UNIVERSITY OF CEBU LAW REVIEW CENTER

LAWS ON PUBLIC CORPORATION

Dean Hilario Justino F. Morales
Bar Review Lecturer
Local Autonomy and Devolution
1. What is local autonomy? Characterize autonomous regions and their relations to the
national government.
ANSWER: Local autonomy is the granting of more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources to the lower
or local levels of a government system. The principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution
simply means decentralization. It does not make the local government sovereign within the state or
an “imperium in imperio.” (Basco vs. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52) Under the Philippine concept of local
autonomy, the national government has not completely relinquished all its powers over local
governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local officers are
delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of delegation is to make governance more directly
responsive and effective at the local levels. Policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the
President and Congress. Municipal governments are still agents of the national government.
(Pimentel vs. Aguirre, 336 SCRA 201) The national government exercises the power of control
through Congress, and the power of general supervision, through the office of the President, over all
local government units or territorial and political subdivisions including autonomous regions. (Article
X, Section 16, Philippine Constitution)
2. What is devolution?
ANSWER: Devolution is the act by which the National Government confers power and authority upon the
various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities (RA No. 7160,
Section 17[e]. Devolution is the act by which the National Government confers power and authority
upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities (RA No.
7160, Section 17[e]. It is the transfer of power and authority from the national government to LGU’s
as the territorial and political subdivisions of the State. The nature of power transfer is political and
the approach is territorial or areal. (Plaza II vs. Cassion, 435 SCRA 294 and Republic v. Daclan, GR
No.197115, March 23, 2015) It includes the transfer to local government units of the records,
equipment, and other assets and personnel of national agencies and offices corresponding to the
devolved powers, functions and responsibilities.
3. Distinguish administrative decentralization from political decentralization.
ANSWER: In administrative decentralization, the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions (provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays) in order to broaden the base of
government power. Political decentralization involves abdication of political power in favor of LGU’s declared
autonomous. (Limbonas vs. Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786) All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by
the Constituion or by law to the autonomus regions shall be vested in the National Government. (Article x,
Section 17, Phil;ippine Constitution)
0

Powers of LGU’s
04. What are the regulatory powers of the National Government Agencies (NGA’s) transferred or
devolved to the LGU’s include the following:
ANSWER: 1) the reclassification of agricultural lands – DAR to cities & municipalities; 2) enforcement of
environmental laws – DENR to all LGU’s; (3) inspection of food products and quarantine – DOH to cities &
Municipalities; 4) the enforcement of the National Building Code – DPWH to cities & municipalities; 5) the
processing and approval of subdivision plans - HLURB to cities and municipalities; 6) the operation of tricycles
- LTFRB to cities & municipalities; 7) the establishment of cockpits and holding of cockfights - Philippine
Gamefowl Commission to cities & municipalities.

The Local Government Code did not fully devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining law to the
provincial government, as its enforcement is subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR, which
is in charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the country’s natural resources. (League of Provinces of
the Philippines v. DENR, GR No. 175368, April 11, 2013))
In Pimentel v. Ochoa, GR No. 195770, July 17, 2012, petitioners argued that the P21 Billion CCTP
Budget be directly allocated to the LGU’s so that it would have enhanced the delivery of basic services and not
result in the “recentralization” of basic governmental functions. The Supreme Court, however, affirmed DSWD’s
full control over the identification of beneficiaries in the CCTP and the manner by which the services are to be
delivered or conditionalities are to be complied with. This is not contrary to the precepts of local autonomy.
05. State whether or not the following city ordinances are valid and give reasons in support of
your answers:
(1) An ordinance authorizing the establishment, operation and maintenance of three cockpits
 within its territorial jurisdiction.
(1)

(2) An ordinance which forbids the running of nightclubs, massage parlors, karaoke bars and
similar business establishments and instructs its owners/operators to wind up business
operators.
(3) An ordinance declaring a particular thing as nuisance per se and order its condemnation, or
declaring a gas station a nuisance per se.
(4) Ordinances prohibiting the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals, including those
already existing, and allowing the operation of only one common terminal located outside
the city proper but within its territorial jurisdiction.
(5) An ordinance requiring all market stall occupants to fill up and submit the necessary
application forms which contained the terms and conditions for the occupation and operation
of the stalls, and if approved, the application would serve as the lease contract.
(6) A zoning ordinance which reclassified the area where the oil depot is situated from industrial
to commercial and that the continued operation of the businesses of oil companies in their
present location will no longer be permitted.
ANSWERS: (1) NO. It is the Sangguniang Bayan concerned alone which has the power to authorize and
license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial
breeding of gamecocks within its territorial jurisdiction. But its discretion is limited by PD 449, the Cockfighting
Law of 1974, in that it cannot authorize more than one cockpit per city or municipality, unless such cities or
municipalities have population of over 100,000, in which case two cockpits may be established. Cockfighting is
a valid matter of police regulation, as it is a form of gambling essentially antagonistic to the aims of enhancing
national productivity and self-reliance – limitation on the number of cockpits in a given municipality is a
reasonably necessary means for the accomplishment of the purpose of controlling cockfighting, for clearly more
cockpits equals more cockfight. A municipal ordinance must not contravene the Constitution and any statute.
Ordinance No. 7 contravenes the Cockfighting Law in allowing three cockpits in a city. (Tan vs. Perena, 452
SCRA 53)
(2) NO. The Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional an ordinance revoking all permits and
licenses previously issued to operators of night clubs, cabarets, dance halls and prohibiting the issuance of new
permits and licenses for such kind of business in the municipality. The Local Government Code authorizes the
local government units to exercise police power yet this power does not include the power to prohibit the
establishment of businesses which are not per se illegal. LGU’s can only regulate but cannot prohibit, the
ordinance is ultra vires and unconstitutional. (Dela Cruz vs. Paras, 123 SCRA 569)
In City of Manila vs. Laguio, 455 SCRA 308, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional an
ordinance which forbids running of nightclubs, sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars and similar
business establishments, and instructs its owners/operators to wind up business operations as it amounts to a
closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of property and is practically confiscatory. An ordinance
which permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond
regulation and must be recognized as a taking of property without just compensation. Private property which is
not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without just compensation.
(3) NO. While a Sanggunian is empowered under the Local Government Code to enact ordinances
declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms of nuisances, it cannot declare a particular thing as a
nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It does not have the power to find as a fact, that a particular thing
is a nuisance with such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor it can authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and
destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such. These things must be
determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law. If a thing be in fact a nuisance due to the manner of its
operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of a Sanggunian. (AC Enterprises, Inc. vs.
Frabelle Corp., 506 SCRA 625)
In Parayno vs. Jovellanos, 495 SCRA 85, it was held that a gas station business could not be
considered a nuisance which a municipality could summarily abate in the guise of exercising police power. The
abatement of nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas station is not
a nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate safety of persons and property, hence it cannot be closed
down or transferred summarily to another location.
(4) NO. The subject ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena,
including those already existing, and allow the operation of only one common terminal located outside the city
proper, franchise for which was granted to Lucena Grand Central Terminal Inc. The assailed ordinances are
characterized by overbreadth – they go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem. Bus
terminals per se do not impede or help impede the flow of traffic. In the subject ordinances, the scope of
proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to provide
facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all. The operation of bus terminals is a
legitimate business which, by itself, cannot be said to be injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of
the community. Unless a thing is a nuisance per se, however, it may not be abated via and ordinance, without
judicial proceedings.
(2)
(5) YES. It was within the ambit of the Sanggunian’s authority in the exercise of police power to regulate
the enjoyment of the privilege to lease the market stalls. The enactment of the ordinance was a valid exercise of
such governmental authority to regulate the possession and use of the public market and its facilities. The lease
and occupation of a stall in a public market is not a right but a purely statutory privilege governed by laws and
ordinances. The operation of a market stall by virtues of a license is always subject to the police power of the
city government. This power could be exercised anytime to change the provisions of the contracts or even
abrogate them entirely, for the protection of general welfare. Such an act did not violate the non-impairment
clause which is anyway subject to and limited by the paramount police power. (Lucero vs. City Government of
Pasig, 508 SCRA 23)
(6) YES. The enactment of the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power. Its purpose is to
promote sound urban planning ensuring health, public safety and general welfare of residents of Manila. The
Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in
case of terrorist attack of the Pandacan oil terminals. Based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights,
the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property. The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable, property
is not. When the state or LGU’s exercise of police power clashes with a few individual’s right to property, the
former should prevail. (Social Justice Society vs. Atienza, 545 SCRA 92)
Expropriation
06. What is the procedural requisite that must be first observed by an LGU before exercising the
power of eminent domain? What is the rationale of such requisite?
ANSWER: One condition required for the proper exercise of power of eminent domain by municipal corporation
is that a valid and definite offer must first be made to the owner and such offer was not accepted. Unless such a
requirement is satisfied, the expropriation of any private property is considered infirm and can be challenged as
invalid exercise of the power of eminent domain. (Section 19, LGC) The purpose of the requirement of a valid
and definite offer to be first made to the owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary acquisition of property
needed for public purposes in order to avoid the expense and delay of a court action. It permits the landowner
to receive full compensation, and the entity acquiring the property, immediate use and enjoyment of the
property. Single bona fide offer that is rejected by the owner will suffice. (Jesus is Lord Christian School
Foundation vs. Municipality of Pasig, MM, 466 SCRA 235)

07. Pursuant to a resolution approved by the Sangguniang Bayan, the Municipality of

Paranaque filed a complaint for expropriation of two parcels of land belonging to VM Realty
Corporation. The corporation argued that the complaint failed to state a cause of action, because it
was filed pursuant to a resolution and not an ordinance as required by the Local Government Code.
Decide.
ANSWER: Section 19 of the Local Government provides that a local government unit may pursuant to an
ordinance exercise the power of eminent domain In this case the mayor sought to exercise the power of
eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the Sanggunian Bayan. Thus, there was no compliance with
requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance. A municipal ordinance is different from a
resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a law-
making-body on a specific matter. The two are enacted differently. A third reading is necessary for an
ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of the members of the Sangguniang
Bayan. (Municipality of Paranaque vs. VM Realty Corporation, 292 SCRA 676) The ordinance must be enacted
prior to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain with the proper court, and not after the court shall have
determined the amount of just compensation to which the defendant is entitled. (Heirs of Suguitan vs. City of
Mandaluyong, 328 SCRA 137)
08. In the event that an LGU exercises the power of eminent domain, when must just
compensation be determined?
ANSWER: Just compensation shall be determined as of time of actual taking. While Section 4 of Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court provides that just compensation shall be determined at the time of filing of the complaint for
expropriation, such law cannot prevail over Section 19 of RA 7160 which is a substantive law. (The City of Cebu
vs. Dedamo, 380 SCRA 754)
09. When does an LGU be entitled to a writ of possession authorizing immediate entry over a
property subject of expropriation as a matter of right?
ANSWER: The requisites for authorizing immediate entry are the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient
in form and in substance, and the deposit of the amount equivalent to 15% of the fair market value of the
property to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration. Upon compliance with these requirements, the
petitioner in an expropriation case is entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right and the issuance of the
writ becomes ministerial. (Municipality of Cordova v. Pathfinder Development Corporation. G.R. No. 205544,
June 29, 2016)
Local Taxation and Fiscal Administration
10. Name two fundamental principles of local fiscal administration
ANSWER: Among the fundamental principles governing the financial affairs, transactions and operations of the
LGU’s are:
1. No money shall be paid out of the local treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation ordinance or law;
2. Local government funds and monies shall be spent solely for public purposes;
(3)
The use of LGU funds for the widening and improvement of privately-owned sidewalks is
unlawful and it directly contravenes Section 335 of RA 7160. Only the construction, improvement,
repair and maintenance of infrastructure facilities owned by the LGU may be bankrolled with local
government funds. (Albon vs. Fernando, 494 SCRA 141, GR No. 148357, June 30, 2006)
Ordinance-making
11. What are the limitations on the exercise of police power by an LGU? What are the requisites
for the validity of a municipal ordinance?
ANSWERS: The following are limitations on the exercise of powers under the general welfare clause: (1)
Express grant by law (e.g., Secs. 16, 391, 447, 458 and 468, LGC) (2) Exercisable only within the territorial
limits of the local government unit, except for protection of water supply (3) Equal protection clause. (The
interests of the public in general, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of the
power (4) Due process clause. (The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive on individuals.) (5) Must not be contrary to the Constitution and the laws.
The following are the requisites for the validity of a municipal ordinance:
1) must not contravene the Constitution and any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be
partial or discriminatory; 4)must nor prohibit, but may regulate trade which is not illegal per se; 5) must not be
unreasonable; 6) must be general in application and consistent with public policy. (Solicitor General vs. MMA,
204 SCRA 837; Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties, GR No. 111097, July 20, 1994) and 7) must not only be within
the corporate powers of the city or municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law. (Langcao vs. City of Cebu, 440 SCRA 279 and City of Manila vs. Laguio, 455 SCRA 308))
12. May an incumbent Governor, while concurrently the Acting Governor, continue to preside
over the sessions of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP)?
ANSWER: NO. Being the acting governor, the Vice-governor cannot simultaneously exercise the duties of the
latter, since the nature of the duties of the Provincial Governor calls for a full-time occupant to discharge them.
The creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor creates a corresponding vacancy in the office
of the Vice-governor whenever the latter acts as Governor by virtue of such temporary vacancy. This event
constitutes an “inability” on the part of the regular presiding officer (Vice-governor) to preside over the SP
sessions, which thus calls for the operation of the remedy set in Sec. 49(b) of the Local Government Code – the
election of a temporary presiding officer from among themselves. The continuity of the Acting Governor’s (Vice-
governor) powers as presiding officer of the SP is suspended so long as he is in such capacity. (Gamboa vs.
Aguirre, GR No. 134213, July 20, 1999)
13. Can an acting presiding officer of a Sanggunian be allowed to vote? How is the required
quorum in the Sanggunian computed?
ANSWERS: NO. A temporary presiding officer who merely steps into the shoes of the presiding officer could not
have greater power than that possessed by the latter who can vote only in case of tie. While acting as presiding
officer, a Board Member my not, at the same time be allowed to exercise the rights of a regular board member,
including that of voting even when there is no tie to break. The entire membership, including the presiding
officer and ex-officio members must be taken into account in computing the quorum of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. (Zamora vs. Caballero, 420 SCRA 384)
14. How may an ordinance be approved? What are the grounds for veto of an ordinance? Is
item veto allowed? How can a vetoed ordinance become a law?
ANSWER: An ordinance shall be approved by the local chief executive by affixing his signature in each and
every page thereof. The grounds for veto are: (1) the ordinance is ultra vires, or (2) that it is prejudicial to public
welfare. The governor or mayor may veto any item in the following cases: (1) Appropriations ordinance (2)
Ordinance adopting a local development plan and public investment program (3) Ordinance directing the
payment of money or creating liability. A vetoed ordinance can become a law: (1) The sanggunian may override
the veto by two-thirds vote of all its members. (2 )Failure of the Local Chief Executive to communicate the veto
to the sanggunian within 15 days in the case of a province and 10 days in the case of city or municipality. The
ordinance shall be deemed approved as if he signed it.
15. Distinguish initiative from referendum. What are the limitations on initiative?
ANSWER: Initiative is the power of the registered voters to propose amendments to the Constitution or to
propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose. Local initiative is the legal process
whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance.
Initiative is a process of law-making by the people themselves without participation of their elected
representatives, while referendum consists of the electorate approving or rejecting what has been enacted by a
legislative body. (Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Commission on Elections, 262 SCRA 492)
 Limitations on Initiative: (1) the power of initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year, (2) It
shall extend only to matters within the power of the sanggunian to enact, (3) If the sanggunian adopts the
proposition, the initiative shall be cancelled. (Sec. 124, LGC)

Settlement of Boundary Disputes

16. What is a boundary dispute? What is the nature and limitation of the power of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan to settle boundary dispute among adjoining municipalities within
the province?
(4)
ANSWER: A boundary dispute may involve “a portion or the whole” of a local government unit’s territorial area.
Nothing in this provision excludes a dispute over an island. So long as the island is being claimed by different
local government units, there exists a boundary dispute. (Province of Antique v. Calabocal, G.R. No. 209146,
June 8, 2016)
The power of the provincial boards to settle boundary disputes is of an administrative nature –
involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities. It
is a power to fix a common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining
municipalities. The power of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to settle boundary disputes is limited to
implementing the law creating the municipality and, any alteration of boundaries not in accordance with the law
is not implementation but amendment of the law, which would exceed their authority. Thus, the agreement
between the municipalities of Jimenez and Sinacaban (embodied in a resolution of a provincial board declaring
certain barrios part of one or another municipality) is invalid as it would effectively amend EO No. 258 creating
the Municipality of Sinacaban. It is contrary to the technical description of the territory of a municipality as per
EO 258, and therefore not binding. The Supreme Court declared that the RTC was correct when it ordered a
relocation survey to determine to which municipality the barangays belonged. (Municipality of Jimenez vs. Baz,
265 SCRA 182)
17. What tribunal is conferred jurisdiction by law to settle the boundary dispute 1) involving
municipalities or component cities of different provinces, and 2) between the Municipality of Kanaga
and Ormoc City, an independent component city, both of the Province of Leyte? 3) over an island
situated between two different provinces where one party took all the necessary steps to settle the
dispute within the procedure set out in the law, while the other party failed to perform its
concomitant responsibility under the same law?
ANSWERS: 1) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be
jointly referred for settlement to the Sanggunians of the provinces concerned. (Section 118©, LGC) The RTC
cannot exercise appellate jurisdiction over the case since there was no petition that was filed and decided by
the Sanggunian panlalawigans of Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur. Neither can the RTC assume original
jurisdiction over the boundary dispute since the LGC allocates such power to the sanggunian panlalawigans of
Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur. (Calanza vs. PICOP, GR No. 146622, April 24, 2009)
2) Section 118(d) of the LGC applies to a situation in which a component city or a municipality seeks to settle a
boundary dispute with a highly urbanized city, not an independent component city. While Kanaga is a
municipality, Ormoc is an independent component city. Clearly then, the procedure referred to in Section 118(d)
does not apply to them. Since there is no legal provision specifically governing jurisdiction over boundary
disputes between a municipality and an independent component city of the same province, the general rule
governing jurisdiction should be used. The applicable provision is found in Section 19 (6) of BP 129, the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by RA 7691, which provides the Regional Trial Court shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person
or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. (Municipality of Kanaga vs. Madrona, 402 SCRA 330)
3) Respondent’s resort to filing a case before the RTC was warranted under the circumstances of the case. It
must be emphasized that respondents followed the procedure laid down in the Local Government Code. They
took all the necessary steps to settle the dispute within the procedure set out in the law, and by all indication,
was prepared to see the matter thru in order to lay the issue to rest.Petitioners cannot demand that respondents
now follow the procedure when they themselves made it impossible for any party to the same stating that they
are not amenable to any form of settlement. (Province of Antique v. Clabocal,supra)
Recall election
18. How is recall initiated? What are the limitations and prohibitions on the conduct recall
elections? When does recall become effective?
ANSWER: RA 9244 effectively amended Section 70 of the LGC and thus, eliminated the preparatory recall
assembly as one of the modes of initiating recall and provided a new procedure in the conduct of recall initiated
through the written petition of registered voters according to the following schedule: 25% - where the voting
population of LGU does not exceed 20,000; at least 20% but not less than 5,000 – for LGU’s with at least
20,000 but not more than 75,000 voting population; at least 15% but not less than 15,000 for LGU’s with at least
75,00 but not more than 300,000 voting population; and at least 10% but not less than 45,000 for LGU’s with
over 300,000 voting population. Recall Election. The official sought to be recalled is automatically a candidate.
(Sec. 71); Prohibition against resignation. The official sought to be recalled cannot resign while the recall
process is in progress. (Sec. 73); Limitations. An official may be subject of recall only once during his term. No
recall shall take place within one year from assumption of office or one year before the regular local election.
(Sec. 74) The phrase “regular election” should be construed as referring to an election where the office held by
the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested. (Paras vs. COMELEC, 264 SCRA 49) Another
limitation is the prohibition to conduct recall election within one year from the date of assumption of office of the
official concerned. The purpose of this limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for judging the performance of
an elective local official. As long as the election is held outside the one year period from assumption from office
of the local official sought to be recalled, the preliminary proceedings to initiate recall can be held even before
the end of the first year in office of said local official. (Claudio vs. COMELEC, 331 SCRA 388)
(5)
Municipal Liability
19. State the legal basis of liability of LGUs.
(1) Art. 2189 : The local government unit is liable in damages or injuries suffered by reason of the defective
condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works.

For liability to arise under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, ownership of the roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings and other public works, is not a controlling factor, it is sufficient that a province, city or muni-
cipality has control and supervision thereof. The power of a municipality to regulate the drilling and excavation
of the ground for the laying of mater or sewer and other pipes within its territorial jurisdiction can only mean that
a municipality exercises the power of control, or, at the very least, supervision over excavations. Such liability
attaches regardless of whether the drilling or excavation is made on a national road or municipal road, for as
long as the drilling and excavation is made on a national road or municipal road, for as long as the same is
within its territorial jurisdiction. (Municipality of San Juan MetroManila vs. CA, 466 SCRA 78)
(2) Liability for Tort: Under Sec. 24 of RA 7160, local government units and their officials are not exempt
from liability for death or injury to persons or damage to property.
a) If local government is engaged in governmental functions, it is not liable.
In Municipality of San Fernando vs. Firme, 195 SCRA 692, it was held that the municipality cannot be
held liable for torts committed by a regular employee, even if the dump truck used belonged to the municipality,
inasmuch as the employee was discharging government functions, i.e., road construction. This ruling was
reiterated in Jayme vs. Apostol, GR 165060, November 27, 2008, where it upheld the trial court’s ruling that the
municipality of Koronadal, the true and lawful employer of Lozano may not be sued because it is an agency of
the State engaged in governmental functions and, hence, immune from suit.
b) If engaged in proprietary functions, local government unit is liable. In Torio vs. Fontanilla 85 SCRA
599, The Municipality of Malasiqui was held liable for the death of a member of the zarzuela group when the
staged collapsed, under the principle of respondeat superior. The holding of a town fiesta managed by the
Municipal Council is a proprietary function. In City of Manila vs. IAC, 179 SCRA 428) the North Cemetery is a
property which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary capacity. The maintenance of the cemetery is a
proprietary function. Hence, for breach of contract, the City of Manila is liable for damages. The City of Manila is
liable for tortuous act committed by its agents who failed to verify the duration of the contract of lease.
c) Personal liability of local officials. Where public officers act maliciously and wantonly and injure
individuals rather than discharge a public duty, they are personally liable. Thus, the Provincial Governor and the
members of the Provincial Board were held liable for damages in their personal capacity arising from the illegal
act of dismissing employees in bad faith. (Rama vs. CA, 148 SCRA 496)
(3) Liability for Contracts
General Rule: A municipal corporation is liable on a contract it enters into provided the contract is
intra viries. If the contract is ultra viries, the local government unit is not liable.
Doctrine of Implied Municipal Liability. A municipality may become obligated upon an implied contract
to pay the reasonable value of the benefits accepted or appropriated by it as to which it has the general power
to contract. Thus, in Province of Cebu vs. IAC, 147 SCRA 447, it was held that the Province of Cebu cannot set
up the plea that the contract was ultra viries and still retain benefits thereunder. Having regarded the contract as
valid for purposes of reaping benefits, the local government unit is estopped to question its validity for the
purpose of denying answerability.
Three consecutive terms limit
20. What is the rationale behind the three-term limit rule? Name the two conditions
which must concur for the application of the disqualification of a candidate based on
violation of the three-term limit rule.
The intention behind the three-term limit rule is not only to abrogate the “monopolization of political
power” and prevent elected officials from breeding “proprietary interest in their position but also to “enhance the
people’s freedom of choice.
There are two conditions which must concur for the application of the disqualification of a candidate
based on violation of the three-term limit rule: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served the three consecutive
terms. (Halili v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 231643, January 15, 2019)
21. What are the two conditions for the application of the disqualification by reason of the three
 consecutive terms limit for local elective officials?
ANSWERS: (1) The two conditions for the application of the disqualification by reason of the three consecutive
terms limit are: (1) the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. (Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, 311
SCRA 602; Latasa vs. COMELEC, 417 SCRA 574; Ong vs. Alegre, 479 SCRA 473 and Abundo vs.
COMELEC, GR No.201716, January 8, 2013))
22. ONG was declared by the Board of Canvassers as winner for a mayoralty position in the
1992 elections. He assumed office but was ordered unseated six months later by virtue of a
successful election protest filed by ALEGRE. He ran again in 1995 and 1998 for the same
position and won and
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served his terms. (1) Is he eligible to run again for mayor in the 2001 elections? (2) Would your
answer be the same if during the 1992 elections, the order unseating him was issued after the
expiration of his term?
(1) YES. Though proclaimed as winner by the Board of Canvassers, he is not considered duly elected for
that particular term because he was unseated. Voluntary renunciation of a term of office does not cancel the
renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from the office for
any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.
(Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602)
(2) NO. In Ong vs. Alegre, 479 SCRA 473, the Supreme Court held that Ong’s assumption as mayor of
San Vicente, Camarines Sur from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, constitutes “service of full term” and should be
counted as full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the Constitution. While Ong’s
opponent “won” in an election protest in the 1998 mayoralty race, and therefore was the legally elected mayor,
that disposition was without practical and legal use and values, having been promulgated after the term of
the contested office has expired. Ong’s contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty
derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation
by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as duly elected mayor in 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his
assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from the start to finish of the term,
should be legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.
In Rivera vs. COMELEC, GR 167591ans GR 170577, May 9, 2007, since respondent Morales was
elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, and assumed the position and served as mayor until June
30 2001, the Supreme Court ruled that he was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the
RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him as mayor. Such circumstance does not
constitute an interruption in serving the full term. Whether as “caretaker” or “de facto” officer, he exercises the
powers and enjoys the prerequisites of the office which enables him “to stay on indefinitely.”
23. What is the effect of the conversion of a municipality into a city upon the three-term limit of
its incumbent officials? Is the second term as mayor of a municipality interrupted by the
conversion of the municipality into a component city?
ANSWERS: While a new component city which was converted from a municipality acquires a new corporate
existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality, this does not mean however, that for the purpose
of applying the constitutional provision on term limits, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed
as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. Where a person has been elected for
three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor and prior to the end or termination of such three-year term the
municipality has been converted by law into a city, without the city charter interrupting his term until the end of
the three-year term, the prohibition applies to prevent him from running for the fourth time as city mayor thereof,
there being no break in the continuity of the term. Accordingly, the municipal mayor is barred from running for
city mayor under the three-term limit rule. (Latasa vs. COMELEC, 417 SCRA 574)
This prohibition also applies to the office of a punong barangay of a municipality merged with another
municipality to create a city as a new political unit. The territorial jurisdiction of such barangay is the same as
before conversion and the inhabitants of the barangay are the same. The voters who voted for the punong
barangay are the same group of voters. The prohibition applies to prevent him from running as punong
barangay for the fourth time, there being no break in the continuity of the terms. (Laceda vs. Limena, GR No.
182867. November25, 2008)
NO. Election to and service of the same local elective position for three consecutive terms renders a
candidate ineligible from running for the same position in the succeeding elections. The territorial jurisdiction of
Mabalacat City is the same as that of the Municipality of Mabalacat which did not change even an inch in the
land area. Also, the elective officials of the Municipality of Mabalacat continued to exercise their powers and
functions until elections were held for the new city officials.The inhabitants are the same group of voters who
elected Morales to be their mayor for three consecutive terms, and over whom he held powers and authority as
their mayor. Accordingly, Morales never ceased from acting and discharging his duties and responsibilities as
Chief Executive of Mabalacat, despite conversionof the Municipality of Mabalacat into Mabalacat City. (Halili v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 231643, January 15, 2019)
25. Distinguish voluntary renunciation from office from involuntary severance from office.
ANSWER: No severance From Office. Where an elective official was elected for 3-consecutive terms but was
the subject of a preventive suspension by the Ombudsman for several months during one of his terms, such
suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer’s continued stay and entitlement to the office
remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred from exercising the functions of his
office during this period. (Aldovino v. COMELEC, December 23, 2009)
Voluntary Renunciation From Office. A Punong Barangay who had already completed two consecutive
terms of office and ran for a third term in the Barangay elections of 2002, and while serving his third term as
Punong Barangay, he subsequently ran and won and assumed the position of a Sangguniang Bayan member,
has effectively abandoned the position of a Punong Barangay and he intended to forego of it. Abandonment,
like resignation, is voluntary. When he voluntarily relinquished his office as a Punong Barangay, there is
voluntary renunciation of said office. (Bolos vs. COMELEC, GR No. 184082, March 17, 2009))
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Involuntary Severance From Office. SFP was elected and served three consecutive term as municipal
councilor. During his second term, he succeeded as vice-mayor due to the retirement of the incumbent vice-
mayor. His assumption as vice-mayor was considered an involuntary severance from his office as municipal
councilor resulting an interruption in his second term of service. It was held that it could not be deemed to have
been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of law, hence qualified to run again as
municipal councillor. (Montebon vs. COMELEC, 551 SCRA 50)

26. EDWARD was elected City Mayor of Puerto Princesa in the elections of 1992, 1995 and
1998, where he fully served all the three consecutive terms. In the 2001 elections he ran for
governor of Palawan but he lost in such electoral race. A year after, a recall election for
City Mayor of Puerto Princesa was called by the COMELEC. Is EDWARD eligible to run for
City Mayor without violating the constitutional provision on term limit?
ANSWER: YES. After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate re-election for a
fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the
third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for
two reasons. First, a subsequent election is no longer an immediate re-election after three consecutive terms.
Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service. (Socrates vs.
COMELEC, 2002, 391 SCRA 457)
27. What is the effect of interruption of service on the three-term limit rule?
ANSWER: In Abundo v. COMELEC, GR No. 291716, January 8, 2013, the Court held that the two-year period
during which Abundo’s opponent was serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption, which
effectively removed Abundo’s case from the ambit of the three-term limit rule. Pending the favorable resolution
of his election protest, Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary constituent since his opponent, as
presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the mayoralty seat. For two years, Abundo was a
private citizen warming his heels while awaiting the outcome of his protest. An elected official who was
belatedly declared as winner and assumed office for only a short period of term is declared eligible by the Court,
Because he was deprived of his right and opportunity to serve his constituents and that an injustice may be
committed against the people of Viga by depriving them of their right to choose their leaders.
Vacancies and Succession
I. Permanent Vacancy
This type of vacancy arises when the local elective official 1) dies 2) permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office 3) fills a higher vacant office 4) refuses to
assume office 5) fails to qualify 6) removed from office 7) voluntarily resigns 8) Retirement
1. Governor and Mayor - succession by the
a. Vice Governor and Vice Mayor
Where the office is vacated by an ineligible candidate whose Certificate of
Candidacy was invalid at the time of filing, the eligible candidate who garnered the highest
number of votes must assume the office. The ineligible candidate who was proclaimed and
who already assumed office is a de facto officer by virtue of the ineligibility. (Jalosjos v.
COMELEC, 193314, June 25, 2013)
The rule on succession in Section 44 of the LGC cannot apply in instances when a
de facto officer is ousted from office and the de jure officer takes over. The ouster of a de
facto officer cannot create a permanent vacancy as contemplated in the LGC. There is no
vacancy to speak of as the de jure officer, the rightful winner in the elections, has the legal
right to assume the position. (Ibid.)
b. Sanggunian members according to ranking
2. Punong Barangay – succession by the
a. Highest ranking sangguniang member
b. Second Highest ranking sangguniang barangay member
3. Ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of the votes obtained to
the number of registered voters in each district, and not merely on the number of voters who actually
voted. (Victoria vs. COMELEC, 229 SCRA 269).
4. Ties will be resolved by drawing of lots. (Sec.44)
5. Sanggunian
a. Provinces, highly urbanized cities and independent component cities – appointment by the
President
b. Component city and municipality – appointment by governor
c. Under paragraph (a) of Section 45 of the Local Government Code, it is the Provincial
Governor who fills any permanent vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan by appointment.
(Farinas vs. Barba, 256 SCRA 396)
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The “last vacancy” in the Sanggunian refers to that created by the elevation of the
members formerly occupying the next higher rank which in turn also had become vacant by
any of the causes enumerated, and the term “last vacancy” is thus used in Section 45(b) of
the Local Government Code, to differentiate it from the other vacancy previously created.
In Navarro vs. CA, 355 SCRA 672, with the elevation of Tamayo who belonged to
Reforma Party, to the position of Vice-Mayor, a vacancy occurred in the Sanggunian that
should be filled up with someone who belongs to the political party of Tamayo. To argue that
the vacancy created was that formerly held by the 8 th Sanggunian member, a Lakas Party
Member, would result in the increase in that party’s representation in the Sanggunian at the
expense of Reforma Party.
Thus, the appointment of Navarro to fill up the vacancy in the Sanggunian is valid.
The reason behind the right given to a political party to nominate a replacement where a
permanent vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian is to maintain party representation as willed by
the people in the election. Otherwise, Reforma Party’s representation in the Sanggunian
would be diminished.
d. Sangguniang barangay – appointment by mayor
e. Except for the sangguniang barangay, the appointee shall come from the political party of the
member who caused the vacancy. (Farinas vs. Barba, 256 SCRA 396) If the member does
not belong to any party, the appointee shall be recommended by the sanggunian. (Ibid.)
Neither petitioner nor respondent is entitled to the vacant seat in the Sangguniang
Bayan. While petitioner was appointed by the provincial governor, he was not recommended
by the Sangguniang Bayan. Such recommendation is a condition sine qua non for the validity
of the appointment. Although respondent was recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan, it
was the municipal mayor and not the provincial governor who appointed him. (Ibid.)
f. The appointee for the sangguniang barangay shall be recommended by the sangguniang
barangay.
g. Vacancy in the representation of the youth and the barangay in the sanggunian shall be filled
by the official next in rank of the organization. (Sec. 45)
II. Temporary vacancy
This vacancy arises when an elected official is temporarily incapacitated to perform their
duties due to legal or physical reasons such as physical sickness, leave of absence, travel abroad or
suspension from office.
1. When the governor, mayor or punong barangay is temporarily incapacitated to perform his duties, the
vice governor, vice mayor, or ranking sangguniang barangay member shall exercise his powers except
the power to appoint, suspend or dismiss employees, which can only be exercised after 30 working
days.
Since the Local Government Code is silent on the mode of succession in case of temporary
vacancy in the position of vice governor, because of the exigencies of public service, the President,
through her alter ego, the Secretary of Local Government, may extend a temporary appointment to
remedy the situation. The appointment of petitioner is in accordance with the intention of the LGC,
which provides that in case of permanent vacancy in the office of the vice governor, the member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who obtained the highest number of votes shall assume office. The
contention that it is the SP who should make the appointment has no merit. As between the President,
who has supervision over local governments, and the members of the SP, who are junior to the vice
governor, the former should prevail. Even if the President has no power to appoint petitioner, at the
very least he is a de facto officer and is entitled to compensation. (Menzon vs. Petilla, 197 SCRA 251)
2. When the local chief executive is traveling within the Philippines, but outside of his jurisdiction for not
more than 3 consecutive days, he may designate an officer-in-charge. The authorization shall specify
the powers of the officer-in-charge except the power to appoint, suspend or dismiss employees.
3. If the local chief executive does not issue the authorization, the vice governor, vice mayor, or highest
ranking sangguniang barangay member shall assume his powers on the fourth day of his absence.
(Sec. 46)
However, Executive Order No. 15, issued on December 13, 2018, authorizes the Secretary of the
DILG to fill temporary vacancies in certain elective offices to prevent hiatus in and paralysis of local government
operations, to wit: (1) for temporary vacancies in the office of the Office of the Local Chief Executive, the vice
governor, city or municipal vice-mayor, or the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member, or in case of a
barangay, the second highest sangguniang barangay member shall automatically exercise the powers and
perform the duties and functions of the Local Chief executive; (2) for temporary vacancies in the office of the
vice-governor or city or municipal vice-mayor, the highest ranking sangguniang member or, in case of his
inability, the second highest ranking sangguniang member, shall be designated by the President through the
SILG.
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