THE NAUTICAL INSTITUTE

SECURITY
AT
SEA

By
Brigadier (Red) B A H Parritt, CBE
International Maritime Security (IMS)

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Foreword by
Mr W A O’Neil, Secretary General
The International Maritime Organization

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 Published by The Nautical Institute
202 Lambeth Road, London SE1 7LQ, England
Telephone: 020 7928 1351
Fax: 020 7401 2817

First published 1991

Copyright © The Nautical Institute, 1991

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or
transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise,
without the prior written permission of the publishers, except for the quotation of brief passages in
reviews.

Typeset and printed in England by O’Sullivan Printing Corporation, Southall, Middlesex, UB2 5LF

ISBN 1 870077 091

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 This book is dedicated to

CAPTAIN E E MITROPOULOS

and

CAPTAIN J L THOMPSON

Two officers of the International Maritime Organization whose contribution to security at sea
has made life so much safer for so many passengers and crew.

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Author wishes to thank the following for their patience and help in the preparation of this book:

First, my colleagues in International Maritime Security, Mr T L Davies, Mr Ft 0 T Raikes, Mr R J

Stuchbury who distilled a security policy for ships into practical solutions.

I would also like to thank Dr Paulo Cavanria for his wise advice and Mr Francesco Sicardi for the
details of the insurance claims of the Achille Lauro. Professional help was supplied by Commander
Don Goldstein, US Coast Guard, and Mr Michael Chapman and Mr Fred Lake of the Ministry of
Defence Library.

I am particulary grateful to Captain ‘Thimio’ Mitropoulos and Captain John Thompson of the IMO.
Their contribution to the protection of all those who travel by sea has been outstanding. I am also
particularly grateful to Mr Mike Ridler of the UK Department of Transport whose individual
contribution in the creation of the UK Aviation & Maritime Security Act has been a most successful
and significant achievement.

Finally may I thank Mr Julian Parker of The Nautical Institute for his positive support, and the two
IMS secretaries, Sue Foster and Biddy Boucher.

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 SECURITY AT SEA

CONTENTS
Page
Acknowledgements 4
Foreword 7
Chapter One The Impact of Terrorism on Passenger Ships 9
Chapter Two Maritime Terrorist Acts 13
Chapter Three Factors in Deciding the Appropriate Level of Protection 19
Chapter Four The International Maritime Organization’s 22
Guidelines to Prevent Illegal Acts at Sea’
and Subsequent Legislation
Chapter Five Practical Measures to Improve 27
Maritime Security
Chapter Six Contingency Plans 33
Chapter Seven Action to be Taken if the Ship 36
is Taken Over by Force
Chapter Eight Anti Drug Smuggling Protection Measures 38
Chapter Nine Security Measures to be Taken if 44
Entering Hostile Waters
Chapter Ten Piracy 51
Chapter Eleven Letter or Parcel Bombs 55

Annexes

1. The International Maritime Organization 56

Maritime Safety Committee Approved Measures
to Prevent Unlawful Acts Against Passengers and
Crew on Board Ships
2. The United States 1986 Ports and 72
Maritime Security Act
3. Directions Under the UK Aviation and 78
Maritime Security Act 1990
4. Threat Assessment Guidelines for Ships 84
Visiting the UK January 1991
5. Sea Carrier Security Manual. Drug Smuggling 89
in Containers, Trailers and Chassis
6. Specimen International Maritime Security (IMS) 95
Ship Security Plan Contents List
7. Searching Procedures in Ports and on Ships 99
Index 103

Navigating officer on board the Seabourn Pride. He is carrying an explosive vapour detector and
has easy access to his hand-held metal detector, radio, visitors log and crew card board.
 FOREWORD
W. A. O’Neil Secretary-General, International Maritime Organization
MERCHANT SHIPPING provides an invaluable service to society transporting goods and
commodities across the world. However, the marine environment can be inhospitable, subjecting
mariners to storms, fog, ice and heat. The commercial climate is also highly competitive and there are
strong pressures to cut costs in order to survive.
It is difficult enough to operate ships today without further distractions, but insidiously a new
threat has to be recognised and dealt with. Perhaps it is no accident that reported incidents of piracy and
armed robbery against ships have been growing whilst the industry struggles to become profitable.
No location is absolutely free from this threat, and merchant ships carrying out their lawful
business often with a minimum of crew on board are targets for those who seek to achieve their ends
through the illicit practice of terrorism, piracy or drugs contraband.
The multi-national facilities for registering, financing and manning ships diffuses governmental
involvement, whilst the freedom of the high seas makes it legally difficult to mount international
maritime security and surveillance.
Self-help is, of course, the most obvious response to a perceived threat, but how should this be
organised? During the first world war there was considerable debate about the desirability otherwise of
convoying ships under escort.
However, statistics soon showed the value of the system and that ships could be better trotected
and more effective use could be made of escorts using the convoy system. When an attack did get
through there was also a better chance of detecting and sinking enemy submarines.
So with security, there are ways of assessing threat and using the ship’s resources to best
advantage. The great value of this practical book is that it demonstrates what can be done. It is
therefore invaluable to ship managers and seamen whose lives, heaven forbid, may depend on the good
advice it gives.
Of course, action taken by ships alone cannot solve the problem of terrorism or piracy; this
requires concerted diplomatic action and in some cases strong police or military intervention may be
necessary. Let us not forget, these are acts of violence against innocent people and they have to be dealt
with firmly.
The International Maritime Organization has played a major role in co-ordinating the
international response to terrorism. The guidelines drawn up by a small poup of experts were
unanimously agreed to by the Maritime Safety Committee and the maritlme industry now has valuable
guidance on what each party, whether flag State, port State, shipowner or shipmaster, should do in the
event of a terrorist attack.
The IMO guidelines break with the tradition of established legislation in that they require
accountability of officers and managers with respect to the security of passengers and crew and they
cause companies to formulate plans for positive response. The whole process is well discussed in this
book and reflects great credit on my predecessor, Mr C. P. Srivastava, and IMO team who helped to
formulate the recommendations.
Piracy is still a major problem and ranges from petty theft in port to armed assault directed
towards the capture of a ship, her cargo or the valuables from the master’s safe. IMO is ontinually
monitoring the incidence of piracy incidents so as to provide warning about trouble spots. The IMO is
also using its influence to apply diplomatic pressure to convince governments that piracy, armed
robbery or other unlawful acts against ships occurring in their ports or adjacent territorial waters must
be brought under control and eradicated.
 It is, however, necessary to be realistic. A well-organised police force does not prevent violent
crime in cities. An effective crime prevention force will, however, contain risk to within reasonable
levels. In certain areas even the forces for law and order may be part of the organised gangs who prey
on merchant ships.
IMO through its monitoring activities can help to identify those areas where the worst crimes
are being committed. If ships must trade to these areas we would recommend that it would be prudent
for them to take extra security precautions.
Security, from burglar alarms on houses to special locks on the doors of ships’ bridges, is sadly
a growing and increasingly uncomfortable part of life. It cannot and should not be ignored. This book
fulfils an important role in creating a realistic sense of awareness. Society and all concerned with
maritime affairs owe the seamen a better epitaph than ‘the loneliness of command.’
 CHAPTER ONE

THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON PASSENGER SHIPS

The murder of one old crippled man in 1985 during the hi-jacking of the Achiue Lauro caused
the cruise industry in the Mediterranean to come to a total and abrupt halt. Passenger ships found
themselves either anchored indefinitely off Piraeus, or joining a queue of fifteen others trying to get a
berth in St Thomas in the US Virgin Islands. The Official Greek Government figures following this
single murder revealed a direct loss of US $300 million; $200 million from tourism and $100 million
from cancelled cruise ship bookings. This enormous impact on the maritime industry was not caused by
large scale mayhem and bloodshed, but by the actions of four men carrying out a terrorist attack.
At the height of the Gulf War in 1991, when the military might of the coalition forces were
devastating Iraqi forces with battleships and bombers, people of all nationalities stopped travelling.
Flights were cancelled, cruise ship bookings fell dramatically, and ferries throughout Scandinavia and
the Mediterranean were laid up to reduce costs.
The reason for this immediate and devastating impact on the passenger industry, was not the
fear of Iraqi tanks, missiles or poison gas, but the fear of perhaps five or six men or women carrying
out a terrorist attack.
Every day in New York City there are over one hundred violent deaths, yet many murders
hardly get a mention in the newspapers. In 1989 however, when a group of insignificant men in a
backstreet in Beirut murdered Colonel Higgins, an American, the President of the United States, who is
the most powerful man in the world, turned his aircraft around and returned to Washington to ‘deal
with the crisis.’ Cruise bookings fell immediately and seamen lost their jobs.
There can be no doubt therefore that acts of terrorism do have a great impact on the passenger
industry and passenger ship profitability. Deciding what a passenger ship company should do to avoid
potential acts of terrorism, or what a passenger ship should eo to prevent acts of terrorism, is
nevertheless a complicated issue. Providing protection from acts of violence is the natural function of a
military ship, but it is a very unnatural function for a ship designed to provide relaxed holidays or fast
ferry travel.
It is also relevant that whilst passenger ships have been the main focus for terrorist activity,
threats have been made against offshore installations. The Gulf War demonstrated a new and
unacceptable threat which was to discharge oil from tankers and shore side tank farms into the Arabian
Gulf as a form of environmental terrorism.

The nature of terrorism

Why is it that this technique called ‘terrorism’has bad such an impact on maritime life? Why is
it that this tactic can have such an immediate and drastic effect on profitability and the level of crew
redundancy?
The answer lies in the unique nature of terrorism as opposed to other acts of violence. Terrorism
is a criminal act, yet the world seems to have accepted that a terrorist crime somehow obscures guilt. A
man who murders his neighbour, or blinds a woman in a robbery, is clearly seen to be a criminal. But if
he does the same thing while alleging that it is for political, religious or even ecological reasons, then it
seems to create the illusion that he is not really a criminal and there may even be some justification for
his wickedness. The excuse given, is that terrorism is an act carried out for a ‘Cause’ rather than for
personal gain, and that in pursuit of this non-financial Cause,’ the participants are special because they
are risking their lives for a motive unconnected with monetary profit.
This combination of ‘Cause’ and apparent self sacrifice, is not in itself sufficient to achieve the
aim of seizing the attention of the whole world. It needs other elements— innocent victims—horror—
and of crucial importance—good communications. If there were no media coverage there would be no
terrorism.
It is by using this combined formula of Cause, innocence, horror and communications that we
have arrived at a situation whereby a very small number of men or women armed with a limited
amount of weapons or explosive can immediately capture world-wide interest. Eight million people
were made aware of the Palestinian problem following the massacre of the Israeli athletes at the
Munich Olympic Games in 1972 where the media of the world were concentrated and available to give
intense coverage of the tragedy.
It would be foolhardy to expect therefore that this uniquely powerful and often successful tactic
will not continue to be used by a growing variety of people who feel abnormally strongly about their
own particular convictions and want to gain world-wide publicity. Acts of terrorism are not going to
stop. Terrorism is with us for ever, and must be dealt with in a routine and undramatic manner. This
also applies to the maritime industry.

Maritime terrorism

Fortunately, although there have been many maritime acts of criminality and piracy and these
are increasing in number and brutality, apart from the sinking of a Greek cruise liner which blew up in
1973 after hittingamine placed by the Black September Terrorist Organisation in Beirut, there have
only been three major acts of terrorism at sea—the Santa Maria in 1962, the Achitle Lauro in 1985 and
the City of Poros in 1989. We will look at these three attacks in some detail, but it is interesting to note
that none of them achieved the practical results originally intended by the perpetrators. All three were
militarily incompetent and ‘professional’ failures. However all three did achieve vast and continuing
world-wide publicity, which is not surprising because the sea provides the perfect setting for a terrorist
drama.
Sailing has always been glamorous and exciting but passengers travelling by sea often feel
vulnerable; after leaving home they feel they have lost a degree of their sovereignty and are in other
people’s hands, certainly they feel at the mercy of the elements. We thus have the ideal ingredients for
a terrorist attack; an exciting and potentially hazardous situation, innocent people in a vulnerable
position. and excellent communications.
For the past decade, with the exception of internecine terrorist operations, e.g. the IRA in
Ireland, the Basques in Spain and the Tamils in Sri Lanka, Americans and American interests have
been the most attractive terrorist target. Given the volatile situation in the Middle East. American
travellers will continue to be at risk.
For a terrorist selecting his target, there is a proven psychological benefit in attacking wealthy
rather than poor victims, and of all peoples, members of the Jewish faith are sadly the most vulnerable.
A cruise ship or ferry which is known to be carrying large numbers of rich American Jews must
therefore be placed in a higher risk category.
But it is important to keep this in perspective. The actual risk is low. There is far more
likelihood of a ship having to use its inert gas system to quench an engine-room fire, or launch its
lifeboats after a collision, than in having to deal with a terrorist incident. No passenger should ever
decide against travelling by sea on the unsubstantiated feeling that a terrorist attack might occur.
The conclusion must be that acts of terrorism are going to continue, and the maritime industry,
like every other transportation industry, will continue to be affected. The risk of attack is low, but it is
now a fact of maritime life that the shipping industry has to take sensible measures to reassure
travellers and crews that proper steps are being taken to protect them. Just as inert gases and lifeboats
are routine and undramatic features of every ship, so security measures must in the same way become
similar, non-controversial, totally unexciting, features of every ship’s design and management.
 CHAPTER TWO

MARITIME TERRORIST ATTACKS

Although limited in number, the three main maritime terrorist incidents do have many features
in common. An examination of the incident is useful therefore in determining protective measures.

Attack on the Achille Lauro

On 1st October 1985 Israel commandos carried out a raid on the Headquarters of the Palestine
Liberation Organisation (PLO) in Tunisia and killed many Arabs. The PLO wanted revenge.
During 1985 a member of the Abu Abbas Palestinian Liberation Front using a Greek passport
had taken a voyage on the Achiue Lauro in order to examine the security arrangements on board. He
had reported that the ship called at the Israeli tourist resort of Ashdod, and that from where it docked it
would be possible to kill many people as they lay on the beach sunbathing. He also reported that it
should be relatively easy to smuggle weapons on board.
For a terrorist, it was an attractive plan. Faced with the highly developed defensive measures
instituted by the Israelis, this would be an ideal way of getting into Israel with weapons. It also
provided the other elements necessary for a successful terrorist attack. It would kill innocent people,
the ship would provide excellent communications, and, by taking American hostages there would be
world-wide publicity and a good chance of negotiating a safe withdrawal. It was decided therefore to
implement the plan.
Four men were selected for the operation. One went to the vessel owner’s office in Genoa and
purchased four tickets. He went to the office on two occasions. The receptionist was a little reluctant
but the man was insistent, and even though it was a very late booking the receptionist took the money
and allocated a four bed, low grade cabin.
The terrorists all had false passports. These included Norwegian passports, but neither the
photographs nor the personal details had been altered. They carried folded machine guns, revolvers and
hand granades in their ‘expensive looking’ hand baggage. During the voyage they kept very much to
themselves and mainly used room service for their meals.
The cabin staff were suspicious. One Italian chamber maid voiced this suspicion and
remarked—’lf you are Norwegian—I am an African.’ But no one mentioned this suspicion to the Hotel
Director or Captain.
At about 1330 hours on 7th October, shortly after leaving Alexandria, a steward entered the
cabin unexpectedly believing that the occupants had gone to lunch. To his horror, instead of an empty
cabin he saw four men busily cleaning automatic weapons. The terrorists were equally startled, but
immediately agreed to implement an alternative plan and instead of going to Ashdod to kill Israelis,
they decided to seize the ship and exploit the situation as it developed.
The four ran into the restaurant where the majority of the passengers were having lunch and
they started shouting and firing shots in the air. They herded all the passengers and staff to the rear of
the restaurant, then one ran to the bridge and one to the engine room. The one who entered the engine
control room shouted at the engineers that they had to obey the bridge and then left. No terrorist ever
returned to the engine room. On the bridge they threatened the Captain and navigating officers and
ordered them to change direction. Acting under duress the Captain made an announcement stating that
everyone should—’Go to the restaurant, be calm and no-one will be shot.’
Six British dancers were sunbathing on the Lido Deck when they heard the shots and after a
quick discussion with an officer they went to a crew cabin and locked themselves in. When they heard
the Captain’s announcement they also moved to the restaurant. It proved a difficult period. The
terrorists asked for an interpreter and then demanded that any Israelis, British or Germans should make
themselves known.
The temperature became very hot and when a girl asked if she could use the toilet facilities, she
was told to take a bowl from the buffet table and squat behind the counter. Men were told to urinate on
the carpet.
The terrorists constantly moved about and changed positions, so that for the whole period
neither the crew nor the passengers were ever quite sure how many were on board. To maintain the
pressure the terrorists claimed to have placed explosive charges throughout the ship and forced the
crew to bring plastic containers of fuel which they placed around the passengers. The thirteen
Americans and the six British dancers were then separated and moved outside under the bridge wing.
More fuel containers were placed near them.
Some of the younger deck officers suggested to the Captain that they should get the skeet guns,
used for clay pigeon shooting, and launch an attack to rescue the ship. The Captain refused and the
weapons were handed over to the terrorists.
During the afternoon Mr Klinghoffer, who was an elderly crippled Jewish passenger, was taken
outside and shot. Two crew members were forced to throw his body and his wheel chair over the side.
The passengers were not told of the death, but the terrorists informed the Captain of the killing
and said that another American passenger. Mrs Hodes, would be the next to be shot. The Captain
offered himself in place of Mrs Hodes, suggesting that his death would have greater international
impact, but the offer was refused.
Forty eight hours later, during which period four men had been able to capture a large crnise
ship, dominate 400 people, murder an American citizen and seize the attention of the whole world, the
ship arrived off Port Said. The terrorist ‘Commander’ Abu Abbas, then negotiated an agreement and
the four terrorists left the ship as free men. They would have remained free if it had not been for the
audacity and skill of the US Armed Forces, who successfully identified and intercepted the Egyptian
aircraft carrying the terrorists and their supporters, and forced it to land in Sardinia where Special
Forces captured all involved.
From the terrorists’ point of view, it had been a well executed operation which had achieved
wide publicity for their Cause. Their failure was in believing that the United States Government would
never blatantly break International Law and force down the aeroplane of another country in
international airspace. They did not believe President Reagan’s statement—’You can ran. But you can’t
hide.’

Attack on the SS Santa Maria

On the 22nd January 1962 when the dead body of the Third Officer and a wounded crewman
were placed ashore in St Lucia from the Portuguese flagged ship 55 Santa Maria, Portugal called on the
world for help in capturing the perpetrators of this act of ‘piracy.’

As it was known that 42 American citizens were on board, American and British ships which
had been training in Puerto Rican waters were rapidly diverted for a rescue operation. lt seemed a
straightforward case of murder. But when the Santa Maria was contacted, to everyone’s surprise the
‘pirate,’ Captain Henrique Galvao. claimed that he and his group of 71 Portuguese and Spaniards were
not committing a criminal act, but were taking part in a political action aimed at the overthrow of the
‘Portuguese Dictatorship of Antonio Salazar.’ The attitude of the American and British Governments
suddenly then changed, and, instead of using armed force, to the frustration and anger of the
Portuguese Government, negotiations were begun and the ship was not seized but merely followed,
eventually arriving at Recife in Brazil. The British naval vessels were then ordered away.
 The incident now became international head-line news and there were many attempts to get the
‘scoop’ story. Two enterprising reporters even attempted an unsuccessful sky-dive to get aboard.
As is usual in a terrorist incident, confusion emerged as various countries tried to influence the
outcome. In the end however, with the tacit agreement of the American Government, the Brazilians
offered asylum to Captain Galvao and his crew, and the passengers were safely disembarked.
The pattern of events is very similar to the Achille Lauro. A ship was taken over by force,
murder was committed, passengers were intimidated, political demands had been made and then the
perpetrators of the crime negotiated their release. No prosecutions followed the killing of the Third
Officer.

Attack on the MV City of Poros

Throughout 1989 America had been exerting great pressure on the Greek Government to
extradite a Palestinian alleged to have been involved in the bombing of a TWA aircraft. In March 1989
the US warship USS Vincennes had misidentified a civilian aircraft, Iran Air Flight 655, and had shot it
down with the total loss of all on board. Two weeks later a German-born Palestinian had been
sentenced in Athens for driving a car loaded with weapons and explosives on board a ferry sailing to
Israel.
Early in July. the American Defence Attache in Greece, Captain Nordeen, was murdered, and
three hours before the MV City of Poros, a Greek ferry, was due to land at Paleon Faliron, a car
suddenly blew up near the port. Inside were found the dismembered bodies of an Arab man and an
Arab woman and evidence of a large amount of explosive and terrorist related documents.
On the City of Poros, 540 passengers had been enjoying the end of a delightful day’s sailing.
Suddenly, without warning, a group of Arabs leapt to their feet and began killing. The killing was quite
indiscriminate. Men, women, children, officers and crew were shot with automatic weapons or blasted
by hand grenades. Within minutes, nine people were dead and forty six were wounded. On the ship the
explosions started a fierce fire and terrified passengers, including English schoolgirls from Worthing
Convent School, leapt over the side into the water. Escaping in the confusion were the two or three men
and women who had done the killing.
Again there are similarities with the AchWe Lauro attack. A passenger ship was taken over by a
group of Arab terrorists, innocent people had been murdered, a political statement had been made
concerning the extradition of the Palestinian in gaol, and then the perpetrators had escaped to their
freedom. Unlike the Achille Lauro incident however, this time, sadly, there was no opportunity to put
the terrorists in prison.
 CHAPTER THREE

FACTORS IN DECIDING THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF PROTECTION

Having accepted that there is a terrorist threat to the maritime industry and that it is sensible to
take preventative measures to reduce the effect of an attack, before they can decide on the most
appropriate measures to counter the threat, the ship operator and master now have to consider a number
of factors.

The moral responsibility

First there is the moral responsibility of management to provide adequate protection for their
passengers and crew. This is a clear requirement, and is no different from the traditional responsibility
of all ship operators and masters to provide the correct safety measures in case of fire, collision or bad
weather. In this case the ship operator and master need to know what is the likelihood of a terrorist
attack, what is the probable nature of the attack, and how best to provide practical protection within a
commercial budget.
The problem is that, whereas there are a multitude of SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea) regulations
and laws of the sea concerning safety, there are no SOLAS or international laws of the sea dealing with
security. All ship operators and masters well understand that, in order to fulfil their safety obligations,
they have to meet clearly defined and well known safety standards and this they do to an internationally
recognised standard. But when trying to fulfil their security obligations, in the absence of clearly
defined and internationally agreed SOLAS or laws of the sea, there has been a great deal of divergence
and many different standards.

Passenger and crew perception

The second factor affecting the level of protection to be installed, and one which is steadily
increasing in importance, is the perception of passengers and crew as to what consitutes credible and
good protection; and it is an intriguing but extremely important fact that this perception can often be
very different from the reality of the actual threat. Travellers have become used to high levels of
security when they travel by air and are now increasingly expecting similar standards of protection
when they travel by sea.
It took a little time for the passenger industry to recognise the importance of this passenger
perception’. Initially, marketing managers were reluctant to see overt security measures installed as
they felt this would increase apprehension about going ni holiday. It is now accepted that this is not the
case. On the contrary, people will be deterred by poor security and are not upset by well managed and
competent security. Passengers now notice which shipping lines have good security, and which lines do
not. Travel magazines are also highlighting the standard of security protection on different ships as a
guide to potential passengers on the selection of their holiday. Security, or perhaps more significantly,
the bad application of security, has become a marketing factor. Good security comforts passengers, bad
security upsets passengers.
In deciding therefore what level of security protection to apply, ship operators cannot base their
decisions solely on the likelihood of an actual attack, which is probably very remote, but on this
unjustified perception of passengers and crew that such an attack may occur while they are on board.
This difference between the actual danger and the perception of danger, also affects the types of
security equipment that must be acquired. It is impossible to create a viable security protection system
without using a certain amount of equipment. Given the volume of passengers embarking and
disembarking and the very short times of turn-round, without specialised equipment there is no way
that credible checks can be made for illegal weapons or explosive.

Governmental involvement

A new factor affecting the required level of maritime security results from the growing tendency
throughout the world, and particularly in the United States and United Kingdom, to pass maritime
security legislation, and then to create special units to cheek to see that their legislation is being
implemented. For the ship operator and master, there is thus emerging yet another set of regulations to
join the mass of paper concerning safety, pollution. garbage and hygiene etc, where failure to meet
required public standards can mean delays, costs and bad publicity.
All the evidence is that this involvement by Government in maritime security is going to
continue. Following such incidents as the destruction of PanAm Flight 103 over Lockerbie, senior
politicians were severely censured and criticised for not having taken sufficient steps to detect and
deter terrorist activity. Now, there is ample evidence of a clear determination in Governments to ensure
that in future they have provisions on their Statute Book which clearly specify required security
standards, establish a capability to ensure the standards are being met and gives them the legislative
authority to punish those who do not comply.

Insurance and compensation

A final factor to be considered when deciding the appropriate level of protection is that of
insurance and compensation. This was highlighted in a most interesting manner following the attack on
the Achille Lauro. The vessel and her owners were insured against marine risks and P & I risks
(including war risk) with Italian insurance companies. There was a limit of US$240,000 per passenger
and an aggregate limit on the vessels of approximately US$10,000,000.
The underwriters were expecting massive claims, considering that more than 100 passengers
had been held hostage and another 600 had been through a very unpleasant and uncomfortable
experience. In fact whereas all 72 US passengers filed claims totalling 1.6 million dollars against
everybody concerned—the tour operators, the L.auro Company, Chandris Celebrity Cruises, the Port of
Genoa etc, none of the non-US passengers filed any claims for ‘pain and sufferings’ claiming only for
loss of property and various expenses. The non-US passengers claims were settled for approximately
US$100,000 plus US$100,000 for valuables allegedly stolen from the ship’s safe.*
The claims were debated in American Courts for several years and a major issue was whether
the Lauro Company had taken ‘reasonable steps’ to prevent the hijacking from taking place. A typical
quotation from one of the hostages was:—
“There was no protection or security at Genoa, either at the dockside or on the ship, nor at any
of the subsequent ports of call. Neither persons boarding the vessel, nor their belongings nor their
luggage were subjected to any examination, search detection or any security device.”
The owners were specifically accused of:—
“Falling to provide adequate protection for passengers and failing to conduct a reasonable
search or inspection of passports, Luggage and belongings of people coming aboard. Failing to
conduct an investigation into the suspicious appearance and activities of the passengers and otherwise
failing to take any reasonable steps to protect the passengers against harm and the dangers and risks
of a terrorist attack, all of which was well known to the transportation industry, particularly in the
Mediterranean area”.
In response to these allegations the Lauro Company pleaded that they had taken ‘reasonable
measures’. That, as there had been no previous terrorist incidents against passenger ships, their
protective measures had been sensible, reasonable, and were up to the standard to match the threat that
existed at the time.
This was a legitimate defence in 1985 when there were no internationally agreed standards for
maritime security and this line of defence had a significant influence on the amount of the final
financial settlement. The fundamental difference today is that this defence will never be acceptable
again. Now, we have the publication of the International Maritime Organization’s Guidelines to
Prevent Illegal Acts at Sea. Everything has changed.

Ferry security

From the very first meetings held in the upstairs room of the IMO in London, it was strongly
pointed out that there were significant differences between the security problem of a cruise ship and a
ferry. The original stipulation was that the IMO Guidelines should only apply to voyages over 24
hours. This was because the Norwegian and Italian representatives pointed out that in their countries
‘ferries were used like buses’ and a different standard of security was necessary.
The doubts expressed by the IMO Committee are valid. Ferry turn-round time is extremely tight
and, unlike other passenger ships the variety of both passengers and freight is considerable. Passengers
arrive on foot, by bicycle, in cars, in caravans and in coaches. Freight is carried by hand, by van, in
containers and in refrigerated lorries, often under TIR rules, thus posing great problems of search.
Having expressed all the difficulties however, it does not mean that nothing can be done. If basic
principles are applied, security can be raised significantly, and again this requires a degree of
knowledge and determination. The IMO Guidelines provide the knowledge, and the recent legislation,
particularly the UK Aviation and Maritime Security Act, provides both the knowledge and the legal
incentive to stimulate the necessary determination.
In simple terms, there has to be a restricted area around the ferry to prevent unauthorised access.
To get into the restricted areas there have to be a number of openings. These openings must be guarded
and to distinguish who has the right of access there has to be a workable pass system.
The matter of searching must be treated with common sense. If it becomes necessary, every person,
every vehicle and many units of freight can be searched. But this is an almost unimaginable scenario,
complicated still further by the implications of the TIR protocols.
A great fear often expressed is the one which concerns the danger of a car-bomb. It is possible,
however, to implement simple and effective measures to ensure that those who bring a vehicle on to a
ferry, cannot get off, have to travel with that vehicle and have to disembark with it. This can provide a
considerable degree of deterrence; few terrorists plan to go up, or in this case down with their own
bomb.
The fact is clear, that to plead ferry security is too difficult, is now unacceptable. The travelling
public and their governments now demand that responsible security procedures are in place. Again, it is
interesting that pressure to improve ferry security is being matched by pressure to improve ferry safety.
It is sensible therefore to combine the two requirements; for example, for safety reasons it is becoming
necessary to make sure that the ferry company knows the names of all passengers on board, and this
needs a checking system which also satisfies the security requirement.
There are, too, sensitive areas in a ferry which should be made inaccessible to the travelling
public, and notices forbidding access will probably not be sufficient in the future. Safety considerations
require, however, that these areas, including bridge and radio room, machinery spaces and car decks
are capable of evacuation in emergency.
Before money is spent therefore, both safety and security requirements should be considered
together.
 Conclusion

On the assumption that acts of terrorism are going to continue, ship operators and masters now
have to look at security requirements as a routine part of running ships. Whether it is because of a real
danger, a perceived danger, because of governmental legislation, or insurance risk, security procedures
covering the protection of passengers and crews have to become an integral part of passenger ship
operations.
Two or three years ago. failure to implement adequate security was an act of irresponsibility.
Now, failure to implement adequate security is a failure of standard ship management. Fortunately the
IMO Guidelines to Prevent Illegal Acts at Sea have been agreed to help ship managers and masters
decide what is an appropriate level of protection.

* Note: Given the emphasis the terrorists continually placed on the political, rather than the criminal nature of their
actions, one wonders if the theft from the ship’s safe left a European rather than an Arab richer after the event.
 CHAPTER FOUR

THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION’S GUIDELINES TO

PREVENT ILLEGAL ACTS AT SEA AND SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION
The work of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in the area of preventing unlawful
acts at sea goes back to 1979, when the growing problem of maritime fraud was considered by the
Assembly and they adopted a resolution relating to ‘Barratry and the unlawful seizure of ships and their
cargoes’.
In 1983, the precedent was continued when the Assembly adopted another resolution dealing
with ‘Measures to prevent acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships’. This was initiated by
Sweden and referred to cases where ships awaiting berth many miles offshore had been attacked by
pirates who were well equipped with motorboats and launches. Sweden pointed out that a distance of
20 miles from the coast no longer gave any protection. The Assembly called upon all Governments,
port authorities, shipowners, ship operators, shipmasters and crews to take steps to review and, as
necessary, strengthen port and on-board security. They took their involvement one stage further by
agreeing that the IMO should act as a focal point to record acts of piracy, so that ship managers and
masters could be informed of danger areas and patterns of attack.
All member countries felt there was an advantage in having an international forum for debate
and agreement concerning security at sea, and the IMO naturally, and successfully, filled this vacuum.
When therefore the Achille Lauro was attacked in October 1985 and the United Nations in New York
expressed their outrage and concern, it was a natural step for them to ask the IMO to consider the
matter. The request was simple, ‘To study the problems of terrorism aboard or against ships, with a
view to making recommendations on appropriate measures’.
On receipt of this request the IMO acted with speed and expertise. The Secretariat of the
Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) prepared a paper drafted by the US Coast Guard and submitted it to
a specially selected sub-committee for their consideration. Seven men then sat together in an upstairs
room in the IMO in London and hammered out a draft resolution which has become one of the most
significant resolutions ever produced by the IMO.
The Sub-Committee was chaired by a Norwegian, and he was supported by a Greek, an Italian,
a Canadian and a Dutchman. The United States representatives took a very low posture as it was his
country’s paper being considered and, as Perestroika and Glastnost were just emerging, the Russian
representative was positive and strong in his approval.
The document they passed to the Maritime Safety Committee was titled ‘Measures to prevent
unlawful acts which threaten the safety of ships and the security of their passengers and crews’. To
everyone’s surprise the Resolution was immediately approved, unanimously, by the 136 member
countries. It was a major achievement for the Sub-committee and the Secretariat.
The MSC though pleased to vote for the proposal were very careful to pre-fix the resolution
with the word ‘Guidelines’, which meant that although their Governments were happy to demonstrate
their willingness to cooperate in working against terrorists, there was no legal requirement for them to
provide money. The task of implementing the ‘Guidelines’ was to be left to port authorities and
shipowners.
It all happened very quickly, but it was indeed momentous. Since the moment that the
resolution was adopted, it has meant that there is, in existence, an internationally recognised and
approved formula which fully, and clearly, sets out what ports and ships have to do in order to provide
proper protection against terrorists’ acts. Since the 26th September 1986 there has been a document,
MSC 53/24, Annex 14 (Sec Annex One), which can be used by politicians, lawyers, newsmen and the
general public to judge whether the port or ship has indeed been taking ‘reasonable measures’ to
protect their passenger and crews.
Following the sinking of the Titanic, international cooperation resulted in the production of
agreed safety standards. Following the attack on the Achille Lauro international cooperation resulted in
the production of agreed security standards. It is truly said—’What the Titanic didfor Safety, the
Achille Lauro has done for Security.’

Leglislation

Although the IMO ‘Guidelines’ are extremely influential, they are only ‘Guidelines’. Certain
countries have decided to strengthen them by adding the force of law.
The United States 1986 Ports and Maritime Security Act (See Annex Two)
Throughout the 1 980s there was growing concern in the United States that protection provided
for sea travellers had fallen behind the protection provided for air travellers and there had been a series
of hearings before Mr Mario Biaggi’s Subcommittee of the House of Representatives. In October 1985
they published their report. This emphasised that although many cruise ship companies were taking
security measures on a voluntary basis, some were not, and that as the Coast Guard did not have the
necessary statutory or regulatory authority to require preventative measures to be carried out, there was
a need for legislation. The 1986 Ports and Maritime Security Act and the Aviation Security
Improvement Act 1990 were the result.
The 1986 Act stated established the desired objectives:
1. Seaport screening of cargo and baggage similar to that done at airports.
2. Security measures to restrict access to cargo, vessels and dockside property to authorised
personnel only.
3. Additional security on board vessels.
4. Licensing or certification of compliance with appropriate security standards.
5. Other appropriate measures to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and crews on
board vessels.
The 1986 Act also gave the President power to suspend the right of any passenger vessel to
operate to and from the United States if that ship came from a nation which used its territory as a base
for terrorist operations, or as a sanctuary for terrorists, or which knowingly used the illegal seizure of
passenger vessels as an instrument of policy. Finally the Act gave great impetus to the production of
more relevant and comprehensive Travel Advisories.

Travel advisories

Given the fact that so many cruise passengers are Americans, the emergence of a much more
comprehensive US Travel Advisory service is a very significant development for ship managers.
The US State Department Travel Advisory is designed to inform Americans travelling abroad of
conditions which may affect them adversely. In official language:— “They are not generated by
isolated international terrorist attacks, but describe a potential for violence and physical danger
reflecting a trend or pattern over a period of time, during which the 118 State Department consider the
local Government is unwilling or unable to afford normal protection”.
Thus, in February 1991, during the Gulf War, in anticipation of possible terrorist attacks, the US
State Department published a Travel Advisory stating that 23 countries were now on their Proscribed
List. The countries, which included India and Thailand, were thousands of miles away from the actual
combat zone, and are traditional holiday areas, where tourists are welcomed and protected. No actual
incidents of anti-American violence has occurred, but within days, nine major cruise lines had
abandoned Far Eastern cruises, sailors were asking for ‘danger money’ and insurance premiums were
being reviewed upwards.
Other Governments also issue Travel Advisories and, when they do, they are fulfilling a
legitimate function. Citizens expect their Governments to keep the world situation under review, and
publish warnings to prevent them from wandering innocently into troubled areas. It would be wrong if
Government Departments took commercial factors into account when deciding which countries to
include on the Proscribed List, but they do cause great resentment in the country concerned. Local
agents, local tourist representatives and almost certainly the local Government, will react vigorously
and will claim that it is grossly unfair and bears no relation to the actual situation. They will
legitimately point to safe anchorage, calm seas, sunshine, warmth of hospitality and lack of any
significant violence.
For a ship manager and master, the dilemma is whether to ignore the Travel Advisory and
continue with the scheduled itinerary, or try to find a suitable and if possible equally attractive
alternative port. The decision is not easy because, if the Travel Advisory is ignored and ships do travel
to proscribed ports, and an iucident then occurs, it will increase the possibility of substantial
compensation claims.
A Travel Advisory is however only a piece of advice, it always has to be borne in mind that the
raison d’être of a ship is to carry passengers or cargo. If, therefore, there is still a demand to sail and it
is good business to do so, the existence of a competent security system does give the ship manager and
master greater flexibility of choice in that they can take the risk and sail, knowing they have installed a
capability for protection.
Expense on security should not therefore be regarded solely as a negative financial liability.
Applied with imagination security protection can attract more passengers and cargo, and enable
itineraries to be fulfilled in spite of the fear of possible violence, or even travel advisories.

The Aviation and Security Improvements Act—1991

On 16th November 1990, President Bush signed into law the Aviation Security Improvement
Act which created the position of Director of Intelligence and Security within the Office of the
Secretary of Transportation.
The task of the new Office is to advise the Secretary of Transportation on domestic and
international intelligence and security matters as they apply to transportation, and to develop
programmes affecting the security of the travelling public.
The Office is intended to ensure the highest standards of security, not only on aircraft, but also
on ships including foreign flag passenger vessels which carry US citizens, and ships which dock in
United States ports.
The first Director is Admiral Clyde E. Robbins. lie was appointed one day after finishing 36
years with the US Coast Guard and soon gathered a team of eleven, all with experience in
transportation security.
It is the publicly stated intention both of the Department of Transportation and the US Coast
Guard eventually to make the IMO Guidelines mandatory. Members of the new Office are therefore
currently assessing the standards of security both in ports and on cruise ships. in order to decide when it
should be done. The members of the Office of Intelligence and Security are well aware of the
difficulties of cruise ship security and are punctilious about carrying proper Governmental credentials
and requesting the permission of the Master to board. At this initial stage their visits are uot intended to
be punitive, but it is clearly not advisable for them to gain the impression that security on the ship is
poor, and inevitably as time goes on their aim of raising security standards is going to affect the
industry.
 US Coast Guard

Members of the US Coast Guard, not part of the Office of Intelligence and Security, also have a
mandate to ensure that passenger ships meet a satisfactory standard of security before they enter a US
port. To avoid problems when an inspecting officer comes on board, it is essential therefore that the
ship has a well constructed Ship Security Plau which demonstrates awareness and compliance with the
IMO Guidelines and US legislation. Failure to have a proper Ship Security Plan can cause problems
and delays. It is safe to predict that in the forseeable future, security inspections by CG officers will be
as routine as safety inspections.

The United Kingdom Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990

In 1988 the UK Government became more concerned that ‘car and passenger ferries will
present attractive and vulnerable targets’ and began a series of discussions with the shipping industry to
try and achieve a set of voluntary standards which the industry could successfully implement. The
Government’s aim was ‘To educate the Industry into accepting that protective security issues were
going to be a permanent feature in its thinking’.
After the tragic bombing of Pan-Am 103 occurred, the Government decided to increase its
powers and formulate an Aviation Security Act. It seemed a logical step therefore, as far as the
Department of Transport were concerned, to expand the scope of the Bill and incorporate the maritime
sector. The result was the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990.
The legislation essentially provides the Secretary of State with power to set requirements and
standards. Its important aspects are:—
• There must be a person appointed to be responsible for all security matters.
• Port Security Committees must be formed.
• Comprehensive contingency plans must be written and staff trained and tested in the
plans.
• Restricted zones must be designated.
• Pass systems must be established.
• Physical protection measures must be in place.
• There must be strict control of access and exits and a searching capability must be
available.
‘A team of Maritime Security Inspectors have been established to inspect ships and ports, and
to serve enforcement notices where the standards are not being met.’ Offenders may be prosecuted,
and fined or imprisopid.
The Act takes precedence over all contracts and over almost all other legislation.
The requirements can be applied to any UK port and to any ship. The burden falls on the
operators of ships and ports to take the measures required and to bear the costs. The Bill also sets out
the responsibilities of ship operators and masters using the IMO Guidelines as a model.
These standards are now legal requirements which apply to all UK ports and all passenger ships
that enter these ports. The Inspectors began their surveys in 1991 and have submitted initial reports. At
the moment there is heavy emphasis on getting the industry to understand the new legislation and begin
work on improvements. But it is quite clear that as the months pass, the ‘steel hand in the velvet glove’
will become more evident, and failure to comply could result in legal action. The first Chief Inspector
Transport Security, Mr H Ditmas, has been appointed and has issued a set of ‘Directions’ to explain the
requirements. (See Annex Three.)
 The United States Anti-Drug Abuse Act 1986 and The Sea Carrier Initiative Programme

Although not an anti-terrorist piece of legislation, the Anti Drug Abuse Act and Sea Carrier
Initiative Programme are very relevant as they also bring new responsibilities to the ship manager and
master to improve security procedures.
The United States Government has made it overwhelmingly clear that they are determined to
prevent illegal drugs being smuggled into America. In 1986 they passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
which greatly increased penalties against ship owners found to have transported drugs. Currently the
fine is US$1000 per ounce for heroin and cocaine, and US$500 per ounce for marijuana and
derivatives. It was a 20% increase over previous penalties. The Act became famous for its declaration
of ‘zero tolerance’ which meant quite simply—’We want NO illegal drugs imported into our country’.
Given the huge quantities of drugs being smuggled, there were quickly cases whereby
shipowners found themselves fined several million dollars and had their ships impounded.
The effects of these draconian fines were considerable, and in an imaginative move by the US
Customs Service they launched the Sea Carrier Initiative Programme whereby, if the shipowners signed
an agreement with the US Customs and agreed to enhance security both at the terminals and on board
their ships then, should illegal drugs be found on board—’The degree of compliance with the terms of
the Agreement will be considered as a mitigating factor in the seizure or penalty decision’. The
measure makes a great deal of sense and has been actively supported by the Baltic and International
Maritime Council (BIMCO). By June 1991, 400 members of BIMCO had joined the scheme and there
were a total of over 1800 individual agreements.
This Carrier Initiative Programme suits the overwhelming majority of sea carriers, but for a
small number of carriers which operate regularly between drug source or transit countries and which
have experienced continuing difficulties with illegal drugs in spite of their full participation in the
standard programme, the US Customs have developed revised agreements for ships operating in
‘medium and high risk’ drug areas. One of these is the ‘Super Carrier Initiative’ Programme. This
Programme is for:—
‘Companies who are already in the standard Carrier Initiative Programme and have fully
implemented the terms of their agreements to the extent feasible: have received several penalties for
transporting illegal drugs, or feel that it is necessary to take extraordinary, and expensive, measures to
attempt to prevent future violations’.
The benefit of the Super Carrier initiative Programme is that companies who undertake this
further commitment, are given practical support to help reduce the risk.
 CHAPTER FIVE

PRACTICAL MEASURES TO IMPROVE MARITIME SECURITY

There is now an incontrovertible case that ship managers and masters should take measures to
improve the standards of security on their ships. In deciding what to do however, although these
security measures have to be credible and fulfil the necessary requirements; they have to be balanced
against tight budgets and the commercial reality that they must not antagonise passengers, crews or
visitors and, the ship must sail on time.
In order to comply with the various requirements, the following sequence is advised. It is very
important to note that this is a philosophy of protection, and that it can be altered immediately if the
ship manager or master feels that other priorities take precedence over the security factor or, if the
threat changes and increased protection is required.
Of particular relevance is the clause in the IMO Guidelines which spells out in precise detail the
exact security responsibilities of named individuals, one a senior ship manager to be called the
Operator Security Officer, and one on board the ship to be called the Ship Security Officer. It is this
requirement for a specifically designated executive manager and ships officer to be personally
accountable for security on the ship, which has created a new dimension of responsibility for many
people in the maritime industry.

Operator Security Officer

The Company must appoint an Operator Security Officer. This is the executive on shore who is
personally accountable for all aspects of security. His responsibilities include:—
• Developing and producing the Ship Security Plan.
• Modifying the Ship Security Plan to ensure it is always up to date.
• Ensuring security awareness and vigilance is maintained at all times.
• Ensuring that correct security training is carried out.
• Maintaining basic security details of the ship in case of emergency.
• Maintaining liaison with the ship security officers and all port security officers to ensure
the maximum protection of the ships.

Ship Security Officer

The Ship Security Officer is the officer on the ship who is specifically appointed to be
personally accountable for all aspects of security. He can be the master, but this is not the best solution.
Better that it is an officer selected by the Operator Security Officer or the master. In many companies
its either the Staff Captain or Chief Officer.
His responsibilities include:—
• Implementing and maintaining the Ship Security Plan.
• Proposing modifications to the Ship Security Plan to correct deficiencies and satisfy
changing requirements on the ship.
• Ensuring security awareness and vigilance on board.
• Ensuring that correct security training is carried out.
• Maintaining liaison both with the Operator Ship Security and the Port Security Officer to
ensure that their support is enlisted for the protection of his ship.
 Security Officer

More and more ships are now including, as a member of the crew, a professional Security
Officer. This has become necessary as the task of implementing the Ship Security Plan and controlling
a busy gangway does require expertise and time. It is important to note however that there is a great
deal of difference between the Ship Security Officer and the professional Security Officer. The former
is a senior officer selected because he has the status to be ‘personally accountable’ if there is a security
breach. The Security Officer is someone who carries out security policy.

Ship Security Plan

Having appointed the two people responsible for security, their first duty is to prepare a Ship
Security Plan. (See Annex Six.) This important document fulfils many functions. Primarily it is
designed to inform all concerned of the details of the Company Corporate Security Policy, and then
blend this Company Security Policy with the individual requirements of a particular ship. It has to
cover all the requirements of the IMO and relevant legislation, but care has to be taken in its
compilation, because it is also the document which, in the case of a terrorist or other violent incident,
may have to be presented to a Board of Enquiry, or passed to a plaintiff’s lawyers. It would be
embarrassing if the Ship Security Plan described systems and procedures which are not actually carried
out on the ship. It is therefore a document which has to be constantly amended and must accurately
reflect the actual security measures in force.

Security planning and the establishment of an intelligence system

The role of the Operator Security Officer is to avoid sailing his ship into a dangerous or loss
making situation. This can be done both strategically and tactically. His strategic advice is a vital
element in the planning and production of future sailing schedules. Sometimes there may be a clash
between the marketing executives who wish to sell their cruises and the Operator Security Officer who
advises caution and it may be for commercial reasons his advice not accepted. Happily the areas of
potential trouble generally coincide with areas that the public do not want to visit on holiday, but if it
has been decided that passengers would like to travel to certain locations and then trouble suddenly
erupts, the Operator Security Officer has a more acute responsibility to provide timely tactical
intelligence.
The advantage of a tactical intelligence capability is that ships can continue with their planned
routes but, if a problem suddenly arises, the ship can be diverted quickly to a more peaceful destination.
The Operator Security Officer needs to establish this capability for information gathering and
assessment at a very early stage. It takes time to formulate collection and assessment procedures and, as
intelligence of no use after the event, the intelligence system should be constructed in time of
tranquillity rather than at the moment of tension. The easiest way to do this is to tie in with a
recognised maritime information service like that provided by International Maritime Security.

Terrorist recognition

It makes sense to try and prevent the potential terrorist from ever getting as far as the ship. For a
commercial company handling hundreds of passengers the task of identifying potential suspects is
difficult. It can be done, and there are a host of governmental agencies tasked to help in this matter, but
it can be a sensitive and time consuming process.
The best solution is to rely on ‘self-help’ to obtain the cooperation of all employees in being
aware of abnormalities. To tell them how to detect abnormalities and then persuade them to report their
suspicions. There is an identifiable series of indicators which characterise a potential terrorist or
possible act of terrorism and if everyone, both ashore and afloat can be motivated to see these
indicators and then feel happy to report their suspicions, the security of everyone is improved
significantly.

Port security

All sea-going mariners would agree that it is far better for security checks to be carried out on
shore, where there is more time, more space, and more people, rather than wait until the ship arrives
and leave it to the responsibility of a very busy master. Certainly the IMO Guidelines and the Maritime
Security Legislation do place equal onus upon port and ship authorities to maintain high security
standards.
Around the worid however port security standards are very variable, and although it is correct
for the Operator Security Officer and the Ship Security Officer to complain about the security standards
in ports, the best advice is to set high standards of security at your own hull, and then ensure these high
standards are maintained. The bottom line is that ships have to protect themselves. They cannot rely on
somebody else.

Entry of people to the ship

Although it may appear that a ship is a vulnerable target, unless the terrorist launches an armed
attack from shore or another ship it is easier for the terrorist to board through an open access. In the
case of an armed attack from outside, there will be a degree of public sympathy for the ship as it is an
unarmed commercial vessel and it is difficult for merchant seamen to resist boarders firing machine
guns. Conversely however, given the public perception of security, if a terrorist manages to get on
board by walking unchecked up the gangway, or jumping through an unguarded bunker or provisions
station, it will be clear evidence that the standards of security on the ship are poor, and the company
and officers will be justifiably criticised. The answer is a matter of discipline; there must always be
enough people of appropriate rank and capability at each opening to maintain a proper watch, and if an
access is not being used—shut it.

Passes

People who wish to come on board can be categorised as crew, passengers, visitors or
stevedores. To enable the gangway watch to decide easily and correctly if the person is authorised to
come on board, a simple system of pass issue must be organised and then closely controlled. Ideally the
pass should include a photograph, sealed in a plastic container. There is often a tendency to clutter up
the pass with a lot of detail which makes it very difficult for the gangway watch to read, especially at
night or when the gangway is crowded. The most important element on the pass is to have a clear
EXPIRY DATE and/or a colour code which is changed at regular intervals.

Some people will however arrive at the gangway without a pass. This is the situation which can
create more tension and aggravation than any other facing the gangway watch. The whole value of the
security effort of the company can be lost by a few minutes of frenzied confrontation. The answer is a
simple rule, clearly understood by all who man the gangway:— ‘No one shall board this ship until they
are identified and authorised’. This has the great advantage that if an arrival does not have a valid pass,
the gangway watch are now told that they do not have the authority to allow boarding, but permission
has to be obtained from someone who has. It is the time for courtesy, firmness—and a smile.
 Searching

The problem of searching is a difficult and often delicate matter for the ship. The IMO, the
legislation, and above all the passengers and crew, expect that a sensible policy is adopted to ensure
that people do not smuggle arms, ammunition and explosives onto the ship. Apart from clandestine
methods, ie throwing packages over the side, goods have to come through openings in the side of the
ship. This means they will come on board, either carried on the person, in handheld baggage, in cabin
baggage or in stores.
Given the volume of traffic and the need for sensible passenger handling, the answer to
searching is a combination of random searching and equipment. To detect weapons carried on the body
there is no alternative to the metal detecting archway. Nothing else gives a more credible level of
detection and permits the necessary flow of people. There should also be a hand held metal detector, so
that if the archway alarms, the offending item can be identified without interrupting the flow of people.
Apart from dogs, which are still the most reliable form of detection, hand held vapour detecting
devices and enhanced X Ray machines are the only suitable equipments to detect explosives. These are
now almost mandatory on large cruise ships and, as time passes, will assuredly become an integral part
of any security system.
But all these types of equipment are valueless and a complete waste of money if the security
officer does not understand how to use them and, more importantly, know when to use them. There is
therefore a requirement for trained and experienced staff.
As the main threat to ships comes from people wishing to smuggle weapons and explosives on
board, random searching is a great deterrent. A terrorist does not wish to be caught with weapons
hidden in his luggage, he wants to use his weapons at the moment of his choice, not prematurely at the
gangway. If a clear impression is given therefore that security on the ship is taken seriously, and there
is a good chance of getting caught, it is highly likely that the terrorist will move away to try and board a
ship which has lower security standards. A simple rule is again appropriate —‘All items brought on
board this ship shall be liable to be searched’.
If one takes a negative approach, random searching can be classed as futile and haphazard, but
random searching used by an experienced security officer who has a ‘sixth sense’ about abnormality is
a most exciting and successful skill. (See Annex Seven.)

IMO restricted areas

Once on board the ship. security can be a very low key matter. Passengers and crew should be
able to relax or carry out their duties with the minimum of restriction. The IMO and the legislation has
however laid down certain requirements to be followed. These are that access to the bridge, the radio
room, the engine control room and the rear steering flat should be denied to unauthorised persons; this
can normally be achieved by the use of a lock system.
Simple though this may sound, it can create difficulties. Deck officers do not like to feel there
are restrictions obstructing them from walking easily outside to listen in fog, to judge distances or sense
the weather. Radio officers do not like the claustrophobic sensation of being locked in small shacks.
Chief engineers are rightly apprehensive about the conflicting requirements of safety and security in
case of any obstruction of their escape routes.
The answer is a balance of conflicting factors, but there are two conclusions. First that it is now
unacceptable for a ship to sail if it is not physically possible to deny unauthorised access to the IMO
designated restricted areas, eg if the locks have been removed. Secondly, the areas should certainly be
locked in port and at night. If these two principles are ignored there is no excuse.
 The IMO and the legislation also require other areas to be secure. Particularly those designated
‘vulnerable areas’, eg communication facilities, emergency generator rooms, hydraulic stations etc.
Again it is the responsibility of the Operator Security Officer and the Ship Security Officer to ensure
that at least there is the capability on the ship to secure these areas.

The discipline of locking

The locking of vulnerable areas and sensitive places on the ship does have other advantages. It
makes it more difficult to conceal illegal items and it is a positive help in the case of a bomb or drug
search. But there is often a natural reluctance to keep locking doors on a ship and unless there is firm
supervision they will be left open. The standard of locking on a ship is directly related to the standard
of discipline on a ship.

Annual ship security surveys

The IMO very sensibly added advice that there should be routine security surveys of the ships.
When an incident occurs, there is immediately great attention paid to security and people look very
carefully at procedures. However, as incidents are happily rare there is a natural temptation to allow
security procedures, which are often an inconvenient insertion into the routine of ship’s life, to be
gradually eroded. Locks become inoperative, pass systems get out of date and new crew arrive who do
not understand the Security Plan. The answer is the Annual Ship Security Survey.
This Annual Ship Security Survey based on the IMO Guidelines is best done as in any othcr
external audit by a professional. A copy of the resulting annual ship security report should be held on
the ship and can be shown to the Coast Guard or other regulatory authority as evidence of the way the
company is fulfilling its responsibilities.

Alert states

An essential element of the Ship Security Plan is a system of alert states. It is a well proven fact
that high standards of security cannot be maintained for long periods. There has to be guidance to the
master and crew of what has to be done in normal circumstances and what has to be done when tension
or risk increases. eg when visitinig a port where there has been rioting.
The UK Government has devised a system of States of Alert which covers five different levels
of preparedness and these are included at Annex four. For a ship however this may seem difficult and
confusing; the International Maritime Security (IMS) view is that it is more simple and effective to
have just two states—one ‘BLUE’ which is normal, the other ‘RED’ which means extra, pre-agreed,
measures are to be taken. lf ‘RED’ is decided upon, it must be reviewed every day and, given the
slightest easing of tension, the state reduced to ‘BLUE’.

Training

It cannot be emphasised too strongly that the most valuable asset in the protection of the ship is
the willing, knowledgeable and cooperative attitude of the cew. To gain this valuable asset however
does take an effort and there needs to be a planned training programme.

On the ship

This training falls naturally into different categories, there are the senior officers, other deck and
engineer officers, hotel staffs, those who have a particular responsibility for fulfilling a security role, eg
the gangway watch, and finally all members of the crew. It is unlikely that on the ship there will be the
capacity or knowledge to train all these categories, but it should be common practice that, just as now
as all crew members receive initial safety lectures and then follow up with practical safety exercises, so
they should be given initial security briefings and then follow up security exercises.
When carrying out the ‘bomb threat exercise’, a little imagination in the choice of concealing
places and the use of a real bottle of whisky to simulate an explosive device, is a good incentive in
producing a worthwhile security exercise.

On the shore

One of the most crucial aspects of the IMO Guidelines and the maritime security legislation is
that two men, the Operator Security Officer and the Ship Security Officer now have specific
responsibilities, and will be held personally accountable, in the case of an incident.
It would be unfair and irresponsible of a company to give their employees this specific
responsibility without allowing them to receive training as to the implications of their appointment. The
reading of the regulations and books such as this, provide a framework of knowledge, but, just like
every aspect of maritime life, if a man is given additional responsibilities he should also be given
training in how to fulfil these responsibilities. As the months go past and the implications of the
legislation become more apparent, so it has to be accepted that on shore security training must become
as routine as safety training.
In line with this concept International Maritime Security and the Southampton Institute of
Higher Education at Warsash now run joint courses which enable a scenario to be set which can bring
out the essential features of both security and safety training.
This course pays particular attention to the ‘human factor’ involved in a security/safety crisis
situation, because recent experience has shown that when an emergency occurs, some crew may decide
it is more sensible to go straight to a lifeboat, rather than descend to a lower deck to take up a
designated emergency position.
Experience also shows that senior officers, who are well used to facing a sudden safety crisis,
for example one arising from fog, huge seas or engine room fires, find it extremely stressful when
dealing with a possible bomb or terrorist attack. Similarly, the Operator Security Officer on shore, often
appointed for administrative reasons, can find the pressure of dealing with intense worldwide media
interest, worried relatives and legal and political problems, a most difficult task.
The course, which is called the Maritime Safety and Disaster Control Course, as well as
covering conventional fire fighting and lifesaving also deals with topics such as how threats and
warnings are received, how they are perceived both on shore and at sea, what people believe about
warnings and the individual and group response to warnings. It also includes the emotional reactions to
shock, panic, death and rescue.
 CHAPTER SIX

CONTINGENCY PLANS
The IMO Guidelines and recent maritime legislation also states that the ship should prepare
contingency plans so that in an emergency people, both ashore and afloat know what to do.
This is in fact an easy requirement for mariners, as such plans have long been a necessary part
of ship management. All ships are required to have emergency plans and these are tested regularly both
within the ship, and by various statutory authorities. The new contingency plans can follow the same
lines, but do have distinctive and unique features.

The bomb search plan

While it is true that the chance of a ship experiencing a terrorist attack is low, this cannot be
said for the chance of a ship receiving the message— ‘A bomb has been placed on board your ship’.
These are occasions when everyone looks to the master for guidance. He has two choices:— he can
take action, or he can ignore the warning. Given the very small number of actual bombs in relation to
the frequency of bomb threats, there is a temptation to do nothing.

If he ignores the threat however and then a bomb explodes with resultant casualties, there will
be much criticism and the world will judge the master very severely.
The first principle is therefore:
Do something, and the thing to do is search.
Given the many ways by which terrorists can disguise explosives, it is almost impossible for a
crewman to determine that what he is looking at is indeed a genuine device. The secret is to search the
area, not looking for a bomb, but looking for an item, be it a package, box or bag that is not usually in
that location. The search must therefore be carried out by the person who works in the area and is
capable of deciding whether the object is abnormally placed. This means that the existing emergency
plan is of little use, as crewmen are often allocated to areas where they do not work. Teams of officers
with the bosun are again not really effective, as these people, although often the most trustworthy and
competent men on the ship, are not familiar with the normal contents of a particular room or locker.
The Ship Security Plan should therefore include a chapter clearly explaining who is responsible for
searching each part of the ship, and what they do if they find something.
The second principle is EYES NOT FINGERS, if a suspicious item is found the crewman
involved must be very clear that they should not touch it, but report the discovery. The master, when
told about a suspicious item, then has a choice to make and no company rule can tell him what to do.
He has a range of options.
If the message has been passed to him, for example from the police, and he has found
something suspicious, it would be sensible to return to the nearest port and seek assistance. If the
message has been received in an unconvincing way, for example by a drunken voice from a bar, then
he might decide to continue his journey but evacuate the area and take the emergency precautions given
in the Ship Security Plan.
Many ships now have a blast suppression blanket on board to use in this type of situation. It
may cause the professional expert a problem later on, but it does provide some protection against blast
and flying glass for people on the ship.
 Finally a master may decide to throw the suspect item over board. This cannot be recommended
by any book on security, but it does happen. If he does decide this course of action however, the master
should use an approved bomb line (see picture on page 18).

The drug search plan

Part of the Sea Carrier Initiative Programme is to show the authorities that there has been a
continuing interest shown by the ship in the prevention of drug smuggling. There should therefore be a
standard procedure laid down whereby at frequent, but different intervals, random searches are carried
out for drugs. This type of search is totally different from the bomb search. It is positively EYES AND
FINGERS, although extreme care must be taken given the HIV hazard if pricked by a dirty needle.
Whereas searching for bombs need not involve the unscrewing of panels or putting hands in
water cisterns, this is not the case for a drug search. Here there is a requirement for a specially trained
team, probably including engineer and electrical officers who need search tools (see picture on page
18) and knowledge of past drug hiding places on board ships. These details, plus the important point
that if a cabin is to be searched then the occupant must be present, should be included in the Ship
Security Plan.

Sabotage

The threat does exist that someone might wish to sabotage the ship by causing an explosion, a
fire or damaging a specific piece of equipment. The difference from a terrorist attack is that there are
no hostages. The target is therefore generally a ship of a particular nationality, a company that has
offended some individual or a ship carrying a particular passenger.
The saboteur is probably unwilling to risk his own life or freedom in committing his crime and
will try to smuggle the device on board in stores or provisions. It is extremely difficult to guard against
this type of attack, but again the threat has to be kept in proportion; even the most sensitive naval
vessels, like nuclear submarines, do not open every can of beans to see if it conceals explosive. The
answer is a sense of awareness, ability to spot the abnonnal, and random searching.
It is comforting that this type of delayed action attack is in fact a very blunt instrument, it is not
easy to gauge where and when the device will explode, and every ship is designed to survive
underwater holing. It is very difficult indeed to sink a ship from an internal explosion. Its effects are
therefore, often more symbolic than real, although a ship carrying a highly sensitive or inflammable
cargo will obviously be more at risk.
Saboteurs have also attacked ships from the outside by gaining access to the hull from a vessel
alongside, a passing small boat, a jetty or from underwater. Likely targets are the main engine cooling
water intake, ‘A’ brackets, propeller shafts or rudder. Such attacks are not easy to mount and require
technical skill outside the capabilities of all but the most sophisticated terrorist group. If there is a fear
about this happening however, precautions can be taken by having divers examine the hull, by
patrolling the waters around the ship, by keeping the screw turning and by additional outside lighting.
Sabotage can also be committed from the inside, by someone on board. The scope for this is
considerable and it can be very effective. The introduction of sand, stones, abrasives, pollutants or
adulterants into oil filters and bearings, the starting of a fire or flood, the cutting of cables or the
insertion of a computer virus, are relatively easy actions and protection is difficult. It is an example of
the professional security officers greatest worry, ‘The enemy within’.
To guard against internal sabotage the routine locking of sensitive areas is helpful, but the real
answer is the vetting of employees. For a shipping company this poses its own problems. On the one
hand, knowledge about a person’s past life is a great help before offering employment, but in the Free
World there are a growing number of legal restrictions to prevent the infringement of people’s civil
liberties and it is becoming more and more difficult to discover the facts about prospective employees.
One thing should be done however before offering an important managerial or financial post, the
referees should be taken up. If a senior person is to be employed, it may also prove cost effective, in the
long run, to have someone visit the referees and ensure the facts are correct. At the moment, however,
for the multitude of different nationalities who provide the bulk of the hotel side of the industry there is
no real solution.

Assault

It is probably inappropriate for the ship to have a detailed contingency plan dealing with a
terrorist assault. But there are certain principles which need to be included in the Ship Security Plan.
First, the experience from all maritime terrorist attacks prove that initial violent reaction to an armed
terrorist is not only highly dangerous, but also ineffective. Once the decision has been made that the
attack really is by a group of armed terrorists, and not by a drunken or drug crazed individual, it is
overwhelmingly good sense to comply with the orders given by the terrorists.
This is not the natural reaction of many maritime officers who, although naturally alarmed by
the terrorist shouts and shots, have an immediate and correct desire to prevent these wicked people
from taking over their ship.
The facts are, however, that this is not the wisest policy. The adrenaline of the terrorists will be
at a high level, they will wish to demonstrate that they intend to dominate the ship by force, they will
be carrying automatic weapons and be confident in their use; the ship’s officer who runs to a safe and
retrieves a pistol, which he may not have fired for many years, is in a very vulnerable position. It is also
very problematical if an exchange of fire will ever defeat a terrorist attack. Given the thin partitions on
many ships the likelihood of a passenger or crew being shot is considerable.
Other factors are also relevant, the ship is a part of the sovereign territory of its flag and subject
to the law of the country of register. This country may have stringent laws regarding the use of
firearms, and although the ship may be sailing in international waters it could mean that an officer who
shot a terrorist would be liable to a charge of manslaughter or even murder.
The experience of insurance claims following the Achi lie Lauro also shows that if there is a
shooting incident, there will inevitably be a host of legal and financial claims, particularly from citizens
of the United States. Whilst this must not be the prime factor in deciding whether to arm the ship, it is a
commercial consideration.
The dilemma is that, given the large number of weapons available to criminals, is it common
sense not to have firearms on board? It could mean that a single armed thief might be able to dominate
and then rob a large passenger ship. One answer is to retain professional security officers who are
trained and equipped to deal with a weapons situation, although this can be expensive.
Putting weapons on a ship is a management decision and, based on their assessment of the
threat, some companies do give their masters firearms. They feel that the master should have the
capability on board to respond to an armed intruder, but then leave it to his discretion whether to
actually open fire. This is a dangerous compromise. The best solution is to give the master the correct
security training and security equipment to help him ensure that any illegal weapons do not get on
board his ship in the first place.
In conclusion, if there is a terrorist assault, it remains the main responsibility of the master to
bring his ship safely home with the lives and limbs of his passengers and crew intact. Time is on the
side of the hostages, and although it may appear at face value that this policy of complying with the
terrorists is weak and unimaginative, it is in fact a planned strategy which requires skill, patience and
courage.
The United States Armed Forces have a very wise policy statement distilled from a great deal of
thought, debate and experience. It is designed to help those servicemen unfortunate enough to find
themselves as prisoners of war, the same simple statement can provide similar guidance for a mariner
caught in a terrorist situation— ‘Survive with Honour’.
 CHAPTER SEVEN

ACTION TO BE TAKEN IF THE SHIP IS TAKEN OVER BY FORCE

Background

On a passenger vessel it is probable that terrorists will attempt to seize the ship by boarding as
innocent passengers and then selecting the ideal moment from their point of view.
For non passenger vessels, terrorists may attempt to seize the ship either by a ruse, eg by
creating a ‘ship in distress’ situation or by a rule of the road infringement which obliges the ship to
stop. It is possible that the ship could be taken by armed force whilst in port but this is less likely. If the
ship is taken over by a terrorist group the following recommendations apply:
First ensure the safety of the ship in accordance with maritime practice.
Then broadcast a distress message if possible. Authentication procedures can be prepared in
advance to alert shore authorities and your company to the possibility that radio messages are being
sent under duress.
Offer reasonable cooperation. Terrorists are likely to be very highly strung and trigger-happy at
the start of the incident. The tension can best be lowered by the master and officers acting normally.
The dangers of provocations are real. Among the hijackers there could be a psychopath who is
seeking an excuse to kill. This excuse could be deliberately created or arise from a misunderstanding.
Abuse or aggression should not be returned.
It is unlikely that hijackers will fully understand how a ship works. They will be naturally
suspicious about routine operations—even the simple procedures for altering course—and will need
reassurance that no subterfuge is being planned against them. They are also unlikely to be fully aware
of any safety requirements which might be associated with the cargo.
At an early stage in the incident, try to establish what group of terrorists is involved.
It is wrong to seek or suggest to the hijacker, who may be no more than a stowaway or mentally
deranged, that he may have political or financial demands or a specific deadline. However, if the
hijacker(s) is a terrorist, it is essential to know what his demands are and what deadlines have been set
for meeting them. Demands may be passed by accomplices ashore and your incident may be linked
with another elsewhere.
It is to be assumed that the incident will be prolonged. This is in your interest since the record
shows that the longer hostage-taking incidents drag on, the more likely they are to end without injury to
the hostages.
You and your crew will feel isolated during the incident, as you will be unaware of steps being
taken by your company/government on your behalf. This sense of isolation can lead to antagonism
against your own authorities and sympathy for the terrorists, unless those involved mentally prepare
themselves against these feelings. Every effort will be made to end the incident with the utmost
emphasis on the preservation of life and personal safety of all innocent parties involved.
On the other hand, establishment of a reasonable rapport between hostages and captors is likely
to reduce the chances of the terrorists acting violently against their hostages.
At some stage in the incident a confrontation between the terrorists and outside authorities is
likely. Before this confrontation, an opportunity may arise or may be created to pass information about
the hijackers. The authorities would like to know how many there are, their descriptions, sex, how they
are armed, how they deploy themselves, how they communicate with each other, the language(s)
spoken and understood, their standard of competence and their level of vigilance.
The establishment of a secure, direct negotiation channel between the terrorists and Government
negotiators is an essential step towards ending the incident successfully and peacefully. Ideally, the
master and his crew should avoid being directly involved in the negotiations but, if forced to take part,
should simply relay the dialogue back and forth. The master will probably need to explain the
difficulties of setting up and maintaining communication over long distances at sea and the problems
stemming from different time-zones, etc. Genuine arguments of this sort help impose authentic delays
which work to the advantage of the hostages.
Wherever and whenever possible, the hijackers should be encouraged to surrender peacefully
and should be discouraged from mistreating either passengers or crew.
Following the incident, the master and his crew should avoid talking to the Press and other
media persons about the Government’s methods of resolving the incident.
Military action may be taken in order to recapture the vessel. In the event or in anticipation of
military action, at an appropriate time the master and crew should instruct passengers in the following
terms:
• Do NOT react to strangely dressed newcomers among you.
• Do NOT attract attention to any unusual activity you see.
• If you hear shooting or the loud command GET DOWN, you should immediately lie
face down on the deck, cover your ears, close your eyes and slightly open your mouth.
Stay in this position and do not get up or move until the assault is ended and the ‘all
clear’ is given.
• If you hear the loud command STAND STILL, then freeze immediately or you are in
danger of being shot.
• If you know where terrorist bombs or weapons are located, inform a member of the
military assault force as soon as possible.
• Do NOT shelter or hide terrorists.
• Do NOT take photographs of the military assault force.
Note: It has to be accepted that this type of advice, given to limit the impact of a terrorist
assault, is also known to the terrorists. This is not all that important. To use a sporting analogy
‘Everyone knows the rules of football—but there is still a winner.’ If those on board the ship are able to
discern and analyse terrorist actions, it is a positive way by which they can help control their own fears
and responses.
 CHAPTER EIGHT

ANTI DRUG SMUGGLING PROTECTION MEASURES

In a positive attempt to reduce the level of drug smuggling into the United States, the US
Customs have formulated a Carrier Initiative Programme designed to ‘deter smugglers of tUegal drugs
from utilising commercial vessels as corweyancesfor their commodities’.
Provided a company can show that they have taken careful steps to implement the undertakings
in the signed agreement, it should influence the customs authority favourably in the final determination
of any penalty if drugs are found. Carriers can only avoid or reduce their exposure to fines by
demonstrating that they have exercised ‘the highest degree of care and diligence’ to prevent the ship
being used for drug smuggling.
To back up this Carrier Initiative Programme, the US Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1986 provides
severe penalties for those found guilty of carrying illegal drugs to the US. Similar legislation has been
enacted by a number of other countries.

Assessment of vulnerability

Ten years ago it was relatively easy to identify known drug source countries. Since then the
increased demand for drugs, the huge profits to be made and the effects of law enforcement lead to the
conclusion that few ports in the world can be considered safe.
Certain countries however appear in connection with drug offences more often than others:
Aruba, the Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Curacao, the Dominican Republic,
Equador. Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Morocco, Panama, Peru, Spain and Venezuela.
When assessing the level of anti drug precautions to be taken, the master should
obtain as much information as possible to help him gauge the level of the threat.
• Is it known to be an active drug port?
• Is it a known trans shipment port?
• Is it located in a known drug trans shipment country?
• Is it located in a country contiguous with a drug source country?

People

Illegal drugs have one thing in common. They will not conceal themselves in provisions or
cargo, they will not wrap themselves around a body or pack themselves in hand and cabin baggage, nor
crawl inside false walls or ceilings. Illegal drugs require people to move them.

Crew involvement

There are two basic methods in which vessels may be used for drug smuggling. The first
method involves an organised conspiracy.
The organised conspiracy generally moves large quantities—ie 10 to several hundred kilograms
of marijuana, cocaine, or heroin. These conspiracies involve several, if not all, crew members.
Concealment techniques are usually highly sophisticated, since the conspirators have had ample time to
hide carefully the illegal drugs. The detection is likely to require substantial time and effort and the use
of tools. The concealment location is likely to be a primary vessel system, such as the engine room,
tanks, voids, compartments, or other internal or external vessel areas.
 The second method involves the individual entrepreneur. He usually moves small quantities, ie
several ounces to five or six kilograms of illegal drugs. He usually operates alone or with at most one
or two confederates. Concealment techniques will not usually be sophisticated, since the smuggler will
not have had a great deal of time to operate unobserved. Detection is not likely to require a great deal
of time, effort, or the use of more than a screwdriver or wrench. The concealment location is likely to
be an area where no one person has unique access but where few are likely to go.
People involving themselves in drug smuggling tend to exhibit certain characteristics:
Nervous or suspicious behaviour.
Display unusually large amounts of money.
Are in possession of unusually expensive clothes and equipment.
Wear out of season clothing.
Wear bulky clothing or have bulges in clothing.
Take an unusual interest in particular areas, cargoes or tools.

Searches

The best protection against the carriage of illegal drugs is to prevent it from boarding. This
means that random search patterns are to be implemented in connection with drugs.
Also on a random basis, or in response to a particular drug threat, searches of the vessel should
take place.
Each time a drug search is carried out, this fact should be recorded in the log.

Drug search plan procedures

A Drug Search Team should be formed under the direction of the Ship Security Officer and
composed of senior representatives from all departments. The chief engineer should be asked for his
full cooperation, because searching is more practical and less damaging if engineer staff are employed.
Where possible, Search Team members should not search areas where they specifically work or
live and, as far as is practicable, team members should search living and working spaces of crew
members in job categories other than their own.
The Team should have the following equipment:
Flashlights and fresh batteries
Screwdrivers, wrenches and crowbars
Mirrors and probes as contained in the IMS Search Kit
Gloves, hardhats and non-skid footwear
Evidence preservation bags/envelopes
Report forms.
The following areas have been used to hide drugs;

Deck department:
Bridge, radio room
Lifeboats
Storage and paint lockers
Swimming pools
Dunnage
Cargo holds
Booms and cranes.
Hotel department:
Galley, dining, and common areas
Passenger staterooms, if applicable
Bonded stores, lockers, slop chest
Freezers and cold storage compartments
Bulk and dry food storage compartments
Crew quarters and officers’ staterooms.

Engineering department:
Maintenance and storage lockers
Elevator shafts, machinery spaces
Bilges
Shaft alley
Steering machinery
Tanks and voids
Ships’ spares.

Some particular hiding places used to conceal drugs, are illustrated below:

Cabins:
Back sides and underneath drawers
Between bottom drawer and deck
Beneath bunk, eg taped behind wall, under mattress
Under wash basin
Inside radios, recorders etc
Ventilator ducts
Inside heater units
Above or behind light fixtures
Above ceiling and behind wall panels or in cutouts.

Companionways:
Ducts
Wire harnesses
Railings
Fire extinguishers
Fire hoses and compartments
On top of watertight doors
Access panels in floors, walls, ceilings
Behind or inside water coolers, igloos.

Toilets and showers:

Behind and under wasbbasins
Behind toilets
In shower heads
In ventilation ducts and heaters
Toilet tissue rollers, towel dispensers. supply lockers
Taped to shower curtains, exposed piping, and light fixtures
Access panels in floors, walls, ceiling.
Deck:
Ledges on deck housing, electrical switch rooms, winch control panels
Lifeboat storage compartments, under coiled rope, in deck storage rooms
Paint cans, cargo holds, battery rooms, chain lockers
Under swimming pools, inside pool liners.

Engine room:
Under deck plates
Cofferdams, machinery pedestals, bilges
Journal-bearing shrouds and sumps on propeller shaft
Under catwalk, in bilges, in shaft alley
Escape ladders and ascending areas
In elevator shafts, and machinery rooms
In ventilation ducts, attached to piping or in tanks with false gauges
Equipment boxes, emergency steering rooms, storage spaces.

Galleys and stewards’ stores:

Flour bins and dry stores
Vegetable sacks, canned foods (reglued labels)
Under or behind standard refrigerators
Inside fish or sides of beef in freezers
Bonded store lockers, slop chest, storage rooms.
 ACTION WHEN DRUGS ARE FOUND AT SEA
Guidance

In the absence of any specific company guidance, seek directions from the company whenever
drugs or suspected drugs are discovered on board. Notify the authorities at the next port of call by radio
BEFORE entering territorial waters.

Safety considerations

All drugs are extremely dangerous and some can even be absorbed through the skin. The
following points must therefore be observed to ensure personal safety when a suspected substance is
discovered:
• Do not feel, handle or touch the substance without skin protection and face mask.
• Do not inhale powders, fumes or vapours.
• Do not rush your actions.
• Do not smoke near the substances or expose to heat or flame.
• Under no circumstances taste, eat or drink the suspected substance.
• Always wash your hands and brush your clothing free of any contamination as soon as
possible.
• Ensure adequate ventilation and safe electric lighting when storing large quantities in a
secure area.

Specific guidance

Get another officer to witness the position of the suspected package or substance and
subsequent actions taken. If possible take photographs of the substance as found.
Handle as little as possible and remember that there may be fingerprint evidence. Taking
handling precautions, remove the goods to a safe place under lock and key. Guard if necessary.
Record any discovery in the ship’s log. lnclude as much detail as possible; date, time, place
found, approximate quantity, person detecting, names of witnesses etc.
Secure any wrapping and anything else found in the space.
Consider searching similar locations and spaces.
Write a report as soon after the event as possible. Cover everything that occurred. A sketch plan
of the space and area often proves helpful. It is also useful to record why the particular location was
inspected (eg servicing of winches). Include any suspicious activity noticed. The report should be
signed by the witnessing officer and the master or head of department, with the date and time.
Do not allow anyone to leave the vessel until interviewed by the appropriate authority in the
port of arrival.
Notify the boarding officer as soon as the vessel docks.

INDICATORS TO ASSIST IN THE IDENTIFICATION OF DRUG ABUSE

In a community as closely confined as the crew of a cruise liner the presence of a drug abuser
amongst the crew could have a dramatically adverse affect on the morale and efficiency of the
remaining crew members.
Drugs create an increasing reliance on them and the drug abuser will often become unable from
his or her normal financial resources to pay for the addiction. The abuser is then compelled to obtain
funds from some other source. It is therefore essential that indications of drug abuse are identified as
early as possible for corrective action to be taken. Some of the early indications are:
• A dramatic increase in pilferage.
• Empty pill or medicine bottles and used syringes in rubbish bins or wastebaskets.
• The smell of burning rope in washrooms or hallways.
• Sudden behaviour changes in otherwise stable crew members.
• Erratic changes in emotion or activity by formeriy stable crew members.
• Degeneration of performance levels.

Physical symptoms

Some of the physical symptoms that supervisors and officers should be aware of and able to
recognise include:
• The wearing of sun-glasses at inappropriate times—to cover dilated or constricted pupils
of the eyes.
• The wearing of long sleeves at all times—to cover injection sores.
• Users of depressants such as barbiturates usually show signs of alcohol intoxication—
slurred speech, staggering etc.
• Users of amphetamines (stimulants) show signs of excessive activity. excitability, or
irritability and heavy perspiration.
• The pupils of the eyes may also be dilated even in bright light. These drugs may also
cause unusual bad breath and chapped or cracked lips. Complexion problems may also
become evident. Excessive nervousness may also lead to itching, chain smoking or
talkativeness.
• The most obvious symptoms of heroin abuse are injection marks and constricted pupils.
Frequent trips to toilets or cabin and excessive secrecy about possessions are also
indicators. After injecting heroin the abuser may become drowsy and lethargic.
• Marihuana cigarettes rolled in paper and normally crimped at both ends are usually
smoked in groups. The smoke of marihuana is recognisable by its odour, like that of
burning rope. The users of marihuana normally display symptoms of talkativeness,
bursts of hilarity and distortions of time and space. There is also some loss of co-
ordination and the eyes may become bloodshot. As the drug wears off, drowsiness and
lassitude comes on.
• Abusers of hallucinogens normally appear to be in trance like state. The most common
other symptom is the dilation of pupils. There are also some mental side effects, but
these are unpredictable; the abuser may experience exhilaration, an urge to self
destruction and sheer panic! “Flashback” effect may also occur possible up to some
weeks after use without further taking of the drugs.

Cautionary note

Supervisors and officers should be aware of the fact that many other explanations could be
given for an individual to display some of the symptoms listed above. For example one of the most
possible in the circumstances in which you are operating is simple tiredness or fatigue.
A simple rule is that any supervisor or officer who thinks he may have identified a possible drug
abuser is that a second opinion should be sought before concluding a person is a drug abuser.
 CHAPTER NINE

SECURITY MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IF ENTERING HOSTILE WATERS

Although wherever possible ships should be diverted to avoid dangerous areas, there is a
possibility that a sudden outbreak of hostilities would involve the ship unexpectedly. The risks of this
are minimal but if it happened the following paragraphs would be of use. (Based on Seaways.)

Risk of attack
The risk of attack can come from:—-

Missile
i) Aircraft launched (fixed wing or helicopter) air to surface.
ii) Ship, fast patrol boat, hydrofoil or hovercraft launched surface to surface.
Missiles can be controlled remotely by radar, television,wire guided or can be self seeking to
heat, radar or radio emissions. The effects of a missile hit are multiple, depending on the type fired,
some are high explosives whilst others are incendiary or perhaps in some conflicts more sinister,
carrying germ or chmical warfare agents.

Torpedo—launched by:
i) Submarine
ii) Fast attack craft.
Torpedoes will either be straight running unguided, wire guided or self seeking using noise
emissions from the target. The effects of a torpedo hit are large underwater explosion, fire, flooding,
certain disablement and often the sinking of the ship.

Gun fire
i) From aircraft
ii) From surface ships and craft
iii) From shore batteries
Gunfire will be heavy naval guns or small arms, including 30mm tracer shells from both aircraft
cannon and Bofors guns.

Mines
i) Tethered contact
ii) Acoustic)
iii) Magnetic) Ground static, rolling or walking type
iv) Pressure)
v) Free floating/drifting contact or as in ii), iii), iv)
vi) Mines can also be delayed action riser/alarming.
Mined areas are usually well known, but there are instances of indiscriminate mining (such as
the RED SEA in 1984) and occasions when mines have broken free and are found floating well outside
the known mined area. Usually these when seen on the surface are rusty and look similar in appearance
to 40 gallon oil drums.

Bombs
i) Aircraft launched at both high and low level or lobbed by ‘stand off’ aircraft.
 PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES TO BE TAKEN PRIOR TO ENTERING THE
DANGER AREA
When free trading in war zones and twilight areas masters must always ensure that they have a
full manifest of cargo carried, and have on the bridge readily available a comprehensive list of cargo.
When challenged by a belligerent naval patrol the comprehensive list of cargo should be passed by
VHF giving details of flag, port of departure, an&destination. If the patrol wish to board no resistance
must be given and all cooperation afforded, including passing ship’s papers and manifest for
inspection. Once boarded the company should be informed as soon as possible, if not immediately, by
the fastest and most secure method. Masters are warned that if the vessel is trading to a port of one of
the belligerents it may be considered a belligerent itself and therefore subject to attack or arrest.
Masters should also give consideration to painting the flag States’ national colours on the ship’s side
and/or wheelhouse top. They should also wear the largest national ensign to be found in the ship’s flag
locker.

Lifeboats/lifesaving

1. Initial preparations
i) Check condition and number of lifeboat covers carried.
ii) Check lifeboat stores, both quantities and quality.
iii) Consider placing extra provision, water and blankets in lifeboats.
iv) Place emergency navigation equipment (chart, pencils, dividers etc) in
appropriate spaces readily transferable to lifeboats or liferafts if required.
v) Check lifeboat engines, bring forward scheduled maintenance.
vi) Check lifeboat ladders, manropes, painters.
vii) Consider stowing spare lifejackets on bridge, engine room, radio etc.
viii) Check each individual lifejacket for condition, ensure owner understands
wearing instructions.
ix) Ship evacuation drills are essential.
x) Check stock of survival suits (if any carried).

2. Final preparations
i) Consider placing deck lifelines.
ii) Rig lifeboat painter, manropes and, if practicable, lower overside ladders to
above waterline.
iii) Place extra medical stores, first-aid kits in lifeboats.
iv) All personnel should be briefed on survival techniques, and in particular on the
dangers and methods of reducing hypothermia.

Darken ship

1. i) Rig darken ship screen at all accommodation entrances/exits to the weatherdecks.

ii) Cover all scuttles/portholes with black plastic (fire hazard) or insulation tape.
iii) Consider painting both sides of windows for which there are no curtains,
deadlights or shutters to assist with darkening ship.
iv) Inspect outward appearance of ship in darkness.

2. i) Remove fuses from upperdeck lighting and cargo working lights.

Fire fighting/damage control

1. i) Check holdings and serviceability of damage control stores (shores/pads, saws,

drills, hammers, nails etc), if possible provide extra timber.
ii) Check complete breathing apparatus (cylinders, safety harness, gloves etc) ensure
that spare cylinders arc topped up.
iii) Check all fire extinguishers and ensure spares are readily available.
iv) Check fire fighting suits for condition, consider purchasing spare suits.
v) Check all hoses, hydrants, nozzles. Bring forward scheduled maintenance.
vi) Check condition of automatic sprinklers and associated alarm systems.
Check smoke detecting alarms.
vii) Consider landing all unrequired flammable stores (paint, luboil, turps etc).
viii) Reduce paper on notice boards to an absolute minimum.
ix) Take positive measures to preserve fresh water supplies.
x) Ensure paint, brushes, rollers, trays, turps etc are all stowed and secured
properly. Paint pots tightly capped by undamaged lids.
xi) Increased emergency drills for the whole crew approaching the danger area.
Some exercise drills to be held at night. Smoke divers to be trained for the
search of missing persons.
xii) Check all ventilator flaps emergency ventilation stops and engine room
working satisfactorily.
2. i) Remove cabin curtains (where they do not impair ability of the ship to
darken fully).
ii) Stow all surplus furniture and dunnage etc.
iii) Stow all unsecured pictures etc.
iv) Stow all loose deck gear in appropriate lockers or store rooms.
v) Remove items likely to give off toxic fumes in the event of fire, remembering
the great danger from mattresses and cushions filled with synthetic
materials, especially in confined spaces.
vi) Ensure where possible all tables, chairs and stools etc are secured to the
deck, or lashed to an upright.
vii) Remove all loose lamp shades.
viii) Remove all unattached carpets, rugs, mats and towels.
ix) Check all alleyways are clear of all obstructions.
x) Check emergency internal accommodation lighting, if held.
xi) Ensure all interior doors, manholes and other openings are closed and,
where appropriate, dogged, and only opened briefly for access.
xii) Keep all watertight openings closed to the extent possible.
xiii) All porthole/scuttle deadlights should be battened down, and all windows
should be shuttered (where possible).
xiv) Remove all glass shelves, cabinet glass front etc, tape all glass (which cannot
be removed) and windows (which cannot be shuttered),
xv) Bridge windows and cabin portholes made of armoured or toughened glass
need not be taped.
xvi) Consider erecting smoke screen curtains in long alleyways.
xvii) All lightweight glass (shaving cabinet mirrors, glass fronted book
cupboards, drinking glasses, bottles, jars, notice boards etc) should be
 removed completely and stowed safely, or ditched overside.
xviii) All glass which is integral to the ship and cannot be removed should be
covered completely with strong masking tape, leaving no glass exposed.
xiv) Rig firefighting equipment (including pumps or equipment in accessible
areas). Rig hoses on deck.
xx) Fire can be initiated through heat transfer from one compartment to
another. Rig hoses for internal cooling purposes including engine room.

Medical

1. i) Check all first aid stocks.

ii) Arrange blood groupings for all personnel on board.
iii) Send list of persons on board to company head office.
iv) Consider making wills of all personnel on board.
v) Ensure hospital is clean, habitable and well equipped.
vi) Check stretchers, oxygen, anaesthetics, drugs etc.
vii) Check there is sufficient bedding.
viii) Consider site of alternative sick bay.
2. i) Shave off all beards, and preferably keep hair to a minimum.
ii) Identify areas for assembly of personnel in emergencies and for dealing with
potential casualties, and stock these areas with first-aid equipment.
NOTE: These are emergency muster positions and not to be confused with
the muster positions mentioned before.
iii) Rig emergency lighting source in hospital.

Radio

1. i) Check serviceability and availability of all emergency communications

equipment.
ii) Check all spares for electronic equipment and bring forward scheduled
maintenance.
2. i) Check TX/RX antenna and securing points.
ii) Check radar scanners (clearance from halliards, flags etc).
iii) Check halliards and securing points.
iv) Ensure books, publications and papers are secured properly within radio
room and radio storeroom.

Refuse

i) Provide stock of sacks for rubbish removal.

Engineering/electrical

i) All machinery is to be in working order where possible.

ii) All scheduled maintenance is to be brought forward where practicable.

Clothing

i) Ensure personnel are issued with survival equipment and fire resistant
 clothing. Preferably personnel should wear cotton (non synthetic) coveralls,
such that all parts of arms and legs are covered. Non nylon underwear and
socks. Shoes or boots—not sandals or slippers. If possible something should
cover the head, it is suggested a cotton cloth or old cotton shirt which can
be soaked in water and wrapped around the head if coming under attacks.
Gloves to cover the hands.
ii) In danger areas, clothing should be appropriate for the climate, but
personnel should remain fully clothed with the absolute minimum of skin
exposed.

Action
i) ‘Take cover’ drill in the event of an air attack or missile attack.
ii) Lie down on the deck, one arm over, one arm under the head.
iii) Eyes shut, mouth open.
iv) Ensure no part of the person is in contact with vertical structure of the ship.

PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES ON ENTERING THE DANGER AREA

Electronic silence

i) Electronic emissions, whether by radio or radar, can assist to guide a potential

attacker to their targets.
ii) In areas where assaults on shipping have occurred, electronic emissions should
be kept to a minimum. Restrict use of VHF, even on board ‘walkie talkies’.
iii) Radars to be on ‘stand by’ using short ‘sweeps’ is a method to reduce electronic
emissions, whilst at the same time navigational safety is preserved.

Navigation

i) Fewer attacks are known to take place during darkness. Some charter operators
instruct vessels to pass into ‘War Zones’ and ‘Twilight Areas’ in darkness.
Vessel transits might be scheduled accordingly.
ii) Navigational lights and other safety light signals should always be visible in
darkness, unless otherwise instructed by maritime authorities in the area, or if the
vessel should come under attack.
iii) Masters should be guided by Naval authorities and ‘Notices to Mariners’ on
which routes to take.

Good visual lookout

i) Watch out for evidence that the ship is under surveillance from either aircraft or
surface vessels.
ii) Watch out for low flying helicopters/aircraft near the horizon. Visual lookout
should be all round and continuous, with particular attention being paid to the
horizon and 50 above it.
iii) Vessels under surveillance suggest that potential attacks may take place within
the subsequent two hours, and masters might consider some of the measures
outlined whilst ensuring that personnel are not subsequently caught in the open.
 iv) Be aware that the launch of the sea-skimming missile is accompanied by a visible
flash and smoke.
v) Detection of a sea-skimming missile is difficult to achieve until the last moments
of flight when the motor smoke trail may be visible.

Firefighting—emergency controls

i) Have fire pumps on line.

ii) Seawater spraying (also for the purpose of cooling down hull structures) through
fire extinguishing appliances and hoses running.
iii) Air-conditioning systems and fans to be shut down in emergencies.
iv) Smoking should not be permitted if an attack or a suspected attack is imminent.

Crew safety

i) Have as many of the crew as possible high in the ship, at or above the weather
deck.
ii) Make vessel’s stay in War Risk exclusion zone as short as possible.
iii) Maintain increased radio listening watches.
iv) Restrict on deck working.
v) Ensure radio operator updated regularly with vessel’s position.

Refuse

i) All burnable refuse should be incinerated where possible.

ii) All unburnable refuse should be disposed of during the hours of darkness,
preferably in weighted bags.

Mine countermeasures

If a master finds himself in the unlikely position of being in a mine field the following
precautionary countermeasures should be carried:

i) Shut down noisy machinery if possible.

ii) Assume highest degree of watertight integrity.
iii) Reduce number of men below decks to a minimum.
iv) Keep to deepest water possible (deeper than 35 metres).
v) Move at or near high water.
vi) Move in the direction of the tidal stream (limits time in mined area).
vii) Use the slowest practical speed through the water.
viii) Post mine lookouts.
ix) Avoid excessive or violent rudder movements.
x) Switch off stabilisers and place in locked position.
xi) Be prepared to anchor.
lt is up to the master to decide which of the above measures to be taken are deemed necessary
by the circumstances of the risk. The above is given only as a guide and as can be seen many of the
items should have been carried out routinely.
 Defence once under attack by missile
Once under attack, being unarmed the ship has few options. Reducing the radar echoing area
presented to the launching vehicle might reduce the chances of the ship being targeted. Turning
towards the attacker does have the result of limiting the effect of the missile, since an oblique impact is
less likely to penetrate than impact at 90°.
Many missiles used in a maritime context do not have a large warhead, hence the presentation
of the least vulnerable part of the ship to the attack might limit subsequent damage. The main hazard is
likely to come from fire, caused either by the warhead explosion or unburnt propellant from the missile
motor (which is normally solid fuelled).

NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL ATTACK

1. Nuclear
i) Nuclear attack may be the result of an air-delivered weapon (missile or bomb),
but would normally only be part of a major war, in which case nuclear-tipped
torpedoes cannot be discounted.
ii) The immediate effects of a nuclear explosion are light, heat, blast and direct
radition, and their severity is dependent on the yield of weapon used and
proximity of the target to Ground Zero. As a general rule, few vessels will
survive within 5 miles of an explosion at sea, and the effects may be severe out to
range of at least 30 miles.
iii) The ‘fallout’ of radioactive material from a nuclear explosion either at sea or on
land will cover a far greater area, this area being decided on by type of blast (eg
ground or air), yield of weapon and the strength and direction of upper air winds,
and may extend hundreds of miles.

PRECAUTIONS
Explosion—There is little that can be done to alleviate the immediate effect of nuclear
explosion, except that personnel should avoid looking at the light if possible and should assume the
prone position used for any conventional explosion, behind as much cover as can be made available.
Normal damage control may or may not then be possible.
Fallout—If a master considers that his ship is likely to steam through an unavoidable area of
nuclear fallout, then there are certain precautions which may be taken:
i) Seal all entrances to crew accommodation and living area, and make them as
airtight as possible.
ii) Cease drawing air from outside into accommodation—ic air conditioning.
iii) If all accommodation cannot be sealed, then choose a ‘citadel’ within it to which
the crew may retreat.
iv) Engine room and machinery spaces will have to accept contamination, because
of the need for cooling air from outside being drawn in to them.
v) Prior to entering fallout area, rig hoses on weather decks to cover as much of the
accommodation, working area and walkways as possible. These areas may be
sprayed with water continuously during passage of the fallout area to try and
wash off contaminated material.
vi) When it is considered that transit of the fallout area is complete, crew members
dressed in full firefighting protective clothing should complete the washing down
and scrubbing of upper deck areas.
As most merchant vessels do not have sophisticated monitoring equipment to determine
residual levels of contamination, nor the levels of radiation that crew members have received, any
vessel that has been contaminated should then be abandoned as soon as it is safely possible, and expert
cleansing teams called in to complete decontamination.
2. Biological
A biological attack is the use of viruses or diseases to destroy the enemy, and would most
probably be sprayed from aircraft, or inserted by other means into drinking water supplies. It is not
considered a very likely threat to shipping.
3. Chemical
Chemical attack is again most likely to be air delivered, by bomb, spray or missile. Chemicals
used are classed as:
Choking Agents
Blister Agents Persistent or non-persistent
Nerve Agents
All may be delivered as droplets, or in a fine mist or spray. Choking and blister agents cause
severe distress and perhaps death, nerve agents cause instant collapse, and unless atropine is
administered at once, death very shortly afterwards. Chemicals do not remain in the atmosphere, unlike
nuclear fallout, and therefore a vessel will only be contaminated each time there is an attack.

PRECAUTIONS
If chemical attack is feared then an airtight citadel, similar to that provided against nuclear
fallout should be made, and hoses similarly rigged to provide continuous washing of upper deck areas.
After an attack, only crew members in full firefighting protective clothing and breathing apparatus
should be allowed on the upper deck to wash as much off as they can.
Again, without specialist monitoring and cleansing equipment, a vessel which has been subject
to chemical attack should be abandoned as soon as it is safe to do so, and experts called in to complete
cleansing.
 CHAPTER TEN

PIRACY
Background
Merchant ships and the seafarers who serve on them have been regarded as targets for attacks
by robbers and thieves probably since the first trading ships moved goods by sea. But having arrived at
a situation at the turn of this century where these incidents were confined to small scale amateurish
attempts to steal personal belongings from unlocked and untended cabins whilst alongside in certain
ports, the past two decades have seen a significant and continuing growth in organised attacks on ships
at sea and underway.
During 1990 at least 23 attacks were reported in Far Eastern waters, with half of them occurring
in the waters off Singapore and the remainder in the South China Sea near the ICer Ananba Islands. In
addition over 100 incidents occurred during 1990 in Brazilian waters with the majority in or around the
ports of Santos and Rio de Janeiro. In 1991 pirate incidents continue and have been particularly savage.

Legal definitions
Legal definitions of Piracy, which are of use to ship managers and masters stem from the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982.

Article 101—Definition of piracy

Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
Any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation committed for private ends
by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft or against persons or property on board such
ship or aircraft.
Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State.
Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of
facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft.

Methods of attack
Attacks are normally, but not always, made at night, and may generally be grouped under two
headings:
Attack while ship alongside or at anchor.
Attack under way.
Attacks while alongside or at anchor, may be made by pirates climbing up mooring ropes and
anchorchains, or scaling the ship’s side from small boats. Thieves have also been known to enter ships
via gangways, bunker and provisions accesses.
While under way a small fast boat or sampan with six or eight men on board approaches the
target vessel’s side or steru. A grapnel is thrown over the rail, or a hook on the end of a bamboo pole,
and the pirates board the vessel.
A larger junk style or ‘mother ship’ deploys several rubber inflatable boats. Two of these rubber
boats will attach themselves with a rope, up to 40 metres long, and manoeuvre themselves into the path
of the approaching vessel. The bow of the vessel catches the rope, drawing the rubber boats close in to
the target ship’s side. The pirates board from both sides, again using grapnels or bamboo poles.
Pirates are normally armed, sometimes with firearms, but more often with knives and swords.
 Aims of piracy
The main aim of piracy is the theft of cash and valuables and particularly from the master’s
safe, but all kinds of ship’s stores have been taken, including the contents of upper deck lockers and
boatswain’s stores. In some cases whole ships have been stolen, their cargo stolen and their crew
murdered and the ship subsequently sold.

Precautions at anchor or alongside

Strict control must be maintained at all gangways and accesses, allowing only those who are
identified and authorised on board.
Large effective ratguards must be placed on mooring ropes, out of reach of the ship’s side and
the jetty.
Fairleads and hawse pipes should be sealed, allowing no human access.
At night, all upper deck lighting should be on at full brilliance, and extra lighting should be
rigged as necessary over the ship’s stern, and seaward side as necessary to eliminate dark areas.
Powerful search or arc lights are preferable.
All upper deck lockers should be locked, also any accesses leading to accommodation or
technical areas, which are not strictly needed for the period during which the ship is alongside or at
anchor.
Upper deck patrols, armed with night sticks, should be maintained at all times during the hours
of darkness.
In dangerous areas, tendering of passengers after dark should be avoided, and accommodation
ladders should be raised.

Precautions when under way

Whenever possible, passage of dangerous areas should be made in daylight. Maximum safe
speed should be used in pirate waters.
A good radar and visual watch should be maintained taking care to give a wide berth to small
stationary objects or boats, particularly if they show no lights at night.
At night, switch on all upper deck lighting, at full brilliance and rig extra lighting over the
ship’s side, and particulariy over the vulnerable areas towards the stem. Powerful search or arc lights
are preferable.
Patrols and watchmen should be maintained on the upper deck throughout the hours of
darkness. They should be equipped with radios and batons, and should have easy access to a charged
firehose on deck.

Organization
Ideally there should be two ratings patrolling the ship using long-range beam torches or the
aldis lamp to be seen to be illuminating the deck and area around the ship.
All entries to accommodation and enclosed spaces should be locked and entry should be via the
bridge where the officer of the watch can control the entry point.
Loud noises can act as an efficient deterrent and if pirates or thieves are identified on board the
officer of the watch can be informed and he can sound the general emergency signal on the ship’s
whistle. This will have two effects. First it will scare the perpetrators and secondly it will alert the
whole ship’s company who will probably consist of more personnel than the pirates are willing to take
on.
This ideal situation does not exist on many ships today. Mostly the crew will be fully occupied
all day and will not be rested to take on these night duties as well. Similarly, manning is such that
officers who have been up most of the night on stand-by also need rest and may not be able to keep an
alert watch at all times.
 A company which undermans its ships to cover proper security must therefore expect losses as
part of the trade off between lower crew costs and increased claims.
What is most likely to happen in practice is that one person will be allocated a night watch. As
such he is very vulnerable and has to let himself in and out of the accommodation with his own key.
The psychological aspects of this situation is such that the individual concerned particularly if
he is an officer, will attempt to confront the pirates to protect his shipmates and the ship. It is a proper
and honourable response, but it is wrong.
There is absolutely no case to be made for risking life to protect property on an under-manned
ship. It is the duty of the shipmaster or the ship’s security officer to brief all watchmen and watch
officers not to confront groups of pirates face to face and to offer only passive resistance if attacked.
Their primary role should be to raise the alarm and if this cannot be done, they should be
instructed on how to minimise losses by acceding to the minimum requests.
Certain sensible precautions can be taken by shipping companies which are not expensive.
Generally, the master’s safe is the prime target of pirates and so it makes good sense to fit two safes to
ships, one in the master’s cabin, where a small amount of currency can be held and another where the
majority of the ship’s cash can be stowed.
Similarly, the bonded store can be held in two separate compartments with the locker carrying
only limited stocks, being the one which is clearly marked and has the largest padlock.
The temptation to use firearms to protect the ship is very strong in these circumstances.
However there are good reasons for not doing so.
First, if a pirate is killed there is the danger that the ship will be arrested in a hostile foreign port
and the person concemed accused of murder. The authorities who may be corrupt, can then extort a
much higher price from the company than the pirates could and the individual may be imprisoned or
executed.
Secondly, it is inevitable that as ships use firearms, so the pirates will become armed
themselves, and this will greatly increase the possibility that ships’ personnel will be killed.
In high risk areas where reliable security personnel can be hired, e.g. from Malaysia and
Singapore for ships visiting Indonesia it may be prudent for shipping companies to employ such
personnel on board for limited periods, releasing the crew for more essential operational duties.
It is unlikely that the shore authorites will allow these security guards to be armed, and may
insist on placing their own armed and corrupt guards on board. This of course solves no problems and
so each situation must be fully evaluated at the time.
Agents should be asked to advise on security and the shipping company should establish the
degree of trust which can be assigned to private security firms, the police or the military and brief the
ship accordingly.
Shipmasters should contribute to this intelligence by reporting on security arrangements when
leaving port, to their companies. Handover notes should also be made for new masters joining on
board.
There is a general understanding that piracy is an activity practised in poor countries where
there is corruption and where the forces of law and order do not exist or are corrupt as well.
Seastaff are not therefore expecting well organised attacks in European ports. Sadly, they exist
and it is necessary to be vigilant at all times, making sure that secure spaces and cabin doors are locked.
One of the more recent techniques employed by criminals in France is to spray sleeping gas into
the cabin door vent. When the occupant is incapacitated, they steal his belongings.
Personal inconvenience can be reduced by ensuring that valuables, passport, discharge book and
wallet are stowed in a place where a thief may not find them. Apart from that, every effort must be
made to ensure that the ship is secure in port, that efficient gangway watch is maintained at all times
and that a direct line of communication is established with the dock or city police.
 Piracy, theft and extortion are civil crimes and lead to loss of property, money and sometimes
personal injury. Most shipping companies are insured for claims and damages through their P&I Clubs,
but before the damages can be recovered a formal report must be submitted by the company which
must include a full statement of events signed by the master.
Immediately, or as quickly as possible, after an attack, the master should write the report
indicating exactly what happened, what incidents took place and the quantified losses sustained. He
should then inform the company accordingly. If in port and the situation is serious, the advice of the
P&I Club representative should be sought.
Individuals should consider taking out their own personal insurance for life, and property.
Should an incident occur, the same advice applies. Write out a report immediately and have it signed
by the master and/or chief engineer and submit as soon as possible to the insurance company.
When taking out a policy to cover maritime theft it is essential to choose a policy, probably via
a marine trade union, which properly accepts the risks involved and the practical problems of passing
on relevant documentation.
Theft claims under general policies are usually required to be made within seven days and be
reported to the police. This may not be practical or even desirable on board a ship. So check the small
print and choose a policy which meets your perceived requirements.

Conclusion
Victims of piracy have normally been those ships which appear to be lightly manned and
unprepared, and an attack on a large well manned cruise ship is considered unlikely.
Smaller vessels may be considered to be more at risk.
The use of firearms by the crew of a passenger ship to deter pirates is not recommended.
If a ship appears to be prepared, and precautions as outlined in this section have been taken,
most forms of piracy should be deterred. Some companies now state that pirate attacks cannot take
place if proper protective measures are in place, no excuse is acceptable if these people get on board
and the master is disciplined.
Have search lights available to illuminate suspected boarding parties.
Have signalling equipment, including emergency rockets, flares and line throwing gun,
available for immediate use.

When suspect boarders are detected

Sound general alarm.
Establish VHF contact with shore stations and other ships in the vicinity.
Increase speed if practicable.
Fire warning rockets.
Switch on all outside lighting.
Use searchlights to illuminate and dazzle suspect.
Continue to maintain good all round watch.

After pirates have boarded

Barricade engine room and bridge, if practicable.
Barricade the crew in secure areas, if practicable.
Report the situation by radio and call for help, if available.
Masters must of course take whatever action they consider reasonable in the circumstances of
the case, to repel boarders. They should not however at any time place themselves or their crews’
personal safety at risk.
 CHAPTER ELEVEN

LETTER OR PARCEL BOMBS

Over the past few years there have been examples of ships receiving explosive devices
concealed in letters or parcels. These have not come from sophisticated terrorist groups, but from such
people as disgruntled ex-employees. Letter bombs can however maim the unfortunate person who
opens it.
If there is a suspicion about a package, the best solution is to take it aft, to an upper deck and
keep people away. If the ship carries a blast suppression blanket, this should be placed over the
package. If not, wet mattresses can be used.
The best protection from letter/parcel bombs is the natural suspicion of any item which is
unexpected, comes from a strange location, or is written in a different manner.
Once suspicion is aroused, other indicators can help decide if the item is in fact dangerous:
• A letter enclosed in an outer envelope with the inner envelope marked ‘private’ or
‘personal.’
• Grease marks on the envelope or wrapping.
• An odour of marzipan or almonds.
• Visible wiring or tin foil, especially if the envelope or package is damaged.
• There is a small pin hole in the envelope or package.
• The envelope or package feels excessively heavy for its size.
• The weight distribution is uneven, the contents may be rigid in a flexible envelope and
there is a feeling of something under tension.
• If a package, it may have excessive wrapping.
• There is poor handwriting, spelling or typing.
• It is wrongly addressed, or comes from an unexpected source.
• There may be too many stamps for the weight of the package.
• It may have been delivered by hand, from an unknown source.

IF YOU HAVE ANY SUSPICIONS ABOUT A LETTER OR PARCEL

DO NOT OPEN IT
 ANNEX 1

THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE

APPROVED MEASURES TO PREVENT UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST PASSENGERS AND
CREWS ON BOARD SHIPS

1 Introduction

1.1 Assembly resolution A.584(14) directed that internationally agreed measures should be
developed, on a priority basis, by the Maritime Safety Committee to ensure the security of passengers
and crews on board ships and authorized the Maritime Safety Committee to request the Secretary-
General to issue a circular containing information on the agreed measures to governments,
organizations concerned and interested parties for their consideration and adoption.
1.2 The text of Assembly resolution A. 584(14) is attached at appendix 1.

2 Definitions

For the purpose of these measures:

.1 DESIGNATED AUTHORITY means the organization or organizations or the
administration or administrations identified by or within the Government as responsible for ensuring
the development, implementation and maintenance of port facility security plans or flag State ship
security plans, or both.
.2 PORT FACILITY means a location within a port at which commercial maritime
activities occur affecting ships covered by these measures.
.3 PASSENGER TERMINAL means any area within the port facility which is used for the
assembling, processing, embarking and disembarking of passengers and baggage.
.4 PORT FACILITY SECURITY PLAN means a comprehensive written plan for a port
facility which identifies, inter a/ia, regulations, programmes, measures and procedures necessary to
prevent unlawful acts which threaten the passengers and crews on board ships.
.5 PORT FACILITY SECURITY OFFICER means the person in a port responsible for the
development, implementation and maintenance of the port facility security plan and for liaison with the
ships’ security officers.
.6 OPERATOR means the company or representative of the company which maintains
operations control over the ship while at sea or dockside.
.7 SHIP SECURITY PLAN means a written plan developed under the authority of the
operator to ensure the application of measures on board ship which are designed to prevent unlawful
acts which threaten passengers and crews on board ships.
.8 OPERATOR SECURITY OFFICER* means the person designated by the operator to
develop and maintain the ship security plan and liaise with the port facility security officer.
.9 SHIP SECURITY OFFICER* means the master or the person on board the ship
responsible to the master and operator for on-board security, including implementation and
maintenance of the ship security plan and for liaison with the port facility security officer.

*The operator security officer functions may be assigned to the ship security officer on board the ship.
3 General provisions

3.1 Governments, port authorities, administrations, shipowners. operators, shipmasters and

crews should take all appropriate measures against unlawful acts threatening passengers and crews on
board ships. The measures implemented should take into account the current assessment of the likely
threat together with local conditions and circumstances.
3.2 It is desirable that there be appropriate legislation or regulations which, inter a/ia, could
provide penalties for persons gaining or attempting to gain unauthorized access to the port facility and
persons committing unlawful acts against passengers or crews on board ships. Governments should
review their national legislation, regulations and guidance to determine their adequacy to maintain
security on board ships.
3.3 The measures contained in this document are intended for application to passenger ships
engaged on international voyages* of 24 hours or more and the port facilities which serve them.
Certain of these measures may, however, also be appropriate for application to other ships or port
facilities if the circumstances so warrant.
3.4 Governments should identify a designated authority responsible to ensure the
development, implementation and maintenance of ship and port facility security plans. The designated
authority should co-ordinate with other relevant domestic agencies to ensure that specific roles and
functions of other agencies and departments are agreed and implemented.
3.5 Governments should notify the Secretary-General of progress made in the
implementation of security measures. Any useful information, which might assist other governments in
their implementation of measures, on any difficulties and problems which arose and were overcome
during implementation of the security measures, should be forwarded with the notification. The
designated authority should co-operate with similar authorities of other governments in the exchange of
appropriate information.
3.6 Governments concerned with an act of unlawful interference should provide the
Organization with all pertinent information concerning the security aspects of the act of unlawful
interference as soon as practicable after the act is resolved. Further information and a reporting format
is given in appendix 2.
3.7 In the process of implementing these measures, all efforts should be made to avoid
undue interference with passenger services and take into account applicable international conventions.
3.8 Governments and port authorities should ensure the application of these measures to
ships in a fair manner.

4 Port facility security plan

4.1 Each port facility should develop and maintain an appropriate port facility security plan
adequate for local circumstances and conditions and adequate for the anticipated maritime traffic and
the number of passengers likely to be involved.
4.2 The port facility security plan should provide for measures and equipment as necessary
to prevent weapons or any other dangerous devices, the carriage of which is not authorized, from being
introduced by any means whatsoever on board ships.
4.3 The port facility security plan should establish measures for the prevention of
unauthorized access to the ship and to restricted areas of the passenger terminal.
4.4 The port facility security plan should provide for the evaluation, before they are
employed, of all persons responsible for any aspect of security.

*Voyages include all segmented voyages.

 4.5 A port facility security officer should be appointed for each port facility. The port
facility security plan should identify the security officer for that port facility.
4.6 The responsibilities of the port facility security officer should include, but not be limited
to:
.1 conducting an initial comprehensive security survey in order to prepare a port
facility security plan, and thereafter regular subsequent security inspections of the port facility to
ensure continuation of appropriate security measures;
.2 implementing the port facility security plan;
.3 recommending modifications to the port facility security plan to correct
deficiencies and satisfy the security requirements of the individual port facility;
.4 encouraging security awareness and vigilance;
.5 ensuring adequate training for personnel responsible for security;
.6 maintaining records of occurrences of unlawful acts which affect the operations
of the port facility;
.7 co-ordinating implementation of the port facility security plan with the
competent operator security officers; and
.8 co-ordinating with other national and international security services, as
appropriate.
4.7 Security measures and procedures should be applied at passenger terminals in such a
manner as to cause a minimum of interference with, or delay to, passenger services, taking into account
the ship security plan.

5 Ship security plan

5.1 A ship security plan should be developed for each ship. The plan should be sufficiently
flexible to take into account the level of security reflected in the port facility security plan for each port
at which the ship intends to call.
5.2 The ship security plan should include measures and equipment as necessary to prevent
weapons or any other dangerous devices, the carriage of which is not authorized, from being introduced
by any means whatsoever on board a ship.
5.3 The ship security plan should establish measures for the prevention of unauthorized
access to the ship and to restricted areas on board.
5.4 A ship security officer should be appointed on each ship. The ship security plan should
identify the ship security officer.
5.5 The operator security officer should be responsible for, but not be limited to:
.1 conducting an initial comprehensive security survey and thereafter regular
subsequent inspections of the ship;
.2 developing and maintaining the ship security plan;
.3 modifying the ship security plan to correct deficiencies and satisfy the security
requirements of the individual ship;
.4 encouraging security awareness and vigilance;
.5 ensuring adequate training for personnel responsible for security; and
.6 co-ordinating implementation of the ship security plan with the competent port
facility security officer.
5.6 The ship security officer should be responsible for, but not limited to:
.1 regular inspections of the ship;
.2 implementing and maintaining the ship security plan;
 .3 proposing modifications to the ship security plan to correct deficiencies and
satisfy the security requirements of the ship;
.4 encouraging security awareness and vigilance on board;
.5 ensuring that adequate training has been provided for personnel responsible for
security;
.6 reporting all occurrences or suspected occurrences of unlawful acts to the port
facility security officer and ensuring that the report is forwarded, through the master, to the operator for
submission to the ship’s flag State’s designated authority; and
.7 co.ordinating implementation of the ship security plan with the competent port
facility security officer.

6 Appendices

The appendices attached hereto contain information which may be useful when developing or
improving security measures.
 APPENDIX 1

RESOLUTION A.584(14)
adopted on 20 November 1985

MEASURES TO PREVENT UNLAWFUL ACTS WHICH THREATEN THE SAFETY OF

SHIPS AND THE SECURITY OF THEIR PASSENGERS AND CREWS

THE ASSEMBLY

RECALLING Article 1 and Article 15(j) of the Convention on the International Maritime
Organization concerning the purposes of the Organization and the functions of the Assembly in relation
to regulations and guidelines concerning maritime safety,
NOTING with great concern the danger to passengers and crews resulting from the increasing
number of incidents involving piracy, armed robbery and other unlawful acts against or on board ships,
including small craft, both at anchor and under way,
RECALLING resolution A. 545(13) which urged action to initiate a series of measures to
combat acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships and small craft at sea,
RECOGNIZING the need for the Organization to assist in the formulation of internationally
agreed technical measures to improve security and reduce the risk to the lives of passengers and crews
on board ships,
1. CALLS UPON all Governments, port authorities and administrations, shipowners, ship
operators, shipmasters and crews to take, as soon as possible, steps to review and, as necessary,
strengthen port and on-board security;
2. DIRECTS the Maritime Safety Committee, in co-operation with other committees, as
required, to develop, on a priority basis, detailed and practical technical measures, including both
shoreside and shipboard measures, which may be employed by Governments, port authorities and
administrations, shipowners, ship operators, shipmasters and crews to ensure the security of passengers
and crews on board ships;
3. INVITES the Maritime Safety Committee to take note of the work of the International
Civil Aviation Organization in the development of standards and recommended practices for airport
and aircraft security;
4. AUTHORIZES the Maritime Safety Committee to request the Secretary-General to
issue a circular containing information on the measures developed by the Committee to Governments,
organizations concerned and interested parties for their consideration and adoption.
 APPENDIX 2

REPORTS OF UNLAWFUL ACTS

1. To safeguard maritime interests against and port State as appropriate. This information
and unlawful acts which threaten the security of will be utilized in updating or revising these
passengers and crews on board ships, reports on agreed measures, as necessary.
incidents and the measures taken to prevent 2. Use of the following report format is e
their recurrence should be provided to the recommended for conveying information for
Organization as soon as possible by the flag such purposes:
 ANNEX A

SECURITY SURVEYS
1 General

1 .1 In order to prepare security plans, an initial comprehensive security survey should be

undertaken to assess the effectiveness of security measures and procedures for the prevention of
unlawful acts and determine the vulnerability of the port facility or the ship, or both, to such acts.
1.2 The results of this security survey should be used to determine the security measures
necessary to counter the threat both at the port facility and on board ships taking into consideration
local conditions.
1 .3 The level of security may vary from port to port, from ship to ship and from time to
time. Liaison between security officers is important to ensure the best utilization of ship and shore
resources.
1 .4 The survey should determine what needs to be protected, what security measures are
already in effect, and what additional security measures and procedures are required.
1.5 The security survey should be periodically reviewed and the security plans updated as
necessary.

2 Port facility security survey

2.1 The port facility security survey may be divided into two parts, the initial preliminary
assessment and an on-scene security survey.
2.1.1 Preliminary assessment
2.1 .1 .1 Prior to commencing the survey the port facility security officer should obtain
current information on the assessment of threat for the locality and should be knowledgeable about the
port facility and type of ships calling at the port. He should study previous reports on similar security
needs and know the general layout and nature of the operations conducted.
2.1.1.2 The port facility security officer should meet with appropriate representatives of
the port facility, of the operator, or of both of them, to discuss the purpose and methodology of the
survey.
2.1.1.3 The port facility security officer should obtain and record the information
required to conduct a vulnerability assessment, including:
.1 the general layout of the port facility and terminal including topography, building
locations, etc.;
.2 areas and structures in the vicinity of the port facility such as, fuel storage depots,
bridges, locks, etc.;
.3 the degree of dependence on essential services, such as electric power,
communications, etc.;
.4 stand-by equipment to assure continuity of essential services;
.5 locations and functions of each actual or potential access point;
.6 numerical strength, reliability and function of staff, permanent labour and casual
labour forces;
.7 the details of existing security measures and procedures, including inspection,
control and monitoring procedures, identification documents, access control procedures, fencing,
lighting, fire hazards, storm drains, etc.;
.8 the equipment in use for protection of passengers, crews and port facility
personnel;
 .9 all vehicle traffic or services which enter the port facility; and
.10 availability of other personnel in an emergency.
2.1.2 On-scene security survey
2.1.2.1 The port facility security officer should examine and evaluate the methods and
procedures used to control access to ships and restricted areas in the port facility, including:
.1 inspection, control and monitoring of persons and carry-on articles;
.2 inspection, control and monitoring of cargo, ship stores, and baggage; and
.3 safeguarding cargo, ship stores and baggage held in storage within the port
facility.
2.1.2.2 The port facility security officer should examine each identified point of access
to ships and restricted areas in the port facility and evaluate its potential for use by individuals who
might be engaged in unlawful acts. This includes persons having legitimate access as well as those who
seek to obtain unauthorized entry.
2.1.2.3 The port facility security officer should examine and evaluate existing security
measures, procedures and operations under both emergency and routine conditions, including:
.1 established safety procedures;
.2 restrictions or limitations on vehicle access to the port facility;
.3 access of fire and emergency vehicles to restricted area and availability of
parking and marshalling areas;
.4 the level of supervision of personnel;
.5 the frequency and effectiveness of patrols by security personnel;
.6 the security key control system;
.7 security communications, systems and procedures; and
.8 security barriers and lighting.

3 Ship security survey

3.1 The ship security survey may be divided into two parts, the initial preliminary
assessment and an on-scene security survey.
3.1.1 Preliminary assessment
3.1.1.1 Prior to commencing the ship security survey, the operator security officer
should take advantage of such information as is available to him on the assessment of threat for the
ports at which the ship will call or at which passengers embark or disembark and about the port
facilities and their security measures. He should study previous reports on similar security needs.
3.1.1.2 Where feasible, the operator security officer should meet with appropriate
persons on the ship and in the port facilities to discuss the purpose and methodology of the survey.
3.1.1.3 The operator security officer should obtain and record the information required to
conduct a vulnerability assessment, including:
.1 the general Layout of the ship;
.2 the location of areas which should have restricted access, such as bridge, engine-
room, radio-room, etc.;
.3 the location and function of each actual or potential access point to the ship;
.4 the open deck arrangement including the height of the deck above the water;
.5 the emergency and stand-by equipment available to maintain essential services;
.6 numerical strength, reliability and security duties of the ship’s crew;
.7 existing security and safety equipment for protection of passengers and crew; and
.8 existing security measures and procedures in effect, including inspection, control
and monitoring equipment, personnel identification documents and communication, alarm, lighting,
access control and other appropriate systems.
 3.1.2 On-scene security survey
3.1.2.1 The operator security officer should examine and evaluate the methods and
procedures used to control access to ships, including:
.1 inspection, control and monitoring of persons and carry-on articles; and
.2 inspection, control and monitoring of cargo, ship’s stores and baggage.
3.1.2.2 The operator security officer should examine each identified point of access,
including open weather decks, and evaluate its potential for use by individuals who might be engaged
in unlawful acts. This includes individuals having legitimate access as well as those who seek to obtain
unauthorized entry.
3.1.2.3 The operator security officer should examine and evaluate existing security
measures, procedures and operations, under both emergency and routine conditions, including:
.1 established security procedures;
.2 response procedures to fire or other emergency conditions;
.3 the level of supervision of the ship’s crew, vendors, repair technicians, dock
workers, etc.;
.4 the frequency and effectiveness of security patrols;
.5 the security key control system;
.6 security communications system and procedures; and
.7 security doors, barriers and lighting;

4 Periodic security inspections

Security inspections should be undertaken on a periodic basis to permit a review and updating
of the initial comprehensive security survey and possible modification of the port facility and ship
security plans.

5 Report
5.1 From the information obtained during the survey assessment and inspection, the
respective security officer should assess the vulnerability of the port facility, ship, or both.
5.2 The report should contain, as appropriate, recommendations for new or revised security
measures and procedures.
5.3 The report will form the basis for development or revision of security plans, should be
confidential and have limited distribution.

***

ANNEX B

SECURITY MEA SURES A ND PROCEDURES

1 General
1.1 Port facility security measures and procedures and ship security measures and
procedures should take account of the recommendations contained in the report described in paragraph
5 of Annex 1.

2 Port facility security

2.1 Security measures and procedures reduce port facility vulnerability. Increased levels of
threat will have a significant influence on the number and type of security measures used and the
degree of measures and procedures adopted. During short periods of heightened threat, increased
security can be achieved through the use of additional manpower.
 2.2 The following on-scene security measures should be considered:
.1 restricted areas;
.2 security barriers;
.3 security lighting;
.4 security alarms and communication systems; and
.5 access control and identification.
2.2.1 Restricted areas
The establishment of restricted areas helps control and channel access, improves security and
increases efficiency by providing degrees of security compatible with the port facility’s operational
requirements. Restricted areas may be further subdivided depending on the degree of restriction or
control required to prevent unauthorized access.
2.2.2 Security barriers
2.2.2.1 The boundary between restricted and uncontrolled areas should be clearly defined.
This can be achieved by security barriers which prevent access except at authorized points.
Where permanent security barriers are appropriate, security fences have proven effective.
2.2.2.2 the purpose of security barriers is to:
.1 delineate the area to be protected;
.2 create a physical and psychological deterrent to persons attempting unauthorized
entry;
.3 delay intrustion, enabling operating personnel and security guards to detect, and,
if necessary, apprehend intruders; and
.4 provide designated and readily identifiable places for entry of personnel and
vehicles into areas where access is restricted.
2.2.2.3 Openings in security barriers should be kept to a minimum and secured when not in use.
2.2.2.4 Security fences and other barriers should be located and constructed so as to prevent the
introduction of dangerous substances or devices, and should be of sufficient height and durability to
deter unauthorized passage.
2.2.2.5 Security fence lines should be kept clear of all obstructions.
2.2.2.6 The effectiveness of a security fence against penetration depends to a large extent on the
contruction employed. The total height of the security fencing should be not less than 2.50 metres.
2.2.2.7 Natural barriers such as water, ravines, etc., can sometimes be effectively utilized as part
of the control boundary. However, they may require supporting safeguards (i.e. fencing, security
patrols, surveillance, anti-intrustion devices, lighting) especially during high threat periods.
2.2.2.8 The roofs of buildings may also provide a possible route for unauthorized access to the
restricted area. Safeguards should be taken to prevent such access by these routes.
2.2.2.9 Restricted areas partly surrounded by water may require security barriers with sufficient
illumination during night hours and, if on navigable waters, frequent and unscheduled patrols by boat
or ashore on foot, or both. illumination of these areas must be of a type and so placed that it does not
interfere with safe navigation.
2.2.3 Security lighting
2.2.3.1 Security lighting with uninterrupted power supply is an important element in a security
programme.
2.2.3.2 The primary system should consist of a series of lights arranged to illuminate a specific
area continuously during the hours of darkness or restricted visibility. In some circumstances, it may be
preferable to use such lighting systems only in response to an alarm.
2.2.3.3 Floodlights may be used to supplement the primary system and may be either portable or
fixed. Floodlights when used should have sufficient flexibility to permit examination of the barrier
under observation and adjacent unlighted areas.
 2.2.3.4 Multiple circuits may be used to advantage in the security lighting system. Circuits
should be so arranged that the failure of any one lamp will not affect a series of others.
2.2.3.5 Controls and switches for security lighting should be protected at all times.
2.2.3.6 Where fences and other barriers are to be illuminated, it is important to ensure that the
intensity of illumination is aequate for the purpose.
2.2.4 Security alarms and communication systems
2.2.4.1 Intrusion detection systems and alarm devices may be appropriate as a complement to
guards and patrols during periods of increased threat.
2.2.4.2 Immediate response capability by guards to an alarm from an intrusion detection system
or device is important if its use is to be effective. Alarms may be local, i.e., at the site of the intrusion,
provided at a central location or station, or a combination of both.
2.2.4.3 A wide variety of intrusion detection systems and devices are available for possible use.
These systems include those which are sensitive to:
.1 breaking of an electrical circuit;
.2 interruption of a light beam;
.3 sound;
.4 vibration;
.5 motion; or
.6 capacitance change in an electrical field.
2.2.4.4 In view of the wide range of technical matters which must be taken into account in
deciding upon the device or system best suited for application in each environment and for each task, if
is prudent to obtain the advice of a qualified expert before a decision is made on the system or device to
be used.
2.2.4.5 A means of transmitting discreet or covert signals by radio, direct-line facilities or other
similarly reliable means should be provided at each access point for use by the control and monitoring
personnel to contact police, security control, or an emergency operations centre in the event assistance
is required. An additional public or overt communications system would be useful to obtain
information or advice on routine matters.
2.2.5 Access control and identification
2.2.5.1 Persons and their property, before being permitted to proceed beyond access points,
should be subject to routine inspection or control and monitoring, or both.
2.2.5.2 It is recommended that port facility employees, vendors, operators’ personnel, assigned
law enforcement officials and others, whose official duties require them to pass through the access
point, should prominently display a tamper-resistant identification card. This procedure should be
closely monitored and strictly enforced to preserve the integrity of the inspection, control and
monitoring processes and the security of the passenger terminal and ships. Approved means of
identification and the procedures to be followed should be specifically provided for the security plan.
2.2.5.3 An effective means of identification is a card which incorporates a photograph of the
individual as an integral part. These should show the relevant details of the holder, e.g., name,
description, or other pertinent data. The provision of a photograph is recommended in order to prevent
misuse of the card by unauthorized persons.
2.2.5.4 To prevent substitution of a photograph and subsequent illegal use, the entire card
should be sealed in a plastic container, preferably of a type which will mutilate the photograph and card
if tampered with.
2.2.5.5 The number and types of different styles of identification cards in the port area should be
limited in order to avoid control problems for security staff and the administration of the identification
programme.
 2.2.5.6 Identification cards should be issued by an appropriate control authority, such as a port
authority or ship operator. Strict card control and accountability procedures should be established and
maintained.
2.2.5.7 Persons who refuse to submit to security clearance at an access point must be denied
entry.
2.2.5.8 Persons denied entry for refusal to submit to security clearance, or for other security
reason should be, if possible, identified and reported to appropriate security personnel.
2.2.5.9 A booth or other area in which a manual search can be conducted is advisable. The
access points should, as appropriate, be equipped with metal detectors to expedite the security
clearance of people.
2.2.5.10 All items should besubjecttoinspection, appropriatetotheriskof unlawful acts, prior to
being placed on board ships. Such inspection methods may include hand search, electronic screening,
the use of dogs, or other means.
2.2.5.11 Tables on which baggage may be searched should be provided at the appropriate access
points. Such tables should be high enough to permit inspection without requiring the examiner to bend.
They also should be sufficiently wide to provide some measure of separation of the baggage from the
passenger. The latter should be able to witness the examination, but should not be in a position to
interfere with the examiner.

3 Ship security
3.1 The master’s traditional authority in matters of ship security remains unchanged.
Maintaining ship security is an ongoing task. Additional security measures should be implemented to
counter increased risks when warranted.
3.2 Ship security should be continually supervised by the ship security officer. A properly
trained crew is in itself a strong deterrent to being subjected to unlawful acts.
3.3 Communication and co-operation with the port facility in security matters should be
maintained.
3.4 The following on-board security measures should be considered:
.1 restricted areas;
.2 deck and overside lighting;
.3 access control and identification; and
.4 security alarms and communication systems.
3.4.1 Restricted areas
3.4.1 .1 The establishment of restricted areas on board ships (e.g., bridge, engine-room, radio-
room etc.) is recommended.
3.4.1.2 The use, number and distribution of master keys on-board ships should be controlled by
the master.
3.4.1.3 The ship security plan should provide for immediate corrective action in the event of
security being compromised by potential misuse or loss of keys.
3.4.2 Deck and overside lighting
3.4.2.1 While in port, at anchor or underway the ship’s deck and overside should be illuminated
in periods of darkness and restricted visibility, but not so as to interfere with the required navigation
lights and safe navigation.
3.4.3 Access control and identification
3.4.3.1 Crew members should carry at all times a photo identification document.
3.4.3.2 When visitors to the ship are permitted their embarkation and disembarkation should be
closely controlled.
 3.4.3.3 All vendors should have an identification document prior to boarding the ship or should
be escorted at all times on board the ship.
3.4.4 Security alarms and communication systems
3.4.4.1 Security alarms and devices may be appropriate in restricted areas and at access points
to the ship, as a complement to guards and patrols. Immediate appropriate response to an alarm is
important if the security alarms and devices are to be effective.
3.4.4.2 In view of the wide range of technical matters which must be taken into account in
deciding upon the device or system best suited for application in each environment, it is prudent that
the advice of a qualified expert be obtained before a decision is made on the system or device to be
used.
3.4.4.3 A means of discreet or covert communications by radio, direct-line facilities or other
reliable means should be provided in each restricted zone and at each access point for use by security or
operating personnel to contact the ship security officer in the event assistance is required.

ANNEX C

SECURITY TRAINING

1 General
A continuous and thorough training programme should support measures taken to safeguard the
security of passengers and crews on board ships. Basic guidance for development of security training
and education is given in the following paragraphs.

2 Criteria
Security training should meet the following criteria:
.1 be comprehensive;
.2 have an adequate number of qualified instructors;
.3 have an effective system of presentation;
.4 use adequate training equipment and aids; and
.5 have a clearly defined objective, i.e,, the attainment of an established minimum standard
of proficiency, knowledge and skill to be demonstrated by each individual,

3 Port facility security personnel training

3. 1 Security and appropriate staff
The port facility security officer and appropriate port facility staff should have
knowledge and, as necessary, receive training in some or all of the following, as appropriate:
.1 security administration;
.2 relevant international conventions, codes and recommendations;
.3 responsibilities and functions of other involved organizations;
.4 relevant government legislation and regulations;
.5 risk, threat and vulnerability assessments;
.6 security surveys and inspections;
.7 ship security measures;
.8 security training and education;
.9 recognition of characteristics and behavioural patterns of persons who are likely to
commit unlawful acts;
.10 inspection, control and monitoring techniques;
 .11 techniques used to circumvent security measures;
.12 dangerous substances and devices and how to recognize them;
.13 ship and local port operations and conditions; and
.14 security devices and systems.
3.2 Inspection, control and monitoring
Instruction and, where appropriate, training for persons assigned to conduct inspection,
control and monitoring at a port facility should take into consideration, as appropriate:
.1 responsibilities under the port facility plan or ship security plan;
.2 inspection, control and monitoring regulations or policies and pertinent laws;
.3 detection and identification of fire-arms, weapons and other dangerous substances and
devices;
.4 operation and testing of security equipment;
.5 manual search methods of persons, baggage, cargo and ship’s stores;
.6 emergency procedures;
.7 recognition of characteristics and behavioural patterns of persons who are likely to
commit unlawful acts;
.8 human relations techniques; and
.9 techniques used to circumvent security measures.
3.3 Guards
Port facility guards who are assigned either to specific fixed locations or to patrols for the
purpose of preventing unauthorized access to areas should receive a general briefing on the training
subjects recommended for the port facility security officer. Initial and subsequent training should
emphasize techniques for:
.1 entry control;
.2 patrols, observation and communications;
.3 inspection, identification and reporting;
.4 person, building and vehicle searches;
.5 apprehension of suspects;
.6 self-defence;
.7 recognizing dangerous substances and devices;
.8 human relations; and
.9 first aid.

4 Ship security personnel training

4.1 Operator security officer and appropriate staff
The operator security officer and appropriate staff should have knowledge and, as necessary, receive
training in some or all of the following, as appropriate:
.1 security administration;
.2 relevant international conventions, codes and recommendations;
.3 responsibilities and functions of other involved organizations;
.4 relevant government legislation and regulations;
.5 risk, threat and vulnerability assessments;
.6 security surveys and inspections;
.7 ship security measures;
.8 security training and education;
.9 recognition of characteristics and behavioural patterns of persons who are likely to
commit unlawful acts;
.10 inspection, control and monitoring techniques;
 .11 techniques used to circumvent security measures;
.12 dangerous substances and devices and how to recognize them;
.13 ship and local port operations and conditions; and
.14 security devices and systems.
4.2 Ship security officer
The ship security officer should have adequate knowledge of and, if necessary, training in the
following, as appropriate:
.1 the ship security plan and related emergency procedures;
.2 the layout of the ship;
.3 the assessment of the risk, threat and vulnerability;
.4 methods of conducting security inspections;
.5 techniques used to circumvent security measures;
.6 operation of technical aids to security, if used;
.7 recognition of characteristics and behavioural patterns of persons who may be likely to
commit unlawful acts;
.8 the detection and recognition of dangerous substances and devices;
.9 port and ship operations; and
.10 methods of physical searches of persons and their baggage.
4.3 Inspection, control and monitoring personnel
Instruction and training, as appropriate, for persons assigned to conduct inspection, control and
monitoring on board ships should take into cosideration, as appropriate, the following:
.1 responsibilities under the port facility or ship security plan;
.2 inspection, control and monitoring regulations or policies and pertinent laws;
.3 detectionandidentificationof fire-arms, weapons and other dangerous substances and
devices;
.4 operation and testing of security equipment, if used;
.5 physical search methods of persons, baggage, cargo and ship’s stores;
.6 emergency procedures;
.7 recognition of characteristics and behavioural patterns of persons who are likely to
commit unlawful acts;
.8 human relations techniques; and
.9 techniques used to circumvent security measures.
4.4 Ship’s crew
Crew members having specific security duties should know their responsibilities for ship
security as described in the ship security plan and should have sufficient knowledge and ability to
perform their assigned duties.

5 Law enforcement personnel

Appropriate law enforcement personnel, when not directly involved in or responsible for port
facility security, should receive a general briefing to become familiar with port and ship operations and
the training of port facility and ship operator security personnel. They should also be orientated
regarding inspection, control and monitoring and the security plans.

***
 ANNEX D

EXCHANGE OF INFORMA TION

1. The prompt and continuing dissemination and exchange of information will assist the
maintenance of effective port and ship security procedures and will enable States, port facilities,
operators and shipmasters to adjust their procedures in response to changing conditions and the specific
or general threats.
2. Effective port and ship security requires efficient two-way communications for the
exchange of information at all levels both domestic and with the governments and organizations
concerned. The prompt, clear and orderly dissemination of such information is vital to the success of
the security programme.

***

Ref MSC/53/24 Annex 14 26 September 1986

 ANNEX 2

THE UNITED STATES 1986 PORTS AND MARITIME SECURITY ACT

International TITLE IX—MARITIME SECURITY

Maritime and SEC. 901. SHORT TITLE.
Port Security Act. This title may be cited as the “International Maritime
46 Usc app. 1801 and Port Security Act.”
note.

Vessels. SEC. 902. INTERNATIONAL MEASURES FOR SEAPORT 46

USC app. 1801. AND SHIPBOARD SECURITY.

The Congress encourages the President to continue to seek agreement through the
International Maritime Organization on matters of International seaport and shipboard
security, and commends him on his efforts to date. In developing such agreement, each
member country of the International Maritime Organization should consult with
appropriate private sector interests in that country. Such agreement would establish
seaport and vessel security measures and could include—

(1) seaport screening of cargo and baggage similar to that done at airports;
(2) security measures to restrict access to cargo, vessels, and dockside property to
authorized personnel only;
(3) additional security on board vessels;
(4) licensing or certification of compliance with appropriate security standards; and
(5) other appropriate measures to prevent unlawful acts against passengers and crews
on board vessels.

46 usc app. 1801 SEC. 903. MEASURES TO PREVENT UNLAWFUL ACTS

note. AGAINST PASSENGERS AND CREWS ON BOARD SHIPS.

(a) REPORT ON PROGRESS OF IMO.—The Secretary of Transportation and the

Secretary of State, jointly, shall report to the Congress by February 28, 1987, on the
progress of the International Maritime Organization in developing recommendations on
Measures to Prevent Unlawful Acts Against Passengers and Crews On Board Ships.

(b) CONTENT OF REPORT.—The report required by subsection (a) shall include

the following information—

100 STAT.893 PUBLIC LAW 99-899—AUG. 27, 1986

(b) SUBMISSION TO COMMITTEE.—The reports required to be submitted to the

Congress under this title shall be submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation of the Senate.
Reports. SEC. 905. THREAT OF TERRORISM TO UNITED STATES
46 usc app. PORTS AND VESSELS.
1802.
Not later than February 28, 1987, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of
Transportation shall report to the Congress on the threat from acts of terrorism to United
States ports and vessels operating from those ports.

SEC. 906. PORT, HARBOR, AND COASTAL FACILITY SECURITY.

The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (33 U.S.C. 1221 et seq.) is amended by
inserting after section 6 the following new section:

Vessels. “SEC. 7. PORT, HARBOR, AND COASTAL FACILITY

36 USC 1226. SECURITY.

“(a) GENERAL AUTHORITY.—The Secretary may take actions described in

subsection (b) to prevent or respond to an act of terrorism against-
(1) an individual, vessel, or public or commercial structure, that is—
“(A) subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; and
“(B) located within or adjacent to the marine environment; or
“(2) a vessel of the United States or an individual on board that vessel.

“(b) SPECIFIC AUTHORITY.—Under subsection (a), the Secretary may—

“(1) carry out or require measures, including inspections, port and harbor patrols, the
establishment of security and safety zones, and the development of contingency plans
and procedures, to prevent or respond to acts of terrorism; and
“(2) recruit members of the Regular Coast Guard Uniformed and the Coast Guard
Reserve and train members services. of the Regular Coast Guard and the Coast Guard
Reserve in the techniques of preventing and responding to acts of terrorism.”

Vessels. SEC. 907. SECURITY STANDARDS AT FOREIGN PORTS.

46 USC app.
1803. (a) ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY MEASURES.—The Secretary of Transportation
shall develop and implement a plan to assess the effectiveness of the security measures
maintained at those foreign ports which the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary
of State, determines pose a high risk of acts of terrorism directed against passenger
vessels.
(b) CONSULTATION WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE.—In
carrying out subsection (a), the Secretary of Transportation shall consult the Secretary of
State with respect to the terrorist threat which exists in each country and poses a high
risk of acts of terrorism directed against passenger vessels.
(c)REPORT OF ASSESSMENTS.—Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment
of this Act, the Secretary of Transportation shall report to the Congress on the plan
developed pursuant to subsection (a) and how the Secretary will implement the plan.

(d)DETERMINATION AND NOTIFICATION TO FOREIGN COUNTRY.—If, after

implementing the plan in accordance with subsection (a), the Secretary of
Transportation determines that a port does not maintain and administer effective security
 measures, the Secretary of State (after being informed by the Secretary of
Transportation) shall notify the appropriate government authorities of the country in
which the port is located of such determination, and shall recommend the steps
necessary to bring the security measures in use at that port up the standard used by the
Secretary of Transportation in making such assessmentS
President of (e) ANTITERRORISM ASSISTANCE RELATED TO MARITIME
U.S SECURITY

The President is encouraged to 22 USC 2349ss. provide antiterrorism assistance related

to maritime security under chapter 8 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to
foreign countries, especially with respect to a port which the Secretary of Transportation
determines under subsection (d) does not maintain and administer effective security
measures.

46 USC app. SEC. 908. TRAVEL ADVISORIES CONCERNING SECURITY

1804. AT FOREIGN PORTS.

(a) TRAVEL ADVISORY.—Upon being notified by the Vessels. Secretary of

Transportation that the Secretary has determined that a condition exists that threatens the
safety or security of passengers, passenger vessels, or crew travelling to or from a
foreign port which the Secretary of Transportation has determined pursuant to section 90
7(d) to be a port which does not maintain and administer effective security measures, the
Secretary of State shall immediately issue a travel advisory with respect to that port.
Any travel advisory issued pursuant to this subsection Federal shall be published in the
Federal Register. The Secretary of Register. State shall take the necessary steps to
widely publicise that publication travel advisory.

(b)LIFTING OF TRAVEL ADVI5ORY.—The travel advisory required to be issued

under subsection (a) may be lifted only if the Secretary of Transportation, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, has determined that effective security measures
are maintained and administered at the port with respect to which the Secretary of
Transportation had made the determination described in section 907(d).

(c) NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS.—The Secretary of State shall immediately

notify the Congress of any change in the status of a travel advisory imposed pursuant to
this section.

Vessels. SEC. 909. SUSPENSION OF PASSENGER SERVICES.

46 USC app.
1805. (a) PRESIDENT’S DETERMINATION.—Whenever the President
determines that a foreign nation permits the use of territory under its jurisdiction as a
base of operations or training for, or as a sanctuary for, or in any way arms, aids, or
abets, any terrorist or terrorist group which knowingly uses the illegal seizure of
passenger vessels or the threat thereof as an instrument of policy, the President may,
without notice or hearing and for as long as the President determines necessary to assure
the security of passenger vessels against unlawful seizure, suspend the right of any
passenger vessel common carrier to operate to and from, and the right of any passenger
 vessel of the United States to utilize, any port in that foreign nation for passenger
service.
(b) PROHIBITION.—It shall be unlawful for any passenger vessel common carrier,
or any passenger vessel of the United States, to operate in violation of the suspension of
rights by the President under this section.
(c) PENALTY.—(1) If a person operates a vessel in violation of this section, the
Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating may deny the vessels
of that person entry to United States ports.

(2) A person violating this section is liable to the United States Government for a
civil penalty of not more than USD 50,000. Each day a vessel utilizes a prohibited port
shall be a separate violation of this section.

46 USC app. SEC. 910. SANCTIONS FOR THE SEIZURE OF VESSELS BY

1806. TERRORISTS.

The Congress encourages the President—

(1) to review the adequacy of domestic and international sanctions against terrorists
who seize or attempt to seize vessels; and
(2) to strengthen where necessary, through bilateral and multilateral efforts, the
effectiveness of such sanctions.

Not later than one year after the date of enactment of this President of U.S. Act, the
President shall submit a report to the Congress Reports. which includes the review of
such sanctions and the efforts
to improve such sanctions.

SEC 911. DEFINITIONS.

For purposes of this title—
(1) the term “common carrier” has the same meaning given such term in section 3(6)
of the Shipping Act of 1984 (46 USC app. 1702~61); and
(2) the terms “passenger vessel” and “vessel of the United States” have the same
meaning given such terms in section 2101 of title 46, United States Code.
SEC. 912. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There are authorized to be appropriated S 12,500,000 for of the fiscal years 1987
through 1991, to be available to the Secretary of Transportation to carry out this title.
SEC. 913. REPORTS.
(a) CONSOLIDATION.—To the extent practicable, the 1 reports required under
sections 903, 905, and 907 shall be consolidated into a single document before being
submitted to the Congress. Any classified material in those reports shall be submitted
separately as an addendum to the consolidated report.
 ANNEX 3

DIRECTIONS UNDER THE UK AVIATION AND MARITIME SECURITY ACT

1990
RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURITY 1 B/9 1

The Secretary of State, in exercise of his powers under section 24 of the Aviation and Maritime
Security Act 1990. for the purposes to which Part III of the Act applies, hereby directs that you as a...
Shall Appoint an individual to have responsibility for protective security matters within the
harbour areas of your authority.
Furthermore, the Secretary of State, in exercise of his powers under section 19 of the Act and
for the same purposes, hereby directs that within 14 days you shall supply him with the names and
addresses of the individuals to whom responsibilities have been given, and notify him of any changes
to this information within 7 days of the previous information becoming inaccurate.

CONTINGENCY PLANNING 3B/91

The Secretary of State, in exercise of his powers under section 24 of the Aviation and Maritime
Security Act 1990, for the purposes to which Part III of the Act applies, hereby directs that you as a.
Shall 1) Ensure that contingency plans are written to cover the following subjects where each
comes within your area of responsibility.
a) Bomb threat.
b) Bomb search.
c) Evacuation of ships or premises.
d) The event of detonation of explosive or incendiary devices.
e) Action in the event of heightened threat state to include searching of passengers,
baggage, vehicles and freight, and access to the port.
f) The numbers of staff required to instigate each plan. including the training required.
g) Port response to bomb threat on board ship, both in port and seeking to
enter port.
h) Other relevant situations.
2) Within such plans include details of all actions to be taken, persons to be contacted and
plans of land and buildings affected.
3) Copies should be made available to all parties involved.
4) Ensure that training is provided to enable staff to implement the contingency plans. This
training shall include such elements as the recognition of devices and weapons, methods of
searching and other appropriate topics.
5) Exercise sufficient trials to ensure the plans can be effectively implemented.
6) Implement such plans when necessary and/or in reponse to threat levels notified by the
Department of Transport.

PORT SECURITY COMMITTEE 2A/91

The Secretary of State, in exercise of his powers under section 24 of the Aviation and Maritime
Security Act 1990, for the purposes to which Part III of the Act applies, hereby directs that you as a. .
Shall 1) Establish a Port Security Committee to consider all issues related to the protective
security of the relevant harbour(s) and its (their) users.
 2) Make membership of the Port Security Committee open to all representatives given
responsibility for protective security within the port, to the statutory controlling authorities, and
to other interested parties as appropriate.
3) Ensure that the Port Security Committee meets no less than (3) times per year and more
often if necessary. Details of the proceedings shall be notified to the statutory controlling
authorities and to harbour users from whom actions are required.

RESTRICTED ZONES 4A/91

The Secretary of State, in exercise of his powers under section 20 of the Aviation and Maritime
Security Act 1990, for the purposes to which part III of the said Act applies, hereby requires that you as
a...
Shall 1) Apply to the Secretary of State for the designation of the whole or part(s) of
the harbour area as a restricted zone(s).
2) Ensure that the proposed restricted zone(s) encompass(es) passenger berths, passenger
terminals, embarkation areas, walkways, linkspans, ‘cleared’ embarkation areas and control
authorities’ check and search points, and such other areas as the harbour authority may
recommend.
3) Submit the application in such form, and accompanied by such plans as required in the
attached application form.
4) Submit the application within 28 days from the date of this direction.
Furthermore, the Secretary of State. in exercise of his powers under Section 22 of the Aviation
and Maritime Security Act 1990, for the purposes to which Part III of the said Act applies,
hereby directs that you shall ensure that, where the restricted zone is temporary (i.e. time
limited) the area of the zone is thoroughly searched immediately before the re-imposition of the
restricted zone status.

APPLICATION FOR DESIGNATION OF A RESTRICTED ZONE(S) WITHIN A HARBOUR

AREA

Note: A restricted zone(s) may be designated for continuous operation or for specified periods
only depending on frequency of use. The vulnerable points requiring protection by the restricted
zone(s) will usually comprise passenger terminals and embarkation areas, walkways, berths, linkspans,
cleared embarkation car and freight parks, and control authorities’ check and search points. Restricted
zone(s) should be kept as small as practicable.

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS REQUIRED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO

ACCOMPANY ANY APPLICATION BY A HARBOUR AUTHORITY FOR THE DESIGNATION
OF A RESTRICTED ZONE(S).

1 HARBOUR AUTHORITY’S OR HARBOUR OPERATOR’S DETAILS

2 PLANS:—
a) Overall plan of port under control of applicant, to a suitable scale to enable all relevant
boundaries and vulnerable points (see above) to be clearly identified.
b) Plan(s) and dimensions of the proposed restricted zone(s) to protect those vulnerable
points. This plan(s) must be to a scale of not less than 1:250 and indicate clearly: —
i) All entry control points and search positions, including those used for port authority
purposes.
 ii) Position of proposed protective fencing to guard the restricted zone(s).
iii) Position of all gates into and out of the restricted zone(s).
iv) Proposals for the siting of all ‘cleared’ vehicle holding areas within the restricted
zone(s).
v) Routes showing the flow of foot passengers, small vehicles, freight and service vehicles
into and out of the restricted zone(s).
vi) Position of protective security fences and gates for areas containing
dangerous goods in bulk.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQIRED IN CONNECTION WITH APPLICATIONS FOR

DESIGNATION OF A RESTRICTED ZONE(S) WITHIN A HARBOUR AREA

THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS REQUIRED BY THE SECRETARY OF

STATE IN EXERCISE OF HIS POWERS UNDER SECTION 19 OF THE AVIATION AND
MARITIME SECURITY ACT 1990.

1 STATISTICS: Table of throughput figures (both inward and outward) annually or

periodically as appropriate to each trade. The figures should identify total number of
passengers/vehicles, number and size of military movements (if any), and volume of dangerous goods
that may be expected to transit the restricted zone(s).
2 OTHER INFORMATION:

a) Who are the other authorities, shipping companies or operators that may be affected by
the proposed restricted zone(s)?
b) Have they been consulted in relation to this application?
c) Has the proposed restricted zone(s) been agreed by the Port Security Committee?
This additional information shall be submitted within 28 days.

PASS SYSTEMS 5A/91

The Secretary of State. in exercise of his powers under section 24 of the Aviation and Maritime
Security Act 1990, for the purposes to which Part III of the said Act applies, hereby directs that you as
a…

Shall 1) Establish a pass system for access to the restricted zone and keep a register of all
such passes issued.
2) Ensure that the pass system shall comprise two categories of passes, a) permanent and b)
temporary.
a) Permanent passes may be valid for an unlimited or for specified period. Passes issued for
a specified period may be renewed only if the holder of the pass continues to require access to
the restricted zone for a legitimate reason.
b) Temporary passes shall be valid for one day only and may be renewed as many times as
may be appropriate. The issuing of such passes shall be by or on authority of the Harbour
Authority.
3) Ensure that Permanent passes are issued either by the Harbour Authority or by
a) the owner, charterer, or manager of a British ship or any other ship which is in a harbour
area.
 b) a person who carries on operations in a harbour area.
4) Ensure that passes are only issued to persons who require access to restricted zones for a
legitimate reason and who are:
a) Persons (including your employees) who satisfy the issuing authority that they are
suitable persons to be issued with a pass; or
b) Persons who are employees of undertakings which the issuing authority is satisfied are
reliable and reputable undertakings and which certify to him in writing that the persons are
suitable to be issued with passes.
5) Ensure that Permanent passes shall not be issued without evidence of identity and
written confirmation from two referees, one of whom should be the previous employer of the
person seeking the pass, that such person is known to them and of good character; or the
undertaking has confirmed in writing that it has obtained the certification of identity and good
character as above.
6) Within the restricted zone passes should be displayed, at all times, by the persons to
whom they have been issued.
7) Loss or misuse of a pass or failure to display a pass should be the subject of disciplinary
action against the person under that employee’s terms of employment by the relevant
undertaking or by any other individual or body for whom such person is working.
8) Ensure that the persons issuing passes shall recover all passes where the pass holder no
longer has a legitimate reason to require entry to a restricted area.
9) The issuing authority shall have the right to withdraw any pass.

PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES 6A/91

The Secretary of State, in exercise of his powers under section 24 of the Aviation and Maritime
Security Act 1990, for the purposes to which part III of the said Act applies, hereby directs that you as
a…

Shall 1) Ensure that restricted zones are bounded by effective physical barriers to prevent
unauthorised access. These physical barriers may include fences, walls, natural barriers or other
effective means of preventing access.
2) Ensure that fences are of a suitable standard and construction to protect the vulnerable
point; they should be at least 2.9 metres high. Normally BS 1722 Part 10 should be the
minimum standard.
3) Ensure that walls shall be of solid construction and normally at least 3 metres high.
4) Ensure that Gates are of at least the same standard as the fence or wall, and are locked
closed or controlled at all times. Locks should be to BS3621: 1980 specification or higher;
hinges should be of a type to prevent easy removal of the gate.
5) Ensure that openings in walls forming part of the perimeter of the restricted zone (e.g.
doors, windows, loading bays) must either be secured to BS3621: 1980 specification or higher
or be controlled at all times.
6) Ensure that passengers arriving (landing at the port) must be separated from those
passengers departing (boarding ships) by physical measures or by time.
7) Ensure that physical barriers to prevent unauthorised entry to and exit from restricted
zones and to prevent contact between arriving and departing passengers are supported by such
other measures (e.g. lighting, manning, patrolling, pass systems, electronic or other intruder
detection systems, CCTV) as are necessary to achieve an effective level of control over the
restricted zone.
CONTROL OF EMBARKATION AND DISEMBARKATION

The Secretary of State, in excercise of his powers under section 24 of the Aviation and
Maritime Security Act 1990, for the purposes to which Part III of the Act applies, hereby directs that
you as a. .

Shall 1) Implement effective measures to prevent unauthorised embarkation on to or

disembarkation from vessels.
2) Ensure that no person is permitted to embark on to a ship without a legitimate reason
and on production of a valid form of authorisation such as a boarding card, ticket or pass.
3) Ensure that no person is permitted to disembark from a ship (prior to sailing) without a
legitimate reason and on production of a recognised pass. Passengers wishing not to travel must
obtain the express permission of the Master or other responsible officer, who must inform the
appropriate shore authorities. The procedures to be followed in such cases, including the contact
points, shall form part of the security plans for both the vessel and the port.
4) Ensure the linking of passengers with their baggage and drivers with their vehicles
within the restricted zone. Where unaccompanied baggage is carried procedures must be
developed to minimise the risk of introduction of explosive or incendiary devices, and to
minimise the effects if such a cdevice should detonate.

CONTROL OF ACCESS TO SENSITIVE AREAS ON BOARD SHIP 8A/91

The Secretary of State, in exercise of his powers under section 24 of the Aviation and Maritime
Act 1990, for the purposes to which Part III of the said Act applies, hereby directs that you as the.

Shall 1) Ensure that access to non-public areas of the ship is at all times strictly limited to
authorised personnel; with particular regard to sensitive areas such as the bridge, engine rooms,
radio room, fan rooms, pump rooms, steering gear and other spaces housing facilities or
equipment essential for the working of the ship.
2) Ensure that, whilst at sea, access to vehicles spaces is strictly limited to authorised
personnel from the time that embarkation procedures are completed until disembarkation
procedures are commenced.

PROVISION OF INFORMATION 9B/91

The Secretary of State, in exercise of his powers under section 19 of the Aviation and Maritime
Security Act 1990, for the purposes to which Part III of the said Act applies, hereby directs that you as
a…

Shall 1) Provide to the Secretary of State the following details of the proper officer, of
your organisation, and his deputy, to whom official documents and information should be
addressed:
a) Name; b) Address; c) Telephone number; d) Fax number; e) Telex number.
2) Provide details a) to e) above of the manager of each port, passenger terminal and
shipping operation as is appropriate within that undertaking; and of the deputies for those
managers.
3) Provide details a) to e) above of the persons who should be contacted in case of
emergency, and of their deputies.
 4) Provide details of the routes and services operated by undertakings carrying out
passenger ship operations.
5) Provide details of all other businesses operating within the restricted zone including the
name of the owner/manager and the telephone number.
6) Provide details of the protective security measures in place at ports, in terminals and
passenger ships under your control.
7) Comply with this directive within 14 days.
8) Provide to the Secretary of State, changes to the above information within
7 days of the previous information becoming inaccurate.
9) Provide to the Secretary of State and to the local Police details of all threats, warnings
and incidents of a nature which fall within the purposes of Part III of the Act and concern the
security of passengers and employees.

PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES 10A/91

The Secretary of State, in exercise of his powers under section 24 of the Aviation and Maritime
Security Act 1990, for the purposes to which Part III of the said Act applies, hereby directs that you as
the...
Shall 1)Ensure that, on board ship, passengers embarking must be physically segregated from
passengers disembarking.
2) Provide for physical barriers, preventing contact between embarking and disembarking
passengers, to be supported by such other measures (e.g. lighting, manning patrolling, pass
systems electronic or other intruder detection systems CCTV) as are necessary to achieve an
effective level of control.

PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES

The Secretary of State, in exercise of his powers under section 24 of the Aviation and Maritime
Security Act 1990, for the purposes to which Part III of the said Act applies, hereby directs that you as
a..
Shall 1) Ensure that the area described is bounded by effective physical barriers to
prevent unauthorised access. These physical barriers may include fences, walls, natural barriers
or other effective means of preventing access.
2) Ensure that fences are of a suitable standard and construction to protect the vulnerable
point; they shall be at least 2.9 metres high. Normally BS1722 Part 10 should be the minimum
standard.
3) Ensure that walls shall be of solid construction and normally at least 3 metres high.
4) Ensure that gates are of at least the same standard as the fence or wall, and are locked
closed or controlled at all times. Locks should be to B5362 1:1980 specification or higher;
hinges should be of a type to prevent easy removal of the gate.
5) Ensure that openings in walls forming part of the perimeter of the area detailed (e.g.
doors, windows, loading bays) must either be secured to BS3621:1980 specification or higher
or be controlled at all times.
6) Ensure that physical barriers to prevent unauthorised entry to and exit from the area
detailed are supported by such other measures (e.g. lighting, manning, patrolling, pass systems,
electronic or other intruder detection systems, CCTV) as are necessary to achieve an effective
level of control over the area.
SEARCHING IN HARBOUR AREAS 12A/91

The Secretary of State, in exercise of his powers under section 22 of the Aviation and Maritime
Security Act 1990, for the purposes to which Part III of the Act applies, hereby directs that you as a .
Shall 1) Arrange for such searches to be carried out of
a) the harbour areas or any part of it
b) any ship which is in the harbour area
c) persons or property (other than ships) which may at any time be in the harbour area
as are appropriate according to the Threat Assessment Guidance issued by the Department of
Transport from time to time, and according to the level of threat notified by the Department of
Transport.
2) Employ the services of reliable and reputable persons suitably trained in security matters
such as searching, in order to carry out the requirements of this direction.
H DITMAS
CHIEF INSPECTOR TRANSPORT SECURITY
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT
 ANNEX 4

THREAT ASSESSMENT GUIDELINES FOR SHIPS VISITING THE UK—

JANUARY 1991
The UK Department of Transport sensibly balancing the enforcement of all the Aviation &
Maritime Security Act with an assessment of the Threat.
Owners and Masters will find the background to these assesments of value if they visit the UK.]

THREAT ASSESSMENT AND ACTION

LEVEL 1—Background measures

General

(a) Each port should establish a Port Security Committee to consider matters of protective
security on a regular basis. Senior representatives of the port authority, ferry operators, other port users
and statutory controlling authorities (Police, both uniformed and Special Branch, Immigration,
Customs and Excise) should be included on the Committee.
(b) All port and ferry operators should produce clear statements of security policy. These
should be available to the Port Security Committee, and subject to regular review.
(c) Written bomb alert procedures should be prepared for all ports and vessels, to include all
public areas in terminals and on board. Appropriate shore and sea-going personnel should be made
aware of the procedures.
(d) Plans for action, which would be put into effect in the event of a threat being received,
should be agreed and appropriate staff informed. (As guidance: on receipt of a threat, the police should
always be informed immediately. The organisation against whom the threat is made should inform any
other relevant parties, including the Department of Transport, evaluate the threat and instigate the
appropriate procedures.)
(e) Port and ferry operators should draw up and exercise plans for searches of port areas and
ships, and for searching of passengers, their baggage and vehicles.
(f) Contingency Plans should be made, with the co-operation and assistance of the Port
Security Committee, for the implementation of additional security measures in response to various
levels of threat.
(g) Wherever applicable, a plan should be prepared to cater for the handling of high risk
targets (e.g. uniformed troops; at higher threat levels.

Ports

(a) Port embarkation areas should be physically segregated (normally by suitable fencing)
and access should be controlled. Unauthorised persons should not have access.
(b) A pass system should be introduced for all port users and their vehicles (if appropriate).
Arrangements for issuing temporary passes to legitimate visitors should be agreed between ferry and
port operators. A central register of all pass holders should be maintained by the port authority. Passes
should be displayed at all times so that authorised personnel are readily identifiable.
(c) Consideration should be given to automatic access systems for regular authorised port
users.
 (d) All passenger movements should be controlled.
(e) An appropriately senior member of the port authority should be designated as the Port
Security Officer, with responsibility for protective security matters.

Ferries

(a) Once having embarked, no passengers should be allowed to disembark without the
express permission of the Master of the vessel or other responsible officer, who will ensure that the
appropriate shore authorities (Customs, Immigration, Police, or Port Security) are informed of the
circumstances.
(b) Both in port and at sea access to certain areas (e.g. bridge, engine room, radio room,
steering gear) should be limited to ship’s staff and other authorised personnel.
(c) At sea access to vehicle spaces should be controlled and monitored from completion of
embarkation procedures until commencement of discharge.
(d) Unauthorised visitors should not be allowed on board in port.
(e) An appropriately senior ship’s officer should be appointed as Ship Security Officer with
responsibility for protective security matters and for the implementation of the company’s security
policy. The Ship Security Officer should take appropriate action on board the vessel in line with the
current threat level.

LEVEL 2—Low risk of attack to a ship, line or port

General

(a) Appropriate staff should be aware of the threat level.

(b) Occasional random searches of embarking passengers, baggage and vehicles should be
conducted, in consultation with HM Customs.
(c) Occasional random searches of port areas and ships should be conducted, in consultation
with HM Customs.
(d) The Port Security Committee should implement additional security measures in
accordance with the contingency plan for the heightened level of threat.
(e) Wherever applicable, the system for handling higher risk targets (e.g. uniformed troops)
should be introduced.

Ports
(a) Automatic access systems (if appropriate) should be audited.

Ferries

(a) The Ship Security Officer should take appropriate action on board the vessel in line with
the threat level.

LEVEL 3—Medium risk of attack to a ship, line or port

General

(a) The Port Security Committee should implement additional security measures in
accordance with the contingency plan for the heightened level of threat.
 (b) The frequency of occasional random searches of embarking passengers, baggage and
vehicles should be increased.
(c) The frequency of occasional random searches of port areas and ships should be
increased in consultation with HM Customs.

Ports

(a) Access to the port embarkation area(s) should be strictly controlled.

(b) Arrangements for issuing temporary passes should be reviewed, and revised if necessary
in the light of the heightened level of threat.
(c) Automatic access systems should be reviewed.

Ferries

(a) The Ship Security Officer should take appropriate action on board the vessel in line with
the threat level.

LEVEL 4—High risk of attack to a ship, line or port

General

(a) The Port Security Committee should meet to consider protective security matters on a
daily basis. It should include consideration of the assistance that could be provided by the relevant
agencies.
(b) Port and ferry operators’ implementation of security policy should be examined.
(c) Appropriate shore and sea staff should be alerted to the threat state and correct
procedures for their ports and vessels.
(d) On receipt of a threat, the Police, the Port Security Committee and the Department of
Transport must be informed. The organisation against whom the threat is made should instigate the
appropriate procedures.
(e) Port and ferry companies should establish overt random checks of their premises, and
aim to check and search a substantial proportion of all passengers, baggage and vehicles as directed.
Appropriate equipment should be obtained and used if available. Where not readily available
consideration should be given to hiring/leasing or borrowing such equipment for the duration of the
heightened level of threat.
(f) The Port Security Committee should implement additional security measures in
accordance with the contingency plan for the heightened level of threat.

Ports

(a) Access to the port embarkation area(s) should be strictly controlled by trained security
staff.
(b) The central register of pass holders, maintained by the port authority, should be
scrutinised.
(c) Strict control should be exercised over visitors.

(d) The use of automatic access cards by regular authorised port users should be strictly
controlled and subject to random checks.
(e) All passenger movements should be strictly controlled by trained staff.
 (f) Parking restrictions should be introduced to keep all unauthorised vehicles clear of ships
and key buildings.

Ferries

(a) The Ship Security Officer should take appropriate action on board the vessel in line with
the threat level.

LEVEL 5—Specific threat to a ship, line or port based on strong intelligence

All measures of level 4 should be implemented for the specified port and/or shipping operator.

THREAT ASSESSMENT AND ACTION TABLE

 ANNEX 5

FROM THE SEA CARRIER SECURITY MANUAL DRUG SMUGGLING IN

CONTAINERS, TRAILERS, AND CHASSIS
Concealing illegal drugs within the walls, Most containers have exposed castings in
floors, ceilings, and frames of containers and each corner. These are interior projections of the
trailers has become a very common method of lifting blocks used to lift the container with a
smuggling large quantities of illegal drugs into crane. The container floor is constructed of wood
the United States. Smugglers have also utilized or a combination of metal and wood panels. The
the framing, fuel tanks, air tanks, tyres, and other exterior bottom of the container consists of
component parts of chassis. Although smugglers exposed steel beams with up to four fork-lift
are becoming quite sophisticated in their pockets.
concealment methods, much of their handiwork The most common concealment methods
can be detected through routine, systematic used in dry van containers include:
examinations. • False front walls
In the following pages, common • False or built-up floors
concealment methods will be identified and • False ceilings
methods of examination provided, to assist • Enclosed exterior bottoms
carrier personnel in detecting alterations to • Container frames.
containers and trailers which may conceal illegal False Front Walls
drugs. When examining a normal front wall of a dry
CONTAINERS van container, both the comer blocks and the
Different types of containers are designed corrugation between the marking panels and the
to accommodate different needs: dry-van front wall are visible. False walls have been
(closed), open-top, open-side, bulk. latrack, tank, detected where the smuggler has manufactured
refrigerated, and others. The most common sizes false corner blocks, but the false wall was flush
are of nominal 20- and 40-foot lengths as set against the marking panel. Additionally, the false
forth in the various specifications of the Inter- wall may be of the same type of corrugated metal
national Standards Organization. The discussion as the legitimate front wall. Other telltale signs
which follows will concentrate on 20-and 40- of alteration include fresh paint, welding burns
foot dry and refrigerated containers. on either the interior or exterior of the container
Containers are composed of a rigid wall, variances in wall texture or lack of
frame, usually steel or aluminium, with panels corrugation, and the odour of fresh paint, burnt
between the frame members. (See figures 1, 2, wood, or body filler.
and 3.) The frame is the principal structural load- False Floors
bearing part of the container. The container’s The floors in unaltered containers are normally
side walls are usually constructed of corrugated flush with the front door frame. If the floor
steel, with corrugations three to four inches boards protrude above the level of the frame or
wide, except at the two flat areas that run the full appear new, not level, or slanting upward toward
vertical height of the panels near each end, These the front wall of the container, then a possible
flat areas are called marking areas. Located false floor may exist. Another method of
approximately 12 to 15 inches from the front and detecting a false floor is to reach for the ceiling
rear walls of the container, they are reserved for upon entering the container and walk toward the
markings that may be required, and they often front wall. If this is done routinely, a change in
contain ventilation holes to allow an exchange of height or the ability to touch the ceiling should
air in the container while preventing the entry of be evident if the floor has been altered.
solids or liquids.
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False Ceilings hollowed out and patched. New rivets, calking,
The construction of the false ceiling can glue or wall material, creases where the wall was
either be internal or external. The external false folded back, or a wavy or uneven wall might be
ceiling, or false roof, can be detected by evidence that it was altered to conceal
observing the distance between the top of the contraband.
corner block and the top of the roof. Normally, Floors in reefer containers are normally
the roof is slightly below or flush with the top of constructed of aluminium and are corrugated to
the corner blocks. If the roof is above the corner allow for cool air circulation beneath the cargo.
blocks, then a false roof may exist. Ceilings are insulated with four to six inches of
An internally constructed false ceiling insultation between the inner ceiling and the
can be detected by reaching for the ceiling. roof. False floors and roofs may be detected by
When a false ceiling or floor exists, a change in noticing telltale signs of tampering, variances in
height or in the ability to touch the roof should height, or uneven appearances.
be noticed. Other telltale signs may also be TRAILERS
present, such as fresh paint, obscured corner Contraband is concealed in trailers in
blocks. welding burns, and the like. much the same manner as in containers. False
Container Frames walls, roofs, ceilings, and floors are common.
The most difficult method to detect is the Additionally, smugglers have routinely used the
use of container frames to conceal drugs (figure trailer undercarriage, air tanks, and tyres to
4). Without other telltale signs, detection is conceal illegal drugs. (Figure 5).
normally possible only by drilling the frame and Examinations of trailers should be
probing. systematic. Beginning with the exterior, notice
Refrigerated Containers the condition of the metal and the rivets
The interior of a reefer container offers comprising the roof. Normally, the roof should
more places to conceal drugs than any other type be flat and the rivets weather-worn. A buckled
of container or trailer. The interior walls, ceiling, appearance or new rivets may indicate that the
and doors are separated from their exterior roof has been altered to conceal illegal drugs.
counterparts by four to six inches of insulation. Next, examine the undercarriage. Often,
At the front of a reefer, a baffle wall separates smugglers working with conspirators aboard the
the refrigeration unit from the cargo, creating a vessel or involved in the unlading process will
space for air circulation. The size of this wall and simply leave small packages of contraband in
the distance from the motor may vary. Usually it existing cracks and crevices in the framework of
starts eight to 10 inches from the floor and ends the undercarriage. Tanks that supply air to the air
eight to 10 inches from the ceiling. Some of brake system have often been disconnected and
these walls are hinged in the centre and can be filled with contraband. Tanks containing only air
pulled down for inspection by simply removing a should give off a clear ringing sound when struck
few screws. Others can be removed only with with a metallic object.
great difficulty. Protruding through a cut-out Tyres have also been used to conceal
section of the baffle wall is the interior section of illegal drugs. Normal tyre pressure is 80 pounds
the blower duct. From this duct, a plastic or per square inch. Underinflated tyres may conceal
canvas tubing system runs the length of the illegal drugs. Detecting contraband in tyres can
container to distribute the cold refrigerated air. be accomplished by using the tap method. Place
A false front wall may exist if the baffle the fingertips of one hand on the tyre tread and
wall reaches the floor or the ceiling or if the tap the opposite side of the tread with the other
interior blower unit barely protrudes into the hand or with a blunt instrument. A clear ringing
container. Smugglers have peeled back entire vibration will be felt if the tyre contains only air.
walls and replaced the insulation with If there is contraband present, there will be a dull
contraband. On occasion, small sections have thud and little vibration. Other telltale signs of
been possible concealment in tyres include

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fresh scratches on lug nuts, clean lug nuts on an by shifting cargo. The ceiling may also be
otherwise dirty wheel, and fresh paint or grease panelled. False walls are common methods of
on lug nuts. smuggling in trailers.
A trailer is supported by two steel girders When examining a trailer’s walls, be alert
set three to four feet apart running underneath for the odour of new glue or caulking used to
the floor from the rear doors to the front attach a false panel or to conceal an odour. Also
mounting plate. A steel plate can be mounted be alert for new rivets, screws, nails, or other
from one girder to another, thus creating a fastening devices and for changes in size, colour,
compartment for contraband. This space should texture, or condition of wall panels. One way to
normally be open, and the wooden floor of the reveal a false wall is to measure and compare the
trailer should be visible. interior and exterior lengths of the trailer.
A furniture van is a trailer with a notch Counting the spaces between the struts on the
cut out where the tractor hooks up. Because of ceiling (each approximately two feet apart) can
this notch, a platform is created which is raised give a fairly accurate length.
off the floor approximately 12 inches and which To detect an alteration in the floor of a
runs approximately six feet from the front wall trailer, compare the interior and exterior wood.
of the trailer. Smugglers have been known to Do they match? Look for new sections of wood
extend these platforms to create compartments in or steel and observe if the floor is abnormally
which to conceal contraband (Figure 6). elevated.
When opening the doors of trailers to CHASSIS
examine their interiors, be aware of any odours Concealment techniques used on
which may be present. Confined areas combined container chassis are similar to those used on the
with built-up heat can make the odour of some undercarriages of trailers. Air and other tanks
drugs quite noticeable. Like containers, the provide ready compartments which can be used
floors, walls, and ceilings of trailers can be to conceal illegal drugs. Tyres and cavities near
altered to conceal illegal drugs. Many trailers the truck hook-up area are commonly used for
have metal, wood, or fiberglass panels covering concealment of illegal drugs.
the interior walls which protect these walls from
damage caused

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 ANNEX 6

SPECIMEN INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SECURITY (IMS)

SHIP SECURITY PLAN
CONTENTS LIST

DESCRIPTION

SECTION ONE—INTRODUCTION & SECURITY POLICY

Section 1.1 Introduction

Introduction
Disclaim

Section 1.2 Operator & Ship Details

Operator
Ship Details

Section 1.3 Security Policy

Operator Security Officer
Director Safety and Security
Ship Security Officer
Security Planning
Port Security Assets
Master Keys
Key Control
IMO Designated Restricted Areas
Vulnerable Points
Small Technical Lockers
Access Points to the Ship
Crew Identification Passes and Boarding Procedures
Crew Safety Card
Passenger IdentificationlBoarding
Passes
Visitors Passes and Boarding Procedures
Shoreside Visitors
Shore Based Staff
Visitor Identification Log
Stevedore Identification and Control
Searching Procedures
Crew Security Training
Computer Security
Drug Policy
Skeet Guns and Ammunition
Defensive Equipment

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Section 1.4 Alert State Measures
Introduction
Access Control
Screening
Securing
Searching the Ship

SECTION TWO—BOMB/SUSPICIOUS OBJECT SEARCH PLANS

Section 2.1 Guidance on Action to be taken if a Bomb Warning is Received

Introduction
Receipt of the Initial Message
Enclosures
Bomb Threat Checklist
Check Sheet One
Check Sheet Two
Port Announcement
Check Sheet Three
First Announcement—At Sea
Second Announcement—At Sea
Third Announcement—At Sea

Section 2.2 Action to be taken on Discovery of a Suspicious Object/Suspect Bomb

Preamble
Enclosures
Check Sheet Four
Check Sheet Five
Suspicious Object/Suspect Bomb
Location & Description Form
Check Sheet Six
Check Sheet Seven
Public Announcement Requesting Information
Public Announcement Concluding the Incident

Section 2.3 First Sweep—Control Sheets

Introduction
Master Control Sheet

Section 2.4 Stage One Search—Control Sheets

Introduction
Control Sheets

Section 2.5 Stage Two Search—Control Sheets

Introduction.
Control Sheets

Section 2.6 Explosive Device Analysis

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Section 2.7 Blast Route Planning

SECTION THREE—ASSISTANCE & GUIDANCE NOTES

Section 3.1 Duties of the Security Guards

Purpose of Duties
Duties at the Gangway
Patrol Duties
Duties at Sea

Section 3.2 Reserved for future use

Section 3.3 Example Orders for the Duty Watch Officer at the Gangway

Section 3.4 Indicators to Assist in the Identification of Suspects amongst Passengers

Section 3.5 Indicators to Assist in the Identification of Forged or Suspect Passport/Travel

Documents
Introduction
Phase One
Phase Two

Section 3.6 Notification of Suspicious Passengers Recommended Action

Introduction
Procedure

Section 3.7 Report on an Unlawful Act

Ship or Port Area Description
Brief Description of Incident or Threat
Number of Alleged Offenders
Method Used to Introduce Dangerous Substances or Devices into the Port
Facility or Ship
Type of Dangerous Substances or
Devices Used
What Measures and Procedures are
Recommended to prevent a Recurrent
Other Pertinent Details

Section 3.8 Guidance on Action to be Taken if the Ship Is Taken Over by Force
General
Military Action
Public/Press Information

Section 3.9 Indicators to Assist in the Identification of Forged US Dollars

Section 3.10 Visitors Record Sheet

Introduction
Retention of Visitors Record Sheets
Specimen Visitors Record Sheet

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SECTION FOUR—INVESTIGATIONS

Section 4.1 Incident Report Forms

Introduction
Statement Form
Report Form—Personal Injury to a Passenger or Visitor
Medical Form—Personal Injury to a Passenger or Visitor
Letter of Indemnity

SECTION FIVE—ANTI DRUG SMUGGLING AND ABUSE PROTECTION

Section 5.1 Anti Drug Smuggling Protective Measures

Section 5.2 Action when Drugs are Found at Sea

Section 5.3 Indicators to Assist in the Identification of Drug Abuse

Section 5.4 Guidelines for the Control of Alcohol on Board Ship

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 ANNEX 7

GUIDE To SEARCHING PROCEDURES IN PORTS AND ON SHIPS

General—Searching should be a team effort under the leadership of a supervisor who should be
responsible for observing the passengers, allocating them to individual searchers, ensuring that the
maximum duty times are not exceeded and for the supervision of in-depth searches, when these are
considered necessary. The supervisor should ensure that his team are not distracted from doing their
jobs efficiently and be on the look out for the tricks that have been used in the past to avoid or defeat
search.
Passenger Search Point—There are three options in selecting the position of the search point
chosen for passengers and their hand carried baggage. As every port is different the final judgment
must be made by local management. Each option has advantages and disadvantages which must be
weighed up when selecting the best solution. These options are:—
(a) Centratised Search Point—The biggest advantage of selecting one centralised search
point is that it is generally more economical in terms of equipment; personnel and space. Also control
services such as Police. Customs and Immigration should be able to integrate easily into centralised
search. The principle disadvantage is that keeping the ‘clean passengers’ segregated after search will
present problems of organisation and surveillance.
(b) Channel Search—In this system, generally applicable to busier ports, several search
points are established in each of the passenger access routes to the ship or ships. It is more expensive in
both manpower and equipment but has the advantage of having a faster rate of processing passengers.
Also control after search should be easier.
(c) Gangway Search—Search at the gangway head is the final and least favoured option as
it has the disadvantages of allowing the terrorists to get very close to the ultimate target. Also space in
ships will be at a premium compared with ashore, and long queues of passengers waiting on an open
gangway to pass the search control may become irritable. While this option cannot be a favourite it will
be imperative in the following circumstances:
(i) By passenger carrying vesse’s at all times when there is no passenger screening ashore.
i.e. In many foreign ports.
(ii) By all ships when there is a high threat of terrorist attack to that ship or port when
double screening of passengers should be done. Indeed all personnel boarding ships should be searched
in such circumstances.

Methods of Search—Passengers
(a) Physical Searching—Passengers and visitors to ships in high threat States may be
searched physically by hand or subject to sweep by metal detectors. Physical searching is best carried
out in booths as privacy minimises embarrassment and increased effectiveness. The use of booths also
prevents search methods being observed. However booths are expensive, take up valuable space and
invite claims for assault. Nevertheless a location where searches can be carried out in private should be
available for those passengers or staff who request privacy and where in-depth searches of those who
arouse suspicion can be carried out, in the presence of a supervisor. As an alternative, screens can be
used to achieve some of the purposes of booths. Passengers should not be given the opportunity of
selcting a particular searcher, and rope stanchions or other barriers should be used to prevent searchers
being crowded and distracted. This enables the supervisor to observe the passengers, to note suspicious
behaviour and to allocate passengers to available searchers to ensure no over-loading.
(b) Metal Detection—The most usual way of using metal detection is to process passengers
and staff through an archway which is preset to alarm if a certain amount of metal is carried on the

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person. Hand-held metal detectors may also be used for screening individual passengers and members
of staff especially those few who object to physical search on religious or other grounds. Irrespective of
which equipment is used it is essential to remember that metal detectors will not pick up explosives,
plastic weapons or inflammable liquids carried in glass or plastic containers on the person. For this
reason metal detection alone is insufficient and must always be accompanied by a physical search of a
proportion of those being screened, including some who do not alarm the detector. This combination
increases the chances of detection and acts as a powerful deterrent.
Baggage Screening—The baggage can be divided into two types: Bags hand carried by foot
passengers, and heavy baggage for cruise liner passengers. The smuggling of weapons and the planting
of lED in baggage are methods well favoured by terrorists, and bombs have been planted in British-flag
vessels this way. Methods of screening both groups of baggage include:—
Metal Detectors
Vapour Detection probes and systems
X-Ray Systems
Physical Search
Dogs

(a) Metal Detectors—Metal detectors are of little use for screening baggage and personal
belongings since most bags and brief-cases have locks, hinges and other metal components which
would result in a very high alarm rate. Moreover hand-held detectors have a limited depth of effective
penetration.
(b) Vapour Detection—Air sampling system either static or hand-held can be used to detect
some explosives. However, currently no commercial system is capable of detecting all forms of
explosives. They can, however, be used to supplement other systems such as X-Ray.
(c) X-Ray Systems
(i) The most usual method of screening baggage and personal belongings is to use X-Ray
equipment and modem equipments are capable of producing images of good definition and penetration.
However, X-Ray examination can also be defeated; for example X-Rays may not detect explosives and
plastic weapons nor will they allow identification of the actual liquid in bottles or other containers.
Morevover it is possible to camouflage the image of weapons and devices by the use of other dense
materials, such as lead crystal glass. The use of X-Ray equipment must therefore also be accompanied
by a percentage physical check of baggage, including a proportion that do not arouse suspiction.
(ii) The use of X-Rays is a very effective method of screening bags and other items provided
certain conditions are met. For example, operator efficiency decreases significantly after only a
relatively short time, particularly at peak screening periods. For this reason operators should only scan
X-Ray images for a maximum of 20 minutes and then be employed on other duties, such as a physical
search, for 40 minutes before returning to the console. It is also essential that the image is presented for
an adequate time to permit proper examination and a minimum of 5 seconds is considered necessary for
this. Screening techniques will vary depending upon whether the equipment presents a fixed or
scrolling (moving) image. Either way it is necessary to ensure that the complete picture is checked and
that any bag whose image arouses suspicion, or contains a dark area which could conceal a weapon or
device, is rejected for physical search.
(d) Physical Search
(i) To be properly effective, physical search of bags and belongings should include a check
for false compartments, often used for the smuggling of weapons and devices. Although false ‘bottoms’
are most usual, devices have been incorporated around the sides of cases, in the lids and in the
compartments of holdalls. Very often a smell of glue or a heavy odour to mask the smell or explosives
is an indication that a lining may have been removed, a substance, such as explosive, placed behind it
and the lining stuck back in position. Attention should be paid to any tampering or repair to a case, non

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standard or unmatched case components, and also to greasy stains or small holes in the case exterior.
The contents of bags should be assessed during search and if the weight seems disproportionate, or the
bag is unbalanced for no obvious reason, then a further check for a false compartment would be
justified.
(ii) Particular attention should be paid to electrical and electronic apparatus, such as radios,
which have often been used as containers for devices to avoid detection under X-Ray examination.
Passengers should be questioned on the origins of the equipment and whether it has been out of their
possession for any period of time. Equipment may be examined for unusual characteristics; signs of
tampering, excessive weight, loose objects inside (rotate, not shake). X-Ray the equipment if
suspicions are aroused. Treat all new, packaged equipment in the same manner as used models.
(iii) Other containers carried in bags, which could be used to conceal weapons must also be
examined. Normally this can be done visually but gift-wrapped parcels, birthday cakes etc., can be
screened by metal detectors or X-Ray.
(e) Use of Dogs—Specially trained dogs can be very effective in searching cars, baggage
and freight. However, they should normally not be used near groups of passengers as they tend to alarm
people and are sometimes put off by them. Dogs can also be used for searching in ships. However, they
need to be familiar with the seagoing environment to achieve results. In fact to have their ‘sea legs.’
Heavy Baggage—The screening of heavy baggage is normally done by central X-Ray machine
supported by physical search. Air sampling probes can be used in the checking of heavy baggage and it
is an area where the use of digs trained to sniff out explosives may well be beneficial. Like passenger
screening; once heavy baggage has been screened it is essential it should be marked and kept under
surveillance until onboard the ship. In the organisation and control of heavy baggage, the rules of
reconciling passengers to their baggage must be strictly adhered to.
Cars and Small Vehicles—The screening of cars boarding ferries has two aims namely:

(A) Preventing a car bomb being driven on-board.

(B) Intercepting weapons, explosive and lED concealed in those cars

(a) Organisation—Port Management must decide where and how they can best screen cars
and other small vehicles before they board the ferries. This will depend upon the physical dimensions
of the port area and the numbers of vehicles boarding each ship. The principles of maintaining sterility
and controlled contact laid out for passengers applies equally to cars. Once the decision as to where and
how screening should be done has been made, the methods of search must be decided. As with
baggage, dogs trained to sniff explosives can be used, but physical search is the most reliable method.
(b) Where random searching or percentage screening is in force the advice of Police should
be sought in picking which car to search Customs will also be interested and can be consulted on
selection. They are both expert searchers and very knowledgeable on the habits of smugglers. If
possible a covered shed with nearby X-Ray equipment should be chosen so that suspect bags can be
subjected to X-Ray examination.
(c) On high risk routes all cars should be searched as they should when a specific threat
arises to a port, ship or line. The deterrent effect of regular searching of cars is considerable.
(d) Spot Searching in Ships—If shore screening is non-existent ships should spot search
cars on-board if they are unable to do this before boarding. This is especially important during high
threats, but should be practised at all times. Car owners should accompany all such searches.
(e) Reconciliation of car and driver—In the same way as baggage; people from vehicles
must never be allowed to land once their car or van is on-board.
Freight Vehicles and dumb trailers—The searching of freight trailers before boarding is
notoriously difficult but measures must be taken to meet this problem. Careful examination of

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paperwork and screening of drivers coupled with reaction to good intelligence goes some way to
solving this problem. Customs are closely concerned with freight and should be consulted. In the
future, developments in the field of air sampling systems may improve the ability to check freight. In
the final event trailers can be ‘unstuffed’ and physically searched using all methods mentioned above,
including sniffer dogs.
Other Freight—Freight consigned to cargo vessels excluding bulk aggregates and liquids should
be checked when the level demands and normally on a random basis. However, the screening of freight
presents problems because of the shape and size of many of the items. Often freight is protected from
damage by wooden crates and other forms of packing and the nature of some items such as large
canisters or carboys containing schemicals, makes examination impossible. Physical search or the use
of XRays will seldom be possible although explosve vapour detectors can be used.
Ship’s Stores—All ship’s stores consigned to a ship offer a conduit for lED or smuggled
weapons. Ships must organise themselves to check their stores carefully and screen each ite when the
threat level so demand. Companies can helf their vessels by bulk consignment of designated ship’s
stores in sealed containers.
Miscellaneous Deliveries to Ships and Ports—Terrorists may well use innocent miscellaneous
vehicles and people delivering routine items such as bread, milk, flowers or fresh vegetables to ports
and ships. Good access control, personnel ID and random search will help to counter this risk.

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