Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS

Self Executing Statutes

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS

G.R. NO. 122156. February 3, 1997
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.

Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51%
of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning
bidder, or the eventual “strategic partner,” will provide management expertise or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of
the Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000
shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel
operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner. Prior to the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel matched the bid price and sent a manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
2. Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.
3. Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature
4. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in refusing the
matching bid of the petitioner.
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

1. It is a self-executing provision.
1. Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
deemed written in every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle,
such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary
or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it
grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
2. A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and
the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring
legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
3. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per sejudicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall
give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that – qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.
And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an
action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation
on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and
from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a
remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. The Court agree.
1. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also
to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
2. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila
Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was
 restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has
since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history.
3. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of
the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises
the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have
actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
3. It is not premature.
1. In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be
allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign
firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if the Court is to give life and meaning to
the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be
expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to
be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
2. The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors.
But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public
scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider when venturing into business
in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with
any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under
the Constitution and the laws of the forum.
4. There was grave abuse of discretion.
1. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to
match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary
market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgement, regardless of the
consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable.
Thus, the Court would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so
than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the
basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
2. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the
bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of
shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as
well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as
provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are
directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to
RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL
CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per
share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the
necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
 Francisco vs House of Representatives
Impeachment; Political Question; Judicial Branch

FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. NO. 160261. November 10, 2003
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG
PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-
in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

Facts:

1. On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and
approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous
House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.
2. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the
Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF).
3. On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the
public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives,
and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13
 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to
dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
4. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with
the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-
mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
“Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the
House of Representatives.
5. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme
Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the
filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of
Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.”

Issues:

1. Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the
12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution.
3. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.

Rulings:

1. This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial
power of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
1. Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question
which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is
clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
2. Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the
very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
2. The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.
1. Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to
 promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase “to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3
of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules.
2. It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental
law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary
implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without
need of referendum.
3. It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken
thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against
the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
Constitution.
2. Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this
Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5,
2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro,
Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates
the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against
the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings

which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October
23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
CLU vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent
G.R. No. 83815 February 22, 1991

FACTS:
 The two petitions in this case sought to declare unconstitutional
Executive Order No. 284 issued by then President Corazon C.
Aquino.

 The petitioners alleged that Section 1, 2 and 3 of EO 284 contravenes

the provision of Sec. 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution

 The assailed provisions of EO 284 are as follows:

Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or

other appointive officials of the Executive Department may in addition to
his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the
government and government corporations and receive the corresponding
compensation therefor.

Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in

section 1, they must relinquish the excess position in favor of the
subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official
hold more than two positions other than his primary position.

Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such

corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant
secretary.
 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, meanwhile, states that:

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet,

and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in
this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice
any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of
interest in the conduct of their office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth

civil degree of the President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of
bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries.
 PETITIONERS CONTENTION: EO 284 adds exceptions to
Section 13 of Article VII other than those provided in the
constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against
holding any other office or employment in government are those
provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice President (may be
appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of
Article VII: “The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of
the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation.”) and
the secretary of justice (as an ex-officio member of the Judicial
and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII: “A Judicial and
Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme
Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman,
the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as
ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.”)

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is unconstitutional

HELD: Yes. EO 284 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The court said, by allowing Cabinet members, undersecretaries or

assistant secretaries to hold at least two positions in the government and
government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple
offices or employment which is a direct contravention of the express
mandate of Article VII, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.
The explained that the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this
constitution” must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those
particular instances cited in the constitution itself which are Section 3 of
Article VII (for VP) and Section 8 of Article VIII (for Secretary of
Justice).

Thus, the PETITION is GRANTED.

ENDENCIA VS DAVID
Posted by kaye lee on 10:03 PM

93 Phil 696 August 31 1953 [Salaries of Judges Tax Exemption]

FACTS:

Saturnino David was the Internal Revenue Collector who ordered Judges Endencio and Jugo’s salaries. A case
was filed. However, upon construing Article VIII Section 9 of the constitution, it shows that judicial officers
are exempt from paying tax from their salaries and thus considered that the deduction of salaries from the
said judges as a violation from the compensation received by judicial officers.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.

RULING:

No, the Section 13 of RA 590 is unconstitutional. The collection of income taxes in judicial officers is
considered as against the provisions given by the Article VIII Sec 9 of the Constitution. The compensation
shall not be diminished during their continuance of their service. Section 13 of RA 590 stated that no salary
received by any public officer of the republic shall be exempted from paying its taxes. This specific part of RA
590 is in contrary with what is Article VIII Sec 9 has provided.

Categories: Constitutional Law 1

GR No. 78780, July 23, 1987, 152 SCRA 284

FACTS:

Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively,
of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit
and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer
of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.

They submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers
constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution mandating that during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said
Constitution."

It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with the matter administratively in response to
representations that the Court shall direct its Finance Officer to discontinue the withholding of taxes
from salaries of members of the Bench. Thus, on June 4, 1987, it was reaffirmed by the Court en banc.

ISSUE:

Whether or not members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes.

HELD:

No.

The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question
until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The
ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be
given effect.

The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of
the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely
assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by
the framers.

The ruling that "the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so
violates the Constitution", in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David must be declared
discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear
and unmistakable terms the meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that
they have adopted

Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and
deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the
cost of maintaining the government and should share the burden of general income taxation equitably.

Therefore, the petition for Prohibition is hereby dismissed.

Aglipay v Ruiz 64 PHIL 201 (1937)
Facts: Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of Posts
from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic
Congress. Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional provision stating
that no public funds shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system of religion,
etc. This provision is a result of the principle of the separation of church and state, for the purpose
of avoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the church, or vice versa, as a weapon to
further their ends and aims. Respondent contends that such issuance is in accordance to Act No.
4052, providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for the production and issuance of
postage stamps as would be advantageous to the government.

Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion.

Held: What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious
toleration. It is however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of
its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the purest
principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No.
4052 “advantageous to the government” does not authorize violation of the Constitution. The
issuance of the stamps was not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or religious
denomination. They were not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage
stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map of
the Philippines and the location of Manila, with the words “Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic
Congress.” The focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila, being
the seat of that congress. This was to “to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists,” the
officials merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance. Although such
issuance and sale may be inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church, any benefit and
propaganda incidentally resulting from it was no the aim or purpose of the Government.