CREATION:

By: Kaufmann Kohler, Emil G. Hirsch

Table of Contents

 Difficulties of the Conception.

 Views of Philo.
 In Medieval Jewish Philosophy.
 Views of Maimonides.
 —In the Koran and Mohammedan Literature:
 In Mohammedan Tradition.

The bringing into existence of the world by the act of God. Most Jewish philosophers
find in (Gen. i. 1) creation ex nihilo ( ). The etymological meaning of the verb
, however, is "to cut out and put into shape," and thus presupposes the use of
material. This fact was recognized by Ibn Ezra and Naḥmanides, for instance
(commentaries on Gen. i. 1; see also Maimonides, "Moreh Nebukim," ii. 30), and
constitutes one of the arguments in the discussion of the problem.

Whatever may be the nature of the traditions in Genesis (see Cosmogony), and however
strong may be the presumption that they suggest the existence of an original substance
which was reshaped in accordance with the Deity's purposes (see Dragon; Darkness), it
is clear that the Prophets and many of the Psalms accept without reservation the
doctrine of creation from nothing by the will of a supermundane personal God (Ps.
xxxiii. 6-9, cii. 26, cxxi. 2; Jer. x. 12; Isa. xlii. 5, xlv. 7-9): "By the word of the Lord
were the heavens made; and all the host of them by the breath of his mouth." To such a
degree has this found acceptance as the doctrine of the Synagogue that God has come to
be desinated as "He who spake and the world sprang into existence" (see Baruk She-
Amar and 'Er. 13b; Meg. 13b; Sanh. 19a, 105a; Ḥid. 31a; Ḥul. 63b, 84b; Sifre to Num. §
84; Gen. R. 34b; Ex. R. xxv.; Shab. 139a; Midrash Mishle, 10c). God is "the author of
creation," ("bereshit" having become the technical term for "creation"; Gen.
R. xvi.; Ber. 54a, 58a; Ḥag. 12a, 18a; Ḥul. 83a; Ecclus. [Sirach] xv. 14).

The belief in God as the author of creation ranks first among the thirteen fundamentals
(see Articles of Faith) enumerated by Maimonides. It occurs in the Yigdal, where God
is called , "anterior [because Himself uncreated] to all that was
created "; in the Adon 'Olam; and it is taught in all modern Jewish catechisms.

Difficulties of the Conception.

Nevertheless, Jewish literature (Talmudic, pseudoepigraphic, and philosophical) shows

that the difficulties involved in this assumption of a creation ex nihilo ( ) and in
time, were recognized at a very early day, and that there were many among the Jews
who spoke out on this subject with perfect candor and freedom. Around the first chapter
of Genesis was waged many a controversy with both fellow Jews and non-Jews. The
influence of Greek ideas is clearly discernible in various Midrashic homilies on the
subject—e.g., those dealing with the mode of divine creation (Gen. R. i., "God looked
into the Torah, and through it He created"—a Platonic idea; ib. x.); with the view of
God as architect (ib. i.; Ḥag. 12; compare Philo, "De Opificiis Mundi," iv.); with the
creative word or letter (Gen. R. i.; Midr. ha-Gadol, ed. Schechter, pp. 10 et seq.; Pesiḳ.
R. xxi.; Yer. Ḥag. ii. 77c); with the original elements (Gen. R. x.; Ex. R. xiii., xv.; Yer.
Ḥag. ii. 77a); with the order of creation, the subject of the well-known controversy
between the schools of Hillel and Shammai (compare Ḥag. 12a; Taan. 32a; Pirḳe R. El.
xxxvi.); with the various acts of creation assigned to various days (Charles, "Book of
Jubilees," 1902, pp. 11 et seq.); with the time consumed in creation (Ber. R, xii.); with
successive creations (Pes. 54a; Gen. R. i.; Ab. R. N. xxxvii.); and, finally, with the
purpose of creation (Abot vi.; Sanh. 98b; Ber. 6b, 61b; see also Bacher, "Ag. Tan." and
"Ag. Pal. Amor.," Indices, s.v. "Weltschöpfung," etc.). The Slavonic Enoch (xxiii.-
xxxv.) contains an elaborate presentation of old Jewish cosmogonic speculations,
apparently under Egyptian Orphic influences (see N. Bonwetsch, "Das Slavische
Henochbuch," Berlin, 1896; "The Book of the Secrets of Enoch," ed. by W. R. Morfill
and R. H. Charles, Oxford, 1896).

I.From right to left: I. Chaos;

Division of Light from
Darkness; Separation of Earth
and Water; Vegetaion.II.II.
Sun, Moon, and Stars; Fishes
and Birds; Animals and Man;
Sabbath Rest.Stages of
Creation.(From the Sarajevo
Haggadah of the fourteenth
century.)

The danger lest speculation on

creation might lead to
Gnosticism underlies the
hesitancy to leave the study of
Gen. i. open to all without
restriction (Sanh. 37a; Deut. R.
ii.; Ḥag. 19b; Midr. Teh. to Ps.
cxxxvi.; Midr. ha-Gadol, ed.
Schechter, p. 4). That such
speculation is of no
consequence to the practical
religiosity which Judaism
means to foster is well
expressed in the caution not to
"inquire into what was before
the world was" (Mishnah Ḥag.
ii.; Yer. Ḥag. ii.). See Cabala.

The Alexandrian Jews, under

the sway of Platonic and
Neoplatonic ideas, conceived
of creation as carried into
effect through intermediate agencies, though still an act of divine will, while the relation
of the agencies to the Godhead is not always clearly defined, so that it is possible to
regard them almost as divine hypostases—subdeities, as it were, with independent
existence and a will of their own (Alexandrian Philosophy). The divine σοΦΊα
("wisdom") has a cooperative part in creation (Wisdom ix. 9). While the Palestinian (II
Macc. vii. 28) insists that all was made by God "out of nothing" (ἐζ οὴκ ὄντων),
Wisdom (xi. 17) posits a formless archmatter (ὔλη), which the Creator simply brought
into order.

Views of Philo.

Philo proceeds to fully develop this idea. The Mosaic account of creation is not to be
accepted literally (see Drummond, "Philo Judæus," i. 293). Creation was not in time. "It
is folly to suppose that the universe was made in six days, or in time at all." The
expression "six days" merely indicates the most perfect arrangement ("De Allegoriis
Legum," i. 2: "De Opificiis Mundi," i. 3; "Quod Deus Sit Immutabilis," i. 277). To the
question whether the world had no real beginning, he gives, though inconsistent with
himself, a negative answer. There was a time when the parts of the cosmos "deified by
the heathen" were not; God alone was never non-existent ("Dec. Orac." ii. 190). "For
the genesis of anything," he says, "many things must combine: that by which, that out of
which, that through which, that on account of which" (= cause, material, instrument,
purpose). God is the cause of the cosmos, while the four elements are the material ("De
Cherubim," i. 161, 162). Nothing suggests that he regarded this material as other than
uncreated. It was there when God arranged the new order of things. God is the demiurge
("De Eo Quod Deterius Potiori Insidiatur," i. 220; "De Plantatione Noe," i. 320; his
expressions are δημιουργός, κοσμπλάστης, τεχνἰτης). As in other points, so on this,
Philo is not rigidly consistent. There are passages again from which a belief in the
creation of matter out of nothing might be assumed. He speaks of matter as corruptible,
and "corruptible" is, in his theory, a correlative of "created" ("Quis Rerum Divinarum
Heres Sit," i. 495).

It was not matter, but form, that God praised as good, and acknowledged thus as His
creative work. Yet Philo protests that God is "not a demiurge, but a creator." What
before was not, He made (οὐ δημιουργός μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ κτίστης αὐτὸς ὠν, "De
Somniis," i. 632; see Siegfried, "Philo von Alexandrien," p. 232). Drummond argues,
against Siegfried, that God is here styled Creator only of the ideal, intelligible world,
not of matter in the visible world (l.c. i. 304). In regard to Philo's Logos and the Memra
of the Targum see Logos.

In Medieval Jewish Philosophy.

In the writings of the Jewish philosophers of the Middle Ages, creation is one of the
problems most earnestly discussed. It belonged to the "four questions" (Maimonides,
"Moreh," i. 71) which were regarded as fundamental. The alternative was between
, Ar. ("creation"), and Ar. ("eternity of matter").
The Arabian thinkers and schoolmen were perplexed by the same problem (Munk,
"Mélanges," p. 421). They had been moved to discuss the subject by their studies (at
second hand) of Plato and Aristotle. The Greek mind could not conceive of creation out
of nothing—" Ex nihilo nihil fit."

Plato's ὕλη (consult his "Timæus") was eternal. Aristotle, too, maintained the eternity of
matter ("De Cœlo," i. 10-12; "Phys." ii. 6-9). God is the source of the order of things
predestined by Himself ("De Mundo," ii.), though Maimonides and Judah ha-Levi argue
for the possibility of claiming for Aristotle the contrary view ("Moreh Nebukim," ii. 15;
"Cuzari," i. 65).

Is the doctrine of the eternity of matter compatible with the Jewish conception of God?
On three grounds this has been negatived: (1) It limits God's omnipotence and freedom.
(2) It is in conflict with the Biblical account, and denies the possibility of miracles,
though the Talmudic theory of miracles would not be affected. "God, when He created
the sea, imposed the condition that it should divide itself before Moses' staff" (Ab. v. 9).
(3) Great men, such as Moses and the Messiah, would be utterly impossible (Albo,
"'Iḳḳarim," i. 12). The first point may be considered cogent, but the two others are not
very profound.

In two ways do those of the Jewish philosophers who maintain the creatio ex nihilo
attempt to prove their thesis: (1) by demonstrating the necessity of the Creation, and (2)
by showing that it is impossible that the world was not created ("Cuzari," v. 18; "Moreh
Nebukim," ii. 30). But in order to achieve this, they had first to disprove the arguments
of their opponents. These were the same as those with which Mohammedan theologians
(see Shahrastani, ii. 199 et seq.) had been confronted. Maimonides (l.c. ii. 14; compare
also Aaron b. Elijah, "'Eẓ Ḥayyim," vi., vii.) arranges them into two groups: (1)
(cosmological, Schmiedl's terminology), and (2) (theological).

In the first group there are the arguments: (a) Motion must be eternal, without
beginning. Time is an accident of motion; "timeless (i.e., changeless) motion" and
"motionless (i.e., changeless) time" are self-contradictory conceptions; therefore, time
has no beginning. (b) The prime arch-matter underlying the four elements must be
eternal. "To become" implies taking on form. But primal matter, according to its own
presupposition, implied in the concept "prime," has no form; hence it has never
"become." (c) Decay and undoing are caused by contradictory elements. But spherical
motion excludes contradictory principles, and is without beginningand end. (d) Suppose
the world had a beginning; then either its creation was necessary—that is, eternal—or
its previous existence was impossible (and thus it might not be now); but if it was
possible, then possibility (potentiality) presupposes a subject carrying attributes
involving the possibility. This subject could not but be eternal.

In the second group there are the arguments (a) God could not have been a creator in
potentia without suffering change in Himself from potentia to reality. What caused this
change? (b) The world created in time presupposes some exciting cause for God's will
to create. Either God did not previously will to create, or, if He did, He had not the
power. The world can not be thought eternal unless we admit defects in God. (c) The
world is perfect, the product of God's wisdom. God's wisdom and His essence are
coincident. God being eternal, His work must also be eternal. (d) What did God do
before the world was?

How did Jewish thinkers meet these positions? They followed in the paths of the Arab
Motekallamin. Especially did they lay emphasis on the proof of free determination,"
which the Arabic logicians had developed ( , Ar. "al-takhṣiṣ"). Admitting no
"law of nature," they posited the principle of limitless possibility. Things are as they are,
not because they must be so, but because a free Being outside of them wills them to be
so. He might also have willed them to be otherwise. He who determines is also He who
creates; that is, produces from nothing. The world is as it is because a Being determined
its being, preferring its being to its non-being. Matter dependent for form upon another,
even if eternal, can not exist. God is by inherent necessity. The fact that matter is as it
is, shows that it was created to be as it is by the preference of the Creator.

In historical succession Saadia was the first to take up the problem, especially in his
"Emunot" (i. 1-5). He argues for the creation from the irrationality of an endless
limitless quantity—a favorite theme among the Motekallamin. His argumentation is
extremely obscure. He enumerates thirteen theories concerning creation; among them,
first, the Biblical; then that of the atomists; next the theory of emanation and dualism;
finally, that in which the four elements are held to be eternal, a theory which he says
had many adherents among the Jews.

Ibn Gabirol devotes a large part of his "Meḳor Ḥayyim" to the problem. He does not
rely upon Biblical texts. His creation theory is as follows: The prime substance
emanated out of itself Will, or the creative Word. This Will mediates between God and
the world. From the Will emanated universal matter (element) , from which
came all beings. His position is a sort of pantheism, not altogether Biblical.
Baḥyaibn Pakuda, in "Ḥobot ha-Lebabot," maintains that (1) nothing is self-created; (2)
there must be a highest first cause; (3) composition proves generation or creation.

Judah ha-Levi invokes the testimony of tradition in his "Cuzari" (i. 43-68; see also
Maimonides' "Moreh," iii. 50; Abravanel, in his , p. 34). He pleads for the
authenticity of the Mosaic account as being corroborated by tradition; by the facts of
human speech, which show the common descent of all men; by the identity of the
system for counting time; etc.

Abraham bar Ḥiyya Albargeloni is another defender of creation. His "Sefer Hegyon ha-
Nefesh" tries to explain the Biblical tradition on mathematical grounds. "Γλη" and
"form" had potential existence until God called them into reality through His will in
combination. But when we speak of time and the like with reference to God, we use
human similes. Time is only a measurer. Therefore before the world was, there was
nothing to measure and consequently no time. Γλη = "Tohu," and form = "Bohu"; both
were preexistent, as the text shows by its use of the expression "the earth had been" (
"Form" = ).

Views of Maimonides.

Maimonides is most timid in his defense of creation. He concedes that it can not be
proved. The most that can be attempted is to weaken the arguments of the opposition
schools ("Moreh," i. 67, 71; see Gersonides to Gen. i.). He endeavors to disprove the
eternity of the world as far as he may, and to strengthen whatever seems to favor the
contrary theory ("Moreh," i. 13-30). He makes much of Aristotle's indecision
concerning the point at issue. He advances "arguments that approximate
demonstrations" (see Maimonides, Moses). They have contributed nothing to the
solution of the perplexity.

Of his successors, Albalag, Gersonides, and Naḥmanides either reject creation ex nihilo
or seriously modify it. Ḥasdai Crescas (in "Or Adonai," iii. 1, 4) criticizes most severely
Gersonides' assumptions that matter and God are equally absolute; while the former is
void of everything, even of form, the latter is highest perfection. Why should equally
absolute and necessary matter submit to the will of God? He charges Gersonides with
inconsistencies in denying special providence while assuming the power of God over
and in the special particulars of archmatter. His pupil Albo regards the denial of creation
ex nihilo as tantamount to the denial of God's perfection ("'Iḳḳarim," i. 23).

The Karaites as a rule accept creatio ex nihilo. It is one of their articles of faith (see "'Eẓ
Ḥayyim," xii.). For the speculations of the Cabalists see Cabala. Regarding modern
views see Evolution.

Bibliography:

 Schmiedl, Studien zur Religionsphilosophie, Vienna, 1869;

 J. Guttmann, Die Scholastik des Dreizehnten Jahrhunderts, Breslau, 1902;
 idem, Das Verhältniss des Thomas von Aquino zum Judentum, Göttingen, 1891.

—In the Koran and Mohammedan Literature:

The Koran does not contain a descriptive and detailed account of the Creation; but it
abounds in allusions to God's power as manifested therein, and in appeals to it in
refutation of heretical assumptions (Polytheism; sura xvi.), or in support of certain
dogmas (Resurrection; ib. xxii. 1-7). On the whole, these various references show that
Mohammed had a general, vague, hearsay acquaintance with both the Biblical and
Talmudical traditions of the Jews. "It is God," according to sura xi. 9, "that created the
heavens and the earth in six days." Beforecreation "His throne [compare ] was
upon the water" (see Gen. i. 2; suras 1. 37, lvii. 4). Special emphasis is laid on the
forming of the mountains, which are said to give stability to the earth (suras xxi. 22,
xxxi. 9, xli. 9. lxxviii. 6). In this a reminiscence of the Biblical (Deut. xxxiii.
27; compare Ps. xc. 2) is suggested, while the popular conceit of the Arabs has it that
the earth, when first created, was smooth and flat, which induced the angels to ask who
could stand on so tottering a frame. Thereupon God next morning threw the mountains
on it (Sale, "Koran," p. 215, note g, Philadelphia ed., 1876). In the space of four days
God distributed nourishment to all that asked (sura xli. 9). The earth and the heavens are
said to have been originally a compact mass which God divided, while water is said to
be the life-giving element (sura xxi. 9, 31). Things were created after a certain
preestablished measure (sura liv. 49; the word "ḳadr" may also be rendered "decree";
but see Baiḍawi, ad loc.). "One word" alone brought the world into being "like the
twinkling of an eye" (sura liv. 50). As Baiḍawi remarks, this word was "Kun" (Let there
be!), though the statement is also explained to imply that God accomplished His work
very easily and quickly, without manual labor or assistance (compare sura l. 37, and
Talmudic , Ber. R. xii.; see Baiḍawi, ad loc.). Nor did He create in sport
(compare rabbinical ), but in truth, and for a definite term, to last until the day
of final judgment (suras xliv. 35, xlvi. 2; Baiḍawi, ad loc.). With scant consistency,
however, Mohammed speaks in another passage of a creation not in six but in two days.
Baiḍawi (sura xli. 8) interprets "days" as "turns."

In Mohammedan Tradition.

Mas'udi ("Prairies d'Or," ed. Meynard and Courteille, i. 36 et seq.) gives in detail the
following traditional order: "First water, which carried the divine throne, was created.
From this primal water God caused a vapor to arise and form the sky. Then He dried the
liquid mass, transforming it into one earth, which He split up later into seven. This earth
was completed in two days—Sunday and Monday. The earth was placed on a fish that
supported it [sura lxviii. 1; compare Pirḳe R. El. ix., and Ginzberg "Die Haggada bei
den Kirchenvätern," p. 19, where it is shown that by this fish is meant the leviathan].
This fish and the earth God propped on blocks of stone, resting on the back of an angel,
this again on a rock, and this finally on the wind. But the motions of the fish shook the
earth mightily, so God put the mountains in place and rendered it stable. The mountains
furnished food for earth's tenants. The trees were created during two days—Tuesday
and Wednesday. Then God mounted up to the vaporous sky and made of it one heaven,
which, in two more days—Thursday and Friday—He split up into seven. Hence the
name for Friday, 'Jum'ah, (joining together), 'union' or 'assembly,' because on it the
creation of the heavens was united to that of the earth. Then God filled the heavens with
angels, seas, icebergs. Creation thus completed, God peopled the earth with the jinn,
made of purest fire [sura lv. 14], among them being Iblis, the Devil. When about to
create man (Adam), He informed the angels of His intention to make him His vicegerent
on earth. The angels made objections [as in the rabbinical legend, Gen. R. viii.]. Gabriel
was sent to bring clay from the earth, but the earth refused to supply it. Michael, also
sent on the same errand, was unsuccessful. Finally the angel of death went forth,
vowing that he would succeed. He brought back earth of various colors, hence the
various colors among men. Adam was made of the surface ["adim"] soil. Forty years a
portion of such soil was hung up to become a compact mass, and then left for another
period of forty years, until the clay became corrupt. To this God then gave human
shape, but left it without a soul for one hundred and twenty years. Finally, after
enduring many indignities at the hand of Iblis, and being an object of terror to the
angels, and at last causing Iblis' banishment, Adam was endowed with divine breath,
according to some gradually; and when he was entirely permeated with this divine
breath, he sneezed; whereupon God taught him to say: 'Praise be to God! may thy
Master have mercy on thee, O Adam!'"

An altogether different account is found in the "Kitab Aḥwal al-Ḳiyamah," edited by

Wolff ("Muhammadanische Eschatologie," Leipsic, 1872). The first object created was
a tree with four thousand branches—the tree of knowledge; the second, the light of
Mohammed—a pearl in the shape of a peacock, which was placed on the tree. Then
God made the mirror of shame, placing it so that the peacock saw his reflected image;
whereupon shame seized him and he prostrated himself five times before God. The light
of Mohammed, too, blushed before God, and in consequence perspired. From the beads
of perspiration taken from various parts of the body were created the angels, the upper
and lower thrones of God, the tablet of revelation or of decree, the pen, Paradise and
Gehenna, sun, moon, and stars, the dividing interval between heaven and earth, the
Prophets, the Sages, the martyrs, the pious, the celestial and the terrestrial Ka'bah, the
Temple in Jerusalem, the places for the mosques, the Moslems—men and women, the
souls of the Jews, the Christians, the Magi, and, finally, the earth from east to west, and
all that it contains. This apocalyptic account is comparatively late [but echoes rabbinical
traditions concerning the light of the Messiah (Gen. R. i.), the . Paradise and
Gehinnon (Pes. 54a); compare also Slavonic Enoch, xxv.—xxvi.—K.]. As to the
theories of creation propounded in the various philosophical schools, see Arabic
Philosophy; Aristotle in Jewish Literature; Motekallamin.

Bibliography:

 Munk, Mélanges, Paris, 1859;

 Maimonides, Moreh Nebukim, ed. Munk, passim;
 Dieterici, Ichivan Essafa, Leipsic, 1896;
 Steiner, Die Mutaziliten, Leipsic, 1865;
 Houtsma, De Strijd over het Dogma, Leyden, 1875.