5 6181665992985280545

Languages and the Military
Palgrave Studies in Languages at War

Series Editors: Hilary Footitt, University of Reading, UK and Michael Kelly,
University of Southampton, UK.
Languages play a crucial role in war, conflict and peacemaking: in intelligence
gathering and evaluation, pre-deployment preparations, operations on the ground,
regime-change, and supporting refugees and displaced persons. In the politics of war,
languages have a dual impact: a public policy dimension, setting frameworks and
expectations; and the lived experience of those ‘on the ground’, working with and
meeting speakers of other languages.
This series intends to bring together books which deal with the role of languages
in situations of conflict, including war, civil war, occupation, peace-keeping, peace-
enforcement and humanitarian action in war zones. It will offer an interdisciplinary
approach, drawing on applied linguistics, sociolinguistics, translation studies, inter-
cultural communication, history, politics, international relations and cultural studies.
Books in the series will explore specific conflict situations across a range of times and
places, and specific language-related roles and activities, examining three contexts:
languages and the military, meeting the other in war and peacemaking, and interpreting/
translating in war.
Titles include:
Hilary Footitt and Michael Kelly (editors)
LANGUAGES AT WAR
Policies and Practices of Language Contacts in Conflict
Hilary Footitt and Michael Kelly (editors)
LANGUAGES AND THE MILITARY
Alliances, Occupation and Peace Building
Forthcoming:
Hilary Footitt and Simona Tobia
‘WAR TALK’
Foreign Languages and the British War Effort in Europe 1940–46
Michael Kelly and Catherine Baker
INTERPRETING THE PEACE
Peace Operations, Conflict and Language in Bosnia-Herzegovina
Palgrave Studies in Languages at War

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9780–230–35517–0 Paperback
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Languages and the Military
Alliances, Occupation and Peace Building
Edited by
Hilary Footitt
University of Reading, UK
and
Michael Kelly
University of Southampton, UK
Selection and editorial matter © Hilary Footitt and Michael Kelly 2012
Individual chapters © their respective authors 2012
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Contents
List of Tables and Figure vii

Preface viii
Notes on Contributors ix
Introduction: Languages and the Military: Alliances, Occupation

and Peace Building 1
Hilary Footitt
1 One Army, Many Languages: Foreign Troops and Linguistic
Diversity in the Eighteenth-Century French Military 12
Christopher Tozzi
2 ‘Amidst Clamour and Confusion’: Civilian and Military
Linguists at War in the Franco-Irish Campaigns against
Britain (1792–1804) 25
Sylvie Kleinman
3 Fighting Together: Language Issues in the Military
Coordination of First World War Allied Coalition Warfare 47
Franziska Heimburger
4 Languages at War: a UK Ministry of Defence Perspective 58
Lieutenant Colonel Justin Lewis RE
5 The Language Policy of the Italian Army in the Occupied
Slovenian Territories, 1915–17 70
Petra Svoljšak
6 Mediating for the Third Reich: On Military Translation Cultures
in World War II in Northern Finland 86
Pekka Kujamäki
7 When Bosnia was a Commonwealth Country: British Forces
and their Interpreters in Republika Srpska, 1995–2007 100
Catherine Baker
8 A Bilingual Officer Remembers Korea: a Closer Look at
Untrained Interpreters in the Korean War 115
María Manuela Fernández Sánchez
9 Victims of War: Refugees’ First Contacts with the British in
the Second World War 131
Simona Tobia
v
vi Contents
10 Jailtacht: the Irish Language and the Conflict in

Northern Ireland 148
Diarmait Mac Giolla Chríost
11 The AIIC Project to Help Interpreters in Conflict Areas 175
Linda Fitchett
12 Learning the Language of ‘The Other’ in Conflict-Ridden
Cyprus: Exploring Barriers and Possibilities 186
Constadina Charalambous
13 Resolving Conflict via English: the British Council’s
Peacekeeping English Project 202
Peter Hare and Nicholas Fletcher
14 Did Serbo-Croat Die with Yugoslavia? A Different View of
Language and Identity in Bosnia-Herzegovina 217
Louise Askew
15 Exhibiting the ‘Foreign’ in a National Museum: Imperial
War Museum London and Languages at War 227
James Taylor
Conclusion: Communication, Identity and Representation
Through Languages in War 236
Michael Kelly
Index 244
List of Tables and Figure
Tables
4.1 Key features of STANAG 6001 63

4.2 Employment factors for dedicated linguists 65
13.1 The two phases of the PEP 204
Figure
4.1 Organizational chart of the governance of language

capability in UK MOD 60
vii
Preface
The contributions in this volume come from an international confer-

ence held at the Imperial War Museum, London, in April 2011 as a result
of the Arts and Humanities Research Council project Languages at War:
Policies and Practices of Language Contacts in Conflict (http://www.reading.
ac.uk/languages-at-war).
We are grateful to the Arts and Humanities Research Council for their
support for the whole project and to the British Academy for its contribu-
tion to the final conference. The Imperial War Museum, which hosted the
conference, proved to be an excellent and supportive venue for our discus-
sions, and we are particularly grateful to Samantha Heywood, James Taylor,
Suzanne Bardgett, Roger Tolson and the Director of the Churchill War
Rooms, Phil Reed.
The conference provided a forum in which war studies specialists, histori-
ans, cultural studies analysts, linguists and translation scholars could meet
together with practitioners in order to explore the place of foreign languages
in war and conflict. The discussions we had were marked with openness and
a genuine desire to cross disciplinary boundaries and learn from each other,
and we are immensely grateful to all who participated.
Hilary Footitt
Michael Kelly
viii
Notes on Contributors
Louise Askew has been a professional translator, interpreter and reviser

working between English and Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian for, amongst oth-
ers, the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague and the NATO
Stabilization Force HQ in Sarajevo where she set up and headed the trans-
lation and interpretation service from 2000 to 2004. She has a PhD on
international language policy in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina from the
University of Nottingham. Louise would like to thank her interviewees for
giving so generously of their time and the Centre for Russian, Central and
East European Studies based at the University of Glasgow for providing
funding for her PhD research.
Catherine Baker is a Research and Teaching Fellow at the University of
Southampton and Teaching Fellow in Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict at
University College London. Her research interests are in the socio-cultural
impact of international intervention and in the politics of popular culture
and entertainment, drawing on research in former Yugoslavia. She is the
author of Sounds of the Borderland: Popular Music, War and Nationalism in
Croatia since 1991 (2010). Her articles have appeared in journals such as War
and Society, Europe–Asia Studies, Nationalities Papers and Ethnopolitics.
Constadina Charalambous is a Lecturer in Language Education and
Literacy at the European University of Cyprus. She specializes in language
education in contexts of conflict, and her broader research interests include
linguistic ethnography, intercultural communication and peace educa-
tion. She has recently co-written ‘Other-Language Learning, Identity and
Intercultural Communication in Contexts of Conflict’ (in The Routledge
Handbook of Language and Intercultural Communication, 2011).
María Manuela Fernández Sánchez is a Senior Lecturer in the Department
of Translation and Interpreting at the University of Granada, Spain.
A teacher of Interpreting Techniques (French–Spanish) and Translation
Theories at both undergraduate and graduate levels since 1986, she has also
taught abroad in Belgium and Mexico. She has published widely in the areas
of translation theory and interpreting history. She is currently researching
the diplomatic and international situation which required high-level inter-
preting during the first two decades of the Cold War era.
Linda Fitchett is a member of the International Association of Conference
Interpreters (AIIC) and coordinator of the Interpreters in Conflict Areas
project. She may be contacted at l.fitchett@aiic.net. She has recently been
elected President of AIIC.
ix
x Notes on Contributors
Nicholas Fletcher has worked in English language teaching, teacher train-

ing and project management since 1973 in Italy, UK, Venezuela, China,
Romania, Poland, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Mozambique, Colombia and
Afghanistan. This includes sixteen years managing English language projects
in various Ministries of Defence.
Hilary Footitt is Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Modern
Languages and European Studies in the University of Reading and was
Principal Investigator for the AHRC project Languages at War. She has three
areas of research activity. Firstly, she has written on the role and discourse of
women in politics (Women, Europe and the New Languages of Politics, 2002),
and was a participant in the nine-country ‘Media Representation of Women
in European Elections’ project. Secondly, she has worked extensively on
Allied–French relations in the Second World War (War and Liberation in
France: Living with the Liberators, 2004) and is a member of the EURO-
HISMEDIA European network, ‘Médias, guerre et imaginaires en Europe’.
Her articles have appeared in Intelligence and National Security, Journal of
War and Culture Studies and Cold War History. She is on the editorial board
of Journal of War and Culture Studies and is currently an investigator in the
Leverhulme ‘Liberal Way of War’ programme. Over the past ten years she
has been active within fora that promote foreign language study in the UK
and was chair of the University Council of Modern Languages and a trustee
of the Association for Language Learning. She wrote the government report
HE and the National Languages Strategy (2005) and is currently co-convenor
of the Language Alliance.
Peter Hare has worked in English language teacher training and project
management since the 1990s in Hungary, China, Georgia, Mongolia and,
currently, Ethiopia.
Franziska Heimburger is finishing a PhD at the École des Hautes Études en
Sciences Sociales in Paris on languages in the Allied coalition on the Western
front during the First World War. Languages at war in this context provide
access to the functioning of a curiously understudied military coalition, be
that on the level of military operations or in coordination of British units
with French civilian authorities behind the lines. After secondary education
in Germany and an undergraduate degree in Britain, followed by postgradu-
ate work in France, she intends to pursue research in the larger field of his-
tory and languages.
Michael Kelly is Professor of French at the University of Southampton and

a specialist in modern French culture and society and in language policy. His
most recent book is The Cultural and Intellectual Rebuilding of France after the
Second World War (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). He was co-investigator in the
Languages at War project. He is also Director of LLAS Centre for Languages,
Linguistics and Area Studies. He is currently working on the policies and
Notes on Contributors xi
practices relating to languages in war and in peace building in Bosnia-

Herzegovina. He is editor of the European Journal of Language Policy / Revue
européenne de politique linguistique.
Sylvie Kleinman is a historian and translator based in Dublin, whose main

focus of research is the late eighteenth century in France and Ireland. She
is a Research Fellow at the Centre for War Studies, Trinity College Dublin,
where she also lectures in eighteenth-century Irish history. Apart from her
interest in the role of languages and communication in war, she is currently
developing a multi-disciplinary undergraduate course at University College
Dublin which examines cultural depictions of war throughout the long
eighteenth century. Students will explore representations of the soldier as
patriotic hero in popular culture, the martialization of public space and elit-
ist allegories of conflict in dynastic and ideological warfare.
Pekka Kujamäki is Professor of German (Translation and Interpreting) at

the Philosophical Faculty, University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu, where he
teaches translation theory and German–Finnish translation. His publications
include studies on Finnish translation history, translators’ networks and
agencies in Finnish–German cultural/political exchange as well as papers on
experimenting in translation class. He is in charge of the four-year project
‘In Search of Military Translation Cultures: Translation and Interpreting in
World War II in Finland with Specific Reference to Finnish, German and
Russian’, which is funded by the Academy of Finland (2011–14).
Lieutenant Colonel Justin Lewis RE runs the UK Defence Operational

Languages Support Unit (DOLSU) as the languages Training Requirement
Authority for the UK MOD. DOLSU is responsible for articulating military
language needs to guide the delivery of training. DOLSU also sponsors mili-
tary language examinations and recruits volunteers to train and deploy as
operational military linguists.
Diarmait Mac Giolla Chríost is Reader in the School of Welsh, Cardiff

University. A Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society and the Royal
Historical Society, his publications include research monographs on
Language, Identity and Conflict (2003), The Irish Language in Ireland from Goídel
to Globalisation (2005) and Language and the City (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
He has given lectures by invitation at universities in Europe, Northern
America and Australia and has advised national and regional governments
on language policy and planning.
Petra Svoljšak is a research counsellor at the Milko Kos Historical Institute

of the research Centre of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts and
Assistant Professor in the department of Cultural History of the University
of Nova Gorica, where she teaches the history of twentieth-century wars.
She is the author of Soča, sveta reka: Italijanska zasedba slovenskega ozemlja
xii Notes on Contributors
1915–1917 (Soča, the Sacred River: Italian Occupation of the Slovene Territory
1915–1917 (2003) and several articles on the Slovenes and the First World
War, refugee problems during the war, the war’s demographic impact and
First World War memory.
James Taylor is Head of Research and Information at the Imperial War
Museum. He has developed interpretational approaches and developed con-
tent for a number of major IWM exhibitions. These include the Holocaust
Exhibition and the Churchill Museum at the Churchill War Rooms as well
as temporary exhibitions such as T.E. Lawrence: the Life, the Legend (2006)
and Camouflage (2007). He was also Historian for the Their Past Your Future
learning programme. James is now directing the Museum’s team of histori-
ans and researchers planning a new First World War gallery. This will open
to the public in 2014.
Simona Tobia currently teaches Modern European History at the University
of Reading, where she has also contributed to the Languages at War project.
With Hilary Footitt, she is currently preparing the monograph War Talk:
Foreign Languages and the British War Effort in Europe 1940–46, forthcoming
from Palgrave Macmillan. She is also the author of Advertising America: the
United States Information Service in Italy (1945–1956) (2008).
Christopher Tozzi is a PhD candidate in the Department of History at Johns
Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland. His dissertation project, which
has been supported by a Chateaubriand fellowship from the French govern-
ment and an International Dissertation Research Fellowship from the Social
Science Research Council, deals with foreigners and minority groups serving
in the French army and navy under the Old Regime, the Revolution and the
First Empire.
Introduction: Languages and the
Military: Alliances, Occupation
and Peace Building
Hilary Footitt
University of Reading
For those who participate in military campaigns, report on wars, or study

the conduct and cultures of conflict, war is largely a foreign-language-free
zone. The tacit assumption has been that international wars are generally
fought with allies and against enemies who obligingly speak our own lan-
guage. However, a recent Arts and Humanities Research Council project,
Languages at War: Policies and Practices of Language Contacts in Conflict,1
took as its starting-point the centrality of foreign languages in war and pro-
posed that languages should be seen as key to an understanding of armed
conflict – for the military who are fighting, for the civilians who meet the
armies ‘on the ground’ of war and for those academics from a range of dis-
ciplines who engage with the multiple meanings of war and conflict. This
book, Languages and the Military: Alliances, Occupation and Peace Building,
brings together these various constituencies to discuss the role of languages
in military operations, a dialogue which began in the project’s international
conference at the Imperial War Museum, London, in April 2011. The confer-
ence provided a forum in which war studies specialists, historians, cultural
studies analysts, linguists and translation scholars could focus together on
one key theme – the role of languages in war. An integral part of this multi-
disciplinary perspective was the contribution of practitioners – the military
who deploy soldiers in war, the professional interpreters who seek to pro-
tect language intermediaries in conflict zones, the agencies which develop
languages as peacekeeping tools and the war museum curators who tell the
story of war to the general public.
War is tragically a widespread phenomenon, both historically and geo-
graphically. From the eighteenth century, to World Wars I and II; from the
Korean War and the conflicts in Cyprus through to Northern Ireland and
Bosnia-Herzegovina and on to Iraq and Afghanistan today, armed conflict
has marked our histories. The armies involved in these campaigns were sel-
dom solely monolingual, and their activities inevitably brought them into
sharp contact with peoples who spoke different languages from their own.
In the theatres of conflict discussed in this book, languages proved vital to
1
2 Languages and the Military
operational effectiveness, to communication on the ground, to mediation

and to peace building, an integral part of the whole economy of war.
Disclosing what has previously been hidden away and discounted, how-
ever, inevitably raises major analytical problems. To begin with, where
are the sources from which accounts of languages in war can be drawn?
Richard Aldrich memorably urged scholars of intelligence to ‘Grow your
own’ resources (2002: 135), to adopt a lateral and imaginative approach
when challenging the apparent absence of traditional historical documen-
tation, and his advice holds equally good for those who research languages
in war. Some contributors to this volume have found evidence by radically
rereading existing national and diplomatic archives, where the presence of
languages has generally passed unnoticed. Sylvie Kleinman, for example,
rereads eighteenth-century documents in the French administrative, diplo-
matic and military archives in order to discover the role of linguists in the
Franco-Irish campaigns against Britain, whilst Christopher Tozzi finds the
linguistic diversity of the armies of France embedded in ordinances issued
by the military authorities and in the contrôles de troupe for each regiment.
Franziska Heimburger builds up her picture of how a military alliance com-
municates across languages by confronting material in the British National
Archives at Kew with documents from the French Military Archives at
Vincennes. Personal memoirs, contemporary accounts from the period,
and archived testimony sit alongside these official documents of armies at
war. Petra Svoljšak for example contextualizes Italy’s occupation policy in
the Slovenian territories (1915–17) by including the indignant responses of
newspapers like Slovenski narod and Slovenec, and Simona Tobia’s discussion
of how World War II refugees were interrogated in Britain uses first-hand
testimony from those involved (archived in the IWM), as well as detailed
War Office reports from the reception centres.
With more contemporary conflicts, however, archives are often closed
and relevant documents classified. In these cases, contributors have inter-
viewed people closely involved in the particular campaigns – military par-
ticipants, language intermediaries or those who resisted army authorities.
María Manuela Fernández Sánchez for example views US negotiations with
North Korea in 1951 through the experiences of the US Army interpreters,
whilst Catherine Baker recreates British peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina
in the words of those locally-recruited interpreters who worked with the
military from 1995 to 2007; and Diarmait Mac Giolla Chríost interviews
former Irish republican prisoners in order to understand the part played by
the Irish language in the conflict in Northern Ireland.
In a sense, such a necessary eclecticism of sources signals the second
problem in addressing languages at war: what methodological and ana-
lytical frameworks are most appropriate to developing an understanding of
the role of languages in conflict? One particularly useful body of research
comes from translation scholars who have been interested in the role that
Hilary Footitt 3
language intermediaries, interpreters and translators, play in conflict zones

(Apter 2006; M. Baker 2006; Dragovic-Drouet 2007; Inghilleri 2008; Rafael
2007; Salama-Carr 2007; Simon 2005; Stahuljak 2000, 2010). In some of
this scholarship, frameworks common in cultural studies and literary theory
(Bermann and Wood 2005) are adopted in order to enlarge contemporary
concepts of translation in ways which might aid our understanding of the
implications of ‘translating culture in an age of political violence’ (Tymoczko
2009: 179). Stahuljak (2000), for example, has called on frameworks of testi-
mony and witness as a means of understanding the voices of interpreters in
conflict, whilst Baker has drawn on narrative theory to position translators
as participants in the construction of war narratives (M. Baker 2006, 2010).
Others, like Inghilleri, have taken a Bourdieusian perspective, positioning
translators and interpreters within the social and professional contexts of
war (Inghilleri 2005, 2009), or have concentrated more specifically on the
ethnography of the interpreting situation (Blommaert 1999), the social biog-
raphy of those who mediate in what may be a ‘material history of interpret-
ing’ (Cronin 2002: 52). The relevance of this body of scholarship is evident
in many of the contributions in this volume. Thus Pekka Kujamäki’s work
on Northern Finland in World War II examines the fields of practice of trans-
lation and the extent to which Cronin’s distinction between autonomous
and heteronymous translation systems (2002) is applicable to this highly
complex political situation. Simona Tobia contrasts her discoveries on the
interrogation of wartime refugees with studies of contemporary asylum
interviews in the UK (Maryns 2006; Inghilleri 2007), and María Manuela
Fernández Sánchez concludes that American interpreters reflecting on their
habitus in the Korean peace negotiations may help us to understand more
about the nature of interpreting as a profession.
The problematics of interpreting and translating are, however, only one
element in the world portrayed in Languages and the Military. Military opera-
tions, whether invasion, occupation or peace support, tend to be organized
in broad phases: pre-deployment, deployment (itself understood in discrete
operational stages) and post-deployment. Archival documentation – Foreign
Office committees, War Office reports, situation analyses – all follow this
trajectory. Military and civilian participants when interviewed relate natu-
rally to the military phases of operations, placing their narratives within
an overall military timescale, either by accepting the chronology proposed
or positioning their experiences as implicit or explicit resistance to it.
Viewing this military framing as key to approaching the role of languages
in conflict has enabled contributors to engage with some of the conceptual
heterogeneity and messiness of conflict – the competing agencies involved
in pre-deployment preparations and the experiences of different levels of
operational command in distinct phases and geographies of the missions.
Catherine Baker for example sees the development of language provision
in Banja Luka in the late 1990s and early 2000s as closely related to the
changing nature of the British Army’s engagement in this geographical area,

in terms of its mission, organization and corporate experiences.
In this perspective, languages are not separate from military engagement
or concentrated solely in the figure of language intermediaries but rather (to
use Bruno Latour’s formulation) ‘translated’ (Latour 2007) into each stage
and element of war, part of the overall landscape of war, conflict and peace-
keeping. Occupying a country, as Petra Svoljšak argues, involves setting the
terms of an encounter between invaders and local residents, an exchange in
which foreign languages are crucially implicated. Resisting the terms of such
an exchange, as Diarmait Mac Giolla Chríost suggests, can, as in the case of
IRA prisoners, take the form of a linguistic challenge which reinforces the
shared sense of a community at war. In the aftermath of ‘hot war’, teaching
a particular language can be positioned as a means of resolving conflict, as
in the ‘Peacekeeping English’ Project described by Peter Hare and Nicholas
Fletcher, or can be seen as a contribution to greater intercommunal under-
standing, as in Constadina Charalambous’ work on Cyprus.
At the root of this holistic approach to languages in war is the expectation
that any war will create its own particular languages landscape, produced
by all participants in the conflict, whether such groups talk overtly about
military language policy, as in the case of Lieutenant Colonel Justin Lewis,
or whether languages become subsumed in the multiple activities of war.
In this scenario, interpreters/translators are one element in an overall lin-
guistic landscape which has been produced by war. They are not only lan-
guage intermediaries, placed, as Linda Fitchett argues, in highly dangerous
physical situations, but also key transmitters of the surrounding languages
environment, in some senses the embodiment of those disruptions which
war and conflict typically engender in their societies.
This framework of a languages landscape of war assumes from the outset
that there is no such thing as a typical war, that conflict is radically con-
text-dependent. War brings together a range of variables: the purpose and
focus of the mission, the constitution of the military forces, the modes of
encounter with civilians and the composition and attitudes of the local
people. What tasks, for example, have the military been given in any
conflict? Are they intended to occupy a country, liberate an area, pacify a
region, make peace between warring groups or build a long-term and stable
peace? Is their deployment expected to be short-term or extensive? Are the
armies drawn from one nationality or several? Have they been deployed as
a national force, or are they organized with others, either in a loose coali-
tion of foreign partners or in a tighter treaty organization? On the ground,
do they seek to have direct relations with foreign civilians through their
own personnel or do they delegate some of these encounters to third-party
nationals, either recruited on the ground or brought in by a civilian agency?
How do local attitudes towards the military differ according to the particular
groups involved, and how do these attitudes change over time, mirroring
Hilary Footitt 5
the behaviour of the armies concerned and/or the evolution of the conflict
itself? Assuming the contextuality of languages in war in this way underlies
all the contributions to this volume.
Languages and the Military: Alliances, Occupation and Peace Building brings
together detailed case studies of languages in war, ranging temporally from
the eighteenth century until today, and geographically among Ireland,
Britain, France, Eastern Finland, Slovenia, Korea, Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Cyprus. Each case study is grounded in empirical evidence and seeks
to adopt what Chris Rundle and Kate Sturge term an ‘outward-looking
approach to translation history’ (Rundle and Sturge 2010: 3), broadly
engaging with the relevant historiography and seeking to contribute a dis-
tinctively languages dimension to future discussions of each conflict. The
case studies are grouped around three principal organizing themes: the role
of languages in military alliances, the part played by languages in ‘occupy-
ing the ground of war’ and the ways in which languages contribute to the
aftermath of conflict. In each theme, at least one writer from the practi-
tioner community provides a description of their own agency’s concerns
on the subject – from the viewpoints of the UK Ministry of Defence, the
International Association of Conference Interpreters, the British Council
and the Imperial War Museum.
The chapters address a number of key questions about the place of lan-
guages in military dispositions, their role in military/civilian encounters
on the ground of war and the part they play in the post-conflict period.
The monolithic monolingualism of armies in war has, as Ardis Butterfield
(2009) contends in relation to the Hundred Years’ War, been something of
a given among historians and war studies specialists. The implicit assump-
tion, in what Tarak Barkawi (2006) rightly sees as a markedly ethnocentric
approach to war scholarship, has been that military action is nearly always
undertaken in the language of the dominant force or at least in that of the
observing commentator or academic. The first section of the volume chal-
lenges this assumption in four contrasting case studies which seek not only
to reveal the presence of foreign languages in the armies of war but also to
pose questions about the ways in which cultural hybridity is welcomed,
managed and integrated as armies prepare for and fight wars. In practice,
linguistic military alliances, these chapters argue, come in many different
shapes and forms.
For Christopher Tozzi, the military alliance is the coalition of foreigners
who served in the French army of the eighteenth century, from the Ancien
Régime and on to the Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire. He argues that
the ways in which this military hybridity was contained in each distinct
period were conditioned by contemporary conceptualizations of the nation
and of the relevant political regime. When linguistic and cultural uniform-
ity were of relatively minor importance in defining the nation, during the
Ancien Régime, the state recognized and explicitly addressed the linguistic
diversity of its army. During the Revolution, however, the Jacobin anxiety
to see the nation as a linguistically homogeneous entity and the general
suspicion generated towards foreigners at this time, rendered efforts to
manage linguistic diversity in the army extremely difficult. In comparison,
the transfer of legitimacy under Napoleon Bonaparte to notions of military
success and personal loyalty to the sovereign made it possible for the mili-
tary authorities to recognize and seek to accommodate the presence of dif-
ferent foreign languages within their armed forces. The official acceptance
and encouragement of hybridity and multilingualism in an army is closely
related to the state’s understanding of its identity and of the bases of its
legitimacy.
Sylvie Kleinman turns our attention away from the authorities and their
management of language diversity to focus on the actual experiences
of foreigners employed in the French army of the period, in particular
Irishmen who served during the joint Franco-Irish campaigns against Britain
(1792–1804). The biographies of these civilian and military interpreters,
who espoused the ideology of Revolutionary France as a means of achiev-
ing Irish independence, demonstrate forcibly how the roles of soldier and
linguist were in practice merged when some of the key tasks of warfare had
to be undertaken: providing information, interrogating prisoners, dealing
with civilians, diffusing propaganda. Kleinman’s Irish bilinguals took on the
persona of the foreign soldiers with whom they fought but also used their
linguistic competence to carve out a space in which they could also distance
themselves from their adopted army. The wavering border between belong-
ing and not belonging for foreign members of the military inevitably passes
through the conflicted zone of language transfer.
Franziska Heimburger’s alliance is the bringing together of two national
armies (the British and the French) in the Allied coalition of World War I.
Heimburger looks at how preparations to communicate with the foreign ally
were strongly influenced by the two countries’ distinct experiences of the
role of languages in nineteenth-century colonial warfare. These experiences,
she argues, were translated into very different organizational structures
and resulted in markedly different approaches to valuing the work of those
involved. The systems we establish to communicate between allied military
forces owe a great deal to the corporate memories of our armies and to the
language structures they have inherited to deal with enemies and allies.
Lieutenant Colonel Justin Lewis, head of the UK Defence Operational
Languages Support Unit, brings discussions up to the present day by exam-
ining how a contemporary armed force prepares its languages capability in
relation to the multiple challenges and varying alliances it may face, par-
ticularly at a time when non-kinetic warfare, winning the hearts and minds
of local populations, is seen to be increasingly important. Lewis argues that
the inter-services model seeks to provide a military capability which is both
responsive and cost-effective, based on a mixture of military linguists and
Hilary Footitt 7
civilians either directly employed by the Army or recruited via third party
agencies. The different representations of the professions of military and
civilian linguist – one a facilitator for army objectives, the other potentially
a neutral mediator between opposing parties – leads naturally into the sec-
ond organizing theme of the book, the part played by languages in encoun-
ters on the ground of war.
Whatever the purposes of foreign troops entering a country, they effec-
tively occupy its space, imposing their own geography on what is to them a
deeply unfamiliar territory. Formal and informal practices of naming space
are of course ubiquitous, exerting what Pratt has described as ‘the power
of naming’ (Pratt 1992: 33). In this process, a perception easily develops
that naming a space amounts to the same as possessing it, so that once
the space is already in one’s possession there is little need to strive towards
understanding. The contributions in the second section of this book exam-
ine the role of languages in these power relationships of occupation. Petra
Svoljšak explores the way in which languages can be a fundamental political
tool in the hands of an occupying military force. The Italian Army based
in the Slovenian territories between 1915 and 1917 employed languages,
she argues, as the basic instrument of their occupation regime, Italianizing
Slovenian place names or adjusting them to Italian orthography. The previ-
ous school system was uprooted and replaced with an Italian one, based
on the Italian language and school curriculum, with the Slovene language
removed from public space and ghettoized in churches and private homes.
This linguistic occupation paved the way for the subsequent annexation of
Slovenian territories into the Italian state.
If the borders between occupiers and occupied were clearly delineated
in the Slovenian case, the example of occupation which Pekka Kujamäki
studies is one in which these frontiers are a good deal more permeable. In
World War II Finland, a Finnish–German zone was created in the north of
the country in which the German military occupied the territory but civil-
ian administration remained in Finnish hands. The German army presence
in Lapland constructed an apparently independent military society but one
which in fact required the linguistic cooperation and mediation of others
in order to operate successfully. Kujamäki argues that the particular circum-
stances of this German occupation problematized easy definitions of ‘them’
and ‘us’, a fact exemplified in what he terms the ‘fragmented profiles’ of
those who mediated across and within the lines drawn by occupation and
collaboration.
Catherine Baker continues this theme of the blurring of loyalties and
identities produced by foreign occupation by looking at the effect which the
British presence in Bosnia had upon those who worked with the military as
language mediators between 1995 and 2007. She traces a developing set of
relationships from an early phase of improvisation and adaptation through
to a more settled, but often locally distrusted, employment with NATO
forces. After the gradual drawdown of foreign troops, she suggests, Bosnian
interpreters were left with a cultural capital which, whilst personally satisfy-
ing, could not easily be redeemed in the contemporary employment mar-
ket. The military creation of a kind of Commonwealth enclave in Bosnia
produced a lasting affinity with elements of Britishness among many of the
language intermediaries who worked with the army.
Occupying territory is also ensuring that one’s own country’s national
concerns continue to be protected and enhanced within the disputed space
of international relations. María Manuela Fernández Sánchez looks at the
role of language mediation in the fraught negotiations ending the Korean
War in 1951. The framing Cold War metaphor of ‘containment’, she sug-
gests, structured the peace talks as a continuation of war, with language
mediation positioned as an integral part of the continuing hostilities.
Gaining ground in the negotiations was intimately connected to a linguistic
war of words passing through the often traumatized figures of interpreters
and translators.
With the papers by Simona Tobia and Diarmait Mac Giolla Chríost, con-
flict is played out in a much tighter interior space: a one-to-one interroga-
tion or the inside of a prison cell. Tobia turns our attention towards the ways
in which a country protects the occupation of its own space against incur-
sions from perceived external threats. The influx of refugees during World
War II led the British to set up a complex military system of security vetting
and intelligence sifting. For those caught up in the conflict as victims of war,
she suggests, the first contacts with British authorities were primarily lan-
guage encounters, interviews with local officials, extensively recorded by the
military, with information obtained cross-checked to establish its credibility.
Entering into this occupied space of safety was via an exchange of words in
the foreign language, in conversations normally conducted by linguistically
capable intelligence officers.
In the case of Irish republican prisoners during the Northern Ireland con-
flict, language operated not as a means of entering a potentially prohibited
space but rather as a way of constructing and occupying a new space of
resistance. Mac Giolla Chríost describes the situation of IRA prisoners who
carved out a community space inside their prison walls through the learn-
ing and use of Irish Gaelic. Irish language classes in the early 1970s began
to mark out what the prisoners termed their resistance space, the ‘Jailtacht’
(a play on ‘Gaeltacht’, the official Irish-speaking parts of the Republic), with
the Irish language itself becoming a means of resistance in this part of the
prison system.
If IRA prisoners in Long Kesh were deliberately eschewing language contact
with their captors, many of the case studies in this section suggest that mili-
tary occupation and defence of space relies to some extent at least on find-
ing suitable language intermediaries. Linda Fitchett, from the International
Association of Conference Interpreters (AIIC), brings the discussion up to
Hilary Footitt 9
date by examining the Allied presence in Iraq and Afghanistan and the
effect that these operations have had on the lives of interpreters and trans-
lators recruited to work with the military. The official invisibility of these
men and women, with no central registry of interpreter deaths and a relative
failure to protect and respect them as professionals in their own right, has
much to do, she argues, with continuing suspicions of the hybrid identity
of language mediators and their potential untrustworthiness in war. AIIC’s
project on ‘Interpreters in Conflict Areas’ aims to place basic responsibilities
for the care and protection of interpreters on the shoulders of the military
forces that employ them.
In the last section of the book, contributors address questions relating to
the aftermath of war and conflict. In the late twentieth century, there has
been a much more systematic interrogation of the terms ‘war’ and ‘peace’
and of any apparently sharp disjuncture between the two time frames – when
exactly does war end and peace begin? Rather than seeking to locate an arti-
ficial caesura between war and peace, these chapters start from the assump-
tion that conflict and peace are often on a continuum, with one feeding into
and repositioning the other. Constadina Charalambous’ account focuses on
the current absence of ‘hot war’ between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots
and the attempts to exploit this lull in hostilities through language learning
initiatives aimed at developing intercultural understanding between the two
groups. Her study of the teaching of the Turkish language in Greek Cypriot
schools suggests that the symbolic value attached to the two languages in
Cyprus continues to create hegemonic educational discourses which provide
relatively little space for positive representations of ‘the other’.
One approach on the conflict/peace continuum has been to promote
effective communication through the improved use of a third language,
foreign to many of the parties involved. Peter Hare and Nicholas Fletcher
discuss the ways in which a language teaching project, the British Council’s
‘Peacekeeping English’, has operated in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Mongolia
and Ukraine. The British Council’s aim has been to produce a self-sustaining
English language capacity which can be owned by each country concerned.
‘Peacekeeping English’ has been particularly effective, Hare and Fletcher
argue, in supporting defence force interoperability in multi-national peace-
keeping missions, and in UN and OSCE (Organization of Security and
Cooperation in Europe) initiatives.
The last two contributions raise the question of the continuance of war
and peace through their specifically language memories. Louise Askew
explores the fate of languages after the international peacekeepers have
nearly all left Bosnia-Herzegovina. Since the early 1990s, the language of
Serbo-Croat has completely disappeared from the area. Instead, the official
languages of the post-war state are now Bosnian, Croatian or Serbian, and
these constitute potent ethnic indicators of identity. Askew argues, however,
that beneath this peace settlement of distinct languages there remains a sub
stratum of Serbo-Croat, a language memory of the past particularly audible

in discussions with those Bosnian interpreters and translators who were
called upon to bridge the new languages’ divide.
The role of foreign languages in our corporate peacetime memories of
war is discussed in James Taylor’s forward-looking contribution. As Head of
Research and Information at the UK’s premier war museum (the Imperial
War Museum), Taylor traces the recent history of the Museum and the
changing relationship that it has had with the ‘foreign’ in war. He argues
that a significant proportion of the IWM’s collections in fact rely upon a for-
eign language for their full meaning but that this ‘international’ context of
conflict is still to be fully exploited in the displays and exhibitions. Making
the foreignness of war clearly visible to the visiting public, Taylor suggests,
may destabilize inherited Anglocentric interpretations of history and pro-
mote the sort of dialogue, exchange and confrontation which will stimulate
new perspectives and discussions.
Languages and the Military: Alliances, Occupation and Peace Building aims to
place foreign languages at the centre of our discussions on war and conflict,
using detailed empirical evidence and bringing together the comments of aca-
demics and practitioners. The contributions in this volume, taken as a whole,
argue that an understanding of the role played by foreign languages in war
may serve to further problematize some of the key frameworks often given to
military deployments. Alliances, these chapters suggest, can be found inside
our national armies as much as outside, within formal Allied coalitions. An
army which operates today needs foreign language supporters as much as
the Franco-Irish contingents required Anglophone speakers in the eighteenth
century. The occupation of territory by military forces, our contributors sug-
gest, has a micro as well as a macro dimension – the blurring of language
identities on the ground, the creation of one-to-one language encounters
and the linguistic defence of space should all be seen alongside the broader
language policies for occupation and colonization. In the so-called aftermath
of war, the continuum between conflict and peace is as visible in the language
traces and memories it leaves behind as in the transformation of our military
forces from fighting soldiers to conciliators and peace builders.
Note
1. See http://www.reading.ac.uk/languages-at-war.
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1
One Army, Many Languages:
Foreign Troops and Linguistic
Diversity in the Eighteenth-Century
French Military
Christopher Tozzi
Johns Hopkins University
Napoleon Bonaparte reportedly once declared of the Alsatian soldiers serv-

ing in his army, ‘Let them speak German as long as they wield their swords
in French’ (Maugué 1970: 146). This statement, though perhaps apocry-
phal, alluded both to the linguistic diversity among French troops during
Napoleon’s lifetime and to his toleration of such heterogeneity so long as it
did not interfere with military operations. Yet Napoleon’s attitudes on the
topic of linguistic diversity in the army were far from representative of those
of other French regimes during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centu-
ries. In an era of considerable political tumult in France, policies on the lan-
guages spoken by soldiers as well as the strategies intended to bridge language
barriers among troops varied widely, reflecting the broader agenda of the
state and the changing notions of political legitimacy which underlay it.
Nowhere were these shifting approaches to language in the military
more apparent than in the experiences of the thousands of foreigners who
served in the French army under the Old Regime, the Revolution and the
Napoleonic Empire. These foreign soldiers in French service provide an
excellent opportunity for studying the difficulties that can arise from lin-
guistic diversity within a military context, the different approaches which
commanders and governments might adopt to address such issues and the
broader political and ideological factors which condition heterogeneity of
language among soldiers.
The Old Regime
In large part, it was the soldiers of Louis XIV who, through their successful
military campaigns, facilitated the emergence of French by the turn of the
eighteenth century as the lingua franca of European elites. Without the feats
of arms that royal troops performed for the Sun King, it is doubtful that
12
Christopher Tozzi 13
French would have become the language of diplomats, scholars and aris-
tocrats throughout the continent, which it remained until the nineteenth
century (Blanning 2007: 434–7). Yet ironically, many of Louis XIV’s own
soldiers, like those of his successors, spoke French with difficulty or not at
all. Bourbon monarchs enjoyed great success exporting their language and
culture abroad, but France itself, including its military, remained the centre
of remarkable diversity in these areas until the Revolution of 1789.
Almost all recruits for the French army, whether they were born in France
or beyond its borders, contributed to the heterogeneity of language within
the military ranks. Inside France, the lack of standardization of French
itself and the persistence until the Revolution of localized patois dialects
among the peasants who comprised the bulk of the French army’s recruits,
ensured that large numbers of the king’s native subjects spoke idioms which
diverged substantially from Parisian French. At the same time, considerable
portions of the French population living on the periphery of the kingdom
spoke foreign languages which had little in common with French, includ-
ing German in the eastern provinces, Italian and Catalonian dialects in the
south, Flemish in the northeast and Breton in Brittany. This plurality of
languages and dialects within France, a topic which several scholars have
studied at length, suggests that the French regiments of the royal army were
a space of considerable linguistic diversity (Brunot 1905–38; Cohen 2000).
The divergent idioms spoken by the king’s subjects, however, were often
mutually intelligible enough to permit effective communication between
individuals from different provinces; in addition, as David Bell has shown,
the growth of the royal bureaucracy and press, as well as the orientation
of local elites toward the royal court and Paris rather than regional centres
of power, contributed over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries to the ability of steadily increasing numbers of the inhabitants of
the kingdom to understand Parisian French (Bell 2001: 171–2). As a result,
linguistic difficulties among French subjects serving in the army were rarely
a concern of military officials under the Old Regime.
Such was not the case for the thousands of foreigners enlisted in the
French army, whose linguistic deviance was more pronounced. In 1789,
thirty-two of the French army’s 168 regular regiments, including eight
cavalry corps and twenty-four infantry regiments, were designated as for-
eign (Rapport 2000: 49). Together, these units nominally represented five
different nationalities, with the foreign cavalry comprising two German
regiments and six Hungarian hussar units, and the infantry counting twelve
Swiss regiments, eight German, three Irish and one Liégeois. In addition,
two other foreign infantry units, the Swiss Guards regiment and the com-
pany of the Hundred Swiss, comprised part of the military reserve of the
royal household, destined to protect the king and his family (Fieffé 1854:
393–420). Two Italian infantry regiments had existed as well until 1788,
when they were converted into light-infantry battalions which no longer
recruited foreigners but retained the Italians who had enlisted prior to the
reorganization.1
Moreover, while the five (or six, with the Italian units included) nation-
alities which the foreign regiments nominally represented brought to the
military a great deal of national and linguistic diversity on their own, in
practice the heterogeneity of the foreign contingent of the army extended
even further. This was particularly true by the second half of the eighteenth
century, when the drying-up of traditional pools of foreign recruits left
officers of the foreign units increasingly eager to enlist any willing man
they could find, regardless of his nationality. As a result, the Irish regiments
by the final decades of the Old Regime counted within their ranks not
only natives of the British Isles but also many Dutch, Belgian and German
soldiers, as well as some French subjects. Similarly, the German regiments
recruited Poles, Swedes and Hungarians, among other nationalities, and
the Hungarian cavalry regiments by the later eighteenth century were com-
prised largely of German-speaking French subjects, although the Hungarian
language survived within the units (Fieffé 1854: 279). The Swiss, Italian and
Liégeois regiments were generally more homogeneous in composition, but
nonetheless occasionally included men born in diverse regions of Europe.
Meanwhile, small numbers of non-Europeans trickled into the recruitment
depots of some of the foreign regiments throughout the eighteenth century,
with natives of such distant regions as sub-Saharan Africa, New York,
Pennsylvania and even the Mughal Empire occasionally appearing on the
rosters of these units.2 Thus the soldiers comprising the foreign regiments
represented an immensely extensive array of nationalities and linguistic
groups blended together within the French army.
Politically and ideologically, such linguistic diversity was of little concern
to French monarchs, who beginning in the sixteenth century had replaced
Latin with Parisian French as the official language of state bureaucracy but
cared little which tongues their ordinary subjects spoke (Bell 2001: 171).
Within the army, however, the failure of personnel to understand orders
effectively in whichever language they were given could prove deadly.
Aware of this challenge, Old Regime military authorities pursued various
strategies for ensuring that officers and soldiers in the foreign regiments
could communicate both with French speakers outside their units and with
one another. These solutions traditionally centred on the employment of
polyglot personnel. Some of the foreign corps, beginning with the Hundred
Swiss in 1626, maintained special ranks for interpreters who were fluent
in both French and the national language of the group with which their
regiment was nominally associated (Discours sommaire 1676: 16). A royal
ordinance of 7 April 1773, which required all foreign regiments to employ
an interpreter, made this practice universal (Malaguti 1892: 92). At the same
time, multilingual commanders helped ensure smooth communication
within the foreign regiments; foreign-born generals such as Ulrich Frédéric
Woldemar, Count of Lowendal, who spoke Latin, Danish, German, English,

Italian, Russian and French, went a long way toward bridging language bar-
riers within the army (Bois 2009). In addition, the Crown worked to attract
to the foreign regiments French natives who were fluent in foreign lan-
guages, going so far as to grant them special exemptions from prohibitions
against the recruitment of French subjects for the foreign corps.3
These ad hoc strategies for dealing with linguistic diversity in the army by
employing interpreters as needed and counting on officers to be fluent in
the languages of the men they commanded remained the chief solution to
the problem for most of the Old Regime period. Toward the middle of the
eighteenth century, however, an initiative aimed at regulating the languages
spoken within the French army as a whole added a new imperative to lan-
guage policy within the foreign regiments. On 6 May 1755, Louis XV issued
a decree establishing an official list of standardized military commands
which all officers of French-speaking regiments were to adopt, in order to
improve the interchangeability of detachments from different units within
the army.4 Although the royal ordinance itself concerned only commands
issued in French and made no mention of those of the foreign regiments,
officers within those units produced their own official translations into
German, Italian and English of the French military instructions shortly after
the decree appeared.5
While officers within the foreign regiments experienced little difficulty
producing lists of official commands in different languages, convincing
their superiors and comrades to agree upon their translations proved more
problematic than many translators appear to have anticipated. It is at this
juncture that the inherent difficulties of regulating commands within a
multilingual military during the eighteenth century become clear. For one,
French military authorities were suspicious of many of the translations and
questioned their accuracy. Such concerns stemmed in many cases from a
total lack of familiarity on the part of military administrators with the for-
eign languages in question, an ignorance underlined by reprimands such
as the following, addressed to the officer who had produced the English
translations: ‘The word your appears to be employed indifferently in place
of le la vostre [and] vos, and the is used to translate both le and la’.6 Similarly,
a French official complained that the German article die appeared variously
in the German translation before both singular and plural nouns, which
to the administrator seemed impossible because all noun markers should
have been unambiguous with regard to number, as they were in French.7
Examples such as these highlight the fundamental lack of multilingual com-
petence among many French military authorities, which contributed to the
difficulties involved in administering the foreign regiments.
At the same time, several of the individuals involved in the translation
project of 1755 recognized the inherent ambiguity of language itself as a
limitation which would render their work imperfect. The soldier behind the
English translations declared to his superiors that he had taken every effort
to ensure that his work would be understood by as many English-speaking
troops as possible, but cautioned nonetheless that ‘a single thing can be
translated from one language into another in any number of different fash-
ions, according to the particular expressions of different individuals. An
officer commanding several detachments will therefore be understood per-
fectly only by his own troops.’8 Along similar lines, Settiers, the Swiss officer
who produced the German translation of the commands for use within the
Swiss regiments, suggested that some of his work might be adapted for the
German regiments as well, but cautioned: ‘I think it would be inappropriate
to subject them to the same terms because some of their words are different,
as are ours.’9
Finally, the fact that the native tongues of soldiers in the foreign regi-
ments, particularly during the decades preceding the Revolution, corre-
sponded only loosely with the nominal national designations of the units
calls into question the effectiveness of the entire translation initiative. Even
if all officers within the Irish regiments had adopted a standardized set
of commands in English, for example, their usefulness for the numerous
speakers of Walloon and Dutch serving under them (to say nothing of Irish
recruits whose native language was not English but Gaelic) would almost
certainly have been limited (O’Callaghan 1870: 161–2). Conditions may
have been better in the somewhat more nationally homogeneous German
and Swiss regiments, but even in those units communication remained
a problem. The Duke of Bouillon, colonel of the German regiment of his
name, addressed a memorandum to the Minister of War in 1789 observing
that, as a result of the unit’s recruitment of many officers and soldiers from
Flanders, the regiment’s personnel ‘speak the German language very poorly’.
He unsuccessfully lobbied the War Ministry to replace German with French
as the official language of command of the regiment.10
The revolutionary decade
Whereas linguistic diversity in the army of the Old Regime troubled authori-
ties only insofar as it mitigated military efficiency, the French Revolution
transformed language into an issue of political and ideological import (Bell
2001: 171–95). As the French revolutionaries constructed a new model of
the nation defined, in part, by a common language and culture, the pres-
ence of foreign languages in the army, like foreign soldiers themselves,
became incompatible with the self-presentation that the French state sought
to cultivate.
For the foreigners enlisted in the French army, lack of linguistic conform-
ity helped to fuel charges of disloyalty to the Revolution and the nation. For
example, the Prussian Colonel Dambach, who commanded the Germanic
Legion, an auxiliary unit of the French army raised in September 1792 to
recruit German speakers sympathetic with the Revolution, was denounced

before the National Convention in 1793 on charges that he spoke ‘not a
single word of the French language and has an immutable hatred for every-
thing French’ (Archives parlementaires 1903: 70). In a similar vein, the author
of a play produced in the wake of the overthrow of the monarchy on 10
August 1792 depicted soldiers of the Swiss Guards regiment, who had infa-
mously shed buckets of blood on that date defending the Tuileries palace
against a mob bent on attacking the royal family, as incompetent brutes
barely capable of communicating in French (‘La Grillade’ 1792). Vilified
Swiss soldiers in the piece spoke lines such as the following:
L’y être pas de mon faute, monsir le tiable, si j’être mort en tuant les autres;
on m’avoir tonné depuis long-temps pour boire et al mes camérates, pour
tirer sur la nation quand on nous le dire . . . aujorthui on dire feu, nous
obéir . . . on nous avoir dit: vous embrasser auparavant, tirer après.
It is impossible to transliterate perfectly the grammatical errors of the French

passage into English, but a rough attempt might read:
It be not my fault, mister devil, if I been killed while killing others; some-
body have given me a drink, my comrades too, and [told us] to fire upon
the people when we are told. Today someday say fire, we obey . . . they
tell us: ‘hug the people first, shoot them afterwards’.
In contrast, other characters in the play communicated in perfect French.

Indeed, the only Swiss soldier speaking in valid French declared himself
to be of mixed nationality, son of a Swiss citizen and a French woman,
and, in eloquent verses, expressed profound remorse for the actions of his
comrades:
Fils d’un Suisse et d’une Marseilloise, je suis né Français: je ne suis que

plus criminel d’avoir trahi ma patrie; mais l’apât de l’or ce métal qui
séduit les hommes, m’a ébloui, sans cependant étouffer les remords
qui s’entassèrent dans mon ame, dès le moment où je me laissai gagner
par mes officiers corrumpus. Nous avons été les fatals instrumens dont la
cour s’est servie pour répandre le sang français.
This text, which is free of grammatical errors apart from a minor spelling
mistake, means in English:
Son of a Swiss man and a woman from Marseilles, I was born French;
thus I am especially guilty for having betrayed my country. The lure of
gold, the metal that seduces men, blinded me, but it did not smother
the remorse lodged in my heart from the moment I allowed myself to be
bought by my corrupt officers. We became the deadly instruments that

the royal court used to spill French blood.
By associating the Swiss Guards’ lack of competence in the French language

with their role in the bloodshed of the day of 10 August, this play pointed
to linguistic diversity within the army as a political danger to the nation.
Similar texts, such as a satirical dialogue between two women, a French
volunteer and a Swiss soldier, had the same effect (‘La Mère Duchesne’).
Suspicions of the loyalty of Swiss soldiers contributed to the Legislative
Assembly’s decree of 20 August 1792, which, published in French, German
and Italian, disbanded the Swiss regiments definitively.11 The National
Assembly had already reorganized the other foreign regiments in 1791 into
units free of any foreign designation, with the result that, by the autumn
of 1792, official policy was to regard all regular units of the army as purely
French.12
In practice, however, the army remained far from homogeneous after that
date in either national or linguistic composition. While the formerly foreign
regiments were officially permitted to recruit only French subjects in the
wake of their reorganization, they continued in many instances to enlist
foreigners as well. In addition, most of the foreign soldiers who had been in
service before the reorganization of 1791 remained in their regiments, and
many of the Swiss soldiers discharged in August 1792 simply re-enlisted in
other corps. At the same time, a number of ‘legions’ levied to recruit specific
groups of foreigners sympathetic to the Revolution were raised as auxiliary
units in 1792 and 1793. Even the revolutionary army’s volunteer battalions,
ostensibly comprised of patriotic French citizens, in some cases counted
large proportions of their personnel as foreign.13 Thus, despite the govern-
ment’s intentions, foreigners and foreign languages retained a significant
presence within the army even after they had theoretically been purged.
Revolutionary political and military leaders, however, disregarded this fact
and failed to undertake pragmatic initiatives to address the problems associ-
ated with linguistic diversity among the troops. This policy made matters
of command and administration more difficult, an issue illustrated by the
decree of 27 Pluviôse Year II (2 February 1794). The law, which mandated
that all officers in the army with the rank of corporal or higher be liter-
ate, was intended to ensure the efficient administration of military units.14
Following the publication of this decree, most of the officers in the second
battalion of the 53rd Regiment, a unit which had formerly been designated
as German and which spent most of the Revolution stationed in the South
American colony of Guyana, learned to read and write, skills which most of
them had not previously possessed.15 The language in which they became
literate, however, was German, not French, and as late as 1798, only fifteen
of ninety-two officers in the battalion exhibited any ability to read or write
in the latter tongue. Of these fifteen officers, moreover, the most competent
was far from fluent in French, able only to ‘write some words’ in that lan-
guage. Other units of the army displayed similar linguistic deficiencies,
with fifteen of twenty-six officers in the first battalion of the 53rd Regiment
(which was not deployed overseas) and seven of forty in the first battalion
of the 98th literate only in German in 1794.16 Nonetheless, these men were
allowed to retain their ranks because the decree regarding literacy in the mil-
itary had not specified in which language the skills were required, since the
legislators behind the law had rested their designs on the false assumption
that there were no more foreigners in the military. Such oversight posed a
variety of difficulties for officers in regiments which retained large numbers
of foreign personnel, as a lack of reading and writing skills in French left
them unable to fulfill administrative tasks adequately.17
Beyond creating problems for the administration of troops, language
barriers that officials in the army or government failed to address dur-
ing the revolutionary era contributed to insubordination and indiscipline
within military units, according to contemporary accounts. An officer of
the Germanic Legion named Schwartz charged the National Convention
in 1793 with having sabotaged the corps by mixing French speakers into
its ranks, preventing the unit’s German-born officers from communicat-
ing effectively with their troops.18 Similarly, a reviewer of the 2nd Foreign
Battalion, another auxiliary unit, warned in 1805 that, although the corps
contained many ‘educated and distinguished officers, several do not speak
the language’ of the soldiers, preventing the maintenance of good order
within the ranks.19
The Napoleonic Empire
The fall of the Jacobin regime in 1794, followed by Napoleon Bonaparte’s

rise to power in 1799, transformed the French political landscape and
brought to an end many of the military policies of the revolutionary dec-
ade. One consequence of these changes was the official re-establishment of
foreign regiments and other foreign units of the French army. The forces of
the First Empire comprised vast contingents both of foreign troops enlisted
directly in the French military, as well as allied forces serving under French
generals, to the extent that only 52.5 per cent of the soldiers of the Grande
Armée in 1812 were French (Brun 2009). Indeed, Napoleon’s dependence on
soldiers who did not speak French was such that in April 1815, as he raced to
raise a new army in the wake of his return from Elba, he circulated a decree
along the French frontier calling on former soldiers to re-enlist, ordering
15,000 copies printed in German, 5000 in Italian and 4000 in Dutch but
only 6000 in French.20
In his strategy for accommodating the linguistic diversity of his armies,
Napoleon revived the ad hoc solutions of the Old Regime, relying on bilin-
gual officers to command foreign troops. Polyglot talents thus became
an important asset for personnel seeking promotion in a military which

counted among its ranks such large numbers of men who could not speak
French. A French soldier named Chesnard was recommended for the posi-
tion of adjutant-major in the 1st Foreign Regiment in 1809, for example,
because he had served previously in Germany and spoke German fluently.21
Another French subject called Bougel became a sous-lieutenant in the
same regiment because he had ‘completed his studies in Strasbourg, where
he learned at the same time to speak and write with ease in German’.22
Few officers, however, could match the linguistic skills of the lieutenants
Ferdinand Matt and Roldanus, both of the 7th Regiment, who spoke French,
Dutch, Italian, German and Latin and French, Dutch, German, Latin and
Greek respectively.23
Besides enjoying advantages when seeking promotion, troops with for-
eign language skills during the post-Jacobin era represented a particular asset
to the French army as it waged campaigns on an unprecedented geographi-
cal scale across Europe. Although he spoke no French, the American William
Tate, who had fled to France after unsuccessfully attempting to levy a legion
of Americans for the French army in South Carolina, received command
of a small army which invaded Britain in 1797 partially because military
planners deemed his knowledge of English crucial to the expedition ( Jones
1950: 54–5, 57). Similarly, the landing of British troops in Holland prompted
French generals to transfer to that region Irish soldiers serving in the French
army in the hope that their ability to communicate with Irish troops fight-
ing on the British side might prove useful.24
Perhaps more unique for their language skills than American and Irish
soldiers were the men of the Maltese Legion, formed by Napoleon during
his conquest of Malta on the way to the Middle East in 1798. A French gen-
eral in 1801 recommended that the legion’s personnel be deployed to serve
as guides for French troops in Egypt because ‘all of the men of whom it is
composed speak the Arabic language perfectly’.25 The general perhaps over-
sold the ability of the Maltese troops to communicate with Egyptians, since
Maltese, although a Semitic language which originated during the Arabic
colonization of Malta in the Middle Ages, had been heavily influenced dur-
ing the early-modern period by Sicilian and Italian (Brincat 2004: 213–24).
Nonetheless, the importance assigned to these troops because of their per-
ceived linguistic talents is clear.
The Napoleonic army’s need for troops fluent in languages as exotic as
Arabic was unprecedented in its time. Yet the significance of linguistic
diversity within the French military remained a constant throughout the
early modern period, from the origins of the professional army in the sev-
enteenth century through the unravelling of the Napoleonic Empire in the
nineteenth.
Also persistent throughout this period was the centrality of different con-
ceptualizations of the nation and the various self-presentations cultivated
by changing political regimes in shaping policies on the languages spoken

by France’s soldiers, particularly those of foreign origin. Under the Old
Regime, when linguistic and cultural uniformity played relatively minor
roles in defining the nation and underpinning the political legitimacy of
the absolute monarch, the state recognized and addressed at an official
level the fact of language barriers among its troops. The effectiveness of the
different efforts directed toward this end varied and was often restricted
by authorities’ failure to understand fully the makeup of the army and the
functioning of language translation itself, but the presence of consistent
policies designed to deal with linguistic diversity at least mitigated many of
the problems that stemmed from it.
For the first half of the 1790s, however, the Jacobin fixation with view-
ing the nation as a linguistically homogeneous entity, combined with gen-
eral suspicion of foreigners serving in the army, rendered comprehensive
endeavors to address linguistic diversity within the military impossible. The
effectiveness of the revolutionary army suffered as a result. It was not until
the political triumph of Napoleon Bonaparte, who fixed his legitimacy on
military campaigns, the maintenance of order and personal loyalty to the
sovereign rather than the autonomous will of the people, that foreign lan-
guages within the army were once again recognized and accommodated by
military authorities.
Notes
1. The Regiment of Royal-Italien and Regiment of Royal-Corse, both Italian corps,
were dissolved by royal ordinances of 17 March 1788 which reorganized them
into light-infantry battalions intended in the future to recruit only French sub-
jects. Soldiers of Italian origin already enlisted in the regiments were allowed to
remain in the French army. See ‘Ordonnance du Roi, Portant réforme du régiment
Royal-Italien’, Bibliothèque nationale de France (BNF), Paris (1788); ‘Ordonnance
du Roi, Portant réforme du régiment Royal-Corse’, BNF (1788). The Regiment of
Royal-Corse, although nominally associated with Corsica, retained its designa-
tion as a foreign regiment until its dissolution in 1788, despite Corsica’s annexa-
tion to France in 1769.
2. Examples of non-Europeans included Frantz Balthazard, a native of the Mughal
Empire who enrolled in the German Regiment of Bouillon in 1766, and Jean
Newton, born in New York, who served with the Irish Regiment of Clare in 1744.
These soldiers are listed on the contrôles de troupe for their respective regiments
in Vincennes, Service historique de la défense (SHD), 1Yc 158 and SHD 1Yc 259.
On a broader level, the Volontaires de Saxe cavalry corps, levied by Maurice de
Saxe during the War of the Austrian Succession, contained an entire squadron of
cavalrymen, about 100 in total, of whom a majority were black soldiers born in
Africa or the New World. For their birthplaces, consult SHD 3Yc 278.
3. An ordinance of January 1763 (the exact date is unclear), which forbade recruit-
ers for the foreign regiments to enroll French subjects, allowed an exception
for those who spoke foreign languages: ‘Tous ceux des Sujets de Sa Majesté qui
Sauront parler la Langue Allemande, Italienne, ou Irlandoise, pourront etre recus
en qualité d’officiers dans un des Régimens qui sont a son service de la nation
dont ils scauront parler la Langue’ (‘All His Majesty’s subjects who can speak
German, Italian or Irish may be admitted as officers in one of the regiments from
the nation whose language they know how to speak’). SHD 1M 1722.
4. ‘Ordonnance du Roy sur l’exercice de l’infanterie, du 6 mai 1755’, BNF (1755).
5. By September 1755, a major in the Regiment of Swiss Guards named Settiers had
published a German translation. A corporal-major in the Regiment of Royal-
Italien submitted an Italian translation around the same time, while an unnamed
officer in the Irish Regiment of Clare had completed a translation into English by
the end of the year, providing commands largely identical to those used in the
British Army at the time. All of these translations are available in SHD Xg 1. For
comparisons between the English translations and the commands used in British
service at the time, consult the military instructions published in Lambart 1776.
6. The original text of these criticisms reads: ‘Ce mot your parvins aussi esté
employé indifferement pour expriemer le la vostre vos, et cependant un trouver
quelquefois the pour rendre le et la’. ‘Observations sur l’Imprimé de la Traduction
angloise’, SHD Xg 1.
7. ‘Observations sur la traduction des Commandemens pour les Regs. Allemands’,
SHD Xg 1.
8. Unsigned memorandum dated 1755, SHD Xg 1.
9. Letter of 2 September 1755, SHD Xg 1.
10. Memorandum of 1 April 1789 from the Duke of Bouillon to the Minister of War,
SHD 1M 1722.
11. A copy of the law abolishing the Swiss regiments is available in SHD Xg 25.
12. Apart from the Swiss units, the foreign regiments of the French army had been reor-
ganized in early 1791, when all units of the line army were ordered to cease identi-
fying themselves by the names of their proprietary colonels and adopt a numerical
designation. See BNF, ‘Règlement Sur la Formation, les Appointements & la Solde
de l’Infanterie Allemande, Irlandoise & Liégeoise’ (BNF), 1 January 1791. Further,
a decree of the National Assembly on 21 July 1791 ordered the German and Irish
regiments to assimilate organizationally to the rest of the army, meaning that their
special pay, regulations and uniforms were to be abandoned. It did not mention
language. On the decree, see Le Patriote Français 712, 22 July 1791 (BNF). The Swiss
regiments were preserved with their privileges intact until 20 August 1792.
13. The most extreme example is the 8th Battalion of the Haut-Rhin. Of the 456
volunteers enlisted at the time of its formation on 21 May 1793, forty-four had
been born outside France. Most of these latter were from various German states,
but Italians and at least one Belgian were present as well. Contrôle de troupe, SHD
16 Yc 442.
14. Information on literacy among officers in other formerly foreign units prior to
the decree of 27 Pluviôse Year II is available in Paris, Archives nationales (hereaf-
ter AN) AF/II/372 3012 (on the 98th Regiment, which until 1791 was the German
Regiment of Bouillon) and AN AF/II/371 3002 (on the first battalion of the 53rd
Regiment, formerly the Regiment of Alsace, which despite its name was desig-
nated as a foreign German regiment).
15. SHD Xi 20. According to a roster in this box describing literacy skills among the
53rd Regiment’s officers, ‘La majeure partie des militaires compris au present Etats
n’a appris ce quelle sait, que depuis son séjour à Cayenne et notamment depuis la
promulgation du Décret du 27 Pluviose an 2’ (‘The majority of the soldiers listed

on this roster have acquired their skills only since their deployment to Cayenne
and in particular since the publication of the decree of 27 Pluviôse Year II’). The
roster is dated 2 Messidor Year VI (20 June 1798).
16. On literacy rates within these two units, see respectively AN AF/II/371, dossier
3001, and AN AF/II/372, dossier 3012.
17. Common tasks required of officers included, for example, maintaining records on
the personnel serving under them, corresponding with other officers and civilian
authorities and balancing the regimental account books. Under the Old Regime and
into the first years of the Revolution, the foreign regiments were provided with tem-
plates of administrative documents printed in the languages of their units, but this
ceased to be the case after the abolition of the foreign corps. For examples of these
templates, see the review of the German Regiment of Salm-Salm, SHD Xb 76.
18. Printed pamphlet on the Germanic Legion, SHD Xk 3. Other German officers
serving in the legion issued similar complaints; cf. AN AF/II/16 dossier 13, item
15, in which the officer Frédéric de Haindel lamented that French officers had
been dispatched to the corps ‘to command men whose language they do not
understand’ (‘comander des homes dont ils nentendoint pas le langage’).
19. Inspection report of 30 Thermidor Year XIII (18 August 1808), SHD Xh 2a.
20. Napoleon issued instructions for the printing of this decree and its circulation
along France’s frontiers in a letter of 10 April 1815 to the Minister of War, SHD
Xh 7.
21. Letter of 10 July 1809, SHD Xh 9.
22. Letter of 17 August 1809, SHD Xh 9.
23. A roster dated 13 September 1810 (SHD Xl 13) recorded the linguistic abilities of
officers in the 7th Regiment.
24. The Irish soldiers Leslie and Howard described their transfer from the Army of
Italy to forces serving in Holland, and the importance of their linguistic skills to
the French war effort, in letters of 22 Thermidor Year VIII (10 August 1800) and
28 Fructidor Year IX (15 September 1801), SHD Xk 21.
25. Letter from General Meyer to the Minister of War, 9 Floréal Year IX (29 April
1801), SHD Xl 33.
References
Archives parlementaires de 1787 à 1860; recueil complet des débats législatifs & politiques
des chambres françaises imprimé par ordre du Sénat et de la Chambre des députés. 1903.
Vol. 64. Paris: P. Dupont.
Bell, David. 2001. The Cult of the Nation in France. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Blanning, T. C. W. 2007. The Pursuit of Glory: Europe, 1648–1815. London: Penguin.
Bois, Jean-Pierre. 2009. ‘Maurice de Saxe et Woldemar de Lowendal, deux maréchaux
d’origine étrangère au service de Louis XV’. Revue historique des armées 255. http://
rha.revues.org/index6745.html (accessed 13 February 2011).
Brincat, Joseph M. 2004. ‘Languages in Malta and the Maltese Language’. In Malta:
Roots of a Nation, edited by K. Gambin, 213–24. Malta: Heritage Malta.
Brun, Jean-François. 2009. ‘Les unités étrangères dans les armées napoléoniennes: un
élément de la stratégie globale du Grand Empire’. Revue historique des armées 255.
http://rha.revues.org/index6752.html (accessed 3 March 2011).
Brunot, Ferdinand. 1905–38. Histoire de la langue française, des origines à 1900. 11 vols.
Paris: Armand Colin.
Cohen, Paul. 2000. ‘Courtly French, Learned Latin, and Peasant Patois: The Making of
a National Language in Early Modern France’. PhD thesis, Princeton University.
Discours sommaire sur la création de la compagnie des cent gardes suisses ordinaires du
Corps du Roy. 1676. Paris: Jacques Langlois.
Fieffé, Eugène. 1854. Histoire des troupes étrangères au service de France. Paris: Librarie
Militaire.
Jones, E. H. Stuart. 1950. The Last Invasion of Britain. Cardiff: University of Wales
Press.
‘La Grillade, ou Les Suisses aux enfers, détail circonstancié de leur réception’. 1792.
Paris: Marchand de Nouveautés.
‘La Mère Duchesne à Lyon, ou Conversation très-vérdique entre la Mère Duchesne,
un soldat suisse, la Mère Capillon, et un volontaire des frontières appelé La Peur’.
1816. In Histoire politique et militaire du peuple de Lyon pendant la Révolution française,
1789–1795, edited by Alphone Balleydier: xvii–xxvi. Paris: Martinon.
Lambart, Richard, Earl of Cavan. 1776. A New System of Military Discipline, Founded
upon Principle. Philadelphia: Aitken.
Malaguti. 1892. Historique du 87e régiment d’infanterie de ligne, 1690–1892. Paris:
Imprimerie J. Moureau et Fils.
Maugué, Pierre. 1970. Le particularisme alsacien, 1918–1967. Paris: Presses d’Europe.
O’Callaghan, John. 1870. History of the Irish Brigades in the Service of France from the
Revolution in Great Britain and Ireland under James II to the Revolution in France under
Louis XVI. Glasgow: Cameron and Ferguson.
Rapport, Michael. 2000. Nationality and Citizenship in Revolutionary France. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
2
‘Amidst Clamour and Confusion’:
Civilian and Military Linguists at
War in the Franco-Irish Campaigns
against Britain (1792–1804)
Sylvie Kleinman
Centre for War Studies, Trinity College, Dublin
The two following references to the pragmatic role of linguists in war were
both made by Irishmen involved, willingly or not and embracing opposite
sides, in the strategic and military partnership against Britain that was first
forged between Revolutionary France and Irish separatists in 1796 and trig-
gered the ill-fated Rebellion of 1798.
The enemy marched directly into my courtyard . . . and demanded to see

M. l’Êvêque. I appeared, and have had full employment ever since as an
interpreter . . . (Stock 1799: 4)
as to rank . . . I could be of use . . . in the family of the général en chef . . .

speaking a little French, to interpret between him and the natives. (Tone
2001: 142)
The two individuals who uttered them match the prototypes of bilinguals
acting as translators and interpreters in settings of conflict, who emerged
from history when identified by pioneering researchers.1 The first was a
Francophone Irish civilian who became trapped in the role of linguistic
intermediary when a small French expeditionary force landed in a remote
spot of County Mayo and requisitioned his home during a month-long
occupation; as he was also a priest, his experience of and sensitivity to
mediation and conciliation would fuse with the interpreting function.
The second was a revolutionary and exile who went to France on a clan-
destine mission, convinced the political and military decision-makers to
include Ireland in their war strategy against Britain and was recruited into
the French army to serve in the ensuing campaign. Trained as a lawyer, he
would combine several skills and become a highly effective staff officer,
though at first he had feared his lack of military experience would diminish
25
his usefulness. However, even with what he perceived as only a basic com-
mand of French, he had identified this imbalanced bilingualism as a poten-
tial pragmatic asset. Both these men have enriched our insights into the past
practices of ad hoc translators and interpreters because they kept insightful
diaries of their experience of conflict, in which the question of both written
and oral cross-linguistic communication and their personal agency in facili-
tating it are recurrent (if not dominant) features (Stock 1799, 1800; Tone
2001). Both texts are widely recognized as essential primary sources for the
historiography of this period, due to the richness of their observations and
the prominence of their respective roles: the first the Anglican Bishop of
Killalla, Joseph Stock, the second in fact the iconic hero of Irish nationalism,
Theobald Wolfe Tone. However, as in numerous other cases, their agency
as linguistic mediators facilitating communication across language barriers,
and the agency of more obscure individuals, has long been overlooked.2
This fraternal coalition led to several French attempts to invade Ireland
not only to harass the common British enemy but also to support a rebellion
which would bring about Irish independence. The disastrous failure of the
substantial French fleet, commanded by the iconic son of the Revolution,
General Hoche, to land at Bantry Bay in December 1796 remains one of the
greatest ‘what-ifs’ of European military history. 1798 was to become ‘the
Year of the French’ in Irish folkloric memory, when no less than three expe-
ditionary forces attempted landings. That of General Humbert succeeded on
22 August and led to the month-long occupation of County Mayo which
inevitably brought foreign soldiers and native civilians together. This defin-
ing moment in Irish history, when the nationalist impulse became rooted in
an international context, has been amply discussed in both academic histo-
ries and popularized narratives of Ireland. One romanticized (and unasham-
edly biased) account of Ireland’s French moment exaggerated the political
role of ‘official’ interpreters serving the liberator (Hayes 1937: 8, 30).
Generally, though the command of troops from varying cultural back-
grounds has always been a reality of military life, linguists have until recently
been a ‘missing dimension’ (Footitt 2010a: 1) of the study of conflict. This
weakness has underestimated their agency in terms of communications,
logistics and propaganda and has overlooked traces of their practices in con-
temporary sources. From a commander’s perspective, the ‘instrumentality of
men speaking the same language’ had been identified by Colonel William
Tate, an exiled American serving under Hoche in 1796–7; pragmatically, he
had noted that the availability of men sharing a common language was a
convenience ‘in warlike operations’.3 This study will examine compelling
micro-historical evidence scattered through the abundant archival material
to have survived on Franco-Irish contacts in the 1790s, which highlights the
often ambiguous role of linguists as facilitators of communication. Whether
officially recognized as translators or not, these famous or obscure actors in
history were keenly aware of their own ‘instrumentality’.
Sylvie Kleinman 27
‘In the service of two masters’:4 Irish civilian translators

in Revolutionary France, c.1793–6
Theobald Wolfe Tone, the most influential of Irish agitators, travelled clan-
destinely to Paris in February 1796 and there undertook a sustained lobbying
mission; it resulted in the French launch of a substantial naval expedition to
Ireland in December. The renewal of war between Britain and France in 1793
had dramatically shifted the strategy of Irish radicals towards revolution,
but they knew that a rebellion (with legislative independence as its politi-
cal goal) could only succeed with France’s military support. Though Tone
arrived at a propitious time, when Anglophobia had been rekindled and was
shaping the French Directory’s war strategy, he would have to mobilize all
his intellectual resources to convince political and military decision-makers
of the feasibility of such a fraternal coalition against Britain. Relentlessly,
he campaigned and petitioned during endless interviews and protracted
negotiations, in which it is self-evident that measures to overcome language
barriers became central to the process.
Tone kept a very detailed (and at times romanticized) diary which
minutely deconstructs various acts of communication and from which two
relevant issues emerge (Tone 2001, 2007). Firstly, he repeatedly agonized
about how his weak level of French was frustrating his lobbying, leading him
to make numerous insightful observations on bilingualism and translation
which are discussed in the next section. Secondly, Tone identified Nicholas
Madgett (1740?–1813)5 and his nephew John Sullivan (1767?–1801?),6 two
exiled Irishmen employed by the government as translators and assigned to
prepare his lobbying memoranda. Not only does he describe the process of
liaising with them, initially expressing resentment at his reliance on them
but then acknowledging the quality of their work, but he also describes vari-
ous documents they all worked on which are easily traced in the relevant
archives.7 Unusually for the work of government employees, many of these
are signed, and they not only corroborate Tone’s account but contradict the
standard neutrality of the translator and here their activity as linguists in
France’s support of the Irish cause.
Delacroix, Minister for External Relations in 1796, had immediately
advised Tone to go to Madgett, ‘a gentleman [who] spoke both languages
perfectly and was confidential’, and explain himself without reserve (Tone
2001: 56). Tone later described Madgett’s overlapping functions as the min-
ister’s bilingual confidante, but also head of a ‘Bureau de Traduction’ within
the ministry. There is scattered but sufficient information on this bureau to
reconstruct a profile (Masson 1877: 354, 366, 388). Madgett and Sullivan
were useful as government translators and cultural informants on machina-
tions in the host country. They were genuinely supportive of Tone’s mission
but were also free – or indeed expected to – actively engage in political agita-
tion through their language skills.
From Tone’s subjective observations on Madgett, there emerges a slightly

dubious portrayal of the sempiternal translator-cum-fixer:
Finished my second memorial on the present state of Ireland for the

French government and delivered it to Madgett for translation. [He] has
the slowness of age and at present the gout. Judge oh ye gods how that
suits with my impatience . . . Madgett has not yet finished the transla-
tion. Hell, Hell! He has lost two or three days in hunting for maps of
Ireland, and would have been much better employed in translating. His
slowness provokes me excessively but I keep it all to myself . . . he is
always hunting for maps and then he thinks he is making revolutions . . .
(Tone 2001: 97, 121)
Madgett and Sullivan’s role was, however, never confined to translation,

and Tone’s (ultimately successful) interaction with them can only be under-
stood once their careers prior to 1796 have been discussed. Their experience
must be seen in the broader context of the expectations of their employ-
ers which included, among other things, mustering and mastering intel-
ligence-gathering and spy networks on British soil and special missions
among British prisoners of war in France. Translations and personal papers
outlining Madgett and Sullivan’s skill-set supplement the scholarship on
purposeful translation as a form of interaction, by which ‘translators quite
regularly do much more than translate texts’ (Nord: 1997: 17–20). They also
reveal their own perceptions of their agency during one of the most turbulent
times of modern history, the middle years of the French Revolution and the
excesses of the Terror (1793–4).
Madgett’s name surfaces relatively often for about a decade in French
archives (1793–1803), almost always in the context of Anglo-Irish affairs
and frequently, but not exclusively, as a translator.8 Irish-born but a long-
term exile in France, Madgett had been awarded a doctorate in theology in
Toulouse. He was thus a multilingual who had inevitably practised transla-
tion for scholarly purposes, and he was not the first or last priest to become
a linguist due to circumstances. The first trace of political activity places
him at the heart of the expatriate community of English, Scottish and Irish
radicals in Paris, at a special banquet to celebrate the Rights of Man and
the progress of the Revolution (November 1792).9 The influential English
pamphleteer Tom Paine, by then an honorary French citizen, had been
a key participant. Despite his active involvement in parliamentary poli-
tics, Paine remained a monoglot and so continuously reliant on linguistic
mediators, including Madgett with whom links have been traced as late as
1803 (Keane 1995: 482).10 Madgett may have worked briefly in journalism,
which was then a widespread political activity ensuring the dissemination of
new ideologies but also one which would develop fluency in composition.
Precise details of how he was recruited as a translator are not known, but
Sylvie Kleinman 29
his name appears in correspondence with Lebrun, then Minister for External
Relations, from February 1793 onwards.11 Sullivan later described himself
and his uncle as having formed the initial core of a translation bureau when
it was established in 1793 in the Department of Marine Affairs; it is likely
that they had been asked to identify a useful skill during the enforced labour
requisitions of that year (Rapport 2000: 194).
While it is safe to assume that as Anglophone translators they had per-
formed routine desk tasks linked to trade and commerce, our insights into
the functional use of foreign languages in war are sharper. From 1793
onwards, Madgett and Sullivan were both expected to select and translate
extracts from the British press displaying official or popular opinion on
events in France. One effort of Sullivan’s reads more like a memorandum
in which he gives free run to the Anglophobia his paymasters expected
from him: ‘Nothing could be more silly and nasty [bête et méchant] than
the monstrous absurdities with which The Times “Les tems” [sic] is full of
thanks to the bribery of Pitt and his agents.’12 To officialize the faithfulness
of translations, several of the samples we have from Madgett and Sullivan
end with the standard phrase ‘Conforme à l’original’ accompanied by their
signature, and Sullivan also signed his invective against the Times with his
surname. It is not uncommon for the translator to become an anonymous
link in cross-linguistic communication, but here their identity reinforced
the accountability of the work they submitted. Clearly they were also sat-
isfying the expectations of their target audience by employing the official
ideological rhetoric, but they seem to have genuinely subscribed to Jacobin
dogma. This also made it possible for them to later agitate for the cause of
Irish independence, partially through translation, an activity ‘neither trans-
parent nor innocent’ (Footitt 2010a: 271).
Madgett’s earliest documented exchange with Lebrun (not only a former
priest, but one trained in an Irish-run seminary) highlighted the impor-
tance of countering British governmental efforts to prevent the spread of
the French ‘epidemic’ (that is, republican fervour). In Paris, Madgett could
suggest names of British expatriates ‘who had demonstrated their civic
qualities’ and could protect the capital from English spies.13 He then pro-
posed that the Ministry of War sanction the dispatch abroad of Irish patriots
known to him in France, who could ‘spread the principles of liberty and
equality’ in contributions to the press and thus enlighten English and Irish
public opinion. This entailed translating existing French texts, composing
new ones in English, and then, in a ‘field’ phase, proselytizing in politi-
cal clubs and gatherings. Madgett also seems to have had direct dealings
with the redoubtable Committee of Public Safety, as confirmed in a list he
addressed to Robespierre as ‘in charge of the Translation Bureau’ (‘chargé du
Bureau des traductions’), requesting finance for key polemical texts he sug-
gested would do ‘the greatest good’ when circulated to an English public.14
The tone implies he was free to air his views, and he proposed a Paris-based
print shop run by exiles who used English typeface, which would make
‘George and Pitt tremble’ as they would think these seditious reprints of
banned or French works had been produced under their noses. Within a
few weeks of the outbreak of war, Madgett also proposed to Lebrun seditious
forms of direct action targeting the enemy’s combatants. He suggested that
handbills be ‘prepared’ for distribution among English seamen, reminding
the Minister that a substantial proportion of them were Irish.15
In 1796, the bureau was due to be downsized or closed, and (conveniently
for our purposes) Sullivan petitioned Delacroix to be kept on. Passionately,
he summarized the patriotic services he had rendered to the Revolution
since the bureau’s creation. Firstly, he had been dispatched to Brittany by
the Bureau in 1793, there charged with ‘a special mission among the prison-
ers of war.’16 One may presume this was to facilitate interrogations, because
that same year a decree17 had stipulated the appointment of interpreters
for any depot holding foreign prisoners of war, within the framework of
regulated Franco-British prisoner exchanges.18 Had Sullivan been required to
take an oath similar to the one proposed for court interpreters (aged at least
twenty-five), by which they promised to translate ‘faithfully and following
their conscience’?19
Sullivan does not refer to himself as an interpreter. However, a promi-
nent Irish radical who had fled jail in Dublin only to be locked up again in
Brittany, Archibald Hamilton Rowan, did. Appreciative of Sullivan’s agency
in negotiating his release, he described him as an ‘interpreter for prison-
ers of war for the 13th Division’, an official title corroborated by another
administrative reference relating to Sullivan’s pay.20 To his minister, how-
ever, Sullivan stressed other functions and made the purpose of his mission
obvious when highlighting its success. At Dinan, no less than 200 prisoners
had ‘offered’ to serve in the Republic’s navy, due to his ‘zeal in preaching the
principles of our revolution to the prisoners of war . . . and contempt and
horror for King George and his ministers’.21 This task of political persuasion
could only be performed effectively by linguistic skill. Though Sullivan is
silent as to whether coercion was involved in such ‘missions’, Tone was not,
as will be seen.
Sullivan also boasted of his written efforts in war propaganda. He had
helped smuggle ‘patriotic tracts’ into England, some of which he had
‘worked on himself’ (in other words, simply composed in English, recycling
the standard French rhetoric), thus corroborating that Madgett’s plans out-
lined above had been carried out. Sullivan also contributed to the plan for
an invasion of Ireland by ‘writing up in French’ the memorials addressed to
the Committee of Public Safety by Rowan, in other words, by simply trans-
lating. We know that Madgett too was actively involved in such recruiting
missions, an initial source of irritation for the newly-arrived (and militarily
naive) Tone. In a note to Delacroix, Madgett had suggested his (experienced)
nephew as ideal ‘to go endoctrinate the Irish seamen’, that is, among the
Sylvie Kleinman 31
British POWs held in French Atlantic ports.22 Sullivan’s brief testimony also
helps us reconstruct what Tone referred to as ‘Madgett’s scheme’, delaying
translations, when he set off ‘on a pilgrimage to root out the Irish prisoners
of war . . . and to propagate the faith among the Irish soldiers and seamen’.23
The language of Jacobin proselytizing was not merely the result of Tone’s
sarcasm, and implies a coercive dimension, again facilitated through fluency
of language.
Theobald Wolfe Tone: iconic nationalist hero as linguist at war
Having to communicate credibly in French to achieve his goal, Tone depicted

himself in his diary as a struggling foreigner. This self-dramatization was
embellished with relevant literary citations: ‘Damn it rot it, and sin it for
me, that I cannot speak French! . . . “Oh, that I had given that time to the
tongues that I have spent in fencing and bear baiting”’ (Tone 2001: 43;
Shakespeare Twelfth Night I, iii). Generations of empathetic readers were
thus convinced that, despite this human failing, their hero had succeeded
against all odds and persuaded the French to assist Ireland. Romanticized,
a pillar of his posthumous legend, Tone’s presumed ignorance of French was
eventually questioned and investigated to better understand the pragmatics
of communication in war (Kleinman 2004; 2009: 175–9). His repeated refer-
ences to cross-linguistic communication, related to his own performance
or the evident need for such activity which a joint Franco-Irish expedition
implied, are worthy of scrutiny. These personal anecdotes are not only
useful historical evidence of communicative behaviour but even reflect
applied linguistic perspectives developed in the twentieth century relevant
to translation.
Tone, pragmatically, distinguished between the four language skills later
covered by STANAG 6001, the NATO benchmark for assessing language
skills. Though it may seem anachronistic to do so, applying the STANAG
6001 level descriptors (Campaign 2004) helps assess how operationally effec-
tive he truly was. Oral communication is the most problematic of skills for
psycholinguistic reasons, and Tone (an experienced barrister) was acutely
aware that the art of persuasion ‘presupposes a common language’ (Palmer
2001: 49). He described as follows his very first contact (August 1795) with
Adet, the French envoy to Philadelphia: ‘He spoke English very imperfectly,
and I French a great deal worse; however, we made a shift to understand
one another’ (Tone 2001: 337, author’s emphasis). Using the term ‘shift’ as
any layman would simply describes the reflex of adapting one’s speech to
make it comprehensible to a non-native speaker, though this often implies
a dilution or loss of the original meaning. That the French Republic had
dispatched a plenipotentiary to America with a weak command of spoken
English seems questionable. Adet, a scientist by training, had not only
published several translations, but even one by an Irishman Tone knew
(Kirwan 1789). However, even on foreign soil, diplomatic protocol dictated

that Adet was at liberty to impose French as the language of that exchange.
Once in Paris, Tone was guided by the American ambassador, Monroe, as
to which French officials would be amenable to his pleas and also spoke
English. The diplomat had received orders from his paymasters recommend-
ing he stick to his native tongue and reiterating the usual doubts about the
reliability of interpreters.24 As luck would have it, the Directory’s military
section was headed by General Henri Clarke, the French-born son of an Irish
exile, who spoke English fluently. Tone had regular dealings with him, and
though they conversed and corresponded25 in English, Clarke could also
relay their dealings to his superiors. Tone further exaggerated his case in a
reply to no less than Napoleon who, during their first interview (December
1797), had asked where he had learned French: ‘to which I replied that I
had learned the little that I knew since my arrival in France, about twenty
months ago’ (Tone 2001: 185, author’s emphasis). Having by that stage
become a fully functional staff officer in the French army, his claims clearly
had no foundation.
Quickly admitted to private interviews with high-ranking officials, Tone
had been justifiably anxious about his oral performance. His account of
his first (favourable) audience with the great Carnot (Director for War) in
the Luxembourg Palace is one of the most cherished episodes of his life in
Irish folkloric memory. Wily, Tone claims he ‘began the discourse by saying,
in horrible French, that I had been informed he spoke English’, and then
casually contradicted previous statements in noting Carnot’s reply: ‘A little,
Sir, but I perceive you speak French, and if you please we will converse in
that language’ (Tone 2001: 76, author’s emphasis). The ensuing conversa-
tion as related in Tone’s diary covers two pages and reads as a perfectly
coherent exchange, each speaker responding promptly in regular turns of
conversation. Similar entries recording equally productive conversations
with Delacroix further expose Tone’s posing and his humouring of the more
powerful interlocutor, as when he apologized for his ‘execrable French’ and
begged to be interrupted if he was not clear (Tone 2001: 83). Internal French
memos never allude to Tone’s incapacity to convey meanings in French,
potentially leading to misunderstandings, and Carnot even commented that
the Directory intended making good use of ‘this quick-witted Irishman’ (‘cet
Irlandois qui a beaucoup d’esprit’).26 Even if struggling with pre-articulatory
planning in English, we may speculate that his speaking ability was at mini-
mum Level 3 of the STANAG rating.
Tone’s first detailed letter to Delacroix had been written in English and
translated by Sullivan (Tone 2001: 80–3).27 The earliest trace of Tone’s writ-
ten French was a brief note which contains basic grammatical errors; clearly
he had not asked his Irish contacts for help, but though this autonomous
effort is a bit stilted, after Tone’s three months in Paris it is perfectly compre-
hensible (Tone 2001: 181).28 Since the French intended dispatching an agent
Sylvie Kleinman 33
to Ireland to gather intelligence and update local revolutionaries on their

plans, Tone had written instructions in English, but he then also copied
Sullivan’s French version29 (for internal records); though a passive exercise,
rewriting his own words in the target language could only have been fruit-
ful. He also copied Madgett’s French translation of two major memorials
on Ireland that Delacroix had requested. Though irritated by his translator-
cum-fixer (whose role was also to advise decision-makers) and his slow
work pace, he appears to have been satisfied with them. He evidently had
learned French in Ireland and the passive skill of reading was probably his
strongest, equivalent for instance to STANAG Level 3 (‘can read all styles and
forms of the written language used for professional purposes’). The bungling
stranger had within a fortnight of his arrival purchased a copy of the French
Constitution, hardly leisurely reading for a beginner, although a logical
choice for a revolutionary lawyer containing familiar ‘professional–specialist
material’ (STANAG Level 4).
Conversing is always the most problematic of skills, and even if Tone had
learned French with native tutors in Ireland this would not have prepared
him for rapid exchanges in colloquial French, which was still mixed in 1796
with regional dialects which made routine host–tourist encounters more dif-
ficult for a foreigner. Typically for the age, Tone attended the theatre nightly,
and seems to have easily followed the plots, assisted by the visual–auditory
inputs of character play and stage action. Adults often learn effectively in
naturalistic settings and through communication in purposeful exchanges,
and his self-deprecations become far less frequent as the lobbying progressed
and his agency was recognized. Apart from his evident motivation, Tone
had a highly developed memory due to years of practising oratory without
notes, a pillar of both the educational practices of his age and his profession.
If twentieth-century training models defined listening for understanding
as a fundamental skill for interpreters, this would have been as relevant
to college debating and the readiness to retort required in the courtroom.
Thus we note that, in the account of one key meeting with Delacroix, Tone
noted no less than forty verbs to signpost turns between the speakers, for
instance, ‘I told him, he interrupted me, I then said, . . . he asked me’, and so
on (Tone 2001: 83–6, author’s emphasis). Interestingly, the English in these
diary entries relating an intense conversation in French is never tainted by
gallicisms, and Tone appeared to be managing his growing bilingualism
efficiently. While this evidence of genuine foreign-language performance
may appear to be only angst-ridden self-perceptions, it is in fact revealing of
Tone’s goal to ‘use the language with great precision, accuracy, and fluency
for all professional purposes’ (STANAG Level 4, Speaking). Somewhat aston-
ishingly, Tone came to see his bilingualism as his most valuable skill when
assured he would be offered a commission in the French army.
When the logistics of deploying the expeditionary force to Ireland could
finally be discussed, Clarke and Tone mused about which renowned French
general would be the ideal commander. Clarke ‘said it would be absolutely

necessary the general en chef should speak English’, but Tone replied ‘it
would undoubtedly be convenient, but not absolutely necessary’ (Tone
2001: 205–6). He had given the issue some thought, and probably discussed
it with Madgett; when Clarke raised the issue of his own rank, though
admitting he had no prior military experience, he suggested that he could
be useful in a strategic communicative role:
As to rank . . . I should wish to be in the family [in the staff] of the général
en chef . . . speaking a little French, to interpret between him and the
natives. (Tone 2001: 142)
The French intended landing in a remote spot of Ireland, where Irish was
still widely spoken. Tone never used Irish, nor gave any indication that he
knew it, though it is likely he had some basic understanding of it. Even
before leaving France, he could also have been useful as an Anglophone to
command a corps of released Irish prisoners attached to the French force.
With time, his naive dismissal of Madgett’s recruitment drives among the
British POWs had matured into pragmatic approval. He thought they could
be useful as scouts, but clearly saw their front-line role as a communicative
one, ‘to serve with the advanced guard of the army not only as soldiers . . .
but as éclaireurs to insense [inform] the country people’ (Tone 2001: 210).
In June, the Directory nominated General Lazare Hoche as commander, and
specified they would send him ‘some English-speaking officers who could
be employed advantageously in this expedition.’30 Diary entries make clear
that Hoche’s exchanges with Tone were in French, and, though it is not
verbalized in relevant French documents, it was probably anticipated that
Tone could also when required act as a liaison officer. Several Irish officers
(exiled or second-generation) served under Hoche, and, though their lin-
guistic liaison role is implicit, it would not be till the later 1798 expedition
that we find evidence of a formal commission as an interpreter (for Henry
O Keane, see below).
By November, Tone was stationed in the naval port of Brest and serving
as a staff officer. He relates one revealing incident, when Hoche needed him
to ‘assist’ with the interview of a captured American captain claiming intel-
ligence of unrest in Ireland. As Tone is not specific, we can only speculate
that he (combining linguistic skill with professional experience) questioned
the witness in English and relayed replies in French to Hoche and the others
present. He found the man was not trustworthy, prevaricated, and as he spoke
in a broad Scottish accent was no American. The French officers present,
even if they understood English and could observe body language, may not
have been able to ‘recognize’ such subtle linguistic ‘nuances of meaning
and irony’ (STANAG Level 4, Listening) the way a native Anglophone with
advance listening skills could. Then, by Hoche’s orders, Tone duly emulated
Sylvie Kleinman 35
Madgett’s ‘scheme’ and himself went to the Breton depot of Pontanezen

to ‘offer liberty’ to British POWs willing to serve France’s fleet (Tone 2001:
371). Sixty accepted, of whom fifty were Irish, the destination of their sail-
ing unknown. He had no qualms about making them ‘drink heartily’ before
leaving the prison, and he seemed proud that they hoped he would be going
with them. By entrusting this subversive role to an Anglophone, the French
had allowed Tone to discover certain leadership qualities.
Ideological propaganda as a pillar of the French Revolution’s domestic
success, and its use in France’s expansion through liberation and conquest,
has been well documented. However, the agency of translators vital to the
dissemination of republicanism abroad has remained hidden from history.
No less than eight addresses and proclamations of a tactical or strategic
nature were prepared by Tone and French associates to be distributed imme-
diately after the landing. Though they targeted Anglophones, they were
either written in French and translated or written directly in English with
French versions prepared for internal records; Clarke was involved, as was
his uncle, Colonel Shee, another second-generation Irishman. Most of this
bilingual corpus has survived.31 As stated above, English was the only target
language used in these strategic documents, though in situ their content
may have been relayed orally in Irish. Many studies of psychological war-
fare, while recognizing that forms of propaganda have existed since the
dawn of time, stress that its practice was defined in the early twentieth-
century and give prominence to the Allied innovation of ‘sykewar’ in 1944,
so crucial to countering the Nazi model (Lerner 1971: 1–9). Yet the Franco-
Irish alliance of the 1790s provides a wealth of historical insights on how
language requirements were addressed, even in an ad hoc manner, to ensure
the circulation of ideology abroad and also how forms of psychological
coercion were practised by bilinguals. Indeed, the definitions of propaganda
provided in the Allied ‘Sykewar Charter’ commissioned by Eisenhower are
easily applicable to these Franco-Irish texts.32 Thus the key item of ‘consoli-
dation propaganda’ devised for the civilian population of Ireland, to ensure
what the Allied Charter would later describe as ‘friendly cooperation . . .
essential services . . . and opinion favourable to the war’ (Lerner 1971: 347),
was the Proclamation to the People of Ireland (Tone 2001: 196–8). On behalf
of the French commander, it outlined the political mission of the expedi-
tion (to liberate and not conquer) and fulfilled a hearts and minds mis-
sion by promising to respect persons, property and religion; the de rigueur
demonization of the English enemy is here relatively mild, featuring typical
accusations of avarice, tyranny and despotism. Tone had been working on
it for months at Delacroix’s request; initially he felt challenged at ‘writing
[in English] in the character of a French general . . . the French loved meta-
phors’ and he preferred his language ‘plain as a pikestaff’ (Tone 2001: 125).
Echoing the translator’s dilemma of appropriating the voice of another and
experiencing the standard problems of French to English transfer, he had
also, like Madgett and Sullivan before him, become ‘highly important to the
political purposes of the regime, not least its expansionist policies’, in the
words of Franz Pöchhacker’s commentary on interpreters in Nazi Germany
(Pöchhacker 2006). Other texts akin to ‘combat propaganda’ were more
subtly subversive, and some exhorted the Irish militia (most of the rank and
file being Catholics) and the Irish in the British Navy to desert (Tone 2001:
392–6; 420–2).33
Studies on total war stress how, during this transformative period in the
history of belligerence, French nationalist zeal legitimized a new type of
ideological conflict, mobilizing civilian masses to destroy a demonized
enemy and often employing dirty guerrilla tactics. When the Revolution
spilled over France’s borders, its armies became, according to one exagger-
ated study, rapacious hordes ‘gratuitously’ terrorizing civilians, ‘burning
what they could not loot’ (Blanning 2002: 131–2). The scholarship has
overlooked this Irish chapter and how translation became vital to French
plans for deployment. When Hoche planned a commando raid as a distrac-
tion to the Irish expedition, he appointed the Anglophone Tate to lead his
‘banditti’ to destroy Bristol and spread the mayhem and horrors of war to
the Welsh coast. Landing near Fishguard in February 1797, Tate was quickly
forced to surrender, upon which the authorities seized his written instruc-
tions, in English. These were printed to publicize the ‘abhorrent inten-
tions’ of French warfare to disunite and thus destroy ‘all ranks of [British]
society’ (Authentic Copies 1797: p.v.) and were appended to a Commons
Report which had investigated the treatment of British POWs in France
(Committee of the House of Commons 1798). No copy of Hoche’s French
version has been located, but it was Tone who had been assigned the task of
translation, and his clear discursive style is recognizable in the transposed
expression of Hoche’s Anglophobic tactics. Tone’s diary yields clear insights
on the moral dilemma triggered by the effort of semantic transposition:
‘I transcribed with the greatest sang froid the orders to reduce to ashes the
third city [Bristol] in the British dominions’ (Tone 2001: 399), and thus to
‘strike terror and amazement into the very heart of the capital of England’.34
Focusing on what would later comprise that fundamental definition of total
war, which blurred the divide between combatant and non-combatant,
Tone was painfully conscious of ‘what misery the execution of the orders’ he
had ‘transcribed and assisted in framing’ would have on innocent civilians,
reducing thousands of families to beggary (Tone 2001: 399).
The proselytizing activities of our Irish linguists were corroborated when
some of Tate’s men (English or Irish, and former prisoners in France) had
been interrogated and satisfied the English authorities that in France, ‘all
efforts [had been used] to inveigle them . . . and advantage was taken
of them when in a state of intoxication’.35 The Pontanezen depot was
mentioned, but not that it had been native Anglophones, or specifically
Irishmen, who had ‘debauched [them] into the scheme’.
Sylvie Kleinman 37
At times resentful of Irishmen who had been in France longer than him –
and so had become more acculturated – Tone was particularly scathing of
his younger adjutant, Captain Bernard MacSheehy, who had been at the
1792 banquet with Madgett. Personality clashes aside, Tone probably simply
envied MacSheehy’s prior experience as a linguist at war. Arrested during
the Terror and probably released on the proviso he serve some function,
the twenty-year old MacSheehy had been appointed to serve as a secrétaire-
interprète to a General Félix for a (later aborted) expedition to the West
Indies.36 Apart from O Keane’s commission mentioned below, this is the
only documented reference to a linguistic role being appended to a military
one for this period. As an agent for Hoche in 1796, MacSheehy had travelled
to Ireland to gather intelligence and on his return compiled a detailed report
in perfect, eloquent French. A later appointment to command Napoleon’s
Irish Legion exposed his poor leadership skills; however, he was pro-active in
terms of devising for his men, as bilingual soldiers,37 a prototype of ‘foreign-
language . . . operational training [using] cultural material closely related to
anticipated work in the field’ (Footitt 2010b: 118).
The Legion’s muster roles actually specified the communicative compe-
tence in French of the Irish recruits, and distinguished between the four
skills, for instance: ‘speaks no French, writes it a little; . . . Speaks and writes
passable French.’38 MacSheehy had his officers translate their regulations
and manuals into English (which he recommended be published39), and
the Irishmen among them copied the same in French; French recruits were
given English lessons. His own prior experience had led him to harness
the additional potential of his men as linguists and develop it with appro-
priate training. If Napoleon never did succeed in invading Britain, this
does not diminish the importance of him having decreed the formation
of a company of Anglophone ‘guides-interprètes’ or interpreter-guides.40
Though this corps was never deployed, its very existence signals an
increasing push towards regularization. Article 3 stipulated that potential
recruits had to have topographical knowledge of England, know English
but also be able to translate it (Arrêté: 1803). The Irish in France were the
only ‘national’ group singled out in the decree as encouraged to enlist and
its commander, a Captain Fleury, had been Clarke’s aide-de-camp in 1796
and met Tone.
‘Amidst clamour and confusion’: languages at war during the

French occupation of Ireland (September–October 1798), and
their civilian and military mediators
As commander of one of the three expeditions to sail to Ireland in 1798,

General Humbert had anticipated the need for liaison officers. He had sailed
under Hoche in 1796, heading a free corps intended for guerrilla raids which
included some released Irish POWs, and so had experienced a multilingual
campaign. His request in 1798 that ‘individuals speaking the language of

the country report to Brest’ is noteworthy, as the authorities in Paris had
not pre-empted the need.41 Four Irishmen presented themselves and were
recruited to the rank of captain, and of these it is not surprising that the
multi-skilled (and ideologically-driven) John Sullivan was appointed as
Humbert’s aide-de-camp. The order is ambiguous as to whether English or
Irish was the native language in question, though a knowledge of the latter
to glean information from, but also credibly engage with, local informants
would be a self-evident bonus. Of the other three, one Henry O Keane was
by coincidence a native of the precise spot where Humbert landed and was
evidently useful as a local guide. However Stock’s observation that ‘being
also expert in Irish as well as French, he was able to render considerable
service to his cause . . . to be of great service as an interpreter’ is welcome
(Stock 1799: 25; 1800: 72). O Keane is also the only one for whom there
are traces of a specific enlistment as an interpreter.42 Tone’s brother Mathew
also served under Humbert, and like his brother probably knew little Irish;
when captured, in a futile attempt to minimize his republican fervour, he
stated it was only his ‘knowledge of two languages [which] did induce those
who planned the expedition to require my cooperation’, by which he meant
English and French.43 The fourth, Teeling, was a northern Catholic who had
received an enlightened education and was probably trilingual.
Stock instinctively contrasted his own ‘instrumentality’ as a language
mediator for the good of the community to that of others induced by politi-
cal motives, and in so doing left vital traces of communicative activities
usually hidden from history, if implied or presumed. The invasion began
with his eldest son being taken prisoner because, according to the father,
‘the French wanted him for an interpreter’ (Stock 1799: 4). It is more likely
the lad was deemed useful as a local guide but especially as a hostage,
being the son of the foremost local civilian, since the invaders had brought
their own bilingual officers to serve that purpose. After seizing Killalla, the
French interrogated a local yeomanry officer, and their ‘queries were inter-
preted by some Irish officers who came with the French’ (Stock 1800: 11).
Despite his own unwavering loyalist politics, Stock spoke well of O Keane,
possibly empathizing with the fact that he was a former priest forced into
soldiering because of the Revolution. In observing that during the occupa-
tion some local priests became ‘useful interpreters, most of them (from
their foreign education) being able to speak a little French’ (Stock 1800:
97), Stock had highlighted the obvious paradox of penal legislation which
forced Catholics to seek seminary training abroad but exposed them to
revolutionary politics (until 1794), in yet another example of priests becom-
ing linguists in situations of conflict. Stock noted that, from the moment
Humbert requested to meet him, he too had been employed ‘ever since as an
interpreter’ (Stock 1799: 5). In this complex role, the bishop had to balance
multiple allegiances and interrelations, and he had to entertain strategic
Sylvie Kleinman 39
relations of trust while maintaining a front of neutrality even if appropriat-

ing the words of the invading enemy.
As in many occupations, the arrival of an external enemy aggravated
pre-existing local tensions, and the initial binary clash between invader
and invaded (French republican plus Irish rebel allies versus anti-Rebellion
loyalists) broadened in a paradoxical way. The region had been generally
quiet until the invasion, and the French military mission was hampered by
the absence of organized cells of trained revolutionaries to rally to them.
Instead, many peasants who flocked to them engaged in indiscriminate
plunder which was deliberately sectarian and targeted wealthier Protestants.
Under the laws of war, the occupiers were responsible for the maintenance
of law and order in their zone, and so the French officers – ordered to strictly
enforce the respect of persons and property and to punish marauders – duly
policed the district and even armed local Protestants and Catholics opposed
to their presence. The supposed allies of the French opposed this with intim-
idating behaviour, and in this tense and complex setting Stock’s agency was
pivotal. It was also greatly facilitated by the complicity which developed
between himself and Charost, the French commandant left behind by
Humbert, who delegated some responsibility to the bishop-cum-fixer and even
consulted him privately on his management of peacekeeping (including
the secret burial of nearly three hundred barrels of gunpowder). Exhausted
but now imbued with a sense of mission (and hampered by his ignorance
of Irish though not stating it): ‘The bishop laboured hard to pacify the
malcontents, amidst darkness and clamour and the confusion of three
languages . . . Willing to do his best, he interpreted . . . went from house
to house in to the town’ (Stock 1800: 52). It could even be argued that
the French were happy to let Stock take on a role comparable to a Civil
Affairs officer in the Second World War, the ‘considerable cultural implica-
tions’ of which have been highlighted by Footitt as the ‘interface between
the Allied Army and local civilians’ (Footitt 2010b: 115).
Stock also verbalized the dilemma faced by many practitioners in having
to appropriate the message of the original speaker, with which he evidently
did not necessarily concur: ‘Night and day I am busied as an interpreter, so
as really to think in French, though not as a Frenchman’ (Stock 1799: 13–14,
emphasis original). At times, though, his efforts seemed futile: ‘Yesterday
was a day of sad confusion and of utter waste of my substance, attended
with intolerable slavery in interpreting and striving to obey orders next to
impossible to be executed’ (Stock 1799: 8). When a mischievous rebel com-
plained to Charost that as a ‘friend of liberty’ he was entitled to a firearm, he
did so ‘still by [through] the bishop, who made it a point to interpret faith-
fully, even where the matter of discourse made him shudder’ (Stock 1800:
84). Stock stressed that Charost ‘would not trust’ the interpretation of local
Catholic priests: ‘if he wanted to know the truth, he waited till he could see
the bishop’ (Stock 1800: 97). Stock had published translations of classical
texts, and possibly this scholarly experience of the ethics of truthfulness had
urged him to apply it to oral transfers of meaning, in parallel to his spiritual
duty to maintain transparency in all human transactions.
Not needing a linguistic intermediary (and being lucky with such ame-
nable invaders), Stock evidently became closer to the French than some of
his counterparts. The narrative of a neighbouring pastor, Reverend Little,
conveys much angst-ridden antipathy towards the French due to his abhor-
rence of their politics, but also to his ignorance of French, which increased
the distance and exacerbated ideological differences. Indeed, as a Dubliner,
Little even stressed that he could not really ‘know’ the people of the locality
as he spoke no Irish, which was the ‘common dialect here used among the
peasantry’ (Little 1941: 72). He confirmed that a proclamation in English had
been immediately distributed, but was totally cynical as to the boundaries of
the mission it stated. His demonization of the enemy yielded one insightful
example when French officers forcefully requisitioned his neighbour’s horses,
but, having no English, found they could only ‘negotiate’ with him through
Latin. Little obfuscated, they scolded him for prevaricating as a man of the
cloth should not, to which he retorted that his schooling had emphasized writ-
ten Latin and not oral skills. Little was particularly scathing (and thus observ-
ant) when describing how the French had brought with them ‘associates . . .
inhabitants of this kingdom . . . in order to assist them in the organizing (as
they called it) i.e. the seduction and enlistment of the Irish [local peasants]’
(Little 1941: 81–2). He not only named the four Irish officers (as above) but
also specified that O Keane was ‘actively employed in haranguing the people
who resorted to the French camp . . . persuading the young and active to enlist’
(Little 1941: 81–2, author’s emphasis). This could only be done effectively
through a common language, or in this case even two, English and Irish.
After the (short-lived) French victory at Castlebar, an Irish militia sol-
dier taken prisoner also described how two Irish-born French officers were
charged with organizing their wards and urging them to turn their coats
(switch allegiance). He described how one ‘Roche’ launched into a rhetorical
diatribe about their country’s oppression and slavery to the English and how
their French brethren had come to ‘break the tyrannical yoke of England,
and free them’ (Hayes 1950–1: 280). The proselytizer was in fact Sullivan,
who had adopted ‘Laroche’ as a nom de guerre: he has thus left a considerable
archival footprint as a linguist at war, doing what we may conceive as much
more than just soldiering.
Conclusion
‘but such a thing is war!’ (Tone 2001: 399)
With the exception of Bishop Stock, all of the linguists described above
were ‘instrumentalized to serve [the] dominant’ (Pöchhacker 2006) ideology
Sylvie Kleinman 41
of Revolutionary France, rhetorically packaged as the cause of liberty. This

was at first simply a survival tactic, but then clearly and emphatically they
worked ‘within and for a particular ideology’ in this case the cause of Irish
independence. While they themselves highlight the instrumentality of their
linguistic skills at a time when the role of military interpreter was not yet
clearly defined, they certainly would have seen their function primarily as
that of a soldier. And while the elusive and fascinating Madgett remained a
civilian, his prior role as head of a ministerial translation bureau was notably
not incompatible with him touring POW camps, to ‘tamper with the Irish
prisoners there’44 and even form his own ‘Legion’ at Orléans in July 1798 as
Humbert’s expedition was getting under way (Hayes 1950–1: 142).
Scholarly interest in the role of language mediators as meaningful actors
of history was initially confined to translation studies. However, recent
shifts in war studies, prompted by the role of linguists being exposed
through new types of war in the twenty-first century, has broadened interest
in the self-evident need to address cultural communication gaps. Historians
have usually ‘cheerfully recorded the burden of parleys without wondering
about the precise mechanics’ of how they were conducted, despite the evi-
dence left by practitioners themselves (Palmer 2003: 257). Yet this histori-
cal study has demonstrated that, even with such close languages as French
and English and the political cultures they defined, monoglots were at a
disadvantage and mediators were required. We have seen that, even among
educated Enlightenment figures, Francophilia was not always synonymous
with sufficient fluency in the language to get on. Embedded in the memoirs
of an iconic figure of Irish nationalist history is an insightful case study of
the pragmatic instrumentality of linguists in military campaigns.
The combined observations of Tone and Stock shed light on military lin-
guists, and, though the profession was regulated by the time of the Second
World War, the anecdotes of the 1790s do not seem all that distant from the
ad hoc measures depicted in Saving Private Ryan to recruit field interpreters in
Normandy. If the reluctant Corporal Upham protested that he only ‘made
maps’ and translated written texts, Captain Miller simply insisted on his
instrumentality as a bilingual soldier (Roday n.d.). And, if Tone were not so
eminent a hero, would the agency of Madgett and Sullivan, supporting the
definition of the ‘cultural consultant . . . doing much more than just trans-
lating’ (Nord 1997: 17), have ever come to light? By recruiting Irish exiles
in Paris, at a time when their national identity increasingly distanced them
from the English, Madgett had solved the sempiternal problem for govern-
ments of sourcing reliable agents with cultural and foreign-language compe-
tence. Though this ‘paradoxically implied relying on people who generally
had a history of close and sustained contact with that enemy’s language
and culture’ (Footitt 2010a: 272), the Irish reversed the paradox by exploit-
ing their mastery of English to survive, then serve, the French Revolution.
Another bilingual Irish exile, William Duckett, had worked in Madgett’s
circle, translating and initiating propaganda in English. Particularly active

in the project to foment a mutiny among Irishmen serving in the
British navy,45 Duckett had asserted that written propaganda was the most
formidable weapon one could wield at the enemy. He was confirming how
the ‘sykewar’ of the revolutionary age – as in 1944–5 – was waged by the
activity of linguists. If prompted, Madgett and Sullivan would no doubt not
have seen any ethical incompatibility between their subversive, underhand
recruiting among Anglophone POWs and, in other contexts, their translat-
ing truthfully and according to their conscience.
Though most chose the profession of soldiering simply to survive, at this
time of politicized war the Irish serving in France’s forces were clearly ideo-
logically driven and acquiesced to the prevailing methods. If self-evident
that the French occupation of Mayo would expose how ‘foreign languages
[were] integral to embodied communities in conflict’ (Footitt 2010b: 111),
Bishop Stock’s account convincingly demonstrates how they were. He even
provided crucial testimony that O Keane had exerted himself to defend
civilians, and especially Protestants, from sectarian massacres. This was an
influential role enforcing humanitarian boundaries and was far more effec-
tive because the message was communicated directly to locals in not one but
two common languages.
The testimony of Bishop Stock is unique in studies of this kind. His bewil-
dered neighbour, Reverend Little, had claimed that it would be impossible
to remain neutral during the occupation, and Stock’s second, reworked and
romanticized narrative places great emphasis on ‘the bishop’s’ agency as a
linguistic mediator and appeaser for the good of the community. He also
portrayed the French officers as friendly enemies, much to the dismay of
loyalist readers, but it is evident that the absence of a communication bar-
rier brought him closer to them, if not in a political way. Possibly privately
relishing a ‘military’ role, it is probable that he found atonement for his
enforced collaboration by fulfilling a pragmatic and highly useful role,
which he ensured was not hidden from history.
Many of the texts on which Madgett, Sullivan and Tone had worked were
most certainly intended to ‘stimulate disorder’ among soldiers and civilians
and entice them to desert and rally to the invader (Lerner 1971: 326). That
this demonstrated the ‘intrinsically aggressive’ nature of psychological war-
fare was fully felt by Tone when translating the order for Tate’s raid (Lerner
1971: 335). The semantic deconstruction of meaning needed to transfer
the French orders and select appropriate equivalents in English, for one so
driven by the creative impulse of language, reinforced the implied horrors
which the words conveyed. He recognized that the task of linguist, insepa-
rable from that of the soldier and one he could not refuse his commander,
had been dehumanizing: ‘I do not think my morality, or feeling, is much
improved by my promotion to the rank of adjudant general . . . but such
a thing is war!’ (Tone 2001: 399).
Sylvie Kleinman 43
Notes
1. See, for instance, Bowen et al. 1995.
2. This paper draws on my doctoral thesis (Kleinman 2005). It is currently undergo-
ing revision for publication under the working title: The War in Words: Ireland in
French Military Strategy 1792–1805: Translating, Persuading, Invading.
3. Tate to General Clarke, Archives Nationales de France [AN] AF/III/186b/858/
62r–3v, 27 July 1796. The following abbreviations have been used in citing archi-
val references: Archives diplomatiques, formerly Archives des Affaires étrangères
Quai d’Orsay (AD); sub-series of AD, Correspondence politique Angleterre (CPA);
Archives nationales de France (AN); Service historique de la Défense (SHD, Armée,
Marine). All translations from French are the work of the present author unless
stated.
4. This phrase is borrowed from Delisle and Woodsworth 1995: frontispiece.
5. AN/MC/I/733, Madgett’s will, 13 April 1813.
6. As n. 7; SHD/Armée, 2Ye, Sullivan’s personal file.
7. See Tone’s diary for February to July 1796. The key documents are in the French
administrative, diplomatic and military archives (for instance, AN AF III, 186b,
AD CPA 589, and SHD/Armée/11B1, 11B2, 17yd 14 GP: Tone’s personal file; SHD/
Marine BB4.
8. See personnel files for Madgett and Sullivan in AD/Pers.1, 47, 65; for traces of
their activity as translators and Madgett’s propaganda and intelligence role, see
CPA/Vols 587–90.
9. AN/C, 241, f. 41r-v, Address of British, Irish and Scottish patriots in Paris to the
Convention nationale, 19 November 1792 [following White’s Hotel banquet].
10. For instance, CPA/584, 150; 588, 12, in which Paine requests interpreters to assist
him.
11. CPA/584, Madgett to Minister Lebrun, 13 March 1793; translation is not men-
tioned, but Madgett relays intelligence about British officials receiving a report of
the November 1792 meeting of radicals, thus demonstrating he had contacts in
London and was acting as an ad hoc advisor on Anglo-Irish affairs.
12. CPA/588, 179, 8 June 1794 (author’s translation). The date is highly signifi-
cant, as on 10 June the infamous law of 22 Prairial would instigate the Great
Terror.
13. CPA/587, 20r, Madgett to Lebrun, 13 March 1793.
14. AD/Pers.1, 47/85-6r, 15 April 1794.
15. AD/CPA 587, 46, no date. Secret expenditure confirms that, on 26 April 1793,
sums were allocated for the translation of placards addressed to the ‘braves mate-
lots anglois’ (‘brave English seamen’): AN AF II, 7.
16. AD/Pers.1, 65/58v, Sullivan to Delacroix, 30 October 1795.
17. Archives Parlementaires 78:16, 29 October 1793.
18. The Cartel agreed and signed in London on 13 September 1798 (updating the
1780 one) was printed in bilingual format, and includes a ‘table of corresponding
ranks in the English and French service’: SHD/Marine [SHD/M] FF1/33/V1; also
reprinted in New Annual Register 1799.
19. Collection générale des décrets rendus par l’AN 1789–1798, 159, 25 October
1795.
20. CPA/588, 280r, Rowan to the Comité de Salut Public, 11 October 1794; Hamilton
Rowan 1972 [1840]: 232; AN/AF II*226, 503, ‘J. Sulivan [sic] En réquisition
comme interprete [sic] des prisonniers de guerre pour la 13e division à Brest’. In
an earlier decree, he is described as needed to ‘inspect papers on seized ships’ in

the ports, that is, to draw up reports in French on their content in English: AN/AF
II, 230, Dubois-Crancé, 30 December 1794.
21. AD/Pers.1, 65/58v, Sullivan to Delacroix, 30 October 1795, author’s translation.
22. CPA/589, 182r, Madgett to Delacroix, author’s emphasis.
23. Tone 2001: 121 (for 22 March 1796), 124.
24. Such doubts were voiced, for instance, by Alexander Hamilton: ‘No business of
consequence should be carried on verbally or in writing but in your own lan-
guage. The minister of each nation has a right to use his own national tongue,
and few men can confide in their exactness when they do business in a foreign
one . . . great care is necessary in the choice of interpreters, when they are resorted
to’ (Hamilton 1903: 8).
25. See AN/AF IV/1671, f.65r–67r, Tone to Clarke, ‘Memorandum on the encourage-
ment of chouannerie in Ireland, 4 April 1796’.
26. CPA/589, 260r, Carnot to Delacroix, 28 May 1796.
27. CPA/589, 169–70, Tone to Delacroix, 26 February 1796.
28. AN/AF III, 369, f. 50, Tone to Delacroix 12 May 1796.
29. CPA 589, 270–271r.
30. SHD/Armée, 11B1, Directory to Hoche, 23 June 1796, author’s translation.
31. Most for 1796 are reprinted in Tone 2001; manuscript copies are filed in SHD/
Armée, 11B1 and 11B2 (1798 expeditions).
32. ‘The Sykewar Charter’, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force,
Operation Memorandum No. 8, 11 March 1944; reprinted as Appendix A in
Lerner 1971: 347–9.
33. French translations made by Henri Shee, another French-born Irish officer who
was also Clarke’s uncle, are in AN 186b/859.
34. Ibid.
35. Committee of the House of Commons 1798: 9, and following.
36. SHD/Armée/2Ye/MacSheehy personnel file.
37. On the multilingualism of the French army, see Tozzi, this volume.
38. SHD/Armée/Xh14, Etat nominatif des officiers de la Légion irlandaise (October 1804),
author’s translation.
39. MacSheehy to Minister for War Berthier, 30 January 1804, reprinted in
Desbrières 1902 III: 592. This may explain why William Macneven, a Legion
recruit who emigrated to New York, later published a pamphlet entitled Of
the Nature and Functions of an Army Staff (Macneven 1812). Its English is cum-
bersome and reads like a literal translation from French, despite Macneven’s
otherwise fluid style.
40. SHD/Armée, 2Ye: Jean-Louis Cuvillier-Fleury, personal file; XR30–2.
41. SHD/M: BB4/123/170, Humbert to the Minister of Marine, Paris, 17 July 1798.
42. First, in a ‘backtranslated’ version of his commission seized upon his arrest: ‘on
account of [his] civism [Humbert had chosen] citizen Henry O’Keon [sic] to be
employed in the quality of an interpreter’ (Musgrave 1802: 139); in a reference
written after his release and return to France when seeking a new post, SHD/A,
2Ye Henry O Keane (1763–1817).
43. Trinity College Dublin Manuscripts, TCD/872/137v, court-martial proceedings
1798, deposition of Mathew Tone 21–26 September 1798 (author’s emphasis).
There is no evidence that he spoke Irish either.
44. English intelligence report quoted in Tone 2001: 312.
45. AD/Pers.1ère série, 25; CPA 589, 155–6.
Sylvie Kleinman 45
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3
Fighting Together: Language Issues
in the Military Coordination of First
World War Allied Coalition Warfare
Franziska Heimburger
EHESS Paris
There are essentially four different situations within a setting of military

conflict in which languages come into play. A given armed force may, first
of all, be composed of components which have different mother tongues.
The handling of colonial troops is a classic example (Van Den Avenne 2005;
Fogarty 2008: 134–68), but there are of course numerous cases of specialist
units with a different first language to that of the parent army (Montagnon
2008: 22).1 Secondly, language skills may be needed against the enemy, be
this for intelligence purposes or for propaganda. Hansi, the Alsatian carica-
turist, thus used his German language skills to draw up French propaganda
material during the First World War (ANOLIR 2008) while WREN listen-
ers worked in the British intelligence facility at Bletchley Park during the
Second World War (Footitt 2010). Next, languages can be an issue ‘on the
ground’ when hostilities occur in a place where a different language from
that of the troops is spoken. The written exams for German officers wish-
ing to qualify as military interpreters in French after the war of 1870–1
included a paper which consisted of translating public announcements to
the local civilian population (Püttmann 1903). Fourthly and finally, warfare
conducted as part of a coalition may require the bridging of language gaps
between coalition partners – this is the case up to the present day in NATO
and UN missions.
These four situations of language interaction are widely repeated
throughout history but each repetition is likely to concern different
language pairs, necessitating a wide range of language skills and specific
services (Craig 1965; Wallach 1993; Weitsman 1994; Rice 1997; Alexander
1998; Prete 2009; Luft 2010). The Allied coalition on the Western Front dur-
ing the First World War presents a particularly interesting case study when
viewed through this taxonomy. From the British and later the US point of
view, the language needed for the third and fourth situation – the language
required on the ground and the language used by part of the coalition – was
the same: French.
47
The Allied coalition’s successful bridging of the language gaps apparent

on the Western Front during the First World War ultimately played an
important role in the military success of the Franco-British alliance, with its
eventual US partners. This is true on all levels, from the high-level strategic
talks on joint command structures under Allied High Commander Foch
(Philpott 1996; Greenhalgh 2005), down to the ground-level negotiations
necessary in so many villages behind the front lines in order for British
troops to obtain billeting and supplies from the local French population
(Gibson 1998, 2003). The functioning of the Allied coalition has not yet
been the subject of a complete study taking all these levels into account, and
anecdotal evidence which has been circulated has not been analysed from
the point of view of language differences and gaps between the coalition
partners. This chapter concentrates on the most neglected linguistic aspect
of the Allied coalition – the process of fighting together.2
The chapter first introduces the background and historical context of lan-
guage policy in the Allied coalition during the First World War. After a quick
overview of the sources and approaches used, it then summarizes the main
archival findings in two distinct sections. The first investigates the contribu-
tion of the rank interpreter, destined essentially for contact between British
troops and French civilians, to the actual fighting. The second takes a closer
look at the enigmatic figure of the liaison officer, in many ways the ‘middle
management’ of coalition language administration.
Several reasons make the Allied coalition on the Western Front during the
First World War a particularly interesting case in which to study ‘languages
at war’. In the British Army, this conflict was the first time that an intel-
ligence service using enemy language material had been truly operational
(Beach 2004, 2008a, 2008b). Overall, it is probably the first case of the sys-
tematic provision of military interpreters to liaise with the local population
on the ground. Finally, the language pair for communication with the local
population and authorities and that for inter-Allied tactical negotiations was
the same, French–English, which allowed for quite a lot of leeway in the
organization of language services.
In order to understand how precisely the different levels of Allied lan-
guage management functions, their origins must be sought in both British
and French experiences of what was essentially colonial warfare during the
nineteenth century. One key feature on the British side was an elaborate lan-
guage qualification system which had seen a considerable number of indi-
viduals qualify as first- and second-class interpreters by 1914. The second
crucial experience in language handling for the British side came from the
Boer War and the extensive use of local ‘scouts’ with knowledge both of the
terrain and the language of the population ( Jones 2011). French forces had
established distinct corps of military interpreters first under Napoleon in
Egypt and then for the ultimately aborted invasion of England (Kleinman,
this volume). They had continued this on a more important scale with the
Franziska Heimburger 49
conquest of Algeria in 1830. These precedents gave them experience in run-

ning a hierarchical language service composed of local recruits at the lower
ranks of ‘interprètes auxiliaires’ (‘auxiliary interpreters’) and of Metropolitan
French expatriates in the roles of ‘interprètes stagiaires’ (‘trainee interpreters’)
and ‘officiers interprètes’ (‘officer-interpreters’) (Messaoudi 2010).
Secret negotiations between 1905 and 1914 had outlined how what was
at that stage still a hypothetical Franco-British military alliance and military
intervention on the continent would function. As early as 1905, the British
side had specified that the French were to provide interpreters as ‘guides and
orderlies’3 and that these men were to be distinct from any liaison officers
who might be exchanged. This system was then put into practice. In early
August 1914, when the British Expeditionary Force landed in France, 576
French rank soldiers and NCOs, selected because they spoke English for
any of a number of reasons but neither prepared nor trained for their tasks
to come, were standing ready to accompany ‘their’ units from the landing
ports. The BEF had crossed over with a small number of designated military
interpreters of its own, but soon found they were not needed as the French
interpreters already filled all the necessary posts. The British interpreters
were thus, by the beginning of 1915, turned into Intelligence Officers to
serve in the nascent Intelligence Service where they could make the best use
of their wide range of language skills and their often considerable general
education (Beach 2008a, 2008b).
The French enlisted and NCO interpreters (‘rank interpreters’) remained
French soldiers during their detachment to serve alongside the British
troops. They came under the authority of French liaison officers, organized
through the French Military Mission to the British Army (Mission Militaire
Francaise auprès de l’Armée britannique) and attached, in their liaison
duties, to the various British army headquarters. While the British did not
provide rank interpreters, they did send liaison officers to the neighbouring
French army headquarters and ran a British bureau at the French general
headquarters (GHQ ).
As the numbers of British troops increased dramatically over the fol-
lowing years of the conflict, so did the numbers of individuals detailed to
bridge the language gap. There must have been more than 3000 French
rank interpreters and perhaps quite significantly more. It is pretty much
impossible to establish figures on the number of liaison officers detached
from either side. These different groups of men played distinctive roles in
the various aspects of coalition warfare on French territory. The following
discussion concentrates on the military aspect of fighting together in coali-
tion formation and examines to what extent the distinction between rank
interpreters (essentially in charge of civilian–military relations) and liaison
officers (charged with tactical cooperation), while officially upheld and in
place in the structures on the ground, actually persisted during the war and
its different phases of combat.
Elizabeth Greenhalgh (2002) has pointed out the wide variety of sources
available for research on the Franco-British coalition during the First World
War. This paper has been able to draw upon official military records both
from the French military archives preserved at the Service Historique de la
Défense in Château de Vincennes and from the British side at the National
Archives in Kew. Interpreters and liaison officers left a multitude of mem-
oirs and other recollections, published or not, and these are obviously
a very important complement to official military records, especially in
understanding the subtle differences between official language policy and
the practice through which it was then implemented. In two particularly
well-documented cases (discussed below), it is possible to view one indi-
vidual from both sides – an interpreter for whom there are both French
administrative records evaluating his work alongside the British troops and
an appreciation in the published memoirs by the British officer he worked
with (Gubb 1978).
Fixers or fighters?
French rank interpreters at the beginning of the war had no prior warning
and even less training to acquaint them with their new duties. In the course
of the war, selection procedures were developed through which men instead
applied for such positions and training courses were eventually established.
Memoirs written by interpreters give an idea of the preconception of their
function they arrived with:
I asked to be instructed as to the role of interpreter: I thought it meant

transmitting messages from an English unit to a French unit and vice
versa. Poireux [from the Military Mission] explained to me that ‘liaison
work’ was the exception; interpreters served as ‘truchements’ between the
French civilian population and the British Army. During combat activity
you would often be put in a safe place. (de Vibraye 1937: 23)
Civilian liaison duties, essentially to do with billeting and compensating

damages, were indeed the primary activities of these military interpreters.
These, however, are not the primary focus of this paper. Memoirs and appre-
ciations of interpreters’ work written by their superiors give a sense of the
military tasks that they were asked to complete:
Malleray told me that we would have to carry written and oral messages
from the Command Post of the Nth French Infantry division, advancing
parallel to us, but separated from us by the road from Amiens to Roye.
He explained the oral part of the message which was not very difficult.
We would find the Command Post near Mézières . . . This time it is real
war and doing liaison duty between two armies participating in the same
attack might give us the chance to witness actual combat. (de Vibraye
1937: 50)
The transmission of messages, often in situations when technological

devices had broken down, put the French military interpreters into the
position which the British Army had reserved for its orderlies, who were
‘complementary to communication by signal’ and in general recruited from
‘suitable civilians’ (General Staff War Office 1912: 41). The work they were
doing was not purely that of a linguist but was very much integrated into a
military communication system.
The role played by rank military interpreters during the First World
War was naturally dependent to a very high degree on the larger military
situation in which they and the units to which they were attached found
themselves. Here, for example, is a British officer’s verdict on the work of
his interpreter:
I should like to bring to your notice Sergt. Cellerier, the interpreter

attached to the Battalion under my command.
At Paturages, close to Mons, on the night of August 22nd/23rd 1914,
my Battn found itself unsupported & out of touch with the Division on
its right. M. Cellerier went out with a patrol under Capt. Edwards (Bedf.
Regt.) to Frameries, some two miles to our right & established communi-
cation with the troops there, having to pass close to large German forces
in doing so. On this patrol he proved of great assistance in visiting houses
& questioning inhabitants as to the exact whereabouts of the advancing
Germans. Next day he was present at the fighting round Paturages. At
the battle of Le Cateau he was present with me in the front trenches. In
October 1914 he assisted at the capture of Givenchy & in the subsequent
defence of the village under heavy shell-fire. I understand he assisted in
the evacuation of the wounded.4
This short appreciation includes a wide range of contributions to the fighting

by the interpreter: intelligence work, lateral communication, accompanying
officers in their front-line duties and even attending to wounded soldiers.
One very interesting case involves documentation from both the French
and the British side: that of the interpreter Rimbod. Rimbod’s evaluation
booklet contains the following verdicts in French:
Did liaison work on 27 May 1918 between French and British units, per-
sonally carrying orders under fire after the destruction of the telephone
lines. Showed great courage in these circumstances.
This NCO particularly distinguished himself during the German
attacks on the Craonne plateau on 27 May 1918. Having twice escaped
death miraculously, he showed great energy maintaining liaison contacts
between the French and English engineering units. Received the Military
Medal on 8 July as recompense for his excellent services.5
The British officer writes the following evaluation:
To O.C. French Mission 19th Don 8 Aug.16
Dear Mr Bertrand,
It is a great blow losing Mr RIMBOD in this way. He has always done so

well for us, and is exceedingly popular with all ranks. I cannot speak too
highly of his help to us during a complete year’s service in France, and
always so bright and cheerful.
He understands a good deal about buying RE Stores and has been most
useful in that way.
I sincerely hope to meet you and the good fellow again some day.
Yours sincerely
Signé R. A. Butterworth6
These two evaluations present two very different verdicts – one insisting on
a courageous military contribution, one on the practical aspects of daily life
behind the front. I struggled to make sense of them when I first discovered
them. This is, in fact, a recurring pattern in the appreciation of interpreters’
work: the French insist on the interpreter’s role in combat, while the British
side hardly mention it, preferring to discuss their contribution to daily life
and its practicalities. The published memoirs of the British officer to whom
Rimbod was attached illustrate this:
I forgot to mention that Rimbod is still with the company, and has been
given the French Médaille Militaire and the British Military Medal. After
the disastrous battle at Reims, the head of the French military mission
at divisional headquarters had asked McQueen if he could recommend
Rimbod for a medal, on the grounds that all the other interpreters had
been recommended, so it would be bad luck if he were not. McQueen,
who was always conscientious, had replied that as Rimbod never went
near the front line, they could not, of course, recommend him for gal-
lantry. However, he was a nice fellow and had done a very good job at
buying food for us in the back areas. On the strength of which he had
received the above medals. (Gubb 1978: 200)
There seems to have been a very different perception of the role of the mili-
tary interpreter on the two sides of the Allied coalition. The French military
administration was particularly conscious of the strain these individuals were

under – Frenchmen, under arms but in non-combatant posts, far away from
their compatriots who were defending their homeland. The French military
authorities therefore felt a particular need to emphasize the contribution to the
actual fighting by these interpreters of whom at least a certain number could
have been considered ‘shirkers against their own will’ (Ridel 2008: 53–5).7
‘His life is spent between the hammer and the

anvil’: liaison officers
The organizational structure of the military language service provided by the

French for British and then also US forces has a double origin in the French
experience of nineteenth-century warfare. First of all, the colonial experi-
ence in Northern Africa had led to the employment of large numbers of mil-
itary interpreters. From the conquest of Algeria in 1830 onwards, the French
military authorities and increasingly also civilian authorities had worked
towards improving and perfecting the language service. As Messaoudi (2010)
has explained, the corps of military interpreters on the ground in Algeria
developed gradually from a body composed of individuals from very diverse
origins, recruited ad hoc and strongly criticized for their perceived lack of
trustworthiness and penchant for corruption, into a professionalized corps
recruited by competitive exam and divided into essentially local ‘interprètes
auxiliaires’ and essentially metropolitan ‘officiers interprètes’.
In a 1933 article, D. De Saint-André, himself a veteran interpreter of the
First World War, described the three facets of the role of the Officier de liaison
(De Saint-André: 1933). According to De Saint-André, during the First World
War liaison officers on the French side were simultaneously administra-
tors, interpreters and combatants. They had to run a language service with
between thirty-six and 140 rank interpreters under their orders, with the
express responsibility of protecting and defending French civilian popula-
tions against British military interests. They had to provide interpreting
services during meetings of Allied commanders. Finally, they, and the rank
interpreters under their orders, had to ensure that lateral liaison between
French and British units on the battlefield was upheld, which could mean
considerable personal risk, for example in carrying messages.
Interpreting coalition leaders to one another was an area fraught with dif-
ficulties. One liaison officer, Spears, observed the following episode:
Sir John did not speak long. Realising as his annoyance spent itself that
he was not understood, since most of the Frenchmen present spoke no
English, he turned to General Wilson and asked him to translate. Wilson
did so, modifying and softening somewhat what his Chief had said. This
bowdlerised translation did not efface the impression Sir John’s tone had
made on General Lanrezac. (Spears 1930: 234)
One case enables a wide overview of the duties of liaison officers: the protracted
negotiations between the British and the French over the delimitation of their
respective military zones and the provision of British reserves for the French
sectors of the front in 1918.8 This makes apparent the impressive amount of
paperwork completed by the liaison officers, who translated written requests
and other communications from the Coalition partners. Although there were
meetings between the respective leaders, most of the decisive preparatory
work happened through written communication beforehand.
Liaison officers handled translations of all kinds of documents that passed
through their offices. Cases in which both the original and the translation have
been preserved in the archives are rare. However, the following case shows the
type of imperfect but nevertheless functional translation accomplished by a US
liaison officer working with the French military mission alongside US troops:
Original:
Referred. I request that if practicable, the matter be taken up with the

Commanding General for this district to release this man from military
service, for use in operating a section of the cold store plant . . .9
Translation attached to the document for transmission to the competent

French service:
Transmis pour informations [sic]. Je demande si cela est possible

que l’affaire soit prise en main par le Général Commandant le [sic]
Subdivision, afin que cet homme soit mis en surcis [sic] pourêtre employé
à maneuvrer [sic] une partie de l’appareil frigorifique . . .10
Looking at liaison officers’ tasks in the context of the First World War coali-
tion clearly shows the important component of written translation that mil-
itary interpreters could be asked to handle. In consequence, it demonstrates
the importance of written language and translation in coalition warfare.
Conclusion
This chapter has shown to what extent pre-war planning drew on two sepa-
rate and essentially colonial traditions. In the French case, distinct corps
of European officer-interpreters and locally-recruited auxiliary interpreters
contributed to the colonial set-up, mainly in Algeria but also elsewhere.
In the British case, language qualifications were acquired by regular offic-
ers rather than being the preserve of specially recruited linguists, but their
efforts were always coupled, especially during actual military conflict, by the
recruiting of local scouts, hired as much for their language skills as for their
knowledge of the terrain.
The system put into place as an essentially French service for the use
of British and later US forces mirrors the division of work in two distinct
hierarchical levels; at least on paper. In practice, the two hierarchical lev-
els contributed both to administrative and military tasks, and the smooth
running of the service was probably due in part to the fact that there was
no disjunction between these two areas of provision. The most interesting
verdict on the functioning of the service is probably a 1919 report on the
Mission Militaire Française auprès de l’Armée Britannique, which explicitly
states that, for any future conflict, it will not be necessary to train and pre-
pare men to fulfil interpreting or liaison duties before the intervention but
that it would be useful to keep a list of suitable men (those with language
degrees and those who live abroad) in order to call them up separately and
ensure that the appropriate number of men are available.
Two further issues emerging from this work are applicable both to the
other conflicts discussed in this volume and to conflicts yet to come. One is
that the French–English language pair during the First World War allowed
for close links between civilian administration roles and military liaison.
However, in a conflict situation where the coalition languages and the
languages on the ground are not the same, separate language services and
structures will most probably take care of the two. This requires further
research to understand the consquences of this difference from the close
integration shown in this case study. A second important issue, which could
only be hinted at here, is the profile of language intermediaries beyond
those officially assigned to intermediary roles. The considerable number of
military interpreters and liaison officers discussed in this chapter were not
the only people bridging language gaps during the First World War. Great
mystery surrounds the part played by the hundreds of qualified interpreters
among the British officers of the First World War. Looking more broadly,
however, researchers must consider how those whose job descriptions have
not included language duties can be integrated into the study of languages
at war.
Notes
1. See Montagnon (2008: 22), who describes the French Foreign Legion’s early phase
of separating battalions by nationality and language. All translations from French
are the present author’s unless stated.
2. So far, this has only been discussed by Greenhalgh (2003).
3. ‘Memo Lt Gen Grierson’, National Archives Kew, WO 106/0049 C Preparation for
Expeditionary Force.
4. Evaluation by Ch. Griffith, Lt. Colonel Commanding 1st Battn Bedfordshire
Regt., dated 23 September 1915, Carnet Cellérier Georges Charles, SHD Vincennes
17 N 467.
5. SHD Vincennes 17 N 447, carnet Rimbod.

6. SHD Vincennes 17 N 447, carnet Rimbod.
7. While the exact mortality rate for interpreters during the First World War is not
known, it was certainly significantly lower than that of the infantry and inter-
preter postings were thus sought after as ‘safer’ positions. This led to a certain
level of criticism in the press questioning the utility of interpreters and consider-
ing them as actual ‘shirkers’.
8. National Archives, Kew, WO 106/1455, WO 158/71, WO 158/77.
9. SHD Vincennes 17 N 237, Mission Militaire Francaise auprès de l’Armée
Américaine, letter dated 29 June 1918.
10. SHD Vincennes 17 N 237, Mission Militaire Francaise auprès de l’Armée
Américaine, letter dated 29 June 1918.
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4
Languages at War: a UK Ministry
of Defence Perspective
Lieutenant Colonel Justin Lewis RE
Joint Capability, UK MOD*
The UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) has a keen interest in the Languages

at War project and has been pleased to support its work, providing a per-
spective to inform lines of investigation and to learn the lessons of history
that have a bearing on today’s and tomorrow’s operations. This paper was
prepared to present at the Languages at War Conference at the Imperial War
Museum, London, in April 2011.
The UK and its MOD is in a similar situation to many other nations
and organizations, working with constantly evolving contexts, a variety
of agendas and increasingly taut resources; each instance is unique.
Therefore, this paper does not suggest that the UK MOD can put forward a
model for the use of languages in war that is simple or, in some way, a para-
digm. Rather, the perspective set out below should be seen more as a case
study for the project, representing one balance between policy, resources
and reality.
The paper is titled: A UK MOD Perspective. The subject of Culture and
Languages (the two being closely associated) is high on the list of capability
issues falling out of the UK’s recent Strategic Defence and Security Review;1
further analysis alongside policy and resource decisions is in hand, so a
single perspective has yet to emerge. Therefore, the views expressed here are
those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the MOD or
HM Government.
The paper will look at the governance of languages in the UK MOD
and the role of the key organizations; what the UK MOD needs of a
military linguist; how its capability is generated; and linguistic challenges
for the future. The paper considers ‘war’ in its widest sense as being any
operation in which the UK military may be involved, from humanitarian
* This chapter © British Crown Copyright 2012/MOD. Published with the permission
of the Controller of Her Britannic Majesty’s Stationery Office.
58
Lieutenant Colonel Justin Lewis RE 59
intervention through peacekeeping and stabilization missions to combat

operations.
Governance
The governance of language capability in the UK MOD is characterized by

clear ownership, mechanisms to build stakeholder consensus and devolved
delivery, summarized in Figure 4.1. Ownership of the language capability is
vested in a Senior Responsible Owner (SRO), in this case the Deputy Chief
of the Defence Staff (Personnel and Training), a 3* officer able to represent
the capability at the highest levels in the MOD and across government;
DCDS (Pers & Trg) owns language policy. His principal executive is the
Head of Training, Education, Skills and Resettlement (TESR). They lead
capability boards, consisting of military stakeholders, at relevant levels; the
boards build consensus and address policy, resources and other capability
generation issues. Having DCDS (Pers & Trg) as SRO acknowledges that an
appreciation of culture and language must be widely embedded in military
culture and developed over time, and should not be a niche capability that
is only ramped up on an as-required basis.
The wider stakeholder community for language capability is varied.
Understanding that crisis management is a cross-Government effort, led by
the political/diplomatic lever of power (a Comprehensive Approach, in MOD
terminology), the MOD confers with other government departments on
language issues through the UK Inter-Departmental Standing Committee
on Languages (UKIDSCOL); this body has scope for facilitating increased
collaboration across government in this area. Another external body is the
NATO Bureau for International Language Coordination (BILC), of which the
UK MOD is a member and from which UK military language standards are
derived. These standards are discussed later in the paper, but their assessment
in the UK is through a partnership between the UK MOD and the University
of Westminster.2
The internal stakeholder community includes a number of customer
agents who represent their employment communities, such as Intelligence,
Defence Diplomacy and operational employers. These stakeholders are
key members of the governance boards. Service Manning Authorities are
important as they assign linguists and manage their career development.
Finally, deployed commanders, staff and units have a key role to play in
reporting back on the latest applied usage to inform the development of
the capability. First amongst the internal stakeholders is the Deputy Chief
of the Defence Staff (Operations) (DCDS(Ops)), whose task it is to represent
all stakeholders collectively (when necessary) and to define the operational
requirement for the capability.
Capability is delivered through three principal organizations. The Defence
School of Languages (DSL) acts as the Training Delivery Authority for
60
3* Defence Languages
Other Stakeholders DCDS (Pers & Trg)
& Cultural Capability
Senior Responsible Owner
UKIDSCOL (x-Govt language body) Management Board
BILC (NATO)
University of Westminster
1* Defence Languages
Military Customer Groups Director Training & Cultural Capability
Manning Authorities & Education Customer Executive
Operational commands & staff Board
DCDS (Ops)
Joint Capability Head of Defence Languages &
Training, Education, Cultural Capability
Skills & Resettlement Working Group
Defence
Defence School Defence Cultural
Operational Languages
of Languages Specialist Unit
Support Unit
Requirements & Operational

Evaluation Capability
Figure 4.1 Organizational chart of the governance of language capability in UK MOD

languages. It provides residential training itself in languages that are

required most frequently or in the greatest volume. Lesser requirements
for long language training are contracted out to external providers where
that is the best-value solution. Short operational language courses for pre-
deployment training are delivered locally but overseen by DSL. Cultural
capability is led by the Defence Cultural Specialist Unit (DCSU), which acts
as the Training Requirement Authority (TRA) for cultural training and whose
training delivery method is evolving. DCSU also generates Cultural Advisors
(CULADs), whose training includes higher-level skills in an appropriate lan-
guage. The third organization is the Defence Operational Languages Support
Unit (DOLSU), currently owned by DCDS (Ops) pending a wider review of
resource ownership.3
DOLSU’s responsibilities include the generation of higher-level linguists
to deploy as augmentees on operations. Selected volunteers undergo eight-
een months of language and other training before undertaking a six-month
deployment as a full-time linguist. However, DOLSU’s main function is to
support the coordination and development of the defence language capabil-
ity through the role of Training Requirements Authority, answerable to the
capability SRO. Tasks include defining language standards and competencies;
advising employers on language needs for each post; identifying the annual
Statement of Trained Requirement (SOTR),4 leading the MOD Languages
Examination Board (in partnership with the University of Westminster),
financial award schemes for languages and external validation of training.
Some of these responsibilities are discussed throughout the paper.
The military linguist
It will be noted that this chapter refers to ‘linguists’, as opposed to interpret-

ers or translators. Civilian, professional interpreters and translators have
a particular understanding of the competencies and skills necessary to pro-
vide their service, including language skills in at least two languages to the
standard of a highly-educated native speaker, along with sophisticated tech-
niques, preferably used in ideal circumstances. Perhaps confusingly, military
linguist terminology includes labels such as ‘Professional’ and ‘Expert’ at
competence levels lower than the educated native-speaker description asso-
ciated with civilian interpreters and translators. However, military linguists
are called upon to interpret and translate within their competence, usually
in less than ideal circumstances, and they are required to provide additional
functions that are unlikely to be found in civilian practitioners. Whilst they
may be in similar roles, it might be best to consider military linguists and
their civilian counterparts as cousins rather than siblings, with different
outlooks, loyalties, strengths and weaknesses.
Military linguists are required to use their language skills in practical ways.
Personnel with lower-level skills use language to be culturally aware, to build
confidence in relationships and to facilitate simple military tasks as part of

their primary role. Higher-level linguists can have another primary role for
which the language skills are essential, but most are dedicated to the lin-
guist role. In this role they are required to mediate, that is, to facilitate the
exchange of information between two languages and actors; this requires
judgement and discretion as to what constitutes critical information and
the ability to filter less important content. They are also required to act as
an employer’s trusted representative to further business, such as arranging
meetings, conveying messages and retrieving information, all in line with
the employer’s objectives. The military linguist must have sufficient field
skills to be robust in adversity and not to be a liability to those around
them.
Pure language standards for military linguists are in accordance with
NATO STANAG 6001 Edition 4.5 The STANAG has two functions, firstly
to guide NATO member nations who need to learn one of the two official
NATO languages (English and French) and secondly to establish a common
scale of competence in any given language. Several other language scales
exist, but the STANAG is particularly relevant to the military environment.
Table 4.1 characterizes the key features of the STANAG scale, including an
indicative equivalence in the Common European Framework of Reference
for Languages (CEFR).
The UK describes competence up to level 2 as being a low-level linguist
and above level 2 as a higher-level linguist. Level 2 linguists who trained to a
level 3 syllabus and achieved a strong assessment result6 may be employed
as a level 3 linguist at risk. The UK sees Level 3 as the lowest level at which
an employer can reasonably expect an assured, accurate service. This is
important in military scenarios where mis-communication can cause com-
manders to make incorrect decisions, which may have undesirable conse-
quences, or put the lives of others at increased risk.7
Another feature of the STANAG system is a Standardized Language Profile
(SLP), consisting of a four-digit code indicating the level attained in the
discrete skills of listening, speaking, reading and writing (in that order).
A level 3, ‘Professional’, linguist would be expected to have a profile of at
least 3333 within NATO. However, the UK, recognizing the importance of
verbal communication, will accept that a linguist with SLP 3321 (for exam-
ple) can be referred to as level 3/Professional, in particular in the context of
financial incentives for languages.
Generating capability
It is an important feature of the UK MOD’s current model that being a lin-

guist is voluntary. The UK finds that the best linguists are volunteers and
that the strong motivation inherent in volunteers is the most significant
factor in achieving good training outcomes. Personnel may join the military
Table 4.1 Key features of STANAG 6001
STANAG Approx. Tasks/Functions Content/Topics Accuracy

Level CEFR Level
0 No functional ability. None or isolated words. Unintelligible.
Above 0 A1 Can make short utterances and ask Immediate needs: greetings, Understandable with difficulty,
(UK-Basic) very simple questions using memorized personal details, numbers, time, even to a native speaker used
material and set expressions. common objects, commands. to dealing with foreigners.
1 A2 Can create sentences; begin, maintain Everyday survival topics and Intelligible with some effort
Survival and close short conversations by asking courtesy requirements. to a native speaker used to
and answering simple questions; satisfy dealing with foreigners; often
simple daily needs; resolve basic situations. mis-communicates.
2 B1 Can describe people, places and things; Concrete topics such as own Understandable to a native
Functional narrate current, past and future activities background, family, interests, speaker not used to dealing
in full paragraphs; state facts; give work, travel and current with foreigners; sometimes
instructions or directions; ask and answer events. mis-communicates.
questions in the workplace; deal with
non-routine daily situations.
3 B2 Can converse in most formal and Practical, social, professional Speaks readily, with only sporadic
Professional informal situations; discuss abstract topics; and abstract topics, particular non-patterned errors in basic
support opinions; hypothesize; deal with interests and special fields of structures. Errors almost never
unfamiliar topics and situations; describe competence. interfere with understanding and
in detail; clarify points. rarely disturb the native speaker.
4 C1 Can tailor language to fit the audience; All topics normally Nearly equivalent to a
Expert counsel, persuade, negotiate, represent an pertinent to professional well-educated native speaker.
official point of view, advocate a position needs. Speech is extensive, precise, and
at length. Can express subtleties and make appropriate to every situation
culturally appropriate references. with only occasional errors.
5 C2 Functions in a manner that is equivalent All subjects. Performance equivalent to that
Articulate to that of a well-educated native speaker. of a well-educated native
native speaker speaker.
intending to use a previously taught or un-taught language skill in one of

the few career streams requiring specific languages. Others may join for
other reasons but are subsequently attracted by language opportunities as an
option within a more varied conventional career plan or to maximize their
experience on operations through a language specialization. Opportunities
exist for members of the Volunteer Reserve or ex-full-time personnel to
serve an extendable twenty-six-month contract, training and deploying as
a linguist on operations.
All volunteers for language training take the Modern Languages Aptitude
Test (MLAT)8 and should be interviewed before selection to explore the
variety of factors that influence successful training and employment: strong
recommendations, motivation, confidence, intelligence, memory, existing
language skills and experience (including English), along with general mili-
tary and educational experience. MLAT is a limited tool, in particular for
non-European languages and where English is not the candidate’s first lan-
guage, but experience shows it can be an indicator of eventual competence
limits. Raw results fit on a percentile scale (compared to all other candidates)
and the UK interprets them as follows:
<50 Unlikely to achieve desired progress and standards at any level.

50–60 May be able to achieve Level 1.
60–80 Probably suitable for Level 2 training.
80–100 Potential ability to succeed at Levels 3 and 4.
It can be seen from this that only 20 per cent of personnel may have the apti-
tude for higher-level training and, once other factors are considered, there
will be a limit to the scope for the UK MOD to meet the potential demand
for higher-level operational linguists from its own resources.9 There are
many second-language speakers in the UK MOD’s branch of the civil service,
but such employees cannot be obliged to declare their skills or to use them
beyond their current post. Therefore, the UK MOD accepts that its deployed
higher-level linguist capability will be found from a balance of military lin-
guists, contracted civilians and Locally-Employed Civilians (LEC). This is not
as great a constraint as might be imagined, as each group has strengths and
weaknesses that can be best matched to particular situations; a comparison of
employment factors for dedicated linguists is summarized in Table 4.2.
Once selected for training, students attend a course at DSL of between nine
and eighteen months’ duration. The length of courses and training resources
available are synchronized to the operational cycle, so most students do not
have time in initial training to reach their full potential. They are trained
in a balanced syllabus with a priority to the skills required in the range of
available employments for each cohort. This does allow the most gifted
linguists to achieve the full range of skills at a given level but acknowledges
that lesser performances by others are still desirable and intended training
Table 4.2 Employment factors for dedicated linguists
For Against
Military Readiness ‘Waste’ of other military skills
Security clearance Potential impact on career
Flexibility prospects
Working in hostile/basic Down-time for training
environments Capability management and
Familiarity with military training overhead
business Release by employers and
Information assurance manning authorities
Quality control of other
linguists
Contribution to language
training
Military A resource that can be Variable experience
(reserves) turned on or off
No career impact
Motivation
MOD civilians Existing resource Limited deployability and
Reachback capability utility in theatre
Wide range of language skills Limited willingness to be
Higher skills more likely employed as linguists
Cost-effective trainers Limited opportunities to take/
train for MoDLEB exams
Contractors Outsources/de-risks provision Expensive
of capability Inadequate provision is slow to
Backfills shortfalls manifest
Low-risk theatres Security clearance limited
Locally- Native target language Risk to base and operational
Employed Comparatively cheap, security
Civilians numerous and available Loyalty
Culturally sensitive (In)Ability to teach
Personal vulnerability to
coercion
Slow to set up
English skills variable and
unassessed
outcomes. A view is taken mid-course about the achievement and potential

of each student in order to prioritize the thrust of training and to earmark
them for particular posts.
The UK MOD has an interest in about fifty languages, in particular those
relevant to current operations such as Pashto and Dari (known as operational
languages). In order to encourage the declaration of language skill amongst
military personnel, a Basic Language Award Scheme will, once an exam has
successfully been passed, award linguists a lump sum relating to the level of
pass and difficulty of language. Payments range between £140 and £2300,
with three-yearly requalification payments at about one-third of the quali-
fication rate. A separate scheme exists for operational languages, with quali-
fication awards between £1800 and £11,700 (and similar one-third awards
for requalification). In addition, linguists in operational languages can earn
a daily active use award between £3.60 (a level 1 linguist on their first tour)
and £70.20 (a level 4 linguist on their fifth tour) every day. These incentives
are an important part of recruiting linguists to training, encouraging further
deployments and maintaining essential capability in the longer term.
Future challenges
It is recognized that today’s military linguist requirements will not neces-

sarily be an accurate guide to future requirements. Today’s requirements,
certainly in terms of low-level skills and volume, are dominated by the need
to support operations in Afghanistan. As that requirement diminishes from
2014, the standing requirement for non-operational linguists will reassert
itself as the baseline for capability generation. Without a particular, demand-
ing requirement for linguists to support operations, decisions are required
on what contingent capability should be developed and maintained; which
languages, at what competence levels, in what numbers and at what readi-
ness? Not all linguists need to be immediately competent; given a degree
of warning, lower-level linguists can be trained ab initio or higher level
linguists’ skills can be refreshed before having to deploy.
One approach to identifying a requirement would be to better understand
the possible threats to current global systems and what the implications
might be for the UK MOD’s linguist needs. Many credible studies exist
to inform such an analysis, including from the UK MOD’s own studies
organization, the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC). It
publishes, amongst other work, a periodic study on Strategic Trends10 and
a study on the Future Character of Conflict,11 which give insights into pos-
sible future causes of international or regional crises and the possible contri-
butions of the military lever of power to crisis management.
The UK MOD cannot make unilateral assumptions at this level. From a
national perspective, crisis management is cross-Government business, led
by political/diplomatic bodies, and many possible scenarios are unlikely
to have a significant military input. Therefore, UK MOD must look to
the National Security Strategy and its own Strategic Defence and Security
Review12 for further policy on what it should plan to be able to do. Still,
the range of possible demand for military linguists could be wide and deep;
decisions on the future linguist capability will depend on judgements con-
cerning risk (that is, likelihood and impact) and resources that are beyond
the scope of this paper.
What is clear from this is that military linguists will be employed in

a range of scenarios that will stretch their skills and experience. At one
extreme, they may be required to provide interpreting and translation serv-
ices under similar circumstances to civilian professionals, suggesting closer
alignment with civilian practice and standards, in particular for contracted
and LEC linguists. Both communities must respond to the use of language
in new media, such as social messaging, perhaps as a new dialect or a new
transnational culture. However, the greater the physical danger, autonomy
of action, sensitivity of content and need to understand military business,
the more likely that military linguist requirements will diverge from those
of civilian practitioners.
One particular area of divergence might be professional ethics. This is not
to suggest that civilian and military language practitioners might inevitably
drift towards ‘good’ or ‘bad’ ends of the moral spectrum. However, there
may be an assumption that all language practitioners should be neutral,
both in terms of accuracy and in terms of being between opposing parties.
Accuracy of facts may be possible, but the application of culture and con-
text will often make literal interpretation inappropriate, a difficulty for all
linguists. The military linguist must also understand that (s)he is a facilitator
for his/her employer and therefore not only not neutral but active in pursu-
ing the commander’s objectives.
UK military doctrine increasingly recognizes the importance of influence
in achieving campaign objectives, reaching out to the hearts and minds of
all those involved.13 This requires an understanding of culture and an abil-
ity to communicate our messages in a way that third parties understand,
predominantly through language. Therefore, language cannot be neutral
to those engaged with a crisis; if we choose to think otherwise, adversaries
will exploit that choice and undermine our chances of success. Strategic
communication or influence activities are no more or no less acceptable in
crisis management and military operations than they are in commerce; we
accept marketing and advertising. However, there may be a debate to be had
and comparisons might be drawn with anthropology, key to understanding
modern social systems (for instance, the Human Terrain or Human Factor
in military terminology), whose practitioner community has an instinctive
non-interventionist ethic.
A final challenge for the military linguist community is recruiting and
retention. The current model described earlier in this paper has its limita-
tions, so it is likely that if aspirations to improve the UK MOD’s linguist
capability are resourced, it will require the model to change. In order to
retain the necessary motivation, voluntary service is likely to remain the
cornerstone of the capability. Steps could be taken to target recruiting at
those with an existing second language or those who demonstrate some
aptitude for further language training by having other language GCSEs,
A levels or equivalents. However, this action is of limited value where the
naturalized UK-based diaspora with a desirable language is small or, in the

case of recruiting teaching staff or tutors, there are few teaching-trained
native speakers with an equal command of English available.
Given that English schoolchildren are not obliged to learn a second lan-
guage at GCSE level, there must be many potential linguists with aptitude
whose interest in learning a second language may emerge later. The UK
MOD needs to develop a mechanism to identify and foster such potential,
but in a more assured manner. Whilst there are a number of alternative lan-
guage aptitude tests to MLAT, none has a strong correlation with training
outcomes given the number of other success/failure factors in play. Also,
given the additional skills required of a military linguist, it may be that
other psychometric assessments such as Myers–Briggs or emotional intel-
ligence tests may provide stronger or complementary indications of suit-
ability for language training and employment.
Remuneration will probably remain a powerful incentive to meet and
maintain capability requirements, whether as recruitment incentives, quali-
fication awards or daily active use payments. Remuneration can also be in
kind; that is, providing the means by which an individual can be helped
to maintain their skills. Examples include time every year for full-time skill
refresher activity (preferably immersed in a native-speaking community)
and day-to-day access to other-language media to keep cultural and current
affairs knowledge up to date.
Conclusion
The UK MOD’s perspective on the importance of language is clear. Language

skills are an essential capability in support of operations, not just to enable
communication between actors in crisis resolution but also, alongside cul-
tural skills, to enable understanding; understanding of contexts, situations
and the impact of actions. Integrated military language capability is both
slow and expensive to grow and maintain, so there will always be a place
for a civilian contribution to military language needs, either contracted or
locally-employed. The challenge for the future will be to build on the best
practice from the past that will remain relevant in the years to come and to
afford the best balance of capability to meet the most likely and demanding
language needs.
Notes
1. A copy of the SDSR can be found at: http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/
AboutDefence/WhatWeDo/PolicyStrategyandPlanning/SDSR/StrategicDefenceAnd
SecurityReviewsdsr.htm.
2. Example language examinations can be found at: http://www.westminster.ac.uk/

schools/humanities/modleb. A new style and format of examination was intro-
duced in early 2012.
3. Since this paper was written, language TDA responsibility has transferred to the
UK Defence Academy, which now owns DSL. DOLSU is now owned by DCDS
(Pers & Trg) pending transfer to the new Joint Forces Command, which is
expected to become a leading stakeholder for language capability.
4. The SOTR is the aggregated training requirement for future years, based on posts
for which a language-trained incumbent is essential. The requirement is abated
by an estimate of trained personnel returning to linguist employment, reducing
the need for ‘ab initio’ training.
5. This NATO Standardization Agreement can be found at: http://www.bilc.forces.
gc.ca/stanag/index-eng.asp (accessed 21 December 2011).
6. The STANAG allows for ‘+’ suffixes to indicate a standard almost at the next level.
However, the UK assessment system does not recognize a ‘+’ performance.
7. For example, a linguist must accurately convey the difference between ‘there is
a bomb in the market’ and ‘there may be a bomb near the market’ in stressful
circumstances.
8. MLAT is described at: http://www.2lti.com/htm/LangAptitudeTesting.htm
(accessed 21 December 2011).
9. However, up to 10 per cent of a deployed force is likely to be trained to a Basic or
Survival level in a relevant language. Such personnel have another primary role
and use their language skills to support that role, not for interpreting tasks they
do not have the skills to undertake.
10. http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/MicroSite/DCDC/OurPublications/Strategic
Trends+Programme/ (accessed 21 December 2011).
11. http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/MicroSite/DCDC/OurPublications/
Concepts/FutureCharacterOfConflict.htm (accessed 21 December 2011).
12. Both documents are available at: http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/
AboutDefence/WhatWeDo/PolicyStrategyandPlanning/SDSR/StrategicDefenceAn
dSecurityReviewsdsr.htm.
13. There is much unclassified military doctrine available on the DCDC website
(http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/microsite/dcdc/), including publications
on Strategic Communication ( JDN 1/12) and Security and Stabilisation ( JDP 3–40)
(see Chapter 3, ‘Influence: the Central Idea’).
5
The Language Policy of the Italian
Army in the Occupied Slovenian
Territories, 1915–17
Petra Svoljšak
Historical Institute, Scientific Research Centre, Slovenian
Academy of Sciences and Arts, Ljubljana
Language is one of the fundamental constitutive elements of a nation.

However, in the case of the Slovenes, language is also a fundamental ele-
ment of national consciousness, since the Slovenes primarily define them-
selves as a nation on the basis of language and culture. In the long decades
of growing national awareness under the Habsburg Monarchy, a process
most visibly marked by the struggle for the use of Slovene in public life,
especially in education, any violation of hard-won rights was also a threat
to the nation’s body politic. An even greater threat, however, came from the
Italian state and its preconceptions about the intellectual and cultural situa-
tion of the Slovenes, which it clearly propagated throughout its occupation
during the First World War and even more so during the Second World War.
In both instances, the conduct of the Italian authorities may be described
as patronizing, drawing on the two-thousand-year-old Roman tradition and
assumed superiority of Italian culture and aimed at eventually bringing
Slovenian culture and language under its sphere of influence. Hence, it is
little wonder that before the First World War the course of action introduced
by the Italian authorities in the Littoral had already become known as cul-
tural policy. In the Slovenian territory, this cultural policy posed a direct
threat to the very foundations of national existence during both the First
and Second World Wars.
Soon after the unification of Italy, Italian military strategists had begun
to seriously consider the scope and significance of the Slovenian ethnic
territory, which was to be included in the Kingdom of Italy for military
and strategic reasons. The demarcation line of the Treaty of London (1915)
had been drawn as early as 1845 by the military headquarters in Sardinia.
The demarcation of this line was also part of the Italian state leadership’s
This chapter was translated from Slovenian by Manca Gaspersič.
70
Petra Svoljšak 71
political ‘unification’ plans and the aspirations of Italian irredentists to

‘redeem’ the unredeemed brothers and the final unification of Italy. The
plans found their ‘confirmation’ in 1915 through the Treaty of London, the
final act of Italy’s negotiations with both warring sides to obtain the largest
possible territorial acquisition after victory in the First World War.
Before joining the war, the Italian government wanted to know how the
Slovenes and Croats in the Habsburg territories of Trieste, Istria and Gorizia
would react to Italian occupation. It therefore sent to Trieste a shrewd diplomat,
Carlo Galli, with the task of persuading the Slovenes and Croats to acquiesce
to Italian occupation in return for respect of their national rights, especially
cultural freedom and the freedom to use their mother tongue (Svoljšak 1999:
393–408). The astute diplomat built up a clear picture of the Slovenes:
Over the last decades Austria has developed their national culture,
afforded them an independent entity, separate from other Slavic groups,
and elevated to a respectable stature their poets, whose reputation was
formerly limited to the territory inhabited by Slovenes. However, this is
a compact and homogeneous group that congregates around its clergy,
with specific character traits and views that make it important. (Galli
1951: 8)
In his opinion, Italian cultural power would be imposed successfully

through what he called ‘[f]reedom and understanding, as well as broad-
based and open-minded tolerance. And then unlimited trust in Italian civil
and cultural supremacy’ (Galli 1951: 8). Galli also highlighted the differ-
ences between the members of various South Slavic peoples that ought to
be given due consideration when introducing the ‘national’ policy across
the future Italian territories: ‘The Serbo-Croatian sentiment, however, differs
from the Slovenian one. Other than both being Slavs, they are distinguished
by major psychological and educational differences. The Slovenes are mostly
of rural origin and all devout Catholics’ (Galli 1951: 8).
As Galli wrote, he followed the same instructions that Napoleon had given
to General Lafon after the siege of Corsica in 1797: to allow the local popula-
tion to retain their religion, priests and bell-towers, so that they would be
good citizens and love the French, or, in this case, Italians. In order to dem-
onstrate the success of the chosen strategy, the Italian authorities referred to
the domestic example of Venetian Slovenes, who, ‘being allowed at all times
to speak and pray as they please’ (Galli 1951: 8), served as loyal Italian citi-
zens and soldiers. The authorities speculated that if permitted to maintain
their language and culture the Slovenes and Croats would be, in one or two
generations’ time at the most, completely assimilated into Italian culture:
Do we not see, indeed, the enduring Triestine phenomenon of foreign

settlers blending in? Already the sons of the first generation consider and
proclaim themselves Italians, adopting a different language, culture and

national sentiment than their fathers. This holds for the Germans, Slavs,
Jews and other ethnic groups that settle here, including the many Greeks,
who form the most resistant ethnic group to environmental influences[.]
(Galli 1951: 10)
In the first onslaught at the end of May and in June 1915, the Italian Army
seized the Slovenian territory on the right side of the border drawn by the Soča
(It.: Isonzo) Front or, in more general terms, the Soča River, which belonged to
the Province of Gorizia–Gradisca with a population of approximately 260,000.
In the occupied territories (terre occupate) or ‘redeemed territories’ (terre redente),
the Italian Supreme Command took over the political and administrative
authority and established the General Secretariat for Civil Affairs (Segretariato
generale per gli Affari Civili), which in the occupied areas of Trento and the
Soča basin assumed the tasks of civil authority in all spheres of public life.
The goal of the meticulously-planned regime of occupation was to prepare the
occupied territories for the post-war period, when peace negotiations would
confirm their annexation to Italy. However, on arrival in the Slovenian ter-
ritory, the Italian army carried out a series of suppressive measures (arrests,
internments, expulsions and decimation of the civilian population), demon-
strating that the authorities were racked with suspicion of espionage for enemy
interests and were mistrustful of the local population (Svoljšak 2003: 39–90).
Apart from dealing with current administrative and public matters, the
primary task of the Supreme Command was to prepare the occupied territo-
ries for their incorporation into the Kingdom of Italy. Therefore, language
and its use in public were regarded as a basic tool for achieving a gradual
but effective fusion of public administrative and ‘domestic’ Italian life. The
language used by public administrative services was Italian, although during
the initial stage of the occupation military decrees, especially those concern-
ing public security and the movement of the population, were issued both
in Italian and Slovene. On the other hand, the orders issued by the Supreme
Command and documents drawn up by civil authorities were written in
Italian, whereas mayors and judges had the discretion to decide whether
or not their decrees would also be published in Slovene. Public offices also
accepted Slovenian personal, municipal and church documents, which were
translated by authorized officers and then subjected to routine bureaucratic
procedures. Transactions between a civil commissioner, who maintained the
broadest range of direct contacts with the civilian population, and munici-
palities were facilitated by the domestic officials’ command of the Italian
language and the presence of Italian officials in the civil administration. The
occupying forces considered such a language policy as compliant with the
principle of official use of the state (Italian) language, while at the same time
having no prejudice against the use of the language spoken in the occupied
territory in matters concerning the civilian population.
Petra Svoljšak 73
The next step towards establishing the Italian language in the Slovenian
territory and setting the groundwork for the future was a systematic trans-
formation or adjustment of Slovenian personal and family names, as well
as Slovenian toponyms, to Italian orthography. As early as February 1915,
the Italian De Agostini Geographical Institute had published a map that
determined the new Italian–Austrian border crossing the Slovenian territory
and labelled Slovenian places with Italian names. The border of the so-called
Italian Alps was delineated by the watershed of the Soča and Sava Rivers.
The author described the language conditions with the use of various col-
ours but left areas higher than 1300 metres above sea level without a colour
mark indicating who lived there, in order to demonstrate the scarcity of the
Slovenian population and the logical soundness of the use of Italian place
names (Svoljšak 2003: 140–2). Toponymy was therefore a crucial part of the
preparations for the incorporation of ‘unredeemed’ provinces into the ‘home’
country. To this end, a special toponomastic commission was set up which, in
spring 1916, embarked on developing a framework for place-name reform.
The first ‘problem’ was encountered during the preparation of a statistical
analysis of the occupied territories that was made at the end of August 1916,
after Italy’s occupation of Gorizia. The instructions issued by the Supreme
Command recommended using place names as they appeared on maps and
replacing the ‘arbitrary’ designations of the Austrian administration with
the original ones used by the local population. With regard to ‘Slavic names,
especially those in the upper Gorizia province, they introduced topography
consistent with Italian pronunciation and accentuation, which was also
used on Venetian maps’.1 Even though the Italian authorities generally
complied with international regulations banning legal acts on place-name
changes during military occupation and prior to annexation, they began
to take the first active steps towards place-name reform as early as 1917.
This was as much for the sake of bringing the new place names into direct
practical use in the civil administration and armed services as for ‘having all
the necessary elements ready, complete and reviewed when the time comes
for the government’s final act in this area’.2 Therefore, in February 1917 the
Supreme Command set up a special toponomastic commission whose task
was to lay down the general principles of reconstructing and transforming
the place nomenclature in the occupied territories.
Slovenian place names were thus to be brought in line with the graphic
and phonetic requirements of the Italian language or translated into Italian,
such as Kobarid (in Slovenian) to Caporetto (in Italian), Bovec (Slo.) to
Plezzo (It.) or Mount Krn to Monte Nero. Names were to remain unchanged
only when the foreign forms were not translated either by Italians nor by
Italian-speaking Slovenes, or when the Slovene language form sounded
Italian enough to cause no orthographic problems. At the end of 1917, the
draft manual of place names, containing more than 2500 entries, was sub-
mitted for approval.
Every last piece of the occupied territories, the newspaper Slovenski narod
wrote with indignation, was given an Italian name.3 The streets of one small
village, Kojsko, which had mostly been spared the ravages of war, were
renamed Via Avellino, Via Toscana, Piazza Forli’ and Corso Vittorio Emanuele.
In Kobarid, too, the locals could now take a stroll along Via Vittorio Emanuele
and Via Cividale. ‘Oddly, however, the monument to Volarič and the memo-
rial plaque on his birth house remained intact.’4 Everything was Italianized,
according to the reports of the newspaper Slovenski narod:
Italian inscriptions, Italian officers, Italian military, Italian schools,

courts, municipal offices, everything instantly became Italian. . . . The
Slovene language was confined to the Church. And even there it would
rarely be heard, since who on earth would want to attract the attention
of an Italian surveillance officer well-versed in Slovene standing in God’s
temple, listening and reporting on conversations. The Italian authorities
found it difficult to tolerate the Slovene language even in church.5
Despite the Italians’ painstaking efforts to present Slovenian places as a

natural part of the Italian state, external observers noted that it was not so.
A war correspondent for the London Times, John Carriage, who visited the
Soča front after completing his coverage of the situation in Serbia, wrote
in the Journal de Genève about the Slovenes in Gorizia, whom he named
Yugoslavs and who, to his surprise, spoke a ‘Yugoslav dialect’. When he
inquired where they had come or fled from, he realized that they were, in
fact, natives living on Slovenian soil. The newspaper Slovenec summarized
his report with the following words: ‘He was bewildered, having always
taken the area as Italian; and Italian papers would constantly write about
the unredeemed brothers who were longing for their caring mother to take
them back in her arms.’6 The Slovene language was thus confined to liturgi-
cal use, as it would later be in the second half of the 1920s and 1930s, when
the Slovenian population of the Julian March was placed under the control
of the Italian Fascist government (Svoljšak 1997: 115–36).
The Italian occupational authorities were most effective and efficient in
introducing Italian in the Slovenian territory with the youngest genera-
tions of the Slovenian population, especially in the education of Slovenian
children. After all, the language education of the future citizens of the
Kingdom of Italy was regarded as the most successful strategy for prepar-
ing the population for its future annexation to the Kingdom of Italy. One
should bear in mind that the General Secretariat was the ‘assembly centre’
of Italian irredentists, who during the war had already been trying to take
an active part in the administration of the occupied territories and hence
the realization of the Risorgimento in the (future) Julian March. They were
also the most committed to the covert objective of the Italian occupational
authorities – the thorough preparation of the occupied territories for the
Petra Svoljšak 75
post-war period – which was nowhere so clearly manifested as in the organi-

zation of educational activities. The establishment of the General Secretariat
was actually an ‘experiment in administrative practice, with which Italy
aimed to undertake the administration of the eastern provinces’ (Andri and
Mellinato 1994: 1–2). With such an office in place, along with the additional
setting-up of a political-administrative office that would take charge of
administering civil matters, the Italian government was able to successfully
coordinate the advances of the Italian Army during the first months after
the war. The inhabitants of the occupied territories to be annexed to Italy
after the war would thus perceive the Italian army not as an occupying force
but as a liberating army which had from the very beginning worked towards
their welfare. Thus, the administration became the first sphere in which the
paternalistic way of understanding the problems of the occupied or ‘unre-
deemed’ territory found its expression. This interpretation of the occupying
policy was adopted by the Italian government as well as by the royal circle.
The Slovenian inhabitants of Friuli viewed the arrival of the occupying
army and its administration with great distrust and suspicion. However,
whereas the Italian authorities were prudent in their expectations of an
enthusiastic reception, the Italian soldiers apparently expected nothing less
than a warm welcome. As one newspaper wrote at the time: ‘a Slovene is a
quiet and patient man and he believes that the present situation in his area
will continue for some time, but not indefinitely’.7 The same opinion was
held by some Italian soldiers. Mario Mariani described his meeting with the
Slovenian population as follows:
On our entering the territory, the population did not receive us with
open arms, but neither did they show hostility. They remained quiet,
somewhat gloomy and distant . . . The Slavs [that is, the local Slovenian
population] are as much loyal to Austria as the settlers in the valley of
the Natisone are to Italy. [They] maintain their own dialect, legends and
poetry, some distinctive features of their life, mysticism; they have a calm
and contemplative character, and suppressed passion. (Pavan 1997: 389)
Only rare representatives of the Italian occupational regime could fully

grasp the complexity and delicacy of the military occupation. The most
sympathetic stance towards the population of the occupied territories was
certainly demonstrated by the Commander of Kobarid, General Achille
Papa, who endeavoured throughout his term to win the trust of the local
inhabitants and acquired a very realistic understanding of the situation:
They are quite suspicious, the Slovenes; however, I still think I was able
to placate them, and they seem to have embraced the idea of an enter-
tainment facility. Now I ought to be carefully navigating between their
suspicions and the suspicions of the commanders . . . We must penetrate
into the population without hurting their feelings or colliding with their
language, which they hold so dear. It will be a time-consuming, arduous
job, but we must undertake it without delay and prove that the current
war was a necessity for us and that we proceed with the best intentions
wherever we can to alleviate the horrendous damage that the war is caus-
ing. (Martinelli 1989: 67)
But how was it possible to win over the distrustful, unfriendly and despond-
ent Slovenian (and Friulian) population? There were various ways to attain
the objective, and the educational system made the biggest strides in this
process (as indicated by the Commander of Kobarid) by targeting the
youngest generation, which could be influenced on both a material and
educational level. In disregard of binding international rules prohibiting
any change to the existing legal and administrative (in the Slovenian terri-
tory, the Austrian) regime, the Italian occupying authorities introduced the
most drastic measures precisely in this very sphere, in education. They thus
set up a completely new educational system that was, indeed, adapted to
wartime conditions but in its essence was completely Italian.
In the early stage of the occupation, the General Secretariat had estab-
lished its fundamental positions on the organization of the educational sys-
tem in the occupied territories in the document La scuola nei territori occupati
(Schools in the Occupied Territories).8 This was a typical attempt at ‘aligning’
the old system ‘with the demands’ of the new times and making it ‘compat-
ible with the character of our [Italian] liberal institutions’.9 Despite initial
plans to retain the existing teachers, most of them were soon held politically
unreliable and were replaced with irredentist refugee teachers (from Austria-
Hungary) or teachers from Italian border provinces. But, regardless of the
initial commitment to abide by international legal norms in administering
the occupied territories, the General Secretariat made drastic changes in the
educational system in the very first year of the occupation, once it realized
that it would be utterly impossible to align the rigid and outdated Austrian
system with the idea of the nation and nationalism that fed from the irre-
dentist well.
Introducing the Italian educational system was an extremely complex
issue, not only because of purely administrative questions but also, and
above all, because of linguistic problems and other substantial problems
that confronted the Italian administration in the occupied territories. At the
same time, this was also a question of the complete incompatibility of the
Austrian and Italian educational systems and their relative effectiveness
in eliminating illiteracy. In this regard one should not ignore the fact that
nearly 90 per cent of the Slovenian population was literate. This figure was
also known to the Italian authorities, and, compared to the 55 per cent liter-
acy rate in the most developed Italian provinces (Piedmont and Lombardy),
presented them with a unique challenge (Vivante 1945: 153).
Petra Svoljšak 77
Before the outbreak of war, schools in the (occupied) Slovenian territories

provided Slovene-language instruction. This had allowed for Italian to be
taught as a second foreign language, but the idea was never put into prac-
tice, with German-language instruction gaining a foothold (Svoljšak 2008:
356–64). Hence, the establishment of schools with Italian as the language
of instruction posed a political and national problem, as well as a specific
educational issue (Svoljšak 2003: 219–76).
Although Italian was the designated official language in the occupied
territories, the central occupying authorities were aware that the introduc-
tion of Italian as the exclusive language of instruction was a delicate matter.
Mention should also be made of the unfruitful initiative of the military
chaplain and Barnabite, Pater Giovanni Semeria, who in November 1916
suggested that bilingual schools be introduced in Slovenian-populated areas
of the Julian March in compliance with the principle of nationality. Prime
Minister Paolo Boselli and Secretary General D’Adamo merely took note of
his suggestion without ever giving it any serious consideration (Svoljšak
2003: 222–3).
The question regarding the language of instruction was closely connected
with the organization of instruction, which was affected by the overall
wartime situation in the occupied territory. From the technical point of
view, the commencement of instruction was thwarted by the occupation of
school buildings by the Italian army and the lack of security at the immedi-
ate rear of the front line. In the hope that the situation would soon improve,
the General Secretariat nevertheless continued making plans for schools for
Slovenian children in the occupied territory. However, it was immediately
confronted by two problems. The first was the shortage of teachers with
knowledge of Slovene and the ability to adapt Slovene-language instruction
so that, rather than serving as a tool for fuelling distrust or even direct anti-
Italian propaganda, it would contribute to the peaceful assimilation that the
occupation had, according to the Italian authorities, successfully introduced
in all other spheres of public life. The second problem was the scarcity of
Slovene-language textbooks which could be replaced with Austrian ones,
since ‘a thorough revision showed that the hatred towards Italy and the
unbearable fetishism of the Austrian supremacy emanated even from the
commandments of the catechism and mathematical numerals’.10
Any measure taken by the occupying authorities with regard to teachers
and textbooks would inevitably have political implications, especially for the
future. However, aware also of the fact that it would be equally harmful and
politically erroneous to leave an educational vacuum, the Italian authori-
ties decided to introduce a substitute form of instruction which was to be
of a temporary nature. They therefore opted for a special programme to be
implemented within the framework of special institutions called educational
entertainment facilities. Since the establishment of a Slovenian school during
the war would provoke a wave of dissatisfaction in Italy, especially in groups
that were against any kind of acquiescence to Slovenes within ‘the natural
borders of their new homeland’, instruction was to be adapted in such a way
as to create appropriate conditions for gradual and peaceful assimilation.
Selecting this format of curriculum, which did not constitute ‘proper
school’, was a way for D’Adamo to postpone the actual decision-making on
the language of instruction until after the war, so as not to prejudice decisions
about the post-war arrangements. In Kobarid, General Papa once again took
heed of the apprehension with which the Slovenian inhabitants received the
introduction of Italian, and he allowed Slovene instruction. He knew that it
‘would be not be wise . . . at the moment to impose our language’ (Martinelli
1989: 68), but on the other hand he firmly believed that it would not be long
before the population of Kobarid began to speak in Italian. In any event, the
free form of curriculum ensured greater freedom of language use, and there
were many possibilities to introduce more flexible and attractive work meth-
ods, among which the Secretary General highlighted:
generous school nutrition (three meals daily) and giving out presents
such as shoes and clothing, which has and will continue to win many
sympathies, even among families that are generally opposed to our occu-
pation and especially to any form of schooling that should follow in the
future, almost naturally, through this gradual, harmless and benevolent
effort. (Martinelli 1989: 68)
Failing to understand this generosity, the newspaper Slovenski narod wrote

that:
Kobarid . . . had an Italian face on the outside, but its heart was Slovenian.
Kobarid’s Slovenian heart was breaking with despair when mothers were
forced to send their children to Italian schools where they were mostly
taught to shout: eviva Italia! [long live Italy!]11
Just before the end of the first Italian occupation, the educational authori-
ties organized additional training programmes for teachers from the occu-
pied territories to equip them with knowledge of Italian teaching methods
and help them obtain permission to teach. The training programmes
focused, above all, on infusing the curriculum with a strong national con-
notation. This especially applied to the Italian language, pedagogy, history
and geography, and even to mathematics, drawing, penmanship, and physi-
cal education – subjects that were undergoing the most drastic ‘reform’. The
new Italian curriculum placed major emphasis on homeland geography
(geografia patria) and the history of the Italian Risorgimento; Italian instruc-
tion began in the second grade, after first-graders had acquired basic skills
in reading and penmanship, which was based on block handwriting as ‘the
most hygienic style of writing, forcing the pupil to sit straight rather than
Petra Svoljšak 79
developing bad habits that negatively affect the spine’.12 The Italian lan-
guage was taught mostly through daily dictations and corrections and was
improved with reading comprehension, while lessons in Italian grammar
would only follow later. Arithmetic and mathematics were given proper
attention in all grades. While religious instruction was optional, choir lessons
were compulsory for all grades, so that children learned the Italian national
anthem as soon as possible. Whereas the selection of teaching methods was
left to teachers, the educational authorities recommended regular commu-
nication between teachers and pupils, many practical exercises and drawing
in all school subjects, as well as out-of-classroom learning, practical lessons,
working with newspapers, picture-postcards and illustrations, school exhibi-
tions and natural science instruction in a natural environment.
With a view to ensuring the smoothest possible learning process in the
occupied territories, the Italian authorities provided all necessary teach-
ing accessories and thus equipped every school with spelling books, abaci,
flexible rulers and scales; the walls of every school lobby were covered with
posters featuring the four directions of the sky and the measuring system.
Classrooms were decorated with portraits of the King, photographs of princes,
and didactic pictures and images from the history of the Risorgimento. Other
indispensable accessories were maps of Italy and historical atlases, notebooks
and textbooks. Textbooks that were selected for pupils from the occupied
territories and primarily focused on geographical–historical content were free
for all pupils or, rather, were bought by every (occupied) municipality. The
authorities made use of existing libraries and organized reference libraries,
and the occupied territories were also supplied with travelling libraries. By
promoting intense ‘literary’ activities, the General Secretariat aimed to cre-
ate a satisfactory book collection in every school that would serve as a basis
for the future organization of popular and school libraries, while during the
occupation the founding and reviving of libraries was carried out in compli-
ance with principles determined by the central, Milan-based federation of
Italian popular libraries (Federazione italiana delle Biblioteche Popolari).
During the war, libraries in the occupied territories had already become hon-
orary members of the Bologna-based National Association for Elementary
School Libraries (Associazione Nazionale per le Biblioteche delle scuole
elementare). In a spirit of friendly cooperation, the association prepared six
hundred ‘patriotic bundles’ ( pacchi patriottici) of books and brochures for
the new members to make sure that ‘love of good literature spreads ever
more widely, from schools to families, to become a popular custom and thus
effectively contribute not only to general culture but also to imparting the
sentiment that fosters and strengthens national consciousness’.13
The organization of the educational system also served as a safety measure
by enabling the authorities to remove children from the streets, and as a
social and healthcare measure by subjecting pupils to physical examination
and vaccination against infectious diseases and providing them with food
and clothes. During the war, these services were of invaluable importance,
especially at the time when the population of the Austro-Hungarian prov-
inces was struggling with rapidly deteriorating standards of living as a
direct result of the severe economic and social crisis (Svoljšak 2009: 107–9).
On the other hand, it is important to recall the long-term objective of the
Italian administration, that is, its step-by-step preparations for establishing
the Italian education system and incorporating the occupied territory into
the Italian state. A high-ranking Italian official described such a policy as
expensive but effective (Ojetti 1964: 37).
On account of their difficult living conditions, children had difficulty
embracing the new school and educational system. The educational authori-
ties indeed tolerated a more relaxed approach towards teaching the Italian
language, but teachers devoted more attention to geography and history,
which were supposed to raise children’s awareness of belonging to the
Italian nation. This belief was to be strengthened through correspondence
between Slovenian and Italian pupils, which was also promoted by the
Italian senator Pio Foà, who was then the president of the Italian Union for
Popular Education (Unione Italiana dell’Educazione Popolare). Foà saw this
as a basis ‘for building new connections of sympathy and solidarity between
the new and the old provinces of Italy’.14
The correspondence of Slovenian children with their Italian peers was an
important aspect of learning Italian, and a means through which the Italian
authorities encouraged the ‘exchange’ of brotherly feelings and promotion
of literacy in the Italian language. In addition to regarding correspondence
as a pleasant and useful exercise in writing, the Italian authorities also saw
it as an opportunity to imbue children with the Italian spirit. Furthermore,
in order for the transfer of subjects taught to be successful and given the
specific (re-)educational mission of the regime, much care was invested in
the teachers recruited by new Italian schools. They were Italian refugees who
came from provinces bordering on the ‘liberated’ territories and possessed
an intimate knowledge of the neighbouring places, customs and traditions,
which made them all the more competent to carry out the educational tasks
assigned to them by the Italian government. Schools also recruited profes-
sional teachers – soldiers whose work was organized and supervised by the
Union of Italian Teachers for the National War, which was responsible for
spiritual propaganda. Nevertheless, Italian teachers would not have been
able to perform their everyday school work successfully without the help of
local women, former teachers, who served as an indispensable communica-
tion link between teachers and pupils.
Following the developments in the Italian educational system and its
impact on the occupied territory, Slovenian newspapers concluded with res-
ignation that ‘little bright [Slovenian] minds will soon speak Italian’.15 On
the other hand, senior Italian officials described the educational work as the
foundation for the inclusion of the population of the occupied territories in
Petra Svoljšak 81
the new homeland and as ‘an act of spiritual liberation, endurance, invig-
oration and planting new seeds, an act that will, wherever it reaches, open
little souls to discovering the Homeland’.16
Alongside, and in close connection, with language policy, the strategy
of incorporating the occupied territories into the post-war state framework
attributed an important role to celebrating Italian national holidays, which
proved to be one of the most effective and efficient ways to establish Italian
authority in the occupied territories. This was a tool of mass and thunder-
ous propaganda that the ‘redeemed territories’ were a self-evident part of the
Italian state territory. The cult of the fallen (Italian) soldiers was carefully
maintained with commemorations and further strengthened by epic narra-
tives of about the Risorgimento and other heroic events from the Italian past.
The most convenient breeding ground for so-called patriotic feelings was, of
course, schools, where ‘children would march in parades, all wearing Italian
cockades with the Heart of Jesus (!) imprinted in them and holding Italian
flags’,17 even though celebrations were generally intended for the entire popu-
lation. Clamorous speeches by military commissioners or army corps com-
manders, accompanied by military bands and recitals of so-called patriotic
poetry, gymnastic shows, didactic exhibitions, essays and drawings, were used
as means to commemorate ‘patriotic’ events, anniversaries of the occupation,
victory and the seizure of Gorizia, the Capture of Rome on 20 September
1870,18 the Day of the Dead, as well as birthdays of the members of the royal
family, which were ideal opportunities for reawakening patriotic sentiment.
Re-education within the framework of school instruction was conducted
as part of civic education. To this end, the Italian authorities even enabled
the use of advanced technological methods and means. They distributed
books among the population for the purposes of propaganda, the success of
which was, according to the Secretary General, infallible:
[T]he act of spiritual liberation . . . was persistent, invigorating, fruit-

ful and intended, wherever it would reach, to open children’s souls to
the knowledge of the Homeland, which was systematically denied by
the Austrian regime; it is a propagandistic act, in the highest sense of the
term, that has – given that the Italian sentiment was perhaps somewhat
superimposed upon but never effaced by the Austrian government –
planted the seed into fertile soil. (General Secretariat [n.d.]: 1)
However, the thunderous celebrations did little to convince the local

inhabitants to trust the Italian authorities. This did not escape the notice of
Mussolini when he made a repeat visit to Kobarid on 15 February 1916. On
that occasion, he wrote with disappointment:
The population has not changed either. When I entered a few shops
I could still find the same mysterious faces I encountered the first time.
No. These Slovenes have yet to grow fond of us. They tolerate us with
resignation and covert hostility. They think that we are merely passing
through, that we do not intend to stay, and they are not willing to com-
promise themselves in case their masters of yesterday return tomorrow.
(Mussolini 1992: 141)
On 27 October 1917, following the Austro-German army’s successful inva-

sion in the Twelfth Soča Offensive, the Italian military administration
withdrew from the Slovenian territory to Padua, thus bringing an end to
the twenty-nine-month occupation. The period between November 1917
and the end of the war was in administrative terms a period of relative anar-
chy; the displaced population slowly returned to their ruined homes, and
provincial representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy began organ-
izing the post-war reconstruction from Vienna, where they had fled at the
outbreak of the war between Italy and Austria-Hungary. Nevertheless, the
Italian authorities would not surrender their control over the territory they
had temporarily lost and, in anticipation of victory, they hastened plans for
a renewed occupation in compliance with the Treaty of London. The occu-
pation began immediately after the signing of an armistice on 4 November
1918, bringing to culmination the aspirations of the Italian national move-
ment, Italia Irredenta and Italian official politics about the unification of
the Italian national territory. Occupational administration was entrusted to
the same office as it had been during the war and to the same personnel,
since such a solution was considered (until January 1919) to provide a solid
and tested backbone of administration. However, the new (or exacerbated)
problem that was now facing the authorities in the Julian March was the
multi-ethnic composition of the population, with 450,000 Slovenes and
Croats living within the borders of the new Kingdom of Italy (Svoljšak 1997:
115–36).
During the first days of the occupation the Governor of the Julian March,
General Carlo Petitti di Roreto, issued a series of measures that had an espe-
cially devastating impact on the inhabitants of the occupied areas, such as
the disarmament of national guards, the establishment of a military court,
the introduction of press censorship, a ban on movement across the demar-
cation line and unauthorized movement in the Julian March, and the prohi-
bition of unauthorized public gatherings. Soon afterwards there followed an
order prohibiting the public use of Yugoslav and Austrian flags and Yugoslav
tricolour cockades. Due to stringent regulations, Slovenian intellectuals
started to flee to the State of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs within the very
first days of the occupation. At the same time, the inhabitants of the Littoral
organized a petition for the incorporation of the province into Yugoslavia,
and the population in the occupied Slovenian municipalities collected sig-
natures for a letter of protest against the Italian occupation. Due to Italy’s
violation of the armistice provisions and its strict regime of occupation, the
Petra Svoljšak 83
Littoral Slovenes submitted to the central authorities of the SHS State and
to the authorities in Trieste their demand to replace the Italian army with
the Allied Forces. This, however, was to no avail. The Italian authorities
retaliated by further intensifying their measures in the Julian March, which
mostly resulted in internments and deportations of the civil population and
men eligible for the draft.
The main wave of internments hit the Julian March in February and March
1919, mostly targeting teachers, priests, officials and doctors. The military
administration of the occupied territories lasted until 1 August 1919, when
civil administration was passed into the control of the Central Office for the
New Provinces (Ufficio centrale per le Nuove provincie) led by the Italian
irredentist Francesco Salata. Having isolated Slovenian areas from their nat-
ural hinterlands, the Italian occupation caused national, social, economic
and political change that wreaked havoc on the local population. In January
1919 the Paris Peace Conference was convened to settle the border dispute
between Italy and Yugoslavia. This was finalized or, rather, confirmed by the
bilateral Treaty of Rapallo in November 1920, which annexed the occupied
territories to the Kingdom of Italy (Svoljšak 1997: 127–36).
In the second half of the 1920s, Fascism gradually and systematically under-
mined the democratic foundations of the Italian state while simultaneously
intensifying nationalist pressure on the Slovenian and Croatian minority. The
beginning of the systematic denationalization of the Slovenian and Croatian
minority in the Julian March was foreboded by the educational reform,
also known as ‘Gentile’s Reform’, which – though coming into force on
7 October 1923 – had its origins in the decade before World War I. This edu-
cational reform modernized the obsolete Italian school system. As regarded
the Slovenian educational system in the Littoral, which had comprised 321
primary and secondary schools before World War I, it prescribed the introduc-
tion of Italian as the language of instruction in primary schools from the first
grade onwards. The language of minorities could only be taught as an extra-
curricular subject at the behest of parents, but only until 1925, when Italian
was mandated as the exclusive language of instruction. By 1927, around four
hundred Slovenian and Croatian primary schools in the Julian March had
been converted into Italian schools, forcing 1000 Slovenian and Croatian
teachers into retirement. Thenceforth, Slovene was taught by Slovenian
priests who managed to preserve the Slovene language and culture by confin-
ing social life within the church walls (Kacin-Wohinz and Verginella 2008).
With regard to military occupations and their consequences, World War I
demonstrated that the upper hand in post-war border negotiations lies with
the state that has acquired positions during the preceding war. This holds
especially true for Italy’s policies during the First World War. Having devel-
oped a meticulous administration system, it set solid foundations for the
future, even in the sphere of nationality policy, which further intensified
after the war and became the backbone of violent nationalism.
Notes
1. Archivio centrale dello Stato (Rome), Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Guerra
Europea, Paesi stranieri occupati dall’Esercito Italiano, fasc. 19-2-64. Prospetti
statistici della Provincia di Gorizia e Gradisca e del Trentino ed Ampezzano.
2. R. Esercito Italiano, Comando Supremo, Segretariato Generale per gli Affari
Civili, ‘La gestione dei servizi civili’. Relazione, Fascicolo II, 31 October 1917: 23.
Hereafter ‘La gestione’.
3. Slovenski narod 11 (15 January 1915): 9.
4. ‘Črtice o Kobaridu’, Slovenec 262 (25 November 1917): 5. Hrabroslav Volarič
(b. Kobarid, 1863; d. Devin/Duino near Trieste, 1895) was a Slovene composer
and choir leader.
5. Slovenski narod 281 (7 December 1917): 4.
6. ‘Anglež o slovenskih Brdih’, Slovenec 105 (8 May 1917): 1–2.
7. Slovenski narod 232, 9 October 1915, p. 2.
8. Issued by Regio esercito italiano, Comando Supremo, Segretariato generale per gli
affari civili.
9. ‘La gestione’, Relazioni I: 71.
10. ACS, PCM, Paesi stranieri occupati dallÈsercito italiano, fasc. 19-2-70, Istruzione
scolastica nei territori occupati.
11. Slovenski narod 281 (7 December 1917): 4.
12. PANG, Civilni komisariat za politični okraj Tolmin 1915–1917, Programma didat-
tico, 1 November 1916.
13. ‘La gestione’, Relazione II: 55.
14. ‘La gestione’, Relazione II: 56.
15. Slovenec 262 (15 November 1917): 4–5.
16. ACS, PCM, GE, Paesi stranieri occupati dall’Esercito italiano, fasc. 19-2-70. Padre
Semeria, ‘Proposta di organizzare le scuole popolari nei paesi sloveni della Venezia
Giulia di tipo bilinguo. Istruzione scolastica nei territori occupati’.
17. Slovenec 262 (15 November 1917): 4–5.
18. On 20 September 1870, the bersaglieri, led by General Raffaelo Cadorna, had
attacked Rome near Porta Pia and crushed the resistance of the army of Pius IX
(‘the Breach of Porta Pia’), completing the unification of Italy.
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6
Mediating for the Third Reich: On
Military Translation Cultures in
World War II in Northern Finland
Pekka Kujamäki
University of Eastern Finland
Finland was involved in three military conflicts in World War II: the Winter
War (1939–40), the Continuation War (1942–4) and the so-called Lapland
War. Unlike the Winter War against the USSR, in which international sup-
port had been minimal, Finland started the second war as an ally of Nazi
Germany in its offensive to the East, that is, in Operation Barbarossa. In
Finnish Lapland, the cooperation created an exceptional wartime con-
text, ‘a Finnish–German zone, in which the military leadership was in the
hands of the Germans but the civilian administration in those of the Finns’
(Lähteenmäki 1999: 241).1 Three years later, in autumn 1944, this alliance
turned into a Finnish–German confrontation on Finnish territory, the so-
called Lapland War, as the peace terms imposed by the USSR dictated that
Finnish troops must drive the Germans out of Northern Finland.
Like any other war, military encounters with the Soviet enemy, or with
brothers-in-arms of the Third Reich, were social encounters of a special kind
in which – stereotypically – weapons were used but in which language use,
including translation and interpreting, also played a significant role: wars
had declarations, reports and narratives made about them for other nations,
and conditions of peace were negotiated between the parties (see Baker
2006: 2). Military manoeuvres were planned in headquarters on the basis
of intelligence reports, and for this purpose prisoners were captured and
interrogated on the front, in the rear area or in the prisoners-of-war camps.
Military occupation was established with communicative acts, problems
in logistics and maintenance of troops were solved with local inhabitants,
and – finally – disagreements between local authorities, civilians and mili-
tary representatives were negotiated in official or unofficial meetings.
For almost six years, the three wars created a multi-national and mul-
tilingual setting in which the practice of translation and interpreting was
constantly present though often forgotten – not only in research on mili-
tary history but also in translation studies. This goes for the international
as well as the Finnish historiography of World War II, in which military
86
Pekka Kujamäki 87
language mediation policies or the translators or interpreters as subjects

have remained, until quite recently, largely invisible.2 This is, however,
hardly surprising, considering that it was only at the turn of the millennium
that historical research in Finland started to move from descriptions of war
to the description of individual experiences of war. As Markku Jokisipilä
(2009: 188) puts it: ‘The image of war has become more fragmented and
individualized. Historical research is more and more interested in the fates
of the group of people previously neglected like women, children and vari-
ous minorities.’ Translators and interpreters working in military conflicts
certainly belong to this group of neglected people, perhaps for the simple
reason that historians have been unaware of the experiences and potential
agency of these seemingly innocent and neutral subjects.3 This situation
is now changing, both internationally and in Finland. In January 2011,
a research project funded by the Finnish Academy was launched to take
a closer look at translation and interpreting practices during the aforemen-
tioned Finnish military conflicts. The first observations of this project are
made in this chapter.
Towards military translation cultures: fields of practice
As the title of the Finnish project – In Search of Military Translation

Cultures – indicates, the communicative situations and mediation practices
are approached as ‘military translation cultures’. The concept ‘translation
culture’ (Translationskultur) was coined by Erich Prunč in 1997 to denote a
set of socially determined norms, conventions, expectations and values of
all those involved in translation and interpreting activities in a given society
or institution. The concept opens up a socio-cultural perspective on transla-
tion and interpreting, a perspective in which the actual practice is combined
with the normative–ideological professional space as well as the status of
the practice and the practitioners in the particular society. For Prunč (2007:
331), ‘translation culture’ is a social construct: it reflects the social agree-
ment and disagreement over acceptable, recommended and obligatory
forms of translation and interpreting in a given time and space.4
Through this definition, Prunč’s concept creates a link to official lan-
guage mediation policies as well as to the unofficial practices and personal
agencies of those involved as military interpreters and translators in the
military operations on the Finnish–Russian front, in the headquarters or
with the Third Reich troops stationed in Northern Finland. In addition to
the descriptions of translation cultures and translation events (‘tasks’) in
general, the project seeks to reconstruct translator and interpreter profiles
with information on their ethnic background, education, language skills
and training in interpreting and translation tasks. Special attention is paid
to networks of interaction and the status of translators and interpreters
in different social settings of military practice. For this objective, Michael
Cronin’s (2002, 2006) concepts of autonomous translation or interpret-

ing strategies (military forces use their own professionals or otherwise
linguistically-versed people) versus heteronymous translation or interpreting
strategies (military forces have recourse to the services of natives to interpret
for them) are of central importance. Using Cronin’s concepts, a German
‘Divisionsdolmetscher’ working in the German headquarters in Rovaniemi
could be regarded as a case of autonomous interpreting, whereas a Finnish
civilian interpreting between German pilots and Finnish airport mechanics
would constitute an example of heteronymous interpreting. However, Cronin’s
categories are only seemingly clear-cut and easy to apply. The problem is
that at least in the context of Northern Finland, where several nationalities
were involved, determining the narrative figure of ‘us’ as opposite to the
‘other’ or ‘them’ is not as simple as is, for example, implied by the opposi-
tion of ‘colonizer’ and ‘natives’ in Cronin’s concepts.
The project has drawn on various research materials in the reconstruction
of military translation cultures: information extracted from biographies
and academic writings on military history have been used as shortcuts to
hypotheses on translation cultures and translators’ or interpreters’ identities.
War novels are analysed as fictional representations (‘narratives’) of military
translation and interpreting situations. Additional important information is
anticipated from ‘oral history’, that is, from interviewees who experienced
language mediation situations or worked as translators and interpreters dur-
ing World War II. The most significant research material, however, is to be
obtained from archived records in Finnish, German and Russian national
and military archives.
The following account is a summary of information that has been
extracted mainly from academic writings on military history and memoirs.
These findings point to four military contexts with potential military trans-
lation cultures. In this first phase of research, however, fields of translation
and interpreting practice referring to geographical locations and to different
fields of military activity will be established; the concept of ‘field’ also cre-
ates a handy allusion to wartime fields of combat. The information on trans-
lation and interpreting practice as well as norms, conventions and values
obtained so far is not yet sufficient to define wartime translation cultures
in depth.
The four contexts and fields are as follows:
1. The Finnish–Soviet military front and rear area in Eastern Finland as well
as behind the Red Army lines: handling of prisoners-of-war (POWs) on
both sides of the front. Use of interpreters and translators in the inter-
rogation of POWs for intelligence purposes. Organization and daily man-
agement of POW camps by the Home Office, including the allocation of
interpreters in the camps. Use of East Karelian POWs as interpreters in the
camps (see Pasanen, 2011).
Pekka Kujamäki 89
2. The Finnish General Staff in Mikkeli: use of linguists and other academics
for processing material from encoded Soviet radio messages and docu-
ments. Translation of intelligence reports for German liaison officers.
The role and mediation practice of German translators and interpreters
in German liaison staff (Verbindungsstab Nord) in Mikkeli.
3. The city of Helsinki with the State Information Bureau (Valtion tiedoi-
tuslaitos): production and translation of radio and newspaper bulletins
by linguists from foreign broadcasts and newspaper materials and the
production and translation of propaganda materials for distribution
abroad.
4. The Finnish–German Zone in Northern Finland: mediation practices of
Finnish liaison officers, German interpreters and Finnish civilians in the
collaboration of German and Finnish troops as well as in negotiations
between German troops and the Finnish civilian administration and
local inhabitants. Interpreting practice in German camps (Stammlager) for
Soviet POWs.
The following discussion focuses on the Finnish–German Zone, introducing

the specific circumstances in Northern Finland from 1941 to 1945 and then
discussing the most important interpreting and translation activities and
actors in these fields.
On the German presence in Lapland
From June 1941 to September 1944, large parts of Finnish territory were
occupied by the armed forces of the Third Reich. The specific feature of this
‘occupation’ was that the German forces were stationed in Lapland with the
full agreement of the Finnish War Cabinet with the purpose of preparing
the nations for a war in which Finland and the Third Reich were to fight as
brothers-in-arms against the common enemy, the USSR. The joint project,
which began with the so-called Agreement on Transit, continued with the
establishment of a permanent supply line from Finnish ports on the Gulf
of Bothnia via Rovaniemi to the northernmost parts of occupied Norway.
In June 1941, it turned into Operation Barbarossa, an offensive to the East
(Vehviläinen 1987: 345–7; Lähteenmäki 1999; Junila 2000: 43–9).
The main purpose of the German presence was to secure possession of
the nickel mines in Petsamo and to advance, in collaboration with the
Finnish troops, from Northern Finland to the Murmansk railway. However,
the German attack proceeded much slower than planned and soon the
defensive line between the German and Soviet forces froze to the east of the
Finnish national frontier for several years (Vehviläinen 1987: 345). During
the war, practically the whole of Northern Finland functioned as the rear
area of the German troops: their logistics, transportation and construc-
tion troops were located there and their communication and supply lines
led through it (Vehviläinen 1987: 346). As a consequence, the presence of

German troops more than doubled Lapland’s population: as early as July
1942, one year after the Continuation War had broken out, the German
armed forces had stationed 180,000 soldiers in Lapland, while the number
of native residents was 150,000, including thousands of men who were
fighting on the front. Rovaniemi was in every respect the German capital
of Finland. In addition to the seventy headquarters of different army units
in Rovaniemi, the main field hospital, the principal supply centre and the
major supply depot all operated in this area. Because of this, the population
of the town increased from 7500 to 13,500 (Vehviläinen 1987: 248; Junila
2000: 90–1; Westerlund 2008).
The collaboration of Finnish and German troops created an exceptional
wartime context, the ‘Finnish–German zone’, in which the German armed
forces had command over military operations but had to leave civilian
administration to the Finns. The German forces constructed, at least in
principle, an independent military society in Northern Finland, a society
with extraterritorial rights, according to which the Germans were subject
to German military law only. The military society was also responsible for
the maintenance of its own forces, including the production of newspapers
and informative and entertaining radio programmes and the establishment
of POW or labour camps in the Far North (Otto 2008; Westerlund 2008).
In practice, however, the successful management of the tasks was largely
dependent on cooperation and communication with local authorities and
civilians. The opportunities and benefits as well as the friction and problems
created by and experienced on both sides are described in detail by Marianne
Junila (2000). Revealingly, Junila often explains friction and disputes as aris-
ing from communicative problems caused by an insufficient command of
German or Finnish, yet the linguistic measures needed or taken by civilians,
local authorities or military personnel are hardly mentioned at all. The
need for translation and interpreting in this Finnish–German coexistence
is, however, obvious.
Mediating in the Finnish–German zone
For local inhabitants, especially female civilians, the German troops brought
several well-paid working opportunities. Finnish women worked in German
hospitals, laundry houses, supply centres and canteens. Because many of
the educated younger women had studied (or were still studying) German
at school – in the 1940s, German was the first foreign language learned in
Finnish schools – they were also employed as interpreters in German mili-
tary airports and in other German rear area units such as Organization Todt,
the military engineering unit.
Unfortunately, there is only fragmentary information on these interpret-
ing and translation activities. As shown in the following examples from
Pekka Kujamäki 91
academic writings on military history, the little bits and pieces of informa-
tion consist of sweeping remarks, in which interpreting is mentioned as one
task among others but the content of the task remains very vague:
Some of the girls worked officially as servants, household workers and

interpreters in German barracks, camps and constructions sites; some of
them sold their bodies and, in order to avoid being arrested for prosti-
tution, they took jobs as maids or other tasks. The demand for open-
minded women was high and the benefits good in the wartime game of
poker. (Lähteenmäki 1999: 116; author’s emphasis)
The Germans needed workers and hundreds of hard-working hands

were hired for kitchens, casinos and laundry houses, for sewing and
cleaning. A much smaller group worked as clerks, translators and inter-
preters. According to a survey conducted [1943] by a labour committee
in Rovaniemi, two thirds of the women working for the Germans had
reached their majority, the rest being younger than 21 years. ( Junila
2000: 320; author’s emphasis)
Another group of translators and interpreters working in this field con-

sists of German military interpreters (the so-called Wehrmachts – or
Divisionsdolmetscher), trained in Germany for military purposes before being
ordered to the front. Stationed in the German headquarters of different
troop formations, the interpreters can be assumed to have been mainly
responsible for the interrogations of Soviet POWs.5 So far, there is no evi-
dence of any German interpreters for the Finnish–German language pair
working in Northern Finland, and it can be assumed that the interpreters of
the Third Reich in Lapland were indeed mainly trained for their tasks with
the Soviets on the front or in the occupied parts of the USSR.
For example, as early as 1938, official regulations for linguistic educa-
tion in the German Air Fleet (Bestimmungen über die Sprachausbildung in der
Luftwaffe) make it very clear that in linguistic training Russian and Polish
were of top priority, whereas languages spoken in Finland, Estonia and
other ‘Randstaaten’ (‘fringe nations’) such as Lithuania and Latvia were
introduced at the bottom of the list of priorities. Perhaps this explains why
German troops commissioned young Finnish men with a sufficient com-
mand of German to act as military interpreters moving with the troops.
Both female and male Finnish interpreters received substantial compensa-
tion for their services, which – together with other material benefits and the
status associated with military rank as well as the uniform of a military civil
servant – must have made the task attractive for those involved. These ben-
efits are expressed in passing in the following two extracts. The first is taken
from a liaison officer’s report dealing with harsh discipline and deaths in
German prisoner-of-war camps, whereas the latter describes the exceptional
wartime nourishment as listed by a woman who interpreted in a German

barrack kitchen:
The prisoners are obviously now held under a regime of iron discipline,
and recently one prisoner was shot at his workplace because he repeat-
edly refused to obey orders and didn’t work properly. As reported by inter-
preter Bo Gadolin, working as a military civil servant in Ivalo (18 years,
civilian, has permission to use the uniform of a military civil servant,
lieutenant, the Germans pay him 4000 Finnish marks per month, addi-
tionally free housing), prisoners-of-war have escaped from this workplace
before, and a guard sustained severe injuries. (Liaison officer G. Stude,
quoted in Alftan (ed.) 2005: 111)
[S]picy meat or soup, frozen fruit for dessert, red wine more often than
milk, and finally black coffee to finish the meal. The late meal contained
tea, bread and some savoury snacks: a bowl of cheese or sardines, a piece
of sausage or canned meat. Portions were so generous that there were
always leftovers to be taken back home. ( Junila 2000: 315)
The attraction of being employed by the Germans becomes clear when

the wages and other benefits are compared with contemporary wages
in Finland: a shop assistant earned one-third of the salary paid by the
Germans to a ‘barrack barmaid’ (Lähteenmäki 1999: 117), and an untrained
and unqualified schoolgirl earned 3000 Finnish marks as an interpreter,
a salary equivalent to that of a schoolteacher in the war years ( Junila 2000:
323). In contrast to this, a Finnish civilian working as an interpreter for
Russians in the Finnish POW camps received only 1750 Finnish marks per
month plus daily allowances for his services (see Pasanen and Karhunen
2011). Little wonder that many people decided to leave their home villages
and start a new life.
Additional benefits, such as learning a foreign language or gaining some

professional skills, or just increased opportunities to enjoy cultural and
social activities provided by the German war colony, attracted young
women from all over the country to head for work in Northern Finland.
This, in a country struggling with labour shortage and wartime rationing,
caused some national confusion and bitter public remarks about ‘gold
diggers’. Adolescent, uneducated girls were not supposed to rise above
others in the food chain. (Heiskanen 2009: 154)
By all appearances, Finnish girls or boys recruited as language mediators

never received any training for the task. The German forces suffered from
a chronic shortage of linguistically-versed people ( Junila 2000: 322), which
is perhaps why the only required prerequisite for the job was (mostly not
Pekka Kujamäki 93
more than) a modest command of German and Finnish; everything else was
learned by doing.
One further group of translators and interpreters working in Northern
Finland consists of Finnish liaison officers under the command of the
Liaison Staff Roi in Rovaniemi. The liaison officers who moved with the
German troops on the front or in different parts of Northern Finland or
observed the military actions in the German High Command worked in two
ways (see Westerlund 2008: 19–20). Firstly, their task was to assist German
troops in their manoeuvres with Finnish troops under their command.
In practice, this meant activities such as translating Finnish or German
documents from a variety of fields plus interpreting between Finnish and
German soldiers, between Finnish civil servants and German military
officials, and between local civilians and German soldiers. Despite their
extraterritorial rights, German forces in Finland were ‘guests in a friendly
country’, as declared by the commander of the AOK Norwegen in his Order
of the Day, and accordingly no colonialist behaviour toward Finnish citi-
zens was tolerated. Tolerated or not, such behaviour occurred regularly, and
liaison officer reports contain examples of mediation situations between
Germans, local police authorities and – for example – a reindeer-owner
whose reindeer had disappeared in the German barrack kitchens (see Alftan
(ed.) 2005). Secondly, Finnish liaison officers working in the north were
responsible for the observation of German troops and officers. On commis-
sion of the Finnish General Staff in Mikkeli, they reported regularly on troop
movements, advances and retreats on the front and evaluated the mental
atmosphere in the German headquarters. For this purpose they wrote sum-
maries of discussions and translated German documents (such as daily
orders, propaganda leaflets and educational materials) into Finnish (Alftan
(ed.) 2005; Westerlund 2008: 20).
One important category of interpreting practices in the context of
Northern Finland is that which prevailed in the German prisoners-of-
war camps that held Soviet soldiers either captured by German armed
forces themselves or handed over to the Germans by the Finnish military
authorities. Although the group of soldiers employed as guard personnel
usually included a couple of interpreters as well (Otto 2008: 93), all evi-
dence collected so far points to the hypothesis that in these camps, just as
in Finnish POW camps, camp discipline was to a great extent dependent
on the mediation practice of bilingual camp inmates, born for example
in the German-speaking areas of Ukraine or in the Baltic countries. In
contrast to the more or less chosen agency of the interpreters discussed
above, what seems to have been characteristic for the camp interpreters
is their enforced role as interpreters between the captor and other captives,
imposed on them in an ad hoc way and entirely on the basis of their appar-
ent otherness that made them stand out from the other inmates. These
interpreters were mostly Ukrainian POWs who in many cases were engaged
as ‘volunteer’ camp policemen (Hilfswillige); not unlike the notorious Kapos

(Kameradschaftspolizei) in the German concentration camps, they learned or
were forced to use their power against their comrades. The material benefits
were mostly the same as those of the Soviet POWs from Eastern Karelia
who were engaged as camp interpreters in Finnish camps, namely a bigger
slice of bread, a couple of extra cigarettes and decent clothing (Pasanen and
Karhunen 2011). However, the benefits went hand in hand with the risk
of being regarded as a traitor by one’s fellow countrymen. As reported by
Westerlund (2008: 273), after the war dozens of volunteer interpreters and
camp policemen were killed as apostates by Soviet soldiers who had survived
their captivity.
Some of the German POW camps in Finland were used for screening
(Aussonderung) of political commissars and other specialists of intelligence
interest. The screening was usually conducted by the Gestapo according to
the Commissar Order, a written order given by Adolf Hitler before Operation
Barbarossa, which demanded that all Soviet political commissars should
be executed immediately after identification. In this task, the Gestapo was
assisted by officers and interpreters from the Finnish Secret Police (Valpo,
Valtiollinen poliisi). At that time, as reported by Oula Silvennoinen (2008),
the Finnish and the German secret police had made an agreement on an
anti-Bolshevist task force, and for this purpose the Finnish side enlisted
officers as well as interpreters whose task was to assist the Gestapo in inter-
rogations and in daily routines with the Finnish authorities. The interpret-
ers were all born in St Petersburg, were well-versed in Finnish, German and
Russian and were considered ideologically suitable for the task force by the
Finnish secret police.
Fragmented profiles
The theatre of war in World War II in Finland contained a multitude of inter-

cultural settings with a multitude of actors for linguistic mediation tasks. A case
in point is the Finnish–German zone in Northern Finland, where the joint
military operation was largely dependent on translation and interpreting serv-
ices provided by German and Finnish military authorities ordered to perform
the task, by volunteer Finnish civilians or, finally, by bilingual Soviet prisoners.
As this list and the above descriptions show, they constituted a heterogeneous
group of mediators with a variety of national or ethnic backgrounds (German,
Finnish, Russian, Ukrainian) and a different narrative positioning in the war
(brother-in-arms, enemy). All this suggests different interpreter and transla-
tor profiles, who each had varying mediating roles, power relationships and
economic rewards through their mediating practice and different concepts of
personal space and freedom in their task performance.
For the description of translators’ and interpreters’ identities, Cronin’s
(2006) distinction between autonomous versus heteronymous translation
Pekka Kujamäki 95
and interpreting strategies or ‘systems of recruitment’ (as in Cronin 2002:

393) offers one interesting starting-point. Autonomous translation or inter-
preting refers to a sort of ‘self-translation’, where it is for example ‘the colo-
nist himself who acquires the language of the native (through a relationship
with the natives)’ (Cronin 2006: 40). In contrast to this, heteronymous
translation and interpreting refers to the ‘dependent’ translation practice,
where the ‘colonizers have recourse to the services of the natives to inter-
pret for them’ (Cronin 2006: 40, 85; see also Dragovic-Drouet 2007: 33). In
the historical context of the present study, the choice between the German
bilingual soldier and the Soviet bilingual POW as an interpreting agent in
the POW camp is an obvious example of the choice between autonomous
and heteronymous interpreting. Through the narrative (ethnic) categories of
‘us’ and ‘them’, the two profiles seem clear and identifiable, at least in the
geographic isolation of the German Stammlager.
However, outside these camps, which were like small-scale German colo-
nies in Northern Finland, the application of Cronin’s framework becomes
slightly problematic. The basic division into two strategies does not quite
help to distinguish mediated contact situations between different ethnic
groups from one another – or to understand the different shades of concepts
like ‘trust’, ‘loyalty’ or the assumed ‘neutrality’, which were all connected
to these categories. This is caused by the specific circumstances of the
‘Finnish–German zone’ as a multicultural area, where in fact both colonizers
and colonized were imported categories and both were ‘hosted’ by a third
party, the Finns. The categories of ‘us’ and ‘them’ become fuzzy.
What separates a Finnish boy engaged as an interpreter for a German
construction unit in Rovaniemi and a Ukrainian POW interpreting German
commands for his camp inmates – both of them examples of heteronymous
interpreting utilized by German armed forces – is their positioning in the war
as well as their narrative roles. For the Germans, the Finnish interpreter was
a brother-in-arms, fighting the common enemy, the USSR, as represented by
the Ukrainian interpreter. (This may, of course, be a gross generalization, as
the Ukrainian soldier may have defined himself first and foremost through
his ethnic background rather than his Soviet citizenship. This did not,
however, change his position as an enemy in the theatre of war.) The Finns
and the Germans had a common goal in the war, defined through shared
narratives (such as ‘preventing the spread of a communist “infection”’ (Otto
2008: 96)) or by uniting motivations (such as securing new Lebensraum and
raw materials for Germans and correcting the great injustice of the Winter
War peace resolution for the Finns). In other words: the ethnic ‘otherness’
of the two parties is overlooked in favour of their shared narratives. As a
consequence, if a Finnish interpreter born in the former St Petersburg with
a multicultural family background shared anti-Bolshevist ideology with his
German employer, he might very well have ended up interpreting at a vio-
lent interrogation of a Soviet political commissar in an agency which was
most probably defined less by his ethnicity than by the ideological frame-
work of the interrogations. The interpreter becomes a representative of the
military authorities in command, a part of the autonomous strategy.
Therefore, in the context of Finnish–German military cooperation, it
seems necessary to define the narrative oppositions of us and them that
loom behind Cronin’s division. These oppositions ‘precede and accompany
all wars [and] constrain practically every form of interaction in this context’
(Baker 2010: 198) according to the (ideological) narratives that are shared by
the actors or that separate them – rather than according to their ethnic back-
ground only. How these shared or opposing narratives manifest themselves
in the socio-cultural position of the military translators and interpreters,
in their mediation practice and in the consequences thereof, is a research
avenue that will be taken in the future phases of the ongoing project. The
consequences can, of course, be approached both from the users’ and from
the interpreters’ perspective. As Cronin (2006: 85) writes, ‘the recurrent dan-
ger with the heteronymous strategy was, of course, that the native’s loyalties
would revert back to the native’. It remains to be seen to what extent the
risks of infidelity are linked to ethnic rather than to ideological narratives
active in the mediated communication. The few examples collected so far,
however, make ethnic affinity a strong candidate to prompt such changes in
interpreters’ or translators’ loyalty. In his biographical ‘story of a prisoner-
of-war’, Alava (2002: 88) describes the violent interrogations conducted by a
Soviet officer and assisted by an interpreter, a born Finn, who had defected
to the USSR after the Finnish Civil War. Alava shows that in the end ‘blood
was thicker than water’: the interpreter got tired of interpreting the same
contents over and over again and started to advise the prisoner ‘to talk
less so that they wouldn’t ask so much’ and smuggled him extra portions
of bread. Similarly, Westerlund (2008: 66) reports on a translation event in
which a fugitive Ukrainian prisoner was executed in front of other camp
inmates as a warning. As his last words he shouted ‘kahi žive Radjanska
Ukraina’ (‘long live the Soviet Ukraine’). The officer in charge requested the
interpreter to translate the message into German. The interpreter did not
want to repeat those patriotic thoughts and interpreted that the executed
prisoner bade farewell to the other POWs. Instead of a faithful interpreta-
tion, the German officer is provided with nothing more than a speech act
with which the interpreter uses his minimal power and positions himself on
the side of the fellow captives, perhaps for the simple reason of protecting
them. In this situation, the dependence of the German officer on the camp
interpreter reveals language as his real ‘point of weakness’, which the inter-
preter uses in his resistance and becomes a ‘power-broker for the powerless’
(Cronin 2006: 91).
These two examples highlight the issues of ‘trust’ and ‘loyalty’ that con-
stantly confront interpreters and translators in military conflicts. Given the
fact that we are dealing with a violent conflict situation between two armed
Pekka Kujamäki 97
forces, it is rather surprising to observe in how many situations captors are

indeed dependent on captives acting as interpreters, or, in other words,
how surprisingly often captors are forced to trust their enemy in the role of
heteronymous interpreter and to trust something that could not have been
checked: the interpreter’s fidelity. There are reasons to believe that the trust
was based on the recruited interpreter’s real fear of death. But, as the above
example shows, even this risk did not always prevent interpreters from using
the only personal space that their commissioners could not control, namely
the space of infidelity. The dramatic dimension of the military interpreters’
agency and the risks thereof is that by the end of the war many of the het-
eronymous interpreters had made themselves vulnerable to acts of revenge
from their countrymen, in cases where they had survived their wartime
superiors.
Conclusion
For four years, the joint military operation of German and Finnish armed
forces against the USSR made Northern Finland a multicultural theatre of
war, where the successful management of military operations between the
brothers-in-arms on the front as well as daily routine in the rear area con-
tinuously called for linguistic mediation. Drawing mainly on recent military
history publications from Finland, this chapter outlines the fields of military
translation and interpreting and the groups of people who were engaged in
these tasks on command, by force or voluntarily. In addition to the official
mediation services provided by the more-or-less-educated German military
interpreters or by the Finnish liaison officers, the persistent shortage of
linguistically-versed people in all areas of warfare led to the ad hoc recruit-
ment of Finnish civilians or Red Army prisoners-of-war as translators and
interpreters. This ethnically as well as ideologically heterogeneous group of
mediators is not easily defined with the concepts of autonomous versus het-
eronymous interpreting, but Cronin’s opposition nevertheless offers a valu-
able tool for the description and analysis of emerging interpreter profiles. In
the next phase of the ongoing project, the focus will be on archival material
and the search for written records that help to determine the framework of
norms, conventions and expectations in which each military interpreter or
translator developed his or her personal agency.
Notes
1. All translations from Finnish are the present author’s unless stated.
2. For a more international overview, see Baker 2010.
3. See also Stahuljak 2010: 393–4.
4. For comments on the concept, see Pym 2006: 23–4.

5. On language and Nazi concentration camps, see Taylor, this volume.
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Third Reich and its Aftermath’. In Finnland und Deutschland. Studien zur Geschichte
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Schümmer: 152–63. Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovac.
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aisen sotaväen rinnakkainelo Pohjois-Suomessa 1941–1944. Helsinki: SKS.
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and Internees: a Book of Articles by the National Archives, edited by Lars Westerlund:
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SOTAVANGIT%20JA%20INTERNOIDUT_WEB.pdf (accessed 20 September 2011).
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Pekka Kujamäki 99
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Tammi.
7
When Bosnia was a Commonwealth
Country: British Forces and their
Interpreters in Republika Srpska,
1995–2007
Catherine Baker
University of Southampton
I interviewed Bojan in a bookshop café in the centre of Banja Luka.1 He

was turning thirty-two that year, only four years older than me, but he had
started working as an interpreter in 1996 while attending a gimnazija, the
most academic Bosnian secondary school, near his hometown in north-west
Bosnia. Bojan and I talked about his work on several British bases around
Multi-National Division South-West, the zone of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH)
where the multi-national military force had been commanded by a British
division headquartered in the so-called Banja Luka Metal Factory. His mother
and father, a schoolteacher and a private-sector employee, had depended on
his earnings, which he remembered as over a thousand Deutschmarks for
a month’s full-time work. After various part-time contracts for other inter-
national organizations and private clients, he won a foreign postgraduate
scholarship and returned to teach at a private college in his hometown.
Afterwards, over coffee, he reflected on what the British presence had meant
to Banja Luka. He associated British forces with a calm efficiency missing
from local practices and suggested to me that when the British had been
in Banja Luka, Bosnia had practically been a Commonwealth country – a
foreign territory drawn into Britain’s cultural ambit through the exercise of
British power.
Bojan was one of fourteen interpreters I interviewed who had worked
for British forces in the Serb entity of BiH, usually known even in English
as ‘Republika Srpska’ or ‘the RS’.2 This paper aims to show the experiences
most common to local people who were employed as interpreters through
the Metal Factory headquarters during the British deployment to north-
west Bosnia. Local interpreters facilitated communication during, and were
essential to, British troops’ peace support activities: weapons inspections,
liaison visits, mine clearance, civil–military relations, patrols. Their accounts
point to a semi-British cultural space within the Banja Luka area that was
produced on military bases yet carried over into interpreters’ homes and
100
Catherine Baker 101
friendship networks. However, they also show many factors impeding affin-
ity between interpreters and the force. Workers could have been supported
and the quality of language mediations could have been improved if inter-
preters or their users and supervisors had been equipped to recognize the
impact of everyday practices or policies not thought through.
The RS group unexpectedly represented the largest single cluster of
interviewees in my study of language support for peace operations in BiH.3
Originally, I had expected respondents semi-evenly spaced throughout
Bosnia besides a predicted Sarajevo cluster. However, my research team
connected two British universities from large English cities and one public
institution associated with semi-official military history (Southampton,
Reading and the Imperial War Museum), and I was a British national and
native English speaker. These links influenced the structure of the dataset
and also shaped the data. The RS speakers were conscious of an immediate
British listener and a remote British audience: even before speaking, they
had chosen to acknowledge their Anglophone audience and perform iden-
tities as experienced English users by giving the interview in English, not
their native language. Studies of oral history remind us that ‘the story that
is actually told is always the one preferred amongst other possible versions’
(Summerfield 1998: 17). The RS stories were told at or near the end of unex-
pected careers to an imagined collective audience that had never appreci-
ated the impact of British presence in north-west Bosnia.
First impressions of work
The British contingent that moved into the Metal Factory in December 1995
was the first foreign military unit permanently stationed in Banja Luka dur-
ing the post-1992 international intervention in Bosnia. Banja Luka was the
RS’s largest city, a symbolic headquarters location with easy access to smaller
towns near the Inter-Entity Boundary Line. British forces arrived with three
years’ experience of managing language support in central Bosnia using a
few British military linguists and colloquial speakers plus more than a hun-
dred locally-recruited interpreters. NATO rather than the UN organized the
multi-national force after Dayton, making human resources, pay and testing
at the Banja Luka Metal Factory a British responsibility.4 Candidates at the
first recruitment day sat speaking, listening, reading and writing tests and
received one of five general pay-grades for local civilian employees.5 Among
the candidates were two of British forces’ longest-serving interpreters,
‘Mitch’ and Slad̄ana. Mitch recalled the start of his twelve years of employ-
ment as almost a happy accident (he had accompanied a female friend),
while Slad̄ana had heard of the recruitment day through her university’s
English department. Mitch and Slad̄ana’s longer accounts both suggested
that young women had been reluctant to approach foreign forces for work
and overcame this by attending in groups or with male friends. Reconciling
on-and-off-duty lives was harder for female interpreters: besides the local
unpopularity of SFOR, female behaviour was more strictly policed by gossip
and they had to ensure their own actions were seen to be morally proper.
The actual tests gave little idea of strengths and weaknesses. Passes
mapped to grades 3 or 4 on the British pay-scale for Locally-Employed
Civilians;6 most field interpreters began at grade 3 as ‘language assistant’.
Worse yet for precision, the test equated English-language knowledge with
interpreting proficiency and did not assess skills such as memorization or
calmness under pressure which would determine in-the-field performance.
In 1999, the Metal Factory’s Pioneer Labour Support Unit retested interpret-
ers during a civilianization scheme that opened certain administrative posts
to locals but still used the four basic language competencies and five pay
grades. British forces never retested interpreters as precisely as HQ SFOR,
which retested all the headquarters organization’s interpreters in 2000 when
it professionalized. British language support remained within the logistics
chain of command, where neither managers nor interpreters were expected
to know the interpreting profession’s own standards.
Successful candidates waited for vacancies at their assigned pay grade.
These were often short-term assignments such as sickness/vacation cover,
dealing with gatehouse enquiries (seen as entry-level work) or even travel-
ling abroad for OPTAG exercises (see below); one former Red Cross press
officer was assigned directly to British generals at divisional headquarters.
Many interpreters lived in or near Banja Luka when they took the tests, but
their work was often further away. Most posts were elsewhere in the RS or
even as distant as Tomislavgrad (a Croat-majority town in the Federation),
so interpreting usually involved weeks or fortnights away from home, work-
ing twelve-hour shifts and living four-to-a-room (the standard for soldiers’
rather than officers’ accommodation) in prefabricated Corimec containers.
Living and working extended hours together produced deep friendships
that often continued after teams were broken up. Weekly/fortnightly shifts
could be convenient for those who travelled long distances but could also
upset family life, as Dubravka recalled: ‘when I had a baby, I used to drive at
eleven [or] twelve at night and travel back in the morning, just to see baby’.7
Some other new mothers chose to quit work or took weekday office-hours
jobs in administration or the Metal Factory’s small office-based language
support unit.
Encountering the other through language
Ten to fifteen years after starting work, interpreters’ first impressions of the
job and its unfamiliar surroundings contained a strong common theme: the
linguistic alienation of entering a landscape of abbreviations, military slang
and obscure regional accents. Interpreters had grown up learning and being
tested on what they termed ‘BBC English’ or ‘the Queen’s English’; yet Her
Catherine Baker 103
Majesty’s Forces, every new interpreter soon discovered, did not speak the
language of Her Majesty. The regional recruitment pattern for British infan-
try and cavalry regiments meant that most soldiers in a unit communicated
in one regional dialect and accent. Interpreters identified Welsh, Scottish
and ‘Geordie’ (Newcastle) accents as the hardest to understand – though
noticed that officers (graduate-level, trained at the Royal Military Academy
in Sandhurst, and not necessarily from their regiment’s home region) spoke
more comprehensible standard English. Even one of the most proficient
interpreters in the RS cluster – Sara, who passed HQ SFOR’s tests in 2000 –
remembered struggling with spoken regional English: ‘that was my first
impression, that oh my God I can’t understand anything . . . But then later
on I just got used to the dialects, and it was better then.’8
Certain units did not even speak English among themselves, exposing
interpreters to two thoroughly alien languages: Welsh and Nepalese.
Britain’s Nepalese-speaking Gurkha units represented several dimensions of
otherness simultaneously: non-Europeans within a force that interpreters
associated with England and tradition; non-native English speakers whose
command of the Army’s working language could be poorer than interpreters’;
non-white men whose racial difference attracted the local gaze (some towns-
people apparently read them as ‘Chinese’). Since the Royal Gurkha Rifles
served more tours in BiH than any other British regiment, many interpreters
worked with Gurkhas for long periods. These interpreters’ accounts reflected
a concept of culture in which a given people all shared a certain culture
and displayed a certain common mentality. Interpreters mainly described
Gurkhas’ difficulties with English pronunciation as counterbalanced by a
positive attitude to problem-solving and, in one account, a higher aptitude
for local language acquisition than Anglophone British soldiers had. Many
nonetheless told of confusion caused by Nepalese-accented pronunciation
or an inflexible flexible ‘mentality’. For Mitch, this last was epitomized by
an incident where a Gurkha soldier had confused a village man’s reference
to the nineteenth-century Serb poet Vuk Karadžić with information about
the war-crimes suspect Radovan Karadžić and had then reported Mitch to
his unit for mistranslation. The anecdote illustrates the procedural mistrust
that underlay day-to-day camaraderie. Beneath soft surfaces of friendship,
there still stood a structure of operational security in which interpreters, as
local nationals, were kept apart from sensitive information and would be
held to account for suspicious behaviour.
Identification
The RS interpreters faced dilemmas of loyalty and identification because of

prevailing Serb perceptions of the intervention and foreign soldiers’ percep-
tions of the Serbs. The RS army was the only belligerent that NATO targeted
with airstrikes in 1994–5; post-war prohibitions on war-crimes indictees
standing for election were interpreted in the RS as interference with Serbs’

political self-determination; in spring 1999, NATO again launched airstrikes
against Serbs in Serbia/Montenegro during the Kosovo War. Mass-mediated
RS public opinion framed the foreign forces, with the partial exception of
Orthodox Christian soldiers, as enemies not allies. Peace operations in this
entity therefore came closer to the post-war occupation paradigm than any
other aspect of the BiH intervention, and working for the British Army in
1999 meant working for the armed forces of a state whose prime minister,
Tony Blair, had led the world in calling for military intervention against
Serbia. Several interpreters had witnessed verbal abuse against interpret-
ers working for ‘occupying forces’, though they emphasized that only a
minority of people were openly hostile. The most direct abuse or threats
were occasioned by street demonstrations against international policy in
BiH, particularly a) a March 1999 ruling constituting the town of Brčko as a
neutral district outside the RS; b) the Kosovo War; c) the reconstruction of
the main city mosque destroyed in 1993 (riots in May–June 2001). Mitch
had accompanied a British unit to the Brčko demonstrations, where he had
been insulted by protesters. He considered that protesters ‘always know
how to recognize the interpreter’ even though interpreters wore British
uniforms:
[T]hey are considering me as someone who is a traitor, for them I have . . .

disrespect to my roots, to the interests of the nation, and I have gone to
work for the local occupiers.9
Mitch could not take comfort in the convention that wearing the employ-
er’s uniform should protect the interpreter – a practice that Slad̄ana, in
contrast, had found reassuring when she nervously accompanied British
troops to visit Bosniak officers (the wartime ‘other side’) in 1996. Instead,
Mitch dealt with the potential dangers of interpreting work by privileging
personal courage and resourcefulness, which had allowed him to maintain
integrity through several difficult language encounters. Mitch’s ration-
alization through displacement (‘it’s not my face, it’s the uniform that I’m
wearing and the job that I do’10) was one common way to make sense of
conflicting demands on interpreters’ sympathy; another was weighing the
implications of working for British forces against the more unpalatable idea
of working for leaders implicated in collective violence and corruption. To
explain divided loyalties, both Serb and non-Serb interpreters sometimes
invited me to imagine a fundamental other to the West: how would I feel if
China had sent soldiers to the UK, or how would a US soldier feel working
with the Iranian army in Tehran?
Often, interpreters resolved sympathy and loyalty problems by turning
to a discourse of professionalism – drawing on British military understand-
ings, not the linguistic profession. During several years’ employment (when
Catherine Baker 105
the resolution of the Northern Ireland armed conflict and Scottish/Welsh

devolution were occurring in Britain), some had identified positive aspects
in their conception of British culture such as workplace politeness or
the peaceful resolution of political disputes. Challenging townspeople’s
attitudes to SFOR could move beyond self-justification into advocacy.
Interpreters still had doubts about working for NATO, especially during the
Kosovo War when NATO airstrikes caused both civilian and military casual-
ties. Most Banja Luka Serbs would always have had friends or relatives in
Belgrade and many would also know Bosnian/Croatian Serbs who had been
displaced to Belgrade in 1991–96. During the Belgrade bombing, Stojan had
been working for a Dutch unit within the British zone while relatives from
Belgrade were staying with him in Banja Luka:
I was in NATO uniform during that time. So I was also, in my mind,

against Milošević and against that regime in Serbia, but . . . I was in
a really bad situation. Because I was against those strikes, personally. I
was really really against those strikes. Because the whole of Serbia was
bombed . . . But I was [going] back to my apartment in uniform, and we
would go together, and it was an interesting time, you know, let’s say.11
The need to reassume the identity of ‘neighbour’ off duty made periods
of tension between SFOR/NATO and local Serb populations awkward for
interpreters. Jovana recalled that she ‘kept a low profile’ when she lived in
Belgrade between interpreting shifts during 1999 but that neighbours’ opin-
ions improved ‘once they realized that you were actually helping locals as
well’.12 Dubravka compared her embeddedness in two such different social
and cultural environments to being ‘a spy in old books, living a double life,
with completely different rules, different clothing’.13 Linguists who were
indeed spies used to experience severe anxieties about whether their per-
formances as ordinary local residents and native speakers would convince
their civilian and military audiences (Pattinson 2007: 15). Yet even linguists
with ostensibly nothing to hide found themselves, in the specific context
of the late-1990s RS, developing dual identities and personas for their two
different communities. Traces of their work were still audible in their easy
use of British military slang, while experience and rumour spoke of others
who had committed to longer-lasting identification with the British. Most
had heard of women marrying British soldiers and moving to the UK;
a story I first heard from a former British commanding officer and encoun-
tered again in Banja Luka spoke of a young man from Travnik or Maglaj
who had become so fascinated with the British Army while working for the
Coldstream Guards in his hometown that he aimed to join, or may even
have joined, the British military himself. The story served as an uncomfort-
able limit case for narrators working out the contradictions of their identifi-
cation with the foreign force.
OPTAG
Another experience most Banja Luka interpreters shared was travelling to

Britain and/or Germany to take part in pre-deployment field exercises. In
the early 1990s, feedback from the Defence School of Languages and super-
visors of military linguists had convinced the Ministry of Defence (MOD)
to incorporate simulated language encounters with genuine native speakers
into troops’ pre-deployment training.14 These took place during field exer-
cises in Cold War-era mock villages localized for Bosnia with road signs in
the local language(s) and graffiti in Cyrillic and Latin scripts. Operational
Training Group (OPTAG) exercises drew native speakers from several sources
(MOD civilian language instructors; Bosnian émigrés in the UK; working
field interpreters) to role-play interpreters and Bosnian interlocutors in sce-
narios like checkpoints and weapons inspections; for many soldiers, OPTAG
was a first contact with Bosnia’s language(s) and with Bosnians. From a MOD
viewpoint, involving active field interpreters was a cost-effective source of
linguistic and cultural authenticity, injecting up-to-date experiences from
‘theatre’ into an iteratively updated training programme.
OPTAG training in interviews was a subject for pleasant reminiscence –
the photos they shared were usually happy OPTAG souvenirs – and, sig-
nificantly, reflected experiences on the margins of the official rationale.
Travelling to OPTAG represented spending time in rural or historic English
landscapes that corresponded to the enduring touristic images of Britain in
former Yugoslavia (one woman had visited the cathedral city of Canterbury
several times and had open invitations to visit military colleagues near
Windsor). However, OPTAG also intersected more deeply with pre-war travel
experiences. Yugoslavia had been distinguished among European socialist
states by its citizens’ legal and economic ability to travel for leisure and
shopping. This mobility, taken for granted by the Yugoslav professional
strata in which most interpreters had grown up, had vanished for most peo-
ple during and after the conflict: as citizens of Yugoslav successor states they
had to make costly and humiliating visa applications even for short tour-
ist trips and travel was substantially less affordable ( Jansen 2009). OPTAG
travel briefly restored interpreters’ mobility and a pre-war ‘normality’ that
was rarely accessible to post-war Bosnians. Interpreters incorporated OPTAG
mobility into their off-duty lives in ways irrelevant to, unseen by and some-
times even confusing to their employers: one interpreter working part-time
had been dismissed when she alarmed her unit by staying on an extra week
to visit her British boyfriend, while one of her colleagues had returned late
from Germany because he was driving back a new car.
Even memories of work during OPTAG ran on parallel tracks to the official
and British understanding. OPTAG was memorable not for the opportu-
nity to influence soldiers’ preconceptions of BiH but for the sheer fun one
could have with friends in role-playing scenarios, defraying the boredom
Catherine Baker 107
of repeating simple scenes for multiple trainee groups. Within the typical
scenario of an improvised three-way conversation between British sol-
diers, an interpreter and Bosnian interlocutors, native-speaker participants
could amuse each other with in-jokes such as naming an elderly blind
grandfather’s character ‘Filip Višnjić’ after the famous nineteenth-century
blind folk poet;15 the freedom of speaking and not being understood even
allowed native speakers to comment on the trainers’ conduct or appearance.
Humour and its untranslatability in the face of power perhaps separated the
inherent simulacrum of crisis from the reality of upsetting and abnormal
experiences that Bosnian participants might themselves have undergone.
Moreover, these practices are strongly suggestive of the ‘hidden transcripts’
identified in subordinates’ behaviour by the political anthropologist James
Scott: such backstage critiques, including rumours, jokes and gossip, may
be seen as working to ‘create and defend a social space in which offstage
dissent to the official transcript of power relations may be voiced’ (Scott
1990: xi). No topic was more ripe for dissent than the strongest nega-
tive theme of interpreters’ narratives, anxiety surrounding contracts and
employee welfare.
Welfare
Negative experiences of interpreting were largely rooted in the British force’s

perceived disregard for local employees’ financial – and cultural – wellbeing.
Simultaneously, they emphasized that among several rotations’ worth of
troops they had experienced friendly, ‘normal’ and ‘human’ treatment as
well as rudeness and depersonalization. Interpreters highly valued a work-
ing relationship where shared goals and reciprocity bridged or masked gaps
of privilege and origin; they felt personally affronted when the working
relationship instead treated them as interchangeable not-fully-human tools.
This was compounded by the upsetting lack of cultural knowledge they
observed in many British soldiers:
It happened that soldiers would think that they . . . were coming to God
knows which country. Like we were supposed to be total peasants over
here or God knows what – we used to call ourselves peasants because
they thought that we were – and then they would be surprised that we
actually have electricity, we have TV, we have satellite, we have internet.
And then they were like, ‘What the hell are we doing here?’ . . . So they
would compare us with Afghanistan, with Iraq . . . well, I guess that we
are – I can’t say that we are much better than them, but in this develop-
ment, this is Europe.16 (Dejan)
The interviewed interpreters respected the soldiers who tried to improve

their historical and cultural knowledge, who used even just enough local
language to participate in everyday social rituals, who maintained contact

with the area after leaving (such as by returning on holiday) and who
accepted local hospitality and reciprocity practices – thus accepting Bosnian
norms of neighbourliness – rather than staying cold and distant. These
judgements should be set in the context of the immense social value placed
on education by the professional urban middle classes of former Yugoslavia,
where ‘being educated’ signified reason and decency, fulfilled selfhood and
distanced one from poorly-educated internal migrants of village origin (who
were imagined to be the core audience of nationalist politics). This had
often led professional parents to put their children through private language
classes.17 Through role-reversal, interpreters implied that if they had been
foreigners deploying somewhere unfamiliar they would have worked harder
to acquire knowledge.
These observations went wider than the RS or British contingents.
A woman working for Canadian forces in the Federation part of MND (SW)
experienced similar misconceptions:
They expected to find savages here, I would say. One girl, I’m still friends
with her, she told me that they were told to bring lots of shampoo and
toothpaste and hygienic items because you could not find it here.18
(Emina)
US Army interpreters in Tuzla were offended by soldiers who lacked basic

knowledge of Bosnian geography (Tarik: ‘He had no idea that Sarajevo was
even in Bosnia. He was like, “You know what? There’s a war in Kosovo and I’m
not going down there”’19) or who expected strict Islamic practices in Bosnia
(Azra: ‘they expect, I don’t know, women to be staying at home, not work-
ing, being covered, praying all the time, going to the mosque and et cetera,
which we don’t do’20). Tuzla’s distinctive socialist, secular and multi-ethnic
urban identity made the last expectation particularly inappropriate.21
At the root of this discomfort were symbolic practices of resolving the
deep-seated cultural ambiguity of formerly-Ottoman South-East Europe. The
Balkans, while geographically European, have been ‘culturally constructed
as “the other”’ to developed Western Europe in political and creative texts
since at least the nineteenth century (Todorova 1994: 455; Hammond
2007). The Balkans’ own ‘nesting’ discourses of cultural identity typically
maintain the Europe/Balkans, west/east and civilized/backward oppositions
but use various symbolic markers to inscribe one’s own group into Europe
and certain others into the Balkans (Bakić-Hayden 1995). Even within one
country, social practices are constructed as ‘European’ or ‘Balkan’ to produce
symbolic stratifications and distinctions that add an urban/rural dimension
to the oppositions, resembling (though not identical to) the symbolic con-
struction of class in Western Europe ( Jansen 2005). Interpreters, generally
the children of professional families, tended to situate themselves within
Catherine Baker 109
a consciously ‘urban’ taste-culture that rejected practices coded as rural or

Balkan. This context meant that soldiers expecting to find barbarism and
poverty were utterly infringing on a fragile Bosnian sense of self which in
certain areas had already been damaged by the moral compromises neces-
sary to survive in war.
Bosnians’ dissatisfaction at foreign forces’ non-recognition of their claim
to westernness and Europeanness also exacerbated problems of financial wel-
fare. Most employees did believe that high hard-currency wages ultimately
justified their insecure fixed-term contracts and the disruptiveness of resi-
dential shifts and workplace transfers. Their complaints focused on employee
welfare, in particular maternity leave, health insurance and compensation
for on-the-job injuries. Until the late 1990s, when several female interpreters
lobbied the divisional personnel unit, maternity and sick leave were limited
to the standard fourteen-day leave period in all contracts – contravening
local pre-war expectations of employer responsibility. Interpreters were
similarly not registered for social security or health insurance, meaning they
would have to provide for themselves even if injured at work.
Poor workplace compensation upset interpreters and compounded their
anxiety about inexperienced and adventurous young male soldiers’ risky
behaviour. One particular incident where a woman was wounded in the leg
and sued the MOD for compensation resonated through several Banja Luka
interviews.22 The interpreter had been accompanying an infantry patrol on
Operation Harvest duties, door-to-door home inspections where soldiers
confiscated arms and ammunition. When a soldier, possibly a Gurkha,
negligently handled a confiscated pistol – or when a group of soldiers were
playing with the pistol – the gun was fired and the woman was shot in the
leg, either directly or by ricochet. After being taken to hospital by Army
helicopter, she spent several years pursuing her legal claim.
Accident stories, which spread very quickly around close-knit interpreter
teams, dramatized the limits of fellowship between interpreters and soldiers.
Distance was situated where people came to harm, lost their jobs or would
need to depend on a state social welfare system – yet the Bosnian state had
handed responsibility for interpreters to the foreign force and the British
state did not give them the same protection as UK employees. Interpreters’
pre-war expectations about socialist Yugoslav employee welfare were not
met by British forces, who hired them under flexible neoliberal conditions.
High wages and potential savings were implicitly supposed to balance short
notice periods and lack of welfare; risk fell on employee not employer,
without state regulation. Interpreting was not a return to normality – the
condition post-war Bosnians strove so hard to achieve – although the earn-
ings might allow interpreters to work towards normality in other areas of
life. Instead, it was a reordering of socio-economic relations, incorporating
the Bosnians who joined this economy into the global economy of develop-
ment, security and casualized short-term work.
Resentment at welfare provisions could sometimes be alleviated by an

environment of mutuality where interpreters believed foreigners were relat-
ing to them as humans not lower-status employees or tools. During most
interviews, my usual welfare question elicited complaints; with one woman
who had worked at the Šipovo field hospital, it instead stimulated a warm
recollection of the base’s mutual aid scheme. This improvised social security
scheme aligned with other positive contributions to Šipovo she remem-
bered the foreign force making: employing four hundred people in a town
of only 10,000; injecting a10–20,000 a month into the town’s economy in
rent; collecting goods and gifts to send back to Šipovo after rotating out;
accepting invitations to family celebrations. The voluntary system was no
substitute for compulsory welfare and did not benefit interpreters in Banja
Luka, Mrkonjić Grad or the other British bases in MND (SW). The warmth
with which it was remembered in this account nonetheless suggests it would
have improved workplace relations at other bases.
Employees of other national contingents and HQ SFOR faced the same
problems (though conditions gradually improved at HQ SFOR). Emina, who
had spent an unhappy month working for Canadian forces in Bihać in 1996,
was extremely offended by the Canadians’ failure to observe reciprocity
after an interpreter was injured in a road accident, asking me to imagine ‘if
the two of us are wounded together in a car accident, and you’re taken to
Zagreb, to the best hospital ever, and I’m taken to the local hospital here’.23
(Canadian troops had organized voluntary contributions for her care but
the inequality of the evacuation outweighed this in Emina’s account; the
interpreter injured during Operation Harvest had at least been treated by
foreign medics.) Women working for HQ SFOR in the late 1990s had had to
make the same choices as British forces’ female employees after giving birth.
At least one RS interpreter, however, believed that RS and Federation inter-
preters had noticeably different working conditions. This appeared more
rumour than policy; it may even have reflected how rumour had made sense
of the greatly improved conditions at HQ SFOR.
Drawdown
British forces remained in the RS until 2007 but began to reduce troop and
financial commitments as early as 1998 by piloting schemes to replace
soldiers with local civilian employees. While certain occupations such as
cleaners and interpreters had always been hired locally, the civilianization
scheme (which one British officer compared to the Army’s employment of
civilians in West Germany) covered several blue-collar and clerical occupa-
tions. Up to four hundred posts were eventually civilianized in Šipovo, start-
ing with skilled carpenters and mechanics who replaced British reservists at
the Army workshop in one of the three British bases. Jelena, the interpreter
who started in the British field hospital, welcomed and had benefited from
Catherine Baker 111
the last stage of civilianization which opened finance clerk positions to

locals with strong English test results. Local interpreters for British forces
or other national contingents did not have skills training organized – yet,
as a finance clerk, Jelena had been sent to the UK and Germany for three
training courses alongside soldiers working in payroll. British forces valued
accuracy in finance far higher than accuracy in language, even though
a poorly-translated document or conversation could have a much worse
impact on force activities than a poorly-reconciled budget.
Most interpreters began to notice the British troop drawdown in the early
2000s when smaller bases such as Gornji Vakuf and the Mrkonjić Grad shoe
factory closed. Close-knit teams that had grown up around repeated residen-
tial shifts were either reassigned to larger bases or disrupted as individuals
moved to fill vacancies, reducing the interpersonal appeal of the work for
some. British troop contributions reduced sharply after the force changed
from NATO to EU control in 2004, and ended in 2007 when the Metal
Factory closed and made six to seven hundred local people redundant.
Among them was Slad̄ana, one of the first interpreters hired in Banja Luka,
who had become a procurement clerk in the commercial office using her
dual language skills to negotiate low-value procurement deals. Her role was
reversed in July–August 2007 when she had to sell off the goods the Army
had decided to leave in theatre.
Following redundancy, Slad̄ana and several other ex-interpreters sought
private-sector administrative jobs but found it difficult to adjust to local
business practices after becoming accustomed to the foreign norms of
a workplace they experienced as more ordered, friendly and efficient.
Corruption was endemic if businesses wanted to obtain contracts or procure
advantages from local authorities and firms; interpreters had worked out-
side these practices for years and been embedded in an environment where
anti-corruption campaigns were part of international discourse. ‘I will just
be sitting around . . . trying to find some other job . . . without very good
connections’, Saša remarked of his likely future after foreign troops left
BiH, turning the trope of Balkan backwardness on to his own evaluation of
Bosnian society: ‘It’s how it works in the Balkans.’24 As when interpreters
in late 1990s Republika Srpska had been connected by a shared experience
of divided loyalties and misunderstanding, the search for work after redun-
dancy was also a type of isolation within one’s own community that created
strong bonds between those who went through it.
Interpreters’ work histories after the Metal Factory closed followed four
main patterns: a) interpreting for other EUFOR contingents (though some
commented that interpreting for non-native English speakers was markedly
less satisfying); b) working as an interpreter or project officer for various
international organizations and NGOs; c) living on a portfolio of freelance
court interpreting, interpreting/translation for private clients, and language
tuition; d) permanent migration abroad for postgraduate study or (in the
case of female interpreters) through marriage. Those who had interrupted

professional career trajectories, such as prospective doctors or civil engi-
neers, sometimes regretted staying so long but recognized that interpreting
paid better than their chosen profession so long as the work lasted. What
might have been a cohort of skilled, resilient professionals was instead left
without any clear direction in the depressed labour market of Republika
Srpska and BiH.
Conclusion
British forces’ initial language support management in BiH had been a his-
tory of improvisation. By 1996, the force had routinized key lessons from
1992–5 (such as use-of-interpreters training for soldiers), though it now
had to handle its own human resources support and testing. New interpret-
ers, however, entered the role with no training or preparation; they were
socialized into the job and the conventions of working on a military base
through learning from more experienced interpreters, supervisors, ‘users’
and the small number of British military interpreters and colloquial speak-
ers. Emina’s comment on interpreting for UN monitors in Bihać could apply
anywhere in wartime BiH: ‘Nobody had experiences like being an inter-
preter in the war’25 – or even in the post-war reconstruction and reshaping
of the country. To learn how to be an interpreter in the war, current and
former holders of the post – or owners of the identity – would have preferred
training or briefing to support them through the initial disorientation of the
first weeks at work. Local interpreters had neither professional or cultural
training to help them perform their roles; yet embodied as native speakers
in field exercises they were the training all troops received before deploy-
ment. The omission is remarkable, considering that most locally-recruited
interpreters would spend longer on the ground implementing the military’s
policies than any soldier.
For the Banja Luka cluster of interpreters, narrating their accidentally
acquired professional selves implicated both interlocutors in an attempt
to produce meaningful narratives from lives characterized by personal and
collective ruptures: the destruction of pre-1992 town communities; the
interruption of educational or professional trajectories; the physical and
emotional toll of war on selves, friends and families; the shock of entering
a new, less secure economy. Some succeeded in composing a narrative even
it was shaped by setbacks such as frequent job changes, family upheav-
als or poor health: ‘Every experience gets you to your main occupation’,
concluded Jelena, ‘I’m quite happy now.’26 Others were more ambivalent,
like Saša (whose work history was actually more consistent): ‘I could work
much more during that time on myself, my education, maybe, have a career
nowadays, were I not involved in that work.’27 Present-day anxieties and
satisfactions unsurprisingly coloured memories of working lives.
Catherine Baker 113
Interpreters’ extended contact with British military working practices,

amounting to repeated temporary English-language immersion without
having to cross the Bosnian border, produced a cultural capital that was
often personally satisfying but could not be easily redeemed in any ‘market’.
For some, language was an entry-point to an entire system of identification,
values and alternative masculinities contrasting with the subjectivities they
perceived in the country’s new elites: Bojan thus related the impression left
by a British officer who turned a relaxed blind eye to locals collecting sur-
plus diesel vapour but calmly yet forcefully pursued an ammunition thief
into a café using a Challenger tank. Jelena considered that ‘Brits brought
back to us culture’ after Bosnians had been reduced to ‘bare survival’ during
the war: ‘they showed us how to combine things, and how to still be liberal
and . . . still honour and respect everybody at the same time as respecting
yourself, and building your self-esteem’28 – observations which were, of
course, delivered to an interviewer from the ex-employer’s country, in the
language of the institution which had represented a privileged but at least
non-nationalist form of power in Banja Luka for twelve years. Interpreters’
disaffection with the character of post-war BiH and disappointment with
RS politics did shape their narratives of working with British forces. While
showing clearly that issues of cultural and financial welfare remained a
barrier to fellowship, they nonetheless suggest that the widespread hiring
of local interpreters in the Banja Luka area produced a strong affinity to
elements of Britishness which has remained, outside immediate ex-military
circles, almost unknown in Great Britain itself.
Notes
1. All interview participants are referred to by pseudonyms.
2. The RS had declared autonomy from the Bosnian state in March 1992 and was
recognized by the Dayton Peace Agreement (December 1995) as one of two state
entities. The other entity, the Federation, contained ten Bosniak- and/or Croat-
dominated ‘cantons’.
3. The collection (fifty-one interviewees total) included seventeen other Bosnian
interpreters and twenty foreign soldiers and foreign or ex-Yugoslav professional
linguists.
4. The NATO force was known as IFOR (Implementation Force) in 1996 and became
SFOR (Stabilization Force) after twelve months.
5. Candidates were also screened by interview to ensure that they had not been
indicted for war crimes; this may have doubled with the speaking test.
6. On the recruitment of local residents as interpreters, see also the chapters by
Kleinman, Lewis and Kujamäki, this volume.
7. Interview, May 2010.

12. Interview, November 2009.
14. On British language preparation, see Kelly 2011.
15. Streets, folklore societies and cultural centres were often named after Višnjić in
pre-war Yugoslavia and the RS.
17. Interpreters’ narratives of education are further discussed in Baker (2011).
21. See Armakolas 2011.
22. A similar story concerned another woman who had sustained pelvic injuries in a
car crash.
References
Armakolas, Ioannis. 2011. ‘The “Paradox” of Tuzla City: Explaining Non-Nationalist
Local Politics during the Bosnian War’. Europe–Asia Studies 63 (2): 229–61.
Baker, Catherine. 2011. ‘Tito’s Children? Language Learning, Educational Resources,
and Cultural Capital in the Life Histories of Interpreters Working in Bosnia and
Herzegovina’. Südosteuropa 59 (4): 477–501.
Bakić-Hayden, Milena. 1995. ‘Nesting Orientalisms: the Case of Former Yugoslavia’.
Slavic Review 54 (4): 917–31.
Hammond, Andrew. 2007. The Debated Lands: British and American Representations of
the Balkans. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.
Jansen, Stef. 2005. ‘Who’s Afraid of White Socks? Towards a Critical Understanding of
Post-Yugoslav Urban Self-Perceptions’. Ethnologia Balkanica 9: 151–67.
Jansen, Stef. 2009. ‘After the Red Passport: Towards an Anthropology of the Everyday
Geopolitics of Entrapment in the EU’s Immediate Outside’. Journal of the Royal
Anthropological Institute 15 (4): 815–32.
Kelly, Michael. 2011. ‘Issues in Institutional Language Policy: Lessons Learned from
Peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina’. European Journal of Language Policy 3 (1): 61–80.
Pattinson, Juliette. 2007. Behind Enemy Lines: Gender, Passing and the Special Operations
Executive in the Second World War. Manchester and New York: Manchester University
Press.
Scott, James C. 1990. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Summerfield, Penny. 1998. Reconstructing Women’s Wartime Lives: Discourse and
Subjectivity in Oral Histories of the Second World War. Manchester and New York:
Manchester University Press.
Todorova, Maria. 1994. ‘The Balkans: from Discovery to Invention’. Slavic Review
53 (2): 453–82.
8
A Bilingual Officer Remembers
Korea: a Closer Look at Untrained
Interpreters in the Korean War
María Manuela Fernández Sánchez
University of Granada
The armistice talks are military. They are neither political

nor diplomatic. Hence, in these discussions, the language
of diplomacy is inappropriate and ineffective.
(General Ridgway, instructions to Vice Admiral Joy and
the negotiating team1)
Interpreting is one of the oldest human activities in the world and has an
intrinsic relationship with central human experiences such as war, com-
merce and diplomacy. Regarding the first of these, war, military history
has offered students of interpreting history a wide range of situations that
have required the presence of translators and interpreters in times of war:
code-breaking, prisoner interrogations and meetings on topics ranging from
commonplace concerns to critical issues, to mention but a few.
The association between war and linguistic needs is commonplace, and
communication through translators and interpreters seems essential before,
during and after armed conflicts. It is important to gain more specific
knowledge on this topic and thus to understand how far and why interpret-
ing matters in the experience of war, and in the different communicative
situations imposed both by government policies tailored to meet various
priorities in conflicts and by the way in which specific conflicts evolve. On
the other hand, the extent to which war as experience constrains or trans-
forms the interpreter’s work and personality cannot be neglected either. This
dual approach could help identify the multi-faceted profile of interpreters
in conflict situations and do justice to their silenced, forgotten interpreting
experiences.
This research has been carried out as part of the research projects HUM2007-62434/
FILO (Ministry of Science and Technology, Spain) and P07-HUM-02730 ( Junta de
Andalucía, Spain).
115
As a modest contribution to the topic of interpreting in armed conflicts,

therefore, this chapter distinguishes between the experience of war and
war as an experience. The analysis of interpreting in the experience of war
responds to various issues related to the following themes:
• The global and domestic settings of the specific conflicts and the differ-
ent levels on which political, diplomatic and military communication
take place in the course of a violent conflict: intelligence services, per-
sonal contacts, military negotiations, staff meetings and political sum-
mits, among others (Fernández Sánchez 2010, 2011).
• The social biography of interpreters serving in wartime – a ‘material his-
tory of interpreting’ in Cronin’s words (2002: 52), or an ‘ethnographic
eye’ according to Blommaert (1999: 7). Who are they? Why are they
there? How have they acquired their hybrid identity and bilingualism?
Are they recognized interlocutors as bureaucrats, diplomats or military
officers, or anonymous interpreters? (Baigorri and Fernández 2010).
• The multiple role of interpreters: linguistic assistants, vital links, survi-
vors or ‘double agents’ (Gentzler and Tymoczko 2002: xix; Salama Carr
2007: 3).
The notion of ‘war as an experience lived by interpreters’ refers to the need

to pay attention to interpreters’ testimonies of their personal experiences
in war. Taking part in a war can be traumatic. Translators and interpreters
involved in armed conflicts are often eyewitnesses and victims of the atroci-
ties of war: violent acts, casualties, torture, detention centres, exile and fam-
ine. They are exposed to further risk because they are physically present in
dangerous situations, and they also face personal risk because they are often
considered traitors by the local population.2 Adopting an interdisciplinary
approach, grounded mainly in sociological and anthropological studies, this
chapter pays attention to the interpreter’s testimony and to the exact words
interpreters use when describing their personal position or situation in con-
flicts. It seeks to understand the role of personal ideologies and emotional
factors associated with the act of remembering and to explore the ‘processes
of appropriation, conflicting interests and overlapping discourses’ entangled
in the politics of memory (Argenti and Schramm 2010: 18).
The Korean War and the study of interpreting in this conflict
This chapter discusses the Korean War, the first armed conflict that took place
during the period of history known as the Cold War (1946–91). It began on
25 June 1950, when the North Korean Army invaded the Republic of South
Korea. Three days later, the US President, Harry Truman, ordered troops to
help defend South Korea. He also requested the assistance of United Nations
members in supporting the Republic of Korea. The war officially ended with
María Manuela Fernández Sánchez 117
an armistice three years later, on 27 July 1953. The negotiations that led to
the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement were conducted between US
military officers, representing the UN command, and Chinese and North
Korean military personnel. As historians specialized in the area have pointed
out (Foot 1990: 1), the negotiating process that began in Kaesong on 10 July
1951 – moving to Panmunjom on 25 October 1951 – could be considered
one of the most difficult and complex of the entire Cold War. Negotiations
stretched over two years and involved 159 plenary sessions and some five
hundred meetings at other levels (Bailey 1992: 70). Throughout this long
negotiating process, interpreters from each delegation were present. They
facilitated communication in the three working languages: English, Korean
and Chinese. Each delegation also had a team of language assistants includ-
ing translators and shorthand typists.
One reason for studying interpreting history is that it has not been done
before (Pym 1998: 15). This is precisely the situation with the Korean War,
where interpreting has been an unjustly neglected topic. One reason for this
neglect may be the fact that researching interpreting in the Korean War is a
significant challenge because of the wide range of sources to be consulted,
the many languages involved and the difficulty of gaining access to archives.
Generally speaking, historical research takes time and requires multilingual
teams to carry out the inquiry. The present author has fortunately been able
to turn to colleagues, proofreaders and library personnel for support and is
extremely grateful for their assistance during her research.
On sources
Like professional historians, students of interpreting history are looking for
‘unwitting testimony as much as witting’ (Marwick 2001: 139). In this sense,
much of what we know about interpreters in armed conflicts generally
comes from unintentional or unwitting sources such as legal and military
documents, the press, letters, or photographic records – especially pictorial
histories of wars or the memoirs and diaries of military personnel. In addi-
tion to this, interpreters’ direct testimonies are found in diaries, memoirs
and other personal accounts written by the interpreters themselves or by
applying techniques drawn from oral history.
This chapter draws primarily on the author’s personal communication
with Richard Underwood,3 a bilingual US Army officer who served as a
Korean language interpreter at the truce negotiations. It considers his biog-
raphy as well as that of his brother, Horace E. Underwood. Underwood’s tes-
timony is complemented with other primary sources such as interviews and
oral testimonies.4 The research has also used press documents, blog entries
on the topic, diaries of military personnel and of civilian advisers to the UN
delegation, and written memoirs of interpreters from different geographic
and cultural backgrounds who worked as translators and interpreters during
the armed conflict or in the negotiations that led to the armistice. Finally,
further data come from two interviews with Robert B. Ekvall5 and from
veterans’ memoirs posted on the Korean War Educator website.6
The next section of the chapter also seeks to place the armistice negotia-
tions in their global and domestic settings. Data for this part of the study
are drawn from secondary sources such as monographs and history books
on the topic but also from electronic archives such as the FRUS7 series and
the Cold War International History Project.8
Interpreting in the experience of the war in Korea
The global and US domestic settings

The Korean War is associated with ‘notable firsts’ (Cowley 2005: 155): the
first armed conflict of the Cold War, the first ‘limited war’ and the first con-
flict fought under the UN flag, among others. Following the Truman admin-
istration’s doctrine of containment, most Americans accepted the idea of
the Korean War as part of the containment of communism (Edwards 2006:
143). If one agrees that metaphors are not mere words but constitute the
very structure of discourse, the foreign policy discourse of the time, which
included terms such as ‘containment’, ‘security’ and ‘totalitarianism’, may
be seen to have provided the frames of reference to understand US foreign
policy after World War II. In regard to the war in Korea, the outbreak of
armed conflict ‘revitalized the use of the term totalitarianism and in par-
ticular the idea that it was more than a longer word for Soviet Communism’
(Abbot 1995: 90). The war in Korea was a real, destructive war, and American
prisoners’ experiences in North Korean and Chinese camps developed the
idea of Communists as fanatics as well as a belief in a dangerous and divided
world (Abbot 1995: 94).
From the point of view of interpreting, the communicative needs of the war
in Korea represented an extraordinary challenge for all involved in the con-
flict because of the US domestic political context – ‘generally hostile to the
formulation of agreements with the Communist world’ (Foot 1990: 17) – the
great differences between the languages and the limited experience of direct
contact between the cultures. The urgent need for translators and interpreters
was present throughout the course of the conflict and in a number of varied
settings. To solve the problem of the lack of Korean translators and interpret-
ers, the US Army had to rely on Nisei soldiers (second generation Japanese-
Americans) who served in the US armed forces and consequently ‘had proved
their loyalty in uniform’.9
The pressing need for interpreters is mentioned directly by the officer-
interpreters studied in this chapter. Major Hee Sung Lee,10 who served as
an office boy in the US Embassy in Seoul before the war and later as an
interpreter near the front lines and in the field medical stations, comments
that ‘after the cease-fire, the need for interpreters became even greater due
to the pending POW exchanges and the need to work out the terms and
conditions of the agreements’ (Lee [n.d.]). Interestingly enough, Major Lee

comments on the suspicious attitude of the North Korean General Nam II,
who refused to allow interpreters who were in the military to conduct pris-
oner interrogations ‘so both sides had to resort to the use of interpreters
from field hospitals, because they were deemed to be neutral’ (Lee n.d.).
Much archival work needs to be conducted on the influential role that
sociopolitical factors such as trust, power and control played in interpreter-
mediated communication during the Korean War.
Colonel Robert B. Ekvall (1960) has described the linguistic situation of
the armistice negotiations in spring 1953 when he arrived in Panmunjom
to replace other interpreters. The negotiations were in their final stages
but communication through interpreters was still necessary. Ekvall was in
charge of the Military Armistice Commission’s language division, dealing
with logistics and technical issues about the demarcation line and super-
vising prisoner exchange. This involved concurrent meetings at various
levels. In addition to interpreting – very often for eight or more hours a
day – Ekvall was required to establish training courses and manage a wide
range of linguistic and nonlinguistic tasks.
Finally, bilingual officers like the Underwood brothers returned to active
duty when war broke out. Later, they were selected to work as interpreters
in the truce talks on account of their knowledge of the Korean language.
In an interview in Korea Times, dated 20 June 2000, Horace G. Underwood
describes vividly the circumstances surrounding his selection, and he men-
tions the shortage of US Korean interpreters:
there weren’t all that many Korean language speaking officers floating
around. I was on the staff at Admiral Turner’s headquarters. When they
first started it, it was an Army run show and my brother was in the army
and he was selected to be one of the interpreters. He went up on the pre-
liminary talks. But my friends in the naval headquarters said hey we’ve
got a naval admiral being the boss of this thing, we ought to have a naval
interpreter for him, so they arranged for me to go. (Korea Times 2000)
One additional implication of these interpreters’ testimonies is that they

reveal US military commanders’ strong expectations that bilingual military
personnel would function as efficient interpreters. Some early interpreters’
testimonies contained identical unquestioned assumptions.11 This seems to
confirm the view of speakers as social actors (Duranti 1997) and the variabil-
ity they adopt concerning their roles and ideologies in different discourses
(Blommaert 1999).
The negotiations as ‘fighting’

Many scholars have noted that those around the negotiating table – US
military personnel representing the UN command and Chinese and North
Korean military – had to come to terms with being physically present at

a negotiation with their enemies whilst effectively receiving orders and
instructions from the White House and State Department on one side or
from Beijing on the other. They were neither diplomats nor politicians
but military men unfamiliar with the intricacies of negotiation. It is now
known that the Communists assigned experienced political leaders to their
delegation, whereas the US/UN delegation was headed by US military offic-
ers who ‘deeply distrusted their adversaries’ (Matray 1992: 477) and ‘found
the process of bargaining tedious and distasteful’ (Foot 1990: 73). Both the
military hierarchy and internal negotiations between US delegates and mili-
tary authorities in Tokyo or Washington imposed further pressure on the
negotiators from the US side (Goldhamer 1994: xxiii).
From the beginning of the talks, it was clear that the delegations saw the
negotiating process very differently. The US/UN delegation wanted to limit
the talks to purely military matters; the Chinese/North Korean delegation
sought a political and military settlement to the war. What is more, lan-
guages, cultures and ways of conducting negotiations differed enormously
in Panmunjom, and this took a toll on communication; the more-than two
years of talks are blatant evidence of this. According to Goldhamer (1994:
69), a civilian observer in the earlier months of negotiations, one of the most
important deficiencies on the UN side during this early stage of the truce
talks was the failure to understand the Communist negotiating style. In
addition to this, as Goldhamer goes on to say (1994: 169), the Communists
saw the negotiations as a way of bringing pressure on the UN delegation
by employing tactics such as using insulting behaviour or showing obvious
inattention to the US delegates’ discourse (Goldhamer 1994: 169).
The ‘war of nerves’ at the negotiating table should not lead us to forget
the linguistic war, ‘the war of words’, that took place in Panmunjom and
that, in turn, characterized the entire negotiating process. However, factors
such as the distrust and enmity between the parties, their mutual igno-
rance and their lack of experience in dealing directly and personally with
Americans or Chinese or Koreans complicated the whole process even more
(Chengwen 2001: 188). Furthermore, this mutual ignorance led each del-
egation to pay great attention to their opponents’ gestures and nonverbal
behaviour (Chengwen 2001: 188).
Interpreters at the Korean Truce Negotiations

On 10 July 1951, both delegations met in the Communist-controlled town
of Kaesong. Representatives were accompanied by staff members, interpret-
ers and secretaries. Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy was the chief representative
at the initial stage of the negotiations representing the UN/US delegation
and General Nam Il was the key speaker representing the Chinese–North
Koreans. From this moment on, each speech at the meeting was trans-
lated into three languages: Chinese, Korean and English. Interpreters only
worked for their own delegates: that is, US interpreters worked from English
to Korean and Chinese. Likewise, Chinese and North Korean interpreters
worked only from Korean or Chinese into English.
In no time at all, difficulties appeared that were more than linguistic in
nature. According to General Chai Chengwen (Chengwen 2001: 194), on
several occasions Admiral Joy ‘kept going on with his speech without wait-
ing for the Chinese translation’. On the UN/US side, Joy recalls (1955: 26)
that ‘Nam Il appeared to be somewhat irritated by the inevitable delays of
translation.’
In addition to this lack of practice regarding communication through
interpreters, sources consulted record contradictory information in regard
to the linguistic knowledge of interpreters. This can be understood by study-
ing the social biography of certain interpreters who worked in the first stage
of the truce talks and throughout the armistice negotiations.
1st Lieutenant Richard Underwood (b. 1927), Lieutenant Horace E. Underwood

(1917–2004) and Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Wu
Richard Underwood was assigned to interpret from English to Korean for
the initial liaison team of UN command officers who flew into Kaesong to
do the groundwork prior to the truce talks. Having first joined the US Army
in 1945, he served as an intelligence officer and later, in 1950, returned to
active service, being sent to Korea at his own request because he felt that
there might be an urgent demand for Korean-speaking officers. In personal
communication, Richard Underwood admitted he was not a professional
interpreter and that he had always felt inadequate because he had had no
formal training in the Korean language; he had just learned Korean natu-
rally while growing up and playing with Korean children.12
Richard Underwood and his brother Horace E. Underwood had a mission-
ary background as grandsons of Horace Grant Underwood (1859–1916), a pio-
neer among Protestant missionaries in Korea. The Underwood brothers were
born in Seoul and received their early education at the Seoul Foreign School.
The elder brother, Horace, joined the delegation later – ‘at Richard’s urging’
(Li, Millet and Yu 2001: 260) – and became Chief Official Interpreter for the
UN Command at Panmunjom. Horace had studied Korean and Chinese char-
acters and had taught English at the Chosen Christian College before the war.
During World War II, he had served as a US Navy officer. He later participated
in the Korean War and in preparing the famous Incheon landing.
Little is known about Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Wu, apart from the fact
that he was an Asian-American Army US officer, born in Burma, and that
he served as a Chinese interpreter for the UN armistice delegation between
8 July 1951 and 27 July 1953. In a brief report in Life magazine, dated 31
August 1953, Captain Bertrand R. Brinley (1953: 9) called for public recogni-
tion of Kenneth Wu’s extremely valuable service at Panmunjom because ‘for
25 arduous months he represented the only constant link of understanding
between the UN Command and the Chinese People’s Volunteers’. According

to General Chai Chengwen, at the first stage of the truce talks, the Communist
side ‘tried to keep the records of the other side’s speeches in English since
Underwood did not speak Korean very well, nor did Wu speak Chinese well’
(Chengwen 2001: 194). However, he also says that Richard Underwood
‘set high standards for himself’ and that interpreter Wu’s language ability
‘improved quickly during the process of the negotiations’ (Chengwen 2001:
194). On the part of the UN command, Joy (1955: 26) considers the US inter-
preters ‘were impeccable linguists, adding keen intelligence to their talents
as interpreters.’ In addition to this, Joy (1955: 26) uses the words ‘exacting
function’ to refer to the interpreters’ work at the truce talks.
Communication through interpreters at the Korean Truce Negotiations

The success or failure of US interpreters cannot be understood without a close
examination of the specific settings where their assistance was needed and
the specific requirements demanded of them. With the exception of Colonel
Robert B. Ekvall, the interpreters studied in this chapter learned how to work
as interpreters ‘on the job’. Their unique personal backgrounds as well as their
motivation to act in their delegations’ best interests were important resources
in facing the complexity of situational constraints at such a sensitive setting
as the Panmunjom negotiations. Examining some examples of interpreting
assignments helps to show the complexity of these negotiations.
Richard Underwood served as a Korean interpreter at the truce talks for
one year. His brother Horace stayed in Panmunjom until the signing of
the armistice. Richard Underwood told us that his brother ‘did virtually
all the interpreting at the plenary sessions’13 whereas he preferred working
at the liaison meetings. He also makes an interesting distinction between
interpreting after having been involved in discussions at staff meetings and
interpreting without this preparation. In his words:
I mentioned that I had no problem at the liaison meetings. I did have

very great problems at the formal meetings because all of a sudden, we
came up with all sorts of technical language that I had no competence to
interpret, and it was a really, really miserable time. (Underwood 2010)
Untrained interpreters at this initial stage were not briefed by the delegates;
they knew neither the topic nor what was at stake. He goes on to say:
At this time, our officers didn’t tell us ahead of time, they didn’t tell the
interpreter ahead of time anything of what was going to be said, so this
all came to us just out of the blue. And that night, I talked to Admiral Joy
and some of the others about it, and said: ‘I really have to be in your staff
meetings. I’ve got to know what you’re talking about beforehand so that
I can be ready to express what you’re saying.’ (Underwood 2010)
From this moment, US interpreters received permission to sit in on the

staff meetings and they also had copies of the prepared ‘position papers’,
although this alone was not enough. As Richard Underwood said:
Before every meeting, Horace, I and the Korean stenographer would

review all of the pre-prepared [sic] to be sure there were no snags due to
vocabulary. Some few times we persuaded our delegate to slightly alter
his wording to make the message more crystal clear in Korean. After each
meeting three of us would review the speeches of each side to try and
ensure that we and the enemy had indeed been accurate in the interpre-
tation made that day.14
This overload of linguistic work was justified because accuracy was one of
the main functions of interpreting in the truce negotiations. In fact, when
asked about the most difficult task he had faced as an interpreter in the truce
talks, Richard Underwood mentioned the constant effort to convey ‘the true
thoughts behind the words’, to be ambiguous or very specific, when ambi-
guity or specificity were required.15 He also mentioned particular problems
with idioms and, specifically, regional expressions.
As Brian Harris observes in a blog post devoted to the Panmunjon talks,
military and diplomatic interpreting ‘often merge because wars end in
armistice negotiations between the generals on the opposing sides and they
bring their military staff interpreters with them’ (Harris 2010). Interpreters
at the truce negotiations acted as diplomat-interpreters, since they had to
work into their ‘foreign’ language and served as interpreting monitors, cor-
recting the errors made by the interpreters on the other side and checking
words with double meanings or ambiguities.
Translators and interpreters in Panmunjom invested countless hours
in eliminating wording differences in agreed texts or preparing texts for
delegates on the basis of details that had been discussed and recorded in
documents produced at lower-level meetings. This process of revision, draft-
ing and editing documents was not an easy one because major differences
existed between the languages used and a supreme linguistic effort was
required on the part of the team of translators and interpreters, as was an
in-depth knowledge of the subject or subjects they were to be interpreted or
translated. In these cases, linguistic mediation emerged as an essential tool
in moving forward the negotiations, and it was greatly appreciated by the
delegates in the two opposing parties.
Interpreting and verbal violence

In Ji’s memoirs, the chapter where he describes his experiences as a note-
taking translator at the negotiating table is called ‘Two Years of Perfidy and
Fleas’ ( Ji 2008: 100). The hostile tone of armistice negotiations, as a result of
the military confrontation on the battlefield, affected the team of translators
and interpreters in many ways and contributed to making their work techni-
cally and emotionally difficult.
From the technical point of view, Goldhamer (1994: 43, 169, 175) reports
many occasions where delegates asked the Underwoods as well as the
Chinese interpreter, Kenneth Wu, for the meaning of particular phrases
or for the translation of terms that carried an emotive charge, particularly
insults. As explained above, the Underwoods and other interpreters who
served in the negotiating process – such as Colonel Ekvall, who was born to
missionary parents on the China–Tibet border – had unique backgrounds
with different levels of bilingualism and biculturalism, which proved to be
of great value in the special circumstances of Panmunjom.
However, in many situations, interpreters found themselves trapped by
their mediator role as ‘true interpreters’ (Harris 1990: 118) and by the risk
of losing face as participants in the face-to-face communicative event. The
variability of responses in interpreting insults and other derogatory uses of
language is nevertheless important and is grounded to some extent in the
setting-related constraints and in the position and social status of interpret-
ers in this mediated event.
One example is provided by Richard Underwood, who describes the
reaction of himself and his brother when they detected a more polite
interpretation – by comparison with the denigrating language used by the
Chinese or Korean delegate – on the part of interpreters for the other side.
He remembers that the tactic ‘of using denigrating language . . . while sugar-
quoting the English was not uncommon and was a tactic we all kept our ears
open to detect and report’.16
The war as an experience lived by untrained interpreters
The discussion so far has considered the technical but nonetheless essential
role that untrained interpreters performed at the Korean truce talks. This was
a challenging experience for many of them on a professional level because
they had to learn to function as interpreters ‘on the job’. Panmunjom was
in some way an interpreter training and practice centre. Alfred D. Wilhelm,
Jr. (1994) has analysed oral interviews with forty people who participated
in negotiations between the USA and China in the decisive period between
1945 and 1983. Many of the non-native speakers of English admitted
that they had perfected their English in interminable, boring meetings in
Panmunjom (Wilhelm 1994: 228). However, Panmunjom, for many transla-
tors and interpreters, was also a challenging experience on a personal level
( Ji 2008: 16).
The second part of this paper focuses on the question of interpreters as
eyewitnesses of the war in Korea. The interest here lies in understanding
how the devastation and military violence of the war in Korea was experi-
enced by ordinary individuals, considering that Korea was the Underwood
brothers’ adopted country. It should not be forgotten that their familiarity

with the Korean language and what amounted to their hybrid identity were
the reasons they served as interpreters in the negotiations. It is therefore
worthwhile to ask: how far does this experience make them relevant wit-
nesses? On what terms is war remembered? And how are personal memories
of the war transmitted?
In this research into untrained interpreters in the Korean War, the idea
of compensating for silenced and forgotten interpreters’ experiences makes
perfect sense. Furthermore, the discussion of oral material is an opportunity
to develop many neglected methodological questions in the field of oral
history (Kurkowska-Budzan and Zamorski 2009), including the reliability of
memory and the relationships between memory and history and between
violence and memory.
A personal experience
One of the challenges of conducting interviews about events that have taken
place in the distant past is the inherent effort to recreate that past. Memory
is what makes an eyewitness, but memory fails. As Horace Underwood
asks himself: ‘How does one describe the feelings of fifty years ago?’ (Korea
Times 2000). Similarly, Richard Underwood admits: ‘It has been fifty-eight
years and my memory fails me in some regards but there was a great deal
of tension.’17
As recent work on memory in the social sciences has shown, memory
and history do not compete against each other. Memory and history are
different modes of being connected to the past (Mate 2008). Consequently,
if remembering is different from historical recording, it should fulfil other
tasks. Likewise, remembering should find its expression in places other
than historical records, such as verbal accounts and even bodily practices
(Connerton 1989).
Listening to Richard Underwood’s verbal account, the interviewer might
not be prepared to find firm convictions that are probably related to ideol-
ogy and American cultural values in the early years of the Cold War. When
Richard Underwood remembers his experiences as a military interpreter in
Panmunjom, he refers to the Communist delegation’s interpreters as ‘enemy
interpreters’, which raises issues such as the scope of remembering as a
political act, particularly as an act of justification and control (Argenti and
Schramm 2010: 19). Some examples from his personal communication are
provided below:
Example 1
Question: . . . How did you take notes, how did you prepare the
meetings?
Answer: . . . Our note-taking was limited to brief scribbles to help us dur-
ing the few times when the enemy interpreters goofed.18
Example 2
Question: Irena Dobosz, a young Polish journalist at that time, who
worked in Panmunjom describes interpreting in a very graphical way . . .
Does that sound familiar to you?
Answer: . . . At our sessions we would only whisper messages to our del-
egate when/if we felt the enemy interpreter was not communicating the
full and correct content and tone of their message.19
Example 3
Question: . . . both sides used to work together after or before plenary ses-
sions, particularly when they worked on agreed texts.
Answer: After each meeting, the three of us [the Underwood brothers and
a Korean stenographer] would review the speeches of each side to try and
ensure that we and the enemy had indeed been accurate in the interpre-
tation made that day.20
One cannot simply assume that this choice in Richard Underwood’s account
is ideologically motivated and therefore unmistakable evidence of the Cold
War mentality. One should instead go beyond metaphors and rhetorical
effects in order to ask questions about the relevance of some particular
discourses (Blommaert 1999: 8). Underwood is remembering his experience
as an interpreter in a real war. The military and the war context in Korea
may adequately account for the fact that interpreters who worked for the
Chinese–North Korean delegation were enemies for the US interpreters.
Similarly, when Wilhelm asked his respondents why there was such hostility
in Panmunjom; they said: ‘Americans were enemies and that’s how enemies
are treated’ (Wilhelm 1994: 57).
Moreover, the references to the ‘enemy interpreter’ or to ‘the enemy’
belong to a conflict in Richard Underwood’s discourse: he is bringing to
the present a conflict in which he is taking sides as he did in the past in
Panmunjom. He is telling us where he comes from and how this remember-
ing is an occasion to be connected with a specific historical situation where
he was, in his view, not only on the right side ideologically speaking but, as
a military interpreter, in a clear position of control. He is also telling us what
his values are: the military and fighting for one’s country. In the same way,
his brother says in the previously-cited article in Korea Times: ‘I am a Korean
War veteran’ (Korea Times 2000).
In a different passage, Horace Underwood remembers another difficult
subject: the destruction of places that the Underwood brothers had known
and loved before the war:
Example 4
When you see places that you know and love destroyed or damaged or
something, yes, you feel badly about it. . . . I was up on the top of a hill
looking down as the Old Severance [a hospital] was burning up in front

of the Seoul railway station . . . that was a kind of a wrenching sight to
watch all that going up in flames. (Korea Times 2000)
These are emotional testimonies that inform us about feelings of identifica-

tion and belonging. Landscapes and places ‘can be said to work as memory’
(Argenti and Schramm 2010: 25, emphasis in original). The Underwood
brothers were born in Seoul and raised there. Tensions and mixed feelings
as a result of a hybrid identity are often the interpreter’s heritage. Finally, in
the Underwoods’ personal accounts – as well as in those of many others – we
have found testimonies of fear and danger related with being at war. In this
regard, the fact of being interpreters in a war is no different to being soldiers
in a war, particularly if serving near the front line or on special missions
(Lee [n.d.]). The focus on memory in these interpreters’ personal accounts
highlights strong feelings and emotions that rarely have a place in historical
records. Memory is partial, selective and opportunist in many situations, but
memory is also a form of knowledge about the past that enables us to save
alternative histories of the interpreting profession.
Conclusion
This chapter has focused on an untapped area in interpreting history. This

is an exploratory study, and much remains unknown about the intricacy
of the role and functions of interpreter-mediated communication in the
Korean War. As the chapter has shown, US military commanders had an
urgent need for bilingual officers who were fluent in Chinese, Korean and
English. Difficult military negotiations presented specific tensions, and
untrained interpreters at the Panmunjom talks experienced a number of
practical constraints. The lack of specific preparation in interpreting com-
pounded the constraints related to the setting of the talks, making made the
interpreters’ work technically and emotionally difficult.
The voices of interpreters in conflicts are normally considered of little
relevance, since interpreters widely viewed as mere linguistic assistants.
The personal accounts presented here shed light on the communicative
challenges of their work in the difficult circumstances of the Korean War.
In recounting their experiences as interpreters in a war, they contextualize
discourse on interpreting in a wide range of assignments, from practical as
well as historical perspectives. More specifically, they reflect on their habitus
(Bourdieu 1977: 82–3), that is, on the practices and concerns related to their
activity in facilitating understanding, to their constant effort ‘to get the
message across’ or to convey ‘the true thoughts behind the words’.
Finally, the focus on war as experience highlights personal experi-
ences of interpreters as eyewitnesses of war. In this sense, their accounts
display mixed feelings in relation to the act of remembering a traumatic
experience: patriotic pride, vulnerability, pain and a sense of danger, to

mention only a few emotions that point to the tensions inherent to the act
of remembering as well as to the need to claim public recognition for them-
selves or for all those who served and fought in Korea.
Notes
1. CinCFE (Ridgway) to JCS, August. FRUS, 1951, VII, 787–8.
2. See, for instance, the chapters by Kleinman and Kujamäki, this volume.
3. The author is very grateful to Richard Underwood for answering my questions
when first contacted by email on 27 May 2010, as well as for later resolving fur-
ther questions and doubts that the subject brought in its wake.
4. Underwood 2010; Longines Chronoscope Interviews, 1953, v. 16, Horace E.
Underwood. Recording provided by the National Archives of the United States,
release date January 2007.
5. http://www.wheaton.edu/bgc/archives/GUIDES/092.html (accessed 22 June 2010).
6. The author gratefully acknowledges the permission of Lynnita Jean Brown to use
the material posted on her website http://www.koreanwar-educator.org.
7. http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/frus.html.
8. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/program/cold-war-international-history-project.
9. http://www.state.nj.us/military//korea/factsheets/asian.html (accessed 8 July
2011).
10. ‘Freedom is not Free’, http://www.koreanwar-educator.org/memoirs/lee/index.
htm (accessed 6 July 2011).
11. Longines Chronoscope Interviews, 1953, v. 16, Horace E. Underwood. Recording pro-
vided by the National Archives of the United States, release date January 2007.
12. Personal communication, 28 May 2010.
15. Personal communication, 2 June 2010.
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9
Victims of War: Refugees’ First
Contacts with the British
in the Second World War
Simona Tobia
University of Reading
Among those who ‘meet the other in war and conflict’ are the hundreds of
thousands of refugees, displaced people, exiles and escapers – all of them
‘victims of war’ – who for various reasons had to leave their countries dur-
ing and after World War II. At the end of the conflict, this massive forced
migration represented a problem of great magnitude, as millions of people
had been expelled, or had chosen to leave their homes: more than ten mil-
lion slave labourers had been forcedly deported by the Nazis to work in
German factories and mines; a series of compulsory population transfers,
the changes in national boundaries, the Third Reich’s effort to build a new
racial order and direct Nazi occupation had affected millions of Europeans
(among them Germans, Italians, Yugoslavs, Bulgarians, Romanians, Soviets,
Hungarians, Czechs and Poles) (Reinisch 2007). In the first, still widely cited,
work on this topic, Malcolm Jarvis Proudfoot (1956) estimated that more
than sixty million Europeans were displaced from their homes during the
conflict and in its aftermath.
This chapter looks at a very specific aspect of this problem, those refu-
gees who escaped from their countries of origin, largely in Nazi-occupied
continental Europe, and arrived in the United Kingdom between 1941 and
1945. Examining the way Britain related to this group of refugees who were
dealt with at the Royal Victoria Patriotic School (RVPS) in Wandsworth, the
chapter tries to locate the importance of languages in the system established
at RVPS, which included a process of interviewing and vetting refugees arriv-
ing to the country followed by other sets of interviews aimed at collecting
valuable intelligence.
Historians have dealt widely with British attitudes towards forced migra-
tion in the Second World War, with particular interest in British policies
towards wartime refugees (see Conway and Gotovitch 2001; Dove 2005),
and the Holocaust (see Wasserstein 1979; Hirschfeld 1984; Berghahn 1984;
London 2000). The problem of displacement in the aftermath of World
War II, on the other hand, has been largely overlooked (Shephard 2008)
131
until a number of recent studies on post-war reconstruction of Europe and

on relief (Reinisch (ed.) 2007; Gemie and Humbert 2009; Shephard 2010).
Whereas research into the politics and practices of relief and asylum in the
aftermath of conflict is now well-established, it could be argued that histori-
cal research has still only looked into a few aspects of the way that refugees
and displaced people were dealt with during the conflict by the British. In
fact, Nicholas Atkin’s pioneering work on The Forgotten French: Exiles in the
British Isles (2003), openly admits that, in the absence of secondary litera-
ture, it had to rely quite heavily on primary sources (Atkin: 2003, viii–xi).
Research in areas such as linguistics and translation studies has recently
shown a great deal of interest in contemporary asylum procedures (Inghilleri
2004–7; Maryns 2006) and in the role of languages and language interme-
diaries within those procedures. However, the role of languages in security
procedures established to deal with refugees and the collection of human
intelligence has been largely overlooked in this body of work.
The analyses by Maryns and Inghilleri both highlight the deep and pre-
dominantly negative influence of defective interpreting systems on the
overall outcome of asylum interviews. In comparison with these situations,
the method developed in British reception centres during World War II
seems to have been quite successful in overcoming language and cultural
difficulties. As we shall see, interviewers and interrogators were carefully
selected: their cultural awareness was of primary importance and was an
essential part of their skills as intelligence officers.
Louise London’s research (London 2000) represents one of the most com-
prehensive studies regarding the British response to the problem of refugees
coming to Britain. In her account of immigration controls on the admission
of (particularly Jewish) refugees, London shows how British policy severely
restricted refuge during the conflict (and during the Holocaust) and consist-
ently limited admissions on a purely humanitarian basis, considering British
self-interest first and foremost:
Alien admissions were severely restricted and evaluated by reference to

the requirements of the war. The policy of non admitting refugees – alien
or British – to the United Kingdom solely on humanitarian grounds was
repeatedly affirmed at Cabinet level. (London 2000: 173)
To be granted entry into the UK, being a war refugee or even a racial refugee
was not enough. One had to fit into the ‘war effort’ category or to qualify
on political grounds (London: 2000, 178). There had to be a compensating
benefit for Britain from any humanitarian scheme for refugees.
During the conflict, many refugees arrived at ports from Nazi-occupied
continental Europe even without permission to enter, and these people had
to be dealt with. Procedures were established to deal with them for reasons
other than relief or humanitarian concern; they were dealt with mainly for
Simona Tobia 133
reasons of security and intelligence. This chapter argues that the authorities’
focus on British self-interest had an important impact on the way in which
linguistic difficulties were overcome and consequently on the final outcome
of these language encounters. The RVPS was not established primarily to
offer relief to those who had managed to reach British shores to escape
from Nazism but in fact to collect valuable intelligence, thus substantiating
once more the idea of Britain as ‘reluctant asylum’ (Atkin 2003: 32; see also
Sherman 1973; Wasserstein 1979; London 2000).
Victims of war encountering the British
British plans for the reception of refugees of all nationalities started in

1940. They were tardy and, on the whole, badly implemented. Initially, it
was decided that the Ministry of Health would deal with the matter, but
foreign refugees were generally regarded with suspicion because they would
consume precious resources and could disrupt home defence. When the
exodus of civilians from continental Europe started, the first refugees arrived
at Southampton and Portsmouth, and from there they reached London by
train. The Ministry of Health thus instructed the London City Council to
assist in the reception of refugees (Atkin 2003: 33–6), a questionable deci-
sion which implied that refugees were to stay in the capital at a time when
Londoners were being relocated to safer areas. Very quickly, nine reception
centres were installed in the capital, where refugees were ‘fed, bathed and
medically examined before being transferred to the twenty cooperating
borough councils for billeting’ (Atkin 2003: 35). At this stage, however, the
reception of refugees in London was chaotic. Since places in reception cen-
tres were becoming scarce, refugees were often housed in prisons until their
credentials could be proven.
In late 1940, the government was forced to recognize the unsuitability of
this situation and sought alternative venues for the processing of refugees
arriving from the continent. The RVPS in Wandsworth was eventually made
available to the security services. To enable the Security Service to examine
aliens arriving in the UK thoroughly, the premises of the RVPS in Trinity
Road, Wandsworth, London SW18, were taken over by the Internment
Camps Division of the Home Office. The facility opened on 8 January 1941
for the reception of aliens of allied and friendly countries, but it would soon
also be used to receive those coming from territory occupied by the enemy.
Women and children were housed in nearby buildings. The centre was
administered by the Home Office, with a Camp Commandant with military
rank and a staff of civilian wardens plus a Pioneer Corps guard. RVPS would
not normally deal with German or Italian civilian refugees, who were sent to
Internment Camp 001 at the Oratory Schools: ‘German and Italian civilian
arrivals, who were sent to the Oratory Schools in London, were interrogated
when their history showed that they should have information of interest.’1
When refugees arrived at ports they were usually kept in prison for one
night, until the first available train to London was ready to leave, but there
were exceptions. In Bristol, for example, they were kept in their vessels until
a train was ready to depart for the capital. Once at the reception centre,
internees were presented with a set of rules which summarized the purposes
of the centre itself:
1 This Reception Centre has been established with the purpose of offer-
ing temporary lodging to allied and neutral subjects who arrive in
Great Britain.
2 It is duly the duty of the Centre’s officers to assist you in proving your
identity and, to this effect, of seeing all the documents to be found in
your possession, and to ask you for all the information that they will
judge necessary.
Your interest is therefore to reply in a frank and explicit manner to the

questions that are put to you.
3 As soon as your identity and good faith have been established, you
will be sent to the representatives of your country in Great Britain,
and every help will be given to you in order that you can reach your
destination. In waiting, you will understand that, for reasons of secu-
rity, no communication will be permitted with the outside, either by
message, letter, telephone, or any other means. (Atkin 2003: 45)
It was very clear that arrivals from continental Europe first of all had to sup-
ply good information, they had to be security-cleared, and only after that
could they be assisted and released to their own authorities in Britain.
On the outbreak of war, security control officers at ports of arrival in
Britain were responsible for collecting military information from aliens
entering the United Kingdom. Once the Axis powers had gained control of
most of Europe in 1940, it was obvious that every arrival from territory occu-
pied or directly governed by the enemy must have had information of value.
The collection of this information at the ports by MI5 officers soon proved
to be an impossibility because of primary security interests and because the
‘reports were scrappy and valueless to service departments’.2
MI9, although normally responsible only for prisoners of war, accepted
the additional responsibility of dealing with aliens arriving in the UK in
a meeting held on 14 May 1941. MI5 initially remained responsible for
those aliens who proceeded directly to their destinations from the ports of
arrival, for the interrogation of British subjects and for producing advices
of interesting arrivals to service sections who might wish to interrogate in
detail. The London Reception Centre (LRC), also known as RVPS, initially
Simona Tobia 135
under MI9’s responsibility, was therefore in charge of the ‘a) interrogation

of Alien refugees and escapers; b) collection of intelligence requirements
and dissemination of Refugee intelligence’.3 MI5, MI6, MI9, Prisoner of War
Interrogation Section (PWIS) and immigration officers were all given office
accommodation at the premises. The PWIS officer arrived at the Centre on
25 May 1941, after the agreement had been made.
By 12 August 1941, a little over two months after it started its operations,
the LRC and RVPS had issued 172 interrogation reports with intelligence
collected from refugees and displaced people. These early days saw a consist-
ent flow of escapers from Norway and to a lesser extent from other coun-
tries: ‘These men, and sometimes women and children, risked their lives
in small boats. They were of an exceptionally high standard and brought
good information.’4 On 12 August 1941, the organization was absorbed
into MI9 (a) (the section which would became MI19 from December 1941).
From January 1942, the organization at the London Reception Centre (LRC)
became MI19 (RVPS). It included officers from PWIS(H) and RNVR and an
officer from the Political Intelligence Department (PID) of the FO. By the
end of November 1942, there had been 10,529 arrivals. 1100 reports had
been written, as well as 77 supplementary reports.
Interestingly, official documents do not always refer to this group of
people as ‘refugees’. Sometimes they are instead referred to as ‘inform-
ants’, showing how deeply attention was focused on the British interest
rather than on humanitarian issues. They arrived not only from enemy
and enemy-occupied territory but also from French possessions in Africa
under Vichy control. Before the landings in North Africa, much informa-
tion of interest was forthcoming from these parts. Between November
1942 and September 1943 large numbers of refugees arrived, many in
direct escape parties from continental countries, chiefly from France,
Norway and Denmark. All of them brought operational and topographical
intelligence.
Since the information obtained from refugees was proving vital in prepa-
ration for the Allied assault on the continent, an expansion of the establish-
ment was started at the end of September 1943. From then on, there were
nine interrogating officers, who all worked in the same manner despite
being from different departments. The period between October 1943 and
June 1944 was the peak of activity, due to preparations for the landings in
Normandy. Thousands of refugees were expected to arrive from the conti-
nent, and preparations to deal with them went on feverishly from January
1944.
Since the spring of 1941, one Miss Davies had been working as a pho-
tographer at the LRC (RVPS), when she answered an advertisement in The
Daily Telegraph for a position as ‘Confidential Government Clerk’. On 5 May
1944, she wrote in her diary that ‘things are beginning to liven up for the
expected invasion’ and that she was ‘frantically busy all day, photographed
30 people’.5 Arrivals totalled 4000 in the period (for a total of 21,400 since
the LRC had into being), and 433 intelligence reports were written.
After D-Day, civilian aliens continued to arrive in the UK in large num-
bers, but their value for intelligence purposes steadily declined. Those who
had anything of operational value had already given it to intelligence offic-
ers of the expeditionary forces. The anticipated influx of refugees from the
beachheads in Normandy did not materialize and the few persons who did
arrive had been interrogated by field units. Therefore, before the end of
1944, the staff of the RVPS was reduced. After January 1945 many officers
and clerks were released for more important work elsewhere, and the unit
was finally disbanded as of 31 May 1945.
Selection
Among the main purposes of examination at the RVPS was the selection of
persons for examination, which involved two phases: security interview-
ing to clear new arrivals and interviewing to collect intelligence. Reports
estimated that about one in ten people examined there were able to give
information of value.6 The greater part of these were interviewed and vet-
ted as to their possible knowledge and 3768 were able to give information
which was embodied in official interrogation reports.7 Direct arrivals from
enemy or enemy-occupied territory by sea or air always brought the most
valuable and up-to date intelligence, and interrogators gave such persons
priority.
Many individuals had already given their information to Military Attachés
or officials in neutral countries. They were only interviewed if they had
something of importance to tell or if they had previously failed to give the
information in sufficient detail. It seems quite evident that women were not
considered to be capable of giving information of value, because they were
given accommodation in a different centre. Those who were thought to
have some information of value were, however, interviewed at RVPS.
Refugees, who in this context were considered as ‘informants’, were
graded as listed below. It is very interesting to note that only informants,
and not the quality of their information, were valued:
1.
A) A reliable first-class source such as a highly qualified technician, emi-
nent doctor, extremely intelligent observer, etc.
B) A competent source or one with good powers of observation.
C) A source of medium reliability.
D) Unobservant or unreliable witness.
2.
No attempt was made to grade the information.
Simona Tobia 137
3.
An otherwise A source talking on a subject with which he was not con-
versant was down graded B or C.
4.
Following the grading of source there sometimes appeared the letter (Z).
This indicated that at the time of writing the report, the witness had not
been wholly cleared from the security point of view.
5.
Weekly lists were issued indicating that the informants in question had
subsequently been cleared by the Security Service.8
Reports
A total of 2641 intelligence reports were written between 25 May 1941 and
31 May 1945, plus other additional reports (total 3768). These were the result
of a process of co-authoring, as they were usually drafted after more than one
interview, after consultation with other services (Admiralty, War Office or
civil sections, or even foreign governments in exile) to assess the precise type
of intelligence needed against what was already known, and a careful control
of the index card of informants, to cross-check every piece of information.
The interrogation took place in the language of the interviewee (therefore
interrogators did not usually speak their own language, while interviewees
did), but the interrogation report was then produced in English, and it usu-
ally included other types of materials such as sketches, maps or any docu-
ments found on the refugee which might have been useful. A lot of clerical
work was also involved in this, before the final report was produced.
Interrogation
When a refugee arrived at the LRC (RVPS) he (or in very few cases she) was
asked three main questions:
1) Where had he been in enemy or enemy-occupied territory?

2) What was his occupation in those places?
3) What periods of time were spent in such occupations and places?9
Interrogations could last between a few minutes and many hours, and they
were carried out between 10 a.m. and 1 p.m., and 2 and 5 p.m.
The Security Service in general preferred to avoid the use of external inter-
rogators, but if someone had some important technical information then
experts might be needed. Furthermore, before D-Day numerous teams of US
interrogators would spend between three and six days with MI19 (RVPS).
A sound principle laid down in this organization was that military informa-
tion should not be disseminated until the informant had been cleared by
the Security Service, and this principle gave rise to a few difficulties. For
example, days or weeks might well have passed before MI5 was satisfied
that an arrival was not an enemy spy, and time factors were of the greatest
importance in intelligence dissemination: ‘Informants, upon arrival, were
bursting with information and full of enthusiasm. If, after a few days, they
had not been interviewed they lost interest in everything except the ques-
tion of how long they would be kept in “prison”.’10
MI5 was quite strict, and aliens might sometimes stay at RVPS for as much
as two or three weeks before MI5 could deal with their case, several weeks
more before being cleared, and a few more days to be interviewed if their
information was considered of value. This system was eventually changed so
that the whole process only took a few days, not weeks. Those cases which
could not be cleared by the Security Services, were then sent to other prison
camps (such as Camp 020 or CSDIC) for detailed interrogation.
Space was so limited at RVPS that it was the exception for officers to be
alone with their informants during an interrogation. Often two or more
interrogations would take place in a small room, and one officer might inter-
rogate several members of the crew of a boat together. It is interesting to note
that, when official documents describe the accommodation for this type of
interrogation, there is no mention of any interpreting/translating: in fact the
evidence does not show that any interpreting/translating as we understand
it today ever took place. Instead, multilingual officers were employed, who
could easily interview their informants – whether to clear them from a secu-
rity point of view or to collect intelligence – in their own language:
Interrogation officers and other staff should not be fit for active service.
The officers should be older men and, in addition to linguistic qualifica-
tions, they should have a good knowledge of the countries from which
refugees are expected, and if possible in addition they should be drawn
from different professions and occupations in civil life.11
These officers were instructed to use the same interviewing method taught
in War Intelligence and German Interrogation courses, although those were
clearly conceived for the interrogation of enemy prisoners of war.
However, a post-war report on the RVPS also points out that:
Obviously to a friendly informant an entirely different approach was

necessary to that when an interrogator was confronted by a resistant
German P/W.
. . . the approach of MI5 examiners was from the nature of their inves-
tigations inclined to be hostile to the alien. On the other hand the
Simona Tobia 139
approach of MI19 (RVPS) officers was cordial. Aliens were welcomed with
a handshake, offered a cigarette, and put at their ease with a few friendly
words of welcome to our land of liberty after their escape from a country
under German rule. . . . An intelligent informant, at his ease and full of
enthusiasm, needed guidance rather than interrogation. It became the
task of the officer to explain what was wanted, and restrain the inform-
ant from exaggerations. An unintelligent informant might need to have
his information dragged out of him, but goodwill was almost inevitably
met with. Only in a few isolated cases did an informant try to withhold
his knowledge in the belief that he should talk only to a member of his
own government in London.
. . . There were dangers against which interrogators had to guard them-

selves. Informants were usually so eager to talk that patience and tact
were necessary to sort out the essential and the superfluous. It was neces-
sary to keep the enthusiasts to facts and to assess the value of tall stories
told by the braggart. Often unlikely information turned out to be true.
To ask leading questions was an invitation to the informant to romance.
Some interrogators were themselves prone to romance in order to write a
good story. It was necessary to give a frequent warning that information
received should not be embellished but faithfully reflected to convey the
exact intelligence given.12
For the sake of winning informants’ confidence and good will, and to coun-
teract the effects of enemy propaganda, informants were given good food,
good accommodation, a sympathetic person, a message of greetings from
their own national governments and from the British Prime Minister.
The system actually seemed to be quite effective, mainly because of the
amount of reports produced, but confirmed also by the memories of those
who had to go through the PRS’ structure. Mattis (from Norway), for exam-
ple, recalls his journey in good detail:
From Edinburgh we went by train, . . . rounded up by military escort, we

went to London to the Royal Patriotic School [sic] who was the centre
that all, all refugees came to be cleared from security point of view. . . .
well it took about one week before you were cleared to be able to come
out of the RVPS, of the group of some sixty that came with the boat that
I came with, was two detained because they turned out to be Nazis infil-
trators. Two of them were stopped. So the next thing was that we were
sent down to County Hotel . . . not only refugees coming there, but also
sailors waiting for their next boat . . . next door was Norwegian security
office who checked [info on] military security installations that we knew
about in our own location in Norway. I suppose it was very important
info.13
Kaspar, who also arrived from Norway, where he had joined the resistance,
agrees:
From Shetland to Scotland, from there to Aberdeen by train, then to

London to the Patriotic School were we were interned. All the people
who came, until they were able to check our background. That took nor-
mally approximately one week, then we were released and handed to the
Norwegian authorities.
. . . There was great staff of people from the MI, other British intelligence.
They had connections of people from home. I believe it was impossible
for anyone from Norway to escape and hide as an agent, in the Patriotic
School. But there were all sorts of nations, they were all coming from
elsewhere. There were at least two or three hundred.
. . . They asked what were we doing . . . normal daily questions, find out
if we were up to something . . . anything that could be of interest. . . .
They were collecting us at Patriotic School.14
Interrogating officers: ‘knowledge of the language is essential

but interrogators need not know a foreign language perfectly’
Interrogators were required to have the skills and qualifications necessary to

deal with the interrogation methods outlined above. Languages obviously
featured among those skills:
Knowledge of the language is essential but interrogators need not know

a foreign language perfectly. Informants knew they were being interro-
gated by British officers. However, the command of a language should
be sufficiently great for the interrogator to put his questions clearly and
concisely and he should be able correctly to comprehend with accuracy
shades of meaning and dialects, although he himself would not be capa-
ble of expressing himself in such idiom or dialect.15
This is obviously quite contradictory. The idea of ‘knowing a foreign lan-

guage perfectly’ is very unclear in itself: ‘perfectly’ is not quantifiable, and
today it would not be accepted as a way to describe the level of language
knowledge. This seems to imply that a near-native level of fluency was not
needed for this type of job, yet later on the report states that interrogators
needed to understand shades of meanings and dialects, which even some
native speakers themselves might sometimes find difficult. The vagueness
of this statement shows how unclear language policy was at the time, even
for a task such as this, where the purpose of the exchange was primarily to
obtain valuable tactical and strategic information to the sole interest of the
Simona Tobia 141
British authorities – as opposed to the case of asylum interviewing where, at

least in theory, the interest of the applicant should be the primary purpose
of the exchange. Yet the system seems to have worked quite well:
In order to understand and cope with refugees from all parts of Europe,
a very good knowledge of both peoples and countries was essential.
Furthermore wide general knowledge and continental experience were
necessary as informants gave facts of interest on every conceivable sub-
ject, not merely on naval, military and air matters, but on commerce,
industry, politics, religion, health and a host of other topics.16
Languages certainly played a major role at the RVPS, as the evidence seems
to show that everyone, except for the clerks, was required to speak some
foreign idioms. The fact that, when there was little work to do, some clerks
took the opportunity of learning some languages from the interrogation
officers shows how those who worked there were fascinated by this skill,
although official documents very rarely refer to this very much needed skill.
Miss Davis in fact reports in her diary that 25 May 1944 was ‘rather a dull
day except that I heard that Captain Cox has offered to teach Wing and
I German. I am seriously considering taking him up on it.’17
Interviewers also needed to have what would today be called exceptional
interpersonal skills: the language and cultural knowledge needed to adapt to
their informant, plus other more human abilities, needed to win the trust of
people who were escaping from their own countries or to nail down enemy
spies.
The psychology of a person who had left enemy or enemy-occupied terri-

tory needed study. Some, for example, had been hunted by the Germans,
had been for months in constant fear of arrest, torture and death, and had
finally made a hazardous crossing of the Channel or North Sea. Others
were completely bored and ‘browned off’ by a long sojourn in Stockholm
or Lisbon. It did not take long to realise that a different approach would
be necessary in the case of each individual. Moreover there were racial
and national characteristics to be considered.18
Many of those who arrived at RVS had had incredibly tough experiences,
and the small amount of testimonies of these experiences does not do jus-
tice to their value. Kaspar’s first attempt to get to Britain had been on a small
fishing boat, about twenty-five feet long. The trip, attempted in February,
took about one day and one night. ‘In that area we were all used to be in
boats.’ The first attempt failed, so he returned to Alesund, and from there he
tried to find a new boat but did not have the money to pay for it. Eventually,
he sailed with sixty people: “We left on March 4th, with him two Jewish
doctors, and others, people coming from other parts of the country. We had
a Norwegian–German agent who infiltrated and tried to send signals to the

Germans. He shot twenty-two escapers’, but they still managed to arrive in
the Shetland Islands.19
Mattis landed on the shores of the Shetlands in a fishing boat as well. When
he arrived, he was with a party of seventy refugees and had absolutely nothing
with him. It ‘took us about three days to get over. First of all it was very danger-
ous because the German coastguard had spotlight following the boat. They had
to do as if they were fishing. I came over to Shetland Island . . . for three days
we didn’t have any food so we were shocked to see bread thrown out of the
boat.’20 In November 1944, Miss Davis photographed ‘a party of Norwegians
and French who were chased by the Gestapo, a plane which attacked them
killed one member of the party – such a tragedy when they were so near
goal’,21 and in February 1945 she worked with another group of Norwegians
‘who are starving to death. They looked dreadful. I felt fatter than ever, most of
them have to go to bed immediately they are in such a sad state.’22
Some interrogating officers had previous experience in the Forces, but some
others had worked in business, in the arts, in civil service or in journalism.
Many had lived in various European countries, and all had travelled widely:
They could cope with the languages of all these countries from which
operational intelligence for the conquest of Hitler’s ‘FESTUNG EUROPA’
was essential. There was definitely one lacuna – no officer spoke the lan-
guages of East and South East Europe. As a result persons from these coun-
tries were interrogated either in language foreign to them or not at all.23
. . . Quite apart from the fact that young officers are needed for active
service, the older man, with wide experience, is definitely the better type
for the detailed interrogation of alien refugees and infiltraters [sic].24
Poumeau de Lafforest
Only one complete case of those dealt with at RVPS has been preserved and
reached us as a complete dossier. Jean Abel Louis Poumeau de Lafforest was a
Breton journalist and claimed to be a resistance activist. He arrived in Britain
on 21 July 1942 and reached the RVPS the following day.
Port of departure: Carantec, 20 July 1942;

Port of arrival: Plymouth 21 July 1942;
Date of arrival at RVPS: 22 July 1942.25
A report written on him on 8 June 1943 included a summary of his story:
Jean de LAFOREST . . . came to this country by small boat from Brittany

last year and passed through LRC. The whole crew was under slight
Simona Tobia 143
suspicion, and one of them was sent to Camp 020, but the LRC decided
that LAFOREST was quite harmless from the point of view of Security and
he was released to the FFC. They however, took a very low view of him
and would not enrol him in their Forces. They treated him rather badly,
and in consequence, he, on his side, did not wish to join. He is working
for the news agency Agence Française Independente. I do not think it
is correct to say that he has valuable information to give to the British
Intelligence authorities, as he had ample opportunity of doing this while
at the LRC. He knows Brittany well, being a native of that part.
Captain C. A. W. Beaumont of the Aliens Department of the Home Office

wrote that, although the British were quite satisfied that Lafforest was not a
danger from a security point of view, the ‘Free French did not like him at all,
and were unwilling to employ him except in a military capacity for which
he is unfit. His eyes being extremely weak.’
Lafforest arrived in Britain on a boat with another four men, one of whom,
Lagall, was then found to be suspicious. Lafforest was ruled out as an accom-
plice German agent because he was not physically fit for the job, he had no
role in the recruitment of the party (he himself was recruited by Lagall) and
his story was considered satisfactory by his interrogators, who found that it
was confirmed by the accounts of the others. Lagall was later cleared, as he was
not a German agent, but he was sent to Camp 020 for further investigation.
All the names that Lafforest mentioned in the course of his interrogation were
crossed-checked against the RVPS’ card index, and a ‘Look-up summary’26 was
produced, including a card for each of the people mentioned by Lafforest,
with the information already known by RVPS on those individuals.
Lafforest was interrogated because he was thought to have interesting
information on the constitution of underground organizations in Brest,
details of military dispositions and sabotage activities and plans of the
effects of the bombing on Brest, and, more importantly, he had claimed that
he had possibilities of liaisons in France. His interrogations were carried out
by different officers in the French section of RVPS, all of whom showed a
very good level of French in their correspondence with the French govern-
mental authorities in London. The RVPS eventually produced three reports
after interviewing Lafforest: on 23 July (a report for MI6 only, with a list of
his relatives and all his previous addresses, his documents and his personal
history), 31 July and 15 August 1942. The conclusion was the following:
Regarding Lafforest, I can find no point in his story which arouses sus-
picion and do not consider that he can add any more in the way of evi-
dence, to what he has already given.27
Lafforest was subsequently released to ‘FFF’ (France Libre, re-named France

Combattante by the time Lafforest arrived to Britain) as a ‘war refugee’.
He subsequently married a British woman, Louise, and worked as a jour-

nalist at first for Agence France Independante, then with the Ministry of
Information and as News Editor for the Office of War Information (OWI)
at the US embassy. He finally became a freelance journalist and translator
in London.
Conclusions: successful language encounters with refugees?
The system developed at the LRC (RVPS) seems to have worked well and to
have achieved all its objectives, since there is no evidence of its malfunc-
tioning. It is true that the evidence is far from being complete and accurate,
but based on what is available today one may conclude that the system
worked well and that it was successful in overcoming language difficulties,
especially in comparison with the systems analysed by Maryns (2006) and
Inghilleri (2004–7). Both these authors have stressed the high (and mostly
negative) impact that an imperfect and sometimes non-existent interpreting
system has on the outcome of asylum interviews.
There are two major differences between the interviewing in this situation
discussed in this chapter and the types of interviewing procedures analysed
by Maryns (2006) in Belgium or Inghilleri (2004–7) in Britain: a) the reasons
for interrogations/interviewing, and b) the way that informants were per-
ceived and treated both during their time in the facility and during the inter-
viewing itself. Perceptions regarding interviewing as a language encounter,
on the other hand, do not seem to have changed. In fact, language barriers
are not perceived as a problem in principle, and a thorough fluency in the
language used for the interview is not requested in principle.
How were language difficulties overcome at LRC? Firstly, there were no
intermediaries in the communication process and no interpreting was
involved, but interviewing and the power to decide the refugee’s fate and to
collect intelligence were still not left to improvised linguists: mature intel-
ligence officers were selected for the job. Although there is no evidence of
assessment of language knowledge, having experiences of living abroad was
a requirement, as it was expected that this type of experience was proof of
deep knowledge of the language as well as cultural awareness. Culture seems
to have had primacy over language, although the only complete dossier
available shows that officers with a very high level of French were employed.
As final reports were produced in English as part of a co-authoring process,
no translation was ever involved either.
Extra-textual issues such as the British need for valuable intelligence and
the way informants were treated seem to be highly relevant in the process of
overcoming linguistic and cultural difficulties. Inghilleri notes that:
The relationship of the interpreter to the host community and to the

community of the asylum applicant is an important variable. While an
Simona Tobia 145
‘ideal’ position is widely felt to be a balance of the immigrant perspec-

tive and the host perspective, in practice the degree of assimilation into or
adaptation to the host culture appears to be important to how and when this
balance is achieved. (Inghilleri 2004: 6)
In the interviewing which took place at RVPS, the information and the
informants were relevant for reasons from which the interviewing authori-
ties could greatly benefit, and therefore informants were treated with care.
The better disposition of interviewing authorities towards informants and
information (valuable intelligence) led to a more objective system, which was
set up in the best interest of the British receiving authorities. Furthermore,
an extra-textual system of cross-verification was set up to establish cred-
ibility by checking carefully every single piece of information received from
a refugee, whether to clear the person or to collect useful information. The
card index system proved very useful in this sense because it helped to verify
every piece of information against information obtained through other
sources (other services, or other refugees). In contrast to today, officers’ dis-
position towards interviewees was substantially better: they did not have in
front of them thousands of desperate people coming from underdeveloped
areas of the world which also happened to be devastated by war. In front of
them, instead, they had sources of potentially vital intelligence and a mixed
group of people who included professionals, intelligent informants and
some informants who had had roles in the Resistance. All efforts were made
to win the informants’ trust and confidence: they were treated very well and
given good food and shelter, although they sometimes felt like they were
being imprisoned. In the cases described by Maryns (2006) and Inghilleri
(2004–7) it was the asylum seeker who had to win the interviewer’s confi-
dence, and not the other way around as at RVPS.
The interaction between refugee and officers is not only a discursive
process but is also a process in which other non linguistic elements come
into play to powerfully influence the cross-cultural encounter. The initial
MI5 interviews, on the other hand, seem much more similar to the process
described by Maryns.
Notes
1. National Archives (NA), WO 208/4970.
2. NA, WO 208/4970.
3. NA, WO 208/4970.
4. NA, WO 208/4970.
5. Imperial War Museum (IWM) Documents 03/43/1.
6. NA, WO 208/4970.
7. NA, WO 208/4970.
8. NA, WO 208/4970.
9. NA, WO 208/4970.
10. NA, WO 208/4970.
11. NA, WO 208/4970.
12. NA, WO 208/4970.
13. IWM Sound Archive 20358.
15. NA, WO 208/4970.
16. NA, WO 208/4970.
17. IWM Documents 03/43/1.
18. NA, WO 208/4970.
23. NA, WO 208/4970.
24. NA, WO 208/4970.
25. NA, KV 4/344.
26. NA, KV 4/344, 139.
27. NA, KV 4/344, 138.
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10
Jailtacht: the Irish Language and
the Conflict in Northern Ireland
Diarmait Mac Giolla Chríost
Cardiff University
The revival of the Irish language was a constitutional aim of the Irish
Republican Army (IRA). The organization would not turn out to realize this
aspiration in the field in Northern Ireland but rather would realize it in
prison; however, the impact of these Irish-speaking prisoners was eventually
felt far beyond the walls of their cells. This chapter examines the mechanics
of the acquisition of the language by Irish republican prisoners along with
their linguistic behaviours and practices from 1972 onwards. It therefore
moves through the different phases in this history: internment (1972–6),
protest (1976–81) and strategic engagement (1981–98). Its aim is to provide
the reader with the bare bones of the historical narrative that is at the core
of this particular case of a language bound up with political violence and
armed conflict.1
Internment (1972–6)
During the early years of the conflict in Northern Ireland, around 2000
(Connolly 1998: 261) Irish republicans were imprisoned at HMP Long Kesh
(popularly known as ‘the Cages’ by Irish republicans), a complex of ex-British
Army Nissen huts located beyond the southwestern hinterland of the city
of Belfast. In the period between 1972 and 1976, the prisoners, whether
interned without trial or imprisoned following conviction in court, were
subject to Special Category Status. This meant that they were allowed to
wear their own clothes, to freely associate with each other, to not do prison
work, to receive food and other parcels from a regular stream of visitors and
generally to organize themselves according to their membership of various
paramilitary groups.
In this period, the Irish republican prisoners organized Irish language
classes for themselves as part of a curriculum which included a broad range
of activities. The views of Séanna Walsh (also known as Séanna Breatnach /
Breathnach and Sid Walsh), now a prominent member of Sinn Féin and a
former leader of Irish republican prisoners, accurately reflect the motivations
148
Diarmait Mac Giolla Chríost 149
of those prisoners who had an interest in the language at that time. It can
be deduced that he first acquired the Irish language in school in Belfast
and in the Donegal Gaeltacht, like many others in Northern Ireland. Upon
imprisonment, he quickly became aware of the ideological significance of
the language for Irish republicanism and set about becoming fluent in Irish.
He describes this in the Irish republican magazine An Phoblacht:
I first got an interest in Irish in primary school and developed it at second-

ary school. I was in Loch an Iúir Gaeltacht in Donegal when Internment
erupted across the North. Within 18 months I found myself in prison, in
the Cages of Long Kesh. I dived into the language with a passion. It was
clear to me at a fairly early stage that the Irish language was much more
than a medium of communication, that wrapped up in it was the history
of conflict and dispossession, genocide and emigration. (Walsh quoted in
Walsh and Mac Ionnrachtaigh 2005)
Irish republican sources dating from the early 1970s indicate how the prisoners
acquired the Irish language at that time. It would appear that, during this
particular period, they learned the language in what one could reasonably
describe as an unremarkable classroom format, including the use of commer-
cially-produced teaching materials. Based upon uncited interviews with former
Irish republican prisoners, the US sociologist Denis O’Hearn incidentally
implies that the Irish language lessons were rather conservative:
Billy McKee appointed his closest friend, Prionsius Mac Airt, to travel
around the cages and keep an eye on organization and morale. A com-
mitted Irish speaker, as Mac Airt went around, he taught Irish in classes of
five to seven students. Mac Airt taught the students classical Irish, using
the old script rather than the Roman alphabet. The Irish language really
took off when two Irish speakers from the south [the Republic of Ireland]
arrived in the cage and began teaching classes. (O’Hearn 2006: 56)
The prisoners also adopted the badges of the Gaelic League (Conradh na
Gaeilge).2 These badges, known as the ‘Fainne Glas’, were to be worn by
individuals as an indicator of their level of fluency in the language:
It happened in June 1973 that men with ten years and more were sent
to the new Cages with cells in them. And after a couple more weeks we
were moved into one of them. In a month there were four new Cages of
‘Provos’ [provisional IRA] adjacent to each other . . . After that they col-
lected names of people who wanted to learn Irish. I took advantage of
this again. It was better than in the Crumlin, we had chalk, blackboards,
books and so on. After they collected the names there were thirty of them
and they decided to establish a Gaeltacht. That Monday I was informed
of the class that I was to be a pupil in. We weren’t working for more than
six weeks until we got the Fainne Glas, our first Fainne. We got it and
wore it on our coats. I was over the moon at getting it.3 (Republican Press
Centre 1977: 35)
Several contemporary and other later sources claim that the prisoners cre-
ated a ‘Gaelic hut’ or ‘Gaeltacht huts’ where the Irish language was to be
dominant, but it is clear from the ‘Prison Struggle’ collection that such a
Gaeltacht was largely made up of learners of the language, many of whom
had very limited competence in the language. That said, the cages were
important sites of Irish language learning for Irish republicans such as
Séanna Walsh:
There were Gaeltacht huts in the cages, during the early 1970s. Proinsias
Mac Airt [aka Francis / Frank Card and Frankie Cards] taught Irish to me
then. I had some, very limited Irish from school, a few words.4
It is asserted in the ‘Prison Struggle’ collection (Republican Press Centre

1977: 35) that there was a Gaeltacht in each of the Cages but other, mostly
later sources (including interviews with ex-prisoners) confirm only the cer-
tain existence of two ‘Gaeltacht huts’, namely Cages 11 and 17, with sleep-
ing accommodation for around twenty in each half-hut. Mac Ionnrachtaigh
(2003) elicited accounts of the language ethos and activities in these Cages
from some ex-prisoners. For example, Cage 11 is described in the following
terms by Liam Ó Maolchluiche:
All the emphasis was on the Irish language, we were immersed in it. There
were classes throughout the day on politics, literature, other aspects of
language and all of this was through the medium of Irish. We promised
newcomers that they’d be fluent inside six months. We weren’t allowed
to look at English-language television or radio. If you broke the rules or
if you spoke English you were excluded from the Gaeltacht and there
was a big list of people waiting to take your place. (Mac Ionnrachtaigh
2003: 22)
The Irish language activity in Cage 17 is similarly described by Gearóid

Mac Siacais (aka Jake Mac Siacais or Jake Jackson), another ex-prisoner, as
follows:
The Irregular Verbs were written on the wooden walls of the huts in huge
letters; you learned these by heart as a part of the basic class. After that,
you joined the middle class, then you went to the higher class and then
to the ‘treasrang’. The ‘treasrang’ showed that you’d developed and that
you were ready to go into the Gaeltacht. You had the bare bones of the
language. All you needed now was oral fluency. The teacher praised you
but there was always a waiting list. (Mac Ionnrachtaigh, 2003: 22)
One of these ‘Gaeltacht Huts’, Cage 11, appears to have been particularly
important as a focal point for a cohort of future leaders of the Irish repub-
lican movement. It was known by the Irish republican prisoners as ‘the
generals’ hut’. Cage 11 was home to a number of individuals who subse-
quently became central figures in the Irish republican struggle against the
British state, both inside and outside the prison. Amongst their numbers
were Bobby Sands (aka Roibeard Ó Seachnasaigh, Roibeard Mac Sandair and
Marcella, who would subsequently lead the fatal hunger strike of 1981),
Gerry Adams (aka Gearóid Mac Adaimh and Brownie, who would go on
to lead Sinn Féin to government in the Assembly in Northern Ireland) and
Séanna Walsh (who would become a key figure in the story of the Irish
language in Long Kesh). Allen Feldman, a US anthropologist conduct-
ing fieldwork in Belfast during the late 1980s, refered to the existence of
Gaeltacht huts at Long Kesh in his book of 1991, along with the use of the
term ‘Jailtacht’ by the Irish republican prisoners:
The compound huts were self-governing communities. Political prison-

ers had little contact with prison staff. All prison administration-prisoner
interaction was mediated by the paramilitary officer commanding each
hut. Within the compound, military hierarchies and ranks prevailed.
This social structure replicated and intensified the paramilitary social
structure on the outside. The Republican compounds engaged in exten-
sive political and military education-training programs. Most noteworthy
were the Gaeltacht or Jailtacht huts, dormitories where only Gaelic was
spoken. Prisoners resided permanently in the Gaeltacht huts. (Feldman,
1991: 296)
Feldman is, of course, mistaken in this regard. To use the term ‘Jailtacht’ in
relation to the ‘Gaeltacht Huts’ is anachronistic. The term was not coined in
the Cages of Long Kesh during the 1970s but rather in a very different sort
of prison during the 1980s.
Protest (1976–81)
On 1 March 1976, the particular prison world of ‘the Cages’ was brought to
an end when the British government implemented a new policy direction
aimed at breaking the IRA’s campaign of political violence. The prisons in
which Irish republican prisoners were held were to be a crucial part of that
initiative. The end of Special Category Status for all prisoners convicted after
that date signified an attempt by the British government to ‘criminalize’
the Irish republican prisoners and the Irish republican movement generally.
From 1 April 1980, Special Category Status was removed from all prisoners
regardless of the date of their conviction. Their resistance to this process of
‘criminalization’, along with the opening of a set of new H-shaped prison
buildings at the site (renamed HMP The Maze by the British government but
still known as Long Kesh by the prisoners themselves) based upon a cellular
design, enormously altered the situation.
At around this stage, a total of approximately four hundred prisoners
were in HMP The Maze and approximately 380 were claimed by the IRA as
members (Melaugh [n.d.]). In response to the change of direction in British
government prison policy, the prisoners embarked upon on a series of pro-
tests – beginning in September 1976 with a refusal to wear prison uniform
(the blanket protest), escalating in March 1978 with a refusal to slop out the
cells (the dirty protest) and culminating in two sets of hunger strikes which
were held during 1980 and 1981. The first set of hunger strikes (October
to December 1980) had very little political impact, but the impact of the
second was enormous.
The second set of hunger strikes began in March 1981 and ended in
October of the same year. During its course, ten of the twenty-three hunger
strikers died and three of the prisoners, of whom two were on hunger strike
and the other was on the blanket protest, were elected to the British and
Irish parliaments. The first and by far the most dramatic election was that
of Bobby Sands as MP for Fermanagh / South Tyrone (Northern Ireland) in
April 1981. This was followed in June 1981 by the election of Kieran Doherty
as TD (Teachta Dála: Member of the Irish Parliament) for Cavan / Monaghan
(Republic of Ireland) and of Paddy Agnew (on the blanket protest) as TD for
Louth (Republic of Ireland). According to many of the prisoners, the events
of this period of protest marked a very significant turning point for the Irish
language in prison. Laurence McKeown, ex-Irish republican prisoner (H-2
and H-6) and ex-hunger striker, recalls that the new conditions in the ‘pro-
testing wings’ of the H-blocks meant that the prisoners were now confined
to their cells (in pairs or in solitary confinement) under 24-hour lock-up
and they were denied access to any Irish-language material – there were no
books, no chalk, no blackboard, no classrooms:5
As more and more republican prisoners were sentenced [subsequent to

the removal of Special Category Status on 1 March 1976] they followed
the example of Kieran Nugent [the first Irish republican prisoner to chal-
lenge the new prison regime of ‘criminalization’] and refused to wear the
prison uniform or do prison work. Their numbers in the early days were
still small, however, and they felt very vulnerable. A very strict regime
was imposed by the guards and prison authorities in an attempt to break
the protest. The prisoners had nothing in their cells except cell furniture,
a Bible and the prison uniform which they refused to wear. They had no
cigarettes, radio, TV, papers, books, magazines, pens, nothing. They were
not even allowed to communicate to one another. Anyone caught doing

so was assaulted by the prison guards. Neither were they allowed to speak
to the conforming prisoners who were held in the same wing. A regime
of ‘silence’ was strictly imposed. (McKeown 1998: 144)
Despite the initial ‘regime of silence’,6 it was this change of prison policy
and the prisoners’ response to it which brought the language to the fore-
front of the Irish republican struggle inside prison. As another of the prison-
ers (Jackie McMullan) recalls, the rapid increase in the number of protesting
prisoners (perhaps as many as several hundred) contributed to the erosion,
in practice if not as a matter of policy, of this regime:
The increase in our numbers meant greater contact with the ordinary
prisoners, which led to more cigarettes and a greater flow of scéal [lit.
‘story’ but meaning ‘news’ or simply ‘gossip’]. Our confidence also began
to grow at this time and we spent more and more time talking to each
other, down at the pipes and even out the doors. It was harder for the
screws to handle the increased numbers, and the less committed among
them became less diligent in enforcing the countless petty rules. ( Jackie
McMullan [H-6] in Campbell et al. 1994: 18)
It is possible to gain an impression, from the prisoners, of how lessons were

now conducted from various sources. The obstacles to normal adult second
language acquisition were overcome in a number of ways. For example, the
ban on Irish-language material was undermined with some external help.
Those prisoners still with Special Category Status, housed in the Cages adja-
cent to the H-blocks, helped those learners of Irish in the H-blocks through
smuggling Irish language material to them, often through Catholic priests.
One such prisoner, Liam Ó Maolchluiche, recalled the practice in interview
with Mac Ionnrachtaigh (2003):
No new faces at all were coming into the Cages and life there became
rather boring and lonely. We felt particularly powerless with the struggle
against criminalization worsening in the Blocks . . . We sent Irish lan-
guage lessons to them through the priests in order to raise their spirits,
especially as the blanket protesters had no facilities at all . . . We would
have to be really certain that it was exactly perfect Irish in case we dis-
seminated mistakes [that is, faulty Irish] throughout the blocks. It was a
great experience and it helped our own Irish. (Mac Ionnrachtaigh 2003:
24–5)
The inability to freely associate and thereby conduct language classes

for the teaching and learning of Irish was overcome in a number of ways.
These lessons were led by those, such as Bobby Sands, Séanna Walsh and
Gearóid Mac Siacais, who were regarded as having a greater command of

the language.
The teaching of the Irish language is one example of how prisoners devel-
oped an informal system of education during the years of the blanket pro-
test in which ‘pupils’ became ‘teachers’ once they had arrived at a particular
level of competence. No one had to be fully qualified according to some
previously set criterion; all that was required was that those more advanced
than others passed on what they knew and attempted to raise others up to
their standard whilst simultaneously trying to acquire a higher standard
themselves. The same applied to other knowledge that people acquired,
be it about economics, socialism or history, but it was in the teaching of
the Irish language that the principle was most apparent (McKeown 1998:
162). Séanna Walsh puts it in his own words as follows: ‘theagasc daoine
le Gaeilge mheasartha daoine le beagán Gaeilge agus theagasc daoine le
beagán Gaeilge daoine gan Gaeilge ar bith agus d’fhás sé mar sin cé nach
raibh ach dornán beag daoine ag an bharr le Gaeilge líofa acu’ (‘People with
a moderate amount of Irish would teach those with a little Irish and those
with a little Irish would teach those without any Irish at all and it grew like
that even though at the start only a small handful of people were fluent
in Irish’) (Mac Ionnrachtaigh 2003: 29).7 The teacher would shout out the
lesson from behind his cell door for the benefit of those learning Irish on
that particular wing. This is how it worked, in the words of Séanna Walsh
again:
The key turning point was the removal of political status. During the
blanket protest the Irish language became the language of resistance.
Irish was necessary for survival. At that time there were four or five who
were very good at Irish and they taught the language to the others. This
started with the learning of key phrases. These would be shouted through
the doors of the cells or they would be scratched onto the walls with
religious medals.8
According to some sources, there was a fairly rigorous routine to the teach-
ing and learning of Irish with lessons occurring at set times of the day and
being of a certain length and organized according to the particular levels
of ability in the language of the learners. For example, one ex-prisoner
described the lessons in the following terms in an interview with an Irish
republican (IRA) prisoner conducted in the late 1980s by Feldman:
In the Blocks the main way you communicated was shouting out the
doors. So that was one of the reasons that the Gaelic became so promi-
nent was that you had no way of communicating except by shouting
out the door in Gaelic . . . The way we learned it was that a fellow got
up and shouted the lesson out the door, the spelling of the words. It was
just a methodical thing. You had a set of rosary beads, a screw, or a nail,
and you scratched the lesson on the walls which were whitewashed.
The beginner’s class was on Monday, Wednesday, Friday between 12:00
and 1:00 pm. Tuesdays and Thursdays from about 3:00 to 5:00 you had
advance classes, and on a Sunday from 12:00 to 2:00 pm you had the
class for the teachers, where the teachers all got together and improved
each other’s Gaelic. At the end of the week you would set aside a day of
storytelling, and then I done the history, Irish history all done in Gaelic
from the head. (Feldman 1991: 213–4)
Gearóid Mac Siacais, who was sent to the H-blocks halfway through 1977,
describes his own role in the initiation of the acquisition of the Irish lan-
guage in the H-blocks as follows:
A small crew of us started drawing up plans while on remand in Crumlin

Road. We had experience of the Cages and we decided to organise
the people in the Blocks into education classes. Politics was used to
incite a combative mentality and Irish was used to build morale and
identity . . . It was an enormous challenge because we were confined to
our cells throughout the day without any facilities at all. A ‘scairteoir’
[lit. ‘shouter’] in each wing and they would shout the classes out through
their cell door in a slow, phonetic manner. The Irish language started as
a basis for security but ended up as the spoken language of the Blocks . . .
The progress was really incredible, truth be known. At the start, there
were no more than seven or eight with Irish from the Cages; within eight-
een months there were 300 prisoners fluent in Irish. (Mac Ionnrachtaigh
2003: 28–9)
Peader Whelan describes his learning process from complete beginner to

fluency as follows:
When I joined the Blanket protest in H3 in 1978, I had no Irish. There

were no ranganna [lit. ‘classes’, but meaning ‘lessons’] in the wing where
I was placed and, while a few men already there had some very basic Irish,
they did not have enought to teach it . . . However, not long after I joined
the Blanket, Eunan Brolley from Dungiven came onto our wing. He had
spent his remand in the Cages where, with the organisation of ranganna
and the access to books that the conditions provided, the tradition of
speaking and promoting Irish was stronger. Eunan had Irish before com-
ing to jail and he used his time in the Cages to improve his command of
the language . . . We began with the verb ‘to be’ learning it bit by bit and
hoping not to get mixed up with the tenses when the múinteoir [teacher]
asked us about it. Our ranganna were conducted by calling to each other
out the door – so any mistakes were very public, adding to the pressure.
Needless to say, ranganna were organised with the minimum of equip-

ment . . . Lacking pen and paper . . . we wrote with a piece of toothpaste
tube on the formica-topped table in the cell – the lead tubing was just
like a pencil and brilliant for writing. The main drawback, though, was
the fact that our only resource was the Irish that Eunan Brolly had in his
head. He did have a fair amount and could confer and cross-check with
the múinteoirí in the other wings, but the refusal by the prison adminis-
tration to provide any educational materials imposed severe constraints
in those early days. (Whelan 1991: 2)
Kevin Campbell, interviewed in a book compiled by a group of ex-prisoners,

confirms that, in the absence of normal writing materials, the cell walls were
used for writing down the basic content of some lessons:
[I]n every wing the ranganna Gaeilge [lit. ‘Irish classes’ but meaning ‘Irish
lessons’] were organised. Men who had acquired the language, either in
the Cages or in school, took the classes. Since we had no writing mate-
rials, we had to write the ranganna on the cell walls. We would keep a
patch of the wall clean to write on and, using a broken piece of a liber-
ated toothpaste tube, we would scratch the Gaeilge on the walls. Within
a year [during 1978] Irish became the first language within the Blocks. All
the news and business was given out the doors in Gaeilge [Irish]. (Kevin
Campbell interview in Campbell et al. 1994: 48)
The contemporaneous writings of Bobby Sands provide a more immediate

account of the conduct of such a lesson:
I went back to my pacing once again as one of the boys shouted Rang
anois [lit. ‘class now’], summoning the lads to their doors for an Irish
language class. The teacher was at the far end of the wing. He began to
shout out the lessons at the top of his voice from behind his heavy steel
door, asking questions, spelling out words and phrases, while the willing
pupils scratched and scribbled them upon the dirty, mutilated walls. It
was a rough and rugged way of teaching but it worked, and everyone
endeavoured to speak what they learned all the time until the words and
phrases became so common that they were used instinctively. The Irish
class continued in the background as I returned to my thoughts. (Sands
1998: 42)
Of course, during the ‘dirty protest’ the prisoners spread their own excre-
ment on the walls of their cells, so it was necessary to keep an area, or areas,
of the walls clean for the writing down of the ‘ranganna’. Mac Siacais: ‘Dá
mhéad na constaicí inár n-éadan, is amhlaidh is mó diongbháilteacht a
thaispeáin muid . . . choinnigh muid bloc cearnógach glan ó shalachar ag
bun an chillín ar mhaithe le nótaí Gaeilge’ (‘However great the obstacles

against us, the fact is that we showed that we were even more steadfast . . .
we kept a square block clear of excrement at the lower end of the cell for
Irish language notes’) (Mac Ionnrachtaigh 2003: 31).9 Another prisoner of
that period, Brendan ‘Bik’ McFarlane (leader of the Irish republican prison-
ers following Bobby Sands), recalled in an interview first published in the
Irish current affairs magazine Magill in 1986 that different spaces of the
filthy cell walls were used for discrete linguistic units:
The prisoners shouted to each other from cell to cell, passing informa-
tion, leanring Irish, and so on. They sang and played quizzes to keep
their spirits up; they had reckoned that it was going to be a short pro-
test. Towards the end of 1978, forced washes and hair cuts were being
introduced. Brendan McFarlane resisted and got a busted eye. As the
men in the H-Blocks began to be moved from cell to cell, they were
learning [Irish] from the writing on the wall. For example, the past
tense of an Irish verb might be on one wall, the future tense on another
and the present tense on another – ‘Jailic’, they called it! In the begin-
ning, they scratched out. Later on, they were written in shit. (Dunne
1986)
Richard O’Rawe (aka ‘Rick’ and ‘Ó Rathaigh’), another prominent member

of the Irish republican prisoners during the late 1970s and early 1980s and
a member of the IRA, recalls in his autobiographical work how he had simi-
larly used such a linguistic space in his cell. This was in July 1981, in the
middle of the second hunger strike, and he was sharing the cell at that time
with Colm Scullion: ‘I turned towards the wall. The names of birds in Irish
were written on the wall; strikingly, there was Bobby’s favourite bird, the
lark, or fuiseóg’ (O’Rawe 2005: 201).
Not all prisoners were equally interested in the language and some did
not engage with the lessons. But, according to Laurence McKeown (aka
Labhrás Mac Eoin), such was the prevalence of the language that it was all
but impossible to avoid acquiring some Irish, perhaps even fluency in it:
My cellmate at that time was Paul Montgomery from Newington, North

Belfast, and Paul had decided that he would know the Irish language
by Christmas 1977. Pacing up and down the cell for hours on end he
would repeat the irregular verbs; Ar chuala tú? – Did you hear?; Chuala
mé – I heard; Níor chuala mé – I did not hear. Despite efforts on my part
to resist it I soon found myself mentally repeating, Ar chuala tú, chuala
me, níor chuala me, and that was how I began to learn the Irish language.
Later in the Blocks the Irish language was as commonly heard as English
and many people, including myself, became fluent speakers. (McKeown
1998: 161–2)
Other techniques in the acquisition of the language included the transla-

tion from English into Irish and the learning by rote of complete chunks of
text from the Bible (a copy of which was permitted in the cells) and iconic,
historical Irish republican texts such as the 1916 Proclamation of the Irish
Republic and the poem ‘Mise Éire’ by the 1916 martyr Patrick Pearse. Also,
some prisoners sharing cells created their own rules regarding the use of
Irish as their language of communication. Colm Scullion, who shared a cell
with Bobby Sands for a period, laid claim to both of these practices during
an interview with Laura Friel in An Phoblacht:
‘Most of my Irish was taught to me by Bobby Sands,’ says Colm. A copy

of the Bible was the only written material allowed in each cell. ‘Bobby
and Jake Jackson would shout out the reference to a passage in the Bible
and we’d try to translate it into Irish,’ says Colm. When Colm and Bobby
shared a cell, ‘we made it a rule to speak Irish all day.’ Only after 11pm
each night did they allow themselves to lapse back into speaking English.
(Friel 1998)
Another ex-prisoner, Pilib Ó Rúnaí (aka Phillip Rooney), confirms these

techniques and, in addition, indicates how some of the essential material,
such as paper, pencils and Irish-language text, was acquired and concealed
from the view of the prison warders:
I first came across it through the command structure, through the OC

[Irish republican prisoner officer commanding on any given wing]. He’d
give orders like ‘Faoi ghlas anois’ [‘Lock down now’]. John Davey [sp.?]
tried to do classes when I was on remand [the Cages] but too many peo-
ple were coming and going. There was no structure even though there
were books. I really learned on the blanket [the H-blocks] from Eddie Fay.
He had a bit of Irish. He would teach me the irregular verbs. When the
screws moved us to different cells and washed down the walls and all
we’d start again. Eddie Fay [later killed by a loyalist assassination gang]
was in the cell next door to me for about a year. He passed some material
to me through the pipes on toilet paper, sometimes we’d pass messages
by hanging the towel through the window but it was mostly oral. I always
had to write it down. I had a pencil lead. I hid it behind my foreskin. I’d
write it down on the wall and on toilet paper. We devoured the stories
brought from the Cages by visitors. Within about two to three months
I’d reached a fair bit of fluency. A later cellmate spoke Irish – around
1980. He’d learned his Irish from another cellmate in another cell. I was
writing it correctly. I’d check it with the priest. Eddie was a bit ahead of
me but by that stage he’d moved on a bit. It was different to the Cages.
You were very dependent on the other learner. Fr. Brian Brady had a bit
of Irish and he could check things with us. We had some material in Irish
smuggled in like Fiachta’s [sp?] ‘History of Ireland’ [?]. They were ideal
circumstances for learning Irish, there was nothing else to do. It kept the
prisoners’ morale up.10
Visiting Catholic priests who were highly educated in the Irish language
were used by the prisoners to explain some points of grammar and idiomatic
phrases as well as offering guidance on pronounciation:
We used Cardinal Ó Fiaich and Fr Faul to explain some phrases and pro-
nounce some of the things we didn’t understand or know how to say. We
used stuff from Ireland’s Own, there was an Irish-language cartoon in it.
Irish material would be smuggled between the Blocks. Block 5 was very
Irish. If we knew somebody was on their way to Block 4 we’d give them
the stuff to take over. It wasn’t as good if you were on Block 4. There
weren’t many good Irish speakers there then so you had to learn from just
text, just reading text. You wouldn’t know how to say it.11
Levels and types of fluency varied, as this account of an encounter with

another prisoner by Peader Whelan illustrates:
One such move [change of cell] brought me together with the comrádái
[comrade] who, having been in H5 for about a year before coming to
H3, had much more Irish than I, his boast was that he knew 70 verbs.
That was impressive. However, his ability to actually speak Irish was
very limited . . . I’m not sure why this was so, although it might simply
have been due to their way of teaching: learn something by rote, memo-
rise it and so know what tense of a verb to use when asked a question.
Something was missing and I think that that something was comhrá
[conversation] . . . Eunan held ranganna with me every day and, impor-
tantly, he conducted these classes through the medium of Irish. This was
significant, I feel, because it meant I was not accumulating words, verbs,
adjective, etc. As did the cellmate I mentioned. Instead, I would describe
the process as one of building a practical awareness of the language and
so gradually increasing my ability to converse. (Whelan 1991: 2)
He provides a particular example of how that converstional ability was

developed in his own case during the course of one of these ‘ranganna’ with
Eunan Brolly:
[O]ut of the blue he asked: ‘An bhfeiceann tú an t-éan ar an sreang?’ (Do

you see the bird on the wire?). ‘An bhfeiceann tú?’ was about as much as
I knew, so he tried to explain what he was talking about by using Irish
that I did know. In describing the scene in front of him and leaving it up
to me to interpret what he was seeing, he was creating a situation where
I could actively use my Irish rather than mechanically follow a pattern of

question and answer around a particular verb. (Whelan 1991: 2–3)
The prison warders would, on a fairly regular basis, interrupt the Irish
language lessons in a rather unstructured manner, usually through shout-
ing and other oral/aural interference but also, on occasion, through using
physical violence. Bobby Sands noted such attempts at disruption in his
contemporaneous writings, for example:
A screw [prison warder] began jeering and shouting from the top of the
wing trying to disrupt the ongoing Gaelic [Irish language] class but the
lads [Irish republican prisoners] continued, disregarding him. It hap-
pened all the time. The screws, achieved nothing, soon got fed up and
departed. (Sands 1998: 43)
It was also the case that the prison warders routinely absented themselves
from the wings in which the prisoners’ cells were, while not actually leaving
the H-block. As a result the prisoners were left largely to their own devices
for substantial periods of time, albeit confined to their cells:
They [prison warders] weren’t able to stop us communicating in Irish

as after lights out there were only prisoners on the wards, in the blocks.
We were left to our own devices. There’d be forty or fifty prisoners on
a wing and only four or five warders so it was impossible for them to
control it.12
The first guy who got the breakfast would shout out in Gaelic, ‘Porridge
on the air!’ . . . If there was a break in that [prison] routine it could mean
violence would be happening. Again in Gaelic somebody hearing the
break in the timing would shout out, ‘What’s happening?’ and the reply
in Gaelic would come, ‘No problem, just checking something.’ There was
a whole regular sound pattern that either meant or did not mean vio-
lence . . . If nothing happened it was shouted out in Gaelic, ‘It’s okay!’ or
‘They’re battering!’ . . . From ten to twelve noon the routine was silence
from the screws, interspersed with the sounds of people coming on and
off visits . . . As you came off the visit you walked through the front gate.
We would stand on top of the heating pipes looking through the glass
into the main yard. People would shout in Gaelic, ‘There’s so and so
back again!’ . . . Around half twelve a deep silence would come because
the screws had gone off to their dinner. That silence told you that was
them away, that it was safe. We could start the Irish classes then. The one
screw who was left on the wing wouldn’t interfere. If they did it usually
meant water or piss being mopped in under the door of the cell. (An Irish
republican (IRA) prisoner in Feldman 1991: 207)
It was prison policy, in this period, to move the prisoners regularly from cell
to cell. This meant that on occasion the prisoners would get to see the Irish
lessons that others had recorded on the cell walls:
I continued on my journey to nowhere as I circled the cell floor like a

guinea pig, stopping here and there for a moment or two to identify the
scratched names on the door and walls; simple testimony and reminder
that others had been and still were in my position. A certain quality of
pride seemed to attach itself to the scrawled names of the tortured writ-
ers. They were entitled to be proud, I thought, as I moved off to read the
scribbled Gaelic [Irish language] phrases and words, noting the progress
of the other wings in the Gaelic classes. ‘Gaelic classes,’ I said it again.
It sounded rather odd. But then it was odd, considering that it meant
standing at the cell door listening to your mate, the teacher, shouting
the lesson for the day at the top of his voice from the other end of the
wing when the screws happened to be away for their dinner or tea. (Sands
1998: 30)
But it would appear that, more often than not, the prison warders would
erase the Irish from the walls on the occasion of moving prisoners between
cells: ‘They [prison guards] would steam clean the walls and spray over
the wall, with white paint covering the Irish and all the political slogans
scratched in’, according to an Irish republican (IRA) prisoner interviewed by
Feldman (1991: 184).
The prisoners communicated in writing both with each other and with
their comrades in the world outside through smuggling material in their
body cavities. One of the most prolific writers in the H-blocks was Bobby
Sands, and Gerry Adams claims that this prodigious output was only pos-
sible because of such activity:
As well as being the leader of the blanket men and of the second hunger
strike, Bobby Sands was also the most prolific writer among the H Block
prisoners. He not only wrote press statements, but he also wrote short
stories and poems under the pen name ‘Marcella’, his sister’s name,
which were published in Republican News and then in the newly merged
An Phoblacht / Republican News after February 1979. Bobby’s writings span
the last four years of his life in H Blocks 3, 4, 5, or 6. They were written on
pieces of government issue toilet roll or on the rice paper of contraband
cigarette roll-ups with the refill of a biro pen which he kept hidden inside
his body. He also wrote as a ‘young West Belfast republican’ and as PRO of
the blanket men in the H Blocks 3, 4, and 6. (Adams 1998: 11)
David Beresford, a journalist writing for the British newspaper the Guardian
at the time of the 1981 hunger strike, describes in some detail the mechanics
of this means of communication, knowledge which is derived from his close

contacts with the Irish republican movement at that time:
The H-Blocks are intended to facilitate control by restriction of both

movement and communication. So the IRA leadership put a priority
on the organization of communications, developing a highly efficient
system. The monthly visits were to some extent under the control of
the prisoners, who were required to submit requests to the governor
stipulating what person was to be invited in and on what date. The
applications were carefully staggered so that, as far as possible, each wing
of each block had a prisoner meeting a visitor every day. Family and
friends – mainly women – acted as couriers, carrying the steady stream
of tiny ‘communications’ or ‘comms’, etched on cigarette papers and
wrapped in household cling-film, in their mouths, in their bras, under
their breasts, in their panties, sanitary napkins and vaginas. The prison-
ers carried them to the visiting area in their backsides, tucked behind
their teeth, jammed up their nostrils, or in their foreskins. The pay-loads
could be formidable – one prisoner was reputed to have set the record by
carrying over forty cigarette papers in his foreskin. The system became
so efficient that on occasion the external leadership could expect to get
a message in, a reply out and a second message back in a single day.
(Beresford 1987: 30)
In his description of a particularly invasive means of searching the prisoners

by the warders, McKeown provides an intimate account of the concealment
of Irish language and other material on their bodies. They coined the word
‘bangling’ for this practice:
The mirror search was meant to discover anything hidden between

prisoners’ hips, which (up until then) was indeed the securest place for
contraband items such as tobacco, pens, cigarette papers and articles
written in Irish to be hidden. With the introduction of the mirror search,
however, prisoners were forced to hide such items inside their bodies.
They wrapped them securely in cling film and then put them up inside
their anus. The practice of hiding items in this manner became known as
‘bangling’ (McKeown 1998: 151–2)
The prisoners also communicated by towel line. This involved using a

thread of towel to which they would attach a paper message. The thread,
or towel line, would then be swung by the deliverer of the message in the
direction of the intended recipient between cell windows, under cell doors
or through cell door windows. Bobby Sands describes this in his prison writ-
ings: ‘“Seán,” I called, “I’ll rig up a line with a bit of towel thread and swing
a few tissues into you, mo chara [Translation: my friend]”’ (Sands 1998: 39).
Sands also describes how the prisoners used the water and heating pipes to
communicate:
Seán knocked on the wall. ‘Down to the pipe,’ I said, getting down to the
corner on top of my mattress with my head right to the wall where the pipes
ran through. There wasn’t a great deal of heat coming through the pipes.
What there was went streaming out the open window into the dark cold
night. ‘Well, Bobby,’ came Seán’s enquiring voice through the small hole in
the wall . . . I continued my conversation with Seán for some time until I
began to feel cramped lying in my unnatural position at the pipes and wall.
So I decided to go back to pacing the floor once again. My feet were numb
with the cold. Seán understood. He was in much the same condition. I told
him that I’d call him later and we both left our corners to resume where we
had left off in our endless pacing. (Sands 1998: 67–8)
The Irish language quickly became very widely used by the Irish republican
prisoners to communicate generally with each other. This communication
apparently included important information regarding tactics and action by
the prisoners as they developed their cycle of protests against the prison’s
regime of ‘criminalization’. Thus, many prisoners regarded Irish as central
to their being fully engaged with activity in the prison during this intense
period of protest:
We knew the Dark [Brendan Hughes] was not going to be content to let
things go as they were. A little bit of excitement began to generate as we
anticipated his next move – how to make the Blanket [protest] effective.
With the knowledge that plans were afoot to escalate the protest, the
staleness of the Blanket became apparent and I grew impatient for action.
Bobby [Sands] was in regular contact with the Dark’s wing. Messages were
shouted back and forward in Gaeilge and code and it was obvious to us all
that he was receiving the details of the next phase of action. Like many
others, it was then that I decided that I must learn Gaeilge, because I was
afraid of missing something. ( Jaz McCann interview in Campbell et al.
1994: 30)
All the news was in Irish. You had to understand Irish to know what was
going on.13
This period of violent protest against the prison regime effectively con-
cluded when the six remaining hunger strikers brought their action to an
end on 3 October 1981 as it became increasingly clear that their families
would intervene to save their lives. The family of Laurence McKeown, for
example, initiated medical intervention to save his life as he entered a coma
on the seventieth day of his hunger strike.
Strategic engagement (1981–98)
The demoralizing end of the hunger strike, from the point of view of the
Irish republican prisoners, was accompanied by the decline of the language
in the prison for several years. For around eighteen months or so after the
end of the 1981 hunger strike, it would appear that Irish language classes
proper were re-commenced but in very limited form:
With only one class per block limited to 15 POWs per class, almost 40
prisoners in each block were left with no cultural outlet. Despite these
rules the prisoners have had tremendous success in examinations in both
‘A’ level and ‘O’ level standard. An excellent feat when you consider that
the POWs were not given access to reading or writing material and had
but one miserable hour long class per week. (Cnamh 1985: 9)
These classes were brought to an end by the prison authorities following a

mass escape of Irish republican prisoners from H-7 in September 1983. In
addition, all Irish-language material was considered contraband, including
articles in Irish in English-language newspapers. Irish classes were facilitated
again by the prison authorities two years subsequent to this, but through
distance-learning courses, with the numbers of learners limited to around
thirty (Cnamh 1985: 9). Irish-language books remained proscribed items
until 1986, but even afterwards they were subject to censorship (Mac
Cormaic 1991: 18–19).
The eventual revival of the morale of the prisoners and the resurrection of
the Irish language seems to have coincided with the return of Séanna Walsh
to serve a new sentence in the H-blocks:14
We always thought that the hunger strike was the secret weapon; that
it never failed. The blanket protest peaked with around three hundred
republican prisoners on it when I came in. At that time more were com-
ing off than going on – it was at tipping point. We were all very young at
the time. One republican who was thirty-four years old was called granda!
Our generation was absolutely sure it would work. It was the ace in the
pack. As far as we were concerned it was unsuccessful. People were thor-
oughly demoralized. The reason Bobby went on it was because he realised
people were demoralized . . . People were thoroughly demoralized. The
confusion and demoralization took very firm leadership. Séanna Walsh
gave that. The first thing was to achieve segregation, to get them [loyal-
ist prisoners and other prisoners, described by Merlyn Rees, Secretary of
State for Northern Ireland at the time of the removal of Special Category
status in 1976 as ‘ordinary decent criminals’]. It was a brutal time. It was
them or us. It involved a lot of casual violence. The language was used to
differentiate with other prisoners. For some the language was a means of
politicizing the non-political prisoners. ’79 to ’82 was very intensive, after
that less so. But Irish was still there. Though we’d no access to Irish books
until 1983 or ’84, there was still a ban on Irish books until then. After
Séanna Walsh came back it became a much more forward approach . . .
There was a decline in the Irish language at that time. It took the best part
of two years to change that.15
Under the leadership of Séanna Walsh, the Irish republican prisoners

developed a policy of ‘strategic engagement with the conforming prison
system’.16 The Irish language was reintroduced and, once again, became a
central part of the everyday lives of the prisoners. But, since the prisoners
were no longer in a continuous state of protest and in violent, direct conflict
with the prison authorities (despite the mass escape of 1983), the conditions
under which the language was now acquired were much more amenable,
though not consistently so. Also, there appears to have been a greater
awareness of some of the practical pedagodical issues regarding the effective
acquisition of as second language. One reult of this was the introduction of
an intensive course in Irish, the development of which is recalled by Séanna
Walsh as follows:
After the blanket protest, during the early 1980s, there was a decline
in the Irish language in the prison but during the late 1980s some of
us decided that we’d revive the language again. An intensive six-week
course was developed by Máirtín Ó Muilleor and brought into the prison.
There was no official access to Irish language teaching material – books,
tapes, etc. – so the course had to be written and brought in specially. You
needed to do the Dianchúrsa [Intensive Course] to get fluent in Irish. It
wasn’t enough to just do a few hours a week, here and there. You needed
to do it all the time, morning and afternoon for six weeks and then you’d
be fluent. We used it to get around ninety prisoners fluent, really fluent.
The use of the Irish language in the prison at this time was different. It
was used all the time, in the communal areas and in individual cells.
You would even dream in Irish. It wasn’t like the old Gaeltacht huts in
the Cages where you’d only use it in the communal area. Around three
hundred of the four hundred Republican prisoners became fluent in the
Irish language.17
The tactics of ‘strategic engagement’ included a number of court cases being

initiated by some of the Irish republican prisoners, challenging the prison
authorities’ policy with regard to the Irish language and other aspects of
traditional Irish cultural activity. According to one source (Rolston and
Tomlinson 1988: 188) there was, in October 1987, litigation regarding the
confiscation of Irish-language Bibles from the prisoners. Then, in June 1989,
two prisoners, Eoghan Mac Cormaic and John Pickering, lost a similar case
and subsequently lost the appeal in September 1990 (Mac Cormaic, 1991).
Their complaints were against the following:
Cosc ar chomhfhreagras trí mheán na Gaeilge;

Cosc ar labhairt na Gaeilge le linn cuairteanna;
Cosc ar fháil is caitheamh an Fháinne;
Cosc ar úsáid ainmneacha Gaelacha;
Moill leatromach ar chinsireacht leabhair Ghaeilge seachas leabhair
Bhéarla;
Cosc ar imirt spóirt Ghaelaigh. (Mac Cormaic 1991: 17)
(1. Ban on correspondence through the medium of Irish; 2. Ban on

speaking of Irish during prison visits; 3. Ban on obtaining and wearing
the Fáinne; 4. Ban on use of Irish-language version of personal names;
5. Undue delay with regard to the censoring of Irish-language books
compared to English-language books; 6. Ban on the playing of Gaelic
games.)
The policy of the prison authorities was not to change substantially until
the IRA ceasefire of 1994. But, in the meantime, the prisoners developed a
considerable body of literature of their own, including material in the Irish
language (see Fanning 2003; Whalen 2008). Many of these literary efforts
appeared in the prison magazine Scairt Amach (Shout Out), produced from
1989. This was circulated only within the prison. Between 1987 and 1990,
the magazine Iris Bheag (Little Magazine) was created and managed by Sinn
Féin and included material by prisoners. Also, much creative writing was
published in An Glór Gafa / The Captive Voice, initiated in 1988 by prisoners
from the H-blocks. A range of this material was subsequently published in
1991 in the volume H-Block: a Selection of Poetry. Also at this time, significant
numbers of Irish republicans came to the end of their sentences and were
released from prison. Their return to various parts of Northern Ireland was
to have considerable impact upon the Irish language in society beyond the
prison walls. While it is the case that the Irish language had been growing
in Northern Ireland for a number of years at that stage (Mac Giolla Chríost
2005: 134–71), beginning with the creation of an urban neo-Gaeltacht on
Shaw’s Road in west Belfast in the early 1970s, there can be little doubt that
the politicization of the language, initiated in the Cages and completed in
the H-blocks, added substantial momentum to this growth. This was par-
ticularly so during the second half of the 1980s and throughout the 1990s
as many Irish republican prisoners left prison to become actively involved
in the Irish language at a community level in various areas of the northern
part of Ireland.
After the IRA ceasefire of 1994, the prison regime relaxed consider-
ably. This included the end of twenty-four-hour lock-up, free association
(McKeown 1998: 308–10) and a more enlightened position on the language.

The prisoners were allowed access to Irish-language material and were
allowed tuition and guest speakers were brought in to hold classes in the
Irish language and literature. According to the prisoners, the most substan-
tial benefit of this new regime was that they were now largely in control of
their own lives in prison.
The achievement of total control of their living environment twenty-
four hours a day was a critical milestone in the prison struggle of repub-
lican prisoners. It signalled an end to all attempts by the government and
prison authorities to criminalize them and heralded a new era whereby
those responsible for the running of the prison on the administration side
recognized the leadership and command structure of republican prisoners
and liaised with them on all matters concerning the daily running of the
prison. A situation similar to that existing in the Cages prior to the removal
of Special Category Status had been achieved. In fact, in this instance it
exceeded what republicans in the Cages system had had. Most significant
was the agreement by the prison authorities to close the punishment Block,
the ‘boards’. From that time onwards the prisoners’ staff (both loyalist and
republican) were to take full responsibility for discipline. Not since the time
of the Frongoch internment camp in Wales in 1917 had such recognition
and authority been bestowed by the authorities upon political prisoners of
war (McKeown 1998: 320).
Laurence McKeown notes that Northern Ireland Prison Service recorded in
its ‘Corporate and Business Plan for 1998–2001’ that by that time the prison
authorities recognized that the ‘prisoners largely manage their own lives’
(McKeown 1998: 21). As a result of this new power to manage themselves,
the Irish republican prisoners, during the course of the next three to four
years, created two wholly Irish-speaking wings in the H-Blocks: ‘The 1994
ceasefire meant we were able to get access to Irish language teachers, tapes,
books, CDs. A Gaeltacht wing was created at this time and by 1998 there
were two Gaeltacht wings.’18 The prisoners adopted the name ‘Gaeltacht na
Fuiseoige’ (‘The Gaeltacht of the Lark’) for this new Irish-speaking commu-
nity in the H-blocks.
Documents written by two of the prisoners at that time provide a direct
and immediate insight into this development. The first was written by
Gearóid Mac Aoidh from D wing in H-5 in 1996 (Mac Aoidh 1996) and is
a review of the creation of the Gaeltacht wing and an overview of current
activities in it. It has the feel of an internal discussion paper aimed at the
republican movement. The second document is a report of a contemporane-
ous educational project (McAllister 1997), conducted and written in H-5 by
Jimmy McAllister, one of the Irish republican prisoners. According to these
sources the first Gaeltacht wing was created by around twenty-five Irish
republican prisoners in H-6 (C wing) on 29 May 1995.19 A third untitled
and anonymous document (‘Gaeltacht na Fuiseoige’, 1995?), which is an
unpublished Irish republican prisoners’ internal discussion paper, confirms

this date and further adds that this ‘full Gaeilge speaking wing’ (‘Gaeltacht
na Fuiseoige’ [1995?]: 3) comprised the following individuals:
Paul Duffy, Tarlac Connolly, Tony O’Neill and Conor Gilmore were moved
from H4; Peter Cunningham, Kevin McMahon, Colman McCrossan, Rory
McCarthy and Martin Malloy were moved from H7; Davy Adams, Collie
Duffy, Arnie Averell and Ricky Sadlier were already there. A fortnight
later Bik McFarlane, Paddy McGilloway, Pat Sheehan, Jimmy McAllister,
Gerry Magee and Micheal Talun were moved on. (‘Gaeltacht na Fuiseoige’
[1995?]: 3)
It was then re-located to H-5 (D wing) in March 1996 (Mac Aoidh 1996: 2).
A second Gaeltacht wing was established by a further twenty-five prisoners
in H-8 at some time during 1997 (McAllister 1997: 3). By the end of 1997,
according to two contemporaneous sources, An Phoblacht and Saoirse (an
organization founded in the context of the emerging peace process and with
the purpose of lobbying on behalf of ‘Irish political prisoners’), H-5 (D wing)
appears to have been made up of nineteen Irish republican prisoners. These
included Séanna Walsh and also Tarlac Ó Conghalaigh (aka Tarlach / Tarlac /
Turlough Connolly), a leading creative writer amongst the prisoners. The
same source lists twenty-one prisoners in H-8 (D wing), which would appear
to be the Gaeltacht wing on that particular block. Their numbers include
Feilim Ó hAdhmaill, the author of an important attitudinal survey on the
Irish language published in 1985, who was transferred from an English jail
in order to facilitate the then fragile political process.
Some of the new cohort of Irish republican prisoners of this period
recall that the members of these Gaeltacht wings were admired as the
‘nios díograisí’ (‘most zealous’) of their members and that there was a very
considerable waiting list to join those wings.20 McAllister’s document pro-
vides us with a more prosaic profile of the typical member of ‘Gaeltacht na
Fuiseoige’:
The average adult learner is twenty nine years old, of a working class
background, is an ex-comprehensive school pupil who left school with
little or no qualifications, had little or no interest in education and an
abiding feeling of having made little or no progress during his school
years. The GnaF [Gaeltacht na Fuiseoige] member has on average spent
six years and four months in prison of which thirteen have been spent
on GnaF. Despite having little or no Irish language experience before his
arrest and no academic qualifications in the subject . . . All members are
actively involved in academic courses GCSE (32%), ACSE (16%) or post
ACSE (52%) as well as the daily informal classes held among themselves
on the wing. Here the more experienced members undertake roles of
facilitators to guide and help newer members in their development. In

addition after spending the time on GnaF 72% of respondents declared
an accomplished or proficient ability with the Irish language. While 60%
described their progress to date as either excellent (28%) or very good
(32%). (McAllister 1997: 8–9)
The more relaxed prison regime allowed the prisoners to obtain Irish lan-
guage teaching materials freely, from a wide range of authoritative sources
outside of the prison, for the first time in many years. It is clear from the
document by Mac Aoidh (1996) that they were provided with such mate-
rial by several organizations competent in Irish language teaching and
learning:
Once sufficient numbers of Irish speakers had settled into H6, Gaeltacht
na Fuiseoige became publicly known following a series of articles in
The Irish News, Lá, An Glór Gafa and AP/RN. We required a wide range
of books, dictionaries and other materials to enable our Gaeltacht to be
an effective learning environment and so we wrote to many of the Irish
language organisations throughout Ireland for assistance. Within weeks
many materials arrived and we now have a library on the wing well
stocked with books in Gaeilge, thanks to the support of: the Cultúrlann in
Belfast, Conradh na Gaeilge, Gael Linn, Glór na nGael, Roinn an Chultúir
Sinn Féin,Bord na Gaeilge, An Institiúid Teangeolaíochta Éireann, Áras
Mháirtín Uí Cadhain, Coiscéim, Cló Iar-Chonnachta, An Gúm, Comhar
na Muinteoirí, An Iontaobhas Ultach and several secondary/grammar
schools in Belfast and Armagh. (Mac Aoidh 1996: 2–3)
However, these organizations tended to supply the prisoners with only

single copies of their products (books, tapes and so on), so the prisoners
subseqently developed their own, specially adapted Irish language courses
from which they were easily able to make multiple copies for their own
use.21 I have been able to obtain a copy, through Tarlac Ó Conghalaigh, of
the foundation course, An Bunchúrsa, developed by the prisoners around
1995. The immersion in the Irish language which was possible at this stage
produced a number of very fluent speakers. One prisoner recalls recogniz-
ing that he was what he considered to be wholly fluent when he attended
one of the talks given by Aodán Mac Póilin, the director of the Irish
language organization Ultach Trust, during August 1995 and understood
absolutely everything that was said. Other Irish republican prisoners felt
that being able to listen to and understand the radio shows of presenter
Rónán Mac Aodh Bhuí on Raidió na Gaeltachta (a Republic of Ireland
government-sponsored radio station broadcasting in Irish) marked this rite
of passage.22 It would appear that some of the former Irish republican pris-
oners look with nostalgia upon this particular period as a kind of zenith.
Take, for example, this comment on the Slugger O’Toole blog by ‘Fuiseog’
on 23 October 2006:
Over a decade later by August 1999 we had 100% de facto political status,
we ran our own communities, we had our own internal education pro-
grammes including a gaeltacht in H-block 5, coupled with access to formal
educational opportunities that I personally availed of to Masters level. In
all life was bearable, we made the very best of what we had improving
ourselves and our conditions as was our duty. (‘Fuiseog’ 2006)
Of course, the political agreement of 1998 and the subsequent prisoner

releases brought down the final curtain on this prison story but not upon
the relationship between the ex-prisoners and the Irish language.
Conclusions
Séanna Walsh was one of the first prisoners to be released under the terms of
the Good Friday Agreement (or Belfast Agreement) of 1998, which brought
peace to Northern Ireland. It is not a coincidence that the Irish language
formed an important part of that agreement. Clause 3 states, for example,
that ‘[a]ll participants recognise the importance of respect, understand-
ing and tolerance in relation to linguistic diversity, including in Northern
Ireland, the Irish language, Ulster-Scots and the languages of the various
ethnic communities, all of which are a part of the cultural wealth of the
island of Ireland’ (NIO, 1998). Upon release, Walsh quickly began to play a
major role in the further political development of Sinn Féin with regard to
the Irish language. He currently directs the party’s Department for Culture
and the Irish language features very strongly on the policy agenda. It is, per-
haps, the ambition for the language within the party which is most striking.
He puts it as follows:
The most interesting aspect of our reinvigorated Roinn a’ Chultúir

[Department of Culture] will be our project to turn Sinn Féin from an
English speaking party, which is fairly good on the language question,
to a bilingual party involved in all areas of radical language develop-
ment and promotion . . . Sinn Féin aims to develop from being a party
which campaigns on Irish language issues to a party that epitomises the
struggle for the repossession of the language. (Walsh in Walsh and Mac
Ionnrachtaigh 2005)
The values that have shaped the life of Séanna Walsh and his peers are
likely to have an impact beyond the north of Ireland, given that he was
appointed in 2007 as a member of ‘Foras na Gaeilge’ (the Irish Language
Board), a cross-border agency with statutory responsibilities for the Irish
language, along with three other Sinn Féin nominees. It was noted in
the Irish-language media, on the main news programme of the Irish-lan-
guage television channel TG4, that these northern appointees brought
‘blas láidir Ultach’ (‘a strong Ulster flavour’) (Nuacht TG4, 18 December
2007) to the membership of the new board whilst also noting that Séanna
Walsh was a friend and one-time cell-mate of Bobby Sands (Foinse, 16
December 2007: 11). Other Irish republican ex-prisoners are involved in
the Irish language in the field in a number of different ways, including the
development of a Northern Ireland Assembly-funded ‘Gaeltacht Quarter’
(Dutton 2004) in Belfast, Irish-medium education, Irish-language film and
television production, journalism and writing. Indeed, visitors to Belfast
are now actively encouraged by the City Council to spend time in this
Gaeltacht Quarter, while The Rough Guide to Ireland informs tourists that
their encounter with the Irish language there touches upon the raw mate-
rial of the recent conflict: ‘In the North, the rise in the use of Irish has
been both cultural and political: in the 1970s Republican prisoners began
to learn Irish, though owing to the insular nature of its usage and the lack
of professional teaching, it mutated into a kind of pidgin that was known
as jailic’ (Greenwood et al. 2001: 741). Thus, the unique prison commu-
nity of the Jailtacht and their peculiar style of Irish, known as ‘Jailic’, is
now an integral part of the fabric of the city. Moreover, the presentation
of this linguistic landscape as a commodity for the gaze of visitors both
from Ireland and internationally invites the engagement of even the most
casual of viewers.
Notes
The author is grateful to the relevant presses for the use in this chapter of versions
of some material that appeared in D. Mac Giolla Chríost (2012), Jailtacht: the Irish
language, Symbolic Power and Political Violence in Northern Ireland, 1972–2008 (Cardiff:
University of Wales Press) p. 240; and D. Mac Giolla Chríost (2010), ‘The Origins
of the Jailtacht’, in Proceedings of the Harvard Celtic Colloquium 2007 and 2008
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) pp. 317–36.
1. On imprisonment and language, see also Taylor, this volume.

2. The Gaelic League was a movement founded in the late nineteenth century in
Ireland with the aim of promoting the Irish language. It later became implicated
in the Irish republican Easter Rising of 1916.
3. Translations from Irish are by the present author unless otherwise stated.
4. Interview, 2007.
5. The protest was confined to H-5 to begin with, but by 1979 there were several
‘protesting blocks’ (O’Dwyer 2006).
6. According to Babington (1968), a central function of incarceration is to silence the
prisoners as a form of punishment and as a means of imposing the discipline of
the prison regime upon them.
7. Original: ‘theagasc daoine le Gaeilge mheasartha daoine le beagán Gaeilge agus

theagasc daoine le beagán Gaeilge daoine gan Gaeilge ar bith agus d’fhás sé mar
sin cé nach raibh ach dornán beag daoine ag an bharr le Gaeilge líofa acu’.
8. Interview, 2007.
9. Original: ‘Dá mhéad na constaicí inár n-éadan, is amhlaidh is mó diongbháil-
teacht a thaispeáin muid… choinnigh muid bloc cearnógach glan ó shalachar ag
bun an chillín ar mhaithe le nótaí Gaeilge.’
10. Interview, 2007.
11. Interview with Pilib Ó Runaí, 2007.
12. Interview with Séanna Walsh, 2007.
14. Walsh had been released after the ‘segregation campaign’ around 1984 but was
reimprisoned by the end of the 1980s.
17. Interview, 2007.
19. A slightly later Irish republican source (de Faoite 1998) suggests that Gaeltacht
na Fuiseoige was first established in H-7: ‘People were enormously proud when
the “Jailtacht” Gaeltacht na Fuiseoige was founded three years ago in Block 7’
(‘ba mhór an bród ar dhaoine nuair a bunaíodh an “Jailtacht” Gaeltacht na
Fuiseoige trí bhliain ó shin i mBloc H7’). Another source, a response posted
on the Slugger O’Toole blog by ‘Fuiseog’ on 23 October 2006, suggests that H-5
was the location (‘Fuiseog’ 2006). As the Mac Aoidh and McAllister documents
were written in the H-Blocks at that time, it is reasonable to afford them greater
accuracy.
20. Interview with Declan Moen (aka Deaglán Ó Mocháin), 2007.
21. Tarlac Ó Conghalaigh, personal communication, 2009.
22. Interview with Declan Moen (aka Deaglán Ó Mocháin), 2007.
References
Adams, Gerry. 1998. ‘Foreword’. In Writings from Prison by Bobby Sands. Cork: Mercier
Press.
Babington, Anthony. 1968. The Power to Silence: a History of Punishment in Britain.
London: Maxwell.
Beresford, David. 1987. Ten Men Dead: the Story of the 1981 Irish Hunger Strike. London:
HarperCollins.
Campbell, Brian, Laurence McKeown and Felim O’Hagan (eds). 1994. Nor Meekly Serve
My Time: the H-Block Struggle 1976–1981. Belfast: Beyond the Pale Publications.
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Crowley, Tony. 2005. War of Words: the Politics of Language in Ireland 1537–2004.
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H-Bloc agus Ard Mhaca.
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Terror in Northern Ireland. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
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18 June. http://republican-news.org/archive/1998/June18/18hs.html (accessed 21
September 2007).
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(accessed 16 April 2007).
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Reflections on the Culture of Resistance in Long Kesh, edited by F. O’Hagan: 17–19.
Belfast: Sinn Féin.
Mac Giolla Chríost, Diarmait. 2005. The Irish Language in Ireland: from Goídel to
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Mac Ionnrachtaigh, Feargal. 2003. ‘An Ghaeilge Faoi Ghlas: Príosúnaigh Pholaitiúla
Éireannacha agus an Ghaeilge’. MA thesis, Queen’s University Belfast.
McAllister, Jim P. 1997. ‘Gaeltacht na Fuiseoige: an Adult Learning Project Based in
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ac.uk/events/hstrike/chronology.htm (accessed 12 January 2009).
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of Resistance in Long Kesh, edited by Felim O’Hagan: 2–5. Belfast: Sinn Féin.
11
The AIIC Project to Help Interpreters
in Conflict Areas
Linda Fitchett1
International Association of Conference Interpreters (AIIC)
About AIIC
The International Association of Conference Interpreters, known by its

French acronym, AIIC (Association international des interprètes de con-
férence), was founded in 1953 in France to defend and promote the inter-
ests of conference interpreters and is still the only international association
of conference interpreters in existence, with more than three thousand
individual members throughout the world. In the years after World War II
when a world in ruin was being reorganized, some colleagues had the
vision to realize that the introduction of simultaneous interpretation, par-
ticularly since its use at the Nuremberg trials, and the creation of many
new international organizations would lead to rapid growth in the multi-
lingual conference ‘industry’ and in the number of interpreters required.
In order to ensure proper pay and working conditions, they realized that
they would need to negotiate with their employers and band together to
defend themselves.
AIIC developed a code of ethics and standards of practice that have been
recognized and carried forward by conference interpreters throughout the
world, even though the origins of these practices may have been forgotten.
In so far as they can apply, many of these practices are also followed by
other branches of the profession, such as court interpreters and amongst
the burgeoning groups of ‘community interpreters’. These practices are
recognized because they are based on good sense and help to guarantee the
quality and professionalism which clients require, whilst ensuring a healthy
working environment for the interpreters.
The conference interpreting profession therefore became organized early
on and AIIC’s efforts in standard-setting and negotiating agreements with
major employers have always benefited both members and non-members
alike. Today, AIIC continues to work with schools of interpretation, stand-
ard-setting bodies (especially in the field of conference technology), major
clients and international organizations and other branches of the profession,
175
such as court interpreting and sign language interpreting: we are still rede-
fining our work in a changing world. Now, as we witness the events which
often precede the major peace conferences where we traditionally work, we
have become involved in an area where we believe regulation is very neces-
sary for the benefit of both the interpreters involved and those who use their
services. Interpreting in conflict and post-conflict areas is not new, but the
sheer number of interpreters involved in recent events is.
Creation of the project
At the January 2009 AIIC Assembly, when the Interpreters in Conflict Areas
project was created, our guest speaker was Tim Washington, who had him-
self been involved with UN missions to conflict areas and had worked with
the local interpreters there. Washington reminded us in his speech that we
were in an organized profession, whereas the local interpreters in conflict
areas had ‘no tools and no rules’. They could not ‘defend themselves’. He
thought that as an organized profession we could help not only the (local)
interpreters in conflict areas but also those using their services by giving
advice about working with interpreters (see Fitchett 2009).
By 2008, a number of our members had become frustrated by the fact that
AIIC had remained silent whilst news of the death and injury of interpreters
in war zones began to percolate through the media. When journalists such
as Florence Aubenas, Daniele Mastrogiacomo or later Stephen Farrell were
kidnapped, vast campaigns were launched to save them. However, journal-
ists were seldom kidnapped alone, because foreign journalists working in
countries whose language they do not speak need help to obtain contacts
and to communicate with them. They hire interpreters and/or ‘fixers’, as
the journalists call them, who are often local journalists themselves, with
valuable local knowledge and contacts. While foreign journalists generally
survived their kidnapping, the ‘fixers’ and interpreters often did not. They
were murdered as traitors or to prevent them from talking by their captors,
or they died in the rescue attempt.
Soldiers from foreign powers operating in a country whose language
they do not speak need similar help. In Iraq and Afghanistan, thousands
of interpreters were recruited both locally and internationally to assist for-
eign troops, and they even rendered assistance on the front lines. Where
soldiers die or are wounded, their interpreters must surely follow, but little
was known about the figures until some became available in the US in 2009
together with other information about how interpreters had been used and
then discarded by the withdrawing troops.
Whilst interpreters working for NGOs may not be in the same danger as
those working for the military or for journalists in the front line of conflict,
it was a former USAID worker, Kirk Johnson, who created the List Project
in the US to help resettle Iraqi refugees, including interpreters, who had
Linda Fitchett 177
worked for the US government but had to flee their own country after
receiving death threats. Some had been his own colleagues.
Clearly AIIC had to speak out and try to do something to help all these
interpreters.
The plight of the interpreters
There is no central registry of interpreter deaths, and individual armed

forces are often loath to give figures. Partial figures released in the US and
published by T. Christian Miller in an article in ProPublica in December 2009
showed that, among those working for US forces alone 360 interpreters had
been killed and more than 1200 injured in Iraq between 2003 and 2008
(Miller 2009). Those figures do not give a breakdown of the nationalities
of the interpreters involved. More recently, an article by Sam Marsden in
The Scotsman reported in August 2011 that twenty-one Afghan interpreters
working with British forces have been killed and more than 90 injured over
the past five years (Marsden 2011), although their deaths are generally not
announced by the Ministry of Defence. The article states that British forces
in Afghanistan employed 650 local interpreters in mid-July 2011. The fig-
ures, which in the article are said to come from the Ministry of Defence in
response to a freedom of information request, show that the deadliest year
for Afghan interpreters working with UK troops was 2009 (when seven were
killed and twenty-three injured), followed by 2010 (four killed and thirty-
three injured), 2007 (four killed and fourteen injured), 2011 up until the
article’s date of publication (three killed and nineteen injured), 2008 (two
killed and three injured) and 2006 (one killed and none injured).
If all nationalities’ armed forces are included and figures updated, inter-
preters working for employers such as NGOs and journalists are added, and
the figures are extended to earlier conflicts and peacekeeping efforts such as
Bosnia-Herzegovina, then the figures on the death and injury of interpreters
must by now be in their thousands. A registry is needed.
Interpreters in conflict areas are rarely professionals. Although lacking in
formal professional training, they provide a vital service to armed forces, jour-
nalists, NGOs, politicians and businesspeople. They are recruited locally or
worldwide, often through agencies, and are therefore rarely directly employed
by those who use their services. Contrary to popular misperceptions, they are
often well educated, speak a foreign language and, for those recruited locally,
have been forced to turn to an unfamiliar profession in order to earn a living
and feed their families in a country in turmoil.2 Similar reasons of economic
difficulty attract interpreters recruited in the home countries of the armed
forces and NGOs who use them. These are generally residents or citizens of
the home country deemed to be less of a ‘security risk’. Some are recruited
into the ranks of the armed forces and sometimes a desired naturalization
process is the lure into this very dangerous profession.
One of the major problems when users do not recruit these linguists
themselves but rely on agencies to do so is that responsibility for the inter-
preters is shifted and may become blurred. Control over agency practices
may be difficult to exercise. According to press reports, this seems to have
been the case in Iraq and Afghanistan, at least in the case of the largest
US recruiting agencies for the military. Required to provide thousands of
linguists in a short time, the agencies preferred quantity to quality, and the
screening of candidates from the home countries of troops did not necessar-
ily take proper account of linguistic skills or physical aptitude. Pay could not
always be ensured in remote localities where the agency had no representa-
tive. Medical care and insurance or compensation in the case of injury or
death were inadequate or difficult to claim. Psychological trauma was rarely
treated. Prior safety instruction was lacking and physical protection cannot,
in any case, be ensured. Armies themselves sometimes had issues about
who should provide body armour, whether to allow face masks to protect
identity, about allowing local interpreters to use camp medical, purchasing
or other facilities or even allowing them to remain in the protective camp
environment when not on duty. Little attention was given to defining rights
and obligations or limitations to the interpreters’ role.
It should be remembered that many local interpreter deaths or injury are
not incurred in the field but as a result of violent attacks on them or their
families by factions who consider them to be traitors. This danger increases
as the troops withdraw. Some countries, such as the US and UK, have state-
sponsored refugee schemes to help those who helped their armed forces. In
many ways, however, these schemes are inadequate, either being restrictive
in numbers and conditions or leaving the beneficiaries unaided once they
arrive in the receiving country. Priority may not be given to interpreters and
the promised and necessary recommendations and certificates to benefit
from such schemes are not always forthcoming from the military hierar-
chy. Several of these schemes are now almost at a standstill, the processing
of applicants being so slow. But some countries regrettably do not have a
scheme at all. At best, their interpreters are passed on to other bodies or
forces with whom they can find work and protection; at worst, they are
killed or flee to neighbouring countries, swelling the ranks of refugees. In
the UK, forty-six Iraqi interpreters or their next of kin are now involved in a
legal battle against government offices for compensation for personal injury
or financial losses incurred whilst employed by those offices as interpreters
in Iraq.
Many military personnel have taken up the cause of the interpreters
who helped them. Recently, however, the Times published an article by its
defence editor, Deborah Haynes, suggesting that some serving British sol-
diers had warned the government not to set up a special asylum programme
for Afghan interpreters who were facing death threats from the Taliban, say-
ing it would deprive Afghanistan of some of its best talent (Haynes 2011).
Linda Fitchett 179
The talent has therefore been recognized. No mention is made as to how

dead talent might help a country.
Several journalists have also taken up the story of the interpreters. These
have included T. Christian Miller and his colleagues, writing for ProPublica
in the United States, and Deborah Haynes for the Times in the UK (whilst a
correspondent in Baghdad). Both wrote a series of articles largely in support
of the interpreters, focusing on the difficulties they or their families had
in obtaining medical treatment and compensation in the event of death
or injury and on the insufficiency of programmes to help them obtain
residence or asylum abroad. Journalists’ reports and other awareness-raising
activities have been important, providing first-hand information about
the plight of the interpreters. But government aid programmes are largely
stalled and the threats, death and injuries to interpreters continue. There is
still a long way to go. We see our own project in the long term.
The project so far
The intention of the AIIC project is to help to support and protect

interpreters in conflict areas initially by
• drawing attention to their fate

• advising them and their users of their rights and obligations and of the
major principles of the profession of interpreter, and of how best to work
together
• supporting other projects offering training to non-professional interpreters
• calling for protection of interpreters both during and post-conflict
• calling for proper employment contracts for them.
Generally speaking, our ultimate aim is to achieve what we would call a

new social contract, a new understanding between employers or users and
the interpreters, encompassing also an effort to achieve international rec-
ognition of the role and status of interpreters. We believe that ultimately a
change in the way that society in general sees interpreters, and indeed in
the way the interpreters see themselves, is the only way to achieve true pro-
tection for them, imperfect as that protection may always be in hazardous
situations (see Kahane 2009). By gathering information and disseminating
it, organizing debates and making presentations, we hope to raise awareness
of the plight of interpreters in conflict throughout the world.
In doing so, we have initially taken an overall approach to the definition
of ‘interpreter’. We recognize that a more differentiated approach could be
taken: recognizing the blur between the two functions of ‘interpreter’ and
‘translator’ or the considerable difference in the skills of the interpreters or
for whom they are working. We believe, however, that the first objective
must be to save lives.
We have been working together with a US-based organization called The

Red T whose aims are very similar to ours. We have also worked with the
International Federation of Translators to produce first a basic field guide
and later a code of best practice for interpreters and their users in areas
of conflict which, if adopted by all parties and applied, will be a first step
towards the new understanding that we seek.3 We hope that greater aware-
ness and political pressure will cause government schemes to be initiated
or improved to provide asylum and assistance for interpreters and their
families who had helped them and are persecuted in their own country for
doing so.
Training and selection are important questions. Many of the people
recruited to act as interpreters in conflict zones have never done the job
before and have little idea of how to do it. They receive little or no train-
ing and seldom any help or further training on the job. Their linguistic
skills may be inadequate to some tasks. They may be deployed in areas
whose dialect they do not fully understand. A video news report called Lost
in Translation, first published online by the UK newspaper the Guardian
by John D. McHugh, a photo journalist embedded with US troops in
Afghanistan, gave rise to a public outcry when shown on US television. Its
depiction of the mistranslation of talks between US troops and local Afghan
elders led to a polemic about the failure of interpreter recruitment policies
and fear that troops were in greater danger because of not being understood
or not understanding what was being said or happening around them. But
the film also showed that the troops, the users of interpreter services, are
equally ill-prepared to work with the interpreters or to communicate in gen-
eral. It may be said that this is not the role of troops. But what if the major
slogan of a military campaign is that it is supposed to be winning the hearts
and minds of the people?
Although our project is not intended to be involved in the training of
interpreters, we support and encourage efforts in this area. We support
one of our AIIC members who has launched a humanitarian project in the
University of Geneva for the online training of interpreters working with
NGOs which operate in conflict areas. We would like other interpreters,
such as those recruited to work for the military, to receive better training.
We would like governments to recognize the role of interpreters and support
interpreter training. In pursuing our mandate in the political sphere, we
have successfully gained the interest of some forty members of the Council
of Europe who signed a members’ Declaration calling for the protection
of interpreters in conflict areas (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe 2010). We intend to take this political initiative further and to other
political fora.
Following up a study made for us in 2009 by Professor Giulio Bartolini,
a member of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law in Sanremo,
we shall pursue the idea of an internationally-recognized status to protect
Linda Fitchett 181
interpreters in conflict zones. Although the need for linguistic mediation is

recognized in the Geneva Conventions in order to protect the rights of others,
interpreters’ own rights are not specifically mentioned at all in national or
international legal texts. While interpreters – unlike the journalists or the
staff of humanitarian organizations recognized for their neutrality (such as
the International Committee of the Red Cross) – have no special protected
status, nothing obliges the international community to protect them.
The interpreter’s role: neutrality, traitors and spies
In theatres of war or post-war and peacekeeping situations, the ‘conflict’ is

the context within which the interpreters work. But we recognize that all
interpreters, in whatever branch of the profession, in whatever context, may
find themselves in conflict either with their own conscience (‘should I work
for these people whose views I really do not share, thus helping them to
spread those views?’) or with others because of common misperceptions of
interpreters and their role. Interpreters working in prisons or courts of law or
between clients and their lawyers may themselves be threatened. Their iden-
tities may be voluntarily or inadvertently revealed, placing them in danger.
Community interpreters may be caught in a conflict of loyalty between an
individual or community and national administrations. Professional inter-
preters learnt long ago that in order to be trusted they must exercise their
profession as independently, that is, impartially, as possible. This is not
always easy for non-professionals or in certain circumstances.
Theatres of war, post-conflict situations and peace operations confront us
with the question of interpreters’ ‘trustworthiness’. ‘Traduttore/tradittore’
(translator/traitor) is a popular duo often quoted outside the profession, and
some within it would definitely have qualms about the interpreters’ role in
wartime. Can an interpreter, caught between two stools, not be considered
a traitor? And are all interpreters spies?
We know that economic reasons, or other lures of a brighter future, drove
most interpreters to work for foreign forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. One
paper presented by Catherine Baker to a Languages at War workshop in
2010 showed that interpreters often offered their services to peacekeeping
troops in Bosnia in order to survive in a war-torn economy: not for any
ideological reason (Baker 2010). Many interpreters are professionals from
other fields. After conflicts both their old and new skills may be invaluable
in rebuilding a war-torn country or surviving in a new society – if indeed
they do survive.
To perceive that interpreters sympathize or identify with their clients
(meaning the party who pays them, since interpreters work for all parties in
communication) is a misunderstanding of the motivation and of the role of
the interpreter. Interpreters are not neutral: they have opinions, they have
consciences, they are human – and will remain so until machines have
been invented to replace them or until the whole world sadly speaks only
one language. Learning a foreign language implies exposure to, and gener-
ally openness, to other peoples, cultures and influences. The motivation to
work as an interpreter may spring from many sources. Doing it well requires
certain qualities and the adherence to certain principles which many non-
professionals and users of their services would benefit from knowing. The
principles can be taught. To earn trust from all sides, an interpreter must
seek impartiality and observe strict confidentiality. Interpreter-advocates
cannot, we believe, properly fulfil their role, which is to accurately transmit
a message from one language/culture to another and for all parties. Accuracy
will depend on linguistic and cultural knowledge but can be acquired with
help, learning, practice and training.
To those who do not believe in contacts or ‘fraternization’ with the
enemy, the interpreter perceived to be ‘from their side’ will perhaps always
be considered a traitor if employed by ‘the other side’. To those who believe
that the future can only lie in an understanding of peoples, the interpreter is
an aid to mediation, whenever this is possible, between peoples in conflict.
There cannot be a guarantee that no interpreter will ever be a spy. But
there can be no guarantee that others will not be either. Expecting inter-
preters to act as spies – to provide information which will help one side
or another – is to condemn them to be traitors to one party. In a military
context where linguists are needed to help in intelligence-gathering,4 this is
perhaps the most difficult question for us to deal with. The much-vaunted
idea of the interpreter as ‘cultural intermediary’ is another case in point.
Whilst the interpreter must certainly be able to transpose a message from
one linguistic culture to another so that both parties are able to understand
it, it may not be the role of the interpreter to ‘teach’ one side or the other
about customs which would give advantage to one side or another.
Researchers are taking a closer look at these questions which may be cen-
tral to the future treatment of interpreters and our objective to protect them.
Knowledge, for both the interpreter and the user, is important for decision-
making. For interpreters, or would-be interpreters, knowledge of the risks
involved in certain tasks and in the perception of themselves by others may
influence the decision to take on certain jobs in certain circumstances. For
users, knowledge may help to change their perceptions of interpreters, of
the roles interpreters play, of the tasks they expect interpreters to fulfil, and
of how users must seek to protect interpreters in the light of the dangers
they face.
A brighter linguistic future
The stated aim of the Languages at War project was to ‘open up a new area
of academic research which is recognized as important in government
and military circles, but which has yet to be studied systematically’. This
Linda Fitchett 183
research was to focus on the official foreign language policies of govern-

ment, military and multilateral agencies, the foreign language experience
of those involved in those conflicts, and how these experiences relate to
the policy frameworks set. At the end of the project, conclusions were to be
drawn ‘on the ways in which the foreign language experience of participants
in invasion or occupation and peacekeeping relate to the language policies
of the official agencies involved’ (Languages at War 2008).
The British government in recent times has not given priority to
language-learning in schools or universities. It recently closed down the
only course in the UK providing a European Masters degree in conference
interpreting. The United States – and Britain in the past – has forged a
worldwide military and cultural supremacy. Their language, English, has
become a lingua franca and an arm of that supremacy which perhaps
leads them to believe that learning other languages is a waste of time or
a sign of weakness: everyone speaks (should speak) English, don’t they
(shouldn’t they)? Global English has indeed become a problem in the
conference industry, where few countries – apart from the French, whose
resolve is also weakening – hold out against the spread of what may in the
future become an ‘English’ language with so many regional variants that
these will become mutually unintelligible: so it seems unlikely that the
need for interpreters will die out altogether. But, as cultural and linguistic
supremacy has changed from one area to another in history, so it is likely
to do in the future.
In 2009, participants in the Languages at War Workshop suggested that
the change from the ‘kinetic’ role of the military towards ‘soft’ intervention
would require more linguists but that the military’s preparedness to meet
this need seemed to be relatively low. This situation may change as the
government becomes more and more aware of the difficulties of linguis-
tic communication in areas of conflict and in a world where peoples are
increasingly asserting their cultural independence.
It may be unclear for many whether Western intervention in Iraq and
Afghanistan should be described as ‘kinetic’ or ‘soft’. But the need for lin-
guistic support was definitely underestimated, and thousands of linguists
had to be recruited with great difficulty and in mostly very sorry circum-
stances. It will certainly never be viable to think that the armed forces
will themselves be able to recruit into their ranks the necessary number of
linguists for all possible needs. We would surely all prefer to see our armed
forces in a ‘soft’ rather than a ‘kinetic’ role in the future, but conflict is
not, it seems, about to disappear from our planet for good. Linguists, and
therefore to a great extent non-professional interpreters will continue to be
needed on an ad hoc basis, perhaps again in great numbers. We would hope
that they can be recruited and protected both during and post-conflict in a
way that will not shame us in the future as it has done recently. This requires
policies and planning well in advance.
We would like to see cooperation between the academic world, govern-

ments, the military, NGOs, journalists, recruiting agencies, professional lin-
guistic bodies and interpreters themselves, all working towards the training
of linguists in the field, the recognition of their services and their protection
during and after conflict – as well as the training and awareness-building of
those who employ or work with them. We hope that the Languages at War
network will encourage academic research in this field and will be seen by
governments as a source of information and inspiration to do something
urgently for a better linguistic future and for the survival of those interpret-
ers who have served them in recent conflict. AIIC would be pleased to offer
its services to that end.
Notes
1. Linda Fitchett is a member of the International Association of Conference
Interpreters (AIIC) and coordinator of the Interpreters in Conflict Areas project.
She may be contacted at l.fitchett@aiic.net.
2. See Baker, this volume.
3. In 2012, AIIC, The Red T and the IFT drafted a short Conflict Zone Field Guide
for Civilian Translators/Interpreters and Users of Their Services. It outlines the basic
rights, responsibilities and practices recommended by the three organizations
and applies to translators and interpreters serving as field linguists for the armed
forces, journalists, NGOs and other organizations in conflict zones and other high-
risk settings. The guide is available at: http://aiic.net/community/attachments/
ViewAttachment.cfm/a2872p3853-2490.pdf?&filename=a2872p3853-2490.
pdf&page_id=3853.
4. See Tobia, this volume.
References
Baker, Catherine. 2010. ‘Prosperity Without Security: Locally-Employed Interpreters
in the Bosnian Economy’. Paper presented at 2nd Languages at War annual work-
shop, Imperial War Museum, London. 28 May.
Bartolini, Giulio. 2009. ‘General Principles of International Humanitarian Law and
Their Application to Interpreters Serving in Conflict Situations’. Paper presented to
the AIIC Seminar on Interpreters in Conflict Zones, Rome, 8 January. http://www.
aiic.net/ViewPage.cfm/page3396 (accessed 5 April 2011).
Fitchett, Linda. 2009. ‘Interpreters in Conflict Areas: a New AIIC Project’. Communicate!
(Spring). http://www.aiic.net/ViewPage.cfm/article2368.htm (accessed 5 April
2011).
Haynes, Deborah. 2011. ‘Soldiers Oppose Asylum System for Interpreters’. The Times,
6 August.
Kahane, Eduardo. 2009. ‘The AIIC Resolution on Interpreters in War and Conflict
Zones: Thoughts Towards a New Ethical, Contractual and Political Understanding
Linda Fitchett 185
with Society’. Communicate! (Spring). http://www.aiic.net/ViewPage.cfm/article2363.

htm (accessed 5 April 2011).
Languages at War. 2008. ‘Welcome to Languages at War’. http://www.reading.ac.uk/
languages-at-war/ (accessed 5 April 2011).
Marsden, Sam. 2011. ‘Afghan Interpreters Pay a High Price For Working for Britain’.
The Scotsman, 22 August.
McHugh, John D. 2008. ‘John D. McHugh in Afghanistan: Lost in Translation’.
The Guardian, 12 June. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/video/2008/jun/11/
afghanistan.johndmchugh (accessed 5 April 2011).
Miller, T. Christian. 2009. ‘Foreign Interpreters Hurt in Battle Find U.S. Insurance
Benefits Wanting’, In series ‘Disposable Army: Civilian Contractors in Iraq and
Afghanistan’. ProPublica, 18 December. http://www.propublica.org/article/iraqi-
translators-denied-promised-health-care-1218 (accessed 5 April 2011).
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 2010. Document 12239, Written
Declaration 442 (April). http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/
workingdocs/doc10/edoc12239.htm (accessed 5 April 2011).
12
Learning the Language of ‘The Other’
in Conflict-Ridden Cyprus: Exploring
Barriers and Possibilities
Constadina Charalambous
European University Cyprus
Following current conceptualizations of language as social and cultural prac-

tice, language teaching policies in many countries have broadened their tra-
ditional focus on grammar and vocabulary so as to include culture. Countries
are nowadays adopting an intercultural perspective on language teaching and
learning, and the Council of Europe has recently included a series of socio-
cultural and intercultural objectives in the ‘Common Framework of References
for Languages’ (Council of Europe 2001). Furthermore, learning modern
foreign languages is often expected to contribute to democratic citizenship
(Starkey 2002, 2005), and, according to the Guide for the Development of
Language Education Policies, it ‘provides the basis for peaceful coexistence’
(Council of Europe 2007: 49). Along the same lines, Turkish language learn-
ing has been introduced in Greek Cypriot secondary schools as a means of
promoting intercultural/inter-communal understanding and bringing the
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities closer. However, as this
chapter reveals, the dominance of nationalist Hellenocentric ideology in
Greek Cypriot education does not leave much space for the renegotiation of
traditionally and historically hostile ethnic relations.
This chapter first presents the Cypriot context, focusing on the Greek
Cypriot community and highlighting a) the symbolic value that has been
historically attached to language, b) the leftist tradition in promoting
the idea of bicommunalism and c) the hegemony of Hellenocentric and
anti-Turkish discourses in the Greek Cypriot educational field. Secondly,
it discusses the Turkish-language classes in light of theories arguing that
language learning can contribute to intercultural understanding and the
reduction of prejudice and conflict. As this chapter shows, the specificities
of the Cypriot sociopolitical context and the available ideological represen-
tations of ‘us’ and ‘others’ have significantly influenced the processes and
outcomes of these classes. They thus pose a serious challenge both to the
aforementioned theories and to educational practitioners – in this case, the
Turkish language teacher. Still, the chapter argues that there is some space
186
Constadina Charalambous 187
for considering these classes as a first step towards a symbolic encounter

with the ‘Other’.
The historico-political and educational background of Cyprus
In Cyprus, the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities1 have a long his-
tory of conflict that dates back to the beginning of the twentieth century,
when the two hitherto religious communities (Christian and Muslim)
came to imagine themselves as part of the broader – and at the time rival –
ethnolinguistic groups of Greeks and Turks (Bryant 2004). Language played
an important role in the two communities developing an ‘ethnolinguistic’
identity, because it could confirm their sameness with their ‘motherland’
and difference to the other Cypriot community. In general, scholars agree
that language was perceived by both communities as a salient part of
their ethnic identity and as a precondition to their survival (Bryant 2004;
Karoulla-Vrikki 2004; Kizilyürek and Gautier-Kizilyürek 2004).
By the mid-twentieth century, nationalist discourse had become hegem-
onic in both communities and had resulted in Greek Cypriots and Turkish
Cypriots seeing each other as culturally and historically incompatible.
Arguing about the ‘Greekness’ and ‘Turkishness’ of the two communities
respectively, the ultimate aspiration of both nationalist movements in
Cyprus was union with the mainlands, something that would later have a
negative impact on the actual foundation of the state of Cyprus in 1960. As
Kizilyürek and Gautier-Kizilyürek explain, the two communities’ depend-
ence on the corresponding mainlands resulted in
the denial of state-building within Cyprus and the development of two

mutually exclusive ethnocultural communities. Cyprus was not per-
ceived as a self-contained territory, in which an independent state could
be created, but as a piece of territory, which assumes meaning only as a
part of the ‘supra-family’ of the Greek and/or Turkish nation. (Kizilyürek
and Gautier-Kizilyürek 2004: 38)
Nevertheless, at around the same time (the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury) an alternative ideology also emerged, which remained repressed by the
dominant nationalisms. In contrast to nationalist discourses, this ideology
emphasized the common identity, the common ‘Cypriotness’, of all Cyprus
people, and in both communities it emerged predominantly from leftist
circles (Mavratsas 1997; Papadakis 2005; Panayiotou 2006a, 2006b).
The Republic of Cyprus was founded in 1960 with both communities
being represented in the government and parliament. As early as 1963,
however, serious intercommunal troubles resulted in the withdrawal of
Turkish Cypriots from all government posts. Due to intercommunal fight-
ing in the same year, around 20,000 Turkish Cypriots moved to ethnically
pure enclaves in the north of the island. The growing and violent hostility
between the two communities led to the overthrow of the legal govern-
ment by a pro-Greek coup in July 1974, and to the Turkish forces’ invasion
a week later. Since the 1974 war, the island has been de facto divided into
north (under Turkish Cypriot administration and not recognized by the
UN) and south and its population has been displaced accordingly. Around
196,000 Greek Cypriots are estimated to have been displaced to the south
(Canefe 2002), which is controlled by the recognized government of Cyprus.
Communication between the two parts was almost impossible until 2003,
when the Turkish Cypriot authorities decided partially to lift the restriction
of movement in Nicosia.
Within this context, speaking the language of the opposite community
seemed not only undesirable but indeed also a sign of betrayal towards one’s
own nation and ethnic group.2 Unsurprisingly, Greek (L1)–Turkish (L2)
bilingualism3 was never developed on the island, and the Turkish language,
though an official language of the Republic of Cyprus, did not exist in any
formal Greek Cypriot school curricula until 2003.
In general, education in Cyprus has been ‘strictly communal’ and mono-
lingual (Karyolemou 2003: 364–5), and, in both communities, schools
were responsible for maintaining links with the respective ‘motherlands’
and creating what Bryant (2004) calls ‘true Greeks’ or ‘true Turks’. It is
noteworthy here that, although an alternative ideology did exist and the
leftist Greek-Cypriot party AKEL, even after the war, promoted the idea of
‘rapprochement’ organizing several bicommunal events in the buffer zone
or abroad (Papadakis 2005; Panayiotou 2006a, 2006b), this ideology had
never been part of official educational discourses.
Concerning Greek Cypriot education, on which this chapter focuses, there
is common agreement amongst most educational researchers that it has been
dominated by ethnocentric discourses, with ‘Hellenic Paideia’4 being the
ultimate goal of formal schooling (Koutselini-Ioannidou 1997; Spyrou 2006).
‘Hellenic Paideia’ in the Greek Cypriot context directly evokes Greek Cypriots’
Greek ‘cultural heritage’. As an educational objective, it is seen as both a
goal and vehicle through which young people could be educated – or even
‘enlightened’ – along with the idea of ‘Greekness’. Furthermore, ethnographic
research in Greek Cypriot schools has shown that ‘the Turks’ are constructed in
Greek Cypriot classrooms, textbooks and national celebrations as the ‘primary
Other’ (Christou 2007; see also Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis 2000; Spyrou 2006),
and that the emotion of ‘fear’ is often evoked for maintaining the division
between ‘us’ and the ‘enemy’ (Zembylas 2009). The ethnocentric character of
the educational system has been also pointed out in a recent report by a com-
mittee responsible for educational reform (Committee of Educational Reform
2004). It appears, therefore, that the dominance of ethnocentrism in the Greek
Cypriot educational sphere has traditionally left little – if any – space for a rec-
onciliatory discourse. After 2003, however, things began to change.
Introducing the language of ‘the Other’
In 2003 and 2004, ‘Cyprus underwent a major transformation’ (Panayiotou

2006a: 278). In April 2003, the two communities, who had until then been
in almost total isolation, were able to cross the ‘borders’ for the first time
(since 1974, or for some areas even 1963). Furthermore, in April 2004, the
two communities had their first opportunity to solve the political problem
(the so-called ‘Cyprus Issue’), along the lines of a UN plan known as ‘the
Annan Plan’. People in both communities were asked to vote in a public
referendum, which was finally rejected by the majority of Greek Cypriots.
These sociopolitical changes did not leave the educational field unaffected.
In April 2003, in the midst of negotiations for Cyprus’s entry into the EU,
the (Greek) Cypriot Government announced the introduction of the Turkish
language as an optional course in the formal modern foreign language cur-
riculum in Greek Cypriot secondary schools. The introduction of Turkish
in formal state education was part of a package of measures offered by the
government for support to the Turkish Cypriots, as a response to the Turkish
Cypriot authorities’ partial lifting of the restriction of movement across the
buffer zone in Nicosia, which had been announced only a week earlier. As
part of the same measures, free Greek and Turkish language classes were also
established for Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot adults respectively. This
was the first time in the history of Greek Cypriot education that the Turkish
language had been recognized and legitimized in formal educational insti-
tutions, and its introduction seemed also to have symbolic significance. At
least in the official Ministry of Education discourses, these classes appeared
to be meant as a first reconciliatory step,5 as they were expected to bring the
two communities closer and, by extension, to contribute to the two commu-
nities’ peaceful coexistence. The reconciliatory purposes that these classes
were expected to serve is evident in the following extracts:
Extract 1
Especially here in Cyprus, this [learning the language of the other] means
that the two sides will keep coming closer and closer to each other, . . . by
learning the language you get many things out of that country and in
the particular case I’m sure that the Turkish Cypriots who learn Greek
come also closer to Greek-Cypriots, they understand better as well as they
feel . . . it [language learning] brings you closer with the culture and the tradi-
tion, the civilization of the people that speak this language and I think that
learning the language of the other brings you closer and combats racism,
bigotry and any separatist phenomena.6
Extract 2
We are a bicommunal state and it is definitely good . . . the knowledge
of Turkish for our part for us the Greeks . . . it will definitely help the
cohabitation in this island, the peaceful and harmonious cohabitation . . .

if the accession of Turkey to EU proceeds and the Cyprus problem gets
resolved, we will definitely have to be taught Turkish and they will have
to be taught the Greek language in their schools . . . It is the best way to
come closer, I believe.7
Language learning and intercultural communication
The senior ministry officials’ statements above, explaining the government’s

rationale behind the introduction of the Turkish language, are in line with
current theories arguing that language learning can assist learners’ develop-
ment of intercultural awareness and positive attitudes towards the target
community. As a matter of fact, ‘intercultural awareness’ or ‘intercultural
competence’ emerge as major issues in recent Modern Foreign Language
(MFL) debates, and language learning has been considered one of the key
subjects for developing intercultural understanding (for example Byram
1997; Byram and Risager 1999; Kaikkonen 1997; Mughan 1999). A recently-
published EU guide for the development of language education policies
states:
For individuals, [foreign languages] contribute to quality of life, the

multiplication of personal contacts, access to other cultures, and personal
development and achievement. For societies, knowing each other’s languages
may provide the basis for peaceful coexistence, while multilingualism can be
an enrichment of the environment and recognition of minority and for-
eign languages a precondition of democracy . . . The acquisition of language
thus involves acquisition of cultural competence and the ability to live together
with others. (Council of Europe 2007: 49; author’s emphasis)
The idea that language learning can lead to intercultural awareness, as

expressed in the extract from the EU guide quoted above, resembles sig-
nificantly the discourse of the Greek Cypriot ministry officials cited earlier.
However, language has often been exploited by politicians and governments
for achieving various political purposes, such as constructing a sense of col-
lective similarity or difference (see Charalambous and Rampton 2011). As
Colin Baker points out, ‘bilingual education has become associated with
political debates about national identity, dominance and control by elites,
power relationships amongst politicians and civil servants, questions about
social order, and the perceived potential subversives of language minori-
ties’ (Baker 2003: 101). Similarly, the MFL curriculum has been also used
as a political project for constructing and shaping ‘national identity’, or
conversely ‘a country’s current allegiances and oppositions could impact
the choice of languages to be offered for modern language study’ (Pavlenko
2003: 329).
Indeed, in Cyprus, the introduction of Turkish language lessons in the for-

mal MFL curriculum had an explicit political intent. This was also indicated
by the fact that this language policy was included in a package of measures
that the government of Cyprus offered the Turkish Cypriot citizens of the
Republic8 (the ‘Measures for Building Trust’, as they were often called in
the media and press). Within this context, the establishment of Turkish
language classes, as well as Greek classes for Turkish Cypriots, can be seen
as an emblematic gesture of solidarity and of will for ‘rapprochement’.
Adopting Ben Rampton’s term ‘crossing’ (Rampton 1995; see also Rampton
and Charalambous 2010), which is a term highlighting the sense of strong
ethnolinguistic boundary transgression involved when using a language
that does not ‘belong’ to you, we can describe official ‘Other’-language
learning in Cyprus as a kind of institutionally-sponsored crossing that can
signal willingness for reconciliation and legitimize the establishment of
inter-ethnic/intercommunal contacts.
Things appeared to work well with the adult learners; however, when this
policy was enacted into secondary school classrooms, the reconciliatory
purpose of these lessons came into conflict with the discourse of Helleno-
centrism, which has been traditionally dominating Greek Cypriot formal
education.
From theory to practice: a linguistic ethnographic project
From September 2006 to January 2007, I conducted ethnographic field-

work and observed a total ninety-five hours of other-language learning
classes, out of which forty-six were recorded. Data were collected from both
secondary-school classrooms and governmental institutions with adult lan-
guage classes. As this chapter is primarily concerned with formal education,
I will only focus here on the thirty-two hours of observations and thirteen
and a half hours of recordings that I carried out in two Turkish-language
classes in a Greek Cypriot High School (Lykeio) in Nicosia. Semi-structured
interviews were also conducted with Turkish-language teachers and students
as well as with Ministry of Education officials. Data collection and analysis
were in line with UK Linguistic Ethnography, a research approach that com-
bines ethnographic methodology with analytical frameworks from sociolin-
guistics in order to examine the relation between macro-social processes and
the micro-reality of moment-to-moment interaction (Rampton et al. 2004;
Rampton 2007).9 Examining classroom interaction – whilst taking also into
account the historical and educational background described earlier – it
emerged that the dominance of Hellenocentrism in formal education had a
very significant impact on the language classes, and the history of conflict
was a constant backdrop in the lessons.
First of all, dealing with Greek Cypriots’ animosity against the ‘Turks’ was
a problem that all three Turkish language teachers interviewed appeared to
face. Mr A, the main teacher participating in this research, stated that several
times he had faced negative reactions from fellow teachers when he revealed
his teaching subject to them. Dimitris, another Turkish-language teacher,
reported that he was often questioned by students (non-Turkish-learners)
in his school about his decision to study the Turkish language. Despite his
authority-status as a teacher, Dimitris seemed to hesitate to provide the
students with an answer, and he adopted a rather apologetic position. As
he admitted: ‘The reply I give them is like Pythia: “whether you see them
as friends or enemies you need to know their language.”’10 Similarly, all the
twenty-one students interviewed reported being called ‘traitors’ by their
peers because they had chosen Turkish as their MFL option.
The similarity between the purpose of these classes (as expressed in official
discourse) and the leftist ideology promoting the ideal of bicommunalism
and encouraging intercommunal contact and events posed an additional
complication. Indeed, some students reported that they were often called
‘communists’ by their peers because they had chosen to learn Turkish. For
example:
Extract 3
Interview with sixteen-year-old Greek Cypriot students, learners of Turkish.
Students are talking about their peers’ reactions against Turkish language learn-
ing. The interviews took place in Greek.
Giorgos: They say that Turkish language is for communists and for
communism and . . . –
Monica: Yeah! They [school peers] think we are traitors because of
learning their [Turkish] language! They told that to me many
times
The different ideological representations of ‘us’ and ‘them’, offered by differ-

ent political traditions in Greek Cypriot society, also presented a significant
challenge also to the language teacher. Adopting the established educational
discourse of inter-ethnic hostility could result in clearly rendering Turkish
in the classroom as the language of the enemy, whereas adopting explicitly
reconciliatory talk could have leftist connotations and therefore result in the
teacher being considered politically biased.
Furthermore, during Turkish language lessons students often made
negative comments about the Turks or Turkish Cypriots. Being aware of the
dominant discourses of Turkish otherness, students resisted any attempt
to introduce a positive representation of the Turkish people, even though
outside the formal lesson they appeared to have access to alternative (such
as leftist and anti-racist) discourses (see Charalambous 2009). For example,
when Mr A tried to argue that Turkish people ‘are polite’, he met with
strong and loud negative reactions from students. Tapping readily-available
popular discourses and media representations, the students invoked exam-

ples of Turkish impolite behaviour from a TV show (Survivor) as ‘concrete’
proof against the teacher’s argument.
The way the language teacher found to deal with this situation – despite
both the ‘rapproaching’ purpose of these classes and theories that argue
in favour of language learning for intercultural communication – was to
disassociate the language from its speakers and reconstruct it as a linguistic
system free from any cultural resonance. Having to face the reactions of his
students and society, Mr A avoided any talk during lessons that could result
in a classroom argument. He explicitly forbade any kind of ‘political discus-
sion’ and, focusing on grammar and vocabulary, he consistently avoided
referring to the Turks or Turkish Cypriots as far as possible.
Even when the teacher explicitly named two sessions as ‘teaching culture’,
he still managed to avoid talking about the Turks and Turkish Cypriots. In
the first case, he restricted his talk to ‘Muslims’, thus creating an ambiva-
lent category in which Turks or Turkish Cypriots were sometimes implicitly
included and most of the times explicitly excluded. In the second ‘culture’
lesson, which consisted of a Turkish song, the song he brought to the class
was in fact an adaptation of a Greek one, limiting again the ‘Turkishness’ of
the lesson’s content to merely the language. The following section presents
an example from the lesson with the song, and is particularly illustrative of
the (mostly) unspoken discourses that Mr A felt he had to argue against.
‘They didn’t steal our song’
The song used in the second culture lesson was entitled ‘Olmasa Mektubun’
(‘If it wasn’t for your letter’) and was a Turkish adaptation of the Greek
song ‘Όλα σε θυμι′ζουν’ (‘Ola se thimizun’/‘Everything reminds [me] of
you’), originally composed by Manos Loizos, a famous Greek composer. The
existence of a hybrid song with Greek music and Turkish lyrics seemed to
be considered rather controversial, and the teacher felt the need to provide
a justification for it, as demonstrated by extract 4 below. In this extract,
although the class remains quiet, Mr A seems to argue against a power-
ful – albeit unspoken – discourse, that is, that ‘the Turks stole our song’:
Extract 411
Turkish language lesson. The class has just finished listening to the song. The
students have been quiet since the teacher took the floor and there is no back-
ground talk.
1 Manos Loizou has written <many songs with Turkish lyrics> (.)
2 I mean this . . . is not . . . (.) I don’t know about this song (.)
3 <they don’t steal> (.) eh (.) it’s not – ehm: (.)
4 They didn’t steal it children from us the Turks (.)
5 I mean we also –
6 Eh we take from the Turks and the Turks take from us
Mr A’s efforts to deal with the institutional representation of the Turks as

‘the Other’, as well as with the Greek Cypriot discourses of animosity, are
depicted clearly in his talk in the extract above. Trying to justify the exist-
ence of a Greek song in Turkish, Mr A uses the word ‘steal’. The use of this
word here is very interesting because ‘stealing’ is not a word normally used
on the occasion of a song being officially remade in another language, and
the Greek word ‘διασκευη′’ (‘diaskevi’, ‘adaptation/version’) – would have
been more suitable in this case. Moreover, the adaptation or remake of a
song is not something unusual in general. In the Greek music scene specifi-
cally, there are many Greek adaptations of songs from the USA, UK, Italy
and other countries, which are very popular and sometimes are popular
in both the original and the adapted version. Nonetheless, Mr A appeared
rather convinced in every case that his audience would assume that the song
was ‘stolen’.
These kinds of discourses are not unusual in Greek Cypriot society. Greek
Cypriot refugees, especially, often talk about Turks or Turkish Cypriots hav-
ing stolen their houses and properties in the North. Furthermore, similar
references were also made in some interviews conducted with Greek
Cypriot adults, where people mentioned the word ‘stealing’ to refer to
the Cyprus Government’s measures of support to Turkish Cypriots. These
measures were perceived as unfair and as ‘the Turks stealing “our” tax
money’. Moreover, during the fieldwork for this study, there was an epi-
sode in the school staff room during which some teachers agreed that the
Turkish language had many Greek phrases of which the origin had not
been acknowledged by the Turks, and they thus considered those words
to be ‘stolen’.
The extract above was not the only case in which Mr A used the word
‘stealing’. A very similar episode, involving the same song, occurred with
two more and considerably different audiences: in another Turkish-language
classroom, which had been Mr A’s favourite – very well-behaved – class,
and in the staff room, where Mr A played a few seconds of the song to his
fellow colleagues. Mr A’s certainty that all three different audiences would
have thought that the Turks ‘stole our song’ reveals how widespread he con-
sidered the discourse of ‘stealing’ to be and points to the challenge he was
facing in his effort to confute it. His uneasiness and discomfort, evident in
the way he delivered his talk in the extract cited, suggest that the stereotype
he was trying to argue against was not only widespread but also very pow-
erful. The hesitations, pauses and repairs that mark his speech reveal him
being in a somewhat difficult situation, even though he does not meet any
resistance in accomplishing his task.12 Still, although he gradually rejects the
word ‘stealing’ and manages to replace it with the word ‘collaboration’, he
does not manage to argue against the more general discourse of the ‘Turks
stealing’, as evident by the subtle shift in his talk in line 19:
18 <δen klè:˚v:un˚> (.) e (.)δen – em: (.)

18 <they don’t steal> (.) eh (.) it’s not – ehm: (.)
19 δen mas to èklepsan peδià i Tùrki (.)
19 They didn’t steal it children from us the Turks (.)
In line 19, Mr A repairs his almost half-pronounced utterance of line 18,

and this time the phrase is fully articulated and actually pronounced with
more confidence (without lengthened syllables, pauses or hesitations).
Comparing these two lines, it emerges that the element being remediated
was actually the tense of the verb ‘steal’ (line 19: they don’t steal [den
klevoun], line 21: they didn’t steal [den eklepsan]), along with the addition
of a direct and indirect object (‘it’ [to]/ ‘from us’ [mas]). These grammatical
and syntactical changes did cause a change in the meaning of the phrase,
transforming it from a general statement to a more specific one. The fact
that Mr A had difficulties in expressing the first suggests that he felt less
safe or comfortable to challenge the fact that ‘the Turks do not steal’ in gen-
eral. On the other hand, claiming that – at least – they have not stolen the
particular song appears to be much easier, since it could also be proven by
the fact that many of ‘their’ lyrics have been used by Greek composers and
in particular by the same composer of that song. Indeed, in the part of the
lesson following the extract presented above, Mr A talks about the famous
Turkish poet Nazim Hikmet, pointing out to the students that many Greek
composers, amongst them Manos Loizos (the one who wrote the song) have
used his lyrics in their songs.
Conclusion
According to Byram and Risager:
For foreign language teachers, the changes in the nature of the nation-
state and its relationship to other states are crucial, since the very notion
of ‘foreign’ depends on the clear definition of frontiers and boundaries.
When the frontiers and boundaries become less clear-cut, when opportu-
nities for crossing are then made easier, the purposes of language teach-
ing change. (Byram and Risager 1999: 1)
In 2003, the partial lifting of the restriction of movement in Cyprus was a

crucial change in the relationship between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish
Cypriot communities. This change was followed by a change in language
education, when the Turkish language was introduced for the first time in
Greek Cypriot formal education. This change was accompanied, as described

in this chapter, with a rhetoric regarding the role of language in promoting
‘mutual understanding’ and thus contributing to ‘peaceful coexistence’.
However, the data reveal, on the one hand, a contradiction between the
‘official purpose’ and its enactment and, on the other hand, another contra-
dicton between theories about cultivating intercultural awareness through
language teaching and everyday teaching practices and classroom realities.
According to Stephen Ball (1993), ‘policies from “above” are not the only
constraints and influences upon institutional practice’ (Ball 1993: 15). This
chapter has identified and illustrated several of the constraints that Mr A
had to face whilst teaching the language of ‘the Other’. Moreover, again
according to Ball:
[P]olicies are textual interventions into practice . . . The point is that we

cannot predict or assume how they will be acted on, what their immedi-
ate effect will be, what room for manoeuvre actors will find for them-
selves[.] (Ball 1993: 12)
From this analysis of thirty-two hours of Turkish language lessons, it

emerges the ‘manoeuvre’ Mr A employed in order to deal with the powerful
discourses of otherness and the students’ reactions was to depoliticize the
lesson and ‘erase’, as far as possible, any talk or references to the Turks or
Turkish Cypriots. Although Turkish language learning was introduced as a
step to bring the two communities closer, Greek Cypriot formal education
instead appears as a site that resists change and reconciliatory discourses.
The hegemony of Hellenocentrism in the Greek Cypriot educational sys-
tem poses a challenge for teachers of Turkish, who have no or very limited
space to negotiate alternative representations of the Other. Within such a
restricted space, Mr A retreated to teaching the language as a formal system
detached from ideologies, history and culture. In contrast to language-
learning theories that argue for an inextricable link between language and
culture, the intercultural dimension was absent from the lesson, and Mr
A’s priority was rather to avoid any negative reactions by the students that
could potentially lead to derogatory talk about the Turks. In the extract
examined, Mr A appeared to be very preoccupied with preventing students
from expressing what he predicted that they could be thinking: ‘the Turks
stole our song’.
The examples described here are, of course, not described as ‘good prac-
tice’, but neither are they described in order to accuse the teacher of failing
to cultivate the students’ intercultural competence in the way that theory
might suggest. On the contrary, this example is intended as a study of the
particular constraints and the various challenges that teachers of Turkish
have to face when teaching the language of ‘the Other’ in Greek Cypriot
classrooms. These challenges, which are closely associated with the very
specific context where the language teaching takes place, also present a
challenge for the theories of language learning and intercultural education,
which might not always take into account the particularities of each differ-
ent context.13
The historico-political sketch at the beginning of this chapter gives an
idea of the symbolic value that language has come to acquire in both com-
munities, as well as of the powerful educational discourses that have domi-
nated Greek Cypriot education. Within this context, the fact that Turkish
has for the first time been recognized and legitimized in Greek Cypriot for-
mal educational institutions is a first step that is not without significance.
Students’ contact with Turkish in the Greek Cypriot classroom can be seen
as a symbolic encounter with ‘the Other’ that can perhaps encourage further
encounters in the future. Indeed, ‘Other-language’ classes have also been
established in other troubled societies such as Israel and Macedonia as part
of an effort to overcome conflict and reduce prejudice (see, for example
Tankersley 2001; Bekerman and Shhadi 2003; Bekerman and Horenczyk
2004; Bekerman 2005). Although more research is needed to compare the
processes taking place in these classes, the establishment of ‘Other-language’
learning in these contexts seems to point to the symbolic value that ‘Other-
language’ learning can acquire, functioning as a conscious crossing of
ethnolinguistic boundaries and signalling willingness for ‘rapprochement’
(Charalambous and Rampton 2011). In the case of Cyprus, nonetheless, the
potential for using Turkish language classes as a site for positive intercultural
dialogue seems to have remained unexploited, and further consideration is
needed, particularly of the serious issues surrounding the practicalities of
teaching Turkish. However, such an attempt (including the design of new
material, teachers’ training seminars, teachers’ guides and so on) should be
grounded not only in current theories but also in research that sheds light
on the specificities of Greek Cypriot education and on the type of problems
documented in the examples given here.
Notes
1. The Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities are the largest ethnolinguis-
tic groups in Cyprus. In 1960, Greek Cypriots were estimated to be approximately
77 per cent, and Turkish-Cypriots 18 per cent, of the population. According to
the 2001 census, Turkish Cypriots are now thought to compose approximately 11
per cent of the population, not including Turkish settlers and Turkish troops. The
UN estimates the number of Turkish settlers to be 109,000–117,000 and Turkish
troops 30–35,000 (Euromosaic 2004).
2. In the late nineteenth century, Greek was introduced as a subject in Turkish
Cypriot high schools, but it was removed in the 1950s.
3. Turkish (L1)–Greek (L2) bilingualism did exist, as the Cypriot variety of Greek,
spoken by the majority of the population on the island, was used as a lingua
franca (Ozerk 2001). However, with nationalism reaching its apex in the 1950s,
there were official efforts in the Turkish Cypriot community to reduce it (such
as the so-called ‘Speak Turkish campaign’). This is discussed by Kizilyürek and
Gautier-Kizilyürek (2004).
4. ‘Paideia’ (παιδει′α) is usually understood in Greek as a concept much wider than
‘education’ (ekpedefsi [εκπαι′δευση]), which has a more narrow and institutional
sense.
5. Also in 2008, an educational objective was introduced by the Ministry of
Education which called on all teachers to promote the idea of ‘peaceful coex-
istence’ between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The objective, though
undoubtedly significant, was still met with strong resistance by teachers and
teachers’ trade unions (Charalambous 2010; see Zembylas et al. 2011).
6. Interview, Mr F, Head of Governmental Institutions, 8 January 2007. Author’s
emphasis.
7. Interview with senior ministry official, 9 January 2007. Author’s emphasis.
8. As argued elsewhere (see Charalambous 2009), these measures, as part of the
political negotiations at the time, were a) in line with EU Protocol 10, which
states that Cyprus’s entry into the EU should benefit all Cypriot citizens includ-
ing the Turkish Cypriots; b) an emblematic gesture of ‘goodwill’ towards the
Turkish Cypriots that aimed to demonstrate the government’s commitment to
rapprochement and reconciliation and thus to improve the relations of the two
communities on both a political and an individual level.
9. Although the potentials of this model for examining inter-ethnic/intercommunal
dynamics in the classroom have been explored in the UK and elsewhere, edu-
cational research in Cyprus seems to have focused mainly on the examination
of textbooks and curricula. Some notable exceptions such as the ethnographic
studies of Greek Cypriot classrooms by Spyros Spyrou, Miranda Christou and
Michalinos Zembylas must be mentioned here for their important contribution
to researching classroom practices (Spyrou 2002, 2006; Christou 2007; Zembylas
2009); however, none of these studies has systematically examined classroom
interaction with the tools of micro-discourse analysis.
10. Pythia, according to Greek mythology, was a famous priestess at the Delphi
Oracle who used to utter oracles in an enigmatic way, therefore the meaning of
her answers was never clear.
11. Transcription annotations:
< > indicates talk that is delivered slower than the usual rhythm,
˚˚ indicates a syllable that is pronounced quieter
: elongated sound
(.) micro-pause, audible in interaction but less than 1 second
– interrupted utterance
underlined: utterance audibly louder
12. In general, Mr A appeared very preoccupied with preventing the students’ pos-
sible reactions against the ‘Turks’ from being expressed. In his justification for
bringing in this particular song, there are several markers of ‘dispreference’, as
described by Schegloff (2007: 58–96) and Levinson (1983: 284–370). For exam-
ple: a) the main topic is delayed: the example is stated first (line 1) and the main
argument is only clearly stated in line 6; b) use of prefaces and hesitation mark-
ers: ‘I mean’ (lines 2 and 5) and ‘ehm:’ line 3; c) self-editing and repairs: lines 2,
3 and 5; d) anticipatory account. By marking his account as ‘dispreferred’, Mr A
is perhaps aligning himself here with the students’ possible reactions, trying
to provide a justification before a request to do so can be articulated by the

students.
13. For a more comprehensive theoretical discussion, see Charalambous and
Rampton (2011).
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13
Resolving Conflict via English:
the British Council’s Peacekeeping
English Project
Peter Hare and Nicholas Fletcher
Peacekeeping English Project1
This chapter aims to examine the British-Council-managed Peacekeeping

English Project (PEP), an English language training programme that has
worked in the field of English language training for the military in about
forty countries since its inception in the mid-1990s. It begins by providing
an overview of the project’s structure and its political context. It then looks at
pedagogical issues before moving on to four case studies in different countries
around the world to illustrate the varying contexts in which the project has
worked. Lastly, the chapter attempts to assess the impact of the global PEP,
bearing in mind that most of the individual country projects have finished.
Overview and political context
The overall aim of the PEP has been to ensure an increased contribution to
international peace support, security and humanitarian and disaster relief
operations through the improved interoperability in English of partner nations’
military, security or justice and home affairs personnel by establishing locally
sustainable systems of English language training. It has sought to achieve this
in the short term by facilitating the build-up of a specific number of English
language users to meet a country’s multi-national peace support obligations or
aspirations and its needs for senior personnel to have international contact. In
the longer term, it seeks to develop sustainable host nation infrastructures.
The programme has been funded by the UK government’s Conflict
Prevention Pool since it was established under the joint auspices of the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and
Department of International Development (DFID) in 2001. The purpose of this
initiative is to ‘promote international security and stability, promote human
rights and reduce poverty’ and thereby prevent conflict (DFID, FCO and MOD
2001: 3). The funding agencies have selected participating countries according
to their strategic priorities with the management of the project then carried out
by the British Council, a decision based on the Council’s experience in English
language teaching projects. The goals of each individual country project, whilst
202
Peter Hare and Nicholas Fletcher 203
keeping to the overall aims and objectives of the project as a whole, have
been agreed with the host partner, as has an agreed timescale for the project,
although this has been subject to funding decisions made on an annual basis.
The involvement of three British government departments is part of a
‘joined-up government’ exercise which aims to reduce and prevent conflict
through a wide range of activities to help countries recover and rebuild,
and thereby to contribute to the alleviation of poverty. Under this scheme,
language training is not viewed as technical training but as an activity that
includes an understanding and engagement with alternative values and con-
cepts, leading to cultural change (DFID, FCO, MOD 2001). The project has
also reflected the British government’s strategic objectives as set out in the
Ministry of Defence’s Adelphi Paper 365 (Cottey and Forster 2004) which
stated that in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks on the United States
there was still a demand for defence diplomacy to help construct a more
cooperative and stable international environment. In addition, the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office’s Command Paper 6052 (FCO 2003) argued for
the importance of creating a basis of teamwork and shared objective-setting,
aspects which are at the very core of the PEP.
Until 2009, the British Council structure included a global manager based
in the UK who reported to the funding partners’ steering committee, with
in-country managers (and teacher trainers for the larger projects) who are
able to develop the sort of longer-term professional relationships that have
enabled partnerships to develop in a way that short-term consultants are
not able to achieve. The relationships they have developed in-country have
included ministers and have focused on language training reform as well as
teacher training, syllabus development and methodology.
For the partner, the benefits have been in three areas. The project has
worked as an enabler for increased participation in United Nations and other
peace support operations, for liaison postings to multi-national agencies and
for international cooperation on security and combating organized crime
and trafficking in arms, drugs and human beings. A second benefit has been
for humanitarian purposes, so that partner country forces have been able to
interact more effectively with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
other agencies in conflict and post-conflict situations, disaster relief and the
treatment of refugees. Thirdly, there has been a benefit in training and infor-
mation exchange, for instance prior to and after peace support missions, par-
ticipation in international courses, workshops, seminars and conferences.
Of the countries where PEP has worked, only three projects are still in
existence at the time of writing (September 2011). These are the projects in
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Ethiopia and Afghanistan (which
is funded differently but has broadly similar activities, discussed in the case
study below). The project went through two phases in terms of the UK
government’s strategic objectives. The first corresponded with the European
Union and NATO accession goals and with the development of the Partnership
Table 13.1 The two phases of the PEP

First phase (1996–2001) Second phase (2001–present [2011])
EAST/CENTRAL EUROPE ASIA

Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Afghanistan, China, Iraq, Mongolia, Sri
Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lanka, Vietnam
Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia,
Slovakia, Slovenia
FORMER USSR AFRICA
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Angola, Botswana, DRC, Ethiopia,
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Libya, Mozambique, Djibouti, Rwanda,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Burundi
Uzbekistan
AMERICAS
Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala,
Nicaragua, Honduras
for Peace (PfP) initiative which existed alongside NATO. This lasted from 1996
until 2001, although some country projects lasted until 2009. It involved
states that had been either a part of the former USSR or under its influence in
Central Europe. The second phase started in 2001, coincided with the DFID
becoming a funding agency, and included an emphasis on training personnel
for peace support operations. It also included a wider global approach in the
UK government’s priorities. In theory this phase has not finished, although
many projects closed in 2009 and 2010, in some cases because they had
reached maturity but in others (including some that had only been in exist-
ence for between one and three years) because of funding cuts related to the
financial situation. The countries involved are listed in Table 13.1.
Countries shown in italics in Table 13.1 did not have full projects but were
linked to a project in another country (Moldova with Ukraine, Djibouti with
Ethiopia, Rwanda and Burundi with DRC), had limited input that did not
amount to a project (Iraq, Cuba, Botswana, Nicaragua, Honduras), or had
activities on a long-term basis but were not integrated into the PEP structure
(Sri Lanka). The projects in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan both closed pre-
maturely due to the deterioration in relations between them and the UK. In
addition, certain British Council teaching centres have worked with military
forces, for instance in Sudan.
The PEP’s approach contrasted with the United States’ Defense

Language Institute programme
Rationale
The PEP’s rationale for the teaching, learning and testing of English for
armed forces has much in common with that of its analogue, the US Defense
Languages Institute (DLI) based at Lackland Air Force Base in Texas. Both
agencies that believe it is much more cost-effective for officers to receive
English language training in-country than in the US or UK, where expensive
training time is better devoted to military-specific training. Both agencies
also believe that English language proficiency is vital for defence forces to
collaborate effectively with multi-national forces both in-country (as in
DRC or Afghanistan) or in multi-national UN or AU (African Union) peace
support operations. However, the two agencies have very different ways of
achieving these common aims.
Syllabus
The DLI uses the American Language Course (ALC), which is a highly-struc-
tured course based on short dialogues, emphasizing listening and speaking
skills. Language is mostly non-military and is culturally focused on life in
the USA. Only specialized military courses outside the mainstream American
Language Course present military terminology.
On the other hand, the PEP uses a variety of course material – whatever
is best suited to the military or security context in which the course is run.
Coursebooks, for example the Campaign Military English series, are used
with serving military officers for peacekeeping missions. Unlike the ALC,
Campaign is totally focused on life in the armed forces and is multi-national
in outlook, using a variety of Englishes from both native and non-native
speakers. In other contexts course books that have been written as part
of the PEP, such as ‘English for Modern Policing’ with police forces and
‘Command English’ with cadets, have been used. However, the syllabus is
far from coursebook-dominated, as subsequent sections reveal.
Methodology
The DLI approach to language learning is based on audiolingualism and
is suited for use in language laboratories. The system dates back to World
War II when large numbers of GIs had to learn foreign languages in a few
months before being posted to theatre in the Pacific. The instructor intro-
duces new language through short dialogues which are then drilled and
practised. The approach is very much instructor-centred with the teacher
as a language model working in lockstep with the trainees, but it allows
few opportunities for the students to have real communicative oral practice
with each other.
The PEP’s approach places more emphasis on student-centred approaches
where foreign language acquisition is seen as developing all four skills.
It is open to the array of approaches to foreign language learning that
exist. Military English is presented and practiced very much in the real-
life context in which it is used, for instance, briefing junior officers on
a convoy route or radioing in a map reference for a helicopter to evacuate
a casualty.
Teacher training and development

The DLI approach to teacher training is to send young officers (usually
graduates of a university English language faculty) to its base in Lackland,
Texas for a six-month grounding in the ALC plus a crash course in the use of
language laboratories. Occasionally, instructors receive more specific train-
ing, such as how to run a junior staff officers’ language course or a language
course for aircraft technicians. There is minimal teacher development, since
it is assumed that once instructors have been trained in the US they need no
additional in-service training.
The PEP has always invested heavily in its ‘human resources’ and pro-
vided extensive in-service training and development of its English teachers,
because they are absolutely vital in the sustainability of the teaching, learn-
ing and testing systems it has helped to establish. Teachers have usually used
very old-fashioned teaching materials and, in terms of pedagogy, are heavily
influenced by the teacher-centred approaches that were common in the
former USSR and its satellites as well as in other contexts. These more mod-
ern approaches are vital in getting the maximum benefit from a coursebook
like Campaign. PEP has run courses recognized by Cambridge English for
Speakers of Other Languages, such as CELTA (Certificate of English Language
Teaching to Adults) and ICELT (In-Service Certificate in Teaching English
as a Foreign Language). It has also developed its own teacher-training and
trainer-training courses, plus courses in materials writing, developing self-
access centres and management. In addition, the PEP has participated in
NATO courses for teachers, which include input on modern military con-
cepts and terminology. Many PEP-trained teachers have thus become train-
ers, materials developers, syllabus designers or self-access centre managers.
Testing
To put trainees into the correct level of an ALC course, DLI uses the multiple-
choice American Language Course Placement Test (ALCPT), which does not
actually require the candidates to produce any written or spoken English.
At the end of each ALC coursebook, the trainees sit a multiple-choice book
quiz which determines whether they pass on to the next level. At the end of
the complete course the trainees sit an English Language Competency (ELC)
test, which is similar in format to the ALCPT, the scores of which determine
whether they go to the USA to undergo their required military training.
In contrast, the PEP uses a variety of tests – placement, progress and
achievement. However, to finally measure students’ English-language pro-
ficiency, it will use examinations which are based on the NATO STANAG
6001 language proficiency descriptors. These descriptors are based on the US
Interagency Language Roundtable rating scales (Herzog 2007) and outline
what a trainee should be able to perform at levels 1 to 5 in the four skills of
listening, speaking, reading and writing. Candidates are awarded a Standard
Language Profile (SLP), which describes their proficiency in these skills.
These four-digit scores are recognized in all NATO military or police institu-
tions (except in the USA where DLI ELC scores are required) and have been
adapted in some other contexts where the project has operated.
In addition, individual projects have usually trained testing teams to be
able to develop their proficiency tests based on the descriptors of STANAG
6001, a principle that the DLI system avoids by entrusting all test develop-
ments to US personnel and the administration of high-stakes tests to the
local embassy staff. This has entailed the PEP providing specific training,
including to Masters level in some of the earlier projects, and the collabora-
tion of national testing teams. This has proved a challenge because there is
only limited knowledge of the target language use domain, NATO and the
UN do not publish needs analyses. What is more, the definition of a SLP
has remained a rather vague notion, and the term ‘native speaker’ is itself
contentious in testing circles (Green and Wall 2005).
Autonomous learning
As previously stated, the DLI course material can be used in audio language
laboratories, and instructors receive training in using such laboratories.
Students can practice their dialogues independently in their individual
booths. Some of the audio-only systems have been replaced by laboratories
with computers that have video clips of the dialogues introduced in the
coursebooks with the possibility of interaction with the trainee. These pow-
erful technical tools are rarely used for self-access learning, however, simply
because the instructors have not received the necessary technical and peda-
gogical training in managing such autonomous learning.
From the start the PEP has attempted to integrate autonomous learning
into its courses and has established numerous Military and Police English
self-access centres in the host institutions. The project aims to make the cen-
tres genuinely multimedia with zones for computer use, audio, video and
reading. Each centre has its own manager(s), whom the project trains either
through a dedicated self-access management course or through having them
shadow a trained and experienced manager. Teachers provide guidance in
autonomous learning with counselling and study logs. The centre has cer-
tain hours dedicated to self-access, when it is open to any officer or cadet
who wishes to raise his or her level in English, whether they attend a taught
course or not. Some projects integrate the centre into their curriculum. The
project has developed its own material for self-access, one example being
the Peacekeeper computer software which it co-produced with a Hong Kong
software company. This self-access concept subtly shifts the responsibility of
learning the foreign language from the teacher to the trainees.
Sustainability
To be sustained in the long term, the DLI ALC courses require funding to
purchase ALC course materials, maintain language laboratories and to pay
for instructors’ salaries and training. Instructors trained in the DLI system
cannot easily adapt to more flexible and diverse language teaching, learning
and testing systems.
In the relatively sophisticated and well-funded defence ministries of
the former Warsaw Pact countries and former Soviet republics, PEP has
managed to ensure that the English language teaching, learning and test-
ing systems it established have been handed over to the local ministry of
defence and stand a reasonable chance of being maintained and funded in
the long term. The key to this has been establishing a cadre of well-trained,
well-motivated and well-resourced English language teachers, trainers,
self-access centre managers and testers who are recognized, valued and
appropriately rewarded by their ministry of defence. In some countries
(oil-rich Kazakhstan is an example), teachers expensively trained by PEP are
often lost to higher-paying jobs in other sectors. However, especially in the
former Warsaw Pact countries, accession to the European Union and mem-
bership of NATO has imposed increased requirements for foreign language
proficiency (especially English) on defence ministries which now have to
inter-operate with the armed forces of other NATO member states. Thus the
ministries have no option but to maintain the working systems established
by PEP – proficiency in the English language has now become an absolute
necessity for almost every serving officer and is often a pre-requisite for
promotion.
Case studies
Afghanistan
The project in Afghanistan is not a PEP as such, because it is funded exclu-
sively by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and is managed jointly
by the British Embassy, Kabul Defence Section, and by the British Council,
Afghanistan. It is known as the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)
Language Capability Project. It started in mid-2009 and will probably run
until UK armed forces leave Afghanistan in 2014. Originally, the project
primarily aimed to set up self-access centres in ANSF military and police
training centres and to run teacher training courses for English language
instructors in the national Military Academy, the Kabul Military Training
Centre and in the national Police Academy, Kabul. The rationale of the
project is to enable the ANSF to collaborate effectively with multi-national
partners in both the short and long term, not to enable the ANSF to par-
ticipate in peace support operations. This is a similar scenario to the PEP in
the DR Congo.
In 2011, apart from setting up and running self-access centres and teacher
training courses, resources have been allocated to running intensive IELTS
preparation courses for ANSF officers selected for military training in the
UK. Achieving a defined band in IELTS is a pre-requisite for military training
in the UK and many selected Afghan officers were failing to achieve these
band scores, frustrating the Defence Section’s efforts to place bright young
officers in the Military Academy, Sandhurst, and in RAF Cranwell. From
2012 onwards, the project will develop Military English curricula in the
planned Foreign Languages Institute of the future ANSF Defence University,
working towards the long-term development of a sustainable English lan-
guage teaching infrastructure.
To date the project has trained approximately 1000 ANSF officers either
through direct Military English courses or through self-access learning,
mostly in Kabul Military Training Centre. In the near future, it plans to open
a two-room training centre in the Afghan Ministry of Defence in collabo-
ration with the US Afghan National Army Development Programme. This
centre will function as a teaching, training and self-access centre for Military
English, and the plan is that it will be managed by two female ANSF officers
which the project will train.
Ethiopia
The Ethiopian project was established in early 2008 in recognition of
Ethiopia’s major role as a peacekeeping nation, which dates back to Congo
(1960) and resumed in Rwanda (1994) after a hiatus during the military
regime of 1974–91 (known as the ‘Derg’) when Ethiopia was allied to the
socialist bloc. The country is currently the twelfth largest contributor to UN
peacekeeping missions, with over 2000 troops on the UNAMID mission in
Darfur and other recent contributions to the UN/African Union missions in
Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia and Ivory Coast amongst others. In 2011, it became
the sole contributor to a mission in Abyei when the state of South Sudan was
formed. Ethiopia is the leading contributor to East Africa’s Standby Brigade
(EASBRIG) in which it cooperates with nine other countries, and it hosts the
headquarters of both EASBRIG and the African Union in Addis Ababa, mak-
ing it a significant regional diplomatic power. The Horn of Africa is known
for its instability, and Africa hosts half of the UN’s peacekeeping missions.
The current Ethiopian government’s commitment to peace support opera-
tions, its comparatively large armed forces, the fact that the armed forces
operate as a disciplined and unifying force amongst the eighty-three ethnic
groups in the country and the representation of Orthodox Christianity,
Islam and other religions amongst its personnel mean that Ethiopia’s contri-
butions to peacekeeping missions can potentially provide African solutions
to African problems.
In 2008, however, the armed forces faced a major problem as regarded the
interoperability of their personnel, due to the non-achievement of English
language proficiency, which is required for most missions. As a result, there
was a high dependence on interpreters, and a significant proportion of
personnel who supposedly had English skills were in fact either repatriated
or redeployed because they did not meet UN requirements. The type of
thwarted potential was expressed (through a translator) by one peacekeeper

in 2008:
Serving on the mission [in Liberia] was a great experience. It gave me the
opportunity to serve alongside many other officers from Kenya, Ghana,
Senegal, Croatia, India, Pakistan and many others. I can say that English
language skills were extremely important and that there were occasions
when our [lack of] English skills held us back from contributing more
fully.2
The PEP has worked with its hosts at the Peacekeeping Training Centre of
the Ethiopian Ministry of Defence to establish a language training system at
seven centres throughout the country, based on a redefined language train-
ing policy that provides intensive 250-hour courses at three STANAG 6001
levels. To date (September 2011) approximately 1200 officers have been
trained, many of whom have done all three courses, and 75 per cent of them
have been deployed on missions, with a marked reduction in repatriation
due to the lack of proficiency in English. A mentor and trainer training sys-
tem and a testing team have been established to enhance the prospects of
sustainability. By the end of the project, planned for March 2013, the system
will be fully embedded into the ministry.
Mongolia
While experiencing transition from a close alliance with the former USSR
to a multi-party democracy in the 1990s, Mongolia’s armed forces under-
went a significant reduction in numbers, with a greater emphasis on their
role in civil defence missions. Although there was an acceptance of the fact
that that international political-military security could be achieved only
through a collective security system, the commitment of the government
to participate in such a system dates from 2000, when it was recognized
that the country’s security would be enhanced by an active contribution to
global peace initiatives. Participation in peacekeeping began in 2002, and to
date Mongolia has deployed in Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan and Sierra Leone
(providing security at the Special Court as part of the UN mission to Liberia).
It has sent military observers to the DRC, Western Sahara, Sudan, Georgia,
the Ethiopia–Eritrea border, Chad and Darfur.
The PEP in Mongolia was established in 2005 and lasted till 2009. During
that time, it worked alongside the US DLI programme at the General Staff of
the Mongolian Armed Forces, establishing three other centres at the Peace
Support Operations Training Centre and two peacekeeping battalions. Given
what has been discussed earlier about the different approaches of the US and
UK programmes, the project in Mongolia is an interesting example of the
degree to which they can work alongside each other, of how a three-way
relationship with the host partner evolved and of the legacy of a UK project
that lasted for less than four years whilst the DLI programme continues. The
DLI was the mainstay of the teaching programme, with the PEP providing,
according to the Mongolian director of the programme, approximately 20
per cent of the courses specifically in military English, proficiency testing,
the development of speaking skills, in-country teacher development, self-
access centres and training on how to exploit them. The Mongolian pro-
gramme has taken the strengths of both systems. Two years after closure,
the PEP programme is still judged as ‘very effective to the military personnel
who would deploy on missions’ by one of the senior teachers.3 During the
project’s lifetime, 450 personnel were trained on this dual programme, with
90 per cent deployment.
Ukraine
The Ukraine project started in 2002, when Military English self-access cen-
tres were set up in MOD training institutions in Lviv and in Sevastopol.
The Hungarian Ministry of Defence sponsored one-to-one English language
training for top Ukrainian generals. In 2004, the PEP set up the ICELT
teacher training programme for English language instructors working in
defence ministry training institutions throughout Ukraine. The next year
PEP established the Campaign coursebook as the official English language
syllabus in all military institutions, and it handed over direct English
language teaching to the Ministry. An English Language Teaching and
Methodology unit was formally established in the Ministry in 2006, and in
the same year the self-access centres in Lviv and Sevastopol were handed
over to the Ministry. In 2007 the project worked with the Ministry to
establish four new self-access centres in Kiev and in Kharkiv, and the next
year the ICELT teacher training programme passed to Ministry ownership,
which has meant Ukrainian trainers delivering the Cambridge University
validated course. The entire programme was handed over to the Ukrainian
Ministry of Defence in 2009. As one of the outcomes of the project,
Ukrainian peacekeepers have played key roles in multi-national peace sup-
port operations in the territories of the former Yugoslavia and in Africa,
where their key asset of heavy-lift helicopters and experienced pilots has
been much in demand.
Impact of the PEP
Since the inception of the PEP, the project has trained approximately
55,000 personnel. However, it is difficult to know precisely how many of
these trainees have actually served on peacekeeping missions. One reason
is because, in the first phase of the project, the PEP was associated as much
with NATO and EU accession goals as with peacekeeping itself. Indeed, it
was only in 2006 that individual projects were required to collect precise
data on personnel who served on missions, and this procedure relied on
accurate reporting from host ministries. It was also regarded as confidential

information for the funding partners. However, it is clear that the capacity
to provide English-language-trained personnel for missions has been signifi-
cantly increased. In late 2009 all of the fifteen UN peacekeeping missions,
and just over half of the non-UN missions, had personnel from countries
where PEP had operated. These countries made up just over 8 per cent of
all uniformed personnel deployed on UN missions, rising to 26 per cent of
military observers. What appear to be relatively low figures are explained by
the fact that, of the ‘PEP countries’, only Ethiopia and China are amongst
the leading twenty contributors of personnel to missions, and these other
eighteen countries contribute 65 per cent (Annual Review of Global Peace
Operations 2010).
There is evidence from UK government sources on what they see as the
importance of the English language training and the role that the PEP has
played. In a Peacekeeping English Project newsletter of 2009, the Ministry
of Defence stated:
The British Council-run Peacekeeping English Projects supported by

the UK’s Conflict Prevention Pool have delivered a strong, indigenous
English language training capability across the world. English, as one
of the two peacekeeping languages in the world, is vital to effective
multinational peace support operations. PEPs have been a central pil-
lar in supporting troop and police contributing countries deploying on
multinational peace support operations. PEPs across the world have been
praised for their delivery. . . . The sustainability of PEPs has been a unique
quality of PEPs, and one which provides value for money. (PEP Newsletter
35 2009: 2)
Individual defence attachés have substantiated this; in 2004 the attaché

to Serbia and Montenegro stated that the project was a fundamental tool
in having a direct, beneficial effect on regional stability, particularly with
Albania and Romania, whilst the attaché to the South Caucasus regarded
‘PEP trained personnel [as] well-placed in the emerging reform structures
after the 2003 Rose Revolution’ (PEP Milestone Survey Report 2004: 3, in
McIlwraith). The British High Commissioner to Mozambique stated that
project was contributing ‘to increase the capacity of the Defence Ministry
to actively participate in peacekeeping operations . . . one of the main
requisites for the participants in some of these operations is proficiency in
the English language’ (PEP Newsletter 35 2009: 7). On a visit to the project
in DRC, the then UK Minister for Africa, Asia and the UN, Lord Malloch-
Brown, recognized the project’s contribution to the ‘important steps towards
meeting the objective fixed by the government of DRC of a well-trained and
fully functioning arm’ (PEP Newsletter 33 2009: 4).
The value of the project to the host countries has also been recognized.
On the opening of a self-access centre at the Academy of the Chinese
People’s Armed Police Academy, its president, Major General Yang Jun,
noted its value, vowing that the staff would ‘make the best use of the
self-access centre, further develop the training materials and provide as
much access as possible to UN peacekeepers [to Haiti] as well as to those
who are enthusiastic about becoming peacekeeping police officers’ (PEP
Newsletter 31 2008: 5). The implied political–diplomatic role of the project
was also highlighted in his comment that, as permanent members of the
UN Security Council, China and the UK might ‘promote communication
and co-operation, strengthen friendship and further improve the UN’s
peacekeeping police work’ (PEP Newsletter 31 2008: 5). During a visit by
Lord Kinnock, then Chair of the British Council, the Head of the Ethiopian
Ministry of National Defence Peacekeeping Centre recognized the value of
PEP. ‘Preparing peacekeepers for the management of the kind of complex
security situation is a critical challenge and language training is one of the
main areas of capacity building that faces a developing country such as
Ethiopia’ (PEP Newsletter 35 2009: 7). In Turkey, Ali Osman Elmastas, the
Director of the National Police Academy, stated that:
I think that the Peacekeeping English Project, our joint project with the
British Council, is very useful for Turkish national police as Turkey appoints
a high number of officers to international duties such as UN and OSCE
[Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe] missions. Perhaps
it will take some time for us to see the results of our Law Enforcement
English training programme at the Turkish National Police Academy, but
I think the police cadets who graduate with knowledge of both General
and Law Enforcement English will be more successful and effective while
performing their international duties. (PEP Newsletter 30 2008)
The importance of English on missions (potentially lifesaving) and the

benefits gained from studying on PEP programmes have also been recorded
by individual officers on missions. Major Ruslan Holubstov from Ukraine
served in Sudan in a multi-national team of advisors to the Sudanese Police
south of Khartoum. He referred to his English training, specifically the
preparation for his own future role as a trainer:
At the start I talked too much when giving training and this confused my
trainees, and I had to learn to make my speech clear and to the point. Just
before I left the mission, this proved to a life-saving skill. We were visit-
ing a police station when some young men, protesting against the recent
international arrest warrant for the Sudanese president, surrounded the
building and started chanting anti-western slogans. On this occasion
I had to give very clear on-the-spot training to the local police on how to
keep the situation under control long enough for us to get to our vehicle
and drive away. (PEP Newsletter 34 2009: 2)
Major Mamuka Mchedelidze from Georgia was in Iraq:
I served as a liaison officer in 2005 in the Tactical Operations Centre of

a US Infantry Battalion. I was sent to a Forward Operations base near
Samarra. We got a task from our HQ to deploy in the intersection near
the village of Ad-Dulyia. It was the day of the referendum for the new
constitution. In the middle of the day we were engaged by insurgents
and took fire. The skills and knowledge I got in the English language
centre helped me in this situation. I called an American sergeant on the
radio, explaining the situation to him and he called up air support. (PEP
Newsletter 26 2007: 1)
The project’s impact on the development of language training systems in

participating countries includes the following areas:
• Teaching methodology. The principle of sustainability has meant using

experienced teacher trainers, self-access centre managers and testers in
other PEP contexts so as to ensure their expertise is fully exploited.
• Course design for specialized purposes. This involved international train-
ing events, and has also led to the writing of materials in book form,
including by international teams.
• Materials design, relating to human rights, sexual exploitation and abuse
and HIV/AIDS, as well as other specific needs of military, police and secu-
rity forces. The Peacekeeper self-study CD-ROM was written by a team of
PEP-trained teachers as materials writers, coordinated by managers, using
the experience and knowledge of personnel who had served on peace
support operations.
• Management of language centres, with a PEP management course run
in Slovenia. The project also developed an Integrated Training for Peace
Support and Security Management (ITPSSM) course, which continued
beyond the closure of most projects and included participants from
Germany, Finland and Russia.
• Test design and testing systems, as described above. Testing also involved
several multi-national events, working in areas such as developing test
specifications and piloting tests. One notable example was the South
Caucasus Testing Group which brought the testing teams of Georgia,
Armenia and Azerbaijan together on a regular basis, an example of people
from two countries still technically at war working together.
• Trainer training. A one-year part-time course developed by PEP involved
trainer trainers from Latvia, Croatia, Slovakia and Macedonia working
with British trainers to develop, manage as well as train on the course. It

trained forty personnel from eighteen countries in three years, many of
whom have been used as trainers including in countries other than their
own. Examples of this are the visit of a Latvian teacher trainer working
in Afghanistan and a Ukrainian visiting Ethiopia.
• Teacher support networks, often developed out of local, regional and
international conferences.
• The significance of the internal impact on the training system of PEP
countries is illustrated by Siria Larmay, the self-access centre coordina-
tor of the Comando Regional de Entrenamiento de Operaciones de
Mantenimento de Paz, the regional peacekeeping training centre for
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua:
‘Now I understand how to modify my classes to prepare students so they
have an optimal outcome once they get into the field, and so improve
their confidence once they arrive at the mission’ (PEP Newsletter 33:
2009).
Conclusion
To a large extent, the PEP has helped countries’ defence forces to accomplish
their goals in terms of English language interoperability. Acknowledgement
of the work done by the project came from the UK Ministry of Defence in a
statement they released in 2009, when many projects were handed over to
host institutions.
The British Council-run Peacekeeping English Projects supported by the

UK’s Conflict Prevention Pool have delivered strong indigenous English
language training capability across the world. English, as one of the two
peacekeeping languages of the world, is vital to effective multi-national
peace support operations. PEPs have been a central pillar in supporting
potential troop and police contributing countries deploying on multi-
national peace support operations. PEPs across the world have been
praised for their delivery, effectiveness and effort. . . . The sustainability
of PEPs has been a unique quality of PEPs, and one which provides value
for money. (PEP Newsletter 35 2009: 7)
It is impossible to know whether a project of a similar nature will be estab-

lished at some point in the future, but it can reasonably be predicted that
the international and national political contexts around the world are
likely to continue to require effective communication in a common lan-
guage between the personnel who assist with recovery after major conflicts.
Moreover, as more than one serving defence attaché has related to us, when
they ask the ministries of countries what support English they require, more
often than not English language training comes out as a priority.
Notes
1. Peter Hare and Nicholas Fletcher have worked for the British Council as manag-
ers of Peacekeeping English Projects in Afghanistan, Colombia, Ethiopia, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia and Mozambique, and they have been involved
in training events in a number of other countries.
2. Interview for Ethiopian PEP with Dimka, Ethiopian peacekeeper, 2008.
3. Personal communication, 23 March 2011.
References
Annual Review of Global Peace Operations. 2010. Annual Review of Global Peace
Operations. London: Lynne Rienner.
British Council. 2004. ‘Peacekeeping English Project Management Plan’. Unpublished
document. London: British Council.
Cottey, A., and A. Forster. 2004. Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New Roles for Military Co-
Operation and Assistance. Adelphi Paper 365. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Department for International Development (DFID), Foreign and Commonwealth
Office and Ministry of Defence. 2001. The Global Conflict Prevention Pool: a Joint UK
Government Approach to Reducing Conflict. http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peacekeeping/
conflict/docs/global-conflict-prevention-pool.pdf (accessed 19 January 2012).
Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 2003. Command Paper 6052 UK International
Priorities: a Strategy for the FCO. Norwich: The Stationery Office.
Green, Rita, and Dianne Wall. 2005. ‘Developing Tests in the Military: Problems,
Politics and Progress’. Language Testing 22 (3): 379–98.
Herzog, Marta. 2007. ‘An Overview of the History of the ILR Language Proficiency
Skill Level descriptions and scale’. Interagency Language Roundtable. http://www.
govtilr.org/Skills/index.htm (accessed 21 August 2011).
McIlwraith, Hamish. 2004. ‘PEP Milestone Survey Report’. Unpublished document.
London: British Council.
PEP Newsletters. 2007–9. London: British Council.
Woods, Paul. 2009. ‘The Hedgehog and the Fox: Two Approaches to English for the
Military’. In (Re)Locating TESOL in an Age of Empire, edited by J. Edge: 208–26.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
14
Did Serbo-Croat Die with Yugoslavia?
A Different View of Language and
Identity in Bosnia-Herzegovina
Louise Askew
University of Nottingham
A language is said to be dead when it no longer has any speakers (Crystal

2000: 1). The process of a language’s demise generally occurs over a long
period of time as speakers of the dying language cease to speak their origi-
nal language in favour of a second language that has greater social prestige
or value. An immigrant community, for example, may experience language
shift as second and third generations see more utility in speaking and hav-
ing as a first language the more powerful language of the host community.
This process of language shift is thought to occur over three generations
(Coulmas 2005: 158). A language can also disappear if, over time, it trans-
forms into one or more languages which bear no resemblance to the
original language. An example of this is Latin, which over centuries has
transformed into French, Spanish, Italian and Sardinian (Aitchison 1992:
197). In both these processes of language demise, a language’s disappear-
ance is a gradual one. In contrast to this, the death of Serbo-Croat seems
to have been a rather swift affair. Since the early 1990s, the language of
Serbo-Croat has completely disappeared from the social and political scene
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is no longer a language of instruction or a subject
in the curriculum in the education system, and in public discourse there is
no longer any mention of Serbo-Croat as a designation for the language of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Instead, the official languages of the post-war state are
now Bosnian, Croatian or Serbian.
This chapter explores whether Serbo-Croat really is dead in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. It maintains that, far from this being the case, the language
of Serbo-Croat still has meaning for certain members of the population of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. In doing so, it draws on interviews that I conducted in
2008 with seventeen interpreters and translators working for international
organizations1 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They were all natives of Bosnia-
Herzegovina who on a daily basis work from and into English and the three
217
official languages of Bosnia-Herzegovina. These were people who thought

about language matters in a very practical sense and therefore, I assumed,
they would express considered and informed opinions on language issues,
as well as on their own language attitudes.
In order to put these language attitudes in context, this chapter begins
with a brief summary of the language situation in the former Yugoslavia
up until the outbreak of the wars that led to its disintegration in the early
1990s. In the former Yugoslavia, there were three main official languages:
Slovenian, Macedonian and Serbo-Croat or Croato-Serbian. Serbo-Croat or
Croato-Serbian officially denoted the speech of four of the six constituent
nations in the former Yugoslavia – the Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins and,
after 1974, the Muslims.2 In post-Second World War Yugoslavia, language
was used as a key element in the Communist regime’s efforts to regulate
inter-ethnic relations; the creation of a unified language was seen by the
authorities as a way of embedding the different constituent nations into the
common state.
Ever since the awakening of ethnolinguistic consciousness in the region
in the nineteenth century, there had been debate over whether the speech
of the Serbs and Croats, as the two largest ethnic groups in the country,
were one or different languages. If they were separate languages, there was
no linguistic justification for the peoples to be united politically in one
state. The Communist authorities therefore strove to maintain language
unity. The speech of the four different constituent nations – the Croats,
Serbs, Montenegrins and Muslims – was therefore considered to be a unified
language but with variant ways of speaking. Broadly, the western variant
denoted the speech of the Croats and the eastern variant that of the Serbs.
This unity came under threat in the 1960s and 1970s when the Croats called
for an end to the single language and the right to call its language Croatian.
This in turn prompted similar calls from the Serbs. A compromise was
reached in the Constitution of 1974 which confirmed the single standard
language but allowed for a Croatian standard idiom and added two more
variants or idioms to take account of the variant speech of the populations
of Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina: the Montenegrin standard idiom
and the Bosnia-Herzegovina standard idiom. Once the country began to
break apart, these idioms became the basis for the separate languages of the
successor states (Greenberg 2004: 57).
Despite the fact that these variants and idioms were based on the same
dialect and were mutually intelligible, in modern-day Bosnia-Herzegovina
each of the three main ethnic groups, which are now its constituent nations,
use linguistic difference as a way to claim ethnic distinctiveness. The Serbs
and Croats look to their kin states of Serbia and Croatia for their separate
standard languages. The Croats in Croatia have been particularly active in
language planning activities to create their own standard language and to
distance it as much as possible from those of the other constituent nations
Louise Askew 219
of the former Yugoslavia. Croatian language planners have concentrated

on differences in morphology, phonology and syntax but most change
has been in lexical items. There has been a purification of vocabulary
which has meant the re-introduction of native Croatian words and the
introduction of neologisms, as well as the rejection of foreign borrow-
ings such as Russianisms and ‘Turkisms’ (old Turkish, Arab and Persian
words). The Croats thereby distance themselves from both Serbian (with its
Russian/Slavonic components) and Bosnian (with its emphasis on Turkisms)
(Greenberg 2004: 124).
The Bosniaks, who do not have a kin state, have had to work harder to
establish their own distinctive standard. Bosniak language planners have
done this by highlighting two particular features of their speech: the pres-
ence of words based on old Turkish, Arabic and Persian words and the
greater prevalence of the phoneme /x/ in the speech of the Bosniaks. These
two features also exist in the other two languages but to a lesser extent.
However, as Curtis Ford notes (2001: 85), these features are hardly sufficient
to warrant a process of standardization.3 They do, however, function as
shibboleths to distinguish a member of the Bosniak nation. So, for example,
using the word kahva, meaning coffee, immediately identifies the speaker as
a Bosniak because neither a Croat nor a Serb would use this word.4
Given the various language planning activities of the three constituent
nations, a question to be asked is whether they have had an impact on
the way in which the population speaks. There has not yet been a com-
prehensive study of language use in Bosnia-Herzegovina since the end of
the conflict, but certain scholars such as Ranko Bugarski (2005) and Svein
Monnesland (2005) consider that there has been no great change in people’s
language habits. This was borne out in the interviews for this chapter. Most
of the interviewees thought people’s language habits had not changed to
a great extent except for the use of certain lexical items. The example that
was given most often during the interviews was the word for ‘municipality’.
In Sarajevo before the conflict the word opština was used, but now the
Croatian version of općina is prevalent. This reflects a tendency for Bosnian
to be influenced by Croatian features as a result of closer political ties to the
Croats than to the Serbs.
Because of the close proximity and mutual intelligibility of the lan-
guages, their value and importance are in their symbolic function as a
marker of ethnic identity. Since the end of the war in 1995, ethnic divi-
sions have become only more entrenched in the post-conflict state; this
means that ethnic identity and affiliation is of utmost importance in day-
to-day life. The political process revolves around representation according
to ethnicity, so it is important how an individual self-identifies ethnically.
No census has been conducted throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1991
(the last one was held when the state was part of the former Yugoslavia)
but in a ‘social mapping exercise’ that was carried out in the Muslim–Croat
Federation, which constitutes half of the state, in 2002 respondents were

encouraged to self-identify according to four categories – Bosniak, Croat,
Serb or Other (Markowitz 2010). This was in stark contrast to the 1991 cen-
sus in which there were twenty-five possible categories which included all
the nations and nationalities of the former Yugoslavia as well as those who
self-identified as Yugoslavs. This last category was chosen by 5.6 per cent
of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991, yet there is no equiva-
lent in present-day Bosnia. It is now no longer possible to self-identify as
a citizen of the state rather than as a member of one of the constituent
nations.
Given this emphasis on ethnic affiliation, language acquires particular
significance as a marker of ethnic identity and as a way for an individual to
self-identify ethnically. In a public opinion survey of 2500 respondents from
throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina that was conducted by the PULS research
institute in 2005, when asked which language each respondent spoke, 98
per cent of the Serbs stated Serbian, 93 per cent of Croats Croatian and 97
per cent of Bosniaks stated either Bosnian or Bosniak (Kostić 2007: 296).5
This clear differentiation of the designations of the languages was not,
however, reflected in the opinions of the respondents as to whether the
languages were the same, similar or entirely different. In this regard, 76.8
per cent of respondents considered the languages to be the same or ‘mainly
the same with some small differences’ (Kostić 2007: 296). A total of 18.2 per
cent thought the languages were ‘separate but similar’ and just 4.5 per cent
thought the languages were ‘entirely different’ (Kostić 2007: 296). This data
indicate that, notwithstanding the respondents’ views on the proximity of
the languages, they had the ethnolinguistic awareness to label their mother
tongue according to one of the official designations. This suggests that the
ethnic designations of the languages have acquired the social prestige that
is important for one language to prevail over another in the process of the
weaker language’s death.
The interviews
Bearing in mind the foregoing discussion and the saliency of ethnic identity
in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina, it might be expected that the inter-
viewees would be unequivocal in their answers to questions about language.
It might be expected that, in answering a question about what language
they spoke, each respondent would answer with one of the three official
designations. This was, however, not the case. While some did describe
their language according to one of the current official designations, others
were more equivocal. Five of them hesitated to use one of the official lan-
guage designations and instead employed different ways of describing their
mother tongue, but in all five cases Serbo-Croat was a reference point for
their descriptions. For example, interviewee KM immediately described their
Louise Askew 221
language as Serbo-Croatian but then went on to justify this designation by

explaining their language in terms of what it is not:
LA: If someone were to ask you what language you spoke, what would
you say?
KM: Serbo-Croatian, still. Well, sometimes I say, like to foreigners, I say

local language. To locals I say our language, naš jezik, or my language,
sometimes Serbo-Croatian. I just don’t feel comfortable saying I speak
Serbian, I speak Bosnian. I definitely don’t speak Croatian. My mother
tongue should be Serbian but I live in Bosnia and it’s kind of a mixture of
Bosnian and Serbian, I don’t know, maybe it’s Serbo-Bosnian (laughs).
This interviewee seems to be saying that they do not recognize any of the
official languages as their mother tongue and, although they are clear about
their ethnicity (Serbian), they are ambivalent about identifying themselves
linguistically with this constituent nation. This is also demonstrated in
their mention of the two ways that are usually employed to avoid using
one of the official designations of the language – ‘the local language’ or ‘our
language’ – which avoids any mention of ethnicity. The dilemma in which
this interviewee finds themselves is typified by their inventing a designation
of their own.
Interviewee CA also eschews the three official ethnic designations, but in
this case they think more locally and favour identification with the specific
locality where they live, in this case Sarajevo. By doing this, they avoid not
only using one of the ethnic language designations but also confirming
their ethnic affiliation. Their response is given below:
LA: If somebody asked you what language you spoke, what would you say?
CA: Privately or professionally? Because there is a difference.
LA: Yes, well, tell me both.
CA: Privately, I speak Sarajevan. (laughs) No, yeh, the local dialect. It
would be, well, heavily influenced by Serbo-Croat, definitely, because
I simply don’t want to spend my days and especially my time off putting
in an effort. So I will speak in Serbo-Croat with a heavy, heavy influ-
ence of local, well, dialect, slang, I would say. Professionally, when I am
addressing someone in local language it is always either Bosnian, Serb or
Croat and I strive to be very correct. I do, I hope.
In talking about their language, it is Serbo-Croat that forms the basis of this
interviewee’s description. By mentioning their professional practice and
ability to differentiate between the three languages in the workplace, they

are indicating that they are fully aware of the language differences and per-
haps want to distance themselves from those who insist on this linguistic
differentiation in their working life.
The ambivalence of CA towards categorically naming their mother
tongue according to one of the official language designations is echoed in
the response of interviewee IR who has a different way of describing their
language, as can be seen in the exchange below:
LA: So if somebody were to ask you which language you spoke, what
would you say?
IR: Oooph. I’d say I speak the same language I spoke in 1990 so it would
be Serbo-Croat (laughs) I don’t know, I guess it’s the same language, it
hasn’t changed.
LA: But if somebody, if a soldier, I don’t know, a foreign soldier, an

American you had never met and he came and asked you what language
you speak what would you say?
IR: Hmm. What would I say? The Constitution says I speak the language
of Bosnian Serbs.
The expressive ‘oooph’ at the beginning of their response indicates the

difficulty this interviewee has in answering the question and expresses
their frustration in providing a satisfactory answer. They initially call their
language Serbo-Croat, but on further questioning they resort to a legalistic
definition and, like interviewee KM, they do not hesitate to give a defini-
tion which makes it clear what their ethnic background is (Serbian). This
interviewee’s mention of 1990 underlines that they see their language in
terms of the pre-war language situation (hence also their reference to Serbo-
Croat) and suggests that they do not consider their own language habits to
have changed since then. In a similar vein, interviewee LB, who is in their
fifties, took a longer view of language use, explaining that Serbo-Croat was
the name of the language throughout their education and they were too old
to change now:
As you know, I am too old, and I was raised, I was born in something that
is today in the Republika Srpska, Trebinje, but I was there until I was five.
I was, I went to school in some areas where the majority are Croats and
from my early first grade in primary school until I finished university it
was Serbo-Croat. We usually say S-H, just the abbreviation. And I cannot
say, I don’t know how someone can say that when he is fifty or over
now he speaks another language . . . I cannot just say today that I’m, my
Louise Askew 223
language is Bosnian, Serbian, Croat, if you divide them, or you can call it
Esperanto. Anyone can name it how they would like but I am speaking
Serbo-Croat.
Interviewee ZJ who is younger than interviewee LB, had a similar view and
emphasized how they endeavour to use the language they were taught at
school. Their response is given below:
LA: If somebody were to ask you what language you spoke, what would
you say?
ZJ: I would say, ah well, that is very difficult. I try hard to speak . . . I am a
Bosniak but I try hard to speak this language that I learned in school that’s
called Serbo-Croatian or Croatian-Serbian. It’s very dangerous to admit
it here because it is Serbian and Croatian, a mixture, a combination but
Bosnian language is, in my opinion, it is something that is invented just to
have a language of the Bosniaks, that Bosniak authorities invented here in
order to have a language of their own just to be different from the Serbian
and Croatian languages. Actually it is a mixture of Croatian and Serbian
again apart from, I don’t know, fifty to one hundred expressions that they
just introduced which are really not very appropriate (laughs) they are slang
and colloquial expressions that were used here some one hundred to two
hundred years ago which are really not standard language expressions. And
because of all these innovations and new words and expressions and terms
whatever, constructions and syntax whatever in the Bosnian language it
became very ugly and it is ridiculous so I try to speak the old version that
I was taught in school. So that is in private but here at work when I am
translating documents or interpreting at meetings I use, I try to be as politi-
cally correct as it is possible because I have to respect and follow the policy
of the OSCE but privately I will say, I will not say that I use Serbo-Croatian
or Croatian-Serbian, I would say I use this version, this language that I was
taught in school before the war and that’s it because it is a standard lan-
guage and I think that it is a good language and it shouldn’t be changed.
Although in this response ZJ self-identifies as a Bosniak, they still see their

language in terms of Serbo-Croat which they consider to be a standard
language and ‘good’. In fact, they are highly critical of attempts to create a
separate language of Bosnian, calling it ‘very ugly’ and ‘ridiculous’. Despite
their positive view of Serbo-Croat, however, they do not in the end name
their language, and they categorically state that they would not call it Serbo-
Croatian or Croatian-Serbian. The element of danger that they perceive
in this designation may be because they believe that their disavowal of
Bosnian as a ‘proper’ language may be interpreted by others as a denial of
the Bosniak nation itself.
A striking feature of the responses of these last two interviewees is their

length. The two interviewees take great pains to explain their feelings about
their language. Although each could quite easily give their language as
Serbian or Bosnian respectively and thereby confirm their ethnic affilia-
tion, they obviously consider that their feelings about their mother tongue
require a more complex explanation, and they are not yet ready to swap
one designation for a completely different one. They are both attached to
the language of Serbo-Croat because it is the language of their school days
but also, at least for interviewee ZJ, it is what they consider to be a proper
standard language rather than something that they see as having been
invented, in contrast to, in their view, the Bosnian language. Interviewee
LB also stresses the artificiality of the current language designations, as they
consider it an artificial thing for a person to start calling their language by
another name after a lifetime of using another designation. Their ambiva-
lence towards using one of the official language designations may also be a
reflection of an ambivalence to wholly self-identify politically as a member
of one of the three constituent nations. Further, it may also be a reflection
of nostalgia for the pre-war state of the former Yugoslavia.
Conclusion
Since the beginning of the 1990s, elites in Bosnia-Herzegovina have made a

clear link between ethnic identity and language in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The
rise and dominance of ethnic nationalism in the country mean that separate
linguistic identities based on ethnicity have had to be created and consoli-
dated. In the process, the pre-war solution to the national question, which
necessarily contained a language element, was also swept aside. It appears that
to all intents and purposes the language of Serbo-Croat is dead. And yet the
interviews quoted above demonstrate that things are more complicated than
that. Certain inhabitants of Bosnia-Herzegovina do not automatically make
the link between their ethnic affiliation and the language they speak. They
may self-identify as a member of one of the official constituent nations,
but they do not necessarily then name their language according to the cor-
responding designation. This may be because they consider the language
planning activities of political and intellectual elites to be based on creating
artificial linguistic constructs which they do not recognize as their mother
tongue. This in turn may reflect a political preference for a language to unify
the ethnically diverse population rather than divide it, in short, a language
such as Serbo-Croat which had been meant to serve this purpose since the end
of World War II. It should be borne in mind here that Bosnia-Herzegovina was
the most ethnically mixed republic in the former Yugoslavia and its authori-
ties were arguably most alarmed by the language debates of the 1960s and
1970s that sought to disrupt the unified language. In their view, undermining
the unity of the language would have necessarily destabilized the republic.
Louise Askew 225
The cited interviews demonstrate that Serbo-Croat still has meaning for
certain members of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It might be argued
that, as interpreters and translators, the interviewees have a heightened
ethnolinguistic awareness and may therefore be more sensitive to language
issues than the vast majority of the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The data
from the PULS agency survey seem to bear this out, although the question
to be asked about the survey data is whether the respondents would have
given a different response if they had been given ‘Serbo-Croat or Croato-
Serbian’ as an option in describing their language. There are nonetheless
generations of people still living in Bosnia-Herzegovina who remember the
language situation before the most recent conflict and who have memories
of language use during their schooling. Because of this experience, they
therefore have an attachment to Serbo-Croat, which gives it more meaning
to them than any of the current three official languages.
Just as an attachment to Serbo-Croat was nurtured in the education sys-
tem until the beginning of the 1990s, post-conflict generations will develop
a loyalty to the language they are taught in schools. There is no common
curriculum throughout the state; rather, since the end of the conflict each of
the three constituent nations has developed its own curriculum suited to the
educational needs of its particular ethnic group. Accordingly, the language
of instruction in each of these curricula corresponds to one of the official
languages. With the disappearance of Serbo-Croat from the education sys-
tem it is the ethnically-based language of instruction, with its greater social
prestige, which will have more meaning for the present and future genera-
tions of school children. Serbo-Croat will finally die once these generations
have replaced the older ones and there is no one in the country who has
the memory of learning a language called Serbo-Croat in their school days.
Until that time, Serbo-Croat will still live on in the hearts and minds of at
least some Bosnians.
Notes
1. These were the EU military force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, EUFOR, and the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
2. In the 1974 Constitution, the Muslims were considered to be an ethnic rather than
a religious category.
3. There is ongoing debate as to whether the languages can be categorized as separate
standards or variants of dialects. For more on this issue, see Greenberg (2004),
Gröschel (2009) and Kordić (2010).
4. The Croatian word for coffee is kava, and the Serbian is kafa.
5. This confusion over the name may be a result of the initial dilemma among
the Bosniaks over what to call their language. A wartime decree adopted by the
Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina called the language bosanski or
Bosnian, and this designation was recognized in the Dayton Peace Agreement of
December 1995. The Serbs and Croats, however, challenge the Bosniaks’ use of
the designation ‘Bosnian’ because they claim that it denotes the speech of the
whole of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina and not just that of the Bosniaks.
According to them, therefore, this means that the Bosnians have unitaristic aspira-
tions politically as regards the state.
References
Aitchison, Jean. 1992. Language Change: Progress or Decay? 2nd edn. Cambridge:
Bugarski, Ranko. 2005. Jezik i kultura. Belgrade: Čigoja štampa.
Coulmas, Florian. 2005. Sociolinguistics: the Study of Speakers’ Choices. Cambridge:
Crystal, David. 2000. Language Death. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ford, Curtis. 2001. ‘The (Re-)Birth of Bosnian: Comparative Perspectives on Language
Planning in Bosnia-Herzegovina’. PhD thesis, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill.
Greenberg, Robert D. 2004. Language and Identity in the Balkans. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Gröschel, Bernhard. 2009. Das Serbokroatische zwischen Linguistik und Politik. Munich:
Lincom Europea.
Isaković, Alija. 1992. Rječnik karakteristične leksike u bosanskome jeziku. Sarajevo:
Svjetlost.
Kordić, Snježana. 2010. Jezik i nacionalizam. Zagreb: Durieux.
Kostić, Roland. 2007. Ambivalent Peace: External Peacebuilding, Threatened Identity and
Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Uppsala: Uppsala University.
Markowitz, Fran. 2010. Sarajevo: a Bosnian Kaleidoscope. Urbana, Chicago and
Springfield, IL: University of Illinois Press.
Monnesland, Svein. 2005. ‘Od zajedničkog standarda do trostandardne situacije’. In
Jezik u Bosni i Hercegovini, edited by Svein Monnesland: 481–524. Sarajevo: Institut
za jezik u Sarajevu.
15
Exhibiting the ‘Foreign’ in a National
Museum: Imperial War Museum
London and Languages at War
James Taylor
Imperial War Museum
Languages at War sits squarely within the mission of the Imperial War
Museum (IWM), which is to enable people to understand human behaviour
through the lens of war and conflict. Yet the policy and practice of lan-
guages in war has previously been one of a raft of issues or themes which
have been at best difficult, sometimes even ‘unsayable’, for museums, not
least the IWM. Particular historical threads might be difficult to address for
any number of reasons. We as museum professionals might fear that our
audiences will not be interested in them. They might, say, prick the bubble
of national myth and ‘heritage’ or be politically controversial. On a practical
level, they might be difficult to render in a museum display because the evi-
dence for them is unappetizing for museum audiences – not least a display of
documents in an unfamiliar, foreign language. Some subjects might demand
the use of disturbing imagery. Indeed, we might not even have any material
in the collections to deliver certain challenging narratives. Our hugely suc-
cessful partnership with the Universities of Reading and Southampton has
naturally led us to think of how we deal with our own practice as regards
foreign languages and cultures in an exhibition environment and how we
might exploit further the richness and diversity of our collections. This
has become an imperative as we embark upon a major redevelopment pro-
gramme, Regeneration: Imperial War Museum London, the first phase of which
will see a new World War I gallery for the centenary of the outbreak of the
Great War in 2014. This chapter will show how the IWM’s approach to deal-
ing with languages and ‘foreignness’ has evolved in the course of its history
and how Languages at War has opened up new ways of thinking for us as we
strive both to engage and challenge future audiences.
The IWM was created during World War I as ‘a lasting memorial of com-
mon effort and common sacrifice . . . and an inspiration for future gen-
erations’ (IWM Third Annual Report: 3). Conceived in 1917 – when Allied
victory was by no means certain – the Museum’s terms of reference were not
intended or expected to go beyond the ‘Great War’. The new Museum was
227
to record the ‘immeasurable sacrifices and supreme national effort which

not only saved the Country from dire catastrophe, but, as we all hope, laid
firm and deep foundations of a better world’( IWM Third Annual Report: 3).
Less than twenty years later, with another world war looming, the Museum’s
Twenty-First Annual Report lamented that the institution created to make an
historical record of the war ‘that was to end war’ was faced with covering
‘a series of world wars, each more terrible than the last’. Indeed, the IWM
has now grown to be Britain’s national museum of conflict, and its terms of
reference now cover all wars involving British and Commonwealth forces
from World War I to date.
The IWM was always meant to show the familiar, not the ‘foreign’, so
by extension foreign-language materials have been absent or at best only
lightly interpreted. Instead, the IWM’s displays have, in the past, relied
upon audience recognition for their relevance and impact. The galleries at
IWM London were built for veterans in the broadest sense. By ‘veteran’ here
is understood anyone, soldier or civilian, who experienced World War I or
subsequent conflicts on either the fighting fronts or the home front and
who would bring with them their own memories. At the IWM’s opening
event in 1920, the Chairman, Sir Alfred Mond, stated: ‘It is hoped to make it
so complete that every individual, man or woman, sailor, soldier, airman or
civilian who contributed, however obscurely . . . may be able to find in these
galleries an example or illustration of the sacrifice he made or the work he
did . . .’ (IWM 1920: 2). The galleries underwent a major redevelopment in
1989, yet the philosophy of display outlined by Sir Alfred Mond continued
to drive the IWM’s interpretation. And with reason. Even twenty years ago,
a significant constituency of IWM visitors still had, through direct experi-
ence or folk memory, a visual understanding of the material culture of twen-
tieth-century conflict. The IWM could be confident, then, that they would
come to the Museum equipped with at least some knowledge and would
revisit their wartime experiences. They would select and interpret items for
their families and friends which had meaning for them. They would give
voice to the objects – ‘this is the type of rifle I fired, you fired it like this . . .’
or ‘this was the type of ration card our family used, you tore off those cou-
pons and gave them to the grocer’. This reliance upon the familiar (although
even an item once so commonplace as a ration book has now become a
curio) has, by extension, largely precluded engagement with ‘the other’, not
least in how we deal with foreign languages and cultures in war.
Given the Museum’s remit, it is scarcely surprising that the majority of
the Museum’s collections are of British and Commonwealth origin. Where
an object’s meaning relies upon language, that language is usually English.
And English-language material can, of course, reveal much about linguistic
and cultural encounters in war. Indeed, personal accounts of the experience
of being the occupier, fighting in another country and interrogation reports
have formed the basis of papers given at Languages at War workshops and
James Taylor 229
conferences. The Languages at War team not only explored the Museum’s
collections, it added to them, and we are now the custodian of interviews
conducted by Dr Catherine Baker of the University of Southampton that
investigate the policies and practice of language encounters in peace opera-
tions in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1995 (the end of the war) and 2000.1
The IWM’s collections are what makes it unique. They are the engine of
the museum, not only in their breadth and depth but in the way that they
have come to us and what they can tell us about war and human behaviour.
The IWM now holds some 170,000 three-dimensional exhibits, ranging
from larger pieces such as tanks, aircraft and artillery pieces down to uniform
items and children’s toys and ephemera. It also holds over 15,000 sets of pri-
vate papers, letters and diaries, approximately 270,000 printed items rang-
ing from monographs to ration cards, more than ten million photographs,
11,000 hours of film and 56,000 hours of historical sound recordings. To
many people’s surprise, the IWM has the second largest collection of twen-
tieth-century British art anywhere in the world, an exceptional collection
of art and graphic design of 19,000 paintings, drawings and sculptures and
15,000 posters. By and large, the material in the collection is not the work
of a select few great men and women, nor is it based upon the once-private
collection of a wealthy individual. It is far more democratic than that. Large
parts of it are made up of memories and possessions that ordinary people
have given to the IWM so that their experience of war, or that of their fam-
ily, can be passed on to future generations. So, in physical terms much of the
IWM’s collection is made up of the intensely personal, such as the diaries
or letters, or small trinkets, items which were mass-produced but have held
huge personal significance to previous owners. It is through these ‘ordinary’
objects that the IWM delivers its key messages and tells the story of ordinary
people in exceptional times, the sacrifices they made and the dilemmas they
faced. Their value lies not in their intrinsic beauty or monetary worth but in
their historical value, what they tell us about our past. What marks out the
IWM is that it is also a museum of narratives – rarely can an item stand on
its own merit. Interpretation and context are crucial if these are not just to
be dead relics. What matters about the objects are the stories behind each
of them – how it was made, by whom and when, why and how it was used.
The onus is upon the historians and curators at the IWM to explore each
object’s biography, to make what might otherwise seem at first sight dull,
everyday items – a spoon, a faded photograph or a letter – come alive in our
displays.
A significant proportion of the collections relies upon a foreign-language
element for meaning. Such objects – chiefly documents, posters, proclama-
tions, printed materials and film – usually have their origin in countries
allied to Britain in time of war, in countries against which Britain has fought
or in neutral states. They range from thousands of World War I posters and
proclamations collected from across Europe by a far-sighted curator, through
Nazi propaganda material, to identity cards from the Krakow Ghetto. Some
of the foreign-language material in the IWM’s holdings was produced by the
Allies for the consumption of foreign nationals, such as an extraordinary
collection of black propaganda, aerial leaflets dropped over Japanese and
Nazi-occupied territory and German-language newsreels produced by the
British occupation administration in Germany after 1945.
So how do foreign languages and the ‘foreign’ culture find expression today
in IWM London? One enters the museum to be met in the Atrium, with its
extraordinary, powerful display of large objects. These are chiefly armoured
fighting vehicles, aircraft and artillery, although we also show some surpris-
ing civilian pieces – a Dunkirk ‘Little Ship’, a World War I London bus and a
small air-raid shelter for Civil Defence personnel. There is a fair sprinkling of
‘foreign’ objects in this display, among them a German Jagdpanther assault
gun, a Heinkel 162 jet fighter and a one-man Biber submarine. With all
objects in the Atrium, the extended captions focus upon their technologi-
cal qualities and destructive power. Their human and cultural associations
or ‘foreignness’ take second place, if interpreted at all. I often start tours
for visitors with the French ‘75’ field gun. The Soixante Quinze exerted an
extraordinary hold on the French military and public imagination during
World War I. It was elevated to cult status following the French victory on
the Marne in 1914, so much so that it was celebrated on posters and in song
and verse. So iconic did this weapon become, it could be seen as the ‘French
Spitfire’ (conveniently for the gallery tours, a Spitfire hangs nearby to enable
me to make precisely that link). This extraordinary piece of technology can
also be seen as the catalyst for trench warfare. Its rate of fire took a devastat-
ing toll of troops in the open and forced the Germans to ‘dig in’, thereby
setting the pattern on the Western Front for four years. Few of our visitors
have any notion that France suffered many more casualties than Britain
during World War I, and this is the first chance to begin gently to overturn
prejudice and preconceptions of history. But while associations such as
this can be highlighted on tours and on the optional multimedia guides,
caption boards demand economy of words and preclude multi-stranded
interpretations.
One exits the Atrium and descends into the labyrinthine First World War,
Second World War and Conflicts Since 1945 exhibition spaces. It is here that
the interpretive philosophy which relies upon memory is most apparent. To
reach the broadest range of audience and thereby facilitate memory meant
displaying as many objects as possible. This explains the large showcases
crammed with exhibits – uniforms, equipment, small arms, letters, diaries
and photographs. Few of the captions, which are largely typological, extend
beyond 25 words: ‘Stokes 3-inch (7.62mm) light trench mortar’ or ‘British
artillery No. 7 dial sight’. Again, these short captions thereby preclude
engagement with any multiple meaning, be it language or any other, for
today’s visitor. On a survey of the First World War space, I found documents
James Taylor 231
in nine languages other than English spread through the display. One con-
fronts foreign languages in the very first showcase in the First World War
display. Two mobilization posters show the captioning technique for for-
eign-language material. Either the language of the headline text is translated
into English, as with a ‘French army and Navy General Mobilization Order’
(‘Armée de Terre et Armée de Mer: Ordre de Mobilisation Générale’) or the
object is simply described, as in the case of the ‘German poster lampoon-
ing the national characteristics of European countries in 1914’, the actual
title of which is ‘Humoristische Karte von Europa im Jahre 1914’. For those
whose language ability is confined to English, any body text for these and
other foreign-language materials, together with any cultural associations,
must remain a mystery. Some ‘foreign’ objects, such as Prussian eagles,
Iron Crosses or Biersteine, confirm their origin not with words but through
cultural identity or iconography and might resonate with visitors – the
foreign as familiar. Yet the war as experienced by ‘others’ is largely lacking.
All foreign-language documents in the displays are official or semi-official.
None are personal letters and diaries, and our visitors are denied a com-
parative look at, say, the trench experience of British, French and German
soldiers on the Western Front. Perhaps the greatest opportunity to look
at language and cultural encounters would have been in the showcase on
prisoners and the German occupation of areas of France and Belgium. That
this apparent opportunity was not taken highlights a major issue which
confronted my predecessors in a very different, analogue age of museum dis-
play where digital technology was not an option. We know that displays of
row upon row of documents – even the most powerful, personal letters – are
very off-putting for visitors. Add lengthy captions, be they translations or
otherwise, and the burden becomes even greater. Do this with a collection of
foreign-language documents which they cannot read and you have lost your
audience. But, for our new galleries in 2014, digital technology will allow
us to do two things. We can give visitors choices, any number of interpre-
tational strands and layers around any given object or collection of objects
which they are free to explore. It also means we can take foreign-language
material and overlay translation and interpretation.
The IWM’s continued and increasing popularity – in 2009–10, the IWM’s
five branches received more than two million visitors – has always relied
upon the organization’s ability and willingness to change. And the IWM has
evolved to moving beyond what is familiar. Without doubt the greatest leap
forward in the museum’s thinking and approach came with the permanent
Holocaust Exhibition, which opened in 2000. The Holocaust Exhibition took
the IWM into challenging territory, tackling difficult and demanding his-
tory in a way that makes people think and even changes them. The very idea
of creating an exhibition on the Nazi persecution and murder of Europe’s
Jews was a departure. It meant that the IWM had undertaken a commitment
to address a subject which was controversial in itself and, crucially, that it
could not lean on public memory and nostalgia. The exhibition heralded
the switch from the typological school of display to exhibitions led by clear
narratives and fed by multiple perspectives. It placed human stories at the
centre of the story, not at the periphery. The exhibition made a very strong
feature of taking twelve Holocaust survivors, all of them now living in the
UK, and weaving their experiences throughout the display. The introductory
space shows these survivors – Polish, German, Austrian and Czech – talking
in English about their childhood or young adulthood. One immediately
knows that this is different to other galleries. The survivors’ accents tell us
that their early lives were not spent in the UK and that English is not their
mother tongue. They will act as guides, helping the visitor navigate through
an extraordinarily difficult episode of history.
The Holocaust Exhibition presented very practical challenges for the
Museum. Firstly, almost all of the documentary evidence was in foreign lan-
guages. We had to invoke unfamiliar, sometimes unpronounceable places,
such as Celldömölk (Hungary) or Ostrowiec Swietokrzyski (Poland), and
words which also conveyed difficult and horrific concepts – Einsatzgruppen
(SS ‘action groups’ or killing squads), or Aufräumungskommando (the pris-
oner detail at Auschwitz forced to help unload trains of deportees). Rather
than crowding the showcases, as was previous practice, we gave the objects
space to ‘speak’. Visitors soon come to realize that each document, while in
a language which might be foreign to them, tells an extraordinarily power-
ful story. The Museum’s English-language text and captions, the authorial
voice, helps them to draw meaning.
The main language of the display, in terms of exhibits, is German, both as
the main language of the perpetrators and the language imposed upon Jews
and other groups in ghettos and concentration camps. One is immediately
met by an area on the rise of the Nazi Party. It contains election posters,
a copy of Mein Kampf and the photograph album of an SA paramilitary to
which he has added captions in German. The first German one hears is an
audiovisual presentation at the beginning of the exhibition which features
speeches by Adolf Hitler and the Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels
and SA men chanting antisemitic slogans during the 1 April 1933 boycott of
Jewish businesses. These are translated. In a further audiovisual display, we
see Goebbels vowing in a 1936 speech to remove Jews from German cultural
life. One particularly powerful document is a small handbill, in which an
inhabitant of the Lodz ghetto offers to ‘write your letters, postcards, peti-
tions in German, quickly and cheaply’ (‘Ich schreibe Ihre Briefe, Postkarten,
Bittschriften in deutscher Sprache schnell und billig’). Any correspondence
sent out of the ghettos had to be written in German for censorship purposes,
although much of the post was never delivered. The Holocaust Exhibition
was the first in which we explicitly addressed the issue of language, show-
ing how it could be a matter of life and death. In an audio presentation,
a number of survivors talk about how important it was to understand
James Taylor 233
German, the official language of the concentration camps, to avoid a beat-

ing or worse. And, as the survivors attest, the camps evolved their own
prisoner slang – much of it derived from German and Austrian criminals in
the pre-war camp system.2 We give a listing of twenty-five words, with trans-
lation and provenance. At Mauthausen, Hackfleisch or minced meat was the
word universally used for a badly-beaten prisoner. At the same camp, the
clubs used to beat prisoners were called Dolmetscher or translators, because
they were used by the guards to convey orders. And we show how the Nazis
twisted German to create a perverse language of deception, using words
such as Umsiedlung (‘Resettlement’) and Endlösung (‘Final Solution’) to refer
to the deportation and ultimately the genocide of Europe’s Jews. Within the
limitations of exhibition technology as it stood ten years ago, the subject
of language therefore became one of the many threads of the exhibition.
It would open our eyes to the possibilities offered by collaboration on the
Languages at War project.
Another project, Their Past Your Future (TPYF), would further open up
the Museum’s understanding of itself, its subject, its collections and the
possibilities inherent in the study of languages, cultural confrontation and
dialogue. Its director, Sam Heywood, would become the driving force in
establishing our partnership with Languages at War. TPYF, which began in
2004, was an extraordinary learning project. It pioneered an entirely new
approach to intergenerational, immersive learning which took young peo-
ple out of their customary, familiar learning environment and offered them
fresh, dynamic and ‘foreign’ approaches to history. One of TPYF’s key ele-
ments was the commemorative visits on which we took school students to
historic sites across the world, to France, Belgium, Italy, Poland, Germany
and even as far as Thailand and Japan. Students would look at historical
events and British involvement in those events through the prism of foreign
cultures and sites of memory. Before and during each visit, the students
would examine relevant areas of the Museum’s collections and speak with
those who had taken part in or witnessed the events we were to investigate.
In the case of Japan, the students met, for example, a British former prisoner
of the Japanese, a member of the Japanese ‘Gestapo’, the Kempeitai, and a
man injured by the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. At each historic
site, museum or memorial, we would together draw out its significance and
meaning and look at wider questions of memory and identity, culture and
language. We asked questions of the students which we could not always
answer. One of the areas we explored on a visit to Hiroshima was whether or
not the dropping of the atomic bombs might actually have saved lives, both
Allied and Japanese, by preventing the potentially enormous casualties on
both sides that an invasion of the Japanese home islands might have caused.
This was not an easy subject to tackle when surrounded by highly emotive
evidence of the destruction and suffering wrought by the Hiroshima atomic
bomb.
Languages at War was, then, a natural progression for the IWM. The IWM’s
association with the project goes back to early 2007, when Sam Heywood
and I gave, at the invitation of Professor Hilary Foottitt, short papers at the
University of Reading for an informal workshop. That initial contact was
the spark, and since then the project, formally established in May 2008,
has gone from strength to strength under the stewardship of Hilary and
Professor Mike Kelly of the University of Southampton. The real value of
Languages at War has been to get us to ask questions of ourselves as museum
professionals, to look afresh at what stories our collections can tells us and
to interpret them for our audiences. We will use what we have learned to
inform Regeneration: IWM London, the most important milestone in the his-
tory of the Museum since it first opened to the public in 1920. The first stage
of Regeneration will involve the opening of new First World War galleries in
2014. This will be an opportunity to completely re-examine and redirect
our historical approaches to a conflict which, for British people particularly,
is subject to more mythology and misconception than any other. We will
look beyond the standard, Anglocentric interpretation, which is confined
to Britain’s role on the Western Front, ‘Lions Led by Donkeys’, mud, poetry
and poppies. We will create a new framework for understanding the First
World War, looking at the conflict from different perspectives, something
Languages at War has given us the confidence to do. The First World War was
above all a clash of nations and the cultures through which they defined
and expressed themselves. The burning of the university library at Louvain
in August 1914 was a deliberate act of cultural destruction. We can explore
surprising stories with our visitors and show what happened when hostile
cultures met and entered a dialogue. The 1914 Christmas Truce will be well
known to many visitors, but how many will be aware that certain sectors of
the line on the Western Front were ‘quiet’ because an unofficial ‘Live and
Let Live’ system was arranged and maintained through regular communica-
tion by the men in the trenches on both sides? What was the human expe-
rience of prisoners of war, of occupation? How did British troops mix with
French civilians? What was the experience of Indian troops on the Western
Front? Why did orders for the Austro-Hungarian army at the 1914–15
siege of Przemysl have to be issued in fifteen languages? Languages at War
has affirmed for us that ‘languages’ do not just mean mere grammar and
vocabulary – they mean dialogue, exchange, often confrontation, subjects
which our visitors find fascinating and which our collections can support
and deliver powerfully. And today we have mobile and digital technology
which our predecessors at the Museum lacked. Our visitors come for a
unique experience. We want them to leave with new perspectives.
Languages at War has placed firmly on the IWM’s agenda new ways of
exploring and thinking its collections from new perspectives. It has added
to our collections, it has added new interpretations to our collections and it
has made us think about how we work towards our gallery redevelopment.
James Taylor 235
The chapters in this book, as well as the papers given at Languages at War
workshops, show just how rich and valuable a seam of research we have
been engaged in. The Languages at War network will ensure that we continue
to explore and exploit the IWM’s collections and that partners will continue
to share research and ideas. Languages at War has been groundbreaking for
the Imperial War Museum. It has show that collaboration between the IWM
and academic institutions can work in a highly effective manner. Each part-
ner has shared knowledge, skills and experience which has benefited the
others. And, ultimately, the IWM’s public will benefit as well.
Notes
1. See Baker, this volume.
2. See Mac Giolla Chríost, this volume, on prisoners and language, and Kujamäki,
this volume, on German POW camps in Finland.
Reference
Imperial War Museum. 1920. Third Annual Report of the Imperial War Museum 1919–
1920. London: HMSO.
Conclusion: Communication,
Identity and Representation
Through Languages in War
Michael Kelly
University of Southampton
Traditionally, linguists and philosophers have seen the primary purpose of

language as being representation and communication. Language is what
enables people to articulate things, ideas and attitudes in an intelligible
form and to transmit the results to other people. More recently, linguists
have recognized the importance of language in identities. Language enables
us to express who we think we are and how we are connected with other
people. The three functions of representation, communication and identity
are intimately interwoven, and in each case language is the main means by
which human beings carry out the crucial tasks of developing their under-
standing of the world, communicating with each other and negotiating
their own place within it ( Joseph 2004). When these tasks are undertaken
between members of different language communities, the balance between
communication, representation and identity becomes both more complex
and more critical to the outcomes of interaction.
In situations of conflict, the outcomes of language interactions can be a
matter of life and death. Language differences subtend almost every aspect
of the military experience. They must be taken into account in the organi-
zation of forces to engage in action, they play a key role in the encounter
with combatants and non-combatants in the theatre of war, and they are
important factors in negotiating the aftermath of conflict. No doubt this has
been true since the wars of antiquity, but this volume confirms the truth of
it in a variety of conflicts since the eighteenth century.
Very often, the difficulties arising from language differences have been
ascribed to the ‘fog of war’. As Clausewitz observed:
War is the province of uncertainty: three fourths of those things upon

which action in War must be calculated, are hidden more or less in the
clouds of great uncertainty. (von Clausewitz 1968: 140)
Languages are a cloud of this sort, which can to a significant degree be

attenuated by adequate preparation and effective measures on the ground.
236
Michael Kelly 237
But the complexity of language functions means that efforts to attenuate

the problems that arise must take account not only of communication
but also of representation and identity. The chapters in this volume have
demonstrated the importance of that complexity in quite different mili-
tary contexts, from Napoleon’s Grande Armée to the conflicts of the early
twenty-first century.
The volume deals with three main stages of conflict, each of which is
dominated by a different function. The stage of preparing and organizing
military forces is dominated by concerns for communication, enabling con-
tingents to liaise with one another and equipping at least some personnel as
specialist linguists. The stage of engagement, with combatants and civilian
populations on the ground, is dominated by issues of identity, establishing
working relationships within and between groups speaking different lan-
guages. And the post-conflict stage is dominated by representation, trying to
remember and understand what has happened and to mediate understand-
ings to others.
Communication within armies
It is by no means a new phenomenon that armies deployed in conflict

are composed of different ethnic and linguistic groups. Christopher Tozzi
points out the extraordinary linguistic diversity of the French armies of the
eighteenth century. The French troops themselves spoke many local dia-
lects and several foreign languages that had little in common with French,
including German, Italian, Catalan, Flemish and Breton. Added to that were
the large numbers of foreigners enlisted in the French army, whether in
designated foreign regiments, which made up one-fifth of the army, or scat-
tered through other regiments. The Jacobins’ attempts to impose linguistic
and ethnic homogeneity on the army proved largely fruitless in practice,
and Napoleon subsequently took a more pragmatic approach to language,
justified by the fact that his Grande Armée was only 52 per cent French by
nationality. Sylvie Kleinman offers some key insights into how this worked
out in practice in the case of the Irish contingents fighting with the French
at this period.
Even where national armies are less diverse, it has been a common
experience that they are deployed alongside other forces and required to
communicate with them. Franziska Heimburger outlines the experience of
Franco-British cooperation during the First World War, where dealing with
this language pair was well within the capacity of the forces on both sides, at
least at officer level. By contrast, Pekka Kujamäki’s study of German–Finnish
cooperation during the Second World War highlights the great difficulties
in meeting the needs of communication between the two languages con-
cerned. There are many other historical examples, including recent multi-
national actions from Bosnia-Herzegovina to Libya, in which coalitions of
forces from different countries have acted together. These cases confirm
Justin Lewis’s contention that ‘each instance is unique’. Each conflict has
its own specific requirements for language preparation and poses different
issues for military planners.
The key asset in managing linguistically diverse forces is undoubtedly the
availability of multilingual personnel, particularly at officer level. A limited
knowledge of a foreign language may be a good start, but it will probably
require hard work, as Wolfe Tone found out, to raise the individual’s compe-
tence to the level needed to carry out the job. It may be easier to locate peo-
ple with a basic knowledge of a language pair such as French and English,
but in the contemporary period the range of language pairs required is more
difficult to provide and may be entirely unpredictable. The approach of the
UK’s Defence Operational Language Support Unit recognizes the need to
motivate and incentivize potential military linguists and to provide signifi-
cant training opportunities, at least in those languages for which there is an
identified current requirement.
The role of military linguists clearly diverges from the model of the profes-
sional civilian translator or interpreter, which carries duties of neutrality in
managing communications between languages. On the contrary, the mili-
tary linguist has a characteristically broad remit, in which language media-
tion may be an intermittent part. On the one hand, they have military
obligations, which may often be more important than their language duties,
and on the other hand, their linguistic obligations include a duty to further
the aims of the military unit in which they are serving. At one end of this
spectrum are the polyglot officers in Napoleon’s Grande Armée, who needed
their language skills to maintain discipline and to pass on orders in a way
that was understood by their troops. At the other end of the spectrum are
enterprising individuals such as Wolfe Tone and Joseph Stock, who carved
out roles for themselves as fixers, facilitators and cultural consultants work-
ing between units of different languages.
In the middle of the spectrum of roles lie liaison officers and military
interpreters. They include people like the Finnish officers working with
German forces in Northern Finland to ensure adequate communications
between two armies and at the same time working to protect the local popu-
lations from misunderstandings. They also include the military interpreters
whom Lewis describes as the ‘cousins’ of civilian interpreters. In these cases,
language mediation is a central part of their job, but it is integrated into a
wider role of mediation and liaison, both between forces and with civilian
populations.
It is a recurrent constraint that all but the most multilingual forces strug-
gle to achieve sufficient capacity for adequate communication between
forces of different nationalities. But just as constraining is the need for
expertise in discovering what opposing forces are thinking and doing.
Whether it is a matter of understanding documents and transmissions or
Michael Kelly 239
whether it involves engaging individuals in interviews and interrogations,

language expertise is a fundamental requirement. As a result, armies cannot
dispense with the services of civilians. They may be locally-recruited civil-
ians such as Bishop Stock of Killalla, who gained ‘full employment as an
interpreter’ with General Humbert during the Year of the French, 1798. They
may be exiles like Nicholas Madgett, who served the French Minister for
External Relations effectively. Or they could even be bilingual prisoners of
war, such as were used in Finland. In more recent conflicts, the use of civil-
ians has become a recognized necessity, systematized as Lewis describes into
‘contractors’, engaged from outside the conflict zone to provide language
services for the military, and ‘locally-employed civilians’, recruited on the
ground ad hoc to assist forces in the conflict zone.
Language capacity is therefore fundamental to ensuring adequate com-
munication in conflict. It is crucial to liaison between the forces engaged
in conflict and to intelligence about the conditions they face. In this sense,
language is one of the sinews of war, a key communication service required
to sustain armed forces in active engagement. Reflecting on the cases dis-
cussed in this volume, it is clear that the communicative role of language is
inseparable from two other dimensions of language: identity and represen-
tation. The military and civilian linguists bring with them a portfolio of loy-
alties and attachments as well as distinct ways of seeing the world. Both of
these dimensions inflect communication, adding further levels of meaning
and reshaping meanings in the process of transmission. These dimensions
will be discussed in detail in the following sections.
In the meantime, reflecting on the communicative roles that are carried
out by linguists, it is clear that dispelling the linguistic fog of war requires
many different solutions. Often enough, commanders seize at whatever
resources they can find, which may include the skills of their military per-
sonnel or the expertise of local people, whether it be the bishop or prison-
ers of war. Where the solutions have been effectively addressed by military
planners, commanders are better equipped but must still reckon with the
impossibility of foreseeing all the eventualities.
Meeting ‘the Other’
Philosophers have long known that language is the ‘root of humanity’,

drawing isolated individuals out of themselves and linking them with other
people (Peters 1997). The corollary of this is that language is the fundamen-
tal mode of encounter with ‘the Other’. What is true of individuals within
their home language community is all the more true of different groups
coming into contact with one another. The lack of a shared language is
often the first point of encounter, and language becomes the mark of the
Other. In this way, the otherness of language is a fundamental dimension of
encounters in conflict. Meetings with combatants or civilians in the theatre
of conflict are marked by a language difference which not only hampers

communication but also highlights the different identities of the partici-
pants. Confronted by the mark of the Other, participants in a conflict may
choose to accentuate the language difference or seek ways of attenuating
it. In either case, their choices are an integral part of the relationships they
establish, whether hostile, friendly or neutral.
At the hostile end of this spectrum, language can be used as a weapon.
Petra Svoljšak, for example, shows how language was used as a tool by the
Italian forces occupying Slovenia in 1915. As well as imposing Italian as the
official language for administration and education, they gave Italian names
to Slovenian people and places. This was the basis of a long term strategy
of Italianization, much as Brian Friel showed the colonizing English troops
renaming rural Ireland in his play Translations (Friel 1981). Conversely,
Diarmait Mac Giolla Chríost shows how Irish Republican prisoners used the
Irish language as a tool for resistance against the British authorities from the
early 1970s. Their unique form of Gaelic, dubbed ‘Jailic’, not only created a
distinct sociolinguistic enclave but also had longer term implications for the
development of the Irish language.
At the ‘friendly’ end of the spectrum of language contact, language can
play a role in facilitating relationships and in making peace. Simona Tobia
outlines the crucial importance of competent linguists in dealings with
the large numbers of refugees and displaced persons during the Second
World War, many of whom had valuable information to share. Catherine
Baker points to the importance of local interpreters in creating productive
relations between the NATO forces and the local population in Bosnia-
Herzegovina during the 1990s.
However, even where the aim of language contact is mutually benefi-
cial, there remains a constant ambiguity in the role of the linguist. María
Manuela Fernández Sánchez shows this in the case of interpreters in the
negotiations which brought an end to the Korean War, where contradictory
demands and requirements were put on them. It is an intrinsic part of what
Michael Cronin (2002: 52) calls the ‘material history of interpreting’ that
those involved have multiple roles and hybrid identities and as a result may
have conflicting personal feelings about their roles.
In many cases, the ambiguous position of interpreters may place them at
personal risk. Linda Fitchett points out that in recent conflicts like Iraq and
Afghanistan, locally-employed interpreters have been exposed to danger on
a daily basis, and have no guaranteed personal or professional future at the
end of the conflict. Often regarded as traitors by their own communities,
they are dependent on the uncertain gratitude of their foreign employer,
who in turn may regard them with a degree of suspicion. In calling for a
neutral, professional status, Fitchett also recognizes that for the foreseeable
future such interpreters and ‘fixers’ will need better protection by their
employers.
Michael Kelly 241
The lesson to be drawn is that language is never just a neutral vector for
communication but is always embodied, and it mobilizes identities, which
are often complex. Some sense of this complexity may be gained by locat-
ing linguists within Roman Jakobson’s classic model of the six functions of
language (Jakobson 1960). According to Jakobson, every communication
has a context, a sender, a receiver, a channel of contact, a common code
and a message. At the simplest level, an interpreter or translator serves as a
key point in the channel of communication, ensuring that the message is
successfully transmitted. However, they are also an intermediary by whom
the message is first received and then re-sent, placing them in the position
of an implicit receiver and sender themselves. They are certainly a part of
the context of communication, whether visible or not, and they are cus-
todians of at least two distinct codes in the form of the pair of languages
with which they are working. Finally, they control the message. If they are
neutral, they will strive to achieve fidelity between the message sent and the
message finally delivered, but in other cases they may reshape the message
according to their own judgement. In summary, the linguist is present in
every dimension of language activity, weaving her or his own identity into
every aspect of communication.
Mediating and remembering
When conflicts have ended, languages continue to play a role in the area of
representation, affecting the cognitive and emotional capability of people to
mediate and remember events in the post-conflict world. Every language is
a code, and every code brings with it a particular way of representing mean-
ing. It is not necessary to be a radical advocate of the Sapir–Whorf hypoth-
esis to agree that ‘an intellectual system embodied in each language shapes
the thought of its speakers’ (Kay and Kempton 1984: 66). The fact that
language contributes to structuring the way people understand the world
means that language plays a large role in the way conflicts are subsequently
represented and remembered. It also means that the role of language itself
becomes an issue in the post-conflict world.
In this perspective, language learning may play an important part in
rebuilding societies and relationships. A clear case in point is discussed
by Peter Hare and Nicholas Fletcher, who outline the British Council’s
Peacekeeping English Project, which has been designed to support media-
tion and peace building in the aftermath of conflict situations. Using case
studies from Mongolia, Ethiopia and Afghanistan, they show that language
learning improves the ability of different forces to communicate and work
together in peace support operations. They also argue that language projects
of this type might help to defuse global conflict and tension.
Conflicts leave their mark on the way particular languages are regarded.
Constadina Charalambous demonstrates this vividly through recent
initiatives in Cyprus to teach Turkish to Greek-speaking students. The

conflicts on that island and their long-running aftermath make these initia-
tives potentially important in contributing to intercultural understanding
and mediation. But teachers of Turkish are challenged by prevailing nega-
tive stereotypes, and their students have frequently been called traitors for
choosing to learn Turkish. In a more encouraging perspective, Louise Askew
reports on a post-war move away from the linguistic antagonisms of the
conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is popularly supposed that the language of
Serbo-Croat is now effectively dead, replaced by the three official languages
of the post-war state: Bosnian, Croatian or Serbian. However, she finds evi-
dence that, far from being dead in the post-conflict period, Serbo-Croat still
continues to retain real meaning for many members of the population of
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
James Taylor suggests that traditionally the role of foreign languages in
war has largely been invisible to the general public who visit museums and
exhibitions concerned with conflict. Speaking on behalf of the Imperial War
Museum, he examines the context in which the foreignness of war could
be expressed and explores the development of the Museum’s approach to
this ‘unsayable’ of war through its more recent activities like the Holocaust
exhibition and the ‘Their Past Your Future’ project. He suggests that the
Languages at War project has brought to the Museum a stronger awareness of
foreign languages, which may enable the previously ‘unsayable’ to be made
both visible and audible.
Three dimensions of languages in conflict
All conflicts, like all other human activities, are fundamentally conducted in
and through language. In most cases, conflict involves interactions between
groups with different language backgrounds. This volume has examined a
wide variety of cases where the contact between languages has had a sig-
nificant impact on the way in which conflict and its aftermath have been
conducted. The impact is felt in three key dimensions of language: its func-
tion of enabling or impeding communication, its function of conveying
and negotiating social identities, and its function of shaping the way people
represent the world to themselves and to each other, including the way they
think about language itself.
Each of the three dimensions appears to dominate in different phases
of conflict, although in reality they are interwoven in practical day-to-day
experience. The preparation and organization of conflict requires particular
attention to communication. However, it is evident that organization must
also take account of the identities of different participants in a single army
or coalition of forces and is structured by particular understandings that
are integral to particular languages. The conduct of conflict on the ground
requires close attention to the identities expressed in language. But it is
Michael Kelly 243
also clear that communication and shared cognitive frameworks are major
requirements of operations. And, similarly, the aftermath of war is domi-
nated by the need to represent conflicts through language and to reflect
on how language structures an understanding of conflicts. However, the
post-conflict world also requires effective communication and a grasp of the
identities embedded in language.
As the essays in this volume suggest, a focus on languages is a relatively
new way of looking at conflicts. No doubt the increasingly multilingual
nature of society and therefore of military forces has served to exert a pres-
sure on the military to address this issue. But it is clear from many cases
studied that the issues are long-standing, and they are only now being
brought to the attention of scholars. It may be hoped that the studies pre-
sented here will both provide insights into the role of languages in conflict
and also encourage scholars to examine other conflicts in the perspective
of the linguistic issues involved. The editors also hope that the insights
provided by contributors to this volume will help military planners, civil-
ian agencies, museums and the media to understand the complex linguistic
dimensions of conflict and peace operations.
References
Turn in Interpreting Studies’. In Translation and Power, edited by Maria Tymoczko
and Edwin Gentzler: 45–62. Amherst and Boston: University of Massachusetts
Press.
Friel, Brian. 1981. Translations. London and Boston: Faber & Faber.
Jakobson, Roman. 1960. ‘Linguistics and Poetics’. In Style in Language, edited by
Thomas A. Sebeok. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Joseph, John Earl. 2004. Language and Identity: National, Ethnic, Religious. Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Kay, Paul, and Willett Kempton. 1984. ‘What is the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis?’
American Anthropologist 86 (1): 65–79.
Peters, John Durham. 1997. ‘“The Root of Humanity”: Hegel on Language and
Communication’. In Figuring the Self: Subject, Absolute and Others in Classical German
Philosophy, edited by David E. Klemm and Gunter Zoller. New York: State University
of New York Press.
Von Clausewitz, Carl. 1968. On War. London: Penguin.
Index
Afghanistan 107, 203, 215, 241 Congo, Democratic Republic of 203

war in 9, 66, 177, 208–9 Corsica 71
see also War on Terror Cronin, Michael 88, 95, 96, 97, 241
Algeria 48–9, 53, 54 Cuba 204
alliances 10 cultural studies 1, 3
organization of 4, 6 culture
working languages 9, 47, 237: value authenticity 106
of 26, 48, 202 intercultural awareness 9, 41, 67, 68,
Arabic 20, 219 132, 141, 144, 182, 186, 190, 196–7:
archives 2, 50 lack of 107–8
material 228
Banja Luka 3, 100, 101, 102, 105, 106, military policy regarding 58, 59, 61,
109, 110, 111, 112, 113 67
Barkawi, Tarak 5 national 16, 70, 71–2, 79, 83, 125,
bilingualism 6, 19–20, 25, 33, 41, 77, 165, 170–1, 187, 188, 234
93, 116, 124, 197–8 object of study 1, 169
Bosnia-Herzegovina training on 41, 61–3, 112
conflict in 1, 5, 229 uniformity of 5–6, 21, 103
interpreters 2, 7–8, 100–14 passim see also ethnicity; identity; language;
language politics 9–10, 217–26 translation
passim, 242 Cyprus
Botswana 204 conflict in 1, 4, 5, 187–8
Breton 13 languages and 9, 186–201 passim,
British Council 5, 202 242
Peacekeeping English Project 9,
202–16 passim, 241 Danish 15
Bureau for International Language Dari 65
Coordination (NATO) 59 Defence Operational Languages
Burundi 204, 209 Support Unit 6–7, 58–69 passim,
238
capital, cultural 8, 113 Defence School of Languages 59, 61,
Caribbean, the 37 64–5, 106
Catalan 13 Defense Language Institute (USA)
China 104, 124, 204, 212, 213 204–8
Chinese 117, 120–1, 122, 127 Department of International
civil affairs 39, 72 Development (UK) 202, 204
civilian–military encounters 6, 7, 26, deployment 3, 4, 49
75, 86, 90, 94, 100–1, 107, 180 preparations for 34, 49, 66, 106–7,
languages and 34, 38, 40, 48, 237 236, 238
coalitions, military, see alliances detention
colonialism 6, 10, 47, 48–9, 53, 54, concentration camps 232–3
87–8, 93, 96 Northern Ireland case study 2, 4, 8,
Common European Framework of 148–76 passim
Reference for Languages 62 in occupations 72, 83, 116
244
Index 245
of prisoners of war 6, 28, 30, 31, 34, foreignness 239–41

40, 41, 86, 88, 91–4, 96, 118, 119, mistrust of 17–18, 72, 75–6, 103,
133, 135, 167, 231, 234, 239 188
of refugees 133–4, 138, 145 representing 10, 227–35 passim
see also interrogation us/them distinction 88, 95, 96, 192
dialect 13, 33, 40, 67, 74, 75, 103, 140, France
180, 218, 221, 225, 237 language in 13
discourse 9, 104, 108, 111, 116, 118, military 2, 5: Napoleonic
119, 120, 126, 127, 186–97, 217 19–21; Old Regime 12–16, 237;
Djibouti 204 revolutionary 16–19, 27–31, 36
Dutch 16, 19, 20 French 12–57 passim, 62, 143, 144,
217, 231, 237, 238
education as lingua franca 12–13
language capacity and 67–8, 92–3,
183 gender
museums and 234, 242 constructions of 108
occupation and 7, 8, 75–80, 83 detention and 133, 162
peacebuilding and 186–201 passim in civilian–military encounters 105,
prisons 8, 148–74 passim, 240 113
enemy of refugees 133, 135, 136
assumptions about 1 in study of war 87
dependence on 97 of war workers 90, 91, 92, 101–2,
fear of 72 110
identification of 94, 95, 104, 125–6, German 13, 14, 15, 18–19, 20, 22, 77,
138, 141, 188 90, 93, 232–3
language of 41, 47, 48, 192 Gestapo 94
representation of 35, 36, 40, 42,
104 history, oral 2, 88, 101, 117
targeting of 26, 30, 42 Holocaust, representing 231–2, 242
English language 15 Honduras 204, 215
as lingua franca 9, 202–16 passim Human Terrain System 67
Estonian 91 Hundred Years’ War 5
Ethiopia 9, 203, 204, 209–10, 212, 215, Hungarian 14
241 hybridity 5, 9, 26, 116, 125, 127
ethnicity
conflict and 186–8, 192, 224–5 identity 237–43
indicators of 9–10, 187, 218–20 ambiguity of 10
of language intermediaries 87, 94–7, duality of 105
221–4 national 41, 155, 187, 190, 217–25
territory and 71–2, 82, 170, 187–8 occupation and 7–8
see also culture; identity performance of 101, 105
privacy and 178, 181
Finland researching 88
in World War II 3, 5, 7, 86–99 state 6
passim, 237 urban 108
Finnish 91 verification of 134, 230
Flanders 16 see also culture; ethnicity; language;
Flemish 13 language intermediaries
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Imperial War Museum 1, 5, 101,
(UK) 202, 203 227–35 passim, 242
246 Index
intelligence language
gathering 8, 27, 89, 94, 131–47 competence: evidence of 31–3;
passim lack of, effects 15, 19, 180; of
languages and 48, 49, 88, 105, troops 13, 16, 17–19
131–47 passim, 238–9 national identity and 16, 21, 70
researching 2 peacebuilding and 167–71
International Association of Conference language intermediaries
Interpreters (AIIC) 5, 8, 175–85 activism of 27–8, 41, 96
passim agency of 27, 42, 96–7, 104–5
International Federation of in combat 50, 51–2, 178
Translators 180 ethics of 67, 105, 175, 181
interoperability 9, 202, 209–10, 215 experiences of, researching 2–3, 102,
see also alliances 127–8
interpreting fears of 104, 127
methods 39, 122–3, 124, 126, gender and 90–1, 101–2, 110, 113
175–6 identities of 6, 7–8, 29, 94, 102,
researching 3, 115, 240 103–5, 108–9, 112, 113, 116, 220–4:
skills needed for 69, 183 mixed 17–18
standards 102 journalists and 176, 178–9
see also language intermediaries loyalties of 17, 38–9, 65, 95, 96, 103,
interrogation 104, 111
languages and 88, 94, 115, 138, management 27–31, 53–5, 101,
140–2, 144 107–10, 110–11, 112
practice of 6, 8, 36, 137–40, 144 military or civilian status of 7, 25,
Iraq 107, 177, 204 41, 61, 65, 67, 91, 142, 177, 238,
war in 214 239
see also War on Terror military policies regarding 14, 37,
Ireland 65, 102, 111, 140–1, 178, 238
French invasion of 6, 20, 25–46 neutrality of 38–9, 42, 67, 95, 181–2,
passim 238, 240–1
Northern: conflict in 1, 105; peace payment of 66, 68, 90, 91, 92, 94,
process 168, 170; prisoners 2, 8, 100, 101, 109–10, 177–8
148–74 passim, 240 recruitment of 15, 25, 37, 38, 49, 54,
Irish language 8, 16, 35, 38, 40, 148–74 55, 62, 64, 67–8, 91, 93–4, 101, 110,
passim 118, 121, 178, 238, 239
Italian 13, 15, 18, 19, 20, 22 redress for 109, 178
in occupied Slovenia 72–85 reprisals against 38, 94, 97, 104, 178,
passim 181
Italy rights of 107–10, 181, 240
Fascism 83 risks to 4, 9, 65, 94, 97, 104, 109,
occupation of Slovenia, see Slovenia, 110, 116, 175–85 passim, 240
Italian occupation of role perception 52–3, 61, 94, 104,
Ivory Coast 209 179
shortages of 64, 118–19
Karelia, Eastern 94 training of 50–1, 91, 92–3, 101, 106,
Kazakhstan 208 112, 122, 124–5, 180
Kobarid (Caporetto) 74, 76, 78, 81–2 trust in 15, 17, 32, 38–9, 41, 49, 65,
Korean 117, 120–1, 123, 125, 127 95, 103, 177, 181, 240
Kosovo 210 see also Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Kosovo War 104–5 interpreters in; interpreting;
Index 247
negotiations, interpreters in; Ministry of Defence (UK) 5, 58–69

translation passim, 106, 202, 203
language planning 218–19, 223 Moldova 204
language policy Mongolia 9, 210–11, 241
in education 186, 195–6 Mughal Empire 14
of military 4, 6–7, 12, 54, 58–69 multilingualism
passim, 91–2, 140–1, 183 in armed forces 13–14, 20
of occupation 72 music 193–5
practice diverges from 17–19, 196 Mussolini, Benito 81–2
language testing museums
of local intermediaries 102 representing languages in 1, 10
military 47, 61, 207–8
Modern Languages Aptitude Test 64, Napoleon 12, 19–21, 71, 237, 238
68, 69 nationalism 26, 36, 41, 76, 83, 108,
see also STANAG 6001 113, 186–7, 198, 224
language training negotiations 72, 83, 176
audiolingualism 205 interpreters in 3, 8, 119–30 passim
improvised 148–74 passim Nepalese 103
language variants and 102–3 New York 14
military 58–69 passim, 204–8 Nicaragua 204, 215
timescales of 66, 68 North Atlantic Treaty Organization
see also education (NATO)
languages enlargement 203–4, 208, 210, 211
diversity within states 13 interoperability, linguistic 47, 62
in war, see war, languages in peace support operations 7–8, 101,
Languages at War project 1, 182, 228–9, 103–4, 111, 113, 240
234–5, 242 perceived as occupier 105
Latin 14, 15, 40, 217 training 206
Latvian 91 see also Bureau for International
liaison, military 37–8, 49, 89, 100 Language Coordination; STANAG
languages and 53–5, 94, 122, 238 6001
liberation Norway 135, 139–40, 142
language and 148, 154
memory of 26 occupation
practice of 35–6 concept of 4, 10
Liberia 209 languages and 7, 71–2, 240
listening 33, 34, 62, 74, 101, 161, 193, practice of 39, 70–85 passim
205, 206 see also Finland, in World War II;
Lithuanian 91 Slovenia, Italian occupation of
logistics 48, 51, 52, 89–90, 102
Padua 82
Malta 20 Panmunjom 117, 119, 120, 121, 122,
memoir 2, 31, 41, 50, 52, 88, 117–18, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127
123 Pashto 65
memory 125, 127 peace
cognition and 33, 64 as continuation of war 8
historical 26, 32, 125, 228, 230, 231–2 language teaching and 4, 9, 186–201
of languages 9–10, 220–5 passim, 242
politics of 116 meaning of 9
sites of 233 as objective 4, 188–90, 196, 240
248 Index
peace – continued Royal Victoria Patriotic School 131–45

support operations 59, 100, 101, passim
177, 181, 202, 203, 205, 208, 209, Russian 15, 91
210, 211–13, 215, 241, 243 Rwanda 204, 209
terms 86, 95
see also Bosnia-Herzegovina; Sands, Bobby 152, 153, 157, 158, 160,
negotiations; reconciliation 161, 162–3, 164
Peacekeeping English Project, see British Sarajevo 101, 108, 219, 221
Council Scott, James 107
Pennsylvania 14 script 106, 149
Polish 91 security
power clearance 8, 65, 134, 136–7, 138,
centralization of 13 139, 143, 177: languages in 132–3
cultural and linguistic 71, 100, 166, collective 210
194, 196–7, 217 discourse of 118
emotional 231–2 operational 103
in language encounters 32, 119, promotion of 202, 203
144 public 72
of language intermediaries 94, 96 social 109, 110
of naming 7 strategy 58, 66
in occupation and conflict 71, 113, Serbo-Croat 217, 218, 220–4, 225,
153, 230 242
resistance to 107, 167 sex work 91
Pratt, Mary Louise 7 Šipovo 110
propaganda 6, 26, 30, 35, 42, 67, 77, Slovenia
139, 230, 232 Italian occupation of 2, 5, 70–85
occupation and 80, 81 passim, 240
translation of 27–31, 35–6, 42, 47, naming in 7, 73
89, 93 Slovenian 72–85 passim
speaking 25, 32, 33, 34, 62, 101, 107,
rank, military 155, 158, 166, 188, 205, 206, 211,
languages and 18, 42, 49 218, 223
reading 19, 33, 62, 78–9, 101, 159, Sri Lanka 204
164, 206, 207 STANAG 6001 31–2, 34, 62, 63, 69,
reconciliation 189, 195–6, 197, 225 207–8
reconstruction, post-war 82, 104, 112, standardization, linguistic 15
132 Stock, Joseph 25–46 passim, 238, 239
see also Bosnia-Herzegovina; Cyprus Sudan 204
Red T 180 Swiss Guards 13, 17–18
refugees 105
classification of 135, 135–7 Tone, Theobald Wolfe 25–46 passim,
as educators 80 238
as intelligence sources 132–3 translation
language intermediaries as 176–7, ambiguity of 16, 21
178 concepts of 3
as security threats 136–43 history of 5
treatment of: contemporary 3, 132, military 15, 54, 89
144–5; World War II 8, 131–47 museums and 231, 233
passim, 241 process of 28, 36
reindeer, requisition of 93 revision 123
Index 249
translation cultures 87: military 15, command 14, 18–19; methodology

16, 87 of researching 2, 88, 116, 117,
see also language intermediaries 125, 184, 191, 217–18; politics
translation studies 2–3, 41, 86, 132 and 5–6; power and 5, 7, 38, 70,
trust, see language intermediaries, 93
loyalty of / trust in total 36
Turkish 186–201 passim, 219, 242 War, Boer 48
Turkmenistan 204 War, Cold 8, 106, 116, 117, 118, 125,
Tuzla 108 126
War, Korean 1, 5, 118
Ukraine 9, 93, 204, 211, 213 negotiations after 8, 115–30 passim,
Uzbekistan 204 241
War on Terror 9, 65, 176, 178, 183
violence Welsh 103
collective 104 World War I 227–8, 229–30, 231, 234
detention and 95–6, 160, 163, 164, Franco-British alliance 6, 47–57
165 passim
memory and 125 see also Slovenia, Italian occupation of
political 3, 148, 151 World War II
witnessing of 116 see Finland, in World War II;
see also interpreters, risks to Holocaust; refugees, treatment of, in
World War II
war writing 19, 30, 35, 44, 62, 78–80, 101,
communities in 4 156–8, 163, 206
culture and: military training see also script
regarding 61
languages in: invisibility of 1, 26, Yugoslavia 106, 108
41–2, 86–7, 90, 141; languages of language in 218, 222–4

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What is the purpose of the Palgrave Studies in Languages at War Series?

What is the purpose of the Palgrave Studies in Languages at War Series?

What are some of the topics covered in the series?

What are some of the topics covered in the series?

Languages and the Military

Palgrave Studies in Languages at War

Palgrave Studies in Languages at War

List of Tables and Figure vii

Introduction: Languages and the Military: Alliances, Occupation

10 Jailtacht: the Irish Language and the Conflict in

4.1 Key features of STANAG 6001 63

4.1 Organizational chart of the governance of language

The contributions in this volume come from an international confer-

Louise Askew has been a professional translator, interpreter and reviser

Nicholas Fletcher has worked in English language teaching, teacher train-

Michael Kelly is Professor of French at the University of Southampton and

practices relating to languages in war and in peace building in Bosnia-

Sylvie Kleinman is a historian and translator based in Dublin, whose main

Pekka Kujamäki is Professor of German (Translation and Interpreting) at

Lieutenant Colonel Justin Lewis RE runs the UK Defence Operational

Diarmait Mac Giolla Chríost is Reader in the School of Welsh, Cardiff

Petra Svoljšak is a research counsellor at the Milko Kos Historical Institute

For those who participate in military campaigns, report on wars, or study

operational effectiveness, to communication on the ground, to mediation

language intermediaries, interpreters and translators, play in conflict zones

changing nature of the British Army’s engagement in this geographical area,

stratum of Serbo-Croat, a language memory of the past particularly audible

Napoleon Bonaparte reportedly once declared of the Alsatian soldiers serv-

The Old Regime

Woldemar, Count of Lowendal, who spoke Latin, Danish, German, English,

The revolutionary decade

recruit German speakers sympathetic with the Revolution, was denounced

It is impossible to transliterate perfectly the grammatical errors of the French

In contrast, other characters in the play communicated in perfect French.

Fils d’un Suisse et d’une Marseilloise, je suis né Français: je ne suis que

bought by my corrupt officers. We became the deadly instruments that

By associating the Swiss Guards’ lack of competence in the French language

The Napoleonic Empire

The fall of the Jacobin regime in 1794, followed by Napoleon Bonaparte’s

an important asset for personnel seeking promotion in a military which

by changing political regimes in shaping policies on the languages spoken

promulgation du Décret du 27 Pluviose an 2’ (‘The majority of the soldiers listed

The enemy marched directly into my courtyard . . . and demanded to see

as to rank . . . I could be of use . . . in the family of the général en chef . . .

‘In the service of two masters’:4 Irish civilian translators

From Tone’s subjective observations on Madgett, there emerges a slightly

Finished my second memorial on the present state of Ireland for the

Madgett and Sullivan’s role was, however, never confined to translation,

Theobald Wolfe Tone: iconic nationalist hero as linguist at war

Having to communicate credibly in French to achieve his goal, Tone depicted

(Kirwan 1789). However, even on foreign soil, diplomatic protocol dictated

to Ireland to gather intelligence and update local revolutionaries on their

general would be the ideal commander. Clarke ‘said it would be absolutely

Madgett’s ‘scheme’ and himself went to the Breton depot of Pontanezen

‘Amidst clamour and confusion’: languages at war during the

As commander of one of the three expeditions to sail to Ireland in 1798,

campaign. His request in 1798 that ‘individuals speaking the language of

relations of trust while maintaining a front of neutrality even if appropriat-

‘but such a thing is war!’ (Tone 2001: 399)