Benigno Aquino, Jr.

VS Military Commission
G.R. No. L-37364 ; May 9, 1975

FACTS:
In September 1972, after the declaration of Martial Law, Ninoy was arrested and was placed under
custody. He was brought to Fort Bonifacio. He filed for the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus which
was denied by the SC. Aquino then questioned the validity of such denial and the declaration of martial
law; at the same time he questioned the authority of the military court [No. 2] created [pursuant to GO
2-A] to try him and his other companions. He was being charged for illegal possession of firearms,
ammunition and explosives. He was also being charged for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act and for
murder. All were filed before the military court. Aquino argued that the military court had no jurisdiction
because civilian courts were still operational and that, being a civilian, his trial by a military commission
deprives him of his right to due process. When the proceedings before the Military Commission opened,
petitioner questioned the fairness of the trial and announced that he did not wish to participate in the
proceedings even as he discharged both his defense counsel of choice and his military defense
counsel. For the petitioner's assurance, a Special Committee was created to reinvestigate the charges
against petitioner. Petitioner filed supplemental petition questioning the legality of the creation of the
Special Committee. On March 24, 1975, petitioner filed an "Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order Against Military Commission No. 2"; praying that said Commission be prohibited from
proceeding with the perpetuation of testimony under its Order dated March 10, 1975, the same being
illegal, until further orders from the Supreme Court

ISSUE:
Whether or not Aquino was afforded due process in a military court.

HELD:
YES. Petitioner nevertheless insists that he being a civilian, his trial by a military commission deprives
him of his right to due process, since in his view the due process guaranteed by the Constitution to
persons accused of "ordinary" crimes means judicial process. This argument ignores the reality of the
rebellion and the existence of martial law. It is, of course, essential that in a martial law situation, the
martial law administrator must have ample and sufficient means to quell the rebellion and restore civil
order. However, according to Schwartz, “The immunity of civilians from military jurisdiction must,
however, give way in areas governed by martial law. When it is absolutely imperative for public safety,
legal processes can be superseded and military tribunals authorized to exercise the jurisdiction
normally vested in court.”

Neither are We impressed with petitioner’s argument that only thru a judicial proceeding before the
regular courts can his right to due process be preserved. The guarantee of due process is not a
guarantee of any particular form of tribunal in criminal cases. A military tribunal of competent
jurisdiction, accusation in due form, notice and opportunity to defend and trial before an impartial
tribunal, adequately meet the due process requirement. Due process of law does not necessarily means
a judicial proceeding in the regular courts. The guarantee of due process, viewed in its procedural
aspect, requires no particular form of procedure. It implies due notice to the individual of the
proceedings, an opportunity to defend himself and “the problem of the propriety of the deprivations,
under the circumstances presented, must be resolved in a manner consistent with essential fairness.”
It means essentially a fair and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of defense.
Here, the procedure before the Military Commission, as prescribed in Presidential Decree No. 39 which
is was promulgated on November 7,1972, providing for the "Rules Governing the Creation,
Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure and Other Matters Relevant to Military Tribunals,” assures
observance of the fundamental requisites of procedural due process, due notice, an essentially fair and
impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of the defense Section 11 of the Manual
for Courts-Martial specifically provides that the “rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of
criminal cases in the courts of the Philippines shall be applied by courts-martial.” This is applicable to
trials in the military commission. There is, therefore, no justification for petitioner’s contention that such
military tribunals are concerned primarily with the conviction of an accused and that proceedings therein
involve the complete destruction and abolition of petitioner’s constitutional rights.

Benigno Aquino, Jr. VS Juan Ponce Enrile

FACTS:
These nine cases are all about the petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners having been arrested
and detained unlawfully by the military by virtue of Proclamation no.1081 dated September 21, 1972
through the President exercising his powers he assumed by virtue of Martial Law. The petitioners were
arrested pursuant to Gen. Order no 2 “for being participants or for having giving aid and comfort in the
conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take over the Government by force…”
(September 22, 1972).The provision of the 1935 constitution reads “the President shall be commander-
in-chief of all armed forces in the Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out
such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion. In case
of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, he
may suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law.” Art VII Section 10(2)

Respondents, through the Solicitor General, answered that such arrests were legally ordered by the
President pursuant to Proclamation of Martial Law as “participant or as having giving aid and comfort
in the conspiracy to seize political and state power and to take the government by force.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not this court may inquire into the validity of Proclamation no. 1081. Is the existence of
conditions claimed to justify the exercise of power to declare martial law subject to judicial inquiry? Is
the question political or justiciable in character?

HELD:
YES. Five justices held that the question is political and should not be determined by court. (Makasiar,
Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez and Aquino) Fernandez adds that as a member of the 1973 Convention
he believes that “the as a member of the Convention, they have put an imprimatur on the proposition
of the validity of a martial law proclamation…” Barredo believes that political question are not per se
beyond the court’s jurisdiction, judicial power vested in it by the Constitution being all-embracing and
plenary but as a matter of policy should abstain from interfering with the Executive’s Proclamation.
Esguerra finds that the declaration of martial lawis final and conclusive upon the courts.

Justice Antonio, with whom Justices Makasiar, Fernandez and Aquino concur, finds that there is no
dispute as to the existence of a state of rebellion in the country, and on that premise emphasizes the
factor of necessity for the exercise by the President of his power under the Constitution to declare
martial law, holding that the decision as to whether or not there is such necessity is wholly confided to
him and therefore is not subject to judicial inquiry, his responsibility being directly to the people.

The question of the validity of the Proclamation no 1081 has been foreclosed by the transitory provision
of the 1973 Constitution (Art XVII. Sec 3 (2)) that “all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and
acts promulgated, issued or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land and
shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective even after … the ratification of this Constitution.” The
political or justiciable question controversy has become moot and purposeless as a consequence of
the referendum of July 27-28, 1973. The question which was overwhelmingly voted upon by a majority
of voters, even between 15 and 18 years of age in affirmative: “Under the 1973 Constitution, the
President, if he so desires, can continue in office beyond 1973 and finish the reforms he initiated under
martial law?”

Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration VS Court of Industrial Relations

FACTS:
On December 20, 1966, claimants, now private respondents, filed with respondent Court a petition
wherein they alleged their employment relationship, the overtime services in excess of the regular eight
hours a day rendered by them, and the failure to pay them overtime compensation in accordance with
Commonwealth Act No. 444. Their prayer was for the differential between the amount actually paid to
them and the amount allegedly due them. There was an answer filed by petitioner Philippine Virginia
Tobacco Administration denying the allegations and raising the special defenses of lack of a cause of
action and lack of jurisdiction. The issues were thereafter joined, and the case set for trial, with both
parties presenting their evidence. After the parties submitted the case for decision, the then Presiding
Judge Arsenio T. Martinez of respondent Court issued an order sustaining the claims of private
respondents for overtime services from December 23, 1963 up to the date the decision was rendered
on March 21, 1970, and directing petitioner to pay the same, minus what it had already paid. There was
a motion for reconsideration, but respondent Court en banc denied the same. Hence this petition for
certiorari.

Petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, as had been noted, would predicate its plea for
the reversal of the order complained of on the basic proposition that it is beyond the jurisdiction of
respondent Court as it is exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of
Commonwealth Act No. 444.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.

HELD:
YES. A reference to the enactments creating Petitioner Corporation suffices to demonstrate the merit
of petitioner's plea that it performs governmental and not proprietary functions. As originally established
by Republic Act No. 2265, its purposes and objectives were set forth thus: "(a) To promote the effective
merchandising of Virginia tobacco in the domestic and foreign markets so that those engaged in the
industry will be placed on a basis of economic security; (b) To establish and maintain balanced
production and consumption of Virginia tobacco and its manufactured products, and such marketing
conditions as will insure and stabilize the price of a level sufficient to cover the cost of production plus
reasonable profit both in the local as well as in the foreign market; (c) To create, establish, maintain,
and operate processing, warehousing and marketing facilities in suitable centers and supervise the
selling and buying of Virginia tobacco so that the farmers will enjoy reasonable prices that secure a fair
return of their investments; (d) To prescribe rules and regulations governing the grading, classifying,
and inspecting of Virginia tobacco; and (e) To improve the living and economic conditions of the people
engaged in the tobacco industry."

The NARIC was established by the Government to protect the people against excessive or
unreasonable rise in the price of cereals by unscrupulous dealers. With that main objective there is no
reason why its function should not be deemed governmental. The success that attended the efforts of
petitioner to be adjudged as performing governmental rather than proprietary functions cannot militate
against respondent Court assuming jurisdiction over this labor dispute.

A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and 2155 on which it relies to obtain
a ruling as to its governmental character should render clear the differentiation that exists. If as a result
of the appealed order, financial burden would have to be borne by petitioner, it has only itself to blame.
It need not have required private respondents to render overtime service. It can hardly be surmised
that one of its chief problems is paucity of personnel. That would indeed be a cause for astonishment.
It would appear, therefore, that such an objection based on this ground certainly cannot suffice for a
reversal. To repeat, respondent Court must be sustained.

Melchora Cabanas VS Francisco Pilapil

FACTS:
Deceased Florentino Pilapil, the husband of Melchora Cabanas and the father of Millian Pilapil, left an
insurance having his child as the beneficiary and authorized his brother, Francisco Pilapil, to act as
trustee during his daughter’s minority. The lower court decided to give the mother of the child the right
to act as trustee while her child is a minor citing the appropriate provisions in the Civil Code. The welfare
of the child is the paramount consideration here, and the mother resides with the child so she is the
rightful trustee. The judiciary pursuant to its role as an agency of the State parens patriae, called for
the mother to take responsibility. The defendant appealed for the case. He claims the retention of the
amount in question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy. He is the rightful trustee of the
insurance policy

ISSUE:
Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of “parens patriae” to the terms of the insurance policy?

HELD:
The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and that whenever
any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be affected then
the judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve according to the best interest of that person.

The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the immediate relative of
the minor child and it is assumed that the mother shows more care towards the child than an uncle.

It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting
as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to
accord priority to his best interest. It may happen, family relations may press their respective claims. It
would be more in consonance not only with the natural order of things but the tradition of the country
for a parent to be preferred. it could have been different if the conflict were between father and mother.
Such is not the case at all. It is a mother asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary as the instrumentality
of the State in its role of parens patriae, cannot remain insensible to the validity of her plea.