En Banc: Syllabus Syllabus

EN BANC
[A.M. No. 93-7-696-0. February 21, 1995.]
IN RE JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO. Ex Rel. Cebu City Chapter of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CONTEMPT; DEEMED COMMITTED IN

CASE OF ABUSE OF AND INTERFERENCE WITH JUDICIAL RULES AND PROCESSES, GROSS
DISRESPECT TO COURTS AND JUDGES AND IMPROPER CONDUCT DIRECTLY IMPEDING,
OBSTRUCTING AND DEGRADING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. — Upon the
indubitable facts on record, there can scarcely be any doubt of Borromeo's guilt of
contempt, for abuse of and interference with judicial rules and processes, gross
disrespect to courts and judges and improper conduct directly impeding, obstructing and
degrading the administration of justice. He has stubbornly litigated issues already
declared to be without merit, obstinately closing his eyes to the many rulings rendered
adversely to him in many suits and proceedings, rulings which had become nal and
executory, obdurately and unreasonably insisting on the application of his own individual
version of the rules, founded on nothing more than his personal (and quite erroneous)
reading of the Constitution and the law; he has insulted the judges and court o cers,
including the attorneys appearing for his adversaries, needlessly overloaded the court
dockets and sorely tried the patience of the judges and court employees who have had to
act on his repetitions and largely unfounded complaints, pleadings and motions. He has
wasted the time of the courts, of his adversaries, of the judges and court employees who
had the bad luck of having to act in one way or another on his unmeritorious cases. More
particularly, despite his attention having been called many times to the egregious error of
his theory that the so-called "minute resolutions" of this Court should contain ndings of
fact and conclusions of law, and should be signed or certi ed by the Justices
promulgating the same, he has mulishly persisted in ventilating that selfsame theory in
various proceedings, causing much loss of time, annoyance and vexation to the courts, the
court employees and parties involved.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OR DUTY OF THE COURT TO INSTITUTE A CHARGE FOR
CONTEMPT AGAINST ITSELF, WITHOUT THE INTERVENTION OF THE FISCAL OR
PROSECUTING OFFICER; ESSENTIAL TO THE PRESERVATION OF ITS DIGNITY AND OF
THE RESPECT DUE IT FROM LITIGANT LAWYERS AND THE PUBLIC. — The rst defense
that he proffers, that the Chief Justice and other Members of the Court should inhibit
themselves "since they cannot be the Accused and Judge at the same time, . . .(and) this
case should be heard by an impartial and independent body, "is still another illustration of
an entirely unwarranted, arrogant and reprehensible assumption of a competence in the
eld of the law: he again uses up the time of the Court needlessly by invoking an argument
long since declared and adjudged to be untenable. It is axiomatic that the "power or duty
of the court to institute a charge for contempt against itself, without the intervention of the
scal or prosecuting o cer, is essential to the preservation of its dignity and of the
respect due it from litigants, lawyers and the public. Were the intervention of the
prosecuting o cer required and judges obliged to le complaints for contempt against
them before the prosecuting o cer, in order to bring the guilty to justice, courts would be
inferior to prosecuting o cers and impotent to perform their functions with dispatch and
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absolute independence. The institution of charges by the prosecuting o cer is not
necessary to hold persons guilty of civil or criminal contempt amenable to trial and
punishment by the court. All that the law requires is that there be a charge in writing duly
led in court and an opportunity to the person charged to be heard by himself or counsel.
The charge may be made by the fiscal, by the judge, or even by a private person. . . "
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH, OF
EXPRESSION, AND TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES; NOT
A JUSTIFICATION FOR REPETITIOUS LITIGATION OF THE SAME CAUSES OR ISSUES, FOR
INSULTING LAWYERS, JUDGES, COURT EMPLOYEES AND FOR ABUSING COURT
PROCESSES. — The Constitutional rights of freedom of speech, of expression, and to
petition the government for redress of grievances as guaranteed by the Constitution (Sec.
4, Art. III, 1987 Philippine Constitution) and in accordance with the accountability of public
o cials invoked by him afford no justi cation for repetitious litigation of the same causes
and issues, for insulting lawyers, judges, court employees and other persons, for abusing
the processes and rules of the courts, wasting their time, and bringing them into disrepute
and disrespect.
4. ID.; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; BASIC PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE JUDICIAL
FUNCTION. — The facts and issues involved in the proceeding at bench make necessary a
restatement of the principles governing nality of judgments and of the paramount need
to put an end to litigation at some point, and to lay down de nite postulates concerning
what is perceived to be a growing predilection on the part of lawyers and litigants — like
Borromeo — to resort to administrative prosecution (or institution of civil or criminal
actions) as a substitute for or supplement to the speci c modes of appeal or review
provided by law from court judgments or orders.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON FOR COURTS; JUDICIAL HIERARCHY. — Courts exist in every
civilized society for the settlement of controversies. In every country there is a more or
less established hierarchical organization of courts, and a more or less comprehensive
system of review of judgments and nal orders of lower courts. The judicial system in this
jurisdiction allows for several levels of litigation, i.e., the presentation of evidence by the
parties — a trial or hearing in the rst instance — as well as a review of the judgments of
lower courts by higher tribunals, generally by consideration anew and ventilation of the
factual and legal issues through briefs or memoranda. The procedure for review is xed by
law, and is in the very nature of things, exclusive to the courts.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARAMOUNT NEED TO END LITIGATION AT SOME POINT. — It is
withal of the essence of the judicial function that at some point, litigation must end. Hence,
after the procedures and processes for lawsuits have been undergone, and the modes of
review set by law have been exhausted, or terminated, no further ventilation of the same
subject matter is allowed. To be sure, there may be, on the part of the losing parties,
continuing disagreement with the verdict, and the conclusions therein embodied. This is of
no moment, indeed, is to be expected; but, it is not their will, but the Court's, which must
prevail; and, to repeat, public policy demands that at some de nite time, the issues must
be laid to rest and the court's dispositions thereon accorded absolute nality. As observed
by this Court in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, a 1967 decision, a party "may think
highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And he may suffer Frustration at
what he feels is others' lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind,
however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's
decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the
temples of right."
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDGMENTS OF SUPREME COURT, NOT REVIEWABLE. — The sound,
salutary and self-evident principle prevailing in this as in most jurisdictions, is that
judgments of the highest tribunal of the land may not be reviewed by any other agency,
branch, department, or o cial of Government. Once the Supreme Court has spoken, there
the matter must rest. Its decision should not and cannot be appealed to or reviewed by
any other entity, much less reversed or modi ed on the ground that it is tainted by error in
its ndings of fact or conclusions of law, awed in its logic or language, or otherwise
erroneous in some other respect. This, on the indisputable and unshakable foundation of
public policy, and constitutional and traditional principle. In an extended Resolution
promulgated on March 12, 1987 in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta — involving an attempt by a
lawyer to prosecute before the Tanodbayan "members of the First Division of this Court
collectively with having knowingly and deliberately rendered an 'unjust extended minute
Resolution' with deliberate bad faith in violation of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code . .
. and for deliberately causing 'undue injury' to respondent . . . and her co-heirs because of
the 'unjust Resolution' promulgated, in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
. . ." — the following pronouncements were made in rea rmation of established doctrine:" .
. . As aptly declared in the Chief Justice's Statement of December 24, 1986, which the
Court hereby adopts in toto, '(I)t is elementary that the Supreme Court is supreme — the
third great department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to
adjudicate with nality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department or
agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust."' It is elementary that "(A)s
has ever been stressed since the early case of Arnedo vs. Llorente (18 Phil. 257, 263
[1911]) 'controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound practice in the
courts demand that at the risk of occasional error, judgments of courts determining
controversies submitted to them should become nal at some de nite time xed by law,
or by a rule of practice recognized by law, so as to be thereafter beyond the control even of
the court which rendered them for the purpose of correcting errors of fact or of law, into
which, in the opinion of the court it may have fallen. The very purpose for which the courts
are organized is to put an end to controversy, to decide the questions submitted to the
litigants, and to determine the respective rights of the parties.' ( Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc.
vs. Maritime Bldg., Co., Inc., 86 SCRA 305, 316-317) . . . Indeed, resolutions of the Supreme
Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or division, speak for themselves and are
entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond investigation or inquiry under the same
principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. (U.S. vs. Pons, 34 Phil. 729;
Gardiner, et al. vs. Paredes, et al. , 61 Phil. 118; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) The
Supreme Court's pronouncement of the doctrine that '(I)t is well settled that the enrolled
bill . . . is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of
the bill before it was certi ed by the o cers of Congress and approved by the Executive
[as claimed by petitioner-importer who unsuccessfully sought refund of margin fees] — on
which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and
undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree' is fully and reciprocally
applicable to Supreme Court orders, resolutions and decisions, mutatis mutandis. (Casco
Phil. Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347, 350). (Citing Primicias vs. Paredes, 61
Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comelec, 3 SCRA 1) The
Court has consistently stressed that the 'doctrine of separation of powers calls for the
executive, legislative and judicial departments being left alone to discharge their duties as
they see fit' (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677). It has thus maintained in the same way that
the judiciary has a right to expect that neither the President nor Congress would cast
doubt on the mainspring of its orders or decisions, it should refrain from speculating as to
alleged hidden forces at work that could have impelled either coordinate branch into
acting the way it did. The concept of separation of powers presupposes mutual respect by
and between the three departments of the government. (Tecson vs. Salas , 34 SCRA 275,
286-287)"
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENTS OF LOWER COURTS NOT
REVIEWABLE EVEN BY SUPREME COURT. — In respect of Courts below the Supreme
Court, the ordinary remedies available under law to a party who is adversely affected by
their decisions or orders are a motion for new trial (or reconsideration) under Rule 37, and
an appeal to either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, depending on whether
questions of both fact and law, or of law only, are raised, in accordance with xed and
familiar rules and conformably with the hierarchy of courts. Exceptionally, a review of a
ruling or act of a court on the ground that it was rendered without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, may be had through the special civil action
o f certiorari or prohibition pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. However, should
judgments of lower courts — which may normally be subject to review by higher tribunals
— become nal and executory before, or without, exhaustion of all recourse of appeal, they,
too, become inviolable, impervious to modi cation. They may, then, no longer be reviewed,
or in any way modi ed directly or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by the Supreme
Court, much less by any other official, branch or department of Government.
9. ID.; ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE, CIVIL OR CRIMINAL ACTION AGAINST JUDGE, NOT
SUBSTITUTE FOR APPEAL; PROSCRIBED BY LAW AND LOGIC. — The Court takes judicial
notice of the fact that there has been of late a regrettable increase in the resort to
administrative prosecution — or the institution of a civil or criminal action — as a substitute
for or supplement to appeal. Whether intended or not, such a resort to these remedies
operates as a form of threat or intimidation to coerce judges into timorous surrender of
their prerogatives, or a reluctance to exercise them. With rising frequency, administrative
complaints are being presented to the O ce of the Court Administrator; criminal
complaints are being led with the O ce of the Ombudsman or the public prosecutor's
o ce; civil actions for recovery of damages commenced in the Regional Trial Courts
against trial judges, and justices of the Court of Appeals and even of the Supreme Court.
Many of these complaints set forth a common indictment: that the respondent Judges or
Justices rendered manifestly unjust judgments or interlocutory orders — i.e., judgments or
orders which are allegedly not in accord with the evidence, or with law or jurisprudence, or
are tainted by grave abuse of discretion — thereby causing injustice, and actionable and
compensable injury to the complainants (invariably losing litigants). Resolution of
complaints of this sort quite obviously entails a common requirement for the scal, the
Ombudsman or the Trial Court: a review of the decision or order of the respondent Judge
or Justice t o determine its correctness or erroneousness, as basic premise for a
pronouncement of liability.
10. ID.; ID.; EXCLUSIVITY OF SPECIFIC PROCEDURES FOR CORRECTION OF
JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS. — The question then, is whether or not these complaints are
proper; whether or not in lieu of the prescribed recourses for appeal or review of
judgments and orders of courts, a party may le an administrative or criminal complaint
against the judge for rendition of an unjust judgment, or, having opted for appeal, may
nonetheless simultaneously seek also such administrative or criminal remedies. Given the
nature of the judicial function, the power vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court
and the lower courts established by law, the question submits to only one answer: the
administrative or criminal remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review
where such review is available, and must wait on the result thereof. Simple re ection will
make this proposition amply clear, and demonstrate that any contrary postulation can
have only intolerable legal implications. Allowing a party who feels aggrieved by a judicial
order or decision not yet nal and executory to mount an administrative, civil or criminal
prosecution for unjust judgment against the issuing judge would, at a minimum and as an
indispensable rst step, confer the prosecutor (or Ombudsman) with an incongruous
function pertaining, not to him, but to the courts: the determination of whether the
questioned disposition is erroneous in its ndings of fact or conclusions of law, or both. If
he does proceed despite that impediment, whatever determination he makes could well
set off a proliferation of administrative or criminal litigation, a possibility hereafter more
fully explored. Such actions are impermissible and cannot prosper. It is not, as already
pointed out, within the power of public prosecutors, or the Ombudsman or his deputies,
directly or vicariously, to review judgments or nal orders or resolutions of the Courts of
the land. The power of review — by appeal or special civil action — is not only lodged
exclusively in the Courts themselves but must be exercised in accordance with a well-
de ned and long established hierarchy, and long-standing processes and procedures. No
other review is allowed; otherwise litigation would be interminable, and vexatiously
repetitive. This is true, too, as regards judgments, otherwise appealable, which have
become nal and executory. Such judgments, being no longer reviewable by higher
tribunals, are certainly not reviewable by any other body or authority.
11. ID.; ID.; ONLY COURTS AUTHORIZED UNDER FIXED RULES TO DECLARE
JUDGMENTS OR ORDERS ERRONEOUS OR UNJUST. — To belabor the obvious, the
determination of whether or not a judgment or order is unjust — or was (or was not)
rendered within the scope of the issuing judge's authority, or that the judge had exceeded
his jurisdiction and powers or maliciously delayed the disposition of a case — is an
essentially judicial function, lodged by existing law and immemorial practice in a hierarchy
of courts and ultimately in the highest court of the land. To repeat, no other entity or
official of the Government, not the prosecution or investigation service or any other branch,
nor any functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or decision —
whether nal and executory or not — and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for
a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order. That
prerogative belongs to the courts alone.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONTRARY RULE RESULTS IN CIRCUITOUSNESS AND LEADS TO
ABSURD CONSEQUENCES. — Pragmatic considerations also preclude prosecution for
supposed rendition of unjust judgments or interlocutory orders of the type above
described, which, at bottom, consist simply of the accusation that the decisions or
interlocutory orders are seriously wrong in their conclusions of fact or of law, or are tainted
by grave abuse of discretion — as distinguished from accusations of corruption, or
immorality, or other wrongdoing. To allow institution of such proceedings would not only
be legally improper, it would also result in a futile and circuitous exercise, and lead to
absurd consequences. Assume that a case goes through the whole gamut of review in the
judicial hierarchy; i.e., a judgment is rendered by a municipal trial court; it is reviewed and
a rmed by the proper Regional Trial Court; the latter's judgment is appealed to and in due
course a rmed by the Court of Appeals; and nally, the appellate court's decision is
brought up to and a rmed by the Supreme Court. The prosecution of the municipal trial
court judge who rendered the original decision (for knowingly rendering a manifestly unjust
judgment) would appear to be out of the question; it would mean that the O ce of the
Ombudsman or of the public prosecutor would have to nd, at the preliminary
investigation, not only that the judge's decision was wrong and unjust, but by necessary
implication that the decisions or orders of the Regional Trial Court Judge, as well as the
Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court who a rmed the original
judgment were also all wrong and unjust — most certainly an act of supreme arrogance
and very evident supererogation. Pursuing the proposition further, assuming that the
public prosecutor or Ombudsman should nevertheless opt to undertake a review of the
decision in question — despite its having been a rmed at all three (3) appellate levels —
and thereafter, disagreeing with the verdict of all four (4) courts, le an information in the
Regional Trial Court against the Municipal Trial Court Judge, the fate of such an indictment
at the hands of the Sandiganbayan or the Regional Trial Court would be fairly predictable.
Even if for some reason the Municipal Trial Court Judge is convicted by the Sandiganbayan
or a Regional Trial Court, the appeal before the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals
would have an inevitable result: given the antecedents, the verdict of conviction would be
set aside and the correctness of the judgment in question, already passed upon and nally
resolved by the same appellate courts, would necessarily be sustained. Moreover, in such
a scenario, nothing would prevent the Municipal Trial Judge, in his turn, from ling a
criminal action against the Sandiganbayan Justices, or the Regional Trial Court Judge who
should convict him of the offense, for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, or against
the Justices of the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court who should a rm his
conviction. The situation is ridiculous, however the circumstances of the case may be
modi ed, and regardless of whether it is a civil, criminal or administrative Proceeding that
is availed of as the vehicle to Prosecute the judge for supposedly rendering an unjust
decision or order.
13. ID.; ID.; PRIMORDIAL REQUISITES FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION. — This is not to say that it is not possible at all to prosecute judges for this
impropriety, of rendering an unjust judgment or interlocutory order; but, taking account of
all the foregoing considerations, the indispensable requisites are that there be a final
declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust
character of the challenged judgment or order, and there be also evidence of malice or bad
faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence; on the part of the judge in rendering said
judgment or order. That nal declaration is ordinarily contained in the Judgment rendered
in the appellate proceedings in which the decision of the trial court in the civil or criminal
action in question is challenged. What immediately comes to mind in this connection is a
decision of acquittal or dismissal in a criminal action, as to which — the same being
unappealable — it would be unreasonable to deny the State or the victim of the crime (or
even public-spirited citizens) the opportunity to put to the test of proof such charges as
they might see t to press that it was unjustly rendered, with malice or by deliberate
design, through inexcusable ignorance or negligence, etc. Even in this case, the essential
requisite is that there be an authoritative judicial pronouncement of the manifestly unjust
character of the judgment or order in question. Such a pronouncement may result from
either (a) an action of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning the validity of the
judgment, as having been rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion; e.g., there has been a denial of due process to the prosecution; or (b) if this
be not proper, an administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court against the judge
precisely for promulgating an unjust judgment or order. Until and unless there is such a
nal, authoritative judicial declaration that the decision or order in question is "unjust," no
civil or criminal action against the judge concerned is legally possible or should be
entertained, for want of an indispensable requisite.
14. ID.; ID.; JUDGES MUST BE FREE FROM INFLUENCE OR PRESSURE. — Judges
must be free to judge, without pressure or in uence from external forces or factors. They
should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions
for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties
and functions. Hence it is sound rule, which must be recognized independently of statute,
that judges are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and
in good faith. This Court has repeatedly and uniformly ruled that a judge may not be held
administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders. To hold
otherwise would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly
unbearable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. The error must be gross or patent,
deliberate and malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith; it is only in these cases that
administrative sanctions are called for as an imperative duty of the Supreme Court. As far
as civil or criminal liability is concerned, existing doctrine is that "judges of superior and
general jurisdiction are not liable to respond in civil action for damages for what they may
do in the exercise of their judicial functions when acting within their legal powers and
jurisdiction." Based on Section 9, Act No. 190, the doctrine is still good law, not
inconsistent with any subsequent legislative issuance or court rule: "No judge, justice of
the peace or assessor shall be liable to a civil action for the recovery of damages by
reason of any judicial action or judgment rendered by him in good faith, and within the
limits of his legal powers and jurisdiction." Exception to this general rule is found in Article
32 of the Civil Code, providing that any public o cer or employee, or any private individual,
who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs
any of the enumerated rights and liberties of another person — which rights are the same
as those guaranteed in the Bill of Rights (Article III of the Constitution) — shall be liable to
the latter for damages. However, such liability is not demandable from a judge unless his
act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. But again,
to the extent that the offenses therein described have "unjust judgment" or "unjust
interlocutory order" for an essential element, it need only be reiterated that prosecution of
a judge for any of them is subject to the caveat already mentioned: that such prosecution
cannot be initiated, much less maintained, unless there be a final judicial pronouncement of
the unjust character of the decision or order in issue.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM : p
It is said that a little learning is a dangerous thing; and that he who acts as his
own lawyer has a fool for a client. There would seem to be more than a grain of truth in
these aphorisms; and they appear to nd validation in the proceeding at bench, at least.
The respondent in this case, Joaquin T. Borromeo, is not a lawyer but has
apparently read some law books, and ostensibly come to possess some super cial
awareness of a few substantive legal principles and procedural rules. Incredibly, with
nothing more than this smattering of learning, the respondent has, for some sixteen
(16) years now, from 1978 to the present, been instituting and prosecuting legal
proceedings in various courts, dogmatically ponti cating on errors supposedly
committed by the courts, including the Supreme Court. In the picturesque language of
former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, he has, "with all the valor of ignorance," 1
been verbally jousting with various adversaries in diverse litigations; or in the words of a
well-known song, rushing into arenas "where angels fear to tread." Under the illusion
that his trivial acquaintance with the law had given him competence to undertake
litigation, he has ventured to represent himself in numerous original and review
proceedings. Expectedly, the results have been disastrous. In the process, and possibly
in aid of his interminable and quite unreasonable resort to judicial proceedings, he has
seen t to compose and circulate many scurrilous statements against courts, judges
and their employees, as well as his adversaries, for which he is now being called to
account.
Respondent Borromeo's ill-advised incursions into lawyering were generated by
fairly prosaic transactions with three (3) banks which came to have calamitous
consequences for him chie y because of his failure to comply with his contractual
commitments and his stubborn insistence on imposing his own terms and conditions
for their ful llment. These banks were: Traders Royal Bank (TRB), United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB), Security Bank & Trust Co. (SBTC). Borromeo obtained loans or
credit accommodation from them, to secure which he constituted mortgages over
immovables belonging to him or members of his family, or third persons. He failed to
pay these obligations, and when demands were made for him to do so, laid down his
own terms for their satisfaction which were quite inconsistent with those agreed upon
with his obligees or prescribed by law. When, understandably, the banks refused to let
him have his way, he brought suits right and left, successively if not
contemporaneously, against said banks, its o cers, and even the lawyers who
represented the banks in the actions brought by or against him. He sued, as well, the
public prosecutors, the Judges of the Trial Courts, and the Justices of the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court who at one time or another, rendered a judgment,
resolution or order adverse to him, as well as the Clerks of Court and other Court
employees signing the notices thereof. In the aggregate, he has initiated or spawned in
different fora the astounding number of no less than fty (50) original or review
proceedings, civil, criminal, administrative. For some sixteen (16) years now, to repeat,
he has been continuously cluttering the Courts with his repetitive, and quite baseless if
not outlandish, complaints and contentions.
I. CASES INVOLVING TRADERS ROYAL BANK (TRB)
The rst bank that Joaquin T. Borromeo appears to have dealt with was the
Traders Royal Bank (TRB). On June 2, 1978, he got a loan from it in the sum of
P45,000.00. This he secured by a real estate mortgage created over two parcels of
land covered by TCT No. 59596 and TCT No. 59755 owned, respectively, by Socorro
Borromeo-Thakuria (his sister) and Teresita Winniefred Lavarino. On June 16, 1978,
Borromeo obtained a second loan from TRB in the amount of P10,000.00, this time
giving as security a mortgage over a parcel of land owned by the Heirs of Vicente V.
Borromeo, covered by TCT No. RT-7634. Authority to mortgage these three lots was
vested in him by a Special Power of Attorney executed by their respective owners.
Additionally, on April 23, 1980, Borromeo obtained a Letter of Credit from TRB in
the sum of P80,000.00, in consideration of which he executed a Trust Receipt (No.
595/80) falling due on July 22, 1980. 2
Borromeo failed to pay the debts as contracted despite demands therefor.
Consequently, TRB caused the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgages given to
secure them. At the public sale conducted by the sheriff on September 7, 1981, the
three mortgaged parcels of land were sold to TRB as the highest bidder, for
P73,529.09.
Within the redemption period, Borromeo made known to the Bank his intention to
redeem the properties at their auction price. TRB manager Blas C. Abril however made
clear that Borromeo would also have to settle his outstanding account under Trust
Receipt No. 595/80 (P88,762.78), supra. Borromeo demurred, and this disagreement
gave rise to a series of lawsuits commenced by him against the Bank, its o cers and
counsel, as aforestated.
A. CIVIL CASES
1. RTC Case No. R-22506; CA G.R. CV No. 07015; G.R. No. 83306
On October 29, 1982 Borromeo led a complaint in the Cebu City Regional Trial
Court for speci c performance and damages against TRB and its local manager, Blas
Abril, docketed as Civil Case No. R-22506. The complaint sought to compel defendants
to allow redemption of the foreclosed properties only at their auction price, with
stipulated interests and charges, without need of paying the obligation secured by the
trust receipt above mentioned. Judgment was rendered in his favor on December 20,
1984 by Branch 23 of the Cebu City RTC; but on defendants' appeal to the Court of
Appeals — docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 07015 — the judgment was reversed, by the
decision dated January 27, 1988. The Court of Appeals held that the "plaintiff
(Borromeo) has lost his right of redemption and can no longer compel defendant to
allow redemption of the properties in question." cdasia
Borromeo elevated the case to this Court where his appeal was docketed as G.R.
No. 83306. By Resolution dated August 15, 1988, this Court's First Division denied his
petition for review "for failure . . . to su ciently show that the respondent Court of
Appeals had committed any reversible error in its questioned judgment, it appearing on
the contrary that the said decision is supported by substantial evidence and is in
accord with the facts and applicable law." Reconsideration was denied, by Resolution
dated November 23, 1988. A second motion for reconsideration was denied by
Resolution dated January 30, 1989, as was a third such motion, by Resolution dated
April 19, 1989. The last resolution also directed entry of judgment and the remand of
the case to the court of origin for prompt execution of judgment. Entry of judgment
was made on May 12, 1989. By Resolution dated August 7, 1989, the Court denied
another motion of Borromeo to set aside judgment, and by Resolution dated December
20, 1989, the Court merely noted without action his manifestation and motion praying
that the decision of the Court of Appeals be overturned, and declared that "no further
motion or pleading . . . shall be entertained . . .."
2. RTC Case No. CEB 8750; CA-G.R. SP No. 22356
The ink was hardly dry on the resolutions just mentioned before Borromeo
initiated another civil action in the same Cebu City Regional Trial Court by which he
attempted to litigate the same issues. The action, against the new TRB Branch
Manager, Jacinto Jamero , was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-8750. As might have
been anticipated, the action was, on motion of the defense, dismissed by Order dated
May 18, 1990, 3 on the ground of res judicata, the only issue raised in the second action
— i.e., Borromeo's right to redeem the lots foreclosed by TRB — having been ventilated
in Civil Case No. R-22506 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Blas C. Abril and Traders Royal
Bank) (supra) and, on appeal, decided with nality by the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court in favor of defendants therein. cdasia
The Trial Court's judgment was a rmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 22356.
3. RTC Case No. CEB-9485; CA-G.R. SP No. 28221
In the meantime, and during the pendency of Civil Case No. R-22506, TRB
consolidated its ownership over the foreclosed immovables. Contending that that act
of consolidation amounted to a criminal offense, Borromeo led complaints in the
O ce of the City Prosecutor of Cebu against the bank o cers and lawyers. These
complaints were however, and quite correctly, given short shrift by that O ce.
Borromeo then led suit in the Cebu City RTC, this time not only against the TRB, TRB
o cers Jacinto Jamero and Arceli Bustamante, but also against City Prosecutor
Jufelinito Pareja and his assistants, Enriqueta Belarmino and Eva A. Igot, and the TRB
lawyers, Mario Ortiz and the law rm, HERSINLAW . The action was docketed as Civil
Case No. CEB-9485. The complaint charged Prosecutors Pareja, Belarmino and Igot
with manifest partiality and bias for dismissing the criminal cases just mentioned; and
faulted TRB and its manager, Jamero, as well as its lawyers, for consolidating the titles
to the foreclosed properties in favor of the bank despite the pendency of Case No. R-
22506. This action also failed. On defendants' motion, it was dismissed on February 19,
1992 by the RTC (Branch 22) on the ground of res judicata (being identical with Civil
Case Nos. R-22506 and CEB-8750, already decided with nality in favor of TRB), and
lack of cause of action (as to defendants Pareja, Belarmino and Igot).
Borromeo's certiorari petition to the Court of Appeals (CA G.R. SP No. 28221)
was dismissed by that Court's 16th Division 4 on October 6, 1992, for the reason that
the proper remedy was appeal.
4. RTC Case No. CEB-10368; CA-G.R. SP No. 27100
Before Case No. CEB-9845 was nally decided, Borromeo led, on May 30, 1991,
still another civil action for the same cause against TRB, its manager, Jacinto Jamero,
and its lawyers, Atty. Mario Ortiz and the HERSINLAW law o ce . This action was
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-10368, and was described as one for "Recovery of
Sums of Money, Annulment of Titles with Damages." The case met the same fate as the
others. It was, on defendants' motion, dismissed on September 9, 1991 by the RTC
(Branch 14) 5 on the ground of litis pendentia. cdasia
The RTC ruled that —

"Civil Case No. CEB-9485 will readily show that the defendants therein,
namely the Honorable Jufelinito Pareja, Enriqueta Belarmino, Eva Igot, Traders
Royal Bank, Arceli Bustamante, Jacinto Jamero, Mario Ortiz and HERSINLAW are
the same persons or nearly all of them who are impleaded as defendants in the
present Civil Case No. CEB-10368, namely, the Traders Royal Bank, Jacinto
Jamero, Mario Ortiz and HERSINLAW. The only difference is that more
defendants were impleaded in Civil Case No. CEB-9485, namely, City Prosecutor
Jufelinito Pareja and his assistants, Enriqueta Belarmino and Eva Igot. The
inclusion of the City Prosecutor and his two assistants in Civil Case No. CEB-9485
was however merely incidental as apparently they had nothing to do with the
questioned transaction in said case. . . ."
The Court likewise found that the reliefs prayed for were the same as those
sought in Civil Case No. CEB-9485, and the factual bases of the two cases were
essentially the same — the alleged fraudulent foreclosure and consolidation of the three
properties mortgaged years earlier by Borromeo to TRB.
For some reason, the Order of September 9, 1991 was set aside by an Order
rendered by another Judge on November 11, 1991 6 — the Judge who previously heard
the case having inhibited himself; but this Order of November 11, 1991 was, in turn,
nulli ed by the Court of Appeals (9th Division), by Decision promulgated on march 31,
1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27100 (Traders Royal Bank vs. Hon. Celso M. Gimenez, etc. and
Joaquin T. Borromeo ), 7 which decision also directed dismissal of Borromeo's
complaint.
5. RTC Case No. CEB-6452
When a new branch manager, Ronald Sy, was appointed for TRB, Cebu City,
Borromeo forthwith made that event the occasion for another new action, against TRB,
Ronald Sy, and the bank's' attorneys — Mario Ortiz, Honorato Hermosisima, Jr., Wilfredo
Navarro and HERSINLAW rm . This action was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6452,
and described as one for "Annulment of Title with Damages." The complaint, dated
October 20, 1987, again involved the foreclosure of the three (3) immovable above
mentioned, and was anchored on the alleged malicious, deceitful, and premature
consolidation of titles in TRB's favor despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 22506. On
defendants' motion, the trial court 8 dismissed the case on the ground of prematurity,
holding that "(a)t this point . . ., plaintiff's right to seek annulment of defendant Traders
Royal Bank's title will only accrue if and when plaintiff will ultimately and nally win Civil
Case No. R-22506."
Having thus far failed in his many efforts to demonstrate to the courts the "merit"
of his cause against TRB and its o cers and lawyers, Borromeo now took a different
tack by also suing (and thus also venting his ire on) the members of the appellate
courts who had ruled adversely to him. He filed in the Cebu City RTC, Civil Case No. CEB-
8236, impleading as defendants not only the same parties he had theretofore been
suing — TRB and its o cers and lawyers (HERSINLAW Mario Ortiz) — but also the
Chairman and Members of the First Division of the Supreme Court who had repeatedly
rebuffed him in G.R. No. 83306 (SEE sub-head I, A, 1, supra), as well as the Members of
the 8th, 9th and 10th Divisions of the Court of Appeals who had likewise made
dispositions unfavorable to him. His complaint, dated August 22, 1989, aimed to
recover damages from the defendant Justices for —
". . . maliciously and deliberately stating blatant falsehoods and
disregarding evidence and pertinent laws, rendering manifestly unjust and biased
resolutions and decisions bereft of signatures, facts or laws in support thereof,
depriving plaintiff of his cardinal rights to due process and against deprivation of
property without said process, tolerating, approving and legitimizing the patently
illegal, fraudulent, and contemptuous acts of defendant TRB, (which) constitute
a) GRAVE DERELICTION OF DUTY AND ABUSE OF POWER emanating from the
people, b) FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION, CARDINAL PRIMARY
RIGHTS, DUE PROCESS, ART. 27, 32, CIVIL CODE, Art. 208, REV. PENAL CODE,
and R.A. 3019, for which defendants must be held liable under said laws."
The complaint also prayed for reconveyance of the "fake titles obtained
fraudulently by TRB/HERSINLAW," and recovery of "P100,000.00 moral damages;
30,000.00 exemplary damages; and P5,000.00 litigation expenses." This action, too,
met a quick and unceremonious demise. On motion of defendants TRB and
HERSINLAW, the trial court, by Order dated November 7, 1989, 9 dismissed the case.
It appears that Borromeo led still another case to litigate the same cause
subject of two (2) prior actions instituted by him. This was RTC Case No. CEB-13069,
against TRB and the latter's lawyers, Wilfredo Navarro and Mario Ortiz . The action was
dismissed in an Order dated October 4, 1993, 1 0 on the ground of res judicata — the
subject matter being the same as that in Civil Case No. R-22506, decision in which was
a rmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 07015 as well as by this Court in
G.R. No. 83306 1 1 — and litis pendentia — the subject matter being also the same as
that in Civil Case No. CEB-8750, decision in which was a rmed by the Court of Appeals
in CA G.R. SP No. 22356.1 2
8. RTC Criminal Case No. CBU-19344; CA G.R. SP No. 28275; G.R. No. 112928
On April 17, 1990 the City Prosecutor of Cebu City led an information with the
RTC of Cebu (Branch 22) against Borromeo charging him with a violation of the Trust
Receipts Law. 1 3 This case was docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-19344. After a
while, Borromeo moved to dismiss the case on the ground of denial of his right to a
speedy trial. His motion was denied by Order of Judge Pampio A. Abarintos dated April
10, 1992. In the same order, His Honor set an early date for Borromeo's arraignment
and placed the case "under a continuous trial system on the dates as may be agreed by
the defense and prosecution." Borromeo moved for reconsideration. When his motion
was again found without merit, by Order dated May 21, 1992, he betook himself to the
Court of Appeals on a special civil action of certiorari, to nullify these adverse orders,
his action being docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 28275.
Here again, Borromeo failed. The Court of Appeals declared that the facts did not
show that there had been unreasonable delay in the criminal action against him, and
denied his petition for being without merit. 1 4
Borromeo then led a petition for review with this Court (G.R. No. 112928), but
by resolution dated January 31, 1994, the same was dismissed for failure of Borromeo
to comply with the requisites of Circulars Numbered 1-88 and 19-91. His motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied by Resolution dated march 23, 1994. cdasia
a. Clarificatory Communications to Borromeo Re "Minute Resolutions"

He next led a Manifestation dated April 6, 1994 calling the Resolution of March
23, 1994 "Un-Constitutional, Arbitrary and tyrannical and a gross travesty of 'Justice,'"
because it was "signed only by a mere clerk and . . . (failed) to state clear facts and law,"
and "the petition was not resolved on MERITS nor by any Justice but by a mere clerk." 1 5
The Court responded with another Resolution, promulgated on June 22, 1994,
and with some patience drew his attention to the earlier resolution "in his own previous
case (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals and Samson Lao , G.R. No. 82273, 1
June 1990; 186 SCRA 1) 1 6 and on the same issue he now raises." Said Resolution of
June 22, 1994, after reiterating that the notices sent by the Clerk of Court of the Court
En Banc or any of the Divisions simply advise of and quote the resolution actually
adopted by the Court after deliberation on a particular matter, additionally stated that
Borromeo "knew, as well, that the communications (notices) signed by the Clerk of
Court start with the opening clause —
'Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the First Division
of this Court dated __________,'
thereby indisputably showing that it is not the Clerk of Court who prepared or signed
the resolutions.
This was not, by the way, the rst time that the matter had been explained to
Borromeo. The record shows that on July 10, 1987, he received a letter from Clerk of
Court Julieta Y. Carreon (of this Court's Third Division) dealing with the subject, in
relation to G.R. No. 77243. 1 7 The same matter was also dealt with in the letter received
by him from Clerk of Court Luzviminda D. Puno, dated April 4, 1989, and in the letter to
him of Clerk of Court (Second Division) Fermin J. Garma, dated May, 19, 1989. 1 8 And
the same subject was treated of in another Resolution of this Court, notice of which
was in due course served on him, to wit: that dated July 31, 1989, in G.R. No. 87897. 1 9
B. CRIMINAL CASES
Mention has already been made of Borromeo's attempt — with "all the valor of
ignorance" — to fasten not only civil, but also criminal liability on TRB, its o cers and
lawyers. 2 0 Several other attempts on his part to cause criminal prosecution of those he
considered his adversaries, will now be dealt with here.
1. I.S. Nos. 90-1187 and 90-1188
On March 7, 1990, Borromeo led criminal complaints with the O ce of the
Cebu City Prosecutor against Jacinto Jamero (then still TRB Branch manager), "John
Doe and O cers of Traders Royal Bank ." The complaints (docketed as I.S. Nos. 90-
1187-88) accused the respondents of "Estafa and Falsi cation of Public Documents."
He claimed, among others that the bank and its o cers, thru its manager, Jacinto
Jamero, sold properties not owned by them: that by fraud, deceit and false pretenses,
respondents negotiated and effected the purchase of the (foreclosed) properties from
his (Borromeo's) mother, who "in duress, fear and lack of legal knowledge," agreed to
the sale thereof for only P671,000.00, although in light of then prevailing market prices,
she should have received P588,030.00 more.
In a Joint Resolution dated April 11, 1990, 2 1 the Cebu City Fiscal's o ce
dismissed the complaint observing that actually, the Deed of Sale was not between the
bank and Borromeo's mother, but between the bank and Mrs. Thakuria (his sister), one
of the original owners of the foreclosed properties; and that Borromeo, being a
stranger to the sale, had no basis to claim injury or prejudice thereby. The Fiscal ruled
that the bank's ownership of the foreclosed properties was beyond question as the
matter had been raised and passed upon in a judicial litigation; and moreover, there was
no proof of the document allegedly falsified nor of the manner of its falsification.
a. I.S. Nos. 87-3795 and 89-4234
Evidently to highlight Borromeo's penchant for reckless ling of unfounded
complaints, the Fiscal also adverted to two other complaints earlier filed in his Office by
Borromeo — involving the same foreclosed properties and directed against respondent
bank o cers' predecessors (including the former Manager, Ronald Sy) and lawyers —
both of which were dismissed for lack of merit. These were:
a. I.S. No. 87-3795 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. ATTY. MARIO ORTIZ and
RONALD SY) for "Estafa Through Falsi cation of Public Documents, Deceit and
False Pretenses." — This case was dismissed by Resolution dated January 19,
1988 of the City Prosecutor's O ce because based on nothing more than a letter
dated June 4, 1985, sent by the Bank Manager Ronald Sy to the lessee of a
portion of the foreclosed immovables, advising the latter to remit all rentals to the
bank as the new owner thereof, as shown by the consolidated title; and there was
no showing that respondent Atty. Ortiz was motivated by fraud in notarizing the
deed of sale in TRB's favor after the lapse of the period of redemption, or that
Ortiz had bene ted pecuniarily from the transaction to the prejudice of
complainant; and
b. I.S. No. 89-4234 (JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO vs. RONALD SY, ET AL. ) for
"Estafa Through False Pretenses and Falsi cation of Public Documents." — This
case was dismissed by Resolution dated January 31, 1990.
2. I.S. Nos. 88-205 to 88-207

While Joaquin Borromeo's appeal (G.R. No. 83306) was still pending before the
Supreme Court, 2 2 an a davit was executed in behalf of TRB by Arceli Bustamante, in
connection with the former's re insurance claim over property registered in its name —
one of two immovables formerly owned by Socorro B. Thakuria (Joaquin T. Borromeo's
sister) and foreclosed by said bank. 2 3 In that a davit, dated September 10, 1987,
Bustamante stated that "On 24 June 1983, TRB thru foreclosure acquired real property
together with the improvements thereon which property is located at F. Ramos St.,
Cebu City covered by TCT No. 87398 in the name of TRB." The a davit was notarized
by Atty. Manuelito B. Inso. cdasia
Claiming that the a davit was "falsi ed and perjurious" because the claim of title
by TRB over the foreclosed lots was a "deliberate, wilful and blatant falsehood in that,
among others: . . . the consolidation was premature, illegal and invalid," Borromeo led
a criminal complaint with the Cebu City Fiscal's O ce against the a ant (Bustamante)
and the notarizing lawyer (Atty. Inso) for "falsi cation of public document, false
pretenses, perjury." On September 28, 1988, the Fiscal's O ce dismissed the
complaint. 2 4 It found no untruthful statements in the a davit or any malice in its
execution, considering that Bustamante's statement was based on the Transfer
Certi cate of Title in TRB's le, and thus the document that Atty. Inso notarized was
legally in order.
3. OMB-VIS-89-00136
This Resolution of this Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 83306 dated August 15,
1988 — sustaining the judgment of the Court of Appeals (10th Division) of January 27,
1988 in CA-G.R. CV No. 07015, supra, was made the subject of a criminal complaint by
Borromeo in the O ce of the Ombudsman, Visayas, docketed as OMB-VIS-89-00136.
His complaint — against "Supreme Court Justice (First Div.) and Court of Appeals
Justice (10th Div.)" — was dismissed for lack of merit in a resolution issued on February
14, 1990 2 5 which, among other things, ruled as follows:
"It should be noted and emphasized that complainant has remedies
available under the Rules of Court, particularly on civil procedure and existing
laws. It is not the prerogative of this O ce to make a review of Decisions and
resolutions of judicial courts, rendered within their competence. The records do
not warrant this Office to take further proceedings against the respondents.
In addition, Sec. 20 of R.A. 6770, the Ombudsman Act states that 'the
O ce of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of any
administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that (1) the
complainant had adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body'; and
Sec. 21 of the same law provides that the O ce of the Ombudsman does not
have disciplinary authority over members of the Judiciary."
II. CASES INVOLVING UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK (UCPB)

As earlier stated, 2 6 Borromeo (together with a certain Mercader) also borrowed
money from the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and executed a real estate
mortgage to secure repayment thereof. The mortgage was constituted over a 122-
square meter commercial lot covered by TCT No. 75680 in Borromeo's name. This
same lot was afterwards sold on August 7, 1980 by Borromeo to one Samson K. Lao
for P170,000.00, with a stipulation for its repurchase (pacto de retro) by him
(Borromeo, as the vendor). The sale was made without the knowledge and consent of
UCPB.
A. CIVIL CASES
Now, just as he had defaulted in the payment of the loans and credit
accommodations he had obtained from the Traders Royal Bank, Borromeo failed in the
fulfillment of his obligations to the UCPB. cdasia
Shortly after learning of Borromeo's default, and obviously to obviate or minimize

the ill effects of the latter's delinquency, Lao applied with the same bank (UCPB) for a
loan, offering the property he had purchased from Borromeo as collateral. UCPB was
not averse to dealing with Lao but imposed several conditions on him, one of which
was for Lao to consolidate his title over the property. Lao accordingly instituted a suit
for consolidation of title, docketed as Civil Case No. R-21009. However, as will shortly
be narrated, Borromeo opposed the consolidation prayed for. As a result, UCPB
cancelled Lao's application for a loan and itself commenced proceedings to foreclose
the mortgage constituted by Borromeo over the property.
This signaled the beginning of court battles waged by Borromeo not only against
Lao, but also against UCPB and the latter's lawyers, battles which he (Borromeo) fought
contemporaneously with his court war with Traders Royal Bank.
1. RTC Case No. R-21009; AC-G.R. No. CV-07396; G.R. No. 82273
The rst of this new series of court battles was, as just stated, the action
initiated by Samson Lao in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu (Branch 12), docketed as
Case No. R-21009, for consolidation of title in his favor over the 122-square-meter lot
subject of the UCPB mortgage, in accordance with Article 1007 of the Civil Code. In this
suit Lao was represented by Atty. Alfredo Perez, who was later substituted by Atty.
Antonio Regis. Borromeo contested Lao's application.
Judgment was in due course rendered by the RTC (Branch 12, Hon. Francis
Militante, presiding) denying consolidation because the transaction between the parties
could not be construed as a sale with pacto de retro being in law an equitable
mortgage; however, Borromeo was ordered to pay Lao the sum of P170,000.00,
representing the price stipulated in the sale a retro, plus the amounts paid by Lao for
capital gains and other taxes in connection with the transaction (P10,497.50).
Both Lao and Borromeo appealed to the Court of Appeals. Lao's appeal was
dismissed for failure of his lawyer to le brief in his behalf. Borromeo's appeal — AC-
G.R. No. CV-07396 — resulted in a Decision by the Court of Appeals dated December
14, 1987, affirming the RTC's judgment in toto.
The Appellate Court's decision was, in turn, a rmed by this Court (Third Division)
in a four-page Resolution dated September 13, 1989, promulgated in G.R. No. 82273 —
an appeal also taken by Borromeo. Borromeo led a motion for reconsideration on
several grounds, one of which was that the resolution of September 13, 1989 was
unconstitutional because contrary to "Sec. 4 (3), Art. VIII of the Constitution," it was not
signed by any Justice of the Division, and there was "no way of knowing which justices
had deliberated and voted thereon, nor of any concurrence of at least three of the
members." Since the motion was not led until after there had been an entry of
judgment, Borromeo having failed to more for reconsideration within the reglementary
period, the same was simply noted without action, in a Resolution dated November 27,
1989. cdasia
Notices of the foregoing Resolutions were, in accordance with established rule

and practice, sent to Borromeo over the signatures of the Clerk of Court and Assistant
Clerk of Court (namely: Attys. Julieta Y. CARREON and Alfredo MARASIGAN,
respectively).
a. RTC Case No. CEB-8679
Following the same aberrant pattern of his judicial campaign against Traders
Royal Bank, Borromeo attempted to vent his resentment even against the Supreme
Court o cers who, as just stated, had given him notices of the adverse dispositions of
this Court's Third Division. He led Civil Case No. CEB-8679 in the Cebu City RTC (CFI)
for recovery of damages against "Attys. Julieta Y. Carreon and Alfredo Marasigan,
Division Clerk of Court and Asst. Division Clerk of Court, Third Division, and Atty. Jose I.
Ilustre, Chief of Judicial Records O ce ." He charged them with usurpation of judicial
functions, for allegedly "maliciously and deviously issuing biased, fake, baseless and
unconstitutional 'Resolution' and 'Entry of Judgment' in G.R. No. 82273."
Summonses were issued to defendants to RTC Branch 18 (Judge Rafael R.
Ybañez, presiding). These processes were brought to the attention of this Court's Third
Division. The latter resolved to treat the matter as an incident in G.R. No. 82273, and
referred it to the Court En banc on April 25, 1990. By Resolution (issued in said G.R. No.
82273, supra) dated June 1, 1990, the Court En banc ordered Judge Ybañez to quash
the summonses, to dismiss Civil Case No. CEB-8679, and "not to issue summons or
otherwise to entertain cases of similar nature which may in the future be led in his
court." Accordingly, Judge Ybañez issued an Order on June 6, 1990 quashing the
summonses and dismissing the complaint in said Civil Case No. CEB-8679.
The Resolution of June 1, 1990 2 7 explained to Borromeo in no little detail the
nature and purpose of notices sent by the Clerks of Court of decisions or resolutions of
the Court En Banc or the Divisions, in this wise:
"This is not the rst time that Mr. Borromeo has led charges/complaints
against o cials of the Court. In several letter-complaints led with the courts and
the Ombudsman, Borromeo had repeatedly alleged that he 'suffered injustices,'
because of the disposition of the four (4) cases he separately appealed to this
Court which were resolved by minute resolutions, allegedly in violation of Sections
4 (3), 13 and 14 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. His invariable complaint is
that the resolutions which disposed of his cases do not bear the signatures of the
Justices who participated in the deliberations and resolutions and do not show
that they voted therein. He likewise complained that the resolutions bear no
certi cation of the chief Justice and that they did not state the facts and the law
on which they were based and were signed only by the Clerks of Court and
therefore "unconstitutional, null and void."
xxx xxx xxx

The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of
the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as nal and
executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are
factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is in accord with the facts of
the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the
petition is led merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-
compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course always gives the
legal basis. As emphasized in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, 18 SCRA 382, 417 [1987],
"[T]he Court is not "duty bound" to render signed Decisions all the time. It has
ample discretion to formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a
legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case" . . . . This is the only
way whereby it can act on all cases led before it and, accordingly, discharge its
constitutional functions. . .
. . . (W)hen the Court, after deliberating on a petition and any subsequent
pleadings, manifestations, comments, or motions decides to deny due course to
the petition and states that the questions raised are factual, or no reversible error
in the respondent court's decision is shown, or for some other legal basis stated in
the resolution, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement . .
. (of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution "that no petition for review or
motion for reconsideration shall be refused due course or denied without stating
the legal basis thereof").
For a prompt dispatch of actions of the Court, minute resolutions are
promulgated by the Court through the Clerk of Court, who takes charge of sending
copies thereof to the parties concerned by quoting verbatim the resolution issued
on a particular case. It is the Clerk of Court's duty to inform the parties of the
action taken on their cases by quoting the resolution adopted by the Court. The
Clerk of Court never participates in the deliberations of a case. All decisions and
resolutions are actions of the Court. The Clerk of Court merely transmits the
Court's action. This was explained in the case — G.R. No. 56280, " Rhine Marketing
Corp. v. Felix Gravante, et al. ," where, in a resolution dated July 6, 1981, the Court
said — "[M]inute resolutions of this Court denying or dismissing unmeritorious
petitions like the petition in the case at bar, are the result of a thorough
deliberation among the members of this Court, which does not and cannot
delegate the exercise of its judicial functions to its Clerk of Court or any of its
subalterns, which should be known to counsel. When a petition is denied or
dismissed by this Court, this Court sustains the challenged decision or order
together with its findings of facts and legal conclusions. cdasia
Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of the Court who
took part in the deliberations of a case nor do they require the certi cation of the
Chief Justice. For to require members of the Court to sign all resolutions issued
would not only unduly delay the issuance of its resolutions but a great amount of
their time would be spent on functions more properly performed by the Clerk of
Court and which time could be more pro tably used in the analysis of cases and
the formulation of decisions and orders of important nature and character. Even
with the use of this procedure, the Court is still struggling to wipe out the backlog
accumulated over the years and meet the ever increasing number of cases
coming to it. . . .."
b. RTC CIVIL CASE NO. CEB-(6501) 6740; G.R. No. 84054

It is now necessary to digress a little and advert to actions which, while having no
relation to the UCPB, TRB or SBTC, are relevant because they were the predicates for
other suits led by Joaquin Borromeo against administrative o cers of the Supreme
Court and the Judge who decided one of the cases adversely to him.
The record shows that on or about December 11, 1987, Borromeo led a civil
action for damages against a certain Tomas B. Tan and Marjem Pharmacy, docketed as
Civil Case No. CEB-6501. On January 12, 1988, the trial court dismissed the case,
without prejudice, for failure to state a cause of action and prematurely (for non-
compliance with P.D. 1508).
What Borromeo did was simply to re- le the same complaint with the same
Court, on March 18, 1988. This time it was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6740, and
assigned to Branch 17 of the RTC of Cebu presided by Hon. Mario Dizon. Again,
however, on defendants' motion, the trial court dismissed the case, in an order dated
may 28, 1988. His rst and second motions for reconsideration having been denied,
Borromeo led a petition for review before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 84054
(Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Tomas Tan and Hon. Mario Dizon).
In a Resolution dated August 3, 1988, the Court required petitioner to comply
with the rules by submitting a veri ed statement of material dates and paying the
docket and legal research fund fees; it also referred him to the Citizens Legal
Assistance O ce for help in the case. His petition was eventually dismissed by
Resolution of the Second Division dated November 21, 1988, for failure on his part to
show any reversible error in the trial court's judgment. His motion for reconsideration
was denied with finality, by Resolution dated January 18, 1989.
Borromeo wrote to Atty. Fermin J. Garma (Clerk of Court of the Second Division)
on April 27, 1989 once more remonstrating that the resolutions received by him had nor
been signed by any Justice, set forth no ndings of fact or law, and had no certi cation
of the Chief Justice. Atty. Garma replied to him on May 19, 1989, pointing out that "the
minute resolutions of this Court denying or dismissing petitions, like the petition in the
case at bar, which was denied for failure of the counsel and/or petitioner to su ciently
show that the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 17, had committed any reversible
error in the questioned judgment [resolution dated November 21, 1988], are the result
of a thorough deliberation among the members of this Court, which does not and
cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial functions to its Clerk of Court or any of its
aubalterns. When the petition is denied or dismissed by the Court, it sustains the
challenged decision or order together with its findings of facts and legal conclusions."
Borromeo obviously had learned nothing from the extended Resolution of June 1,
1990 in G.R. No. 82273, supra (or the earlier communications to him on the same
subject) which had so clearly pointed out that minute resolutions of the Court are as
much the product of the Members' deliberations as full-blown decisions or resolutions,
and that the intervention of the Clerk consists merely in the ministerial and routinary
function of communicating the Court's action to the parties concerned. cdasia
c. RTC Case No. CEB-9042

What Borromeo did next, evidently smarting from this latest judicial rebuff, yet
another in an already long series, was to commence a suit against Supreme Court
(Second Division) Clerk of Court Fermin J. Garma and Assistant Clerk of Court
Tomasita Dris. They were the o cers who had sent him notices of the unfavorable
resolutions in G.R. No. 84054, supra. His suit, led on June 1, 1990, was docketed as
Case No. CEB-9042 (Branch 8, Hon. Bernardo Salas presiding). Therein he complained
essentially of the same thing he had been harping on all along: that in relation to G.R.
No. 91030 — in which the Supreme Court dismissed his petition for "technical reasons"
and failure to demonstrate any reversible error in the challenged judgment — the notice
sent to him — of the "unsigned and unspeci c" resolution of February 19, 1990, denying
his motion for reconsideration — had been singed only by the defendant clerks of court
and not by the Justices. According to him, he had thereupon written letters to
defendants demanding an explanation for said "patently unjust and un-Constitutional
resolutions," which they ignored; defendants had usurped judicial functions by issuing
resolutions signed only by them and not by any Justice, and without stating the factual
and legal basis thereof; and defendants' "wanton, malicious and patently abusive acts"
had caused him "grave mental anguish, severe moral shock, embarrassment, sleepless
nights and worry;" and consequently, he was entitled to moral damages of no less than
P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00, and litigation expenses of
P5,000.00.
On June 8, 1990, Judge Renato C. Dacudao ordered the records of the case
transmitted to the Supreme Court conformably with its Resolution dated June 1, 1990
in G.R. No. 82273, entitled "Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Samson
Lao," supra — directing that all complaints against o cers of that Court be forwarded
to it for appropriate action. 2 8
Borromeo led a "Manifestation/Motion" dated June 27, 1990 asking the Court
to "rectify the injustices" committed against him in G.R. Nos. 83306, 84999, 87897,
77248 and 84054. This the Court ordered expunged from the record (Resolution, July
19, 1990).
2. RTC Case No. R-21880; CA-G.R. CV No. 10951; G.R. No. 87897
Borromeo also sued to stop UCPB from foreclosing the mortgage on his
property. In the Cebu City RTC, he led a complaint for "Damages with Injunction," which
was docketed as Civil Case No. R-21880 (Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. United Coconut
Planters Bank, et al.). Named defendants in the complaint were UCPB, Enrique
Farrarons (UCPB Cebu Branch Manager), and Samson K. Lao. UCPB was represented in
the action by Atty. Danilo Deen, and for a time, by Atty. Honorato Hermosisima (both
being then resident partners of ACCRA Law O ce). Lao was represented by Atty.
Antonio Regis. Once again, Borromeo was rebuffed. The Cebu RTC (Br. 11, Judge
Valeriano R. Tomol, Jr., presiding) dismissed the complaint, upheld UCPB's right to
foreclose, and granted its counterclaim for moral damages in the sum of P20,000.00;
attorney's fees amounting to P10,000.00; and litigation expenses of P1,000.00.
Borromeo perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 10951. That Court, thru its Ninth Division (per Martinez, J., ponente, with
de la Fuente and Pe, JJ., concurring), dismissed his appeal and a rmed the Trial
Court's judgment.
Borromeo led a petition for review with the Supreme Court which, in G.R. No.
87897 dismissed it for insu ciency in form and substance and for being "largely
unintelligible." Borromeo's motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution dated
June 25, 1989. A second motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated
July 31, 1989 which directed as well entry of judgment (effected on August 1, 1989). In
this Resolution, the Court (First Division) said: cdasia
"The Court considered the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 4, 1989
led by petitioner himself and Resolved to DENY they same for lack of merit, the
motion having been led without "express leave of court" (Section 2, Rule 52,
Rules of Court) apart from being a reiteration merely of the averments of the
Petition for Review dated April 14, 1989 and the Motion for Reconsideration dated
May 25, 1989. It should be noted that petitioner's claims have already been twice
rejected as without merit, rst by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu and then by the
Court of Appeals. What petitioner desires obviously is to have a third ruling on the
merits of his claims, this time by this Court. Petitioner is advised that a review of a
decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound judicial
discretion and will be granted only when there is a special and important reason
therefor (Section 4, Rule 45); and a petition for review may be dismissed
summarily on the ground that 'the appeal is without merit, or is prosecuted
manifestly for delay or the question raised is too unsubstantial to require
consideration' (Section 3, Rule 45), or that only questions of fact are raised in the
petition, or the petition otherwise fails to comply with the formal requisites
prescribed therefor (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 45; Circular No. 1-88). Petitioner is
further advised that the rst sentence of Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution refers to a decision, and has no application to a resolution as to
which said section pertinently provides that a resolution denying a motion for
reconsideration need state only the legal basis therefor; and that the resolution of
June 26, 1989 denying petitioner's rst Motion for Reconsideration dated May 25,
1989 does indeed state the legal reasons therefor. The plain and patent
signi cation of the grounds for denial set out in the Resolution of June 26, 1989
is that the petitioner's arguments — aimed at the setting aside of the resolution
denying the petition for review, and consequently bringing about a review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals — had failed to persuade the Court that the errors
imputed to the Court of Appeals had indeed been committed and therefore, there
was no cause to modify the conclusion set forth in that judgment, and in such a
case, there is obviously no point in reproducing and restating the conclusions and
reasons therefor of the Court of Appeals.
Premises considered, the Court further Resolved to DIRECT ENTRY OF

JUDGMENT."
On August 13, 1989 Borromeo wrote to Atty. Estrella C. Pagtanac, then the Clerk
of Court of the Court's First Division, denouncing the resolution above mentioned as "a
LITANY OF LIES, EVASIONS, and ABSURD SELF-SERVING LOGIC from a Supreme Court
deluded and drunk with power which it has forgotten emanates from the people," aside
from being "patently UNCONSTITUTIONAL for absence of signatures and facts and law:
. . ." and characterizing the conclusions therein as "the height of ARROGANCE and
ARBITRARINESS assuming a KING-LIKE AND EVEN GOD-LIKE POWER totally at
variance and contradicted by . . . CONSTITUTIONAL provisions . . .." To the letter
Borromeo attached copies of (1) his "Open Letter to the Ombudsman" dated August
10, 1989 protesting the Court's "issuing UNSIGNED, UNSPECIFIC, and BASELESS
'MINUTES RESOLUTIONS'"; (2) his "Open Letter of Warning" dated August 12, 1989; and
(3) a communication of Domingo M. Quimlat, News Ombudsman, Phil. Daily Inquirer,
dated August 10, 1989. His letter was ordered expunged from the record because
containing "false, impertinent and scandalous matter (Section 5, Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court)." Another letter of the same ilk, dated November 7, 1989, was simply "NOTED
without action" by Resolution promulgated on December 13, 1989.
3. RTC Case No. CEB-4852; CA G.R. SP No. 14519; G.R. No. 84999
In arrant disregard of established rule and practice, Borromeo led another
action to invalidate the foreclosure effected at the instance of UCPB, which he had
unsuccessfully tried to prevent in Case No. CEB-21880. This was Civil Case No. CEB-
4852 of the Cebu City RTC ( Joaquin T. Borromeo vs. UCPB, et al. ) for "Annulment of
Title with Damages." Here, UCPB was represented by Atty. Laurence Fernandez, in
consultation with atty. Deen. cdasia
On December 26, 1987, the Cebu City RTC (Br. VII, Hon. Generoso A. Juaban,
presiding) dismissed the complaint on the ground of litis pendentia and ordered
Borromeo to pay attorney's fees (P5,000.00) and litigation expenses (P1,000.00).
Borromeo instituted a certiorari action in the Court of Appeals to annul this
judgment (CA G.R. SP No. 14519); but his action was dismissed by the Appellate Court
on June 7, 1988 on account of his failure to comply with that Court's Resolution of May
13, 1988 for submission of certi ed true copies of the Trial Court's decision of
December 26, 1987 and its Order of February 26, 1988, and for statement of "the dates
he received . . . (said) decision and . . . order."
Borromeo went up to this Court on appeal, his appeal being docketed as G.R. No.
84999. In a Resolution dated October 10, 1988, the Second Division required comment
on Borromeo's petition for review by the respondents therein named, and required
Borromeo to secure the services of counsel. On November 9, 1988, Atty. Jose L.
Cerilles entered his appearance for Borromeo. After due proceedings, Borromeo's
petition was dismissed, by Resolution dated March 6, 1989 of the Second Division for
failure to su ciently show that the Court of Appeals had committed any reversible
error in the questioned judgment. His motion for reconsideration dated April 4, 1989,
again complaining that the resolution contained no findings of fact and law, was denied.
a. RTC Case No. CEB-8178
Predictably, another action, Civil Case No. CEB-8178, was commenced by
Borromeo in the RTC of Cebu City, this time against the Trial Judge who had lately
rendered judgment adverse to him, Judge Generoso Juaban. Also impleaded as
defendants were UCPB, and Hon. Andres Narvasa (then Chairman, First Division),
Estrella G. Pagtanac and Marissa Villarama (then, respectively, Clerk of Court and
Assistant Clerk of Court of the First Division), and others. Judge German G. Lee of
Branch 15 of said Court — to which the case was ra ed — caused issuance of
summonses which were in due course served on September 22, 1989, among others,
on said defendants in and of the Supreme Court. In an En Banc Resolution dated
October 2, 1989 — in G.R. No. 84999 — this Court, required Judge Lee and the Clerk of
Court and Assistant Clerk of Court of the Cebu RTC to show cause why no disciplinary
action should be taken against them for issuing said summonses.
Shortly thereafter, Atty. Jose L. Cerilles — who, as already stated, had for time
represented Borromeo in G.R. No. 84999 — led with this Court his withdrawal of
appearance, alleging that there was "no compatibility" between him and his client,
Borromeo — because "Borromeo had been ling pleadings, papers, etc. without . . . (his)
knowledge and advice" — and declaring that he had "not advised and . . . (had had) no
hand in the ling of (said) Civil Case CEB 8178 before the Regional Trial Court in Cebu.
On the other hand, Judge Lee, in his "Compliance" dated October 23, 1989, apologized
to the Court and informed it that he had already promulgated an order dismissing Civil
Case No. CEB-8178 on motion of the principal defendants therein, namely Judge
Genoroso Juaban and United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). Atty. Cerilles' withdrawal
of appearance, and Judge Lee's compliance, were noted by the Court in its Resolution
dated November 29, 1989.
4. RTC Case No. CEB-374; CA-G.R. CV No. 04097; G.R. No. 77248
It is germane to advert to one more transaction between Borromeo and Samson
K. Lao which gave rise to another action that ultimately landed in this Court. 2 9 The
transaction involved a parcel of land of Borromeo's known as the "San Jose Property"
(TCT No. 34785). Borromeo sued Lao and another person (Mariano Logarta) in the
Cebu Regional Trial Court on the theory that his contract with the latter was not an
absolute sale but an equitable mortgage. The action was docketed as Case No. CEB-
374. Judgment was rendered against him by the Trial Court (Branch 12) declaring valid
and binding the purchase of the property by Lao from him, and the subsequent sale
thereof by Lao to Logarta. Borromeo appealed to the Court of Appeals, but that Court,
in CA-G.R. CV No. 04097, a rmed the Trial Court's judgment, by Decision promulgated
on October 10, 1986. cdasia
Borromeo came up to this Court on appeal, his review petition being docketed as
G.R. No. 77248. By Resolution of the Second Division of March 16, 1987, however, his
petition was denied for the reason that "a) the petition as well as the docket and legal
research fund fees were led and paid late; and (b) the issues raised are factual and the
ndings thereon of the Court of Appeals are nal." He moved for reconsideration; this
was denied by Resolution dated June 3, 1987.
He thereafter insistently and persistently still sought reconsideration of said
adverse resolutions through various motions and letters, all of which were denied. One
of his letters — inter alia complaining that the notice sent to him by the Clerk of Court
did not bear the signatures of any Justice — elicited the following reply from Atty.
Julieta Y. Carreon, Clerk of Court of the Third Division, dated July 10, 1987, reading as
follows:.
"Dear Mr. Borromeo:
This refers to your letter dated June 9, 1987 requesting for a copy of the
'actual resolution with the signatures of all the Justices of the Second Division' in
Case G.R. No. 77243 whereby the motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of
the petition was denied for lack of merit.
In connection therewith, allow us to cite for your guidance, Resolution
dated July 6, 1981 in G.R. No. 56280, Rhine Marketing Corp. v. Felix Gravante, Jr.,
et al., wherein the Supreme Court declared that "(m)inute resolutions of this Court
denying or dismissing unmeritorious petitions like the petition in the case at bar,
are the result of a thorough deliberation among the members of this Court, which
does not and cannot delegate the exercise of its judicial functions to its Clerk of
Court or any of its subalterns, which should be known to counsel. When a petition
is denied or dismissed by this Court, this Court sustains the challenged decision
or order together with its ndings of facts and legal conclusions." It is the Clerk of
Court's duty to notify the parties of the action taken on their case by quoting the
resolution adopted by the Court.
Very truly yours,
JULIETA Y. CARREON
xxx xxx xxx"
B. CRIMINAL CASES
Just as he had done with regard to the cases involving the Traders Royal Bank,
and similarly without foundation, Borromeo attempted to hold his adversaries in the
cases concerning the UCPB criminally liable.
1. Case No. OMB-VIS-89-00181
In relation to the dispositions made of Borromeo's appeals and other attempts
to overturn the judgment of the RTC in Civil Case No. 21880, 3 0 Borromeo led with the
O ce of the Ombudsman (Visayas) on August 18, 1989, a complaint against the
Chairman and Members of the Supreme Court's First Division; the Members of the
Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez,
Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III, and Cebu City Prosecutor Jufelinito Pareja,
charging them with violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the
Revised Penal Code. cdasia
By Resolution dated January 12, 1990, 3 1 the O ce of the Ombudsman

dismissed Borromeo's complaints, opining that the matters therein dealt with had
already been tried and their merits determined by different courts including the
Supreme Court (decision, June 26, 1989, in G.R. No. 87987. That resolution inter alia
stated that, "Finally, we nd it unreasonable or complainant to dispute and de antly
refuse to acknowledge the authority of the decree rendered by the highest tribunal of
the land in this case. . . .".
2. Case No. OMB-VIS-90-00418
A second complaint was led by Borromeo with the O ce of the Ombudsman
(Visayas), dated January 12, 1990, against Atty. Julieta Carreon, Clerk of Court of the
Third Division, Supreme Court, and others, charging them with a violation of R.A. 3019
(and the Constitution, the Rules of Court, etc.) for supposedly usurping judicial
functions in that they issued Supreme Court resolutions (actually, notices of
resolutions) in connection with G.R. No. 82273 which did not bear the justices'
signatures. 3 2 In a Resolution dated March 19, 1990, the O ce of the Ombudsman
dismissed his complaint for "lack of merit" declaring inter alia that "in all the questioned
actuations of the respondents alleged to constitute usurpation . . . it cannot be
reasonably and fairly inferred that respondents really were the ones rendering them,"
and "it is not the prerogative of this o ce to review the correctness of judicial
resolutions." 3 3
III. CASES INVOLVING SECURITY BANK & TRUST COM. (SBTC)
A. CIVIL CASES
1. RTC Case No. R-21615; CA-G.R. No. 20617; G.R. No. 94769
The third banking institution which Joaquin T. Borromeo engaged in running
court battles, was the Security Bank & Trust Company (SBTC). From it Borromeo had
obtained ve (5) loans in the aggregate sum of P189,126.19, consolidated in a single
Promissory Note on may 31, 1979. To secure payment thereof, Summa Insurance Corp.
(Summa) issued a performance bond which set a limit of P200,000.00 on its liability
thereunder. Again, as in the case of his obligations to Traders Royal Bank and UCPB,
Borromeo failed to discharge his contractual obligations. Hence, SBTC brought an
action in the Cebu City RTC against Borromeo and Summa for collection.
The action was docketed as Civil Case No. R-21615, and was assigned to Branch
10, Judge Leonardo Cañares, presiding. Plaintiff SBTC was represented by Atty. Edgar
Gica, who later withdrew and was substituted by the law rm, HERSINLAW. The latter
appeared in the suit through Atty. Wilfredo Navarro.
Judgment by default was rendered in the case on January 5, 1989; both
defendants were sentenced to pay to SBTC, solidarily, the amount of P436,771.32; 25%
thereof as attorney's fees (but in no case less than P20,000.00); and P5,000.00 as
litigation expenses; and the costs. A writ of execution issued in due course pursuant to
which an immovable of Borromeo was levied on, and eventually sold at public auction
on October 19, 1989 in favor of the highest bidder, SBTC.
On February 5, 1990, Borromeo led a motion to set aside the judgment by
default, but the same was denied on March 6, 1990. His Motion for Reconsideration
having likewise been denied, Borromeo went to the Court of Appeals for relief (CA-G.R.
SP No. 20617), but the latter dismissed his petition. Failing in his bid for
reconsideration, Borromeo appealed to this Court on certiorari — his appeal being
docketed as G.R. No. 94769. On September 17, 1990, this Court dismissed his petition,
and subsequently denied with nality his motion for reconsideration. Entry of Judgment
was made on December 26, 1990.
However, as will now be narrated, and as might now have been anticipated in light
of his history of recalcitrance and bellicosity, these proceedings did not signify the end
of litigation concerning Borromeo's aforesaid contractual commitments to SBTC, but
only marked the start of another congeries of actions and proceedings, civil and
criminal concerning the same matter, instituted by Borromeo. cdasia
2. RTC Case No. CEB-9267 .

While G.R. No. 94769 was yet pending in the Supreme Court, Borromeo
commenced a suit of his own in the Cebu RTC against SBTC; the lawyers who
represented it in Civil Case No. R-21625 — HERSINLAW, Atty. Wilfredo Navarro, Atty.
Edgar Gica; and even the Judge who tried and disposed of the suit, Hon. Leonardo
Cañares. He denominated his action, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-9267, as one for
"Damages from Denial of Due Process, Breach of Contract, Fraud, Unjust Judgment,
with Restraining Order and Injunction." His complaint accused defendants of "wanton,
malicious and deceitful acts" in "conniving to deny plaintiff due process and defraud
him through excessive attorney's fees," which acts caused him grave mental and moral
shock, sleepless nights, worry, social embarrassment and severe anxiety for which he
sought payment of moral and exemplary damages as well as litigation expenses.
By Order dated May 21, 1991, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 16 (Hon. Godardo
Jacinto, presiding) granted the demurrer to evidence filed by defendants and dismissed
the complaint, holding that "since plaintiff failed to introduce evidence to support . . .
(his) causes of action asserted . . ., it would be superfluous to still require defendants to
present their own evidence as there is nothing for them to controvert."
2. RTC Case No. CEB-10458; CA-G.R. CV No. 39047
Noting daunted, and running true to form, Borromeo led on July 2, 1991 still
another suit against the same parties — SBTC, HERSINLAW, and Judge Cañares — but
now including Judge Godardo Jacinto, 3 4 who had rendered the latest judgment against
him. This suit, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-10458, was, according to Borromeo, one
"for Damages (For Unjust Judgment and Orders, Denial of Equal Protection of the Laws,
Violation of the Constitution, Fraud and Breach of Contract)." Borromeo faulted Judges
Cañares and Jacinto for the way they decided the two cases (CVR-21615 & CEB No.
9267)," and contended that defendants committed "wanton, malicious, and unjust acts"
by "conniving to defraud plaintiff and deny him equal protection of the laws and due
process," on account of which he had been "caused untold mental anguish, moral shock,
worry, sleepless nights, and embarrassment for which the former are liable under Arts.
20, 21, 27, and 32 of the Civil Code."
The defendants led motions to dismiss. By Order dated August 30, 1991, the
RTC of Cebu City, Branch 15 (Judge German G. Lee, Jr., presiding) dismissed the
complaint on grounds of res judicata, immunity of judges from liability in the
performance of their official functions, and lack of jurisdiction.
Borromeo took an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which docketed it as CA-G.R.
CV No. 39047.
In the course thereof, he led motions to cite Atty. Wilfredo F. Navarro, lawyer of
SBTC, for contempt of court. The motions were denied by Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (Special 7th Division) dated April 13, 1993. 3 5 Said the Court:
"Stripped of their disparaging and intemperate innuendoes, the subject
motions, in fact, proffer nothing but a stark difference in opinion as to what can,
or cannot, be considered res judicata under the circumstances."cdasia
xxx xxx xxx
"By their distinct disdainful tenor towards the appellees, and his apparent
penchant for argumentum ad hominem, it is, on the contrary the appellant who
precariously treads the acceptable limits of argumentation and personal
advocacy. The Court, moreover, takes particular note of the irresponsible lea ets
he admits to have authored and nds them highly reprehensible and needlessly
derogatory to the dignity, honor and reputation of the Court. That he is not a
licensed law practitioner is, in fact, the only reason why his otherwise
contumacious behaviour is presently accorded the patience and leniency it
probably does not deserve. Considering the temperament he has, by far, exhibited,
the appellant is, however, su ciently warned that similar displays in the future
shall accordingly be dealt with commensurate severity."

IV. OTHER CASES
A. RTC Case No. CEB-2074; CA-G.R. CV No. 14770; G.R. No. 98929
One other case arising from another transaction of Borromeo with Samson K.
Lao is pertinent. This is Case No. CEB-2974 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. It
appears that sometime in 1979, Borromeo was granted a loan of P165,000.00 by the
Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) on the security of a lot belonging to him
in San Jose Street, Cebu City, covered by TCT No. 34785. 3 6 Later, Borromeo obtained a
letter credit in the amount of P37,000.00 from Republic Planters Bank, with Samson
Lao as co-maker. Borromeo failed to pay his obligations. Lao agreed to, and did pay
Borromeo's obligations to both banks (PBCom and Republic), in consideration of which
a deed of sale was executed in his favor by Borromeo over two (2) parcels of land, one
of which was that mortgaged to PBCom, as above stated. Lao then mortgaged the land
to PBCom as security for his own loan in the amount of P240,000.00.
Borromeo subsequently sued PBCom, some of its personnel, and Samson Lao in
the Cebu Regional Trial Court alleging that the defendants had conspired to deprive him
of his property. Judgment was rendered against him by the trial Court. Borromeo
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where his appeal was docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 14770. On March 21, 1990, said Court rendered judgment a rming the Trial
Court's decision, and on February 7, 1991, issued a Resolution denying Borromeo's
motion for reconsideration. His appeal to this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 98929, was
given short shrift. On May 29, 1991, the Court (First Division) promulgated a Resolution
denying his petition for review "for being factual and for failure . . . to su ciently show
that respondent court had committed any reversible error in its questioned judgment."
Stubbornly, in his motion for reconsideration, he insisted the notices of the
resolutions sent to him were unconstitutional and void because bearing no signatures
of the Justices who had taken part in approving the resolution therein mentioned.
B. RTC Case No. CEB-11528
What would seem to be the latest judicial dispositions rendered against
Borromeo, at least as of date of this Resolution, are two orders issued in Civil Case No.
CEB-11528 of the Regional Trial Court at Cebu City (Branch 18), which was yet another
case led by Borromeo outlandishly founded on the theory that a judgment
promulgated against him by the Supreme Court (Third Division) was wrong and "unjust."
Impleaded as defendant in the action was former Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, as
Chairman of the Third Division at the time in question. On August 31, 1994 the presiding
judge, Hon. Galicano O. Arriesgado, issued a Resolution inter alia dismissing
Borromeo's complaint "on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and res judicata." His Honor
made the following pertinent observations: cdasia
". . . (T)his Court is of the well-considered view and so holds that this Court
has indeed no jurisdiction to review, interpret or reverse the judgment or order of
the Honorable Supreme Court. The acts or omissions complained of by the
plaintiff against the herein defendant and the other personnel of the highest Court
of the land as alleged in paragraphs 6 to 12 of plaintiff's complaint are certainly
beyond the sphere of this humble court to consider and pass upon to determine
their propriety and legality. To try to review, interpret or reverse the judgment or
order of the Honorable Supreme Court would appear not only presumptuous but
also contemptuous. As argued by the lawyer for the defendant, a careful perusal
of the allegations in the complaint clearly shows that all material allegations
thereof are directed against a resolution of the Supreme Court which was
allegedly issued by the Third Division composed of ve (5) justices. No allegation
is made directly against defendant Marcelo B. Fernan in his personal capacity.
That being the case, how could this Court question the wisdom of the nal order
or judgment of the Supreme Court (Third Division) which according to the plaintiff
himself had issued a resolution denying plaintiff's petition and a rming the
Lower Court's decision as re ected in the "Entry of Judgment." Perhaps, if there
was such violation of the Rules of Court, due process and Sec. 14, Art. 8 of the
Constitution by the defendant herein, the appropriate remedy should not have
been obtained before this Court. For an inferior court to reverse, interpret or review
the acts of a superior court might be construed to a certain degree as a show of
uncommon common sense. Lower courts are without supervening jurisdiction to
interpret or to reverse the judgment of the higher courts."
Borromeo's motion for reconsideration dated September 20, 1994 was denied
"for lack of sufficient factual and legal basis" by an Order dated November 15, 1994.
V. ADMINISTRATIVE CASE No. 3433
A. Complaint Against Lawyers of his Court Adversaries
Borromeo also initiated administrative disciplinary proceedings against the
lawyers who had appeared for his adversaries — UCPB and Samson K. Lao — in the
actions above mentioned, and others. As already mentioned, these lawyers were:
Messrs. Laurence Fernandez, Danilo Deen, Honorato Hermosisima, Antonio Regis, and
Alfredo Perez. His complaint against them, docketed as Administrative Case No. 3433,
prayed for their disbarment. Borromeo averred that the respondent lawyers connived
with their clients in (1) maliciously misrepresenting a deed of sale with pacto de retro
as a genuine sale, although it was actually an equitable mortgage; (2) fraudulently
depriving complainant of his proprietary rights subject of the Deed of Sale; and (3)
defying two lawful Court orders, all in violation of their lawyer's oath to do no falsehood
nor consent to the doing of any in Court. Borromeo alleged that respondents Perez and
Regis falsely attempted to consolidate title to his property in favor of Lao.
B. Answer of Respondent Lawyers
The respondent lawyers denounced the disbarment complaint as "absolutely
baseless and nothing but pure harassment." In a pleading dated July 10, 1990, entitled
"Comments and Counter Motion to Cite Joaquin Borromeo in Contempt of Court," July
10, 1990, led by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Cebu City Chapter, signed by
Domero C. Estenzo (President), Juliano Neri (Vice-President), Ulysses Antonio C. Yap
(Treasurer); Felipe B. Velasquez (Secretary), Corazon E. Valencia (Director), Virgilio U.
Lainid (Director), Manuel A. Espina (Director), Ildefonsa A. Ybañez (Director), Sylvia G.
Almase (Director), and Ana Mar Evangelista P. Batiguin (Auditor). The lawyers made the
following observations: cdasia
"It is ironic. While men of the legal profession regard members of the
Judiciary with deferential awe and respect sometimes to the extent of cowering
before the might of the courts, here is a non-lawyer who, with gleeful abandon
and unmitigated insolence, has cast aspersions and shown utter disregard to the
authority and name of the courts.
And lawyers included. For indeed, it is very unfortunate that there is a non-
lawyer who uses the instruments of justice to harass lawyers and courts who
crosses his path more especially if their actuations do not conform with his
whims and caprices."
Adverting to letters publicly circulated by Borromeo, inter alia charging then Chief
Justice Marcelo B. Fernan with supposed in delity and violation of the Constitution,
etc., the lawyers went on to say the following:
"The conduct and statement of Borromeo against this Honorable Court,
and other members of the Judiciary are clearly and grossly disrespectful, insolent
and contemptuous. They tend to bring dishonor to the Judiciary and subvert the
public con dence on the courts. If unchecked, the scurrilous attacks will
undermine the dignity of the courts and will result in the lose of con dence in the
country's judicial system and administration of justice."
". . . (S)omething should be done to protect the integrity of the courts and
the legal profession. So many baseless badmouthing have been made by
Borromeo against this Honorable Court and other courts that for him to go scot-
free would certainly be demoralizing to members of the profession who afforded
the court with all the respect and esteem due them."
Subsequently, in the same proceeding, Borromeo led another pleading

protesting the alleged "refusal" of the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines to act on his disbarment cases "filed against its members."
C. Decision of the IBP
On March 28, 1994, the National Executive Director, IBP (Atty. Jose Aguila
Grapilon) transmitted to this Court the notice and copy of the decision in the case,
reached after due investigation, as well as the corresponding records in seven (7)
volumes. Said decision approved and adopted the Report and Recommendation dated
December 15, 1993 of Atty. Manuel P. Legaspi, President, IBP Cebu City Chapter,
representing the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, recommending dismissal of the
complaint as against all the respondents and the issuance of a "warning to Borromeo
to be more cautious and not be precipitately indiscriminate in the ling of
administrative complaints against lawyers." 3 7
VI. SCURRILOUS WRITINGS
Forming part of the records of several cases in this Court are copies of letters
("open" or otherwise), "circulars," yers or lea ets harshly and quite unwarrantedly
derogatory of the many court judgments or directives against him and defamatory of
his adversaries and their lawyers and employees, as well as the judges and court
employees involved in the said adverse dispositions — some of which scurrilous
writings were adverted to by the respondent lawyers in Adm. Case No. 3433, supra. The
writing and circulation of these defamatory writing were apparently undertaken by
Borromeo as a parallel activity to his "judicial adventures." The Court of Appeals had
occasion to refer to his "apparent penchant for argumentum ad hominem" and of the
"irresponsible lea ets he admits to have authored . . . (which were found to be ) highly
reprehensible and needlessly derogatory to the dignity, honor and reputation of the
Courts."
In those publicly circulated writings, he calls judges and lawyers ignorant,
corrupt, oppressors, violators of the Constitution and the laws, etc.
Sometime in July, 1990, for instance, he wrote to the editor of the "Daily Star" as
regards the reported conferment on then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan of an "Award
from the University of Texas for his contributions in upholding the Rule of Law, Justice,
etc.," stressing that Fernan "and the Supreme Court persist in rendering rulings patently
violative of the Constitution, Due Process and Rule of Law, particularly in their issuance
of so-called Minute Resolutions devoid of FACT or LAW or SIGNATURES. . . ." He sent a
copy of his letter in the Supreme Court. cdasia

He circulated and "OPEN LETTER TO SC justices, Fernan," declaring that he had
"suffered INJUSTICE after INJUSTICE from you who are sworn to render TRUE JUSTICE
but done the opposite, AND INSTEAD OF RECTIFYING THEM, labelled my cases as
'frivolous, nuisance, and harassment suits' while failing to refute the irrefutable
evidences therein . . ."; in the same letter, he speci ed what he considered to be some
of "the terrible injustices inflicted on me by this Court."
In another letter to Chief Justice Fernan, he observed that "3 years after EDSA,
your pledges have not been ful lled. Injustice continues and as you said, the courts are
agents of oppression, instead of being saviours and defenders of the people. The
saddest part is that (referring again to minute resolutions) even the Supreme Court, the
court of last resort, many times, sanctions injustice and the trampling of the rule of law
and due process, and does not comply with the Constitution when it should be the rst
to uphold and defend it . . . ." Another circulated letter of his, dated June 21, 1989 and
captioned, "Open Letter to Supreme Court Justices Marcelo Fernan and Andres
Narvasa," repeated his plaint of having "been the victim of many . . . 'Minute Resolutions'
. . . which in effect sanction the theft and landgrabbing and arson of my properties by
TRADERS ROYAL BANK, UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, AND one TOMAS B. TAN
— all without stating any FACT or LAW to support your dismissal of . . . (my) cases,
despite your rm assurances (Justice Fernan) that you would cite me such facts or
laws (during our talk in your house last march 12, 1989);" and that "you in fact have no
such facts or laws but simply want to ram down a most unjust Ruling in favor of a
wrongful party. . . ."
In another yer entitled in big bold letters, "A Gov't That Lies! Blatant attempt to
fool people!" he mentions what he regards as "The blatant lies and contradictions of the
Supreme Court, CA to support the landgrabbing by Traders Royal Bank of Borromeos'
lands." Another yer has at the center the caricature of a person, seated on a throne
marked Traders Royal Bank, surrounded by such statements as, "Sa TRB, para kami ay
royalty. Nakaw at nakaw! Kawat Kawat! TRB WILL STEAL!" etc. Still another "circular"
proclaims: "So the public may know: Supreme Court minute resolutions w/o facts, law,
or signatures violate the Constitution" and ends with the admonition: "Supreme Court,
Justice Fernan: STOP VIOLATING THE CHARTER." 3 8
One other "circular" reads:
SC, NARVASA — TYRANTS !!!
— CODDLERS OF CROOKS!
— VIOLATOR OF LAWS
by : JOAQUIN BORROMEO
NARVASA's SC has denied being a DESPOT nor has it shielded CROOKS in
the judiciary. Adding, "The SCRA (SC Reports) will attest to this continuing
vigilance of the Supreme Court." These are lame, cowardly and self-serving
denials and another "self-exoneration" belied by evidence which speak for
themselves (Res Ipsa Loquitor) (sic) — the SCRA itself.
It is pure and simply TYRANNY when Narvasa and associates issued
UNSIGNED, UNCLEAR, SWEEPING "Minute Resolutions" devoid of CLEAR FACTS
and LAWS in patent violation of Secs. 4(3), 14, Art. 8 of the Constitution. It is
precisely through said TYRANNICAL, and UNCONSTITUTIONAL sham rulings that
Narvasa & Co. have CODDLED CROOKS like crony bank TRB, UCPB, and SBTC,
and through said fake resolutions that Narvasa has LIED or shown IGNORANCE
of the LAW in ruling that CONSIGNATION IS NECESSARY IN RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION (GR 83306). Through said despotic resolutions, NARVASA & CO.
have sanctioned UCPB/ACCRA's de ance of court orders and naked land
grabbing — What are these if not TYRANNY? (GR 84999).
Was it not tyranny for the SC to issue an Entry of Judgment without rst
resolving the motion for reconsideration (G.R. No. 82273). Was it not tyranny and
abuse of power for the SC to order a case dismissed against SC clerks (CEBV-
8679) and declare justices and said clerks 'immune from suit' — despite their
failure to le any pleading? Were Narvasa & Co. not in fact trampling on the rule
of law and rules of court and DUE PROCESS in so doing? (GR No. 82273). cdasia
TYRANTS will never admit that they are tyrants. But their acts speak for
themselves! NARVASA & ASSOC: ANSWER AND REFUTE THESE SERIOUS
CHARGES OR RESIGN!!
"IMPEACH NARVASA
º ISSUING UNSIGNED, SWEEPING, UNCLEAR,
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 'MINUTE RESOLUTIONS'
VIOLATIVE OF SECS. 4(3), 14, ART. 8, Constitution
º VIOLATING RULES OF COURT AND DUE PROCESS IN
ORDERING CASE AGAINST SC CLERKS (CEB-8679)
DISMISSED DESPITE THE LATTER'S FAILURE TO
FILE PLEADINGS, HENCE IN DEFAULT
º CORRUPTION AND/OR GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE
LAW IN RULING, THAT CONSIGNATION IS
NECESSARY IN RIGHT OF REDEMPTION,
CONTRADICTING LAW AND SC'S OWN
RULINGS — TO ALLOW CRONY BANK TRB TO
STEAL 3 LOTS WORTH P3 MILLION
º CONDONING CRONY BANK UCPB'S DEFIANCE OF
TWO LAWFUL COURT ORDERS AND STEALING OF
TITLE OF PROPERTY WORTH P4 MILLION
º BEING JUDGE AND ACCUSED AT THE SAME TIME
AND PREDICTABLY EXONERATING HIMSELF AND
FELLOW CORRUPT JUSTICES
º DECLARING HIMSELF, JUSTICES , and even MERE
CLERKS TO BE IMMUNE FROM SUIT AND UN-
ACCOUNTABLE TO THE PEOPLE and REFUSING TO
ANSWER AND REFUTE CHARGES AGAINST
HIMSELF
JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO
Mabolo, Cebu City
Te. 7-56-49.
VI. IMMEDIATE ANTECEDENTS OF PROCEEDINGS AT BAR
A. Letter of Cebu City Chapter, IBP, dated June 21, 1992
Copies of these circulars evidently found their way into the hands, among others,
of some members of the Cebu City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Its
President thereupon addressed a letter to this Court, dated June 21, 1992, which (1)
drew attention to one of them — that last quoted, above — " . . . sent to the IBP Cebu
City Chapter and probably other o cers . . . in Cebu," described as containing "highly
libelous and defamatory remarks against the Supreme Court and the whole justice
system" — and (2) in behalf of the Chapter's "o cers and members," strongly urged the
Court "to impose sanctions against Mr. Borromeo for his condemnable act.". cdasia
B. Resolution of July 22, 1993

Acting thereon, the Court En banc issued a resolution on July 22, 1993, requiring
comment by Borromeo on the letter, notice of which was sent to him by the O ce of
the Clerk of Court. The resolution pertinently reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The records of the Court discloses inter alia that as early as April 4, 1989,
the Acting Clerk of Court, Atty. Luzviminda D. Puno, wrote a four-page letter to Mr.
Borromeo concerning G.R. No. 83306 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Traders Royal bank
[referred to by Borromeo in the "circular" adverted to by the relator therein, the IBP
Cebu City Chapter]) and two (2) other cases also led with the Court by Borromeo:
G.R. No. 77248 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Samson Lao and Mariano Logarta ) and
G.R. No. 84054 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v. Hon. Mario Dizon and Tomas Tan ), all
resolved adversely to him by different Divisions of the Court. In that letter Atty.
Puno explained to Borromeo very brie y the legal principles applicable to his
cases and dealt with the matters mentioned in his "circular."
The records further disclose subsequent adverse rulings by the Court in

other cases instituted by Borromeo in this Court, i.e., G.R. No. 87897 (Joaquin T.
Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, et al .) and G.R. No. 82273 (Joaquin T. Borromeo v.
Court of Appeals and Samson Lao), as well as the existence of other
communications made public by Borromeo reiterating the arguments already
passed upon by the Court in his cases and condemning the Court's rejection of
those arguments.
Acting on the letter dated June 21, 1993 of the Cebu City Chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines thru its above named President, and taking
account of the related facts on record, the Court Resolved:
1) to REQUIRE.
(a) the Clerk of Court (1) to DOCKET the matter at bar as a proceeding for
contempt against Joaquin T. Borromeo instituted at the relation of said Cebu City
Chapter, Integrated bar of the Philippines, and (2) to SEND to the city Sheriff, Cebu
City, notice of this resolution and copies of the Chapter's letter dated June 21,
1993 together with its annexes; and cdasia
(b) said City Sheriff of Cebu City to CAUSE PERSONAL SERVICE of said
notice of resolution and a copy of the Chapter's letter dated June 21, 1993,
together with its annexes, on Joaquin T. Borromeo at his address at Mabolo, Cebu
City; and
(2) to ORDER said Joaquin T. Borromeo, within ten (10) days from receipt
of such notice and the IBP Chapter's letter of June 21, 1993 and its annexes, to
le a comment on the letter and its annexes as well as on the other matters set
forth in this resolution, serving copy thereof on the relator, the Cebu City Chapter
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Palace of Justice Building, Capitol, Cebu
City.
SO ORDERED.
1. Atty. Puno's letter of April 4, 1989
Clerk of Court Puno's letter to Borromeo of April 4, 1989, referred to in the rst
paragraph of the resolution just mentioned, explained to Borromeo for perhaps the
second time, precisely the principles and established practice relative to "minute
resolutions" and notices thereof, treated of in several other communications and
resolutions sent to his by the Supreme Court, to wit: the letter received by him on July
10, 1987, from Clerk of Court Julieta Y. Carreon (of this Court's Third Division) (in
relation to G.R. No. 77243 3 9 ), the letter to him of Clerk of Court (Second Division)
Fermin J. Garma, dated May 19, 1989, 4 0 and three Resolutions of this court, notices of
which were in due course served on him, to wit: that dated July 31, 1989, in G.R. No.
87897; 4 1 that dated June 1, 1990 in G.R. No. 82274 (186 SCRA 1), 4 2 and that dated
June 11, 1994 in G.R. No. 112928. 4 3
C. Borromeo's Comment of August 27, 1993
In response to the Resolution of July 22, 1993, Borromeo led a Comment dated
August 27, 1993 in which he alleged the following:
1) the resolution of July 22, 1993 requiring comment) violates the
Constitution which requires "signatures and concurrence of majority of members
of the High Court;" hence, "a certi ed copy duly signed by the Justices is
respectfully requested";
2) the Chief Justice and other Members of the Court should inhibit
themselves "since they cannot be the Accused and Judge at the same time, . . .
(and) this case should be heard by an impartial and independent body";
3) the letter of Atty. Legaspi "is not veri ed nor signed by members of said
(IBP Cebu Chapter) Board; . . . is vague, unspeci c, and sweeping" because failing
to point out "what particular statements in the circular are allegedly libelous and
condemnable;" and it does not appear that Atty. Legaspi has authority to speak or
file a complaint "in behalf of those accused in the 'libelous' circular;"
4) in making the circular, he (Borromeo) "was exercising his rights of
freedom of speech, of expression, and to petition the government for redress of
grievances as guaranteed by the Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and in accordance
with the accountability of public o cials"; the circular merely states the truth and
asks for justice based on the facts and the law; . . . it is not libelous nor
disrespectful but rather to be commended and encouraged; . . . Atty. Legaspi . . .
should specify under oath which statements are false and lies;"
5) he "stands by the charges in his circular and is prepared to support them
with pertinent facts, evidence and law"; and it is "incumbent on the Hon. Chief
Justice and members of the High Court to either refute said charges or dispense
the justice that they are duty-bound to dispense."cdll
D. Resolution of September 30, 1993

After receipt of the comment, and desiring to accord Borromeo the fullest
opportunity to explain his side, and be represented by an attorney, the Court
promulgated the following Resolution on September 30, 1993, notice of which was
again served on him by the Office of the Clerk of Court.
". . . The return of service led by sheriff Jessie A. Belarmino, O ce of the
Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, dated August 26, 1993, and the
Comment of Joaquin Borromeo, dated August 27, 1993, on the letter of President
Manuel P. Legaspi of the relator dated June 21, 1993, are both NOTED. After
deliberating on the allegations of said Comment, the Court Resolved to GRANT
Joaquin T. Borromeo an additional period of fteen (15) days from notice hereof
within which to engage the services or otherwise seek the assistance of a lawyer
and submit such further arguments in addition to or in ampli cation of those set
out in his Comment dated August 27, 1993, if he be so minded."
SO ORDERED.
E. Borromeo's Supplemental Comment of October 15, 1992
Borromeo led a "Supplemental Comment" dated October 15, 1992, reiterating
the arguments and allegations in his Comment of August 27, 1993, and setting forth
"additional arguments and amplification to . . . (said) Comment," viz.:
1) the IBP and Atty. Legaspi have failed "to specify and state under oath
the alleged 'libelous' remarks contained in the circular . . .; (they should) be
ordered to le a VERIFIED COMPLAINT . . . (failing in which, they should) be cited
in contempt of court for making false charges and wasting the precious time of
this Highest Court by filing a baseless complaint;"
2) the allegations in the circular are not libelous nor disrespectful but "are
based on the TRUTH and the LAW, namely:
a) "minute resolutions" bereft of signatures and clear facts and laws

are patent violations of Secs. 4(32), 13, 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution";
b) "there is no basis nor truth to this Hon. Court's a rmation to the
Appellate Court's ruling that the undersigned "lost" his right of redemption
allegedly due to his failure to consignate the redemption price, since no
less than this Hon. Court has ruled in many rulings that CONSIGNATION IS
UNNECESSARY in right of redemption;
c) "this Hon. Court has deplorably condoned crony banks TRB and
UCPB's frauds and defiance of court orders in G.R. Nos. 83306 and 878997
and 84999. prLL
F. Borromeo's "Manifestation" of November 26, 1993

Borromeo afterwards led a "Manifestation" under date of November 26, 1993,
adverting to "the failure of the IBP and Atty. Legaspi to substantiate his charges under
oath and the failure of the concerned Justices to refute the charges in the alleged
'libelous circular'" and, construing these as "an admission of the truth in said circular,"
theorized that it is "incumbent on the said Justices to rectify their grave injustices as
well as to dismiss Atty. Legaspi's baseless and false charges."
VII. THE COURT'S CONCLUSIONS
A. Respondent's Liability for Contempt of Court
Upon the indubitable facts on record, there can scarcely be any doubt of
Borromeo's guilt of contempt, for abuse of and interference with judicial rules and
processes, gross disrespect to courts and judges and improper conduct directly
impeding, obstructing and degrading the administration of justice. 4 4 He has stubbornly
litigated issues already declared to be without merit, obstinately closing his eyes to the
many rulings which had become nal and executory, obdurately and unreasonably
insisting on the application of his own individual version of the rules, founded on
nothing more than his personal (and quite erroneous) reading of the Constitution and
the law; he has insulted the judges and court o cers, including the attorneys appearing
for his adversaries, needlessly overloaded the court dockets and sorely tried the
patience of the judges and court employees who have had to act on his repetitious and
largely unfounded complaints, pleadings and motions. He has wasted the time of the
courts, of his adversaries, of the judges and court employees who have had the bad
luck of having to act in one way or another on his unmeritorious cases. More
particularly, despite his attention having been called many times to the egregious error
of his theory that the so-called "minute resolutions" of this Court should contain
ndings of fact and conclusions of law, and should be signed or certi ed by the
Justices promulgating the same, 4 5 he has mulishly persisted in ventilating that self-
same theory in various proceedings, causing much loss of time, annoyance and
vexation to the courts, the court employees and parties involved.
1. Untenability of Proffered Defenses
The rst defense that he proffers, that the Chief Justice and other Members of
the Court should inhibit themselves "since they cannot be the Accused and Judge at the
same time, . . . (and) this case should be heard by an impartial and independent body," is
still another illustration of an entirely unwarranted, arrogant and reprehensible
assumption of competence in the eld of law; he again uses up the time of the Court
needlessly by invoking an argument long since declared and adjudged to be untenable.
It is axiomatic that the "power or duty of the court to institute a charge for contempt
against itself, without the intervention of the scal or prosecuting o cer, is essential to
the preservation of its dignity and of the respect due it from litigants, lawyers and the
public. Were the intervention of the prosecuting o cer required and judges obliged to
le complaints for contempt against them before the prosecuting o cer, in order to
bring the guilty to justice, other courts would be inferior to prosecuting o cers and
impotent to perform their functions with dispatch and absolute independence. The
institution of charges by the prosecuting o cer is not necessary to hold persons guilty
of civil or criminal contempt amenable to trial and punishment by the court. All that the
law requires is that there be a charge in writing duly led in court and an opportunity to
the person charged to be heard by himself or counsel. The charge may be made by the
fiscal, by judge, or even by a private person. . . ." 4 6
His claim — that the letter of Atty. Legaspi "is not veri ed nor signed by members
of said (IBP Cebu Chapter) Board; . . . is vague, unspeci c, and sweeping" because
failing to point out "what particular statements in the circular are allegedly libelous and
condemnable"; and it does not appear that Atty. Legaspi has authority to speak or le a
complaint "in behalf of those accused in the 'libelous' circular" — is in the premises,
plainly nothing but superficial philosophizing, deserving no serious treatment. cdasia
Equally as super cial, and sophistical, is his other contention that in making the
allegations claimed to be contumacious, he "was exercising his rights of freedom of
speech, of expression, and to petition the government for redress of grievances as
guaranteed by the Constitution (Sec. 4, Art. III) and in accordance with the
accountability of public o cials." The constitutional rights invoked by him afford no
justi cation for repetitious litigation of the same causes and issues, for insulting
lawyers, judges, court employees and other persons, for abusing the processes and
rules of the courts, wasting their time, and bringing them into disrepute and disrespect.
B. Basic Principles Governing the Judicial Function.
The facts and Issues involved in the proceeding at bench make necessary a
restatement of the principles governing nality of judgments and of the paramount
need to put an end to litigation at some point, and to lay down de nite postulates
concerning what is perceived to be a growing predilection on the part of lawyers and
litigants — like Borromeo — to resort to administrative prosecution (or institution of
civil or criminal actions) as a substitute for or supplement to the speci c modes of
appeal or review provided by law from court judgments or orders.
1. Reason for Courts; Judicial Hierarchy
Courts exist in every civilized society for the settlement of controversies. In every
country there is a more or less established hierarchical organization of courts, and a
more or less comprehensive system of review of judgments and nal orders of lower
courts.
The judicial system in this jurisdiction allows for several levels of litigation, i.e.,
the presentation of evidence by the parties — a trial or hearing in the rst instance — as
well as a review of the judgments of lower courts by higher tribunals, generally by
consideration anew and ventilation of the factual and legal issues through briefs or
memoranda. The procedure for review is xed by law, and is in the very nature of things,
exclusive to the courts.
2. Paramount Need to End Litigation at Some Point
It is withal the essence of the judicial function that at some point, litigation must
end. Hence, after the procedures and processes for lawsuits have been undergone, and
the modes of review set by law have been exhausted, or terminated, no further
ventilation of the same subject matter is allowed. To be sure, there may be, on the part
of the losing parties, continuing disagreement with the verdict, and the conclusions
therein embodied. This is of no moment, indeed, to be expected; but, it is not their will,
but the Court's, which must prevail; and, to repeat, public policy demands that at some
de nite time, the issues must be laid to rest and the court's disposition thereon
accorded absolute nality. 4 7 As observed by this Court in Rheem of the Philippines v.
Ferrer, a 1967 decision, 4 8 a party "may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That
is his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. This is
his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden
into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the
time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right." cdasia
3. Judgments of Supreme Court Not Reviewable

The sound, salutary and self-evident principle prevailing in this as in most
jurisdictions, is that judgments of the highest tribunal of the land may not be reviewed
by any other agency, branch, department, or o cial of Government. Once the Supreme
Court has spoken, there the matter must rest. Its decision should not and cannot be
appealed to or reviewed by any other entity, much less reversed or modi ed on the
ground that it is tainted by error in its ndings of fact or conclusions of law, awed in
its logic or language, or otherwise erroneous in some other respect. 4 9 This, on the
indisputable and unshakable foundation of public policy, and constitutional and
traditional principle.
In an extended Resolution promulgated on March 12, 1987 in In Re: Wenceslao
Laureta — involving an attempt by a lawyer to prosecute before the Tanodbayan
"members of the First Division of this Court collectively with having knowingly and
deliberately rendered an 'unjust extended minute Resolution' with deliberate bad faith in
violation of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code . . . and for deliberately causing
'undue injury' to respondent . . . and her co-heirs because of the 'unjust Resolution'
promulgated, in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act . . . ." — the
following pronouncements were made in reaffirmation of established doctrine: 5 0
". . . As aptly declared in the Chief Justice's Statement of December 24,
1986, which the Court hereby adopts in toto, "'(I)t is elementary that the Supreme
Court is supreme — the third great department of government entrusted
exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with nality all justiciable
disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon its
judgments or declare them "unjust." It is elementary that "(A)s has ever been
stressed since the early case of Arnedo vs. Llorente (18 Phil. 257, 263 [1911])
"controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound practice in the
courts demand that at the risk of occasional error, judgments of courts
determining controversies submitted to them should become nal at some
de nite time xed by law, or by a rule of practice recognized by law, so as to be
thereafter beyond the control even of the court which rendered them for the
purpose of correcting errors of fact or of law, into which, in the opinion of the
court it may have fallen. The very purpose for which the courts are organized is to
put an end to controversy, to decide the questions submitted to the litigants, and
to determine the respective rights of the parties." ( Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs.
maritime Bldg., Co., Inc., 86 SCRA 305, 316-317) cdasia
xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court whether en
banc or division, speak for themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence
and are beyond investigation or inquiry under the same principle of
conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. (U.S. vs. Pons, 34 Phil 729;
Gardiner, et al. vs. Paredes, et al. , 61 Phil. 118; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil.
1). The Supreme Court's pronouncement of the doctrine that '(I)t is well settled
that the enrolled bill . . . is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the
measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been
any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certi ed by the o cers of
Congress and approved by the Executive [as claimed by petitioner-importer who
unsuccessfully sought refund of margin fees] — on which we cannot speculate,
without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one
of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or
curative legislation, not by judicial decree' is fully and reciprocally applicable to
Supreme Court orders, resolutions and decisions, mutatis mutandis. (Casco Phil.
Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347, 350. Citing Primicias vs. Paredes, 61
Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comelec, 3 SCRA 1)
The Court has consistently stressed that the "doctrine of separation of

powers calls for the executive, legislative and judicial departments being left
alone to discharge their duties as they see t " (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677).
It has thus maintained in the same way that the judiciary has a right to expect
that neither the President nor Congress would cast doubt on the mainspring of its
orders or decisions, it should refrain from speculating as to alleged hidden forces
at work that could have impelled either coordinate branch into acting the way it
did. The concept of separation of powers presupposes mutual respect by and
between the three departments of the government. (Tecson vs. Salas , 34 SCRA
275, 286-287)"
4. Final and Executory Judgments of Lower Courts Not Reviewable Even by

Supreme Court
In respect of Courts below the Supreme Court, the ordinary remedies available
under law to a party who is adversely affected by their decisions or orders are a motion
for new trial (or reconsideration) under Rule 37, and an appeal to either the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court, depending on whether questions of both fact and law, or
of law only, are raised, in accordance with xed and familiar rules and conformably with
the hierarchy of courts. 5 1 Exceptionally, a review of a ruling or act of a court on the
ground that it was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion, may be had through the special civil action of certiorari or prohibition
pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. cdasia
However, should judgments of lower courts — which may normally be subject to

review by higher tribunals — become nal and executory before, or without exhaustion
of all recourse of appeal, they, too, become inviolable, impervious to modi cation. They
may, then, no longer be reviewed, or in any way modi ed directly or indirectly, by a
higher court, not even by the Supreme Court, much less by any other o cial, branch or
department of Government. 5 2
C. Administrative, Civil or Criminal Action Against Judge, Not Substitute for
Appeal;Proscribed by Law and Logic
Now, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that there has been of late a
regrettable increase in the resort to, administrative prosecution — or the institution of a
civil or criminal action — as a substitute for or supplement to appeal. Whether intended
or not, such a resort to these remedies operates as a form of threat or intimidation to
coerce judges into timorous surrender of their prerogatives, or a reluctance to exercise
them. With rising frequency, administrative complaints are being presented to the
O ce of the Court Administrator; criminal complaints are being led with the O ce of
the Ombudsman or the public prosecutor's o ce; civil actions for recovery of damages
commenced in the Regional Trial Courts against trial judges, and justices of the Court
of Appeals and even of the Supreme Court.
1. Common Basis of Complaints Against Judges
Many of these complaints set forth a common indictment: that the respondent
Judges or Justices rendered manifestly unjust judgments or interlocutory orders 5 3 —
i.e., judgments or orders which are allegedly not in accord with the evidence, or with law
or jurisprudence, or are tainted by grave abuse of discretion — thereby causing injustice,
and actionable and compensable injury to the complainants (invariably losing litigants).
Resolution of complaints of this sort quite obviously entails a common requirement for
the scal, the Ombudsman or the Trial Court: a review of the decision or order of the
respondent Judge or Justice to determine its correctness or erroneousness, as basic
premise for a pronouncement of liability.
2. Exclusivity of Specific Procedures for Correction of Judgments and Orders
The question then, is whether or not these complaints are proper; whether or not
in lieu of the prescribed recourses for appeal or review of judgments and orders of
courts, a party may le an administrative or criminal complaint against the judge for
rendition of an unjust judgment, or, having opted for appeal, may nonetheless
simultaneously seek also such administrative or criminal remedies.
Given the nature of the judicial function, the power vested by the Constitution in
the Supreme Court and the lower courts established by law, the question submits to
only one answer: the administrative or criminal remedies are neither alternative nor
cumulative to judicial review where such review is available, and must wait on the result
thereof. cdasia
Simple re ection will make this proposition amply clear, and demonstrate that
any contrary postulation can have only intolerable legal implications. Allowing a party
who feels aggrieved by a judicial order or decision not yet nal and executory to mount
an administrative, civil, or criminal prosecution for unjust judgment against the issuing
judge would, at a minimum and as an indispensable rst step, confer the prosecutor (or
Ombudsman) with an incongruous function pertaining, not to him, but to the courts: the
determination of whether the questioned disposition is erroneous in its ndings of fact
or conclusions of law, or both. If he does proceed despite that impediment, whatever
determination he makes could well set off a proliferation of administrative or criminal
litigation, a possibility hereafter more fully explored.
Such actions are impermissible and cannot prosper. It is not, as already pointed
out, within the power of public prosecutors, or the Ombudsman or his deputies, directly
or vicariously, to review judgments or nal orders or resolutions of the Courts of the
land. The power of review — by appeal or special civil action — is not only lodged
exclusively in the Courts themselves but must be exercised in accordance with a well-
de ned and long established hierarchy, and long-standing processes and procedures.
No other review is allowed; otherwise litigation would be interminable, and vexatiously
repetitive.
These principles were stressed in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, supra. 5 4
"Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204 of the Revised
Penal Code as to "rendering knowingly unjust judgment," refer to an individual
judge who does so "in any case submitted to him for decision" and even then, it is
not the prosecutor who would pass judgment on the "unjustness" of the decision
rendered by him but the proper appellate court with jurisdiction to review the
same, either the Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court. Respondents should
likewise know that said penal article has no application to the members of a
collegiate court such as this Court or its Divisions who reach their conclusions in
consultation and accordingly render their collective judgment after due
deliberation. It also follows, consequently, that a charge of violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that such collective decision is
'unjust' cannot prosper. cdasia
xxx xxx xxx
To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and prosecution, a

judge, more so a member of the Supreme Court for o cial acts done by him in
good faith and in the regular exercise of o cial duty and judicial functions is to
subvert and undermine that very independence of the judiciary, and subordinate
the judiciary to the executive. 'For it is a general principle of the highest
importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial o cer in
exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own
convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself. Liability
to answer to everyone who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge
would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, and would destroy
that independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful.'
(Bradley vs. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335).
xxx xxx xxx
To allow litigants to go beyond the Court's resolution and claim that the
members acted "with deliberate bad faith" and rendered an "unjust resolution" in
disregard or violation of the duty of their high o ce to act upon their own
independent consideration and judgment of the matter at hand would be to
destroy the authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such collegiate acts and
resolutions and to disregard utterly the presumption of regular performance of
o cial duty. To allow such collateral attack would destroy the separation of
powers and undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the nal arbiter of all
justiciable disputes.
Dissatis ed litigants and/or their counsels cannot without violating the
separation of powers mandated by the Constitution relitigate in another forum the
nal judgment of this Court on legal issues submitted by them and their
adversaries for nal determination to and by the Supreme Court and which fall
within the judicial power to determine and adjudicate exclusively vested by the
Constitution in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be
established by law.
This is true, too, as regards judgments, otherwise appealable, which have

become nal and executory. Such judgments, being no longer reviewable by higher
tribunals, are certainly not reviewable by any other body or authority.
3. Only Courts Authorized, under Fixed Rules, to Declare Judgments or Orders
Erroneous or Unjust
To belabor the obvious, the determination of whether or not a judgment or order
is unjust — or was (or was not) rendered within the scope of the issuing judge's
authority, or that the judge had exceeded his jurisdiction and powers or maliciously
delayed the disposition of a case — is an essentially judicial function, lodged by existing
law and immemorial practice in a hierarchy of courts and ultimately in the highest court
of the land. To repeat, no other entity or o cial of the Government, not the prosecution
or investigation service or any other branch, nor any functionary thereof, has
competence to review a judicial order or decision — whether nal and executory or not
— and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or administrative
complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order. That prerogative belongs to the
courts alone.
4. Contrary rule results in Circuitousness and Leads to Absurd Consequences
Pragmatic considerations also preclude prosecution for supposed rendition of
unjust judgments or interlocutory orders of the type above described, which, at bottom,
consist simply of the accusation that the decisions or interlocutory orders are seriously
wrong in their conclusions of fact or of law, or are tainted by grave abuse of discretion
— as distinguished from accusations of corruption, or immorality, or other wrongdoing.
To allow institution of such proceedings would not only be legally improper, it would
also result in a futile and circuitous exercise, and lead to absurd consequences. cdasia
Assume that a case goes through the whole gamut of review in the judicial
hierarchy; i.e., a judgment is rendered by a municipal trial court; it is reviewed and
a rmed by the proper Regional Trial Court; the latter's judgment is appealed to and in
due course a rmed by the Court of Appeals; and nally, the appellate court's decision
is brought up to and a rmed by the Supreme Court. The prosecution of the municipal
trial court judge who rendered the original decision (for knowingly rendering a
manifestly unjust judgment) would appear to be out of the question; it would mean that
the O ce of the Ombudsman or of the public prosecutor would have to nd, at the
preliminary investigation, not only that the judge's decision was wrong and unjust, but
by necessary implication that the decisions or orders of the Regional Trial Court Judge,
as well as the Justices of the Court Appeals and the Supreme Court who a rmed the
original judgment were also all wrong and unjust — most certainly an act of supreme
arrogance and very evident supererogation. Pursuing the proposition further, assuming
that the public prosecutor or Ombudsman should nevertheless opt to undertake a
review of the decision in question — despite its having been a rmed at all three (3)
appellate levels — and thereafter, disagreeing with the verdict of all four (4) courts, le
an information in the Regional Trial Court against the Municipal Trial Court Judge, the
fate of such an indictment at the hands of the Sandiganbayan or the Regional Trial
Court would be fairly predictable.
Even if for some reason the Municipal Trial Court Judge is convicted by the
Sandiganbayan or a Regional Trial Court, the appeal before the Supreme Court of the
Court of Appeals would have an inevitable result: given the antecedents, the verdict of
conviction would be set aside and the correctness of the judgment in question, already
passed upon and nally resolved by the same appellate courts, would necessarily be
sustained.
Moreover, in such a scenario, nothing would prevent the Municipal Trial Judge, in
his turn, from ling a criminal action against the Sandiganbayan Justices, or the
Regional Trial Court Judge who should convict him of the offense, for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment, or against the Justices of the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court who should affirm his conviction.
The situation is ridiculous, however the circumstances of the case may be
modi ed, and regardless of whether it is a civil, criminal or administrative proceeding
that is availed of as the vehicle to prosecute the judge for supposedly rendering an
unjust decision or order.
5. Primordial Requisites for Administrative, Criminal Prosecution
This is not to say that it is not possible at all to prosecute judges for this
impropriety, of rendering an unjust judgment or interlocutory order; but, taking account
of all the foregoing considerations, the indispensable requisites are that there be a final
declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly
unjust character of the challenged judgment or order, and there be also evidence of
malice or bad faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in
rendering said judgment or order. That nal declaration is ordinarily contained in the
judgment rendered in the appellate proceedings in which the decision of the trial court
in the civil or criminal action in question is challenged. cdasia
What immediately comes to mind in this connection is a decision of acquittal or

dismissal in a criminal action, as to which — the same being unappealable — it would be
unreasonable to deny the State or the victim of the crime (or even public-spirited
citizens) the opportunity to put to the test the proof such charges as they might see t
to press that it was unjustly rendered, with malice or by deliberate design, through
inexcusable ignorance or negligence, etc. Even in this case, the essential requisite is
that there be an authoritative judicial pronouncement of the manifestly unjust character
of the judgment or order in question. Such a pronouncement may result from either (a)
an action of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning the validity of the
judgment, as having been rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion; e.g., there has been a denial of due process to the prosecution; or
(b) if this be not proper, an administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court against the
judge precisely for promulgating an unjust judgment or order. Until and unless there is
such a nal, authoritative judicial declaration that the decision or order in question is
"unjust," no civil or criminal action against the judge concerned is legally possible or
should be entertained, for want of an indispensable requisite.
D. Judges Must be Free from Influence or Pressure
Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or in uence from external forces
or factors. They should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or
administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the
performance of their duties and functions. Hence it is sound rule, which must be
recognized independently of statute, that judges are not generally liable for acts done
within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good faith.
This Court has repeatedly and uniformly ruled that a judge may not be held
administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders. 5 5 To
hold otherwise would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position
doubly unbearable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. 5 6 The error must be
gross or patent, deliberate and malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith; 5 7 it is only
in these cases that administrative sanctions are called for as an imperative duty of the
Supreme Court.
As far as civil or criminal liability is concerned, existing doctrine is that "judges of
superior and general jurisdiction are not liable to respond in civil action for damages for
what they may do in the exercise of their judicial functions when acting within their legal
powers and jurisdiction." 5 8 Based on Section 9, Act No. 190, 5 9 the doctrine is still
good law, not inconsistent with any subsequent legislative issuance or court rule: "No
judge, justice of the peace or assessor shall be liable to a civil action for the recovery of
damages by reason of any judicial action or judgment rendered by him in good faith,
and within the limits of his legal powers and jurisdiction." cdasia
Exception to this general rule is found in Article 32 of the Civil Code, providing
that any public o cer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the enumerated
rights and liberties of another person — which rights are the same as those guaranteed
in the Bill of Rights (Article III of the Constitution) — shall be liable to the latter for
damages. However, such liability is not demandable from a judge unless his act or
omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. But then
again, to the extent that the offenses therein described have "unjust judgment" or
"unjust interlocutory order" for an essential element, it need only be reiterated that
prosecution of a judge for any of them is subject to the caveat already mentioned: that
such prosecution cannot be initiated, much less maintained, unless there be a nal
judicial pronouncements of the unjust character of the decision or order in issue.
E. Afterword
Considering the foregoing antecedents and long standing doctrines, it may well
be asked why it took no less than sixteen (16) years and some fty (50) grossly
unfounded cases lodged by respondent Borromeo in the different rungs of the
Judiciary before this Court decided to take the present administrative measure. The
imposition on the time of the courts and the unnecessary work occasioned by
respondent's crass adventurism are self-evident and require no further elaboration. If
the Court, however, bore with him with Jobian patience, it was in the hope that the
repeated rebuffs he suffered, with the attendant lectures on the error of his ways, would
somehow seep into his understanding and deter him from further forays along his
misguided path. After all, as has repeatedly been declared, the power of contempt is
exercised on the preservative and not the vindictive principle. Unfortunately, the Court's
forbearance had no effect on him.
Instead, the continued leniency and tolerance extended to him were read as signs
of weakness and impotence. Worse, respondent's irresponsible audacity appears to
have in uenced and emboldened others to just as amboyantly embark on their own
groundless and insulting proceedings against the courts, born of affected bravado or
sheer egocentrism, to the extent of even involving the legislative and executive
departments, the Ombudsman included, in their assaults against the Judiciary in pursuit
of personal agendas. But all things, good or bad, must come to an end, and it is time for
the Court to now draw the line, with more promptitude, between reasoned dissent and
self-seeking pretense. The Court accordingly serves notice to those with the same
conceit or delusions that it will henceforth deal with them, decisively and fairly, with a
rm and even hand, and resolutely impose such punitive sanctions as may be
appropriate to maintain the integrity and independence of the judicial institutions of the
country. cdasia
WHEREFORE, Joaquin T. Borromeo is found and declared GUILTY of constructive

contempt repeatedly committed over time, despite warnings and instructions given to
him, and to the end that he may ponder his serious errors and grave misconduct and
learn due respect for the Court and their authority, he is hereby sentenced to serve a
term of imprisonment of TEN (10) DAYS in the City Jail of Cebu City and to pay a ne of
ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00). He is warned that a repetition of any of the
offenses of which he is herein found guilty, or any similar or other offense against
courts, judges or court employees, will merit further and more serious sanctions.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Quiason, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ ., concur.
Puno, J., took no part.
Footnotes
1. Barrera v. Barrera, 34 SCRA 98, 106; Peo. v. Catolico, 38 SCRA 389, 407.
2. SEE Sub-Head I, A, 7, infra.
3. Per Judge Benigno G. Gaviola, Branch 9, RTC, Cebu.
4. Ramirez, J., ponente, with whom concurred Francisco (Cezar) and Vailoces, JJ.
5. Judge Renato C. Dacudao, presiding.
6. Judge Celso M. Gimenez, Branch 5.
7. Guingona, J., ponente, with whom concurred Javellana and Imperial, JJ.
8. Branch 24, Hon. Priscila S. Agana, presiding.

9. Per Judge Jose P. Burgos, Branch 17.
10. Per Judge (now CA Associate Justice) Godardo Jacinto.
11. SEE Sub-Head I, A, 1, supra.

12. SEE Sub-Head I, A, 2, supra.
13. SEE Sub-Head I, supra.
14. Decision dated May 21, 1993: Austria-Martinez, J., ponente, with whom concurred Puno
and Ramirez, JJ.
15. As every lawyer knows, the Clerk of Court of a Division or of the court En banc is, of course,
not a "mere clerk," but the highest administrative officer in the Division or Court, next
only to the Justices.
16. Sub-Head II, A, 1, infra.
17. Sub-Head II, A, 4, infra Sub-Heads VI, B, 1, and II, A, 1, c, infra.
18. Sub-Heads VI, B, 1, and II, A, 1, c, infra, respectively.

20. See sub-head I, A, 3, supra — Because TRB consolidated its ownership over the foreclosed
immovables during the pendency of Civil Case No. R022506. Borromeo filed criminal
complaints in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu against the bank officers and
lawyers, which were however, and quite correctly, given short shrift by that Office.
21. Per 3rd Assistant Fiscal Enriqueta Roquillano-Belarmino
22. See sub-head I, A, 1, supra.
23. See sub-head I, supra.

24. By resolution of Fiscal Rodulfo T. Ugsal, approved by City Fiscal Jufelinito R. Pareja.
25. Per Investigator Mario E. Camomot, recommended for approval by Director IV V.V. Varela,
and approved by Juan M. Hagad, Deputy Ombudsman, Visayas.
26. In the third paragraph of this opinion.

27. Like the letter written to Borromeo, dated July 10, 1987, Sub-head A, 1, 5, supra.
28. Rollo of G.R. 82273.
29. This concerned a fourth bank, the Philippine Bank of Communications.
30. Sub-head II, A, 3, supra.

31. Written by Felicito C. Latoja, Asso. Graft Investigation Officer II, and approved by Juan M.
Hagad, DOMB.
32. SEE Sub-head II, A, I, supra.
33. SEE also sub-head II, A, 2, supra.

34. Judge Jacinto has, to repeat, since been promoted to the Court of Appeals.
35. Rollo, Vol. VII, p. 115.
36. SEE Sub-Head II, A, 5, supra.

37. During the entire period that the administrative case was pending (1990 to 1994),
Borromeo wrote an unceasing stream of letters, leaflets, flyers to IBP, harshly critical of
the courts and the lawyers who had in one way or another taken measures adverse to
him. One of the last was an "OPEN LETTER to IBP prexy Manuel Legaspi" dated April
19, 1994.
38. There are at least ten (10) other such "circulars," flyers, or letters in the record, all mouthing
more or less the same errors and defamatory imputations.
39. Sub-Head II, A, 4, infra Sub-Heads VI, B, 1, and II, A, 1, c, infra.

40. Sub-Heads VI, B, 1, c, infra, respectively.
42. Sub-Head II, A, 1, a, infra.
43. Sub-Head I, A, 7, supra.
44. Rule 71, Sec. 3, (c) and (d), Rules of Court.
45. SEE Sub-head II, A, 1, a, supra
46. Peo v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211, cited in Gavieres v. Falcis, 193 SCRA 649, 660
(1991); see also Fernandez v. Hon. Bello, 107 Phil. 1140.
47. Garbo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 250, G.R. No. 100474, September 10, 1993; GSIS v.
Gines, 219 SCRA 724, G.R. No. 85273, march 9, 1993; Gesulgon v. NLRC, 219 SCRA
561, G.R. No. 90349, March 5, 1993; Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Japson, 211
SCRA 879, G.R. No. 68073, July 29, 1992; Cachola v. CA, 208 SCRA 496, G.R. No.
97822, May 7, 1992; Enriquez v. CA, 202 SCRA 487, G.R. No. 83720, October 4, 1991;
Alvendia v. IAC, 181 SCRA 252, G.R. No. 72138, January 22, 1990; Turqueza v.
Hernando, 97 SCRA 483, G.R. No. L-51626, April 30, 1980; Lee Bun Tin v. Aligaen, 76
SCRA 416, G.R. No. L-30523, April 22, 1977.
48. 20 SCRA 441, 444.

49. Against judgments of the Supreme Court, since obviously no appeal to a higher court or
authority is possible, the only remedies are those set forth in the Rules of Court,
particularly Rule 56 in relation to Rules 52 and 53, with regard to civil cases and
proceedings, and Rule 125 in relation to Rule 124, in respect of criminal cases. SEE
Calalang v. Register of Deeds, 208 SCRA 215, G.R. No. 76265, April 22, 1992; Tan v.
Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 212, G.R. No. 97238, July 15, 1991; Church Assistance
Program v. Sibulo, 171 SCRA 408, G.R. No. 76552, march 21, 1989; Ver v. Quetulio, 163
SCRA 80, G.R. No. L-77526, June 29, 1988; Ang Ping v. RTC of Manila, 154 SCRA 77,
G.R. No. 75860, September 17, 1987; Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. v.
NLRC, 125 SCRA 577, G.R. Nos. L-58011-2, November 18, 1983; Tugade v. CA, 83 SCRA
226; Barrera v. Barrera, 34 SCRA 98, G.R. No. L-31589, July 31, 1970; Albert v. CFI, 23
SCRA 948, G.R. No. L-23636, May 29, 1968; Shoji v. Harvey , 43 Phil. 333, G.R. Nos.
92163 and 92164, June 5, 1990.
50. 148 SCRA 382, 417-418.

51. Against a final and executory judgment, the extraordinary, equitable remedy of relief from
judgment under Rule 38 may be availed of, or in extreme situations, an action to annul
the judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud.
52. Miranda v. CA, 141 SCRA 302, G.R. No. L-59370, February 11, 1986, citing Malia v. IAC, 138
SCRA 116, G.R. No. L-66395, August 7, 1985; Castillo v. Donato, 137 SCRA 210, G.R. No.
L-70230, June 24, 1985; Bethel Temple, Inc. v. General Council of Assemblies of God,
Inc., 136 SCRA 203, G.R. No. L-35563, April 30, 1985; Insular bank of Asia and America
Employees' Union (IBAAEU) v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663, G.R. No. L-52415, October 23,
1984, and the cases cited therein pertaining to "immutability of judgments;" Heirs of
Pedro Guminpin v. CA, 120 SCRA 687, G.R. No. L-34220, February 21, 1983;
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Visayan Electric Co., 19 SCRA 696, G.R. No. L-
24921, March 31, 1967; Daquis v. Bustos, 94 Phil. 913; Sawit v. Rodas, 73 Phil. 310.
53. Articles 204-206 of the Revised Penal Code define and penalize offenses which have
"unjust judgment" or "unjust interlocutory order" for an essential element.
54. 148 SCRA 283, 418, 419, 420-421.
55. Rodrigo v. Quijano, etc., 79 SCRA 10 (Sept. 9, 1977)

56. Lopez v. Corpus, 78 SCRA 374 (Aug. 31, 1977); Pilipinas Bank v. Tirona-Liwag, 190 SCRA
834 (Oct. 18, 1990)
57. Quizon v. Baltazar, Jr., 65 SCRA 293 (July 25, 1975).
58. Alzua, et al. v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308, 326.

59. The old Code of Civil Procedure.

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EN BANC

[A.M. No. 93-7-696-0. February 21, 1995.]

IN RE JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO. Ex Rel. Cebu City Chapter of the

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CONTEMPT; DEEMED COMMITTED IN

The RTC ruled that —

a. Clarificatory Communications to Borromeo Re "Minute Resolutions"

2. I.S. Nos. 88-205 to 88-207

II. CASES INVOLVING UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK (UCPB)

Shortly after learning of Borromeo's default, and obviously to obviate or minimize

Notices of the foregoing Resolutions were, in accordance with established rule

xxx xxx xxx

b. RTC CIVIL CASE NO. CEB-(6501) 6740; G.R. No. 84054

c. RTC Case No. CEB-9042

Premises considered, the Court further Resolved to DIRECT ENTRY OF

By Resolution dated January 12, 1990, 3 1 the O ce of the Ombudsman

2. RTC Case No. CEB-9267 .

xxx xxx xxx

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Subsequently, in the same proceeding, Borromeo led another pleading

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B. Resolution of July 22, 1993

The records further disclose subsequent adverse rulings by the Court in

D. Resolution of September 30, 1993

a) "minute resolutions" bereft of signatures and clear facts and laws

F. Borromeo's "Manifestation" of November 26, 1993

3. Judgments of Supreme Court Not Reviewable

xxx xxx xxx

The Court has consistently stressed that the "doctrine of separation of

4. Final and Executory Judgments of Lower Courts Not Reviewable Even by

However, should judgments of lower courts — which may normally be subject to

xxx xxx xxx

To subject to the threat and ordeal of investigation and prosecution, a

This is true, too, as regards judgments, otherwise appealable, which have

What immediately comes to mind in this connection is a decision of acquittal or

WHEREFORE, Joaquin T. Borromeo is found and declared GUILTY of constructive

8. Branch 24, Hon. Priscila S. Agana, presiding.

11. SEE Sub-Head I, A, 1, supra.

19. Sub-Head II, A, 3, infra.

23. See sub-head I, supra.

26. In the third paragraph of this opinion.

30. Sub-head II, A, 3, supra.

33. SEE also sub-head II, A, 2, supra.

36. SEE Sub-Head II, A, 5, supra.

39. Sub-Head II, A, 4, infra Sub-Heads VI, B, 1, and II, A, 1, c, infra.

48. 20 SCRA 441, 444.

50. 148 SCRA 382, 417-418.

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58. Alzua, et al. v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308, 326.

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