Facts showing the State of Mind

Certain offences are culpable on the basis of the state of mind of the accused. In order to prove such
offences, certain facts which show the existence of a particular state of mind are relevant and admissible
as evidence. Section 14 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, embodies this particular rule.
It reads as follows, “Facts showing the existence of any state of mind such as intention, knowledge, good
faith, negligence, rashness, ill-will or good-will towards any particular person, or showing the existence of
any state of body or bodily feeling are relevant, when the existence of any such state of mind or body or
bodily feeling, is in issue or relevant.
Explanation 1. –– A fact relevant as showing the existence of a relevant state of mind must show that the
state of mind exists, not generally, but in reference to the particular matter in question.
Explanation 2. –– But where, upon the trial of a person accused of an offence, the previous commission
by the accused of an offence is relevant within the meaning of this section, the previous conviction of such
person shall also be a relevant fact.” Let us discuss its scope and provisions in further detail.

Scope

This section is applicable in cases where the offence alleged to have been committed by the accused is
culpable on the basis of the state of mind or feeling of the accused. This includes offences such as slander,
false imprisonment, etc. in which malice is the primary requirement for culpability. However, the
applicability of the section must not be extended to those cases which are supposed to be decided upon
actual facts and not any state of mind or bodily feeling.
For instance, in order to prove that a man has committed an offence such as that of theft on one occasion,
the fact that he committed similar offences on other occasions is not relevant.[1]
In Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. the State of Bombay,[2] the Supreme Court held that the acts, writings and
statements of an individual co-conspirator may be used by the prosecution under this section to rebut a
probable defence that the participation of the co-conspirator was innocent.
Thus, the section may also be invoked when the state of mind has not become a fact in issue or relevant
fact but there is a high probability of it being such a fact in the course of the proceedings of the case.
The specific state of mind
Per Explanation 1 to the section, the evidence must be pertaining to the specific state of mind that
pertains to the case at hand and not that of general reputation. Thus, anything that has a distinct and
immediate connection to the case at hand is admissible.[3]
In R v. B, [4] the accused was convicted of assaulting his grandsons on the basis of pornographic
magazines found in his possession and his sexual proclivities. The subsequent appeal filed by him was
allowed and the Court observed that the evidence of pornographic magazines and the subsequent cross-
examination of the accused showed a mere tendency and had no probative value due to which it should
not have been admitted as evidence in the first place.
Previous Convictions
Per Explanation 2 to the section, in a case where the previous commission of an offence is relevant, the
fact that the accused was previously convicted for the said offence would be relevant under the section.
However, the question of previous convictions being used in subsequent cases is often debated under
various provisions of the Evidence Act.
For instance, in Emperor v. Alloomiya Husan,[5] the accused was arrested and convicted under the Bombay
Prevention of Gambling Act for keeping a common gaming house. The conviction by the Magistrate was
based upon the fact that the accused was previously convicted on multiple occasions under the Gambling

1
Act. Upon appeal, the decision was upheld and the fact pertaining to previous convictions was held to be
relevant and admissible under section 14 of the Evidence Act.
The legality of the decision is often doubted by many who argue that the previous conviction is simply
evidence showing bad character and is therefore inadmissible under section 54 of the Evidence Act. Thus,
the relevancy of previous convictions under section 14 might conflict, on certain occasions, with the rules
of exclusion of evidence showing bad character under section 54.
Conclusion
The proof of the existence of a particular state of mind is of extreme importance in certain cases. The
overall scope of the section extends beyond questions of previous convictions. However, the section is
mostly called for interpretation in cases where it is tendered that the previous conviction of the accused is
relevant in deciding upon the case at hand.
This might be because the other aspects of the section are already covered by the rest of the provisions of
the Evidence Act.

Doctrine of Res Gestae – History, Scope, Usage and Criticisms

INTRODUCTION
‘Res Gestae’ is a Latin term which can roughly be translated to ‘things done’.[1] The concept of res gestae
has emerged from the belief that certain acts or statements, which may otherwise be irrelevant and
inadmissible, may be admitted as evidence due to the very situation in which they were committed or
uttered.
The doctrine of res gestae is generally used to admit a potentially inadmissible piece of evidence in order to
provide context to an event. Thus, one of the important requirements for the applicability of the doctrine is
that the said act or statement must not exist in complete ‘factual isolation’.[2] Statements forming a part of
res gestae are often admitted as evidence even though they may be hearsay. Thus, res gestae is also
recognized as an exception to the general rule of hearsay evidence.
The rationale behind this is that human nature is such that sometimes the words uttered and actions have
done are so interwoven with each other that it becomes difficult to view the action in total isolation and
doing so might lead to a miscarriage of justice. Therefore, such statements were declared to be a part of
res gestae and an exception to the rule of hearsay evidence. Let us look at the historical development of
the principle or doctrine of res gestae in common law.
HISTORY
The doctrine of res gestae can be traced back to as far as 1693 when in the case of Thompson v.
Trevanion[3] the court admitted a declaration accompanying an act as evidence giving the justification
that it provides an explanation regarding the commission of the act. Although it was later discussed upon
and used in a number of subsequent cases,[4] its development began only in 1805 after the case of Aveson
v. Lord Kinnaird.[5]
The scope and applicability of the concept gained the attention of scholars and jurists after the infamous
case of R. v. Bedingfield[6] wherein Cockburn C.J. ruled that a res gestae statement cannot be made after
the transaction. In this particular case, the accused had slit the throat of the deceased who ran outside
and told a witness to look at what the accused had done.
The Court ruled that since the statement was made after the throat had been slit, it cannot be said to be a
res gestae statement. This decision was later overruled in the case of Ratten v. R.[7] wherein it was stated
that a res gestae statement may even be made immediately after the transaction. The scope of the
doctrine of res gestae in common law was further widened by this decision.
UNDER INDIAN LAW
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The concept made its way to the Indian Evidence Law in the form of section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872, which reads as, “Relevancy of facts forming part of the same transaction. –– Facts which, though
not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as to form part of the same transaction, are relevant,
whether they occurred at the same time and place or at different times and places.”
The provision is contained in Chapter-II of the Act which deals with the ‘Relevancy of Facts’. It begins with
section 5 which states that evidence may be given to prove the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue,
that is, a fact which has been submitted to the judicial investigation, or any other fact which has been
declared relevant by the statute.
Following this is section 6 which provides that even though a fact may not be ‘in issue’ but is connected to
such a fact so deeply that it forms a part of the same event or ‘transaction’, it is a relevant fact and
evidence may be submitted to prove or disprove it u/s 5 of the Act. The facts may have occurred at the
same time and place or at different times and places.
The provision inter alia covers the following:-
 Statements made by either of the parties or by any by-stander during or shortly before or after the
event
 Facts containing the effects of the act committed by the accused, regardless of the fact that he might
not have caused all of them himself.
 Facts which provide context to an event even though they may not constitute the event itself.
Test for Applicability
The foremost requirement for the applicability of the section is that the fact must be a part of the ‘same
transaction’. The following requirements must be fulfilled in order to conclude that the facts are a part of
the same transaction:-
 They must be in close proximity of time, so much so that there remains no possibility of concussion
or fabrication.
 They must have occurred at the same place or at different places which are in close proximity to each
other.
 There must be certain continuity in action.
 There must be a ‘community of purpose’.
The courts have used the aforementioned test to determine the applicability of section 6 in a case. Gestures
made by the victim while dying may also qualify as res gestae.[8] As far as statements are concerned, the
Supreme Court has ruled in the case of Krishna Kumar Malik v. State of Haryana[9] that the doctrine of res
gestae is an exception to the rule of hearsay evidence. It further observed that for a statement to be
admissible under section 6 of the Evidence Act, it must be made contemporaneously with the act or
immediately thereafter.[10]
Where there was a significant time lapse between the occurrence of the event and recording of statement
of injured victims by the magistrate, it was held that the statements will not qualify as res gestate
statements u/s 6 of the Evidence Act.[11] In another case,[12] the witnesses arrived at the place of
occurrence immediately after the completion of the event and heard a full account of what had happened.
Their testimony was considered valid u/s 6 of the Evidence Act. It is essential to note here that only a
statement of fact can form part of res gestae and not a statement of opinion.
Widening Scope
Initially, the doctrine of res gestae was mainly applied to cases involving murder. However, over time the
courts have started applying the doctrine in cases of rape, domestic violence, etc. which are generally
based on circumstantial evidence.
The requirement of the proximity of time is given relaxation in cases of rape and domestic violence due to the
general attitude of the Indian society on the issue which discourages women from immediately coming out to
seek legal redressal or help. Thus, a statement made by the victim in cases of rape and domestic violence
3
even after the lapse of time may fall under the purview of section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872,
provided that it has been established that the victim was still under some kind of shock or trauma due to the
incident. The same rule of relaxation may also apply to cases involving child witnesses.
An interesting decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Shyam Nandan Singh v. State of
Bihar[13] is worth discussing in the light of the widening scope of the doctrine of res gestae. In this
particular case, the deceased and her mother went to a field where they were stopped by the accused
from harvesting crops and they slit the throat of the deceased who had raised an alarm. The deceased’s
mother narrated the events to the people who had gathered due to the alarm and went to lodge an FIR in
nearby police station along with them. Subsequently, the mother passed away before she could be
examined.
The issue before the court was pertaining to the admissibility of the FIR as res gestae since it was lodged
by the mother who had seen the incidents first hand. The council on behalf of the accused argued that
FIR can only be used as a corroborative piece of evidence and not as substantial evidence.
The court, after careful consideration, ruled that the FIR is a relevant fact under the provisions of section
6 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. However, it further stated that, since the person who has lodged the
FIR in the instant case has passed away before she could be examined, the FIR is required to be used as
substantive evidence. This cannot be done since the general rule is that FIR is supposed to be used only as
a corroborative piece of evidence. Therefore, the court allowed the appeal and acquitted the accused.
The rule of res gestae is generally extended to acts done or statements made. By bringing an FIR within its
purview, the court has made room for expansion of the scope of section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
CRITICISM
The concept of res gestae has been subjected to criticism since its very inception. The concept has been
remarked to be conveniently obscure leaving an ample amount of room for loopholes and multiple
interpretations.
Wigmore has even criticized the very nomenclature stating that the rule is overlapping with one or the other
well-established principle of the law of evidence. He has stated that the phrase ‘Res Gestae’ is ambiguous
and, therefore, harmful for use.
CONCLUSION
The rule of res gestae is often used as the last resort. The legislative rationale behind the inclusion of the
rule in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, was to make sure that no criminal walks away freely due to lack of
evidence against him. The rule of res gestae has been subjected to criticism for its nomenclature as well as
its obscurity. However, when looked at from a different angle, the vagueness and obscurity enable the
courts to judge each case on its own merits.
The exact contents and requirements of res gestae are still subjected to interpretation on a case-to-case basis.
Moreover, as we have already seen, the scope and horizons of the doctrine are expanding through various
judicial decisions over time. This particular trend, in a way, justifies the legislative rationale behind the
provision and may even be helpful for the overall realization of the constitutional goal of ‘justice for all’
which has been subtly highlighted in the preamble.

Facts Which Need Not Be Proved – Provisions and Case Laws

Section 56 to 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 lays down provision relating to facts which
need not be proved. Here are the facts which should not be proved in any court of law.

4
1. FACTS JUDICIALLY NOTICEABLE NEED NOT BE PROVED (SECTION- 56):
Section 56 declares that “no fact of which the court will take judicial notice need be proved”.
Thus, if the court is bound to take notice of a particular fact the parties are spared of the
burden of proving that fact. For example, the court is bound to know the law of the land.
In Managing Committee of Raja Sidheshwar High School v. State of Bihar (AIR 1996 Pat. 19.), it
was held that the court can take judicial notice of the fact that the system of education in the
State has virtually crumbled and serious allegations are made frequently about the manner in
which the system is being worked.
2.FACTS OF WHICH COURT MUST TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE (SECTION- 57):
Introduction: The Provision is supplemented by two declarations at the end of the section.
One of them says that in all these matters, and also on matters of public history, literature,
science or art, the court may consult the appropriate books or documents of reference. The
second declaration is that if a party calls upon the court to take judicial notice of any fact, it
may refuse to do so unless and until such person produces any such book or document as
the court may consider necessary to enable it to take judicial notice. It means that the party
who desires the court to take judicial notice of a fact has to produce before the court the
reference material. Where, for example, a party request the court to take judicial notice of the
proceedings of the legislatures, he should produce before the court the journal of those
bodies, or their published acts or abstracts, or copies purported to be printed by order of the
government concerned. In other words, the source material in which the judicially noticeable
fact is recorded will have to be produced before the court.
The only guiding principle, apart from statute, as to judicial notice which emerges from the
various recorded cases, appears to be that wherever a fact is so generally known that every
ordinary person may be reasonably presumed to be aware of it, the court notices it either
simpliciter if it is at once satisfied of the fact without more, or after such information or
investigation as it considers reliable and necessary in order to eliminate any reasonable
doubt.
The basic essential is that the fact is to be of a class that is so generally known to give rise to
the presumption that all persons are aware of it. This excludes from the operation of judicial
notice what is not ‘general’ but ‘particular’ facts.
Constitutional, Political and Administrative Matters: Judicial notice of a fact means that the
court is supposed to have knowledge of the fact and the judge may rely upon his personal
knowledge for deciding the case though it is not evidence in the real sense. Thus, where a
judge recognized the signature of the minister for defence saying that he knew the Minister
and had seen his signature as such Minister on many papers which came to him.
Law, Regulations and General Customs: The Courts may also take notice of regulations, bye-
laws and other forms of sub-legislation. “Regulation made under the Act became part of the
law and a tribunal takes judicial notice of the law, being at liberty to refresh memory by
referring to the text of the regulations which, if there is any doubt about it, can be established
by reference to a copy printed by the government printer. In Union of India v. Nihar Kanta Sen
(AIR 1987 SC 1713), the Supreme Court has pointed out that the court should have taken
judicial notice of the fact that a notification had been issued concerning the land of an
intermediary.
The courts also take judicial notice of general customs. In Jiwan Singh v. Des Raj (AIR 1982
Punj. [N.O.C] 306), it was held that when a general usage has been judicially ascertained and
established, it becomes a part of the law merchant which courts of justice are bound to know
and recognize.
Matters of common knowledge: The courts also take judicial notice of matters of common
knowledge. For example, the courts take judicial notice of the meaning of ordinary terms
5
being a matter of common knowledge, and evidence is not admissible to expound their
meaning, through the court, in addition to suing its own knowledge, may refer to standard
authors and authoritative dictionaries in order to obtain assistance in interpretation [Camedan
Marquis v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, (1914) 1 K.B. 641].
Judicial notice of the value of service of the housewife: A housewife died in a motor vehicle
accident. The court said that judicial notice could be taken if services rendered by a housewife
to her family. Rs. 1,500/- was taken to be the value of such services. The question of deducting
1/3 of the amount did not arise. Award of compensation of Rs. 2,95,000 was held to be proper
(United Indian Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Virambhai Ranchodbhai Patel, AIR 2007 Guj. 119.).
Judicial notice, the fact of marriage in Army record: The fact of the marriage of an Army officer
which was duly entered by the Army in its record was allowed to be tendered in evidence to
prove the factum of marriage (Ajay Singh v. Tikka Brijendra Singh, AIR 2007 H.P. 52).
3.FACTS ADMITTED NEED NOT BE PROVED (SECTION- 58):
Another set of facts which need not be proved are facts which have been admitted. “Facts
admitted need not be proved”. Section 58 lays down this principle. Averments made in a
petition which have not been controverted by the respondent carry the effect of a fact
admitted.
In Thimmappa Rai v. Ramanna Rai, [(2007) 14 S.C.C. 63: (2007) CHN 144], an admission made
by a party to a suit in an earlier proceeding is admissible against him in a subsequent suit
also. Once a party to a suit makes an admission, it can be taken in an aid for determination of
issues having regard to the provision of Section 58.
There are two systems of holding a trial, one is the inquisitorial system in which the judge
also acts as an investigator of facts; he can neither advice any party nor ask for the
production of any evidence. He gives his judgment on the basis of the contentions argues
before him, that is to say, according to the issues between the parties. Facts which have been
admitted on both sides are not an issue and, therefore, no proof needs to be offered of them.
The effect of admissions has already been noted before. It is that an admission does not
constitute conclusive evidence of the fact admitted, though it may operate as an estoppel.
Therefore, section 58 also provides that the court may in its discretion require some other
proof of an admitted fact. But the discretion is that of the court. The section does not bar the
court from acting on the admission itself and without requiring any further proof.

Law Relating to Presumption

The term “presumption” refers to an affirmative or non-affirmative illation pertaining to a doubtful fact
or proposition and drawn by following a process of probable reasoning from something
substantive.[1] Section 4 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, enunciates the law of presumption. It defines
three phrases- “May presume”, “Shall presume” and “Conclusive proof”.
May Presume
Per section 4 of the Evidence Act, wherever it is mentioned that the Court may presume a fact, it may:
 Regard the fact as proved until and unless it is disproved; or
 Call for the proof of the fact
Thus, wherever the words “may presume” have been used, the court has the discretion to either make a
rebuttable presumption or call for confirmatory evidence. It must be noted here that the presumption so
made is not conclusive or incapable of being rebutted.[2]
Shall Presume

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Unlike “may presume”, wherever the words “shall presume” have been used, the court has to regard a
fact as proved unless it is disproved. Thus, the court has to necessarily make a rebuttable presumption
regarding the existence or non-existence of a fact. For disproving a fact so presumed or, in other words,
rebutting a statutory presumption, the evidence has to be clear and convincing.
It must be such that, by judicial application of mind, it is established that the real fact is not the one that
has been presumed.[3]
Conclusive Proof
Section 4 of the Evidence Act defines “Conclusive proof” as follows, “When one fact is declared by this Act
to be conclusive proof of another, the Court shall, on proof of the one fact, regard the other as proved, and
shall not allow evidence to be given for the purpose of disproving it.”
The section provides for non-rebuttable presumptions, that is, presumptions which are conclusive in nature.
In the case of Gitika Bagechi v. Subhabrota Bagechi,[4] the husband and the wife were in a relationship
for eight years before getting married. After marriage, they lived together in a room for months in
complete privacy. The court regarded this fact as conclusive proof of the fact that the marriage had been
consummated.
In Umashanker v. the State of Chhattisgarh,[5] an eighteen-year-old student was alleged of passing
counterfeit currency note of ₹100 to a shopkeeper. Upon investigation, he was found to be in possession of
13 more such counterfeit currency notes. The court refused to regard the fact as conclusive proof of the
fact that the accused was having the knowledge or had reason to believe that the notes were counterfeit.
Conclusion
The law relating to the presumption under the Evidence Act provides for rebuttable as well as conclusive
presumptions. Presumption of fact may sometimes be essential for establishing the guilt or innocence of an
accused and to facilitate effective delivery of justice in a case.
In certain cases, any kind of presumptions may fatally hinder the overall progression of the case. Thus, in
cases where presumptions are required to be made but such presumption may be rebuttable, the court
“shall presume”.
On the other hand, in cases where the court has to decide as to whether it must make a presumption or
call for confirmatory evidence, it “may presume”. Further, where non-rebuttable conclusive
presumptions are required to be made in a case to save the court’s time, the court designates a fact as
“conclusive proof” of another fact.

Distinction between Relevancy and Admissibility

Relevancy is the ultimate touchstone for determination of the admissibility of evidence.[1] It is due to this
fundamental rule of the Law of Evidence that the terms ‘relevancy’ and ‘admissibility’ are often used
interchangeably. It must be noted that both the concepts are quite distinct from each other.[2]
For instance, a confession made by an accused to his wife may be relevant but is inadmissible since it falls
within the purview of ‘Privileged Communications’ under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
It may be stated that all that is admissible is relevant but all that is relevant may not be admissible. Let us
further evaluate the difference between relevancy and admissibility.
Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, defines relevancy as “one fact is said to be relevant to another
when the one is connected with the other in any of the ways referred to in the ways referred to in the
provisions of the Act relating to relevancy of facts.” The said provisions are contained in sections 5 to 55
of the Evidence Act.

7
A fact may either be logically relevant or legally relevant. Where a fact bears such casual relation to the
other that it renders probable its existence or non-existence, it is said to be a logically relevant fact. For
instance, where it is to be determined whether A has placed the murder weapon in the field or not, the
fact that B saw A walking towards the field with the murder weapon is relevant.
The Evidence Act recognizes some of the kinds of casual relations. Thus, those kinds of casual relations
which are recognized by law are known as a legally relevant fact. Therefore, while all legally relevant
facts are logically relevant, all logically relevant facts may not be legally relevant. For instance, an
accused gives the following statement- “I have kept in the field the knife with which I killed A.”
While the statement may be logically relevant to establish the guilt of the accused, its legal relevancy extends
to only so far as it confirms the fact that the accused had kept the knife in the field. This is so because section
27 of the Evidence Act clearly lays down that only that part of the information may be proved which clearly
relates to the fact thereby discovered.[3]
Admissibility refers to the question as to whether the court must consider a relevant fact in deciding upon
the issue or not. A fact is admissible only if it does not infringe any of the rules of exclusivity provided by
law. Thus, logically relevant facts are relevant but may not be admissible whereas legally relevant facts
are relevant as well as admissible.
Relevancy is a question pertaining to the tendering of evidence before a court of law and is for the lawyers to
decide. On the other hand, admissibility is for the judge to decide since it pertains to the weight that must be
attached to a piece of evidence tendered before the court.[4]

The various points of distinction may be briefly summarized as follows:

Relevancy Admissibility
Governed by logic and probability Strictly governed by legal rules

All relevant facts may not be admissible All admissible facts are relevant

Rules of Evidence described from sections 5 to 55 Rules of relevancy described after section 56 in the

in the Evidence Act Evidence Act

Rules of relevancy declare whether a piece of Rules of admissibility declare whether a relevant

evidence is relevant or not piece of evidence is admissible as such or not