Chapter - III

FOREIGN NATIONAL MOVEMENT AND THE AASU

An event that catapulted the AASU forever in history has been its ret--nth-
struggle against the influx of Bangladeshi and Nepali citizens to Assam. The h ■■reign
national movement, better known as the Assam Movement or the Assam Agnation
is the mile post on which the glory of the AASU will forever rest.

The problem of immigration is nothing new for world society. Historical

societies of the most advanced nations of the world are but a contribut:mi >>!
immigration— a flight of people from one place to another in search o! better
standards of living. Europe as we see today, was the source of the most imomaul
migratory movement in world history. Its first manifestations occurred cent uric n
earlier, in such forms as the eastward expansion of Germanic settlers anti the
westward and southward conquests of the Iberian state.1

But it was the Industrial Revolution in Europe, simultaneously sustaining

massive growth in population and producing enhanced forms of transportation ami
weaponry, that really stimulated the continent’s outward thrust. Between 184b and
1890, people emigrated from Europe at an average rate of 377,000 per y ar hm
between 1891 and 1910 emigration soared to an average rate of 911,000 pm soar.
Indeed, between 1846 and 1930, over 50 million Europeans sought a nma hu
overseas.2 It was all good then because the earlier migration wen trim
technologically advanced societies into less advanced societies. But corner.mumm
migrants chiefly move from poor and underdeveloped societies to a better-oil - k iuv
whether developed or developing, causing all sorts of imbalance— p hue ii
economic and social. Some of the notable examples could be workem in m
Southeast Asia moving to Japan, millions of North Africans migrating to Bur >tx ami
thousands of families from south of the Rio Grande moving to North America.

87
History of Immigration into Assam
The foreign national movement emerged in the 1970s, the genesis of which
however, lies in the last couple of decades before independence and couple m
decades after independence of the country. By the beginning of the 20th centur\
immigration to Assam was a historical necessity keeping in view the massive
requirement of labourers in the tea gardens of Assam. The Britishers had then
encouraged migration, as the local Assamese, according to them, were not keen to
work in the tea gardens. They encouraged migration into tea gardens of Assam
from Bihar, Chhota Nagpur, Bengal, Madras, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa. Andhia
Pradesh, etc.

The ‘babu class’ managerial posts were fdled chiefly by educated Bengalis
However, the influx of labourers was not confined to tea plantation alone. Workers
from Bihar, Orissa and Uttar Pradesh were extensively drafted in the construction <>t
roads, bridges, houses and railway tracks. Nepali immigration was encouraged for
the jobs of chowkidars, domestic helpers and grazing of cows. The British Arms was
heavily composed of the trusted Gurkhas from Nepal. Rajasthanis and Bengalis
formed the trading class. But the most significant immigration was that <>t the
landless but tireless farmers of East Bengal. The following chart tells us the tale m
a nutshell.

Annual immigration of labour including children into Assam plantations

Table-I
Year No. of Labours Year No. of Labours
1902-03 26,684 1919-20 102.0S1'
1903-04 22,162 1920-21 25.4".'
1904-05 24,209 1924-25 33.7. "
1905-06 31,830 1925-26 33.(M >o
1906-07 25,617 1926-27 4 3 .6 'i .
1907-08 84,824 1927-28 42.84 s
1908-09 60,773 1928-29 6 X 3 )0 1 1

1909-10 39,332 1929-30 s') i'

1910-11 43,657 1930-31 53.5 i1'
1911-12 58.646 1931-32 50,0'i

88
 Y ear N o. o f L a b ou rs Y ear N o . o f L a b o u rs

1912-13 59,873 1932-33 39.901

1913-14 58,646 1933-34 47.960

1914-15 63,638 1934-35 19.968

1915-16 110,376 1935-36 23.876

1916-17 48,130 1936-37 27.843

1917-18 19,407 1937-38 32,3 3-

1918-19 222,171

Source-1 : Assam Labour Enquiry Committee Reports o f 1906 and 1921-22; Reports on Ipimiei. nt
Labour in the Surma Valley and Hills Division as well as the Assam Valley D iv is io n tor ; u
year ending the 30th June, 1929.
Source-2 : Annual Reports on the Working of the Tea Districts Immigration Labour Act (XXII i I M i
Also, relevant Reports o f the Land Revenue Administration, Government of A s s a il

T h u s it c o u ld b e seen that im m ig ra tio n h e lp e d th e n o n -A s s a m e s e g et a foothold

in a lm o st a ll e c o n o m ic a c tiv itie s o f A s s a m , p a rtly due to th e p o lic y o f the Britishers

and p a rtly as m an y B ritish a d m in istra tors o f the tim e put it— the attitude o f me

in d ig en o u s A ssa m ese. A rep o rt b y B ritis h C o m m is s io n e r W .W . H u n te r stands am ple

testim on y to the a b o ve. T h e re p o rt in ter a lia stated, “ th e p e o p le are axerse :o

w o r k in g fo r d a ily w a g e s as th ey a ffir m that b y d o in g so th ey c o m p ro m is e their

resp ecta b ility . T h e in d ig e n o u s p o p u la tio n fu rn ish es v e r y fe w p erm a n en t labourers u>

the tea gard en s.” 3 A n o th e r rep o rt b y S ir P e r c iv a l G r iffit h says, “ the v illa g e r s n pn ,-d

an e c o n o m y w h ic h w as a lm o s t s e lf-s u ffic ie n t and w ere, th e r e fo r e , noi mu h

in terested in the e m p lo y m e n t o ffe r e d b y th e e a rly tea plan ters, as a rule, neither

in c lin e d n o r c o m p e lle d b y circu m sta n ces to h a ve c o m e in search o f w o r k . " ' 1 he liven

A ssista n t C o m m is s io n e r o f N o r th L a k h im p u r, S ir John O a k a ls o said, “ It i a u r\

rare th in g in d eed fo r an A s s a m e s e liv in g at a d istan ce to le a v e his h o m e fo r the nv re

in d u cem en t o f g ettin g w o rk in a tea ga rd en . T h e ir ta k in g such w o r k at a ll is genera l\

attribu table to tem p o ra ry n e c e s sity as fo r in stan ce in a b ility to p a y th eir :cven ie.

w a n tin g to g e t m arried and not h a v in g the n ecessa ry m eans, b e in g in a d im u a

Kayah and w a n tin g , i f p o s s ib le, to e s ca p e p a y m e n t o f e x o rb ita n t interest, o i r m- >re

c o m m o n ly happens, p a w n in g th e ir fr e e d o m b e in g in w an t o f y o k e o f bu llock^ in-

c u ltiv a tin g pu rposes, etc., etc.” 5

89
 Despite all these, noted historian, Sir E.A. Gait in his Census report wi >ie in
1891, “It might have been thought that the amount of available land, the lerti i!\ n
the soil, and the prevailing low rents, would have induced some portions at Uad < i
the overcrowded cultivators of Bengal to find their way to Assam and take no land
here. But this does not appear to be the case."'1 What added impetus to masso
migration to Assam was Lord Curzon’s partition of Bengal into East Bengal and
Assam in 1905. Besides this, the newly-laid railway tracts from Chhatagum I >
Dibrugarh under the Assam Bengal Railway Company also encouraged n assn
migration from 1898-1905.7 Another factor that needs to be highlighted as the mason
behind massive migration to Assam from East Bengal was the prevalence o!
Ryotbari system in Assam, a much liberal form of revenue collection than the
Zamindari system prevalent in East Bengal. In fact from 1904-11, 54,000 peasants
mostly from Mymensingh, Rangpur and Jalpaiguri in East Bengal migrated >
Assam for good, out of which 51,000 settled in Goalpara. From 1911-19 . the
numbers rose by almost six times to 300,000.8
Mullan’s Census Report of 1931
It was not only from East Bengal Muslims that Assam was facing a migration
deluge but the Nepalis too were slowly but surely establishing their foothold her
A decadel study from 1901-1931 shows that from a figure of 21,000 in I9d|. the
immigration of Nepalis jumped to 47,654 in 1911 and to 70,344 in 1931 i.e. m three
decades, the number of Nepalis in Assam rose by three-and-a-half times.1' h curb
this threat of massive migration to Assam and to check crimes following tercible
occupation of grazing reserves, unauthorized fishing in beels, lifting of cattle and
buffaloes, assault on indigenous graziers and cultivators in Nowgong and kamrup
the British administrators, as per the suggestion of the Deputy Commissi.mci s
Nowgong, devised a line system in 1916 and put it into operation in 1920 in he tv n
districts. The aim of the system was also to isolate the immigrants from tK Kv a!
people by compelling the former to live and toil in particular ‘segregated localities
The policy of the system was one of planned settlements in the interest of cuitoah i -
themselves and the protection of interest of the indigenous people, partial! u l\ te
tribal and backward classes. The Line System and settlement of immigrant' am-<i
quite an uproar for a number of years in Assam’s political scene. In 1928 a m

90
member committee was formed, headed by A.W. Botham and included Natan
Chandra Bordoloi and Mohammad Saadullah, to look into the line system an t
colonization scheme of the immigrants. Before, much headway could be made mt
the issue, the Census Report of S. C. Mullan, Census Superintendent of mn
published in 1931, set the alarm bell ringing.

Though the report was on expected lines, but the enormity of the problem ami
the foresightedness of Mr. Mullan were what stood out in the report. It was pi >hahl\
for the first time that the Britishers also recognized the intensity of the inimi nation
problem and its repercussion on the Assam province. Mr Mullan, in his repoii.
wrote, “ Probably the most important event in the province during the last t \ent
five years, an event moreover, which seems likely to alter permanently the ". ho e
future of Assam and to destroy more surely than did the Burmese invaders m : '
the whole structure of Assamese culture and civilization—has been the inva ion a
a vast horde of land-hungry Bengali immigrants, mostly Muslims, from the m 'tn e f'
of Eastern Bengal and in particular Mymensingh.” 10 This invasion began sometimes
before 1911 and the Census Report of that is the first report which makes mention

of the advancing hordes. But, as we now know, the Bengali immigrants censmed lor
the first time on the char island of Goalpara in 1921 were merely the aci Minced
guards or rather the scouts— of a huge army following closely at their heels lu
1921, the first army corps had passed into Assam and had practically conquered me
district of Goalpara. Mullan added, “ In fact, the way in which they have seized upon
the vacant areas in the Assam Valley seems almost uncanny. Without fuss, u t h ri n
tumult, without undue trouble to the district revenue staff, a population whu h mi si
amount to over half-a-million has transplanted itself from Bengal into Assan Vail \
during the last twenty-five years. It looks like a marvel of admin •strum e
organization on the part of Government but it is nothing of the sort, the on:\ tin u
1 can compare it to is the mass movement of a large body of ants.... it is sac an \
no means improbable that in another thirty years, Sivasagar district will be n e m i\
part Assam in which an Assamese will find himself at home.” " Five years later m

1936, a strong move was initiated in the Provincial Council to abolish me 1 ne

System altogether as, the argument put it : it impeded absorption of the im m igrants

into the Assamese society. Speaking on the occasion, the Revenue Ministe had m

91
refer to the danger of uncontrolled immigration driving the indigenous p o p u la tio n

off the map. After 1937 elections, pressure against the Line System w as so gn. ii that

a committee of the Assembly had to be appointed to examine the whole quesnou m

depth. In an effort to reconcile diametrically opposite points of view, the C o m m itte e

produced, in due course, a via-media report to provide “ a working solution >1 an

extremely complicated problem” . In December, 1937, Jawaharlal Nehru w ro te a

letter to Bishnuram Medhi saying that he too realized the gravity of the s i'n a tio n

arising out of Muslim immigration to Assam.

The Report of the Line System Committee (1938) appointed b\ the

Government of Assam, observed that large-scale immigration led to a shift m the

demographic balance in favour of the Muslims with abnormal rise in their p o p u la tio n

from 9 per cent in 1921 to 19 per cent in 1931 and 23 per cent in 1941. In h a rp e a

subdivision alone, the population of Muslims shot up from 0.1 per cent in l ‘ MI o

49 per cent in 1941.

Political Conspiracy
During Sir Mohammad Saadullah’s Muslim League Ministry in Assam in the

1930s, when the country was echoing with not only the demand for independent e.
but also for the creation of a separate country— Pakistan— a concerted effort was
made to encourage the migration of Bengali Muslims into Assam for p o litic a l

reasons. The then Viceroy Lord Wavell wrote in the Viceroy’s journal when h

visited Assam, on December 22, 1943, “The chief political problem is th e d ire t

the Muslim ministers to increase the immigration into the uncultivated govem nu m

land under the slogan of grow more food but what they are really after is grow more
Muslims” . Further, during the Census operation in 1941, Saadullah in s tr u c t'd that

population should be classified on the basis of community rather than re lig io n . \s

a result, a large number of tribal people who had earlier enrolled th e m e Le-. as

Hindus, Christians and Buddhists were now included under the head trib a l I nts
meant that the Hindu tribals in Assam had been shown as non-Hindus in the l(c !
Census. Consequently, the Census figures indicated a considerable re d u c tio n m fu

Hindu population. This was in league with the nationwide demand of the M i c m

League for a division of the country on the basis of religion. T h e g re a te r plan i

92
Saadullah probably was joining Pakistan at the time of independence Ihio
immigration which had begun for economic compulsion was starting to be u-rd !< i
sinister political designs.

This belief was further strengthened by the remarks of Moinul Haqtk . the
private secretary of Jinnah, who after independence of India became a Mimsiei m
Assam, and later at Delhi. He told Jinnah that he would “ present Assam to mn *-n
a silver platter” . Jinnah, confidently, had then declared in Guwahati that Assam was
in his pocket. The design of Jinnah had nearly materialized when the ( ihin !
Mission plan of Sir Stafford Cripps had placed Assam in Group C with Bengal The
Congress as well as the Muslim League accepted the grouping plan, but Gopinadi
Bordoloi opposed it. Bordoloi received Mahatma Gandhi’s support and Jinnah \ plan
was foiled.

When in 1946, two Assamese — Bijoy Chandra Bhagabati and Mohendra

Mohan Chaudhuri— met Gandhiji on the grouping plan at Panchgani. Mahatma
expressed his anguish over unrestricted migration to Assam. He said, “ Bordoloi has
referred to the problem of unrestricted migration to Assam under the patronage o|
the Saadullah Ministry. The Assamese people should never accept the policy II
unrestricted immigration to a small province like Assam from a neighbouring
province is allowed to continue, and if as a result of this the existing people are likely
to be reduced to a minority, then the state has a right to take proper action agaimi
this.... Assam must not lose its soul” .

With India’s independence, East Pakistan too came into existence. The partition
of India left the Hindus homeless in Pakistan. The Bengali Hindus then stan.nl
pouring into Assam and Tripura from East Pakistan. But strangely, along with he
Bengali Hindus, a large number of Bengali Muslims also came to Assam I he
Central Government was thus forced to introduce a Bill on December 2 4 PM9
which in 1950 became the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950. flic Bill
provided that, “any immigrant person excepting the displaced person, who. fxvai.se
of civil disturbance or fear of civil disturbance entered Assam, was liable to he
deported” .

93
 Measures, however, were taken from time-lo-time to cheek migration ln>m k.a-i
Bengal and the first effort materialized in the form of the Nehru-- fiaquat pant <>i
1950 which inter alia allowed anyone coming to India before December 31,1 o50 t >
become an Indian citizen. Though the pact provided for the nature of Muslim from
Pakistan to India, and Hindus from India to Pakistan, the Hindus did not go hack t >
their original homeland, once they came over to India from East and West Pakistan

In the first post-Independence Census Report of 1951. India's s uim

Commissioner R. B. Vaghaiwalla said, “ I have personally seen hundreds of persons
coming on trains during the first months I held charge of Goalpara district 1 had
the same experience as the Deputy Commissioner in Cachar” .

Migration to Assam during the decade from 1951-1961 continued unabated

though the number of Muslims in the State in the Census had stood considerably
lower due to the fact that lakhs of Muslims had fled away to East Pakistan during
the communal clashes that year, and hence they were not available for enumeration
during the Census, but it would be naive to assume that this mass exodus was
showing a negative growth. Because as soon as the situation returned to nonnalcv
the East Pakistani Muslims returned in even larger numbers to paraphrase what
Edward Said, noted Palestinian historian had said, “ to a land without people tor
people without land” .12Also, if the number of Muslims in Assam appear somew hat
deflated in the Census of 1951 in comparison with their numbers in 1941 it was
because of the transfer of the overwhelmingly Muslim majority district of S Ihot to
East Pakistan in the wake of the partition of the country in 1947.

The mass exodus of East Pakistani and Nepali people was not only having
social ramification but also affecting the economic condition of Assam greatf B \
Nath, in his article in the Eastern Voice— Impact of Immigration on Adam's
Economy— cited that the daily wages of the agricultural labourers in the areas A
high concentration of immigration such as Goalpara was merely Rs 3 as ompnivd
to Rs 8 in Sivasagar district where there was no immigration. No doubt, imnugrati >n
labourers were in demand over the indigenous ones, and locals started m h-e!
neglected.

Immigration to Assam was alsq orchestrated by .Pakistan with an eye m

incorporate the fertile land of the State into that nation. No wonder, the late Pukisian

94
Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto wrote in his book The M y th of liu lc p a id t w <• m
1968, “ It would be wrong to think that Kashmir is the only dispute that divide* IihIm
and Pakistan, though it is undoubtedly the most significant.... one at least as near! ,
important as the Kashmir dispute is that of Assam and some districts ot India
adjacent to East Bengal. To these, East Pakistan has very good claims, which should
not have been allowed to remain quiescent” . When B. P. Chaliha, the Chief Mmisti i
of Assam, realizing the grave danger posed by immigrants, intensified th*. dri\e
against immigrants to deport them in the late 1960s after the formation of the
Foreigners’ Tribunals in 1964, politicians no less stature than Md. Fakhruddm Aii
Ahmed and Moinul Haque Choudhury pressurized him to stop deportation and
convinced the Centre to close down the Foreigners’ Tribunals, and all cases against
foreign infiltration were then transferred to ordinary courts of law. Thus, simo the
early stages, the State had to fight infiltration and their ‘sympathizers' both within
and without. Even the partition of India did not “ assuage the land hunger " n East
Pakistan. The new international boundary was not marked and was unguarded
resulting in the interplay of economic forces despite partition and a large number of
Muslims from East Pakistan continued to move across the open frontiers into Assam.
Tripura and West Bengal—for land, work and opportunities. Their passage was
illegal but economic forces proved more potent than passport and visa regulations
The Influx , a publication of the Foreign Ministry further described East Bengal is
“ demographically.... overloaded” . Thus the traditional migration from East Pakistan
continued even though the political frontier had come into being.

C. S. Mullan’s prophetic warning was borne by the events that fallowed

Massive migration of the East Pakistan Muslims into Assam shook the Government
at the Centre. An action plan to stop migration from East Pakistan and to detect and
deport those who had already infiltrated was drawn up by the Union Home Ministry
in 1964. The plan known as Pakistani Infiltration Prevention (PIP) Scheme was
authored by the then Director of Intelligence Bureau, B. N. Mullick. The motivation
of the PIP Scheme was significant. After the two Census operations in P a l and
1961, the Government of India was alarmed at the decadel rise of population n
34.93 per cent in Assam by 1961. But during the same period, the decadel nca. s,-
computed for East Bengal on the basis of a normal 30 per cent rise, turned out to

95
be about one million less than what it should have been. At the same turn the
Muslim population in Assam, West Bengal, Tripura and the Purnea district ol Bihai
(reckoned on the norm of a 30 per cent increase) registered an additional increase of
about 1.03 million. The conclusion of a population migration of around a million
from East Pakistan to India was thus indubitably established. This is why the PIP
Scheme came into being. It is, however, a different story that the Scheme proved to
be an unmitigated disaster that hardly prevented any infiltration from across the
border, because of persistent pressures from a powerful section of the minority
community in the Congress. An influential minister continued to state in public that
‘Indian citizens’ were being harassed. The project proved to be a non-starter

The enormity of the problem of infiltration also increased after the Indo-Pak
war of 1965, when a large section of Bengali Hindus were forced to leave f a s t
Pakistan. What was also perplexing was that a supposedly pro-Indian Bangladesh
Premier Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had in his book : Eastern Pakistan : its Population
and Economics observed, “because Eastern Pakistan must have sufficient land for its

expansion and because Assam has abundant forests and mineral resources, coal,
petroleum, etc., Eastern Pakistan must include Assam to be financially and
economically strong” .

Former Assam Chief Minister Hiteswar Saikia, in his capacity as the State
Home Minister, also once admitted, “Turning to pages of the Census reports in each
decade, one could not fail to realize that there has been a steady stream <>! land
greedy’ cultivators from districts like Mymensingh, Sylhet, Dhaka and Camilla m
East Bengal to Assam— mainly Nagaon, Darrang, Goalpara, North Kami up and
North Lakhimpur where they settled” .13

Creation of Bangladesh and Influx

In 1971, the uprising for Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan broke out.
The Pakistani Army began a massive crackdown on the Bangla Liberal ion
Movement. On March 25, 1971, the Indo-East Pakistan borders were urtualK
thrown open and there was massive infiltration to Assam, and other north-eastern
States. During the uprising, nearly 11 lakh infiltrations entered Assam, a millioi ol

96
them were stationed in camps, and around one lakh of them, mostly Hindus uaved
with their relatives. After Bangladesh’s independence, many migrants, did n<>t rotuin
to their country despite the Indira-Muzib Treaty in 1972. What was disappointing m
the entire episode was that while the Government lay in slumber, political parties
encouraged, aided and abetted this whole business of infiltration and helped c\en in
incorporating the infiltrators’ names in the voters’ list with an eye on selfish ends
India’s aiding Bangladesh’s cause could also be interpreted from a shairu lul at I
of the Chief Election Commissioner who changed the enumeration card for Assam
in 1971, by skipping the penal section in that card. This single act of the Cl ( had
enabled the Assam Government to enlist 6.32 lakh voters in the year 1971 alone
against the average increase of 1.13 lakh voters per year prior to that period
This design of the Centre later came to the fore when an AASU delegate >n met
the Assam Chief Secretary in New Delhi while submitting a memorandum to mm on
the alarming situation arising out of the illegal foreign nationals. Mr Sarao then
Chief Secretary, Assam, told the AASU delegation that, “after all whai was
Bangladesh was once a part of Pakistan, and who knows someday it would not he
a part of India.” 14

AASU’s Charter of Demands

Disgusted by the whole affairs of infiltration into Assam and its repercussions
on the State’s economy, the AASU in 1974 drew up a charter of demands, popular K
known as the Economic Charter, because all major items on the charter were on
economic lines. The issue of infiltration was also highlighted in the charter Pro!
Deba Prasad Barooah, former Vice-Chancellor of Gauhati University says 'faced
with the Government’s failure to deal with the exasperations generated by dubious
role of the major political parties, the student community of Assam raised he ti si
voice of an organized movement when the All Assam Students’ Union i A.ASi i
presented a 21-point charter of demands to the Assam Government on February I
1974, the detection and deportation of foreign nationals was one of the demands
By 1975, infiltration of foreign nationals, struck deep roots with grew
repercussions. A highly-concerned Central Government, therefore, had to instruct

97
State Governments to adopt extraordinary procedure of getting Electoral Roll,
checked by the Criminal Investigation Department. It was also advised that cavs
foreign nationals enrolled as voters should be brought to the notice of Electoral
Registration Officer for necessary action. Simultaneously, the Election Comnu siua
also issued specific instructions for deleting such names from Electoral Rolf,
invoking the relevant provisions of Section 22 of the Representation of People - Am
As conceded by the 1971 Census Report— The 1971 Census gave the number ol
immigrants into Assam as 1,503,543. This figure is also not reliable and cannot be
used to make any valid estimate of growth of either immigrants themselves or the
total population of the State excluding the immigrants. The available figure may be
somewhat misleading. Taking the whole population of 3.29 million of Assam in 1901
as ‘indigenous’ and applying the all India rate of increase of 129.67 per cem bom
1901-1971, its population should have been 7.56 million instead of 14.63 million
“ In the background of this Census Report, the Home Ministry’s reported connate
that out of around nine lakh foreigners’ between 1961 and 1971, only 28,000 happen
to be Muslims cannot but appear naive in the extreme, distorting as it does, tla vers
character of mass immigration into Assam ever since the turn of the century as well
as creation of Pakistan. It would look all the more absurd when it is remembered that
even in the 1972-81 decade, after creation of a ‘friendly’ Bangladesh, detection ot
illegal Muslim immigrants happens to be more than 50,000 with year-wise detection
exceeding that of all others in eight out of 10 years.16

What was surprising to the AASU and all those concerned about the enti v
episode was the failure on the part of the State as well as the Centre to detect and
deport infiltrators. To add to this, soft-pedalling in the process of deiect ion.
prosecution and deportation, the burden of proving that the person concerned wa^ a
foreign national and not an Indian citizen appears to have been placed prim. n l\ >n
the prosecution thus making effective exercise of power under the Foreigner -\ct o
good as academic. Deportation, which had begun with much enthusiasm, beiian u>
decline sharply and the tribunals earlier set up seemingly became redundant th.-it
eventual abolition was only a logical corollary since the problem ot illegal
infiltration was considered to have been duly ‘resolved’.

98
 Tabic - II

YEAR DETECTION DEPORTATION

1961 5,146 : 4,603

1962 14,616 : 13.377
1963 31,801 : 30,825
1964 72,651 : 69,415
1965 72,718 : 46,244
1966 24,664 14,488
1967 4,740 : 4,063
1968 5,962 : 4,709
1969 4,365 : 2,458
1970 2,444 : 1,716
1971 1,013 : 441

The table shows that whereas in 1964 and 1965, more than 72,000 infillrator.
were detected and 69,515 were deported in 1964 and 46,244 were deported in 1965:
in the year 1971, only 1,013 were detected and 441 were deported.

The massive infiltration was harming Assam’s agriculture and thereby it ^

economy in a big way. In a span of five years the number o f operational holdings
with less than one hectare each rose from 11 lakh in 1971 (World Agricultural
Census) to 1,343,692 in 1976-77 as revealed in the Agricultural Census of the sank
year. In fact, even by 1964, the State’s arable land became so scarce that diminishme
reserve forest and other government reserves had to be the only means of satis!} me
the ever-increasing land hunger resulting from ceaseless immigration. A stu.h a
connection with the PIP Scheme reveals, “ the main attraction for the immigrants
land, and the land that is available is in the Char areas, and in the govemmeni
reserve forest and other government reserve areas.... We feel that the only way
find a permanent solution to infiltration is to deny infiltration the main attractu n
which draws him into Assam, that is the arable land o f forest.” By 1976-77. Assail' '
total forest area came to 30 per cent of its geographical area. In the light of the 1<T !
Census, the 1977 Electoral Rolls was preserved to have contained 14-15 !akh >!
illegal voters. The Assam Government’s acceptability of this ‘voters list' as the ba e
made a mockery of the ‘deletion’ operation it had tried to carry out then.

99
 Myron Weiner, who is regarded as an authority on migration and its political
impact, notes as far back as 1978 that the population o f Assam— in its ; resent
boundaries which is one-third o f what it was before the smaller States were curved
out o f it in the 1970s— was 3.3 million. He said, “ Had Assam’s population im eased
at the same rate as the rest o f India from 1901-1971 (130 per cent), her population
would now be 7.6 million rather than fifteen million, a difference of 7 4 million.
Actually, the proportion o f migrants and descendants is substantially greater Mine
large-scale migrations into the State commenced in the middle o f the nineteenth
century. If we accept the 1891 Census that one-fourth of the population of the
Brahmaputra Valley was then o f migrant origin, we can estimate that the migrant
population and its descendants in 1971 was more than 8.5 million, against an
indigenous population of 6.5 million.... Between 1961 and 1971, the popula'ion of
Assam increased by 34.7 per cent as against 24.6 per cent for India as a whole.

After Emergency was lifted, the issue of infiltration came again to the
forefront. On September 24, 1978, Mr. S. L. Shakdhar, the Chief Hcetmn
Commissioner at a conference o f chief electoral officers at Ootacumund warned <>|
large scale inclusion o f foreign nationals in voters’ list. The report of the Cl ( inter
alia said, “I would like to refer to the alarming situation in some States, especially
in the north-eastern region wherefrom disturbing reports are coming regarding lame
scale inclusion o f foreign nationals in the electoral rolls. In one case (Assam), the
population in 1971 recorded an increase as high as 34.98 per cent over the l9o|
figure, and this increase was attributed to the influx o f a very large number 4
persons from the neighbouring countries. This influx has become a regular feature.
I think it may not be a wrong assessment to make, on the basis of the increase >!
34.98 per cent between the two censuses, the increase that is likely to be rm orded
in the 1991 Census would be more than 100 per cent over the 1961 C'envo. ' In
other words, a state would be reached when the State would have to reck m with
the foreign nationals who may constitute a sizeable percentage if not the maim im I
the population, of the State. Another disturbing factor in this regard is the demand
made by the political parties for the inclusion in the Electoral Rolls of the n tines >t
such migrants who are not Indian citizens without even questioning and propcK
determining the citizenship status. This is a serious state of affair. The gravit ot the

100
situation, therefore, calls lor drastic and effective measures. After ascertainin'. vmn
views on the matter, I propose to address a communication to the U nion Mom
Ministry stressing the immediate need for the necessary administrative set-up at tli
lowest possible level for the purpose of identifying each foreign national i th
country and for the expeditious grant of certificate of citizenship under Cm / n\hm
Act to all eligible persons by adopting an effective and uniform procedure

In November 1978, the Minister for External Affairs, Atal Bchari Vaipayc
replying to a question told Parliament, “ It has come to the notice of the Election
Commission from time to time, that large-scale inclusion of foreign nationals in the
electoral rolls, specially in the north-eastern region, has been taking plaa Mr
Vajpayee also said, “ In August 1975, the Ministry of Home'Affairs instructed all tin
State governments and the administrations of all the Union Territories that th Siam
Criminal Investigation Departments might be instructed to take immediate vxps
check the electoral rolls, and if they discover the names of foreigners in the n K the
fact might be brought to the notice of the concerned electoral officers tor aciting
such names deleted from the electoral rolls” .

Beginning of the Movement

The AASU started a stir on August 8, 1978, demanding expuEmn I

foreigners, with picketing at every district headquarters office followed K
satyagraha, hunger strike, Assam bandit and fast-unto-death, etc. On Dece inner 2 -
1978, AASU leaders, on the request of the Government of Assam, started a
discussion but to no avail. The students’ body then decided to carry out x ov n
course of action following Government’s indifference. In March 1979, the \AM
elected its new committee in the Sivasagar conference. Prafulla Kumar Mahai ia
became the president and Bhrigu Kumar Phukan, the general secretar I an
Rajkhowa and Nagen Sarma became its advisers.

On March 28, 1979, the sitting MP of Mangaldoi constituency, Hiralal I’atowan

died. Naturally, a by-election had to be held, whereupon electoral rolls had to x
revised and updated. According to the Central Government instructions, the deletr >n
of foreigners names, estimated to be at least 70,000 in Mangaldoi alone, wav taken

101
up and as many as 26,900 Bangladeshis were detected judicially.1'' This st.iftItn -
disclosure, understandably, caused intense controversy, widespread dismay am! hittei
resentment. A strong demand was voiced by intelligentsia, journalists and the AASl
for a thorough revision of electoral rolls of all parliamentary constituencies m the
State. Apparently, the Election Commission also ordered a scrutiny of the remainin g
constituencies. A beginning also seems to have been made in the parlianu tiuu \
constituencies of Nowgong, Barpeta, Kokrajhar and the Autonomous Hills Pi anct
This only helped in stirring the proverbial hornet’s nest, for the same forces which
successfully stalled the PIP Scheme in 1966 were back again, with an identical
complaint of Indian citizens being harassed and bona fide voters being deprived of
a fundamental right in a parliamentary democracy. In the resultant political
instability in an atmosphere surcharged with bitter animosity, two su o issiu -
governments had to quit. As a logical corollary, the process of checking names of

foreign nationals also came to a grinding halt.20

As a result, the Chief Election Commissioner had to bend. He directed the

authorities to stop deletion of foreigners’ names and said, “A person whose name has

been included.... shall be presumed to be a citizen of India” ....contrary to his

previous statements.21 The AASU strongly objected to this and demanded immediate
sealing of the Indo-Bangladesh borders beside detection, deletion and deportation n|
infiltrators. Yet the Centre and the State Government remained unmoved. Thu being
left with virtually no alternative, the AASU decided to start its historn and
pathbreaking stir against foreign nationals beginning June 8, 1979. AASU provident
Prafulla Kumar Mahanta observed, “Neither the Union Government nor the State
Government took any step considered essential under the law and Constitution This
left the AASU with no alternative but to draw the attention of the Government to is
inescapable duty to cut out this cancerous growth o f infiltrators in the voters list ov
resorting to legitimate and permissible Gandhian means.22

The spring of 1979 even saw cases of communal tension in some part of the
State. On March 9 and 10, 1979, there was rioting in Rangia after a police round

up of Bangladeshi immigrants. There was widespread violence, including lo o tin g

and arson and the police had to open fire. Many were injured and many arrest d I he

102
signs were ominous. The then Chief Minister Golap Borbora said in the State
Assembly that influx o f people from Bangladesh and Nepal was assuming alemune
proportion and that his Government had taken sincere steps to check it. He said that
the Government intended to deport every foreign national. He cited the step taken
by his Government— deportation, examination o f the Electoral Rolls, scrutim/ation
of land records, strengthening o f the border police force and river police-— t<wards
the end. On April 16, 1979, Prime Minister Morarji Desai met Bangladesh Pr udent
Zia-ur Rahman in Dhaka where both the leaders agreed that infiltration to Indi t mint
stop. The Bangladesh President in the meeting remarked, “ If there arc g mume
Bangladeshis I shall take them back” . On April 18, 1979, Prime Minister Moralji
Desai, in a press conference, reiterated that infiltration had to stop. On April l ‘h
1979, in Parliament, Mr Desai repeated his press conference statement hi the
infiltrators. On May 14, 1979, the AASU in a press release, demanded detei ion >i
infiltrators and their deportation. The release also demanded the deletion of
infiltrators’ names from the voters’ list. On May 16, 1979, Prime Minister De,ai and
Home Minister H. M. Patel explained in Parliament that in the year 1978 7o the
Border Security Force (BSF) had pushed pack 23,904 Bangladeshi infiltrator-, As d
to attest this, the External Affairs Minister A. B. Vajpayee said that infiltration was
continuing. He said that between April 10 and May 10, 1979, 1,809 Bangladeshis
were pushed back by the BSF.

On May 23, 1979, the AASU executive in a meeting decided to pi mice

headlong in the anti-Bangladeshi momentum it created in the State. The meeting
called a 12-hour Assam bandh on June 8, 1979 signalling the beginning >| me
foreign national movement.

On June 7, 1979, when the Assam Chief Minister, Mr. Golap Barbora was m
Delhi, he had a long meeting with the Prime Minister wherein he wanted that ill
immigrants coming after March 1971 should be pushed back. This, he said would
be the first step to deal with the foreign nationals problem. Nothing, however came
out of the meeting, considering the political turmoil the Centre was in.

The AASU on June 8, 1979, gave a 12-hour Assam bandh call, marking lie
first step in its six year long agitation. The AASU bandh was for stopping intilirati hi

103
of foreigners, checking the rise in prices of essential commodities and geiviatiiv’
employment opportunities for the local people. The Government, as a stern warning,
issued a press statement on June 12, 1979 saying that all attempts at disrupt ion <1
public life by means o f bandhs and strikes would be severely dealt with

On June 24, 1979, AASU president Prafulla Kumar Mahanta, in an open letter
to Chief Minister Golap Barbora, accused the State Government o f dismal failure in
tackling the burning problems of the State.21 He pointed out that Assam was mmiiv
heavily for sheltering infiltrators and thereby endangering the culture and identity of
the indigenous people. He reminded the Chief Minister o f Mr Shakdhar s warning
the fallout of the revisions o f Mangaldoi Electoral Rolls. The AASU wondi red as

to why the Government was inactive in stopping the flow of foreigners. Thu lettei
also said that a section o f inhabitants along with the infiltrators, old and new
succeeded in creating pockets o f their own. The AASU president said that the
infiltrators were trying to establish their linguistic might in the State and nourishing
political ambitions. The AASU president, in his missive, blamed it on the political
leaders o f Assam, old and new, for such an ominous situation. He also demanded
protection o f the socio-economic interest o f the indigenous people of the S ate

Meanwhile, the Centre saw two successive Prime Ministers resigning. On

August 22, 1979 the Lok Sabha was dissolved and new elections were ordered

The AASU, in order to facilitate the participation o f all sections of the people
in the struggle, both on the mental and physical planks, decided to institutionalize
the involvement o f non-students in the movement. Thus the All Assam Gann
Sangram Parishad (AAGSP) was bom by a resolution of the AASU at its meeting
in Dibrugarh convention o f August 27 and 28, 1979. The AAGSP consisted of the
AASU, the Asom Sahitya Sabha, and the Purbanchaliya Lok Parishad. Lea r mu
Jatiyatabadi Dal, the Asom Yubak Samaj and the Young Lawyers’ Forum alsi mined
the AAGSP.

On September 5, 1979, the AASU announced a mass two-day sit-m -strike

beginning the next day. The PLP also backed the AASU campaign. Meanwhile, me

104
Jogcndra Nath Hazarika Ministry took over in Assam. He assured the AASU tnat i!
demands would be looked into, but it did not materialize. The AASU called mas-,
picketing of all government and semi-government offices from September ,'-U
1979. A press release issued by the AASU said that the picketing was agaiiM the
Government’s inaction in detecting and deporting of foreign nationals from A^am
and in fulfilling its other demands. On September 13, 1979, the agitation ' imed
momentum. Work in all offices in Sivasagar, Golaghat and Rangia was parah cd In
Sivasagar subdivision, students abstained from classes, staged a sit-in-strike in from
of SDO’s office and raised slogans. On September 14, 1979, in Kamrup. all
Government offices were closed because of picketing. In Jorhat, Golaghat, Noogone
and Barpeta too, picketing paralysed normal administrative work. The Secretariat in
Dispur was deserted. Around 550 people were arrested for violation of prohibitory
orders.

Meanwhile, on September 10, 1979, the Chief Election Commissionei asked

the Chief Electoral Officer, Assam, to include all names from the earlier voter. h a
in the Draft Electoral Rolls. On September 15, 1979, the CEC clarified that Electoral
Registration Officers had wide powers to delete names from the Draft Electoral
Rolls.

On September 18, 1979, a press release from the Government said II.
Commission has instructed that no person whose name was included in the Elector i!
Rolls shall be eliminated on the ground of citizenship as the process of establish ire
citizenship was time consuming....” The Commission further advised scruunv I
Electoral Rolls after the election is over.... The AASU said, “ Justice was sauilicx I
for haste” ! 24 On September 24, 1979, the AASU announced that mass rallies woiml
be held all over the State against the CEC’s directives. Demonstration, bovcoti i
classes and hunger strike took place throughout the State. The AASU, the A AGS I ’
the Asom Jatiyabadi Dal, the Assam College Teachers’ Association anc oth i
organizations called an all Assam mass rally. On October 6, 1979, at Judge Ik d
in Gauhati, an Olympic-style torch was brought by runners from Sadiya along w::!i
a portrait of the great Assamese general Lachit Borphukan. A resolution was pass d
at the rally urging all national and other political parties not to put up candidates ! :

105
polls and to abstain from taking part in the elections. The rally warned that it the
demand of the AASU regarding foreign nationals was not fulfilled, election
campaign were also to be disallowed.

On November 1 and 2, 1979, Deputy Prime Minister Y. B. Chavan paid i briet

visit to Assam. His discussion with the leaders of the movement failed to achieve a
breakthrough. On November 9, 1979, the AASU-AAGSP announced a campaign to
drive out foreign nationals with a statewide general strike to follow. Violent ■„lashes
took place at several places. The Assam Chief Minister warned of seveie
consequences if violence continued. The AASU, undeterred, announced i new
programme of a week-long gana satyagraha from November 12, 1979, all over the
State demanding detection of foreigners, deletion of their names from the Electoral
Rolls and their deportation. At the call of satyagraha by AASU, lakhs of oeopic
including the intelligentsia, courted arrest. The Bangla Bhashi Asomiya Sainai and
the Sikh Association stepped in and so did the non-Assamese trading commumtv.
People participated irrespective of caste or creed, language or religion, proving
beyond all doubts that the question of the movement being against any pamcular
community does not arise.25 Mass picketing in front of all Central and the State
Government establishments and offices started from November 19, 1979, at the call
of the AASU-AAGSP combine. The Government banned processions and alerted the
Army. Thousands of picketeers were arrested. There was police firing and stray
incidents o f assault were also reported.

The massive satyagraha observed by the AASU on the lines of the Indian
freedom struggle was unique. Thousands courted arrest daily. Officials were m a
quandary : where to keep the satyagrahisl The existing jail accommodate>n was
totally inadequate, so the officials finally thought a way out, of the situation MI fie
open spaces in Guwahati were converted to temporary jails with magistrate uttiug
under shamianas telling batches of satyagrahis, who violated official order hannmg
the gathering of five or more persons, that they were under arrest. Aftei a tew
minutes, the detenues were allowed to go and make space for fresh satxagoilus

Meanwhile, on November 25, 1979, the state executive committee of the ruling
Janata Party in Assam observed that in view of the extraordinary situate >n me

106
forthcom ing parliam entary polls in the State should be postponed till the collection
o f voters' list according to law .26 Th e com m ittee w h ich review ed the piv .aim ■

situation in course o f a resolution said that the entire atm osphere in the Slaw was

charged with em otion and agitation and in som e parts, the law -and-order wa^ Nulls

impaired, the atm osphere was not at all fit and con gen ial fo r holding free and

dem ocratic elections. T h e com m ittee also appreciated the peacefu l nature >! the

satyagrahis and picketin g led by the A A S U . T h e C entre was, how ever, adamant n
holding the elections. It said, “ the C h ie f M in ister o f A ssam had assured the 1 entre

o f diffu sing the situation and h old in g the elections as scheduled, and there warn gom e

to be no change in the election schedule. W h ile the E lection C om m ission was

determ ined to g o through the election in the teeth o f opposition, several indent
leaders from the N orth-east w ent to D elhi and requested the President to a d v a e the

C E C to hold election s in A ssam on ly after the correction in the voters' list

of all
On N o vem b er 27, 1979, the A A S U - A A G S P com bine ca lled the closure

educational institutions and picketin g in State and Central G overnm en t offices. The

next day Y. B. Chavan, the H o m e M in ister o f the Charan Sin gh G overnm ent . ailed
invited all
a round-table con feren ce to s o lv e the rising im b ro g lio in Assam . Chavan

political parties in A ssam and the A A S U leaders. T h e A A S U refused the invitation,

but the C E C , M r Shakdhar and the Assam C h ie f M inister, M r Jogen Hazarika were

present in the m eeting. N oth in g , how ever, w as achieved. A t the directives of the

C E C , the final E lectoral R o lls , without necessary deletions, w ere published n

D ecem ber 2, 1979. T h e dates fo r fillin g up o f nom inations fo r the parliamentar>

constituencies o f A ssam w e re fix e d from D ecem b er 3-11, 1979. T h e Centre and tue

State G overnm ent appealed to the students o f A ssa m to avoid the path of actuation

in the greater interest o f the State, since postponem ent o f election w ould in v u m

Assam from sending its representatives to the L o k Sabha. T h e A A S U retail tied n

calling a 36-hour bandh all o v e r the State fro m D ecem b er 3, 1979. From Dcceml w

5-8, 1979, there was mass p icketin g in front o f all p o llin g o ffic e s w here nominations

could be filed . T h e A A G S P asked the B oard o f Secon dary Education. A - v im o

postpone exam inations till the situation in the State becam e conducive, u uko

for ek\ ti<>>v

directed its volunteers to sp ec ific a lly w ork fo r p reventin g preparations

E lection officers, printing presses and all other places connected w ith electio n \\< rk

1 0 7
were also picketed. Most importantly, the AAGSP directed its volunteers to lions
arrest candidates, taking part in the elections, till the last date lor filing >1 ilk-
nominations so as to prevent them from doing so. On December 5, 1979, the lii t
day of the general strike, normal life in Assam was thrown out of gear. By Dei inbi i
7, 1979, no candidate was allowed to file nominations in the Brahmaputra Valiev. <>n
December 9, 1979, the AASU-AAGSP called for a statewide hantlh the next day. the
last date for filling of nominations. Air, water and road communication^ were
intended to be blocked. Government proclaimed curfew on December 9. P'79, m
central Guwahati and on December 10, 1979, at Nalbari and Barpeta.

At Barpeta, police resorted to firing when a mob tried to prevent Begum Abida
Ahmed, the wife of former President of India, Late Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed from
filing her nomination. A reign of police excesses was let loose on protester. The
then IGP K P S Gill-led police escort ruthlessly thrashed peaceful agiiatoiv
Khargeswar Talukdar, the twenty-year-old secretary of the Barpeta AASU unit, was
beaten to death and thrown into a ditch on the highway at Bhabanipur. Thus the first
martyr of the Assam movement emerged in the form of Khargeswar Talukdar on
December 10, 1979.

Begum Abida’s nomination papers were, however, rejected. Due to picketing,

election was postponed at Karbi Anglong, but election work went on in the
remaining two constituencies in Cachar district. Assam Governor L. P. Singh also
pleaded with the CEC regarding the postponement of polls in Cachar, but his plea
fell on deaf ears. Paying tributes to the movement, The Assam Tribune, a leading
English daily of the State wrote, “ Notwithstanding attempts by interested uiiaru-r^
to don the movement with sectarian hue, it has already established itself in the eyes
of all objective observers in and outside the State as prominently a national
struggle— a struggle for the preservation of the sanctity of the Constitution and im­
purity of democratic process .” 27

On December 18, 1979, the people of Assam pledged “ to sacrifice our h\ es c >r
the national cause of Assam and promise that we will remain active participants >t
the national movement launched by the All Assam Students' Union and we will sa\ v

108
our motherland from the clutches of the foreigners and from any danger th;n ma\
comc” .2s

On December 21, 1979, the AASU, in a press release, said that the Centre'
acceptance of the poll process in Cachar district was a dishonour to demnerate
values in the country. The release also informed the Government of the will >t the
people of Assam to fight against the influx problem till the very end. The ideas*
warned the Centre of a prolonged agitation, much more severe than hitherto noticed
and asked the people of Assam to get themselves ready for the impending tussle. I h.
AASU also announced a programme of non-cooperation for the period, Deccmhei
24-31, 1979.

Earlier, however, the Hazarika Ministry lost support from its constituent and
the Governor notified to the Centre that the constitutional machinery in the State had
broken down. The Union Cabinet, after an emergency meeting, decided to mvok
Article 356, placing the Assembly in a state of suspended animation and thus
President’s Rule was imposed in Assam. The year 1980 began with a 58-hour \ssaei
bandh. On January 3, a teenaged, Dilip Huzuri was killed near Nalbari by suspected
Bangladeshi nationals, fomenting more anti-foreigners sentiment. On the lav t
section of Bengali speaking people refused to pay subscription for the movement
which resulted in violence, and Huzuri, a plain tribal was murdered and his bod\ w,.s
found in the field the next day. The violence soon spread to other areas and troumi
40 people lost their lives. Nalbari was put on curfew and the CRPF was called out

Meanwhile, parliamentary polls in the two constituencies in Cachar weu he.d

on January 3 and 6, 1980, along with the rest of the country and the Congre ss led
by Indira Gandhi came to power with a triumphant majority. On the other hand tired
of growing apathy towards the cause of Assam by the Centre, the AASU thought I
a new means to put pressure on the Centre. They started picketing on the vital points
of oil establishments at Duliajan and Narangi. Duliajan is the administrate e
headquarters of Oil India Limited and the pipelines from there carry oil front weds
in Assam to the refineries at Guwahati, Bongaigaon and Barauni in Bihar.

109
 The flow of crude oil to these refineries is regulated by a pumping station at
Narangi in Guwahati. About 5,000 picketecrs peacefully picketed in these two vital
installations and completely stopped the flow of crude oil paralysing the refineries

The AASU’s picketing of 21 days at the oil installation was passing o il

peacefully but January IB, 1980, all that changed. On that day, OIL's resident duel
executive Ajit Sarma was summoned to Guwahati by the Governor, Mr. L,. P Singh
to discuss a solution to the impasse. Dr Ravi Moitra, the technical manager was
given the charge in Ajit Sharma’s absence. Tension started mounting t the
administration under Dr. Moitra’s directive decided to break the picket on that <Ja\
At 7.30 a.m., on January 18, 1980, the police declared the picketeers unlawful and
started lathi charge which was followed by busting of tear gas shells. But the
picketeers refused to disperse and remained non-violent. The OIL authorities osued
order to resort to firing which resulted in the death of agitationists and injuries io

several of them. The injured were taken to the Oil Hospital where the apath\ <>| the
hospital staff infuriated the agitationists who stoned Dr. Moitra to death wnen he
arrived at the hospital gate.29

Soon after, a section of political leaders started dubbing the movement as one
inspired by communal hatred and tried to give the democratic movement a
communal colour. The sponsor of the movement— AASU—had time without
numbers been vocally advocating that theirs was a democratic movement. Dr 1). P
Barooah, professor and then head, Department of Political Science, Gauhati
University, testifies, “ Looked at from any consideration, the Assam movement e a
truly national one and assertions to the contrary are not based on facts bm rank
chauvinism and politically motivated considerations” .30Justifying its oil pukcum;
the AASU was of the viewpoint, “ without it, you in Delhi or Bombay would newr
have realized the magnitude of the problem here.” 31

On January 18, 1980, AASU president Prafulla Kumar Mahanta. through a

letter to the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, informed her that influx from Bandadedi
and Nepal has started to agitate the minds of the people of the entire north eastern
region. He also cautioned the Prime Minister that the very existence d me

110
indigenous population was being threatened. The AASU president also suggested
certain steps for effective solution of the problem, which were finally given m detail
in a memorandum submitted to the Prime Minister on February 2, 1980. Tht letter
also reflected the AASU’s determination of not remaining silent spectators when tin-
sovereignty of India was at stake. The AASU alleged in the letter that the pro nous
of the Constitution have been bluntly violated by the politicians in the State, h
demanded an urgent attention of the Centre, and a firm and strong decision to detent
and deport foreign nationals from Assam. The AASU also urged die Prime Mmist. t
for a detailed discussion of the problem.31

On January 21, 1980, a black day was observed by the people at the call of the
AASU and the AAGSP against oath-taking of two MPs of Cachar district and
people’s resentment against widespread police atrocities. On January 22. I9 ko. the
AASU, in a press release, tried to allay the unfounded fears of the political leader
that the movement was taking a communal march. While reassuring the people d
Assam, the AASU stated its resolve of an unequivocal commitment to the movement
within the ambit of the Constitution, and of the peaceful means to be adopted The
AASU release said that the students’ body was proud of the secular and democrat a
nature of the movement. It also reiterated the AASU’s demand for boycott of foreign
nationals while maintaining the tolerant nature of their struggle yet denying the
infiltrators any sort of political mileage and rights. The release finally warned the
Centre that any attempt to infer the movement with a myopic vision will result n
a tragic historical error. The AASU also clarified that it was with a secular frame >t
mind that the AASU extended invitation to the Prime Minister to visit Assam, when
the two emissaries from the Centre— Dr Shankar Dayal Sharma and Mr Vashpal
Kapoor—had come to Assam for an on-the-spot study of the situation.

However, within a month of taking office, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi

invited AASU leaders for a discussion to Delhi. The Prime Minister, m her
invitation, appreciated the AASU’s adoption of the Gandhian means of agitation.
Following is the full text of her invitation to the AASU leaders for a discussion in
Delhi.

Ill
 PRIME MINISTER
New Delhi
20th January, 19M

Dear Shri Mahanta,

I have received your letter brought by Dr. Shankar Dayal Sharnia and
Shri Yashpal Kapoor, who have also apprised me of the present situation m
Assam as explained by you. They have informed me of your attitude and ur y<

anxiety to solve this problem in a peaceful manner at the earliest. I am glad n>
hear of your emphasis on the Gandhian approach of non-violence and
secularism.
We are considering your suggestions. Action on some of them, l kc
ensuring the inviolability of our borders, is being urgently taken.
Thank your for inviting me to Assam. As you perhaps know, Parliament
is meeting from the 21st and a number of foreign dignitaries are visiting m
connection with the UNIDO Conference and Republic Day celebration v
Therefore, it is not possible for me to come to Assam as soon as I should I ke
to do. I suggest that in the meantime you and your colleagues come to Dchi
for a discussion.
As you know, I always have had affection for the people of Assam and
deep concern for their welfare. Immediately after assumption of office on lie
14th, I asked the Governor to come here and sent my emissaries to study die
situation there so as to get full information regarding the situation. 1 am anxious
to find a speedy solution. I am glad to know that you and your colleagues
responded in a constructive manner. Now that the process of discussion and
implementation of certain steps has started, any activity like picketing, ghemo
and protest rallies has become redundant. Unfortunately it has resulted m
violence and loss of human life. My thoughts go out to the bereaved famiues
of those who are no more.

Shri P. Mahanta, Yours sincereh

President Sd/- Indira Gandh
All Assam Students’ Union

112
February 22, 1980 : AASU leaders with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
at the discussion table
 This was first among many major meetings AASU leaders were to huu ai tli
highest level. Accordingly, a delegation of the AASU led by its president Pialulh
Kumar Mahanta and general secretary Bhrigu Kumar Phukan arrived in I k iln on
January 28, 1980, for a face-to-face discussion with the Prime Minister

Talks, Memorandum and Agitation

The movement leaders met the Prime Minister on February 2 and submitted i
memorandum to her. The memorandum, in four chapters, presented graphicali . th
menace of infiltration and its impact on the demography of Assam, its poln\ m i
economy.

The AASU drew the attention of the Prime Minister on the issue tlinsueh
detailed graphics. The following is the full text of the letter to the Prime Mmistc

To
The Prime Minister of India
NEW DELHI

Hon’ble Prime Minister,

We, on behalf of ALL ASSAM STUDENTS' UNION, hereby submit fi r yom

urgent attention the following Memorandum on the explosive issue of ini lux f
foreign nationals into the North East Region, particularly Assam.

The Problem which is agitating the minds of people of the entire North East
Region is the problem of influx of foreigners from the neighbouring countries
particularly Bangladesh and Nepal. The influx of foreign nationals into Assam is ici
a recent phenomenon. The problem exists from the days of independent.- Ue
problem has become so alarming that the very existence of the indigenous
Population is threatened. But we are determined to preserve our identity, our mstoi .
our culture and our heritage in our strive to maintain the ethnic beauty of the people
of North East Region.

The huge magnitude of the problem and the serious threat to the territorial
integrity of the nation that this influx of foreign nationals poses is clearly i -real o
by the following figures :

113
 TABLE - 1
Percentage of increase of population per decade
ASSAM AND INDIA
Year Population of % increase % incrca
Assam Assam India
1951 8,028,856 19.94 13.31
1961 10,837,329 34.98 21.64
1971 14,625,154 34.95 24.80
Assam tops the list of States which registered more than 50% increase during
1911-1961.

TABLE - 2
State Rate of Increase
Andhra 67.8
Assam* 174.0 *
Bihar 64.1 j

Gujarat 110.5
Jammu & Kashmir 55.3
Kerala 136.5
Madhya Pradesh 66.5 1

Madras 61.2
Maharashtra 84.2
Mysore 74.4
Orissa 54.2
Punjab 70.0
Rajasthan 88.5
Uttar Pradesh 58.2
West Bengal 94.0
ASSAM’S POSITION REMAINED UNCHANGED TILL 1971. WE HAVE [ VMA
REASON TO APPREHEND THAT THE NEXT CENSUS WOULD DEFINITE I't
MAINTAIN THE SAME TREND IF NOT INCREASE IT.
 As early as the 1930 important leaders like Nehru and Rajendra Prasad had
expressed their concern at the continuing influx into Assam. They must have beer
alerted by the following table :

TABLE - 3
TREND IN POPULATION :: ASSAM AND INDIA
(% decadal variation)
Year Assam India
1911 16.99 5.73
1921 20.47 6.30
1931 19.92 11.00

But that was a different story. India was then not divided. Following partitior
of India, illegal immigration particularly from Bangladesh (then East Pakistan anr
Nepal began on a scale larger than ever before (Table-1). The people of Assam ha\
reasons, based on real experience, to be apprehensive of being swamped by loreigt.
nationals in the near future. Commenting on this large increase of 34.95 < pc
decade compared with the national figure of 24.80% (one of the highest m th
World), the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) said at duty during the Conh iene
of the Electoral Officers held on 24-26 September, 1978 :
“The influx has become a regular feature. I think that it may not be a emone
assessment to make on the basis of this increase of 34.95% between the two i. ensu
the increase that is likely to be recorded in 1991 census would be more than 100' <
over the 1961 census. In other words, a state would be reached when the Stale ma ,
have to reckon with the FOREIGN NATIONALS who may in all probability
constitute a sizeable percentage, if not the majority population in the State

INFERENCES FROM TABLE - 1

(a) Only influx of foreign nationals can account for this extremely high percentage
of increase of population in Assam.
(b) India is definitely exposed to dangerous moves by foreign nationals in Nor>h
East Region.
CASE OF KARBI ANGLONG & NORTH CACHAR
Percentage of Growth Rate
1941 1951 1961 1971
Karbi Anglong — 30.06 79.21 68.28

North Cachar — 6.16 36.95 40.00

115
 As the above ligures show, the situation is more frightening in the distceis <>:
Karbi Anglong and North Cachar.

The unbelievable rise in population only glorifies the determination >l th

people of Karbi Anglong which made the election that was imposed impo.sihk
Every one, except the foreign nationals and their sympathisers, contributed t<> tin-
success of the non-cooperation movement launched to prevent the election
Intensity of belongingness and unity shown by the people of Karbi Anglong .vould
remain a memorable event. The above figures naturally lead to the demand < I
detection and deportation of foreign nationals on a war footing.

A silent invasion by foreign nationals from the neighbouring countries

particularly BANGLADESH and NEPAL is taking place. We cannot remain silent
spectators when sovereignty of India is at stake. The problem has been deliK-iatel\
neglected by the leaders leaving the destiny of Assam at the mercy oj I■>ivigu
nationals. The foreign nationals pose a challenge to the integrity of India.

The first thing foreign nationals try is to enrol their names in the volets' lists
with the connivance of antisocial elements, politicians and officials on this ide oi
the border. The motive is crystal clear. The infiltrators vote for the politicians who
protect them in all respects. In fact, politicians encourage infiltration to ensure their
political survival. Therefore, naturally the rapid growth in population of Assam as a
result of large-scale influx from the neighbouring countries is bound to be reflected
also in the increasing number of electors in Assam from 1957 to 1979. The follow mg
figures fully reveal it.

TABLE - 4
Year No. o f electors Increase % of increase durin
the year

1957 4,498,359 — —

1962 4,942,816 449,457 10% (in 5 year

1966 5,585,056 642,240 12.99% (in 4 veai
1970 5,701,805 116,749 2.09% (in 4 yeai
1971 6,296,198 594,393 10.42% (in 1 yeai
1977 7,229,543 933,345 14.82% (in 6 yeai
1978 7,974,476 744,988 10.30% (in 1 yea
1979 8,537,497 563,024 7.06% (in 1 yea:

116
 A comparison of percentage increase in electorate of different State alv
demonstrates the gravity of the problem confronted by the people of an
According to the draft electoral rolls prepared for the just-concluded me term
Parliamentary election, the increase in the electorate is worked out to be 12 6 m m
an average. Against this all-India average, the increase in Assam was 18 1V

TABLE - 5
States Electorate in Electorate % increase
draft rolls in increase since
1979 1977
Assam 8,537,497 1,311,881 18.15
Bihar 39,536,456 4,540,054 12.98
J & K 2,813,164 255,742 10.00

Madhya Pradesh 25,266,988 2,484,056 10.91

Manipur 869,686 81,463 10.34

Orissa 13,804,670 1,159,235 9. IX

It is true that percentage increase of voters of States like Punjab and Haryana
are comparable to, though less than, the percentage increase of voters of Assam.

It is not difficult to explain migration of Indians from other States mm an

industrially developed or developing state. Haryana alone has 208 large-scale an 1
22,000 small-scale industrial units.

On the other hand, Assam is economically backward. Infrastructure I r

industrialization is virtually non-existent. Resources have only been drainer, on:
Economic stagnancy, too, rules out large-scale migration from other State-- urn >
Assam to account for the staggering growth rate of population. The dangerous i rer d
is conveyed by the following Government compiled statistics also :

TABLE - 6
Year Duration Increase in Rate (per year)
(years) electorate (Lakhs)
(Lakhs) approx
1957-1970 13 12 0.9 2

1971-1979 8 28 3._-

117
Inference from Table-1, Table-4 and Table-6
(1) Growth in the number o f electorate in Assam has been very large.
(2) Since the prominent rise in population is due to large-scale in flux of foreign
nationals and the number of electorate has also increased correspond mg I .
clearly the constitutional provisions have been blatantly violated in A s ,im h\
allowing the foreign nationals to exercise franchise.
Indian Constitution defines in unambiguous terms who can be a votn. A
FOREIGN NATIONAL CANNOT CERTAINLY PARTICIPATE IN INDIAN
ELECTIONS. But the sovereignty of the country has been openly insulvd In
the political parties. This is amply told by the CEC :
“Another disturbing factor is the demand made by the political parties for the
inclusion in the electoral rolls o f the names of such migrants who an n.n
INDIAN CITIZENS, without even questioning and properly determinin'..', tlu u

citizenship status.”

The number of foreign nationals in Assam has already become explosnc li e

problem must be tackled with utmost speed. Foreign nationals whose presence is <d
grave concern to the people of Assam, are mainly from Bangladesh and Nepal. In
addition o f Bangladeshis, Nepalis who have entered Assam WITHOUT Restricted
Area Permits either from Nepal or from Bhutan account for a sizeable number i
foreigners. The increase o f Nepali immigrants in the last two decades cannot k
ignored. (Table-7).

TABLE - 7
NEPALI IMMIGRATION
Year Persons Decade General varii
variation Assam
1957 101,335 - -

1961 182,925 48.1% 34.9801

1971 353,673 48.2% 34.9591

Inference o f Table - 7 :
The percentage of increase o f the Nepali population is higher by about I ; .
than the percentage of increase in the general population during the period Ik" t
1971.

118
 The conclusion from all these figures is obvious. V ariations in population
and electorates have been abnorm al. Only influx of foreign nationals from
neighbouring countries can account for such consequential changes.

The Central Government and the Election Commission have been n lull
knowledge of the alarming situation arising out of unabated infiltration of lornenei
into the North Eastern Region, particularly into Assam. In the year l(Co tik
Immigrant (Expulsion from Assam) Act. 1950 was passed by Parliament. In the
statements of Objects and Reasons of the said Act it was mentioned that

“During the last few months a serious situation had arisen from the
immigration of a very large number of East Bengal residents into Assam. Such large
migration is disturbing the economy of the province besides giving rise to a ermus
law-and-order problem.”

Therefore, the problem existed, and was officially recognised to have existed,
as early as the birth of the Indian Republic. But unfortunately no positive steps we-e
taken either by the Union Government to prevent infiltration of foreigners into tiv
North Eastern territories of India or by the Election Commission to prevent indusi< n
of the names of these infiltrators into the Electoral Rolls. The directive sent by the
Union Government on 2.8.75 to check the Electoral Rolls to the State Government
and the Union Territories of the North East Region was also ignored by the Stan-
Government. According to the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, the subject
“Citizenship Naturalisation” aliens and admission into and immigration aid
expulsion from India—“Passports and visas”-are subjects related to the Ceniial h-i
vide entry 17 and 19 of the said list. Therefore, it is the constitutional dut> >t tIk-
Central Authorities to stop influx of foreign nationals. But the Central Government
has so far completely failed to tackle the problem.

Similarly, preparation of electoral rolls is directly within the purview t

Election Commission. We reiterate that, inclusion of a single name of a Iore km
national in the voters’ list is unconstitutional.

Consequences of unbridled im m igration :

The harmful effects of continuous immigration are evident in every sphere >1
life. Tensions in the social, political, economic and cultural fields have alread\

119
surfaced anti both Central and State Governments must act before it is u>'> lai<
Attempts to develop the region industrially cannot succeed unless the tor-1
population growth due to influx is fully halted. Immigrants have created pn w u \
unprecedented in the modern world history, on every resource of the region

The immigrants have acquired enough strength to influence many maim

decisions of the State Government overlooking the security of the State and the
country. An innocent looking newspaper report that appeared in The Statesnum on
January 16, 1979, throws sufficient light on the threat to our sovereignty

It reads :
“An off-shoot of this population explosion has been a sudden change in the
composition of the district’s (Goalpara) electorate. The immigrants are in at solui
majority in seven of the nineteen Assembly constituencies in the district In In,
more constituencies they are numerous enough to be crucial for an electoral \ ictm
There is almost a similar transformation in the smaller border district of ( aehar
which returns 15 legislators to the 126-member State Assembly.”

It is quite possible that majority of immigrants and the leaders behind them are
determined to create instability in the region to serve the interest of the foreign
powers. Nobody can deny such a possibility. We are apprehensive of the political
realities since VOTE is central to our democratic structure. Those who vote and
those who are elected are deemed to be invested with power and responsibiln\
safeguard Assam’s political future within the framework of the Indian Constitution

The people of Assam have genuine reasons to believe that foreign nationals
would injure REGIONAL and NATIONAL interest. Our neighbours in the hill
States share our fears.

Threat to tribal existence :

The problem has badly hit the tribal population. All the 33 blocks and belts roserv d
for the tribal people are on the verge of extinction. Pressure on economy has icduc-.-d
sizes of the reserved tribal blocks. Forest resources are fast disappearing due u-
indiscriminate felling of trees and occupation of the areas by the foreign nuiiomus

1 2 0
The very identity of tribal population is in danger of extinction. The recent
history of Tripura provides a good example to substantiate our belief. People of
Assam cannot afford to ignore the warning.

Why the present movement was started :

As already stated, that the existing electoral rolls are contaminated to the

presence of foreign nationals, mostly Bangladeshi, was openly admitted i>\ S:i
Shakdhar in 1978. The CEC further acknowledged pressure from different political

groups to include foreigners in the electoral rolls of the North Eastern States. | .,
check the process effectively, the CEC suggested the Home Ministry the introduction
of identity cards. The entire population of North Eastern States welcome the
suggestion and hoped for the best. But regrettably, we have noticed there > n■>
positive response from the Central Government so far.

Then in March 1979, a bye-election had to be held in the Mangaldai

constituency due to the death of a sitting Member of Parliament. The voters lot was
revised and during the process a large number of foreigners’ names were discos ered
Objections were raised against some 70,000 names in the constituency. But <>t thi
45,000 were declared as foreigners by competent courts. It was then the dark loro
behind the whole conspiracy against Assam raised their ugly heads. The politic ii
parties who would have benefited by these foreigners’ votes used all their iniluem e
and forced the authorities to stop deletion of foreigners names from the e le c t o r il
rolls. Our thoughts were provoked. Then came the mid-term Parliamentary elections.
The experience of burial of Indian democracy in Mangaldai constituency v as too
fresh to be forgotten. What was true for Mangaldai became true for whole of \ssa n
How could the people of Assam let their fate be determined by lakhs of foreigners
in the electoral rolls? Everybody in Assam expected the CEC to delete the names >t
the foreigners from the voters’ list. Unfortunately, contrary to all his pnm o o
statements, the CEC directed the authorities to stop deletion of foreigners nam es

and said :

“A person whose name has been included shall be presumed to be a citizen of

India.... Scrutiny of electoral rolls can be taken up after the election is over...."

121
 The people of Assam could not accept the argument put forward by the CE(
Dignity of the Constitution must not be lowered. Foreign nationals cannot be
allowed to participate in Indian politics at any cost. The CEC believed that the
anomalies in the existing list would be removed on the basis of the objection bled
by the Indians against the non-Indians. That was a false belief. For example m
Assam the number of objections Filed against non-Indians was about 3.5 lakhs But
the actual number is bound to be much greater. The reason is simple. In Assam then-
arc many areas where detection of foreign nationals is not possible only with the
help of the Government machinery. But for reasons best known to the CEC only.
Section 22 of Peoples' Representation Act was made inoperative in Assam

This open disregard to the security of the State could no longer be tolerated
and the ALL ASSAM STUDENTS' UNION look the lead in launching a statewide
movement on a massive scale.

Different phases of the movement :

When appeals and requests to the State Government, Central Government and
the President of India failed to evoke any response, the people of Assam had to take
to the streets.

Thousands of meetings were organised throughout the State to educate the

people. Rallies were held. Mass picketing and Mass Satyagraha received support >1
everybody with a sense of belongingness to the region. Non-cooperation was
extremely successful. The will of the people made election in twelve constituencies
impossible. Determination of the people prevailed over the unconstitutional directi v
of the CEC. However, election machinery forced the election on the indigenous
population in the two constituencies of Cachar. The representatives who are declan d
to be elected from Cachar district have natural obligation to protect the interest I
foreigners. Foreign nationals have already outnumbered the Indians in Cachar
district. The people of Assam registered due protest on January 21 by observing it

as a BLACK Day.

The students of Assam have been agitating on the issue since 19 -i [ H

detection and deportation of foreign nationals w ere-our demands included in the I

122
point Charter w h ich was submitted to the State G overnm ent in 1974. N ow wo are

d e te rm in e d to c o r r e c t th e m istakes o f o u r p re v io u s gen era tio n s.

C h a r a c te r o f th e M o v e m e n t :

W e are com m itted to pursue the cause o f the present m ovem ent with souse d
deep con viction on the principle o f n on-violen ce, dem ocracy and secularism Th.it

the p eop le o f A ssam spontaneously responded to our call w ith a sense o f discipline

and solidarity w ith the m ovem ent is evident in every phase. Determ ination t >
maintain peace and harm ony is written on the fa ce o f every b o d y participating m the

m ovem ent.

U nfortunately, State politicians created troubles at differen t places and mans

lives have been lost.

W e c o n d e m n a ll ty p es o f v io le n c e an d stan d b y o u r chosen path .

A b o u t the character o f the m ovem ent, said the Editor, Illustrated W e e k ly d

India in a R a d io in terview :

“ I am one o f those w h o b elieve things can be done constitutionally. But i!

things have to be done, I w ou ld rather say that they w ere done as here (In Assam)
now. 1 see no vio le n c e , no buses being burnt. W h at strikes m e the mosi ahem
Assam ese p eop le is a certain elem ent of softness, and certain elem ent d
gentleness.... I f G an dh iji cou ld not keep his p eop le under control, student leaders a c
trying to keep every b o d y under control” .

A c t iv e C o n s p ir a c y :

But a conspiracy has been on. T h is on ly proves that fo re ig n nationals are \vr\
active in the State politics. P olitical elem ents patronizing the fo re ig n nationals are
in flam in g com m u nal passions am ong the innocent p eop le in the name of language
and religion . O ur firm answer has been a fo r e ig n e r is a fo r e ig n e r ; a fo r e ig n e r shall

n o t b e ju d g e d b y th e la n g u a g e he sp eaks o r b y th e r e lig io n h e fo llo w s :

C onspirators, in collusion with a section of anti-Assam politicians and

bureaucrats, are active in their attempts to frustrate the m ovem ent by indulging m
antisocial a ctivities at Lu m ding, Pandu, M a lig a o n and D ig b o i. Th ese conspirators

123
raised their ugly heads in Bhawanipur, Gauhati Medical College and Dhamdhamn
and stretched their design to Morigaon, Soalkuchi and Bijni. The same happened m
North Kamrup. The Army took advantage of the situation, tortured innocent people
and raped helpless women and girls. At Duliajan many peaceful picketed wete
brutally killed by the CRPF. It is unparalleled in the history of India. Hven <'achar
was not excluded. But we are clear about o u r aims and objectives.

ANOTHER UNDESIRABLE FACTOR :

There is another disturbing factor that has complicated the problem Mam
infiltrators once deported by Assam Government have been detected again. But most
surprisingly now they are armed with citizenship certificates issued by West Bengal
and Tripura Governments. The Assam Government, however, has no power to t ano l
these certificates in spite of the previous records that these people are 'orvign
nationals. Only the Central Government can nullify such illegal certificates. I >'cling
helpless, the Assam Government was reported to have forwarded the cases ,0 me
Central Government. However, the Central Government has not taken any immediaic
action against those anti-national officials. Though these factors have complicated
the issue, the problem is not beyond permanent solution. People’s representatives
must also play the constructive role expected of them. In Assam, it is surprismg that
no Member of Legislative Assembly has demanded that the foreign nationals m his/
her constituency should be detected and deported. What does it indicate0 I ■■ not
very difficult to find the answer.

FINALLY :
The district authorities, the State Government, the Election Commission, the
Central Government—every component of the administration knows the problem
very well. But the immigration continues. For us, it has become a mystery. Don't \e
have a Constitution providing security to every part of the Country ?

Why the North Eastern Region then, is subjected to such an extreme negligent c '

Why is the Defence Ministry so indifferent to the security that is threatened hv

foreign nationals?

The mystery is deepening as the time passes.

124
 A r c w c t o b e w r i t t e n o f f f r o m t h e m a p o f I n d i a ?

T h e p r o b l e m h a s a s s u m e d a n a l a r m i n g p r o p o r t i o n i n A s s a m a n d t o m o i n > u u

w o u l d e n g u l f t h e w h o l e r e g i o n .

O U R D E M A N D S :

( 1 ) F o r e i g n n a t i o n a l s m u s t b e d e t e c t e d a n d d e p o r t e d f r o m o u r c o u n t r y .

( 2 a ) N a m e s o f f o r e i g n n a t i o n a l s m u s t b e d e l e t e d f r o m t h e c o n c e r n e d electoral roll
b e f o r e h o l d i n g , a n y e l e c t i o n i n A s s a m .

( 2 b ) I n c l u s i o n o f f o r e i g n n a t i o n a l s ’ n a m e s i n t h e e l e c t r i c a l r o l l s i n f u t u r e must k
m a d e i m p o s s i b l e w i t h t h e h e l p o f a n a d e q u a t e a n d s t r o n g e l e c t i o n m a c l n n e r

( 3 ) B o r d e r o f I n d i a w i t h n e i g h b o u r i n g c o u n t r i e s m u s t b e f u l l y p r o t e c t ' d i

e f f e c t i v e l y c h e c k i n f i l t r a t i o n .

( 4 ) I n d i a n v o t e r s r e s i d i n g i n A s s a m s h o u l d b e i s s u e d i d e n t i t y card u im
p h o t o g r a p h a f f i x e d .

( 5 ) N e c e s s a r y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s a f e g u a r d s s h o u l d b e p r o v i d e d t o t h e p e o p l e o l N o r t h

E a s t e r n R e g i o n f o r t h e n e x t 1 5 / 2 0 y e a r s b y m a k i n g n e c e s s a r y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l

p r o v i s i o n s f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e i d e n t i t y o f t h e i n d i g e n o u s p e o p l e i n t h i s

r e g i o n .

(6) T h e G o v e r n m e n t o f A s s a m s h o u l d b e f r e e t o r e j e c t a n y c e r t i f i c a t e issued h\ t h e

d i s t r i c t a u t h o r i t i e s o f W e s t B e n g a l a n d T r i p u r a .

(7) W e d e m a n d t h a t t h e a u t h o r i t y t o g r a n t c i t i z e n s h i p c e r t i f i c a t e d e l e g a t e e t o the
S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d b e w i t h d r a w n b y C e n t r a l G o v e r n m e n t im m ediate \
f r o m a l l S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t s , s o t h a t t h o s e f o r e i g n e r s w h o a r e d e and
t e c t e d

d e p o r t e d f r o m A s s a m d o n o t c o m e b a c k e q u i p p e d w i t h c i t i z e n s h i p ticaias
c e n t

i s s u e d b y o t h e r S t a t e s .

A D D I T I O N A L D E M A N D S :

F r e s h n o m i n a t i o n s m u s t b e i n v i t e d w h e n e l e c t i o n f o r K a r b i A nglong and N onh

C a c h a r i s a n n o u n c e d a f t e r d e t e c t i o n a n d d e p o r t a t i o n o f f o r e i g n e r s .

125
SOME OF OUR PROPOSALS :
(1) The National Register of Citizens (NRC) of 1951 should be made up-io date
by taking into consideration the additions to the number of each famih Mine
the time of compilation of the Register.

(2) A comparison of the NRC with the successive electoral rolls since 1 9 v u n i
also be helpful in making it up-to-date.

(3) A free zone devoid of trees and houses should be created all along the border
and any one crossing it without valid travel documents from either sid> must
be shot at. We attach great importance to this suggestion. We have reached a
stage when the threat to the State of Assam and to the country can no longer
be ignored.

(4) Birth and death registers at all blocks, villages, towns, etc., level should he
strictly maintained in order to prevent future infiltration into voters list

(5) The number of check posts should be increased so as to enable one cheek p< m
to be visible from the other.

In this connection, we would like to add a few lines about the ROLE O f THE
BSF. We have come to know of the proposal to employ more BSF personnel m the
border areas to check infiltration. But Madam, effectiveness of the BSE has he. n
very disappointing. The following figures are sufficient to drive home the point

NUMBER OF INFILTRATORS INTERCEPTED BY

THE BSF AND BORDER DIG (State Govt.)

Year B.S.F. Border D.I.G. (State Govt.)

1974 104 5,171
1975 405 18,068
1977 1 5,074

We earnestly request you to look into the cause of the definite failure ot i h
BSF in the past. Central Home Ministry must erase suspicion from the minds ot tm
people regarding the role of the BSF.

126
LASTLY,
Madam, the problem demands immediate attention o f the Central Ciovernmeni
Firm and strong decision and its implementation to detect and deport toreign
nationals from Assam can only ease the minds of the people. We know of ynm
association with Assam from your early days. We all look forward to a speeds and
just solution. Loss o f so many lives must not go in vain. We hope, you would feel
the pangs o f our bleeding hearts.

We once again request you to pay a visit to Assam and meet the people and
different organizations.

With regards,

Yours sincerely,
Sd/- Prafulla Kumar Mahanta
President, AASU

Sd/- Bhrigu Kumar Phukan

2nd Feb. 80 Secretary, AASU

It was a significant statement from the AASU on all counts related to the
movement.

The AASU on February 8, 1980, through a press release, said that it w is

cognizant o f the fact that the people o f Assam had vested in them a hu -e
responsibility and it was very attentive to it and would not budge a wee-bit from !■-
role. The AASU also said that its receptiveness to suggestions emanating irvm
various quarters were but very much part o f the democratic nature o f the movement.
The AASU also renewed its pledge to carry on with the movement till all foreigiu r\
are deported. It also claimed moral victory from the abortive talks in New IV In
saying that with talk taking place at Delhi, the influx problem has now assumed me
status o f a national issu e.12

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, meanwhile, in her public speeches in Gorakhpur

and New Delhi, said that the problem in Assam was basically o f unemplmmrni
among the educated and not infiltration. In a follow-up of the Prime Mmisu ^
meeting with the AASU, Union Home Minister Zail Singh visited Assam in ihe i i !
week o f February, 1980, but his meetings with the AASU widened rift between lie

127
two sides and led to hardening of attitudes. On February 25, 1980. an AASl press
release criticized the Centre’s double standard. The release said that the Constitution
through which New Delhi is administering the country was not being used to tackle
the problem of influx in Assam. It expressed surprise at the lack of commitment on
the part of the Home Minister on the question of a solution to the problem ot
infiltration. It also said that it had suggested the 1951 National Register of Citizens
and the 1952 voters’ list as the benchmarks to identify foreigners in Assam, because
that would have also covered the 1950 Nehru-Liaquat pact. Based on this, the NASI
said that Nehru had declared in Parliament once that 1952 could be taken as the cm
off year to deport illegal Bangladeshi and Nepali citizens from the countrs The
AASU said that based on this, the Home Minister in the first round of discussion
with it said that all foreigners coming to India after independence would he
deported. However, in a volte face in the next phase of discussion, the V-USU
regretted that Mr Zail Singh refused to budge from 1971 as the cut-off year. It also
regretted that in 1962 Nehru had left Assam’s fate to China, and in 1980, the Home
Minister nearly left Assam’s fate to Bangladeshi and Nepali immigrants. The W SI
was also very vocal in rejecting any political solution to the influx problem living
that if the Centre was trying to impose upon Assam and its people, a political
solution which is beyond the purview of the Constitution, New Delhi was htghlv
mistaken.33

On March 1, 1980, Indira Gandhi met Opposition leaders to discuss the

situation in Assam. She also appealed to the student leaders to accept 1971 as the
cut-off year. The AASU, on the other hand, called for a mass picketing of ('entral
and State Government offices from March 3, 1980, onwards. On the same dav. the
AASU received an invitation from the Prime Minister for talks. The AASU leader
met Ms Gandhi on March 7, 1980, for nearly an hour. They also met the Home
Minister the next day and asked him to involve the AAGSP in the talks. The Home
Minister agreed and asked the AASU for the suspension of picketings to which the
latter agreed. The next day an eight-member team led by Nibaran Bora reached
Delhi. Several meetings took place between the Centre and AASU-AAGSP but the e
was no breakthrough. On March 11, 1980, a minister in the Indira Gandhi < abm i
Yashpal Kapoor said that Assam’s cultural identity would be safeguarded and the
problem of infiltration would be solved within the framework of the Constmuioi

128
 On April 1, 1980, the Assam Governor Mr. L. P. Singh invited AASU leader,
to Shillong on an urgent summon and suggested them to accept 1967 as a mi-oil
year for identification and deportation of infiltrators. This, he felt would cou-r On­
flow of refugees who came to undivided Assam from East Pakistan following the
1965 Indo-Pakistan war. The AASU, however, rejected the proposal, much to the
disappointment of the Governor.

Meanwhile, the AASU’s picketing of oil installation was crippling the oil
sector in the State. On April 3, 1980, the State Government warned the picketed s
to withdraw the oil blockade. It promulgated Sec 144 CrPC, brought in additional
CRPF units and also asked the Army to be ready for any eventuality. It declared the
half-a-kilometre stretch all along the pipeline route as a protected area. On April \
1980, except for Cachar and Karbi Anglong, Assam was declared a disturbed aiea
under the provisions of the Assam Disturbed Areas Act 1955. This Act was t nacted
to make better provisions for the suppression of disorder and for the restoratp >n and
maintenance of public order in disturbed areas in Assam. Under the Ace wide
powers are given to a magistrate and certain officers of police, armed branch <>l
police and the Assam Rifles to use force even to the extent of causing of death >1
any person who is acting in contravention of any law or order in force. It pmhihits
the assembly of five or more persons or the carrying of weapons or things *apahle
of being used as weapons or fire arms, ammunition and explosive substanc ■ The
Armed Forces (Assam and Manipur) Special Powers Act, 1958 was also declared m
Assam.

Thus a systematic and well-orchestrated move was in process to resist the spirit
of the Assam movement and its people, a move which boomeranged because it
further provoked the people and made them doubly determined. The A AS l . in a
press statement, accused the Centre of trying to suppress the democratic right-- of t Un­
people of the State on an issue on which it had once shown sympathy. The A AM-
lamented the fact that on demanding expulsion of foreigners, it was being confronted
with armed forces. The AASU asked the people of Assam to unite to tacc the
Centre’s onslaught. The release also challenged the Centre to prove AASU's demand
as unjustified— legally or constitutionally. The AASU reiterated its commit mem m
peaceful agitation and asked the Centre to reciprocate in the same manner. H n\ e\ i

129
Ihc AASU said that if the Centre continued to use force to quell the democraiu and
peaceful movement, then a three-pronged strategy would be adopted :

1) Non-cooperation by all employees and officials of the oil sector, if lon e was
used to procure crude oil from Assam.
2) All employees and officials working for Central, State or private sectors .tould
stay away from work.
3) All political leaders and legislators living in the soil of Assam would he
socially boycotted.

The release also directed all anchalik units of the AASU to carry on with (licit
full might the mass satyagraha and asked the people of Assam to be ready tor the
supreme sacrifice.34

Chapter of State violence

Soon after, President Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy promulgated the Essential
Service Maintenance (Assam) Ordinance, empowering the State administration and
the Centre to declare any service as essential and prohibiting strikes in any “essential
service” . The Gauhati High Court, however, stayed the Act after a P1L had been tiled
by a businessman Mr Indrajit Barua. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister came n
Gauhati, and asked the AASU to accept 1971 as the cut-off year. But the talks tailed
The AASU announced its intention of going ahead with the oil blockadt In a
broadcast to the people of Assam, Ms Gandhi declared “ ....solutions to the pn >bletns
that are agitating your mind will be found. They should be arrived at in goodwill and
in a spirit of give and take.... It is my duty to mention that a large number of peop c
in the State have told me that they feel insecure because some looked upon them in

foreigners.”

On April 16, 1980, the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the orders
passed by the Gauhati High Court staying the operation of the Disturbed Areas Act
and Armed Forces Act, on an appeal preferred by the Central Government anti tin
State Government, and directed the High Court to hear the parties and dispose ( It
the petitions for vacating the stay order passed by the court. The Gauhati High < on i
in its ruling on April 18, 1980, made some amendments in its earlier verdict and

130
passed another judgement. The Government, not satisfied, lost no time m
promulgating the Assam Preventive Detention Ordinance. Crackdown <m the
agitationists thus began. In the early morning of April 19, 1980, 50 student leaders
were arrested and curfew was announced. People responded and reacted sharply. In
a show of defiance and demonstration of fearlessness, people started marching
towards the vicinity of oil refinery. An account suggested that the number o! people
could have been four lakh. They were undaunted in the face of lathi charge and tear
gas shells. The Kamrup Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Kamaleswar Bora was for ced to
withdraw curfew. Though police, Army and paramilitary forces were able to clear
the picket lines at Narangi on April 20, 1980, aiming to start the pumping ot crude
oil to Barauni, but executives, officials and engineers of the Oil India I united
refused to participate in the operation. Thus the movement started gaining
acceptance from all quarters, justifying the AASU stand that theirs was a movement
for the entire State and its people.

The AASU-AAGSP also announced a ban on exports of jute, plywood, timber

and bamboo. A five-day picketing started again on April 22, 1980. On April 2*.
1980, Martial Sounds Day (Ranasikha Divas) was announced in which lakhs of
people participated.

In the meantime, Assam Chief Secretary Parasivam was asked to go on leav e

and he was replaced by Ramesh Chandra. H. C. Sarin, an ICS officer, was appointed
as the chief adviser to the Governor, Assam.

On May 2, 1980, the AASU, in a press release, warned that if infiltrators we- e
not deported, India would lose North-east forever. The release also criticized the
Centre’s design of trying to create a communal schism in the State and to tr ample
upon the democratic rights of the agitationists. On May 3, 1980, the Prime Minister
in her speech in Bhubaneswar, said that the movement in Assam was not peace!u!
as claimed by the student leaders.

Meanwhile, an already tense situation in Assam was further aggravated

CRPF firing at Kampur in Nagaon. The AASU, in a press release on May Ids')
criticized the Centre for what it termed as camouflaged ‘Emergency’ in Assam 1 ie
AASU said that the Centre was trying its best to finish the seven-tm ntlm Id

131
democratic movement o f the student union. The AASU also charged the Centre <1
trying to take Assam back to the Emergency days. On May 9, 1980. the \A S C
decided to send representatives to all major cities o f India to educate, and solicit
support for the movement being carried out by them. Eminent personalities like 1)
P. Barooah and Chaganlal Jain led these delegations. The AASU also published a
leaflet Save Assam Today to Save India Tomorrow wherein the problems and
demands o f the AASU and AAGSP were highlighted. In the publication, the AASU
unequivocally denied charges raised by some quarters that it was a secessionist
group. Meanwhile, an All Assam Minority Students’ Union was launched as an
antidote to the AASU. On May 28, 1980, they organized a mass convention it
Barpeta and Howly with Bangladesh flags.

Very soon, Assam was engulfed in communal violence. Curfew was declared
in nine major towns of the Brahmaputra Valley and hundreds of protesters were
arrested. Many decomposed bodies were found floating down the Kolong River at
Nowgong. In the communal violence that followed, one o f the worst in the history
o f Assam, more than 100 people were killed. The AASU, in a press communique,
appealed for unity and integrity among the various communities. It regretted that the
indigenous people of Assam were insecure in their homeland. The AASU reiterated
that religion cannot be the basis o f the identification of an infiltrator. It resoived to
carry on fighting on behalf o f the schedule tribes. The AASU, for the first time, said
that ex-tea garden labours would be issued identity cards and requested the tea union
bodies for cooperation.

On May 31, 1980, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi called an all-party meet m
Delhi but without much success. The participants were unanimous in demanding that
the agitation should be called off in order to create an atmosphere conducive tor
negotiation. The AASU-AAGSP clearly spelled out their stand on the issue of
infiltrators saying that for the dialogue to be meaningful, identification of foreigners
illegally staying in Assam must be on the basis o f the constitutional provisions and
relevant laws. The AASU also said that those coming before 1961 would not he
asked to quit. The crux o f the matter was in relation to those infiltrators who came
between 1961 and 1971. The AASU clarified that its stand for 1951 NRC and Pi52
voters’ list was not to be taken meaning deportation o f those identified. It s.mi that

132
it was aware of the difficulties in deporting old settlers, but that should not be laken
as a stumbling block in starting the work of identification.

In the meantime, a counter-student movement began in Bengal on the plea >1

atrocities on Bengalis in Assam and also against the oil blockade. The West Bengal
Chief Minister branded the agitation as communal and secessionist and mad< snide
remarks about Assamese women. On June 11, 1980, the AASU issued a press
statement warning the people to be cautious of communal forces trying r take
advantage of the situation. It also took to the Centre for trying to unite and let end
infiltrators in the name of minorities. The release said that the movement is in a \ ei\
crucial juncture and participants need to show foresightedness. The AASt also
picketed successfully outside all State and Central Government offices from inly
20, 1980, in which even government employees participated. The situation in Assam
was getting tense following communal clashes. A worried Prime Minister said. I
am willing to agree to anything provided other Indians are safe in Assam and not to
anything which puts life of minorities in danger.” 35 The agitation was tempi ra n k
suspended on July 21, 1980. The 14-day respite announced by the AASU-AAGSP
created a positive environment which allowed time to the Government to tmnk of
resumption of dialogue.

Manipur Chief Minister R. K. Dorendra Singh also began efforts to bridge the
communication gap between the Central Government and the movement leaders ( >n
July 25, 1980, after a successful parleys with the AASU-AAGSP, he announced m
a press conference that the movement leaders had agreed to withdraw the agitation
as a first step towards resumption of talks within a week. The movement leaders ako
agreed to withdraw their blockade on forest products of timber, bamboo and
plywood. The Centre, on its part, agreed to the reciprocal concession of release >i
all persons arrested under the Prevention of Detention Order as well as withdraw a!
of the notification issued under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act and the Assam
Disturbed Areas Act. The AASU, however, clarified that lifting of the oil blockade
could be done only after the Government withdraw all repressive measures and fulfil
all the conditions set out.
On August 18, 1980, talks between the movement leaders and the Centre
represented by Union Minister of State for Home Affairs Yogendra Makwana began

133
in Shillong. However, very little was achieved. The AASU announced three da\s oi
agitational programme which crippled air services and passenger train serenes i<
and from the State. The Government came out with stringent measures and gau tin
CRPF a free hand.
Amid all the uncertainties, the AASU, in a press release, warned the politic-a'
parties in the State to refrain from creating division among people on commima
lines. In another release soon after, it said that those in favour of a 1971 cut-nil vcai
did not want Assam’s tribal areas be free o f infiltrators. It said that hitherto no parts
had called for the deportation of infiltrators from the 33 tribal belts and blocks
despite their being cognizant of the fact that all these areas were under the sv\a\ oi
infiltrators.
A silver lining, however, emerged out o f the cloud of uncertaint) I h.
Government o f India decided to arrange talks between the Union Home Ministei ank
the movement leaders on September 17, 1980, in New Delhi.
But the AASU was in no mood to tone down the movement. In its executn
committee meeting, it decided to hold rallies in support o f the movement till
September 12, 1980. The AASU felt that the Centre was exploiting the present
situation by trying to divide the people when it had suspended the agitation in eood
faith. The AASU was also aware of the scepticism prevailing in some quarter
regarding the movement. On September 11, 1980, the AASU said that it xould
continue towards its objectives through agitation and negotiation. The week Ions
negotiation failed to break the deadlock as the Government expressed its resei vain
about the National Register of Citizens, 1951 to be a valid document on wlma
identification o f foreigners could be based. But the only positive outcome 1 the

meeting was that both the parties had agreed to disagree and decided on anoth«.i
round o f talks in New Delhi where substantive issues could be discussed.

On October 8, 1980, three days before talks were to resume with the < onto
the AASU released a press note in favour o f the 33 tribal blocks and belts neop'e
and said that the Government had done nothing to facilitate the constitutional rights
o f these people. Talks resumed in New Delhi but no consensus was reached on the

cut-off year. On October 12, 1980, the AASU warned the political parties that widt
the 6th Five-Year Plan around, the general tendency of give and take might tale
precedence over the all-important issue o f the foreigners staying in the State Ike

134
AASU also condemned the role of political parties in the State. It stated that whereas
students sacrificed one valuable year, people sacrificed their lives, hut p>ditieol
parties continued to betray the faith imposed on them. The AASU, in anothc press
communique on October 22, 1980, stated that deportation of foreigners based on
religion would never be accepted. It criticized the Centre for terming Hindu to be
refugees and Muslims to be infiltrators, in the past, in order to derive political
mileage. Meanwhile, on November 4, 1980, the Centre ordered to the \n m
(reportedly after training them) to take all measures to flush out oil from Oil India
pipelines, frozen for m onths/6

On November 19, 1980, the AASU condemned the Centre’s move to 'orm a
council of ministers to administer Assam. It stated in a press release that these
ministers, consisting of elected legislators, would surely work in favour of the
immigrants rather than against them. The AASU warned the legislators that then
lust for power would not be able to trample the movement. It condemned <n
November 21, 1980, the Centre, for giving up of implementation of the 19< s plan
for border security, and regretted that lack of implementation of the plan had resulted
in large-scale illegal migration. On November 24, 1980, the Centre called >ut the
Army in Guwahati. On the same day, the Union Home Minister met Y. B. < havan
and A. B. Vajpayee and agreed for a tripartite meeting of the Government, the
Opposition leaders and the movement leaders. On November 28, 1980, the AAS l
in a press statement, severely condemned the atrocities of the CRPF in (lauhati
Thus, the Centre was trying the time-tested technique of negotiation on the one hand
and force on the other to quell the spirit of Assam and its people.

On December 2, 1980, the tripartite talks began in Delhi and AASU put
forward a mild condition that detection of foreigners should be on the basi of the
constitution and the existing laws. Nothing much could be achieved in the tabo
Meanwhile, the provision of Article 356 (5), restricting the total duration >t
President’s rule to a maximum period of 12 months, meant that a popiuat
Government was to take charge at Dispur. Accordingly, a new Congo ss !>
Government headed by Anowara Taimur took office on December 6, lbxu I k
AASU immediately called for a 24-hour total non-cooperation against a hat it
termed as “ a Government elected by votes of foreign nationals and through a

135
process of defection” . The Congress had eight members initially but increased iiv
strength to 52. The new incumbent at Dispur— Ms. Taimur— in her first broadcast
said that her Government would give first priority to the influx problem, which she
admitted, was a national one. On December 14, 1980, the AASU started a t>atui
satyagraha from December 18, 1980, to demand the deportation of foreigner x trom
Assam. It also criticized the Taimur Government for lack o f democratic values \
press release also asked the people to take a long-term plan in order to male the
future o f Assam secure. From December 18 to 30, 1980, Assam was in a state «>f
turmoil, as a result o f thousands of satyagrahis courting arrest. It resulted n 5 .(>00
people courting arrest on December 19, 1980, alone. On December 29 and 30 1980,
a 34-hour Assam bandh was called to protest against the death of satyagrahis and
assumption of power by the State Government under the Special Powers Act. A
national convention on January 14, 1981, participated by prominent c ti/ei's
journalists and politicians confirmed that the infiltration problem in Assam was a
national one. The convention also appreciated the peaceful and non-violent character
o f the Assam movement. From January 7-11, 1981, meetings were organized by the
AASU-AAGSP to mould public opinion. On January 11, 1981, the AASl) and the
AAGSP announced that the Bongaigaon refinery was allowed to resume production
in view o f the scarcity o f oil products in the State. From January 12. osi. a
symbolic satyagraha was organized against the State and Central repression On
January 18 and 19, 1981, a convention o f the AASU was held at the Assam
Agricultural University in Jorhat, where 600 delegates took part. At the end of the
convention, the AASU announced a series o f protest measures including the boycott
o f the Republic Day celebrations. People were, however, asked to hoist the national
flag on top of their houses. On January 20, 1981, the AASU warned of icnewed
blockade o f movement o f plywood and jute from north-eastern States hroueh
Assam. After the success o f the January 26, 1981, Republic Day boycott, the AAS l 1
announced resumption o f the oil blockade on January 28, 1981.

Hectic politicking was also in progress both in New Delhi and Dispur to
facilitate dialogue between the Centre and the movement leaders, including visits b\
close confidantes o f the Prime Minister. The AASU on May 11. 1981, through a
press release, stressed the need to evolve a long-term economic plan to go alongside
the movement because the Centre was delaying the solution to the influx problem

136
in order to wear down the A A S U . The A A S U , for the first time, said that economic

and political power must he brought to the hands o f the indigenous Assamese m

order to solve the immigration issue.

The Centre, meanwhile, announced that dialogue with the movement ieadeis

would resume on M ay 18, 1981. Talks began in N ew Delhi. The Centre evolved a

new formula which stated that unauthorized entrants o f the 1961-1971 period diould

be retained in the State. On M ay 21, 1981, the Centre rejected A A S U 's proposal <>|

1961 as the cut-off year. The Home M inister appealed to the movement leaders to

take a humane approach, view ing the problem on a national perspective. On Mas 2T

1981, the A A S U and the A A G S P agreed to the adjournment o f the agitation and to

continue negotiation in the next round to be held from middle o f June Tims the

eighth round o f talks ended between the Centre and the movement leaders It w a s

the longest o f all negotiations. Talks between the movement leaders and the ( entie

started again on June 29, 1981. Agreement on fencing o f border was arrived at in the

meeting. M eanwhile, in Assam, the Taimur M inistry collapsed on June 30. 19s i . and

President’ s rule was imposed. Talks, however, continued till July 15, 19X1 The

movement leaders sought from the Centre a clear-cut definition o f unauthorized

foreigners. A disgruntled Centre blamed the movement leaders for evading me real

issue after talks had failed.

Informal talks also took place between Cabinet Secretary Krishna Swami Ran

Saheb and the agitation leaders at Shillong on August 2 and 3, 1981. But there u is

no sign o f a breakthrough. In the meantime, the Manipur C h ief Minislei R K

Dorendra also was successful in arranging talks in Imphal between the A A SC

leaders and a top official in the Union Hom e Ministry.

Another round o f talks started in N ew Delhi on August 18, 1981. It continued

till August 23, 1981, but without any success. The bone o f contention was the

differentiation between refugees and illegal migrants. The Centre’ s stand was to
include all members o f the minority community w ho had come from East Pakistan

as refugees to which the movement leaders opposed. Another factor which >vsulu d

in the talks being deadlocked was that the movement leaders wanted the decision d
the appellate tribunal to be final. They were also against the use o f ration cares.

1 3 7
driving licenses, etc., as evidence. Hardening their stand even further, the movement
leaders almost rejected the proposal that the 1961-1971 entrants, who were granted
citizenship, could stay on in Assam.

Towards an Agreement
Frustrated at the increasing rate of failure of talks, ten Opposition parties
including the Left demanded of the Government to spell out appropriate measures
for the solution of foreign nationals’ issue on the basis of the Constitution ol India,
the relevant laws, the international agreements and the national commitments The
AASU too, in a press release, spelt out its own stand on the talks and future of the
movement. The AASU said that for it negotiation was an integral part of the
movement, and only if the strategy failed, a new phase in the movement would take
shape. The AASU stated that it was prepared for a long-drawn-out movement. The
AASU also disclosed that a convention on October 2 and 3, 1981, will determine its
future course of action. On October 27, 1981, the AASU and the AAGSP prepared
a revised draft, according to which, all foreigners were to be detected on the basis
of the Constitution and relevant laws—Citizenship Act, 1955, the Foreigners A( i.
1946, and Passport Act, 1952.

Another round of talks began in New Delhi on October 29, 1981. The meeting
agreed, in principle, to take measures for checking further infiltration by constructing
a road running parallel to the Assam-Bangladesh border, and creating a no-man's
land between the boundary proper and the road. The other points discussed in the
meeting were : Amendment to Section 3 (2) of the Citizenship Act to exclude
foreigners’ children bom in India claiming Indian citizenship because of such birth,
applicability of international and national commitments, humanitarian considerations
in deciding citizenship and shifting of 1961-71 entrants to places outside the Siam.
The deadlock persisted on these issues besides on the one on the grant of citizenship
to immigrants from Pakistan on reciprocal basis under Section 5 (1) <>! the
Citizenship Act. The Centre did not accept the view of the movement leaders that
reciprocity did not exist after 1951. Talks were adjourned on November IdM
After their return to Gauhati, the AASU-AAGSP leaders declared that they \ere m
longer interested in talks with the Centre. On November 19, 1981, a 36-hom Assam
bandh was called. Around 700 AASU activists were arrested. The AASC and

138
AAGSP also announced a nionth-long agitation beginning December 27. 1981. and
ending with a 12-hour janata curfew on the Republic Day of 1982. A statewide
poster campaign gave vent to AASU feelings. Slogans in the poster read : deport
foreigners’, ‘no elections’, ‘do not usurp democratic rights of Assamese people . er.
Police repression was let loose on the agitationists. Three of them were killed m
police firing and hundreds arrested. The AASU described the firing on unarmed
people as a “ dark chapter in the history of the civilized world.”

Efforts by national political parties bore fruits and the Centre said that
invitations had been issued to the AASU and the AAGSP for tripartite talks
beginning January 18, 1982. On January 9, 1982, the AASU announced that it would
take part in the talks but said that agitation would not be withdrawn. On January 1 V
1982, a Government led by Keshab Chandra Gogoi was sworn in at Dispur, alter the
revoking of the President’s rule. The AASU-AAGSP declared that they were against
the illegal installation of a Government of defectors, and legislators elected >n
foreigners’ votes. A total non-cooperation was observed on January 18 1982.
disrupting normal life in the Brahmaputra valley.

Talks began on January 18, 1982. This was the first-ever tripartite talks
involving the Opposition leaders. There was optimism all around. A national issue
was accorded its due importance. The meeting agreed that security measures on the
border between Assam and Bangladesh would be tightened to prevent infiltration.
The Government and the Opposition agreed on the following formulations ill
foreigners should be detected on the basis of the Constitution and the relevant laus
as existing on the day. In doing so, all relevant documents— National Register of
Citizens, 1951, Electoral Rolls of 1952 and land records maintained under Assam
Land and Revenue Regulation Act— shall be made use of. The movement leaders
were not satisfied at the casual use of the words ‘relevant documents', for the
AASU-AAGSP, this meant that this would provide legitimacy to immigrants, miner
the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act of 1952, who had to come to India
because of communal disturbances. The main reasons for the lack of progress nt
talks were the conflict on definitions of foreigners, and the Centre’s desire to adhere
to Policy Instructions issued in 1965. Under this Policy Instructions, a large number
of Bengali Hindu refugees, who had crossed over to India from East Pakistan abet
the Indo-Pak war, were to be given citizenship. The AASU-AAGSP wanted the Idea

139
Policy Instructions be scrapped. According to them, the Centre wanted to smuggle
in the 1965 Policy Instruction under ‘relevant documents’. A notable face to i merge
from the tripartite talks was the former Janata Dal minister at the Centre— Has nuier
Verma.

On February 2, 1982 the AASU announced temporary suspension ol maim

agitational programmes to help students prepare for their forthcoming examination -
Meanwhile, the Keshab Gogoi Ministry resigned on March 18, 1982. Assam was
placed under President’s rule for the third time in four years. The Governor s report
said that party loyalties of some members were extremely flexible and the chant as
of a stable ministry were remote.

Another round of talks took place in April 1982. It met the same fate as tin
earlier ones. The AASU, AAGSP leaders declared that the Government had no
genuine interest in finding out a satisfactory solution to the problem. They stated that
the Prime Minister not taking part in the talks was an indication that the entire
exercise was an academic one for the Centre.

On the other hand, a constitutional crisis was looming large in Assam with
every passing day. Since President’s rule was not to be imposed beyond 12 monthv
an impending election was on the cards. But the moot questions were : with foreign
voters or without them ? What was the Centre up to? On May 29, 1982, the Chief
Election Commissioner, Mr S. L. Shakdher said that election process in Assam
would be initiated only after normalcy returned and a decision taken to In
President’s rule from the State. He said that under the Constitution, the Government
could not hold elections in the State unless the atmosphere was congenial and
electoral rolls were thoroughly revised.

The AASU asked the political parties whether some secret directives had bean
issued to them by their party high commands with regard to the 1965 Polios
Instruction? An AASU press release stated that whereas the infiltratoi n wt re
occupying government agricultural lands, the indigenous labourers were witheut
land in their own place. The AASU wanted to know whether the political parti^
supported redistribution of land, once the infiltrators have been deported ? The A A M
regretted the fact that indigenous tribals have been forced to stay in reserve Mr* m
lands following the occupation of their land by the infiltrators.

140
 On August 14, 1982, the AASU, in another press release, raised s<>iw
important questions. It said, “ Legally we are free, but have we savoured political
social and economic freedom? If yes, to what degree” ? It regretted that Assam has
failed to march together with other States of the country. The AASU also questioned
the very features of freedom and the role of successive governments at the (Vnire m
ensuring freedom for Assam and its people in the face of massive onslaught I p >m the
illegal migrants.

Tripartite talks resumed on August 25, 1982, but were adjourned aftc time
days of deliberation to enable the participants to study the draft formula prepared h\
Ravinder Verma. The formula delinked the process of detection of alien- from
government agencies and left the work to quasi-judicial tribunals functioning at tin
Assembly constituency-level with the verdict of the tribunals being guided t \ law.
The discussion resumed on September 1, 1982, after the movement leaders had
suggested modifications to the formula. The Centre’s insistence on applying the IWa
Policy Instructions created difficulties in the talks as the AASU, AAGSP eade ^
refused to budge from their stand against the Policy Instructions. Ravinder Verma
then suggested in a new working paper that all those persons who entered Assam
illegally between 1961 and 1971 could be detected and their names could be Icleu d
from the electoral rolls and they might be dispersed according to admini-.train c
convenience, barring those who had been granted citizenship under 1465 l’ub< \
Instructions and other laws.

The Centre showed reservations about the Verma formula but agreed •>
consider favourably the demand for suitable constitutional safeguards to ensu e
preservation of the social, cultural and political identity of the Assamese people a
however, rejected the demand of the movement leaders to make the findings ■>! ti e
tribunal final, because it pointed out legal and constitutional difficulties in com.eding
to wholesale deletion of names of persons suspected to be foreign nationals At d e
end of the talks on September 8, 1982, a new date— September 28, 198 w i-
announced for resumption of dialogue. There was hardly any change in the stand l
the Centre in the September 28, 1982, round of talks. The core of the problem v- i-
still the status of the 1961-1971 migrants. The movement leaders were opposed
arming the proposed tribunals with power to determine the eligibility of foreigner

141
to Indian citizenship. The work of the tribunals, according to them, should lv
confined to determining whether or not an individual was an Indian citizen. <md ho
date of entry into the State.

In a press release on October 22, 1982, the AASU slammed the Congioss i i
and Left parties for refraining from making serious attempts in reaching a solution
as they felt that deportation of infiltrators would harm their political fortunes hhe
AASU said that failed negotiations were sending out wrong signals regarding the
characteristics of national political parties. They termed Congress (I) leader Pranah
Mukherjee as the defender of Hindu Bengalis. It also said that its proposal >1 an
equitable deportation of 1961-1971 immigrants was agreeable to many States as it
had confirmed reports regarding the stand of many States. The AASU stated that it
the Prime Minister was ready to accept the AASU’s proposal, a solution a m id la-

very much in sight.

Another round of tripartite meeting began on November 6, 1982. The Centre

insisted on its stand of March 1971 as the cut-off date. The movement leaders
protested the Home Minister’s reference to March 1971, stating that the meeting had
been called to discuss the fate of 1961-71 migrants. Ravinder Verma then presented
his revised formula to reconcile the stand of the Centre and movement leader
dividing infiltrators in four categories and suggesting appropriate treatment The

AASU-AAGSP leaders rejected the Verma formula and eventually the talks tailed
However, there was a tentative agreement to resume dialogue on December o Ios
It was also agreed during the talks that two Union Ministers— P. C. Sethi and k
Venkatraman—would visit Guwahati to make a joint inspection with AASU-AAC iSP
leaders of Indo-Bangla border check posts.

It was at this crucial juncture in December 1982, that the real intent ot the

Centre was revealed by a Congress party leader Rajesh Pilot while talking to Nekh.u
Gupta. Pilot was then managing election campaign in Tripura. Buoyed b\ m
emerging Congress wave in Tripura, Pilot declared nonchalantly that election
campaign would be launched in Gauhati. Gupta asked him, “Are you serious '

Pilot : Why not? People are fed up. They want elections, they want a p o l i t u ai

government.

142
Gupta : But who told you that? There will be bloodshed why is it so important
to hold elections in Assam?

Pilot : Because the agitators must be finished politically. This is the wax to do
it.

Gupta : It will be impossible....

Pilot : How can you say that? If you put, 5,000 of them in jail for the election
period, the problem is solved. It is only the mischief-mongers you haw
to tackle. The rest of the people will heave a sigh of relief. Yon dor. t
know how powerful the government can be.36

This was a clear hint of things to come.

Tripartite talks, however, began on January 4, 1983, but met with no result ami
talks were adjourned sine die on January 5, 1983, because the fate of 1901 1() I
migrants could not be decided. The AASU, meanwhile, also asked the people >|
Assam to stay away from all sorts of entertainment and celebrations as a mark d
respect to those killed in the agitation, and prepare for tough time to come

The Farcical Election

On January 6, 1983 the Election Commission announced that by-elections o
12 parliamentary constituencies and general elections to the Assam Assemble would
be held on February 14, 17 and 20, 1983, on the basis of the 1979 electoral mbs
It was a clear insult to the movement leaders who refused to follow the Cl (
directives. As soon as the AASU-AAGSP leaders landed in Gauhati, thee were
arrested thereby triggering a chain reaction of violent protests throughout the State.

On January 19, 1983, the Nowgong DC and SP were attacked by a mob of

people. Bomb explosions were reported at APCC (I) offices in Gauhati and Barpcta
on January 22 and 23, 1983, respectively. Some gazetted officers in the hill district
of Karbi Anglong, including a district agricultural officer, were suspended t >r then-
decisions conveyed in writing not to attend polling duty.

As election neared, violence grew. Not a single day went by when media in the
State did not report of violence. On February 1, 1983, the Supreme Court dmmissed
the petition filed by Raj Narain seeking stay of the Assam elections. The Chief

143
Sea of Hum anity during A S S A M M O V E M E N T
Sea of Humanity during ASSAM MOVEMENT
First Martyr of ASSAM MOVEMENT
KHARGESWAR TALUKDAR
December 10, 1979
* ^
Justice said, “ we are not saying that the situation is not serious, but we are powerless
to interfere” . On the same day, the AASU-AAGSF carried out a march in all majoi
places of Assam protesting against the polls. On February 2, 1983, five persons were
killed when a CRPF patrol opened fire on a mob in Bourdalgaon in Mangaldoi
subdivision of Darrang district. On the same day, the Patna High Court stayed the
Bihar Government’s order directing its employees to assist polls in Assam. Women
in the State were also active participants in the movement. On February 3, 1983. the\
took out a procession on the call for the AASU-AAGSP combine, protesting polls
in Assam. The movement leaders on the same day also asked State Government
employees of a full non-cooperation in administrative work from February 5-2.’,
1983. In Burha, Mangaldoi, many protesters were killed in police firing. On
February 4, 1983, teachers in Assam took out a procession against polls at the call
of the AASU-AAGSP. On the same day, the advisor to the Assam Governor C. K
Subhramanium and the Assam Chief Secretary Ramesh Chandra met secretaries m
the Home Ministry. The Centre, however, ruled out postponement of polls.

The Centre, meanwhile, ordered another battalion to be sent to Assam to

maintain law and order. On February 7, 1983, the Kamrup bandh and janata curfew
in Gauhati were total. On February 8, 1983, anti-poll demonstrations were organized
by the AASU throughout Assam in which 11 lives were lost. On that day, Opposition
leaders like A. B. Vajpayee, Choudhury Charan Singh, Jaswant Singh, and others,
were in Guwahati and called for a boycott of the Assam polls. On the other hand,
the Centre, after consultation with the Assam Chief Secretary, decided to send
additional 5,000 men by air to assist in polls in the State. The Officer on Special
Duty for Assam in the Home Ministry, Mr. P. P. Nair, also arrived in Assam to get
a first-hand knowledge of the situation. On February 9, 1983, the Prime Minister
kicked-off her poll campaign in Assam. In a unique incident, police arrested an
executive engineer, M. Rahman, in Moirabari, Nagaon district after he refused to
construct a helipad for the Prime Minister’s visit.

Violence continued unabated. On February 10, 1983, eight persons lest their
lives due to police firing. The AASU-AAGSP called for a successful 12-hour inn,ua
curfew in protest against the Prime Minister’s visit. The movement got a shet in the

144
arm when 150 top officials of Oil India Limited, Duliajan submitted their rcsignatini
expressing their solidarity with the movement. On February 11, six person .vet'
shot dead by the police in Nalbari and Barpeta subdivision. Violence started akim
a communal hue in Lakhimpur and Kamrup. On February 12, 1983, 11 person wen
killed in communal clashes in the two districts. Came February 14, 1983, the lay ot
the first stage of the polls. It witnessed one of the most gruesome communal vi< dence
in Assam’s history. About 100 people were killed in communal clashes. The seculai
and tolerant image of the State lay in ruins. Polling continued on the body I ik
victims. It was polls in papers only, many polling stations reported zero -oting.
February 17, 1983, also witnessed polling amid communal clashes with staiewidr
polling percentage being 20. It was a strange election on all counts. Electoral Rolls
printed in Calcutta, polling personnel air-lifted from Patna, Delhi and Mus ouik

policemen coming all the way from Jaipur, Lucknow and Chandigarh, and last but
not the least, voters bom and migrated from Mymensingh, Sylhet and other
districts of Bangladesh to elect a ‘popular’ government in Assam in the name <<f
democracy.

In 9 constituencies, polling was below 2 per cent (Table-A) and in ' <
constituencies, it was below 5 per cent (Table-B).

Table - A
(Constituencies with less than 2 per cent polling)

Constituency District Total electorate Votes polled % of total

Khumtai Sibasagar 66,625 1,022 1 53
Teok Sibasagar 68,391 1,374 2.00
Sibasagar Sibasagar 59,874 1,094 1.83
Guwahati East Kamrup 73,580 1,239 1.67
Dharampur Kamrup 69,308 267 0.38
Bihpuria Lakhimpur 64,000 440 0.68
Dhakuakhana Lakhimpur 76,877 650 0.85
Dhemaji Lakhimpur 90,441 360 0.40
Morigaon Nowgong 78,012 1513 1.94

145
 Table - B
(Constituencies with less than 5 per cent polling)

Constituency District Total electorate Votes polled % of total \

Bokakhat Sibasagar 60,091 1,536 2.56

Sarupathar Sibasagar 86,429 2,535 2.53
Golaghat Sibasagar 77,365 2,505 3.23
Dergaon Sibasagar 73,469 1,811 2.46
Jorhat Sibasagar 72,377 1,834 2.84
Titabor Sibasagar 68,766 1,709 2.48
Amguri Sibasagar 67,579 2,188 3.23
Thowra Sibasagar 75,500 3,192 4.23
Kamalpur Kamrup 68,759 1,422 2.06
Nalbari Kamrup 80,567 2,411 2.99
N. Lakhimpur Lakhimpur 62,447 3,053 4.89
Jagiroad Nowgong 72,368 3,159 4.37
Barhampur Nowgong 77,867 3,879 4.98

On February 17, 1983, the CEC asked the Centre whether it wanted to go
ahead with the February 20 polls. The Centre was unmoved. On February 18 198 9
more than 1,200 people, mostly Muslims, were massacred at Nellie in Nowgong. Hie
slaughter continued for 24 hours. Assam was in blood. Clashes continued and so did
the polling. On February 20, 1983, after the third phase of polls, the Cento-
complemented the people for exercising their franchise. On February 22, Ft8 9 the
Parliament adopted a resolution condemning the Assam killings and pleaded with un­
people to restore normalcy. The Union Home Minister too said that the Government
did not stand on prestige and would resume negotiations with the movement leadi i s
but with a rider— only when a conducive atmosphere was created. However, the
Home Minister stated that the Centre no longer considered the AASU-AAGSP as tin­
sole representatives of Assam’s interests and that, therefore, it would in future
consult other parties, elected representatives and representatives of ethnic groups and
minorities. On February 24, 1983, the AASU complimented the people of Assam >r
opposing the elections forced upon the State by a so-called democratic govi-rnnvni
at the Centre. It accused the Centre o f blatant violation of the Constitution and
condemned it for the perfidious act o f arresting the movement leaders alter die

146
aborted talks in New Delhi. It paid rich tributes to all those killed in the election
related violence. It also appealed to the people not to recognize the regime at Dispui
and to further strengthen their resolve in fighting for deportation of infiltrator^

On February 25, 1983, counting of votes was completed. Congress won a

landslide victory bagging 90 seats out of 108 for which polling was held. The parts
also won five Lok Sabha seats, the counting of which was completed by February
26, 1983. On February 27, 1983, a 13-member Ministry headed by Hitcswar Saikia
was sworn in. On February 28, 1983, the AASU, in a press communique, blamed tin
Centre for its divisive policies which were responsible for the disturbances in Assam
The release said that a divide and rule policy was being followed by the Centre whik
dealing with the general and the tribal people and between the Hindus and tin
Muslims, to derive political mileage. The AASU decried the swearing in d tin.
Saikia Ministry and termed the Government as illegal as the elections were farce
The AASU sought total non-cooperation of the people for the regime at Dispur.

Post-Poll Developments

On March 7, 1983, the apex body of Assam’s literary and cultural life— Asom
Sahitya Sabha—condemned the Assembly polls in the State, and proposed action
against those who participated in the recent elections. The AASU, on that day ruled
out further negotiations with the Centre. On March 18, 1983, Chief Minister
Hiteswar Saikia announced that tribunals would be constituted to detect post- 197
infiltrators. On the same day, the Minister of State for Home Affairs, Nihar Ranjan
Laskar said that 4,626 Bangladeshis had been deported from Assam during the lao
two years. The AASU, in a press release, said on March 18, 1983, that non-', mlei i
means of the movement would continue to be its policy. It said even thouuh th
Centre was less understanding to AASU, the people of Assam were and that \v<;
what mattered the most to it. On March 19, 1983, in a significant decision, the Chit I
Minister unequivocally rejected demands emanating from some quarters urging a baa
on the AASU. The AASU declared a three-hour black-out on March 29 I9S
against the Prime Minister’s visit to Assam.

147
 Meanwhile, cracks began to appear in the AASU leadership. The lirst si.m ui
a rift in the AASU appeared on April 11, 1983, when some Muslim memU ^ oi
AASU held a separate meeting under the leadership of Nurul Hussain. On Apm Hi
1983, AASU vice-president Nurul Hussain called for the ouster of ‘cominuna>
elements’ in AASU hinting at the involvement of the BJP and the RSS n tin
students’ body. On April 18, 1983, the AASU stated very clearly that it w i n n
having any links with the RSS as alleged by some of its own members. The \ AS l
seem to have been heading for a split when disciplinary action was initiated aeams!
Nurul Hussain. Meanwhile, Chief Minister Hiteswar Saikia was also expiorm;
possibilities of talks by getting in touch with AASU leaders. He also announc <1 the
formation of 20 tribunals for detection of foreign nationals of the post-1971 period
Parliament, in the meantime, passed the Illegal Migrants (Determination bv
Tribunals) Act, 1983 to provide for the establishments of tribunals h i the
determination, in a fair manner, of the question— whether a person was an illegal
migrant— to enable the Central Government, to expel him from the country. I in An
came into force in Assam from October 15, 1983. The Act gave Assam a unique
distinction of being the only State in the world with two different laws to deter t
foreigners staying in the State.

Interestingly, the passing of the IM (DT) Bill, 1983, in the Lok Sabha was
marked by a rejection of pleas from some Opposition parties to resume negotiations
on the Assam problem because as per the Centre, extremists were holding swa\ m n
the movement. The Home Minister, however, in the Rajya Sabha, during a debate <a
the Bill, stated the Centre’s newly-adopted position that future negotiations on ti e
influx issue would also include all concerned parties besides the movement leader
The AASU, in a release to the press on November 17, 1983, denounced the IM <I ) i
Act, 1983 and stated that it would obliterate the political freedom of the people I
Assam.

Mehta Commission Report

In a two-day conference at Mangaldoi, starting November 26, 1983, the A s^m
State Freedom Fighters’ Association decided to constitute a non-government iiidiaal
probe commission, to look into the unprecedented police atrocities, commut a;
violence as well as to look into the free-and-fair poll angle of the 1983 p o ik I k

148
Commission was headed by the retired Himachal Pradesh High Court Chief Justice
Mr. T. U. Mehta. The period of investigation was from January 1, 1983 to April 30
1983. At Mr Mehta’s suggestion, two eminent persons— Mr Ganesh Chandra
Phookan, a retired Secretary and Finance Commissioner, Government of Assam , and
Prof. Raihan Shah, former Head of the Department, English, Cotton College were
made members of the Enquiry Commission.

The Commission filed its report on August 20, 1984, after an extensive ton;
schedule into the villages and towns of Assam and a careful analysis of more than
5,000 memoranda, it received during its tenure.

The Commission, in its report, indicted the Centre and citing ‘unimpeachable
sources’ said that there were orders from the top of going ahead with the elections
no matter how. The report also attested what the AASU had been saying all alone
that there were manipulations in voters’ list, taking advantage of the movement
leaders’ absence; and that the Centre wanted to foist a Congress Government in
Assam under the garb of constitutional imperative for polls, etc.

Towards a Solution
In a convention of the AASU on January 10 and 11, 1984, in Jorhat, the need
for a unified regional party was stressed by the 500 delegates who participated
These delegates were from all organizations which were involved in the \ssam
movement. The idea of a regional party in State politics proved to be seminal on the
political firmament of the State. After much deliberations, it was agreed that tl
AASU, notwithstanding its apolitical stand, would contribute in bringing all region d
parties in Assam under a common political platform. On June 15, 1984, the A AM
declared an Assam bandh, protesting against Centre’s indifference to the influx isxu

The Supreme Court in October, 1984, in its verdict, declared the contrivers! a l
electoral rolls and the 1983 polls based on them as valid. The Court also stated tl u
the 1979 rolls be the basis of the forthcoming Lok Sabha and Assembly poll which
could not be held or completed in February 1983. The AASU-AAGSP reje< ted the
verdict. Meanwhile, the Election Commission, after parleys with political parti'
declared that the 1971 rolls to be the basis of the forthcoming polls.

149
 M e a n w h ile , P r im e M in iste r In d ir a G an d h i w as a ssa ssin a te d on O c t o lx .' H

1984. L o k S a h lia e le c tio n s w ere an n o u n ced fo r D ecem b er 2 4 an d D ecem h c! 27

1 9 8 4 , in t w o p h ase s, ex cep t in A s s a m an d P u n ja b , w h e r e m ilita n c y sta rte d r a isin - ’ i h

u g ly h ead. T h e C o n g re ss cam e to p o w e r w ith a la n d slid e v ic to r y u n d e r R a jiv G a n d h i

T h e A A S U , in a p re ss re le a se on D ecem b er 19, 1 9 8 4 , sa id th a t it h a d d e c id e d

to r e fr a in fro m in te r fe r in g in th e v o t e r s ’ list to b e p rep ared b y th e E C b ased on a

S u p r e m e C o u r t d ir e c tiv e , b u t w a rn e d th a t i f th e lis t in c lu d e d th e n a m e s o f fo r e ic u c r s

th e n th e p e o p le o f th e S ta te h ad th e p r e r o g a tiv e to r e je c t it, th e w ay it h a i l r e ie v te d

th e 1979 list.

M e d ia re p o rts, m e a n w h ile , ta lk e d o f secret ta lk s b e tw e e n th e C e n tre an d tin -

m o v e m e n t le a d e r s w h e re th e y e ar 1965 w a s re p o rte d to h av e e m e rg e d as th e m i- o f

y ear. O n A p r il 8, 1 9 8 5 , th e U n io n H o m e S e c re ta ry m et th e A A S U le a d e r w ho

d em an d ed d ise n fr a n c h ise m e n t o f th e 1 9 6 1 -7 1 stre am o f fo r e ig n n a tio n a ls an c ih e n

d isp e rsa l to o th e r p a rts o f th e co u n try , rep eal o f th e IM (D T ) A c t, 1981 an d

d isso lu tio n o f th e S ta te A sse m b ly . W ith o u t c o m m ittin g a n y th in g , th e U n io n H om e

S e c re ta ry sa id th a t fo rm a l d isc u ssio n w o u ld resu m e so o n .

O n M ay 7 , 1 9 8 5 , fo rm a l ta lk s sta rte d b e tw e e n th e A A S U -A A G S P and th e

C e n tre h ead ed b y H o m e S e c re ta ry R . D . P rad h an . T h e ta lk s en d ed in a sta le m a te -

a fte r d r a g g in g on fo r n e a rly a m o n th on Ju n e 4 , 1 9 8 5 . T h e C e n tre , h o w ev er, agreed

fo r a fre sh ro u n d o f ta lk s fro m Ju ly 2 9 , 1985, at S h illo n g . N o th in g much w a -

a c h ie v e d in S h illo n g a s w e ll. A n o th e r r o u n d o f ta lk s sta rte d in N ew D e lh i o n A u g u st

11, 1985. T h e m o v em en t le a d e r s p re sse d fo r a n ew c u t-o ff d a te o f Ja n u a ry 1 I0 6 o

fo r d e te c tio n an d d e p o r ta tio n o f in filtr a to r s, d ise n fra n c h ise m e n t fo r 10 years ;

a g a in s t th e ir p r e v io u s d em an d o f 2 0 y ears an d d isso lu tio n o f th e A sse m b ly

Signing of the Assam Accord

O n A u g u st 12, 19 8 5 , P r im e M in iste r R a jiv G an d h i v isite d G u w a h a ti -

c o n n e c tio n w ith th e C o n g re ss C e n te n a ry C e le b r a tio n , an d sa id th a t th e re w i uKl 1-.

“ g o o d n ew s” fo r th e S ta te .

150
August 15. 1985 : 2.45 a.m. - The historic moment of signing the ASSAM ACCORD
August 21, 1985 : THE SEA OF HUMANITY at Judges' Field, Guwahati
 In Delhi, meanwhile, hcetic negotiations continued among the 45-member
Coordination Committee of the AASU-AAGSP in which the draft agreement readied
by the Centre and the movement leaders was discussed threadbare. The talks ai one
point seemed to have hit a roadblock, but the Prime Minister himself intervened and
persuaded all the movement leaders to show some degree of flexibility on the
question of the dissolution of the State Assembly. The leaders relented and thus a
historic accord known as the “Assam Accord” (Memorandum of Settlement was
signed on 2.45 a.m. of August 15, 1985, marking the culmination of the six-yearoi
life and death struggle of Assam movement.

151
References :
1. G. V. Scammel; The World Encompassed, The First European Maritime Empire- -'Dti
1650, J. H. Parry, The Age o f Reconnaissance.
2. C. M. Cipolla, Economic History o f World Population, P-120.
3. W. W. Hunter, —A Statistical Account o f Assam, P-336.
4. Sir Percival Griffith, The History o f the Indian Tea Industry, P-267.
5. Ibid.
6. E. A. Gait, Census of India-1891.
7. S. B. Medhi, Transport System and Eonomic Development in Assam.
8. Census of India, 1921.
9. C. S. Mullan, 1931 Census Report.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Edward Said, The Question o f Palestine.
13. Hiteswar Saikia, The Foreign National Problem in Assam, Nagarik, December 20 ’
translated by Mr. D. N. Bezboruah.
14. The Silent Invasion— Arup Bordoloi in The Sentinel, June 25, 1992.
15. D. P. Barooah, ‘Foreigners’ Issue in India’s North-east with special reference to A mam
in P. Thakur’s India’s North-east : A Multifaceted View.
16. Dharmananda Das, A Heap o f Broken Images, the Story of Assam 1946-82.
17. Myron Weiner, Sons o f the Soil : Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India.
18. Dharmananda Das, Op cit.
19. Voice of AASU, Mass Upheavel in Assam—published by the All Assam Students' i mm
20. Dharmananda Das, Op cit.
21. Voice of AASU, Mass Upheavel in Assam—published by the All Assam Students' m< u

22. Assam Tribune, January 12, 1980.

23. Voice of AASU, Mass Upheavel in Assam—published by the AASU.
24. Assam is not fo r Burning—Published by the AASU.
25. Dainik Asom, April 12, 1980 (Translated).
26. The Assam Tribune. November 26, 1979
27. The Assam Tribune, December 10, 1979
28. Save Assam Today to Save India Tomorrow. An Appeal from the People of -\ssar
Published by the AASU-AAGSP.

152
29. Echo from North-east—An inside view of Assam’s Struggle. February 28, 19!so. //„
Observer, Hyderabad.
30. D. P. Barooah, Op cit.

31. Niru Hazarika, ‘Asom Andolanar Alochanat Abhumuki’ in Asom Atulokm : Prai^hnii
Aru Phalashruti, Dr. H. Gohain, Dr. D. Bora (Edit.)
32. Sadou Asom Chatra Santhar Niti Bishyak Nirbasita Bibrilir Slionkolan by Pi,dull;
Mahanla and Bhrigu Phukan, (Translation Mine).
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.

35. Quoted in The Assam Tribune, July 5, 1980.

36. Vijay Kr. Dewan, Assam Issue—the Beginning—the End and the Beginning.
37. Cited in Sanjib Baruah, Op cit.

153