separation are Lucita’s parents and siblings while such decree would condemn him as a
violent and cruel person, a wife-beater and child abuser, and will taint his reputation, especially
among the Filipino-Chinese community; substantial facts and circumstances have been
overlooked which warrant an exception to the general rule that factual findings of the trial court
will not be disturbed on appeal; the findings of the trial court that he committed acts of repeated
physical violence against Lucita and their children were not sufficiently established; what took
place were disagreements regarding the manner of raising and disciplining the children
particularly Charleston, Lucita’s favorite son; marriage being a social contract cannot be
impaired by mere verbal disagreements and the complaining party must adduce clear and
convincing evidence to justify legal separation; the CA erred in relying on the testimonies of
Lucita and her witnesses, her sister Linda Lim, and their parent’s doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzanzo,
whose testimonies are tainted with relationship and fraud; in the 20 years of their marriage,
Lucita has not complained of any cruel behavior on the part of William in relation to their marital
and family life; William expressed his willingness to receive respondent unconditionally
however, it is Lucita who abandoned the conjugal dwelling on December 14, 1995 and instituted
the complaint below in order to appropriate for herself and her relatives the conjugal properties;
the Constitution provides that marriage is an inviolable social institution and shall be protected
by the State, thus the rule is the preservation of the marital union and not its infringement; only
for grounds enumerated in Art. 55 of the Family Code, which grounds should be clearly and
convincingly proven, can the courts decree a legal separation among the spouses.14

Respondent Lucita in her Comment, meanwhile, asserts that: the issues raised in the present
petition are factual; the findings of both lower courts rest on strong and clear evidence borne by
the records; this Court is not a trier of facts and factual findings of the RTC when confirmed by
the CA are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal; the contention of William
that Lucita filed the case for legal separation in order to remove from William the control and
ownership of their conjugal properties and to transfer the same to Lucita’s family is absurd;
Lucita will not just throw her marriage of 20 years and forego the companionship of William and
her children just to serve the interest of her family; Lucita left the conjugal home because of the
repeated physical violence and grossly abusive conduct of petitioner.15

Petitioner filed a Reply, reasserting his claims in his petition, 16 as well as a Memorandum where
he averred for the first time that since respondent is guilty of abandonment, the petition for legal
separation should be denied following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code. 17 Petitioner argues
that since respondent herself has given ground for legal separation by abandoning the family
simply because of a quarrel and refusing to return thereto unless the conjugal properties were
placed in the administration of petitioner’s in-laws, no decree of legal separation should be
issued in her favor.18

Respondent likewise filed a Memorandum reiterating her earlier assertions.19

We resolve to deny the petition.

It is settled that questions of fact cannot be the subject of a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. The rule finds more stringent application where the CA upholds the findings
of fact of the trial court. In such instance, this Court is generally bound to adopt the facts as
determined by the lower courts.20
The only instances when this Court reviews findings of fact are:

(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the
Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to
that of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as
in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when
the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted
by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion.21

As petitioner failed to show that the instant case falls under any of the exceptional
circumstances, the general rule applies.

Indeed, this Court cannot review factual findings on appeal, especially when they are borne out
by the records or are based on substantial evidence.22 In this case, the findings of the RTC were
affirmed by the CA and are adequately supported by the records.

As correctly observed by the trial court, William himself admitted that there was no day that he
did not quarrel with his wife, which made his life miserable, and he blames her for being
negligent of her wifely duties and for not reporting to him the wrongdoings of their children.23

Lucita and her sister, Linda Lim, also gave numerous accounts of the instances when William
displayed violent temper against Lucita and their children; such as: when William threw a steel
chair at Lucita;24 threw chairs at their children;25 slapped Lucita and utter insulting words at
her;26 use the buckle of the belt in whipping the children;27 pinned Lucita against the wall with
his strong arms almost strangling her, and smashed the flower vase and brick rocks and
moldings leaving the bedroom in disarray;28 shouted at Lucita and threw a directory at her, in
front of Linda and the employees of their business, because he could not find a draft letter on
his table;29 got mad at Charleston for cooking steak with vetchin prompting William to smash the
plate with steak and hit Charleston, then slapped Lucita and shouted at her "putang ina mo,
gago, wala kang pakialam, tarantado" when she sided with Charleston;30 and the December 9
and December 14, 1995 incidents which forced Lucita to leave the conjugal dwelling.31

Lucita also explained that the injuries she received on December 14, 1995, were not the first. As
she related before the trial court:

q. You stated on cross examination that the injuries you sustained on December 14,
1995 were the most serious?

a. Unlike before I considered December 14, 1995 the very serious because before it is
only on the arm and black eye, but on this December 14, I suffered bruises in all parts of
my body, sir.32
To these, all William and his witnesses, could offer are denials and attempts to downplay the
said incidents.33

As between the detailed accounts given for Lucita and the general denial for William, the Court
gives more weight to those of the former. The Court also gives a great amount of consideration
to the assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses as trial court judges
enjoy the unique opportunity of observing the deportment of witnesses on the stand, a vantage
point denied appellate tribunals.34 Indeed, it is settled that the assessment of the trial court of
the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect and weight having had the opportunity to
observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying.35

In this case, the RTC noted that:

William’s denial and that of his witnesses of the imputation of physical violence
committed by him could not be given much credence by the Court. Since the office
secretary Ofelia Rosal and the family laundrywoman Rosalino Morco are dependent
upon defendant for their livelihood, their testimonies may be tainted with bias and they
could not be considered as impartial and credible witnesses. So with Kingston Ong who
lives with defendant and depends upon him for support.36

Parenthetically, William claims that that the witnesses of Lucita are not credible because of their
relationship with her. We do not agree. Relationship alone is not reason enough to discredit and
label a witness’s testimony as biased and unworthy of credence37 and a witness’ relationship to
one of the parties does not automatically affect the veracity of his or her
testimony.38 Considering the detailed and straightforward testimonies given by Linda Lim and
Dr. Vicente Elinzano, bolstered by the credence accorded them by the trial court, the Court finds
that their testimonies are not tainted with bias.

William also posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case for legal separation is in order
for her side of the family to gain control of the conjugal properties; that Lucita was willing to
destroy his reputation by filing the legal separation case just so her parents and her siblings
could control the properties he worked hard for. The Court finds such reasoning hard to believe.
What benefit would Lucita personally gain by pushing for her parents’ and siblings’ financial
interests at the expense of her marriage? What is more probable is that there truly exists a
ground for legal separation, a cause so strong, that Lucita had to seek redress from the courts.
As aptly stated by the RTC,

...it would be unthinkable for her to throw away this twenty years of relationship,
abandon the comforts of her home and be separated from her children whom she loves,
if there exists no cause, which is already beyond her endurance.39

The claim of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his reputation and label him as
a wife-beater and child-abuser also does not elicit sympathy from this Court. If there would be
such a smear on his reputation then it would not be because of Lucita’s decision to seek relief
from the courts, but because he gave Lucita reason to go to court in the first place.

Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a
decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code
which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for
legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without
justifiable cause for more than one year.40 As it was established that Lucita left William due to
his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.

As a final note, we reiterate that our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the
family as a basic social institution.41 The Constitution itself however does not establish the
parameters of state protection to marriage and the family, as it remains the province of the
legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities
to protect it and put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect the same. 42 With the
enactment of the Family Code, this has been accomplished as it defines marriage and the
family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and
family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal
separation.43 As Lucita has adequately proven the presence of a ground for legal separation,
the Court has no reason but to affirm the findings of the RTC and the CA, and grant her the
relief she is entitled to under the law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
Rollo, pp. 30-44; penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and concurred
in by Associate Justices Teodoro P. Regino and Josefina Guevara-Salonga.

2
Rollo, p. 46.

3
See records, p. 1.

4
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:

(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the
petitioner, a common child, or a child of petitioner;

xxx

5
Records, p. 2.

6
Rollo, pp. 49-51 (RTC Decision).

7
Id. at 53 (RTC Decision).

8
Rollo, p. 56.

9
Id. at 55.
10
Id. at 40-44.

11
Rollo, pp. 40-42.

12
Id. at 46.

13
Id. at 8-9.

14
Rollo, pp. 9-24.

15
Id. at 149-152.

16
Id. at 157-169.

17
Art. 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the following
grounds:

xxx

(4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation;

xxx

Rollo, pp. 210-236.

18
Id. at 221.

19
Id. at 188-203.

20
Mangonon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125041, June 30, 2006.

21
Id.

22
Potenciano v. Reynoso, 449 Phil. 396, 405-406 (2003).

23
TSN, Ong Eng Kiam, September 25, 1997, pp. 29-32.

24
TSN, Lucita Ong, June 11, 1997, p. 14.

25
Id. at 20.

26
Id. at 21.

27
Id. at 23.

28
TSN, Linda Lim, June 25, 1997, p. 5.

29
Id. at 5-6.
30
Id. at 7-8.

31
TSN, Lucita Ong, May 9, 1997, pp. 9-11, 16.

32
Id. at 21.

33
See TSN, Ong Eng Kiam, September 25, 1997, pp. 11, 53; TSN, Kingston Ong,
September 24, 1997, pp. 16-18.

34
Roca v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 326, 333 (2001).

35
Cirelos v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 146523, June 15, 2006; Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No.
155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353, 364.

36
Rollo, p. 56.

37
Roca v. Court of Appeals, supra note 34 at 334.

38
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127473, December 8, 2003, 417
SCRA 196, 207.

39
Rollo, p. 55.

40
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds

(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than
one year.

41
Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 169, 180 (1996).

42
Antonio v. Reyes, supra note 35 at 372.

43
Id. at 372.